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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                         L. Dunbar
Internet Draft                                              J. Guichard
Intended status: Informational                                   Huawei
 Expires: Dec 2019                                          Ali Sajassi
                                                                  Cisco
                                                               J. Drake
                                                                Juniper
                                                         Ayan Barnerjee
                                                              D. Carrel
                                                                 Cisco

                                                           July 8, 2019



                   BGP Usage for SDWAN Overlay Networks
                   draft-dunbar-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-01

Abstract

   The document describes three distinct SDWAN scenarios and discusses
   the applicability of BGP for each of those scenarios. The goal of
   the document is to make it easier for future SDWAN control plane
   protocols discussion.

   SDWAN edge nodes are commonly interconnected by multiple underlay
   networks that are owned and managed by different network providers.
   A BGP-based control plane is chosen for handling large number of
   SDWAN edge nodes with little manual intervention.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to publish it
   as an RFC and to translate it into languages other than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that





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   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

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   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents


   1. Introduction...................................................3
   2. Conventions used in this document..............................4
   3. Use Case Scenario Description and Requirements.................5
      3.1. Requirements..............................................6
         3.1.1. Client Service Requirement...........................6
         3.1.2. SDWAN Node Provisioning..............................6
      3.2. Scenarios #1: Homogeneous WAN.............................8
      3.3. Scenario #2: SDWAN WAN ports to VPN's PEs and to Internet.9


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      3.4. Scenario #3: SDWAN WAN ports to MPLS VPN and the Internet12
   4. Provisioning Model............................................14
      4.1. Client Service Provisioning Model........................14
      4.2. WAN Ports Provisioning Model.............................14
         4.2.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SDWAN WAN Ports
         Registration?..............................................15
   5. SDWAN Traffic Forwarding Walk Through.........................16
      5.1. SDWAN Network Startup Procedures.........................16
      5.2. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #1......................16
      5.3. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #2......................17
         5.3.1. SDWAN node WAN Ports Properties Registration........19
         5.3.2. Controller Facilitated IPsec SA & NAT management....19
         5.3.3. BGP Based SDWAN client routes.......................21
      5.4. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #3......................22
   6. Manageability Considerations..................................23
   7. Security Considerations.......................................23
   8. IANA Considerations...........................................23
   9. References....................................................23
      9.1. Normative References.....................................23
      9.2. Informative References...................................24
   10. Acknowledgments..............................................25

1. Introduction

   An "SDWAN" network consists of many segments of parallel paths over
   different underlay networks, some of which are private networks over
   which traffic can traverse without encryption, others require
   encryption over untrusted public networks.

   [Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the network related problems that
   enterprises face today in transitioning their IT infrastructure to
   support a digital economy, such as the need to connect enterprises'
   branch offices to dynamic workloads in different Cloud DCs, or
   aggregating multiple paths provided by different service providers
   to achieve better performance.

   Even though SDWAN has been positioned as a flexible way to reach
   dynamic workloads in third party data centers over multiple underlay
   networks, scaling becomes a major issue when there are hundreds or
   thousands of nodes to be interconnected by the SDWAN overlay paths.






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   BGP is widely used by underlay networks. This document describes
   using BGP to enhance the scaling properties of SDWAN overlay
   networks.

2. Conventions used in this document

   Cloud DC:   Third party data centers that host applications and
               workloads owned by different organizations or tenants.



   Controller: Used interchangeably with SDWAN controller to manage
               SDWAN overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the
               path conditions between sites.

   CPE:        Customer Premise Equipment

   CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Secure network formed among CPEs.
               This is to differentiate from more commonly used PE-
               based VPNs [RFC 4364].

   Homogeneous SDWAN: A type of SDWAN network in which all traffic
               to/from the SDWAN edge nodes has to be encrypted
               regardless of underlay networks. For lack of better
               terminology, we call this Homogeneous SDWAN throughout
               this document.

   ISP:        Internet Service Provider

   NSP:        Network Service Provider. NSP usually provides more
               advanced network services, such as MPLS VPN, private
               leased lines, or managed Secure WAN connections, many
               times within a private trusted domain, whereas an ISP
               usually provides plain internet services over public
               untrusted domains.

   PE:         Provider Edge

   SDWAN End-point:  a port (logical or physical) of a SDWAN edge node.




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   SDWAN:      Software Defined Wide Area Network. In this document,
               "SDWAN" refers to the solutions of pooling WAN bandwidth
               from multiple underlay networks to get better WAN
               bandwidth management, visibility & control. When the
               underlay networks are private, traffic can traverse
               without additional encryption; when the underlay
               networks are public, such as the Internet, some traffic
               may need to be encrypted when traversing through
               (depending on user provided policies).

   SDWAN IPsec SA: IPsec Security Association between two SDWAN ports
               or nodes.

   SDWAN over Hybrid Networks: SDWAN over Hybrid Networks typically
               have edge nodes utilizing bandwidth resources from
               multiple service providers. In Hybrid SDWAN network,
               packets over private networks can go natively without
               encryption and are encrypted over the untrusted network,
               such as the public Internet.

