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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                         M. Eubanks
Internet-Draft                                   Iformata Communications
Intended status: Standards Track                             P. Chimento
Expires: April 27, 2011                 Johns Hopkins University Applied
                                                      Physics Laboratory
                                                        October 24, 2010


                   UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets
                     draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-01

Abstract

   We address the problem of computing the UDP checksum on tunneling
   IPv6 packets when using lightweight tunneling protocols.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.










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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Some Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Problem Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.4.  Recommended Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.5.  Additional Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   2.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11





































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1.  Introduction

   The origin of this I-D is the problem raised by the draft titled
   "Automatic IP Multicast Without Explicit Tunnels", also known as
   "AMT".  See draft-ietf-mboned-auto-multicast-09, Section 6.6.  That
   draft used UDP as the transport layer protocol for tunneling packets;
   that is, the outer packet carrying a tunneled (inner) packet is a UDP
   packet.  The draft specifies that for packets carrying tunneled
   multicast data only, the UDP checksum in the UDP header of the outer
   packet SHOULD be 0.

   However RFC 2460 [RFC2460] explicitly states that IPv6 receivers MUST
   discard UDP packets with a 0 checksum.  So, while sending a UDP
   packet with a 0 checksum is permitted in IPv4 packets, it is
   explicitly forbidden in IPv6 packets.  The reason that this
   prohibition exists is that there is no header checksum in the IPv6
   header.  The computation of an additional checksum, when the inner
   packet(s) are already adequately protected, is seen to be an
   unwarranted burden on nodes implementing lightweight tunneling
   protocols.  However, there are issues with a UDP checksum of zero in
   IPv6 packets; these issues are described in detail in
   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero]

   Since the first version of this draft, the need for an efficient,
   lightweight UDP tunneling mechanism has increased.  Indeed, other
   workgroups, notably LISP [I-D.ietf-lisp] and Softwires [RFC5619] have
   also expressed a need to have exceptions to the RFC 2460 prohibition.
   More recently, a discussion on the DCCP mailing list covered the UDP
   over IPv6 checksum issues.  Other users of UDP as a tunneling
   protocol, for example, L2TP and Softwires may benefit from a
   relaxation of the RFC 2460 restriction.

1.1.  Some Terminology

   For the remainder of this draft, we discuss only IPv6, since this
   problem does not exist for IPv4.  So any reference to 'IP' should be
   understood as a reference to IPv6.

   Although we will try to avoid them when possible, we may use the
   terms "tunneling" and "tunneled" as adjectives when describing
   packets.  When we refer to 'tunneling packets' we refer to the outer
   packet header that provides the tunneling function.  When we refer to
   'tunneled packets' we refer to the inner packet, i.e. the packet
   being carried in the tunnel.







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1.2.  Problem Statement

   The argument made by the draft authors is that since in the case of
   AMT multicast packets already have a UDP header with a checksum,
   there is no additional benefit and indeed some cost to nodes to both
   compute and check the UDP checksum of the outer (encapsulating)
   header.  Consequently, IPv6 should make an exception to the rule that
   the UDP checksum MUST not be 0, and allow tunneling protocols to set
   the checksum field of the outer header only to 0 and skip both the
   sender and receiver computation.

1.3.  Discussion

   The draft [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] does an excellent job of discussing
   all the issues related to allowing UDP over IPv6 to have a valid
   checksum of zero.  We will not repeat that work here.

   In Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero], the authors propose nine
   (9) constraints on the usage of a zero checksum for UDP over IPv6.
   We agree with the restrictions proposed, and in fact proposed some of
   those restrictions ourselves in the previous version of the current
   draft.  These restrictions are incorporated into the proposed changes
   below.

   As has been pointed out in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] and in many
   mailing lists, there is still the possibility of deep-inspection
   firewall devices or other middleboxes actually checking the UDP
   checksum field of the outer packet and discarding the tunneling
   packets.  This is would be an issue also for legacy systems which
   have not implemented the change in the IPv6 specification.  So in any
   case, there may be packet loss of lightweight tunneling packets
   because of mixed new-rule and old-rule nodes.

   As an example, we discuss how can errors be detected and handled in a
   lightweight UDP tunneling protocol when the checksum protection is
   disabled.  Note that other (non-tunneling) protocols may have
   different approaches.  We suggest that the following could be an
   approach to this problem:

   o  Context (i.e. tunneling state) should be established via
      application PDUs that are carried in checksummed UDP packets.
      That is, any control packets flowing between the tunnel endpoints
      should be protected by UDP checksums.  The control packets can
      also contain any negotiation that is necessary to set up the
      endpoint/adapters to accept UDP packets with a zero checksum.

   o  Only UDP packets containing tunneled packets should have a UDP
      checksum equal to zero.



