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Versions: 00 01 02 03 draft-ietf-sip-dtls-srtp-framework

Network Working Group                                          J. Fischl
Internet-Draft                               CounterPath Solutions, Inc.
Expires:  August 29, 2006                                  H. Tschofenig
                                                             E. Rescorla
                                                       Network Resonance
                                                       February 25, 2006

  Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Media Over Datagram Transport
                         Layer Security (DTLS)

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).


   This document specifies how to use the Session Initiation Protocol
   (SIP) to establish secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) media
   sessions over the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.
   It describes a mechanism of transporting a fingerprint attribute in

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   the Session Description Protocol (SDP) that identifies the
   certificate that will be presented during the DTLS handshake.  It
   relies on the SIP identity mechanism to ensure the integrity of the
   fingerprint attribute.  This allows the establishment of media
   security along the media path.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Conventions Used In This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Verifying Certificate Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   6.  Miscellaneous Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     6.1.  Anonymous Calls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     6.2.  Early Media  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     6.3.  Forking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.4.  Delayed Offer Calls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.5.  Session Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.6.  UDP Payload De-multiplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.7.  Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.8.  Conference Servers and Shared Encryptions Contexts . . . .  9
     6.9.  RTP Header Compression Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Example Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.1.  UPDATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     8.2.  SIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.3.  S/MIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.4.  Single-sided Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.5.  Out of Band Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   10. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     11.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 20

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1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [6] and the Session Description
   Protocol (SDP) [2] are used to set up multimedia sessions or calls.
   SDP is also used to set up TCP [19] and additionally TCP/TLS
   connections for usage with media sessions [1].  The Real-Time
   Protocol (RTP) [11] is used to transmit real time media on top of
   UDP, TCP [15], and TLS [1].  Datagram TLS [4] was introduced to allow
   TLS functionality to be applied to datagram transport protocols, such
   as UDP and DCCP.  This draft provides guidelines on how to use the
   existing specifications to transmit RTP over DTLS and to signal
   support for it in SDP.

   The goal of this work is to provide a key negotiation technique that
   allows encrypted communication between devices with no prior
   relationships.  It also does not require the devices to trust every
   call signaling element that was involved in routing or session setup.
   This approach does not require any extra effort by end users and does
   not require deployment of certificates to all devices that are signed
   by a well-known certificate authority.

   The media is transported over a mutually authenticated DTLS session
   where both sides use self-signed certificates.  The certificate
   fingerprints are sent in SDP over SIP as part of the offer/answer
   exchange.  The SIP Identity mechanism [3] is used to provide
   integrity for the fingerprints.

   This approach differs from previous attempts to secure media traffic
   where the authentication and key exchange protocol (e.g.  MIKEY [27])
   is piggybacked in the signaling message exchange.  With this
   approach, establishing the protection of the media traffic between
   the endpoints is done by the media endpoints without involving the
   SIP/SDP communication.  It allows RTP and SIP to be used in the usual
   manner when there is no encrypted media.

   In SIP, typically the caller sends an offer and the callee may
   subsequently send one-way media back to the caller before a SIP
   answer is received by the caller.  The approach in this
   specification, where the media key negotiation is decoupled from the
   SIP signaling, allows the early media to be set up before the SIP
   answer is received while preserving the important security property
   of allowing the media sender to choose some of the keying material
   for the media.  This also allows the media sessions to be changed,
   re-keyed, and otherwise modified after the initial SIP signaling
   without any additional SIP signaling.

   Further issues that influence the applicability of this specification
   and a comparison with other approaches are discussed in Section 3.

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2.  Overview

   Endpoints wishing to set up an RTP media session do so by exchanging
   offers and answers in SDP messages over SIP.  In a typical use case,
   two endpoints would negotiate to transmit audio data over RTP using
   the UDP protocol.

   Figure 1 shows a typical message exchange in the SIP Trapezoid.