   WAN Port:   A Port or Interface facing an ISP or Network Service
               Provider (NSP), with address (usually public routable
               address) allocated by the ISP or the NSP.

   C-PE:       SDWAN Edge node, which can be CPE for customer managed
               SDWAN, or PE that is for provider managed SDWAN
               services).

   ZTP:        Zero Touch Provisioning


3. Use Case Scenario Description and Requirements

   SDWAN networks can have different topologies and have different
   traffic patterns. To make it easier for the focused discussion in
   subsequent drafts on SDWAN control plane and data plane, this
   section describes several SDWAN scenarios that may have different
   need or impact to their corresponding control planes & data planes.






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 3.1. Requirements

3.1.1. Client Service Requirement

   Client interface of SDWAN nodes can be IP or Ethernet based.

   For Ethernet based client interfaces, SDWAN edge should support
   VLAN-based service interfaces (EVI100), VLAN bundle service
   interfaces (EVI200), or VLAN-Aware bundling service interfaces. EVPN
   service requirements are applicable to the Client traffic, as
   described in the Section 3.1 of RFC8388.

   For IP based client interfaces, L3VPN service requirements are
   applicable.



3.1.2. SDWAN Node Provisioning

   Unlike traditional EVPN or L3VPN where PEs are deployed for long
   term, SDWAN edge nodes (virtual or physical) deployment at a
   specific location can be ephemeral. Therefore, Zero Touch
   Provisioning (ZTP) is a common requirement for SDWAN. ZTP for SDWAN
   can include many areas, but from network connectivity perspective,
   ZTP should include the following:

     -   Upon power up, an SDWAN node can reach a central SDWAN
     Controller (which can be burned or preconfigured in the device)
     via a TLS or SSL secure channel.

     -   The Central SDWAN Controller can designate a Local Network
     Controller in the proximity of the SDWAN node; the Local Network
     Controller and the SDWAN nodes might be connected by third party
     untrusted network. The Local controller does all the following 4
     tasks:

         1) ZTP
         2) Auto-discovery of Network
         3) (Auto)-Provisioning for IPsec SAs (initial provisioning
         part)
         4) Signaling of tenant's routes/info
     BGP is well suited for (4), using Route Reflector (RR) [RFC4456]
     to propagate network information among SDWAN edge nodes. The SDWAN



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     node can establish a secure connection (TLS, SSL, etc) to the
     Local Network Controller (RR).



                              +---+
                 Peer Group 1 |RR |   Peer Group 2
                +======+====+=+   +======+====+=====+
               /      /     | +---+      |     \     \
              /      /      |            |      \     \
           +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+      +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+
           |C-PE|  |C-PE|--|C-PE|      |C-PE|  |C-PE|  |C-PE|
           | 1  |  |  2 |  | 3  |      |4   |  |  5 |  | 6  |
           +----+  +----+  +----+      +----+  +----+  +----+
                Tenant 1                   Tenant 2
          Figure 1: Peer Groups managed by Local Controller


   The SDWAN nodes (a.k.a. C-PEs throughout this document) belonging to
   the same Tenant can be far apart and can be connected by third party
   untrusted networks. Therefore, it is not appropriate for a SDWAN
   edge node (C-PE) to advertise its SDWAN Port properties to its
   neighbors. Each C-PE propagates its SDWAN Port attributes via the
   secure channel (TLS, SSL, etc.) established with the Local
   Controller.

   C-PE-1 should include the following aspects in addition to managing
   client routes:
       - Register the SDWAN node's WAN port <-> local address mapping
          to its Local Controller. The Local Controller propagates the
          information to C-PE2 & C-PE3.
       - Exchange IPsec property (capability such as the supported
          encryption algorithms, etc.) and ports NAT property (e.g.
          private addresses or dynamically assigned IP addresses) with
          the Local Controller.
       - C-PE2 and C-PE3 can establish IPsec SA with the C-PE1 after
          receiving the information from the Local Controller.
       - Then distribute the routes attached to the C-PE to its
          authorized peers.


   Tenant separation is achieved by the Local Controller creating
   different Tenant based Peer Groups.


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 3.2. Scenarios #1: Homogeneous WAN

   This is referring to a type of SDWAN network with edge nodes
   encrypting all traffic over WAN to other edge nodes, regardless of
   whether the underlay is private or public. For lack of better
   terminology, we call this Homogeneous SDWAN throughout this
   document.

   Some typical scenarios for the use of a Homogeneous SDWAN network
   are as follows:

   -  A small branch office connecting to its HQ offices via the
   Internet. All sensitive traffic to/from this small branch office has
   to be encrypted, which is usually achieved using IPsec SAs.

   -  A store in a shopping mall may need to securely connect to its
   applications in one or more Cloud DCs via the Internet. A common way
   of achieving this is to establish IPsec SAs to the Cloud DC gateway
   to carry the sensitive data to/from the store.