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   o  UDP keep-alive packets with checksum zero can be sent to validate
      paths, given that paths between tunnel endpoints can change and so
      middleboxes in the path may vary during the life of the
      association.  Paths with middleboxes that are intolerant of a UDP
      checksum of zero will drop the keep-alives and the endpoints will
      discover that.  Note that this need only be done per tunnel
      endpoint pair, not per tunnel context.

   o  Corruption of the encapsulating IPv6 source address, destination
      address and/or the UDP source port, destination port fields : If
      the 9 restrictions in [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] are followed, the
      inner packets (tunneled packets) should be protected and run the
      usual (presumably small) risk of having undetected corruption(s).
      If lightweight tunneling protocol contexts contain (at a minumum)
      source and destination IP addresses and source and destination
      ports, there are 16 possible corruption outcomes.  We note that
      not only are these outcomes not equally likely, most require
      multiple bit errors with errored bits in separate fields.  The
      possible corruption outcomes fall out this way:

      *  Half of the 16 possible corruption combinations have a
         corrupted destination address.  If the incorrect destination is
         reached and the node doesn't have an application for the
         destination port, the packet will be dropped.  If the
         application at the incorrect destination is the same
         lightweight tunneling protocol and if it has a matching context
         (we assume a very small probability event) the inner packet
         will be decapsulated and forwarded.  If it is some other
         application, with very high probability, the application will
         not recognize the contents of the packet.

      *  Half of the 8 possible corruption combinations with a correct
         destination address have a corrupted source address.  If the
         tunnel contexts contain all elements of the address-port
         4-tuple, then the liklihood is that this corruption will be
         detected.

      *  Of the remaining 4 possibilities, with valid source and
         destination IPv6 addresses, 1 has all 4 fields valid, the other
         three have one or both ports corrupted.  Again, if the
         tunneling endpoint context contains sufficient information,
         these error should be detected with high probability.

   o  Corruption of source-fragmented encapsulating packets: In this
      case, a tunneling protocol may reassemble fragments associated
      with the wrong context at the right tunnel endpoint, or it may
      reassemble fragments associated with a context at the wrong tunnel
      endpoint, or corrupted fragments may be reassembled at the right



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      context at the right tunnel endpoint.  In each of these cases, the
      IPv6 length of the encapsulating header may be checked (though
      [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] points out the weakness in this check).
      In addition, if the encapsulated packet is protected by a
      transport (or other) checksum, these errors can be detected (with
      some probability).

   While this is not a perfect solution, it can reduce the risks of
   relaxing the UDP checksum requirement for IPv6.

1.4.  Recommended Solution

   There is a need that a UDP checksum of zero could be allowed on the
   outer encapsulating packet of a lightweight tunneling protocol.  This
   would imply that UDP endpoints handling that protocol must change
   their behavior and not discard UDP packets received with a 0 checksum
   on the outer packet.  We also recommend that the constraints in
   Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero] be adopted.

   Specifically, this draft proposes that the text in [RFC2460] Section
   8.1, 4th bullet be amended.  We refer to the following text:

   "Unlike IPv4, when UDP packets are originated by an IPv6 node, the
   UDP checksum is not optional.  That is, whenever originating a UDP
   packet, an IPv6 node must compute a UDP checksum over the packet and
   the pseudo-header, and, if that computation yields a result of zero,
   it must be changed to hex FFFF for placement in the UDP header.  IPv6
   receivers must discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and
   should log the error."

   This item should be taken out of the bullet list and should be
   modified as follows:

      Whenever originating a UDP packet, an IPv6 node SHOULD compute a
      UDP checksum over the packet and the pseudo-header, and, if that
      computation yields a result of zero, it must be changed to hex
      FFFF for placement in the UDP header.  IPv6 receivers SHOULD
      discard UDP packets containing a zero checksum, and SHOULD log the
      error.  However, some protocols, such as lightweight tunneling
      protocols that use UDP as a tunnel encapsulation, MAY omit
      computing the UDP checksum of the encapsulating UDP header and set
      it to zero, subject to the following constraints (from
      [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero]).  In cases, where the encapsulating
      protocol uses a zero checksum for UDP, the receiver of packets in
      the allowed port range MUST NOT discard packets with a UDP
      checksum of zero.  Note that these constraints apply only to
      encapsulating protocols that omit calculating the UDP checksum and
      set it to zero.  An encapsulating protocol can always choose to



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      compute the UDP checksum, in which case, its behavior should be as
      specified above.



      1.  IPv6 protocol stack implementations SHOULD NOT by default
          allow the new method.  The default node receiver behaviour
          MUST discard all IPv6 packets carrying UDP packets with a zero
          checksum.

      2.  Implementations MUST provide a way to signal the set of ports
          that will be enabled to receive UDP datagrams with a zero
          checksum.  An IPv6 node that enables reception of UDP packets
          with a zero-checksum, MUST enable this only for a specific
          port or port-range.  This may be implemented via a socket API
          call, or similar mechanism.

      3.  RFC 2460 specifies that IPv6 nodes should log UDP datagrams
          with a zero-checksum.  This should remain the case for any
          datagram received on a port that does not explicitly enable
          zero-checksum processing.  A port for which zero-checksum has
          been enabled MUST NOT log the datagram.