                 +-----------+            +-----------+
                 |SIP        |   SIP/SDP  |SIP        |
         +------>|Proxy      |<---------->|Proxy      |<------+
         |       |Server X   | (+finger-  |Server Y   |       |
         |       +-----------+   print,   +-----------+       |
         |                      +auth.id.)                    |
         | SIP/SDP                              SIP/SDP       |
         | (+fingerprint)                       (+fingerprint,|
         |                                       +auth.id.)   |
         |                                                    |
         v                                                    v
     +-----------+          Datagram TLS               +-----------+
     |SIP        | <---------------------------------> |SIP        |
     |User Agent |          RTP / RTCP / SIP           |User Agent |
     |Alice@X    | <=================================> |Bob@Y      |
     +-----------+                                     +-----------+

     <--->: Signaling Traffic
     <===>: Data Traffic

   Figure 1: DTLS Usage in the SIP Trapezoid

   Consider Alice wanting to set up an encrypted audio session with Bob.
   Both Bob and Alice could use public-key based authentication in order
   to establish a confidentiality protected channel using DTLS.

   Since providing mutual authentication between two arbitrary end
   points on the Internet using public key based cryptography tends to
   be problematic, we consider more deployment friendly alternatives.
   This document uses one approach and several others are discussed in
   Section 8.

   Alice sends an SDP offer to Bob over SIP.  If Alice uses only self-
   signed certificates for the communication with Bob, a fingerprint is
   included in the SDP offer/answer exchange.  This fingerprint is
   integrity protected using the identity mechanism defined in
   Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in SIP [3].  When
   Bob receives the offer, Bob establishes a mutually authenticated DTLS

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   connection with Alice.  At this point Bob can begin sending media to
   Alice.  Once Bob accepts Alice's offer and sends an SDP answer to
   Alice, Alice can begin sending confidential media to Bob.

3.  Motivation

   Although there is already prior work in this area (e.g., Secure
   Descriptions for SDP [18], Key Management Extensions [17] combined
   with MIKEY [27] for authentication and key exchange and SRTP [25] for
   media traffic protection) this specification is motivated as
   o  TLS will be used to offer security for connection-oriented media.
      The design of TLS is well-known and implementations are widely
   o  This approach deals with forking and early media without requiring
      support for PRACK [23] while preserving the important security
      property of allowing the offerer to choose keying material for
      encrypting the media.
   o  The establishment of security protection for the media path is
      also provided along the media path and not over the signaling
      path.  In many deployment scenarios, the signaling and media
      traffic travel along a different path through the network.
   o  This solution works even when the SIP proxies downstream of the
      identity service are not trusted.  There is no need to reveal keys
      in the SIP signaling or in the SDP message exchange.  In order for
      SDES and MIKEY to provide this security property, they require
      distribution of certificates to the endpoints that are signed by
      well known certificate authorities.  SDES further requires that
      the endpoints employ S/MIME to encrypt the keying material.
   o  In this method, SSRC collisions do not result in any extra SIP
   o  Many SIP endpoints already implement TLS.  The changes to existing
      SIP and RTP usage are minimal.

4.  Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [5].

   DTLS/TLS uses the term "session" to refer to a long-lived set of
   keying material that spans associations.  In this document,
   consistent with SIP/SDP usage, we use it to refer to a multimedia
   session and use the term "TLS session" to refer to the TLS construct.
   We use the term "association" to refer to a particular DTLS
   ciphersuite and keying material set.  For consistency with other SIP/

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   SDP usage, we use the term "connection" when what's being referred to
   is a multimedia stream that is not specifically DTLS/TLS.

   In this document, the term "Mutual DTLS" indicates that both the DTLS
   client and server present certificates even if one or both
   certificates are self-signed.

5.  Verifying Certificate Integrity

   The offer/answer model, defined in [7], is used by protocols like the
   Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [6] to set up multimedia sessions.
   In addition to the usual contents of an SDP [2] message, each 'm'
   line will also contain several attributes as specified in [14], [12]
   and [1].

   The endpoint MUST use the setup and connection attributes defined in
   [12].  A setup:active endpoint will act as a DTLS client and a setup:
   passive endpoint will act as a DTLS server.  The connection attribute
   indicates whether or not to reuse an existing DTLS association.

   The endpoint MUST use the certificate fingerprint attribute as
   specified in [1].

   The setup:active endpoint establishes a DTLS association with the
   setup:passive endpoint [12].  Typically, the receiver of the SIP
   INVITE request containing an offer will take the setup:active role.