   As described in [SECURE-EVPN], the granularity of the IPsec SAs for
   Homogeneous SDWAN can be per site, per subnet, per tenant, or per
   address. Once the IPsec SA is established for a specific
   subnet/tenant/site, all traffic to/from the subnets/tenants/site are
   encrypted.






















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                                       +---+
                        +--------------|RR |------------+
                       /  Untrusted    +-+-+             \
                      /                                   \
                     /                                     \
         +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+
         | CN3|--|         P1-----+ -------------+------ P1     |--| CN1|
         +----+  | C-PE    P2-----+              |       | C-PE |  +----+
         +----+  |  A      P3-----+     Wide     +------ P2  B  |  +----+
         | CN2|--|         |      |     area     +------ P3     |--| CN3|
         +----+  +---------+      |   network    |       +------+  +----+
                              |              |
         +----+  +---------+      | all packets  |       +------+  +----+
         | CN1|--|         P1-----+ encrypted    +------ P1     |--| CN1|
         +----+  | C-PE    P2-----+     by       |       | C-PE |  +----+
         +----+  |  C      P3-----+ IPsec SAs    +------ P2  D  |  +----+
         | CN2|--|         P4-----+--------------+       |      |--| CN2|
         +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+

          CN: Client Networks, which is same as Tenant Networks used by NVo3

                      Figure 1: Homogeneous SDWAN

   One of the key properties of homogeneous SDWAN is that the SDWAN
   Local Network Controller (RR)is connected to C-PEs via untrusted
   public network, therefore, requiring secure connection between RR
   and C-PEs (TLS, DTLS, etc.).

   Homogeneous SDWAN has some similarity to commonly deployed IPsec
   VPN, albeit the IPsec VPN is usually point-to-point among a small
   number of endpoints and with heavy manual configuration for IPsec
   between end-points, whereas an SDWAN network can have a large number
   of end-points with an SDWAN controller to manage requiring zero
   touch provisioning upon powering up.

   Existing Private VPNs (e.g. MPLS based) can use homogeneous SDWAN to
   extend over public network to remote sites to which the VPN operator
   does not own or lease infrastructural connectivity, as described in
   [SECURE-EVPN] and [SECURE-L3VPN]

 3.3. Scenario #2: SDWAN WAN ports to VPN's PEs and to Internet

   In this scenario, SDWAN edge nodes (a.k.a. C-PEs) have some WAN
   ports connected to PEs of Private VPNs over which packets can be
   forwarded natively without encryption, and some WAN ports connected
   to the Internet over which sensitive traffic have to be encrypted
   (usually by IPsec SA).


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   In this scenario, the SDWAN edge nodes' egress WAN ports are all
   IP/Ethernet based, either egress to PEs of the VPNs or to the
   Internet. Even if the VPN is a MPLS network, the VPN's PEs have
   IP/Ethernet connections to the SDWAN edge (C-PEs). Throughout this
   document, this scenario is also called CPE based SDWAN over Hybrid
   Networks.

   Even though IPsec SA can secure the packets traversing the Internet,
   it does not offer the premium SLA commonly offered by Private VPNs,
   especially over long distance. Clients need to have policies to
   specify criteria for flows only traversing private VPNs or
   traversing either as long as encrypted when over the Internet. For
   example, client can have those polices for the flows:

      1. A policy or criteria for sending the flows over a private network
         without encryption (for better performance),
      2. A policy or criteria for sending the flows over any networks as long
         as the packets of the flows are encrypted when traversing untrusted
         networks, or
      3. A policy of not needing encryption at all.


   If a flow traversing multiple segments, such as A<->B<->C<->D, has
   either Policy 2 or 3 above, the flow can traverse different
   underlays in different segments, such as over Private network
   underlay between A<->B without encryption, or over the public
   internet between B<->C in an IPsec SA.

   As shown in the figure below, C-PE-1 has two different types of
   interfaces (A1 to Internet and A2 & A3 to VPN). The C-PEs' loopback
   addresses and addresses attached to C-PEs may or may not be visible
   to the ISPs/NSPs. The addresses for the WAN ports can have addresses
   allocated by the service providers or dynamically assigned (e.g. by
   DHCP). One WAN port shown in the figure below (e.g. A1, A2, A3 etc.)
   is a logical representation of potential multiple physical ports on
   the C-PEs.












