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IETF                                                      Jitendra Kumar
Internet-Draft                                          Balaji Rajendran
Intended status: Experimental                           Bindhumadhava BS
Expires: July 13, 2019                                   C-DAC Bangalore
                                                         January 9, 2019


 Enhanced XML Digital Signature Algorithm to Mitigate Wrapping Attacks
           draft-enhanced-xml-digital-signature-algorithm-00

Abstract

   XML signature standard as described in [RFC3275] and defined by IETF/
   W3C references or identifies signed elements by their unique
   identities in the given XML document.  Hence, signed XML elements can
   be shifted from one location to another location in a XML
   document,and still, it does not have any effect on its ability to
   verify its signature.  This flexibility paves the way for an attacker
   to tweak original XML message without getting noticed by the
   receiver.  This document proposes to use absolute XPath as an
   "Positional Token" and modifies existing XML Digital Signature
   algorithm to overcome the XML Signature wrapping/rewriting attacks on
   XML ignatures.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 13, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  XML Digital Signature structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Suggested Modified Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Algorithm for signing SOAP Request  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Algorithm for verification of Signature . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  Verifying SignedInfo Element Digest with Decrypted
               Digest from SignatureValue element  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Simple Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Algorithm Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Mitigation of XML Signature wrapping attacks  . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Mitigation of XML elements jumbling type of wrapping
           attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Many researchers have shown that even a signed SOAP messages are
   vulnerable to interception and further manipulation of its content.
   McIntosh and Austel (described in wrapping_attack [wrapping_attack])
   have illustrated that a SOAP message content, protected by an XML
   Digital Signature, as specified in WS-Security(refer, WS-Security
   [WS-Security]) can be forged without invalidating the signature.
   These attacks are termed as XML Signature wrapping attacks or XML
   rewriting attacks.These types of attacks are possible because the XML
   Digital Signature refers to a signed element in XML document in a way
   that does not take care of its location inside the XML document into
   consideration.Attackers inject additional nodes replacing signed
   nodes while still preserving the signed nodes inside the document but
   at different level in the hierarchy of the XML tree such that it
   results in successful signature verification thereby resulting in XML
   Re-Writing/Wrapping attack.



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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  XML Digital Signature structure

   XML Signatures (described in RFC3275 [RFC3275]) are applied to
   arbitrary digital content (data objects).Data objects are digested,
   the resulting value is placed in an element (with other information)
   and that element is then digested and cryptographically signed.XML
   digital signatures are represented by the Signature element which has
   the following structure (where "?" denotes zero or one occurrence;
   "+" denotes one or more occurrences; and "*" denotes zero or more
   occurrences):

           <Signature ID?>
            <SignedInfo>
              <CanonicalizationMethod/>
              <SignatureMethod/>
              (<Reference URI? >
                (<Transforms>)?
                <DigestMethod>
                <DigestValue>
              </Reference>)+
            </SignedInfo>
            <SignatureValue>
           (<KeyInfo>)?
           (<Object ID?>)*
          </Signature>


   Signatures are related to data objects via URIs [URI].Within an XML
   document, signatures are related to local data objects via fragment
   identifiers.

3.  Suggested Modified Algorithm

   As, SOAP requests are prone to XML wrapping attacks and this
   vulnerabilities stems mostly because of usage of ID (Identity) to
   identify the signed XML sub tree.  There are many solutions proposed
   to mitigate such attacks but still such attacks can't be fully
   eliminated because of inherent limitation present in XML Digital
   Signature standard.In this document, we have proposed an addition of
   "Positional Token" as a doping to the XML element getting signed to
   mitigate XML Signature wrapping attacks.  We are also proposing a
   little modification of existing XML Signature standard as to use of



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   "Absolute XPath" instead of ID in <Reference> node's "URI" attribute
   to refer the signed element.  Use this absolute XPath as a
   "Positional Token", as this token exactly points to the position of
   element getting signed.  Also, during signing process, add this
   "Positional Token" as an attribute (e.g.  PosToken= "Absolute XPath")
   to the element subjected to be signed.  This absolute XPath as a
   "Positional Token" would identify the signed element in XML Signature
   and addition of this "Positional Token" as an attribute to the
   element getting signed eliminate the chances of XML Wrapping attacks
   as in the case of forged SOAP requests, calculated digest of signed
   element will not match with the respective digest value in
   <DigestValue> node during signature validation process.We propose a
   modified XML signature algorithm which suggests usage of absolute
   XPath as a "Positional Token" and it will be used during signing as
   well as during signature validation process.  The algorithms are as
   follows.:

3.1.  Algorithm for signing SOAP Request


                1.      KS=Load(Keystore.JKS) //Load certificates and keys
                2.      For each element subjected to be signed(represented
                        by its "id" attribute value) {
                3.      ABSXpath= "Absolute XPath" of element to be signed
                        as identified with its "Id" attribute value
                4.      ProtectTree=Node as identified by ABSXpath
                5.      MixedElement=AppendSyntacticToken(ProtectTree,  ABSXpath)
                        /*Append a Positional Token as an attribute,
                        "PosToken= ABSXpath" to the ProtectTree */
                6.      H=Hash(MixedElement)
                7.      Add ABSXpath  to <Reference> node  as "URI" attribute value
                8.      Enclose H to <DigestValue> node inside the <Reference> node,
                        as defined in XML Signature standard.
                9.      }
                10.     SignedInfoHash=calculate hash of <SignedInfo> element
                        /* Calculate the digest of the <SignedInfo> element */
                11.     SignedSOAP=Encrypt(SignedInfoHash , KS.PrivateKey)
                        /*Signing that digest and enclosing the signature value
                        in a <SignatureValue> element */



3.2.  Algorithm for verification of Signature








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                1.      SignInfoDigest=Calculate digest of the <SignedInfo> element
                2.      SignatureValueContent= content inside <SignatureValue> node
                3.      Flag=VerifySignature(Public Key, SignatureValueContent, SignInInfoDigest)
                4.      If(Flag){
                5.      Ids=All  URI's in <Reference> nodes inside the <SignedInfo> node
                6.      For each  Id from Ids){
                7.      ABSXpath=Get the content of Id
                8.      Subtree=Get the sub tree identified by ABSXpath
                9.      MixedElement =AppendSyntacticTokenSubTree(Subtree, ABSXpath)
                        /* Append a Positional Token as an attribute,
                                "PosToken= ABSXpath" to the Subtree  */
                10.     H=Hash (MixedElement)/* generate hash value of signed elements. */
                11.     Digest=Get digest value under the  <Reference>
                        node and inside <DigestValue> node, whose "URI" is equal to Id
                12.     If(H!=Digest){
                13.     return "Signature Validation Failed"
                14.     }else{
                15.     return "Signature Validation Successful"
                16.     }
                17.     } //For loop
                18.     else
                19.     return "Signature Validation Failed"
                20.     }



3.2.1.  Verifying SignedInfo Element Digest with Decrypted Digest from
        SignatureValue element


                        1.      VerifySignature(PublicKey, SignatureValueContent, SignInInfoDigest){
                        2.      DecryptedDigest=Decrypt SignatureValueContent with PublicKey
                        3.      If(DecryptedDigest!=SignInInfoDigest){
                        4.      return False
                        5.      }
                        6.      else{
                        7.      return True
                        8.      }
                        9.      }



4.  Simple Example








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   The <Signature> Lets consider an XML document for the example
   purpose:

   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <PatientRecord>
           <Visit date="10pm March 2018">
                   <Account id="id1">1234</Account>
                   <Name>ABC</Name>
                   <Diagnosis>Kidney Test</Diagnosis>
           </Visit>
           <Visit date="12pm May 2018">
                   <Account id="id2">1235</Account>
                   <Name>DEF</Name>
                   <Diagnosis>Liver Test</Diagnosis>
           </Visit>
   </PatientRecord>


                                 Figure 1
































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   Existing XML Signature algorithm would produce a <Signature> element
   for the XML document mentioned in Figure 1, as follows:

<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
        <SignedInfo>
                <CanonicalizationMethod
                        Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#WithComments" />
                <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />
                <Reference URI="#id1">
                        <Transforms>
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                        </Transforms>
                        <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />
                        <DigestValue>.................</DigestValue>
                </Reference>
                <Reference URI="#id2">
                        <Transforms>
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                        </Transforms>
                        <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />
                        <DigestValue>................</DigestValue>
                </Reference>
        </SignedInfo>
        <SignatureValue>
                ..........
        </SignatureValue>
        <KeyInfo>
                <X509Data>
                        <X509Certificate>
                        .............................
                        </X509Certificate>
                </X509Data>
        </KeyInfo>
</Signature>















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   The proposed XML Signature algorithm would produce a <Signature>
   element for the XML document mentioned in Figure 1, which is
   described in Figure 2.  Also, during signing process, "Positional
   Token" as an attribute e.g.(PosToken= "Absolute XPath") has been used
   in it, as per proposed algorithm in Section 3.1.  Now, <DigestValue>
   elements inside <Signature> element will also contain the trace of
   "Positional Token", hence the relative position of signed elements in
   the given XML document:

<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
        <SignedInfo>
                <CanonicalizationMethod
                        Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#WithComments" />
                <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />
                <Reference URI="/PatientRecord/Visit[1]/Account[@id='id1']">
                        <Transforms>
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                        </Transforms>
                        <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />
                        <DigestValue>.................</DigestValue>
                </Reference>
                <Reference URI="/PatientRecord/Visit[2]/Account[@id='id2']">
                        <Transforms>
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />
                                <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" />
                        </Transforms>
                        <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />
                        <DigestValue>................</DigestValue>
                </Reference>
        </SignedInfo>
        <SignatureValue>
                ............
        </SignatureValue>
        <KeyInfo>
                <X509Data>
                        <X509Certificate>
                        .............................
                        </X509Certificate>
                </X509Data>
        </KeyInfo>
</Signature>


                                 Figure 2






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5.  Algorithm Validation

   In this section we will discuss as how the suggested algorithm can
   mitigate the various scenarios of XML wrapping attacks.

5.1.  Mitigation of XML Signature wrapping attacks

   This kind of attacks are possible because signature verification
   algorithm identifies signed element using identity i.e. ID and
   identifying position of signed element using ID has inherent flaw as
   the signed element can easily be moved within the document and still
   the document retains the ability to verify its signature.  So, in our
   algorithm, we have suggested the usage of absolute XPath in place of
   ID for identifying the position of signed elements.  Absolute XPath
   has two fold advantages as it can easily identify the position of
   signed element within the XML document and it fixes both the vertical
   and horizontal axes of the signed element exactly.  The absolute
   XPath expression to identify signed element will not be same as
   absolute XPath expression for signed element in forged document.The
   signature validation will fail at step-8, of algorithm in
   Section 3.2, as there is no such node, Further, if the attacker
   modifies the URI attribute and tries to perform XML wrapping attack,
   the digest of <SignedInfo> will not match and signature validation
   will fail at step-4 of algorithm in Section 3.2.

5.2.  Mitigation of XML elements jumbling type of wrapping attacks

   This kind of wrapping attacks are possible as the attacker jumbles
   the position of signed elements within the document as XML signature
   process defined by specification takes only ID into consideration for
   referencing the signed elements.  The proposed algorithm suggests
   using "Absolute XPath" for referencing the signed elements as well as
   doping the elements subjected to be signed with it.  Hence, the
   digest of the signed element inside <DigestValue> node has a trail of
   the position of element; refer step-6 of algorithm in Section 3.1.
   Hence, any changes in the position of signed elements by the
   attackers will invalidate the signature validation; refer step-12 of
   algorithm in Section 3.2, because calculated digest during signature
   validation will not match with the digest contained in <DigestValue>
   of the forged SOAP request.

6.  Conclusion

   XML Signature wrapping attacks try to inject forged elements into the
   XML document structure in such a way that the valid signature covers
   the unmodified elements, while forged elements are processed by the
   application logic.  This results in a scenario, where an attacker can
   perform arbitrary web service requests, while authenticating as a



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   legitimate user.  The proposed algorithm takes help of the absolute
   XPath as a "Positional Token" for identifying the signed elements and
   adding this to the elements to be signed as an attribute before the
   canonicalization process has a trace of both content of signed
   element and its position in the XML document as well.  Hence, the
   proposed algorithm can solve the issue of XML wrapping attacks
   elegantly without much change in the current standard.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

8.  Security Considerations

   This draft proposes a modification to the existing algorithm of XML
   signature to counter XML Signature wrapping attacks.  However other
   forms of attack may be possible that could not be mitigated.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2807]  Reagle, J., "XML Signature Requirements", RFC 2807,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2807, July 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2807>.

   [RFC3275]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible
              Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
              RFC 3275, DOI 10.17487/RFC3275, March 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3275>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]
              Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", draft-narten-iana-
              considerations-rfc2434bis-09 (work in progress), March
              2008.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2629, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2629>.




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   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [wrapping_attack]
              McIntosh, Michael. and Paula. Austel, "XML signature
              element wrapping attacks and countermeasures", 2005,
              <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1103026>.

   [WS-Security]
              OASIS., "OASIS Web Services Security (WSS) TC", 2006,
              <https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/
              tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wss>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jitendra Kumar
   C-DAC Bangalore
   #68, Electronics City Hosur Road
   Bangalore  560100
   India

   Email: jitendra@cdac.in


   Balaji Rajendran
   C-DAC Bangalore
   #68, Electronics City Hosur Road
   Bangalore  560100
   India

   Email: balaji@cdac.in


   Bindhumadhava BS
   C-DAC Bangalore
   Old Madras Road, Opposite Hal Aero Engine Division
   Bangalore  560038
   India

   Email: bindhu@cdac.in









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