   The certificate presented during the DTLS handshake MUST match the
   fingerprint exchanged via the signaling path in the SDP.  The
   security properties of this mechanism are described in Section 8.

   If the fingerprint does not match the hashed certificate then the
   endpoint MUST tear down the media session immediately.

   When an endpoint wishes to set up a secure media session with another
   endpoint it sends an offer in a SIP message to the other endpoint.
   This offer includes, as part of the SDP payload, the fingerprint of
   the certificate that the endpoint wants to use.  The SIP message
   containing the offer is sent to the offerer's sip proxy over an
   integrity protected channel which will add an identity header
   according to the procedures outlined in [3].  When the far endpoint
   receives the SIP message it can verify the identity of the sender
   using the identity header.  Since the identity header is a digital
   signature across several SIP headers, in addition to the bodies of
   the SIP message, the receiver can also be certain that the message
   has not been tampered with after the digital signature was applied
   and added to the SIP message.

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   The far endpoint (answerer) may now establish a mutually
   authenticated DTLS association to the offerer.  After completing the
   DTLS handshake, information about the authenticated identities,
   including the certificates, are made available to the endpoint
   application.  The answerer is then able to verify that the offerer's
   certificate used for authentication in the DTLS handshake can be
   associated to the certificate fingerprint contained in the offer in
   the SDP.  At this point the answerer may indicate to the end user
   that the media is secured.  The offerer may only tentatively accept
   the answerer's certificate since it may not yet have the answerer's
   certificate fingerprint.

   When the answerer accepts the offer, it provides an answer back to
   the offerer containing the answerer's certificate fingerprint.  At
   this point the offerer can definitively accept or reject the peer's
   certificate and the offerer can indicate to the end user that the
   media is secured.

   Note that the entire authentication and key exchange for securing the
   media traffic is handled in the media path through DTLS.  The
   signaling path is only used to verify the peers' certificate

6.  Miscellaneous Considerations

6.1.  Anonymous Calls

   When making anonymous calls, a new self-signed certificate SHOULD be
   used for each call so that the calls can not be correlated as to
   being from the same caller.  In situations where some degree of
   correlation is acceptable, the same certificate SHOULD be used for a
   number of calls.

   Additionally, it MUST be ensured that the Privacy header [9] is used
   in conjunction with the SIP identity mechanism to ensure that the
   identity of the user is not asserted when enabling anonymous calls.
   Furthermore, the content of the subjectAltName attribute inside the
   certificate MUST NOT contain information that either allows
   correlation or identification of the user that wishes to place an
   anonymous call.

6.2.  Early Media

   If an offer is received by an endpoint that wishes to provide early
   media, it MUST take the setup:active role and can immediately
   establish a DTLS association with the other endpoint and begin
   sending media.  The setup:passive endpoint may not yet have validated

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   the fingerprint of the active endpoint's certificate.  The security
   aspects of media handling in this situation are discussed in
   Section 8.

6.3.  Forking

   In SIP, it is possible for a request to fork to multiple endpoints.
   Each forked request can result in a different answer.  Assuming that
   the requester provided an offer, each of the answerers' will provide
   a unique answer.  Each answerer will create a DTLS association with
   the offerer.  The offerer can then correlate the SDP answer received
   in the SIP message by comparing the fingerprint in the answer to the
   hashed certificate for each DTLS association.

6.4.  Delayed Offer Calls

   An endpoint may send a SIP INVITE request with no offer in it.  When
   this occurs, the receiver(s) of the INVITE will provide the offer in
   the response and the originator will provide the answer in the
   subsequent ACK request or in the PRACK request [23] if both endpoints
   support reliable provisional responses.  In any event, the active
   endpoint still establishes the DTLS association with the passive
   endpoint as negotiated in the offer/answer exchange.

6.5.  Session Modification

   Once an answer is provided to the offerer, either endpoint MAY
   request a session modification which MAY include an updated offer.
   This session modification can be carried in either an INVITE or
   UPDATE request.  In this case, it is RECOMMENDED that the offerer
   indicate a request to reuse the existing association (using the
   connection attribute) as described in Connection-Oriented Media [12].
   Once the answer is received, the active endpoint will either reuse
   the existing association or establish a new one, tearing down the
   existing association as soon as the offer/answer exchange is
   completed.  The exact association/connection reuse behavior is
   specified in RFC 4145.