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                                       +---+
                        +--------------|RR |----------+
                       /  Untrusted    +-+-+           \
                      /                                 \
                     /                                   \
     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over     +------+  +----+
     | CN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +------ B1     |--| CN1|
     +----+  | C-PE    A2-\                          | C-PE |  +----+
     +----+  |  A      A3--+--+              +---+---B2  B  |  +----+
     | CN2|--|         |   |PE+--------------+PE |---B3     |--| CN3|
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+   +------+  +----+
                              |      WAN     |
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   packets    +---+   +------+  +----+
     | CN1|--|         C1--|PE| go natively  |PE |-- D1     |--| CN1|
     +----+  | C-PE    C2--+--+ without encry+---+   | C-PE |  +----+
             |  C      |      +--------------+       |  D   |
             |         |                             |      |
     +----+  |         |      without encrypt over   |      |  +----+
     | CN2|--|         C3--+---- Untrusted  --+------D2     |--| CN2|
     +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+

     CN: Client Network
                         Figure 2: Hybrid SDWAN





   Some key characteristics of a Hybrid SDWAN overlay network are as
   follows:

  - one C-PE may be connected to different ISPs/NSPs, with some of its
     WAN ports addresses being assigned by the ISPs/NSPs.

  - The WAN ports connected to PEs of trusted private networks (e.g. MPLS
     VPN) hand off IP/Ethernet packets, just like today's CPE that do not
     handle MPLS packets and do not participate in the underlay VPN networks'
     control plane.  Traffic can flow natively without encryption when be
     forwarded out through those WAN ports for better performance.

  - The WAN ports connected to untrusted networks, e.g. the Internet,
     requires sensitive traffic to be encrypted, i.e. encrypted by IPsec SA.






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  - An SDWAN local Network Controller (RR) is connected to C-PEs via
     the untrusted public network, therefore, requiring secure
     connection between RR and C-PEs via TLS, DTLS, etc.

   - The SDWAN nodes' [loopback] addresses might not be routable nor
     visible in the underlay ISP/NSP networks. Routes & services
     attached to SDWAN edges at the SDWAN overlay layer are in
     different address spaces than the underlay networks.

  - There could be multiple SDWAN devices sharing a common property,
     such as a geographic location. Some applications over SDWAN may
     need to traverse specific geographic locations for various
     reasons, such as to comply regulatory rules, to utilize specific
     value added services, or others.

   - The underlay path selection between sites can be a local section.
     Some policies allow one service from CPE1 -> CPE2 -> CPE3 using
     one ISP/NSP underlay in the first segment (CPE1 -> CPE2), and
     using a different ISP/NSP in the second segment (CPE2-> CPE3).

   - Services may not be congruent, i.e. the packets from A-> B may
     traverse one underlay network, and the packets from B -> A may
     traverse a different underlay.

   - Different services, routes, or VLANs attached to SDWAN nodes can
     be aggregated over one underlay path; same service/routes/VLAN can
     spread over multiple SDWAN underlays at different times depending
     on the policies specified for the service. For example, one
     tenant's packets to HQ need to be encrypted when sent over the
     Internet or have to be sent over private networks, while the same
     tenant's packets to Facebook can be sent over the Internet without
     encryption.

 3.4. Scenario #3: SDWAN WAN ports to MPLS VPN and the Internet

   This scenario refers to existing VPN (e.g. MPLS based VPN, such as
   EVPN or IPVPN) adding extra ports facing untrusted public networks
   allowing PEs to offload some low priority traffic to those ports
   facing public networks when the VPN MPLS paths are congested.
   Throughout this document, this scenario is also called Internet
   Offload for Private VPN, or PE based SDWAN.




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   In this scenario, it is important that the packets offloaded to
   untrusted public network be encrypted. In this scenario, there is a
   secure BGP connection between RR & PEs.

   PE based SDWAN can be used by VPN service providers to temporarily
   increase bandwidth between sites when they are not sure if the
   demand will sustain for long period of time or as a temporary
   solution before the permanent infrastructure is built or leased.





                                   +---+
                           +-------|PE2|
                          /        +---+
                Internet /          ^
                offload /           || VPN
                       /     VPN    v
                      ++--+        ++-+       +---+
                      |PE1| <====> |RR| <===> |PE3|
                      +-+-+        +--+       +-+-+
                        |                       |
                        +--- Public Internet -- +

          Figure 3: Additional Internet paths added to the VPN


   Here are some key properties for PE based SDWAN:

       - For MPLS based VPN, PEs continue having MPLS encapsulation
          handoff to existing paths.
       - The BGP RR is connected to PEs in the same way as VPN, i.e.
          via the trusted network.
       - For the added Internet ports, PEs have IP packets handoff,
          i.e. sending and receiving IP data frames. Internally, PEs
          can have the option to encapsulate the MPLS payload in IP, as
          specified by RFC4023.
       - The ports facing public internet might get IP addresses
          assigned by ISPs, which may not be in the same address domain
          as PEs'.




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       - Ports facing public internet are not as secure as the ports
          facing private infrastructure. There could be spoofing, or
          DDOS attacks to the ports facing public internet. Extra
          consideration must be given when injecting the new routes
          from public network into VRFs.
       - Even though packets are encrypted over public internet, the
          performance SLA is not guaranteed over public internet.
          Therefore, clients may have policies only allowing some flows
          to be offloaded to internet path.



