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Internet Engineering Task Force                         Francis Dupont
INTERNET DRAFT                                           ENST Bretagne
Expires in July 2002                               Claude Castelluccia
                                                                 INRIA
                                                          January 2002


                    IPv6 Network Ingress Filtering

              <draft-dupont-ipv6-ingress-filtering-00.txt>


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
   areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
   distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This document describes how network ingress filtering should be
   done for the IPv6 protocol, including with mobile IPv6.

   Ingress filtering is a standard reply to Distributed Denial of
   Service (DDoS) using forged source addresses. A priori ingress
   filtering can be done anywhere but is most efficient when it is
   done by border routers of the source site. This can be considered
   as a form of "responsible use of the network".

   Mobile IPv6 amplifies the DDoS threat with the home address option:
   this can be used in order to add an indirection level in DDoS attacks
   and to foul simple ingress filtering. The proposed reply is a better
   ingress filtering. This document explains how to improve basic
   anti-spoofing filtering too.


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1. Introduction

   In a DDoS attack a large number of compromised nodes "As" send a lot
   of packets to a target "T" using forged source addresses [1]. The
   reply is to verify the validity of source addresses, i.e. to do
   network ingress filtering and/or to try to find the real sources
   like with itrace [2].

   Ingress filtering can be done inside a backbone at aggregation
   points, using unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) check,
   i.e. verifying that the incoming traffic interface and the route to
   the source address match. This has some issue with multi-homing,
   stressed by IPv6, even if contrary to a common myth uRPF can work
   with asymmetrical routing [3].

   Another (better) choice is to implement ingress filtering in
   Internet connectivity border router, i.e. to put a fire-wall which
   filters traffic from inside the site to the Internet. This is not so
   uncommon: this kind of filters is heavily used (or should be heavily
   used) when Internet access is provided to an unskilled or untrusted
   community (cybercafes, student rooms, ...). One can consider this as
   a form of "responsible use of the network" enforcement.

   Mobile IPv6 [4] introduces a new issue: the home address option
   which contains an alternate source address (a mobile node sends
   packets with a care-of address as the source address in the IPv6
   header and with the home address in the home address option). When the
   home address option is processed by the node receiving a packet with
   it, the alternate source address replaces the original source address,
   i.e. the traffic seems to come from the alternate source address but
   but the source address seen by simple ingress filtering devices is
   topologically correct.

   A node blindly processing home address options can be used as a
   reflector, i.e. in a iDDoS attack some nodes "As" send a lot of
   packets with their own source addresses and a home address option
   with the address of the target "T" to reflectors "Rs". Reflectors
   "Rs" send replies to "T". This is a flood of replies, less dangerous
   by far enough if the purpose is to overload "T" or its
   infrastructure. The advantage of bad guys is the traffic from "Rs"
   to "T" does not mention "As": trace back is far more difficult.


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   The threat is against ingress filtering: simple ingress filtering
   devices check only the source address in the IPv6 header, not the
   alternate source address in the home address option. So the basic
   solution is to verify both addresses are legitimate, i.e. to know
   the "binding" between the two addresses.

   The remainder of the document will essentially explain how to use
   this knowledge. Note the home address option is a degenerate case
   of tunneling where inner and outer destination addresses are the
   same [5]. The same threat (and the same solution) exists with
   tunneling but, by simplicity, this document deals only with in
   the current mobile IPv6 context.

2. Correspondent Nodes

   The first solution is to use the knowledge of bindings in
   correspondent nodes: when a packet is received with a home address
   option, it is checked against the binding cache. If it does not
   match, it is declared invalid.

   This solution is too drastic and leaves only two modes to mobile
   IPv6: bidirectional tunnel between the mobile node and its home
   agent, or routing optimization, i.e. two way direct communication
   between the mobile node and its correspondent, using home address
   options and routing headers. The asymmetrical medium possibility is
   no more available.

   Of course, this cannot work without bindings, i.e. this solution
   is not applicable to other uses of home address options than
   mobile IPv6.

   Our opinion is that binding cache entry check should be used
   only as a sanity check.

3. Smart Ingress Filtering

   The second solution is to use better ingress filtering in the
   access network: fire-walls between the access network know active
   bindings and check outgoing traffic against them. If it does not
   match the action is the same than with forged source addresses.

   The main issue with this solution is how to get the knowledge of
   bindings. The proposal is to improve the network access control:
   as a node inside the site should not be allowed to use an
   unauthorized source address, a mobile node inside the site has to
   declare in addition via the network access control system its home
   address(es), or filters will not be "opened" for its home address
   options.


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   Mobile IPv6 and AAA drafts [6b, 7] have already this feature: the
   local/visited AAA server has the knowledge of care-of and home
   address(es), home agent address, ... More, home related informations
   are certified by the home/remote AAA server: smart ingress
   filtering doesn't rely on AAA infrastructure availability but
   an AAA infrastructure shall provide many new/extra features.

   This solution has two drawbacks: fire-walls enforcing it are more
   complex, for instance they have to manage some state (even if the
   state is the network access control system too). This solution
   relies in an advanced network access control too, but one may say
   that without a good network access control an Internet access
   provider is only a danger for everybody, i.e. this is more a "how
   to enforce a Best Current Practice" than a technical issue.

4. Other Threats

4.1 Smart Anti-Spoofing Filtering

   A common and very useful filtering rule is to forbid traffic from
   the outside using an inside address as source. Of course, this has
   to be extended to home address options.