6.6.  UDP Payload De-multiplex

   Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE), as specified in [16],
   provides a methodology of allowing participants in multi-media
   sessions to verify mutual connectivity.  In order to make ICE work
   with this specification the endpoints MUST be able to demultiplex
   STUN packets from DTLS packets.  STUN[10] packets MUST NOT be sent
   over DTLS.

   The first byte of a STUN message is 0 or 1 and it is reasonable to

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   expect it to remain 0 or 1 for the near future.  The first byte of a
   DTLS packet is "Type" which can currently have values of 20,21,22,
   and 23 as defined in ContentType declaration in [20].  It is
   reasonable to expect the first byte to remain under 64 and greater
   than 1.  For RTP the first byte has a value that is 196 or above.  A
   viable demultiplexing strategy would be to look at the first byte of
   the UDP payload and if the value is less than 2, assume STUN, if
   greater or equal to 196 assume RTP, otherwise assume DTLS.

6.7.  Rekeying

   As with TLS, DTLS endpoints can rekey at any time by redoing the DTLS
   handshake.  While the rekey is under way, the endpoints continue to
   use the previously established keying material for usage with DTLS.
   Once the new session keys are established the session can switch to
   using these and abandon the old keys.  This ensures that latency is
   not introduced during the rekeying process.

   For example, a client could decide that after sending more than a
   certain number of bytes on one session that it should rekey.  For
   AES-CTR mode[28], this is 2^48 DTLS records.

6.8.  Conference Servers and Shared Encryptions Contexts

   It has been proposed that conference servers might use the same
   encryption context for all of the participants in a conference.  The
   advantage of this approach is that the conference server only needs
   to encrypt the output for all speakers instead of once per

   This shared encryption context approach is not possible under this
   specification.  However, it is argued that the effort to encrypt each
   RTP packet is small compared to the other tasks performed by the
   conference server such as the codec processing.

6.9.  RTP Header Compression Behavior

   In some current environments RTP header compression occurs hop-by-hop
   at layer 3 by routers.  If the SRTP compatibility mode defined in
   [13] is not used, then header compression would have to occur at the
   endpoints inside of the DTLS payload.  All of the normal compression
   techniques can still be used, such as Compressed RTP (CRTP) [21],
   Enhanced Compressed RTP (ECRTP) [24] and RObust Header Compression
   (ROHC) [22].  Theoretically it would also be possible to take
   advantage of the compression profiles defined for DTLS (see [26]).
   Note, however, that the current compression profiles are stateful and
   will therefore not work with DTLS.

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7.  Example Message Flow

   Prior to establishing the session, both Alice and Bob generate self-
   signed certificates which are used for a single session or, if
   desired, reused for multiple sessions.  In this example, Alice calls
   Bob. In this example we assume that Alice and Bob share the same

   The example shows the SIP message flows where Alice acts as the
   passive endpoint and Bob acts as the active endpoint meaning that as
   soon as Bob receives the INVITE from Alice, with DTLS specified in
   the 'm' line of the offer, Bob will begin to negotiate a DTLS
   association with Alice for both RTP and RTCP streams.  Early media
   (RTP and RTCP) starts to flow from Bob to Alice as soon as Bob sends
   the DTLS finished message to Alice.  Bi-directional media (RTP and
   RTCP) can flow after Bob sends the SIP 200 response and once Alice
   has sent the DTLS finished message.

   The SIP signaling from Alice to her proxy is transported over TLS to
   ensure an integrity protected channel between Alice and her identity
   service.  Note that all other signaling is transported over TCP in
   this example although it could be done over any supported transport.