      4.  A stack may separately identify UDP datagrams that are
          discarded with a zero checksum.  It SHOULD NOT add these to
          the standard log, since the endpoint has not been verified.

      5.  UDP Tunnels that encapsulate IP MUST rely on the inner packet
          integrity checks provided that the tunnel will not
          significantly increase the rate of corruption of the inner IP
          packet.  If a significantly increased corruption rate can
          occur, then the tunnel MUST provide an additional integrity
          verification mechanism.  An integrity mechanism is always
          recommended at the tunnel layer to ensure that corruption
          rates of the inner most packet are not increased.

      6.  Tunnels that encapsulate Non-IP packets MUST have a CRC or
          other mechanism for checking packet integrity, unless the
          Non-IP packet specifically is designed for transmission over
          lower layers that do not provide any packet integrity
          guarantee.  In particular, the application must be designed so
          that corruption of this information does not result in
          accumulated state or incorrect processing of a tunneled
          payload.

      7.  UDP applications that support use of a zero-checksum, SHOULD
          NOT rely upon correct reception of the IP and UDP protocol
          information (including the length of the packet) when decoding



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          and processing the packet payload.  In particular, the
          application must be designed so that corruption of this
          information does not result in accumulated state or incorrect
          processing of a tunneled payload.

      8.  If a method proposes recursive tunnels, it MUST provide
          guidance that is appropriate for all use-cases.  Restrictions
          may be needed to the use of a tunnel encapsulations and the
          use of recursive tunnels (e.g.  Necessary when the endpoint is
          not verified).

      9.  IPv6 nodes that receive ICMPv6 messages that refer to packets
          with a zero UDP checksum MUST provide appropriate checks
          concerning the consistency of the reported packet to verify
          that the reported packet actually originated from the node,
          before acting upon the information (e.g. validating the
          address and port numbers in the ICMPv6 message body).

      Middleboxes MUST allow IPv6 packets with UDP checksum equal to
      zero to pass.  Implementations of middleboxes MAY allow
      configuration of specific port ranges for which a zero UDP
      checksum is valid and may drop IPv6 UDP packets outside those
      ranges.

1.5.  Additional Observations

   The persistence of this issue among a significant number of protocols
   being developed in the IETF requires a definitive policy.  The
   authors would like to make the following observations:

   o  An empirically-based analysis of the probabilities of packet
      corruptions (with or without checksums) has not (to our knowledge)
      been conducted since about 2000.  It is now 2010.  We strongly
      suggest that an empirical study is in order, along with an
      extensive analysis of IPv6 header corruption probabilities.

   o  A key cause of this issue generally is the lack of protocol
      support in middleboxes.  Specifically, new protocols, such as
      DCCP, are being forced to use UDP tunnels just to traverse an end-
      to-end path successfully and avoid having their packets dropped by
      middleboxes.  If this were not the case, the use of UDP-lite might
      become more viable for some (but not necessarily all) lightweight
      tunneling protocols.

   o  Another cause of this issue is that the UDP checksum is overloaded
      with the task of protecting the IPv6 header for UDP flows (as it
      the TCP checksum for TCP flows).  Protocols that do not use a
      pseudo-header approach to computing a checksum or CRC have



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      essentially no protection from misdelivered packets.  We suggest
      that decoupling IPv6 header protection from transport generally
      should be studied in this workgroup.  One approach might be to
      consider an extension header for IPv6 containing (at least) a
      header checksum.  However, that is beyond the scope of this draft.


2.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.


3.  Security Considerations

   It is of course less work to generate zero-checksum attack packets
   than ones with full UDP checksums.  However, this does not lead to
   any significant new vulnerabilities as checksums are not a security
   measure and can be easily generated by any attacker, as properly
   configured tunnels should check the validity of the inner packet and
   perform any needed security checks, regardless of the checksum
   status, and finally as most attacks are generated from compromised
   hosts which automatically create checksummed packets (in other words,
   it would generally be more, not less, effort for most attackers to
   generate zero UDP checksums on the host).


4.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Brian Haberman, Magnus Westerlund and Gorry
   Fairhurst for discussions and reviews.


5.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-6man-udpzero]
              Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 UDP Checksum
              Considerations", draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-02 (work in
              progress), October 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-lisp]
              Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-09 (work in progress), October 2010.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate



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              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC3828]  Larzon, L-A., Degermark, M., Pink, S., Jonsson, L-E., and
              G. Fairhurst, "The Lightweight User Datagram Protocol
              (UDP-Lite)", RFC 3828, July 2004.

   [RFC5619]  Yamamoto, S., Williams, C., Yokota, H., and F. Parent,
              "Softwire Security Analysis and Requirements", RFC 5619,
              August 2009.


Authors' Addresses

   Marshall Eubanks
   Iformata Communications


   Phone: +1-703-501-4376
   Fax:
   Email: marshall.eubanks@iformata.com
   URI:


   P.F. Chimento
   Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
   11100 Johns Hopkins Road
   Laurel, MD  20723
   USA

   Phone: +1-443-778-1743
   Fax:
   Email: Philip.Chimento@jhuapl.edu
   URI:












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