4. Provisioning Model

 4.1. Client Service Provisioning Model

   The provisioning tasks described in Section 4 of RFC8388 are the
   same for the SDWAN client traffic. When client traffic are multi-
   homed to two (or more) C-PEs, the Non-Service-Specific parameters
   need to be provisioned per the Section 4.1.1 of RFC8388.

   Since most SDWAN nodes are ephemeral and have small number of IP
   subnets or VLANs attached to the client ports of the SDWAN nodes, it
   is recommended to have default and simplified Service-specific
   parameters for each client port, remotely managed by the SDWAN
   Network Controller (i.e. the RR) via the secure channel (TLS/DTLS)
   between the controller and the C-PEs.

   More details are to be added.

 4.2. WAN Ports Provisioning Model

   Since the deployment of PEs to MPLS VPN are for relatively long
   term, the common provisioning procedure for PE's WAN ports is via
   CLI.

   A SDWAN node deployment can be ephemeral and its location can be in
   remote locations, manual provisioning for its WAN ports is not
   acceptable. In addition, a SDWAN WAN port's IP address can be
   dynamically assigned or using private addresses. Therefore, it is
   necessary to have a separate control protocol; something like NHRP
   did for ATM, for a SDWAN node to register its WAN property to its
   controller dynamically.




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   Unlike a PE to MPLS based VPN where its WAN ports are homogeneously
   facing MPLS private network and all traffic are egressed in MPLS
   data frames through its WAN ports, the WAN ports of a SDWAN node can
   be connected to a PE of VPN, MPLS private network directly, the
   public Internet, or the various combinations of all.

   For Scenario #1 above, the WAN ports can face public internet or
   VPN.

   For Scenario #2 above, WAN ports are either configured as connecting
   to PEs of VPN where traffic can be sent as IP/Ethernet without
   encryption, or configured as connecting to public Internet.

   For Scenario #3 above, the WAN ports are either configured as VPN
   egress ports (hand off MPLS data frames), or as connecting to the
   public internet that requires MPLS in IP in IPsec encapsulation.

4.2.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SDWAN WAN Ports Registration?

   For a small sized SDWAN network, traditional hub & spoke model using
   NHRP or DSVPN/DMVPN with a hub node (or controller) managing SDWAN
   node WAN ports mapping (e.g. local & public addresses and tunnel
   identifiers mapping) can work reasonably well. However, for a large
   SDWAN network, say more than 100 nodes with different types of
   topologies, the traditional approach becomes very messy, complex and
   error prone.

   Here are some of the compelling reasons of using BGP instead of
   extending NHRP/DSVPN/DMVPN. (Same as the reasons quoted by LSVR on
   why using BGP):

   -  BGP already widely deployed as sole protocol (see RFC 7938)

   -  Robust and simple implementation

   -  Wide acceptance - minimal learning

   -  Reliable transport

   -  Guaranteed in-order delivery

   -  Incremental updates

   -

   -  Incremental updates upon session restart



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   -  No flooding and selective filtering

   -  RR already has the capability to apply policies to communications
   among peers.



5. SDWAN Traffic Forwarding Walk Through

   BGP based EVPN control plane are still applicable to routes attached
   to the client ports of SDWAN nodes. Section 5 of RFC8388 describes
   the BGP EVPN NLRI Usage for various routes of client traffic. The
   procedures described in the Section 6 of RFC8388 are same for the
   SDWAN client traffic.

   The only additional consideration for SDWAN is to control how
   traffic egress the SDWAN edge node to various WAN ports.

 5.1. SDWAN Network Startup Procedures

   A SDWAN network can add or delete SDWAN edge nodes on regular basis
   depending on user requests.

     - For Scenario #1: a SDWAN edge node in a shopping mall or Cloud DC can
        be added or removed on demand. The Zero Touch Provisioning described
        in 3.1.2 are required for the node startup.
     - For Scenario #2: this can be Data Centers or enterprises upgrading
        their CPEs to add extra bandwidth via public internet in addition to
        VPN services that they already purchased. Before the node powers up
        or upgraded, there should be links connected to the PEs of a provider
        VPNs.
     - For Scenario #3, the Internet facing WAN ports are added to (or
        removed from) existing VPN PEs.


 5.2. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #1

   Upon power up, a SDWAN node can learn client routes from the Client
   facing ports, in the same way as EVPN described in RFC8388.
   Controller facilitates the IPsec SA establishment and rekey
   management as described in [SECURE-EVPN]. Controller manages how
   client's routes are associated with individual IPSec SA.

   [SECURE-L3VPN] describes how to extend the RFC4364 VPN to allow some
   PEs being connected to other PEs via public networks. [SECURE-L3VPN]
   introduces the concept of Red Interface & Black Interface on those


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   PEs, with RED interfaces face clients' routes within the VPN and the
   Black Interfaces being WAN ports over which only IPsec-protected
   packets to the Internet or other backbone network are sent so that
   eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the backbone.

   [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes PEs terminate MPLS packets, and use MPLS over
   IPsec when sending over the Black Interfaces.