   Alice            Proxies             Bob
     |(1) INVITE       |                  |
     |---------------->|                  |
     |                 |(2) INVITE        |
     |                 |----------------->|
     |                 |        (3) hello |
     |(4) hello        |                  |
     |                 |     (5) finished |
     |                 |     (6) rtp/rtcp |
     |(7) finished     |                  |
     |                 |     (8) 200 OK   |
     |                 |     (9) rtp/rtcp |
     |(10) ACK         |                  |

   Message 1:  INVITE Alice -> Proxy

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   This shows the initial INVITE from Alice to Bob carried over the TLS
   transport protocol to ensure an integrity protected channel between
   Alice and her proxy which acts as Alice's identity service.  Note
   that Alice has requested to be the passive endpoint which means that
   it will act as the DTLS server and Bob will initiate the session.
   Also note that there is a fingerprint attribute on the 'c' line of
   the SDP.  This is computed from Bob's self-signed certificate.

   INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
   Max-Forwards: 70
   Contact: <sip:alice@;transport=TLS>
   To: <sip:bob@example.com>
   From: "Alice"<sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
   Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Length: xxxx

   o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4
   c=IN IP4
   a=fingerprint: \
     SHA-1 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
   t=0 0
   m=audio 6056 UDP/TLS/RTP/AVP 0

   Message 2:  INVITE Proxy -> Bob

   This shows the INVITE being relayed to Bob from Alice (and Bob's)
   proxy.  Note that Alice's proxy has inserted an Identity and
   Identity-Info header.  This example only shows one element for both
   proxies for the purposes of simplification.  Bob verifies the
   identity provided with the INVITE.

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   INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0
   Via: SIP/2.0/TLS;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53244234324234
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP;branch=z9hG4bK-0e5b7d3edb2add32
   Max-Forwards: 70
   Contact: <sip:alice@;transport=TLS>
   To: <sip:bob@example.com>
   From: "Alice"<sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
   Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   Identity: CyI4+nAkHrH3ntmaxgr01TMxTmtjP7MASwliNRdupRI1vpkXRvZXx1ja9k
   Identity-Info: https://example.com/cert
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Length: xxxx

   o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4
   c=IN IP4
   a=fingerprint: \
     SHA-1 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
   t=0 0
   m=audio 6056 UDP/TLS/RTP/AVP 0

   Message 3:  ClientHello Bob -> Alice

   Assuming that Alice's identity is valid, Message 3 shows Bob sending
   a DTLS ClientHello directly to Alice for each 'm' line in the SDP.
   In this case two DTLS ClientHello messages are sent to Alice.  Bob
   sends a DTLS ClientHello to for RTP and another to
   port 6057 for RTCP.

   Message 4:  ServerHello+Certificate Alice -> Bob

   Alice sends back a ServerHello, Certificate, ServerHelloDone for both
   RTP and RTCP associations.  Note that the same certificate is used
   for both the RTP and RTCP associations.

   Message 5:  Certificate Bob -> Alice

   Bob sends a Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify,
   change_cipher_spec and Finished for both RTP and RTCP associations.

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   Again note that Bob uses the same server certificate for both

   Message 6:  Early Media Bob -> Alice

   At this point, Bob can begin sending early media (RTP and RTCP) to
   Alice.  Note that Alice can't yet trust the media since the
   fingerprint has not yet been received.  This lack of trusted, secure
   media is indicated to Alice.

   Message 7:  Finished Alice -> Bob

   After Message 5 is received by Bob, Alice sends change_cipher_spec
   and Finished.

   Message 8:  200 OK Bob -> Alice

   When Bob answers the call, Bob sends a 200 OK SIP message which
   contains the fingerprint for Bob's certificate.  When Alice receives
   the message and validates the certificate presented in Message 5.
   The endpoint now shows Alice that the call as secured.

   SIP/2.0 200 OK

   To: <sip:bob@example.com>;tag=6418913922105372816
   From: "Alice" <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
   Via: SIP/2.0/TCP;branch=z9hG4bK-0e5b7d3edb2add32
   Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
   CSeq: 1 INVITE
   Contact: <sip:;transport=TCP>
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Content-Length: xxxx

   o=- 6418913922105372816 2105372818 IN IP4
   c=IN IP4
     SHA-1 FF:FF:FF:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
   t=0 0
   m=audio 12000 UDP/TLS/RTP/AVP 0
   a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000/1

   Message 9:  RTP+RTCP Alice -> Bob

   At this point, Alice can also start sending RTP and RTCP to Bob

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   Message 10:  ACK Alice -> Bob

   Finally, Alice sends the SIP ACK to Bob.