   The only valid case of an inside address in a home address option
   is for a mobile node which belongs to the site, i.e. its home site
   is the site. So the knowledge of special binding cases, home
   registrations, are enough. In general, one can assume the possible
   home addresses and home agent addresses are known, this provides
   a basic protection against random home address option or binding
   updates.

   The needed knowledge of home registrations can be gained from
   binding update/binding acknowledge exchanges or better from home
   agent collaboration, for instance through the remote network access
   control system (the home/remote AAA server of mobile IPv6 and AAA
   drafts [6b, 7]), or (second example from a Michael Thomas' proposal)
   by reflecting the binding update/binding acknowledge exchange (i.e.
   home agents send the contents of the two packets of home
   registrations to the border routers of the home domain.

   This has the same drawbacks than for the smart ingress filtering
   but the home agent function is a more advanced feature than Internet
   access, so the required extra control should be easier to enforce
   (for instance the part of the site where there may not be a home
   agent is easy to protect by simply applying the anti-spoofing rule
   to home address options).


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4.2 Rogue Routing Headers

   Even if nodes should deal with rogue routing headers with a proper
   policy, especially hosts (there is consensus about sound policies
   but there are not *yet* documented in a (partial) requirements for
   IPv6 hosts document), with binding knowledge a fire-wall can easily
   detect rogue routing headers.

   The filtering rule to apply is exactly the symmetrical rule than
   for home address options. Of course, all other things are the same.
   This is not crucial but to know when one is under attack is in
   general useful so this should be done (belt and braces too).

4.3 Rogue Tunneling

   The current mobile IPv6 uses only tunneling between the mobile node
   and the home agent. If the inner IPv6 header is not hidden, filtering
   rules similar to home address option and routing header rules should
   be applied with the constraint that the peer of the mobile node is
   the home agent.

   If the inner IPv6 header is hidden (by ESP for instance), this
   should be authorized according to security policy rules (this can be
   an issue because a protected tunnel with the outside may infringe
   the Bell-LaPadula write rule [8]). The fact that the tunnel is for
   mobile IPv6 if and only if peers are the mobile node and its home
   agent should be used, for instance one can deny the use of tunnels
   by inside nodes which have not negotiated mobility stuff.

5. Security Considerations

   Today the best rely to Distributed Denial of Service attacks is the
   network ingress filtering. Ingress filtering can be a bit harder
   for IPv6 but mobile IPv6 introduces a new threat because of one of
   its basic feature, the home address option.

   This document argues as the home address option defeats simple
   ingress filtering, the solution is to use better ingress filtering
   which can be applied if the network access control provides the
   knowledge of bindings to fire-walls between the access network and
   the Internet.


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6. Acknowledgments

   This problem was discussed inside the MobiSecV6 project many years
   ago (the MobiSecV6 project joined mobility and security, especially
   fire-wall, people). As ingress filtering is not really enforced the
   threat was considered as minor (i.e. we knew a good reply) but the
   security requirements of mobile IPv6 were recently revisited,
   including this issue, and too drastic IMHO solutions proposed [9].

   We apologized because our intention was to publish this document
   near one year ago. Unfortunately we spent to much time on warm
   mailing list discussion and we let fear, uncertainty and doubt
   settle when we knew by our concrete experience that secure mobile
   IPv6 is possible.

   Thanks to (from North to South), Pekka Nikander, Pekka Savola,
   Jari Arkko, Stanislav Shaluno, Michael Thomas, ...

7. Normative References

   [1] P. Ferguson, D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating
       Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address
       Spoofing", RFC 2827 and BCP 38, May 2000.

8. Informative References

   [2] S. Bellovin, M. Leech, T. Taylor, "ICMP Traceback Messages",
       draft-ietf-itrace-01.txt, October 2001.

   [3] Cisco, "Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) Enhancements
       for the ISP-ISP Edge", http://www.cisco.com/public/cons/
       isp/documents/uRPF_Enhancement.pdf, February 2001.

   [4] D. Johnson, C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6",
       draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-15.txt, July 2001.

   [5] S. Deering, B. Zill, "Redundant Address Deletion when
       Encapsulating IPv6 in IPv6",
       draft-deering-ipv6-encap-addr-deletion-00.txt, November 2001.


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   [6] F. Dupont, M. Laurent-Maknavicius, J. Bournelle,
       "AAA for mobile IPv6", draft-dupont-mipv6-aaa-01.txt,
       November 2001.

   [7] S. Faccin, F. Le, B. Patil, C. Perkins, "Diameter Mobile
       IPv6 Application", draft-le-aaa-diameter-mobileipv6-01.txt,
       November 2001.

   [8] D. Bell, L. LaPadula, "Secure Computer System: Unified
       Exposition and Multics Interpretation", MTR-2997 rev. 1,
       March 1976.

   [9] P. Savola, "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address
       Options", draft-savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security-01.txt,
       November 2001.

9. Authors' Addresses

   Francis Dupont
   ENST Bretagne
   Campus de Rennes
   2, rue de la Chataigneraie
   BP 78
   35512 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
   FRANCE
   Fax: +33 2 99 12 70 30
   EMail: Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr

   Claude Castelluccia
   INRIA Rhone-Alpes
   655, avenue de l'Europe
   38330 Montbonnot Saint-Martin
   FRANCE
   Fax:   +33 4 76 61 52 52
   EMail: claude.castelluccia@inria.fr

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