   [SECURE-EVPN] describes a solution where BGP point-to-multipoint
   signaling is leveraged as control plane for SDWAN Scenario #1. It
   utilizes the BGP RR to facilitate the key and policy exchange among
   PE devices to create private pair-wise IPsec Security Associations
   without IKEv2 point-to-point signaling or any other direct peer-to-
   peer session establishment messages.

   When C-PEs do not support MPLS, the approaches described by RFC8365
   can be used, with addition of IPsec encrypting the IP packets when
   sending packets over the Black Interfaces.



 5.3. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #2

   In this scenario, C-PEs have some WAN ports connected to the public
   internet and some WAN ports connected to (i.e. directly connected
   to) PEs of trusted VPN. The C-PEs in Scenario #2 are almost like
   CPEs to MPLS VPN that have the IP/Ethernet data frames egress to the
   PEs of the VPN, except the packets need encryption if egress to the
   WAN ports facing public Internet.

   Users specify the policy or criteria on which flows can only egress
   WAN ports facing trusted VPN without encryption, which can egress
   the WAN ports facing the public Internet with encryption, or which
   can egress WAN ports facing the public Internet without encryption.

   The Control Plane should not learn routes from the Public Network
   facing WAN ports. Should strictly follow the policies specified by
   the users. The internet facing WAN ports can face potential DDoS
   attacks, additional anti-DDoS mechanism has to be implemented on WAN
   ports facing those public networks.

   The Scenario #2 SDWAN Control Plane has three distinct functional
   components:






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                                       +---+
                        +--------------|RR |----------+
                       /  Untrusted    +-+-+           \
                      /    Network                      \
                     /                                   \
     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over     +--------+  +----+
     | CN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +------ B1       |--| CN1|
     +----+  | C-PE1   A2-----+              +-------B2 C-PE2 |  +----+
             |10.1.1.1 |                             |10.1.2.1|
     +----+  |         |   +--+              +---+   |        |  +----+
     | CN2|--|         A3  |PE+--------------+PE |---B3       |--| CN3|
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+   +--------+  +----+
                              |     VPN      |
                              +--------------+
          Figure 5: SDWAN Scenario #2


     - SDWAN node's WAN ports property registration to the SDWAN
        Network Controller (BGP RR).
          o This is used to inform the SDWAN controller of all the
             underlay networks to which the C-PE is connected.
          o RR is responsible for propagating the C-PE WAN ports
             properties to authorized peers.

     - Controller Facilitated IPsec SA management and NAT information
        distribution
          o Used by the SDWAN controller to facilitate or manage the
             IPsec configurations and peer authentications for all
             IPsec SAs terminated at the SDWAN nodes.
          o When WAN ports have private addresses, need exchange
             between SDWAN edges and the RR about the type of NAT, and
             mapping of the private addresses/ports <-> public
             addresses/ports.

     - Attached routes distribution via BGP RR, which can be EVPN,
        IPVPN or others.
          o This is for the overlay layer's route distribution, so
             that a C-PE can establish the overlay routing table that
             identifies the next hop for reaching a specific
             route/service attached to remote nodes. [SECURE-EVPN]
             describes EVPN and other options.





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 5.3.1. SDWAN node WAN Ports Properties Registration

   In Figure 6, A1/A2/A3/B1/B2/B3 WAN ports can be from different
   network providers.



                                       +---+
     10.1.1.1 via       +--------------|RR |----------+  10.1.2.1 via
        A1/A2/A3       /  Untrusted    +-+-+           \  B1/B2/B3
                      /                                 \
                     /                                   \
     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over     +--------+  +----+
     | CN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +------ B1       |--| CN1|
     +----+  | C-PE1   A2-----+              +-------B2 C-PE2 |  +----+
             |10.1.1.1 |                             |10.1.2.1|
     +----+  |         |   +--+              +---+   |        |  +----+
     | CN2|--|         A3  |PE+--------------+PE |---B3       |--| CN3|
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+   +--------+  +----+
                              |     VPN      |
                              +--------------+
          Figure 6: SDWAN Scenario #2 WAN Ports Registration


   Each SDWAN edge(C-PE) needs to register its WAN ports properties
   along with its Loopback addresses to the SDWAN Network Controller
   (RR). The policies that govern the communications among peers are
   managed and controlled by the SDWAN Controller. Individual SDWAN
   edge relies on its SDWAN Controller to determine which peers can
   establish connections. The SDWAN controller is responsible for
   propagating the mapping information to the authorized peers. If C-
   PE-1 is not authorized to communicate with C-PE-n, C-PE-1's WAN
   port<->Loopback address mapping will not be propagated to C-PE-n.

   A C-PE's Loopback addresses & attached routes may not be visible to
   some ISPs/NSPs to which the CPE's WAN port is connected.