8.  Security Considerations

   DTLS or TLS media signalled with SIP requires a way to ensure that
   the communicating peers' certificates are correct.

   The standard TLS/DTLS strategy for authenticating the communicating
   parties is to give the server (and optionally the client) a PKIX [8]
   certificate.  The client then verifies the certificate and checks
   that the name in the certificate matches the server's domain name.
   This works because there are a relatively small number of servers
   with well-defined names; a situation which does not usually occur in
   the VoIP context.

   The design described in this document is intended to leverage the
   authenticity of the signaling channel (while not requiring
   confidentiality).  As long as each side of the connection can verify
   the integrity of the SDP INVITE then the DTLS handshake cannot be
   hijacked via a man-in-the-middle attack.  This integrity protection
   is easily provided by the caller to the callee (see Alice to Bob in
   Section 7) via the SIP Identity [3] mechanism.  However, it is less
   straightforward for the responder.

   Ideally Alice would want to know that Bob's SDP had not been tampered
   with and who it was from so that Alice's User Agent could indicate to
   Alice that there was a secure phone call to Bob. This is known as the
   SIP Response Identity problem and is still a topic of ongoing work in
   the SIP community.  When a solution to the SIP Response Identity
   problem is finalized, it SHOULD be used here.  In the meantime, there
   are several approaches that can be used to mitigate this problem:
   Use UPDATE, Use SIPS, Use S/MIME, Single Sided Verification, or use
   an out of band method.  Each one is discussed here followed by the
   security implications of that approach.

8.1.  UPDATE

   In this approach, Bob sends an answer, then immediately follows up
   with an UPDATE that includes the fingerprint and uses the SIP
   Identity mechanism to assert that the message is from
   Bob@example.com.  The downside of this approach is that it requires
   the extra round trip of the UPDATE.  However, it is simple and secure
   even when the proxies are not trusted.

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8.2.  SIPS

   In this approach, the signaling is protected by TLS from hop to hop.
   As long as all proxies are trusted, this provides integrity for the
   fingerprint.  It does not provide a strong assertion of who Alice is
   communicating with.  However, as much as the target domain can be
   trusted to correctly populate the From header field value, Alice can
   use that.  The security issue with this approach is that if one of
   the Proxies wished to mount a man-in-the-middle attack, it could
   convince Alice that she was talking to Bob when really the media was
   flowing through a man in the middle media relay.  However, this
   attack could not convince Bob that he was taking to Alice.

8.3.  S/MIME

   RFC 3261 [6] defines a S/MIME security mechanism for SIP that could
   be used to sign that the fingerprint was from Bob. This would be
   secure.  However, so far there have been no deployments of S/MIME for

8.4.  Single-sided Verification

   In this approach, no integrity is provided for the fingerprint from
   Bob to Alice.  In this approach, an attacker that was on the
   signaling path could tamper with the fingerprint and insert
   themselves as a man-in-the-middle on the media.  Alice would know
   that she had a secure call with someone but would not know if it was
   with Bob or a man-in-the-middle.  Bob would know that an attack was
   happening.  The fact that one side can detect this attack means that
   in most cases where Alice and Bob both wish the communications to be
   encrypted there is not a problem.  Keep in mind that in any of the
   possible approaches Bob could always reveal the media that was
   received to anyone.  We are making the assumption that Bob also wants
   secure communications.  In this do nothing case, Bob knows the media
   has not been tampered with or intercepted by a third party and that
   it is from Alice@example.com.  Alice knows that she is talking to
   someone and that whoever that is has probably checked that the media
   is not being intercepted or tampered with.  This approach is
   certainly less than ideal but very usable for many situations.

8.5.  Out of Band Verification

   An alternative available to Alice and Bob is to use human speech to
   verified each others' identity and then to verify each others'
   fingerprints also using human speech.  Assuming that it is difficult
   to impersonate another's speech and seamlessly modify the audio
   contents of a call, this approach is relatively safe.  On the other
   hand, SIP is not only used for voice communication.

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   There has been some work on how to represent the fingerprint in a way
   that is easy for humans to verify with minimal errors.  This
   specification needs more details describing how to do this and how to
   cache the resulting certificates.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This specification does not require any IANA actions.

10.  Acknowledgments

   Cullen Jennings contributed substantial text and comments to this
   document.  This document benefited from discussions with Francois
   Audet, Nagendra Modadugu, and Dan Wing.  Thanks also for useful
   comments by Flemming Andreasen, Rohan Mahy, David McGrew, and David

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
         Transport Layer Security (TLS)  Protocol in the Session
         Description Protocol (SDP)", draft-ietf-mmusic-comedia-tls-05
         (work in progress), September 2005.

   [2]   Handley, M., "SDP: Session Description Protocol",
         draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-new-26 (work in progress), January 2006.

   [3]   Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated
         Identity Management in the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
         draft-ietf-sip-identity-06 (work in progress), October 2005.

   [4]   Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
         Security", draft-rescorla-dtls-05 (work in progress),
         June 2005.

   [5]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [6]   Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [7]   Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with

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         Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002.

   [8]   Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
         Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.

   [9]   Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private Extensions
         to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity
         within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325, November 2002.

   [10]  Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy, "STUN
         - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through
         Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489, March 2003.

   [11]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson,
         "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD 64,
         RFC 3550, July 2003.

   [12]  Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the
         Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145, September 2005.

   [13]  Tschofenig, H. and E. Rescorla, "Real-Time Transport Protocol
         (RTP) over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
         draft-tschofenig-avt-rtp-dtls-00.txt (work in progress),
         February 2006.

   [14]  Fischl, J. and H. Tschofenig, "Session Description Protocol
         (SDP) Indicators for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
         draft-fischl-mmusic-sdp-dtls-00 (work in progress),
         February 2006.

11.2.  Informational References

   [15]  Lazzaro, J., "Framing RTP and RTCP Packets over Connection-
         Oriented Transport", draft-ietf-avt-rtp-framing-contrans-06
         (work in progress), September 2005.

   [16]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A
         Methodology for Network  Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for
         Offer/Answer Protocols", draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-06 (work in
         progress), October 2005.

   [17]  Arkko, J., "Key Management Extensions for Session Description
         Protocol (SDP) and Real  Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)",
         draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-15 (work in progress), June 2005.

   [18]  Andreasen, F., "Session Description Protocol Security
         Descriptions for Media Streams",

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         draft-ietf-mmusic-sdescriptions-12 (work in progress),
         September 2005.

   [19]  Yon, D., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport in the Session
         Description Protocol  (SDP)", draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-comedia-10
         (work in progress), November 2004.

   [20]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1",
         draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-13 (work in progress), June 2005.

   [21]  Casner, S. and V. Jacobson, "Compressing IP/UDP/RTP Headers for
         Low-Speed Serial Links", RFC 2508, February 1999.

   [22]  Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima, H.,
         Hannu, H., Jonsson, L-E., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T., Le, K.,
         Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro, K., Wiebke, T.,
         Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust Header Compression (ROHC):
         Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP, ESP, and uncompressed",
         RFC 3095, July 2001.

   [23]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Reliability of Provisional
         Responses in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3262,
         June 2002.

   [24]  Koren, T., Casner, S., Geevarghese, J., Thompson, B., and P.
         Ruddy, "Enhanced Compressed RTP (CRTP) for Links with High
         Delay, Packet Loss and Reordering", RFC 3545, July 2003.

   [25]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
         Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
         RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [26]  Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression
         Methods", RFC 3749, May 2004.

   [27]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
         Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
         August 2004.

   [28]  Modadugu, N. and E. Rescorla, "AES Counter Mode Cipher Suites
         for TLS and DTLS", draft-modadugu-tls-ctr-00 (work in
         progress), October 2005.

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Authors' Addresses

   Jason Fischl
   CounterPath Solutions, Inc.
   8th Floor, 100 West Pender Street
   Vancouver, BC  V6B 1R8

   Phone:  +1 604 320-3340
   Email:  jason@counterpath.com

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739

   Email:  Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com

   Eric Rescorla
   Network Resonance
   2483 E. Bayshore #212
   Palo Alto, CA  94303

   Email:  ekr@networkresonance.com

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