 5.3.2. Controller Facilitated IPsec SA & NAT management

   One IPsec SA between two end points is straightforward. However, for
   a network with many IPsec SAs among many end points, the
   configuration and IPsec Key management for the entire network can be
   complex.





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   For a 1,000-node network, each node is responsible for maintaining
   and managing 999 keys to all their peers, which could potentially
   result in 1,000,000 key exchanges to authenticate among all nodes.
   In addition, when an edge node has multiple tenants attached, the
   edge node may need to establish multiple tunnels for tenants. For
   example, for a network with N nodes, a node A has 5 tenants app
   attached to it, then the node A has to maintain 5*(N-1) number of
   keys if each tenant needs to communicate with all other nodes.

   In addition, all the IPsec keys have to be refreshed periodically,
   which adds more complexity. Therefore, simplification facilitated by
   an SDWAN controller is necessary for large-scale SDWAN deployment.

   When the SDWAN IPsec SAs are fine-grained, such as per client
   address, per client's VLAN, the number of IPsec SAs & Keys to be
   managed can go much higher, leading to more IPsec management
   complexity. It is better to aggregate multiple flows into one IPsec
   SA.

   SDWAN edge nodes can rely on the SDWAN controller to facilitate the
   pair-wise IPsec key establishment and refreshment [RFC7296] and
   maintain the Security Policy Database (SPD) [RFC4301].



  - In the Figure 5 SDWAN Scenario #2 above, if C-PE1 & C-PE2 each has
     two ports facing two different ISPs networks, and their loopback
     addresses are not visible to the ISPs, i.e. the C-PE1 & C-PE2 are
     using a provider assigned IP addresses for A1/A2/B1/B2; you are
     going to need minimum four IPsec SAs between C-PE1 & C-PE2.
  - When C-PEs loopback addresses are visible to ISPs/NSPs, i.e. the
     C-PEs' private source and destination IPs are part of a prefix
     exported to the ISP(s) in each site, it is possible to have one
     IPsec SA between C-PE1 & C-PE2.


   The IP addresses of SDWAN WAN port can be dynamic (e.g. assigned by
   DHCP) or private IP. Some SDWAN nodes are identified by "System-ID"
   or Loopback addresses that are only locally significant. In some
   SDWAN environments,  "System-ID + PortID" are used to uniquely
   identify a SDWAN WAN port. Sometimes, a SDWAN tunnel end-point can
   be associated with "private IP" + "public IP" (if NAT is used.)

   When CPE WAN ports are private addresses, an additional sub-TLV has
   to be added to the [Tunnel-Encap] to describe the additional


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   information about the NAT property of SDWAN nodes' WAN ports. A
   SDWAN node can inquire STUN (Session Traversal of UDP through
   Network Address Translation [RFC 3489]) Server to get the NAT
   property, the public IP address and the Public Port number to pass
   to the authorized peers via the SDWAN Controller.



 5.3.3. BGP Based SDWAN client routes

   The client routes attached to SDWAN client ports have to be
   distributed to all SDWAN edge nodes, just like BGP/MPLS IP VPN
   [RFC4364], so that all SDWAN edges can establish the overlay routing
   table that identifies the remote SDWAN edges to reach a specific
   route/service. When C-PEs do not handle MPLS, RFC8365 can be used
   for packets over WAN ports, albeit applying IPsec SA encryption when
   sent over the WAN ports facing the public networks.

   Using the terminologies described by [SECURE-L3VPN], the RED
   interface are the clients' ports and the ports facing private
   networks (e.g. connected to the PEs of MPLS VPN). Black Interfaces
   are ports facing public networks. The behavior described in [SECURE-
   L3VPN] applies to this scenario too, the C-PEs cannot mix the routes
   learned from the Black Interfaces with the Routes from RED
   Interfaces.

   To minimize the burden on SDWAN edge nodes (especially low powered
   virtual SDWAN edges), some SDWAN network can let SDWAN controller
   take care of authenticating communications among SDWAN edge nodes
   instead of pushing down policies to SDWAN edge nodes. SDWAN Edge
   nodes might get clients routes from SDWAN controller instead of
   learning from clients ports.

   The Hybrid SDWAN control plane for distributing clients' routes is
   more similar to overlay using EVPN [RFC8365], albeit the packets
   sent over the internet facing ports have to be encrypted by IPsec
   SA.

    [Tunnel-Encap] can be used to associate client routes with specific
   tunnels:

      - C-PE1 can advertise the following properties to others C-PEs
        via RR:
            - Encapsulation capability of the Ports to VPN PE
            - Encapsulation capability of the Ports to the Internet:
               GRE-IPsec, or MPLS over GRE over IPsec


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                 - with prior established IPsec SA
                 - NAT information if ports are private addresses

      - The Remote Endpoint sub-TLV is NOT appropriate because
            - The network to which a SDWAN port is connected might
               have an identifier that is more than the AS number. The
               SDWAN controller might use its own specific identifier
               for the network.
            - Suggest using an SDWAN overlay specific Transport-
               Network-ID to represents the connected networks.

   The underlay network selections to next hop C-PE can be a local
   decision.  Different services, routes, or VLANs can be aggregated to
   one underlay network between two C-PEs; the same service/routes/VLAN
   can spread over multiple SDWAN underlay networks at the next
   segment.



 5.4. Packet Walk-Through for Scenario #3

   The behavior described in [SECURE-L3VPN] applies to this scenario,
   except C-PEs not only have RED interfaces facing clients with within
   the VPN but also have RED interface facing MPLS backbone, with
   additional BLACK interfaces facing the untrusted public networks.
   The C-PEs cannot mix the routes learned from the Black Interfaces
   with the Routes from RED Interfaces. The routes learned from core-
   facing RED interfaces are for underlay and cannot be mixed with the
   routes learned over access-facing RED interfaces that are for
   overlay. Furthermore, the routes learned over core-facing interfaces
   (both RED and BLACK) can be shared in the same GLOBAL route table.

   There may be some added risks of the packets from the ports facing
   the Internet. Therefore, special consideration has to be given to
   the routes from WAN ports facing the Internet. RFC4364 describes
   using an RD to create different routes for reaching same system. A
   similar approach can be considered to force packets received from
   the Internet facing ports to go through special security functions
   before being sent over to the VPN backbone WAN ports.








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6. Manageability Considerations

     SDWAN overlay networks utilize the SDWAN controller to facilitate
     route distribution, central configurations, and others. To
     minimize the burden on SDWAN edge nodes, SDWAN Edge nodes might
     not need to learn the routes from clients.

7. Security Considerations


   Having WAN ports facing the public Internet introduces the following
   security risks:

   1) Potential DDoS attack to the C-PEs with ports facing internet.

   2) Potential risk of provider VPN network being injected with
   illegal traffic coming from the public Internet WAN ports on the C-
   PEs.

8. IANA Considerations

       None

9. References


 9.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4364] E. rosen, Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
             networks (VPNs)", Feb 2006.

   [RFC7296] C. Kaufman, et al, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version
             2 (IKEv2)", Oct 2014.

   [RFC7432] A. Sajassi, et al, "BGP MPLS-Based Ethernet VPN", Feb
             2015.

   [RFC8365] A. Sajassi, et al, "A network Virtualization Overlay
             Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", March 2018.



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 9.2. Informative References

   [RFC8192] S. Hares, et al, "Interface to Network Security Functions
             (I2NSF) Problem Statement and Use Cases", July 2017

   [RFC5521] P. Mohapatra, E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation Subsequent
             Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP Tunnel
             Encapsulation Attribute", April 2009.

   [BGP-SDWAN-Port] L. Dunbar, H. Wang, W. Hao, "BGP Extension for
             SDWAN Overlay Networks", draft-dunbar-idr-bgp-sdwan-
             overlay-ext-03, work-in-progress, Nov 2018.

   [Net2Cloud-Gap] L. Dunbar, A. Malis, C. Jacquenet, "Gap Analysis of
             Interconnecting Underlay with Cloud Overlay", draft-dm-
             net2cloud-gap-analysis-02, work in progress, Oct. 2018.

   [VPN-over-Internet] E. Rosen, "Provide Secure Layer L3VPNs over
             Public Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00,
             work-in-progress, July 2018

   [DMVPN] Dynamic Multi-point VPN:
             https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/dynamic-
             multipoint-vpn-dmvpn/index.html

   [DSVPN] Dynamic Smart VPN:
             http://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/en/thread-390771-1-
             1.html

   [SECURE-EVPN] A. Sajassi, et al, "Secure EVPN", draft-sajassi-bess-
             secure-evpn-01, Work-in-progress, March 2019.

   [SECURE-L3VPN] E. Rosen, R. Bonica, "Secure Layer L3VPN over Public
             Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00, Work-
             in-progress, June 2018.

   [ITU-T-X1036] ITU-T Recommendation X.1036, "Framework for creation,
             storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for
             network security", Nov 2007.



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   [Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect
             Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement", draft-dm-
             net2cloud-problem-statement-02, June 2018

   [Net2Cloud-gap] L. Dunbar, A. Malis, and C. Jacquenet, "Gap Analysis
             of Interconnecting Underlay with Cloud Overlay", draft-dm-
             net2cloud-gap-analysis-02, work-in-progress, Aug 2018.

   [Tunnel-Encap] E. Rosen, et al "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation
             Attribute", draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-10, Aug 2018.



10. Acknowledgments

   Acknowledgements to Jim Guichard, John Scudder, Darren Dukes, Andy
   Malis and Donald Eastlake for their review and contributions.

   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.



























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Authors' Addresses


   Linda Dunbar
   Huawei
   Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com

   James Guichard
   Huawei
   Email: james.n.guichard@futurewei.com

   Ali Sajassi
   Cisco
   Email: sajassi@cisco.com

   John Drake
   Juniper
   Email: jdrake@juniper.net




























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