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Internet Engineering Task Force
INTERNET-DRAFT Sally Floyd
draft-floyd-dcp-problem-01.txt Mark Handley
Eddie Kohler
ICIR
26 August 2002
Expires: February 2003
Problem Statement for DCCP
Status of this Document
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of [RFC 2026]. Internet-Drafts are
working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Abstract
This document gives the problem statement underlying the
development of an unreliable transport protocol incorporating
end-to-end congestion control. This is also the problem
statement underlying the development of DCCP, the Datagram
Congestion Control Protocol. DCCP implements a congestion-
controlled, unreliable flow of datagrams suitable for use by
applications such as streaming media or on-line games.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Congestion Control for Unreliable Transfer . . . . . 4
2.2. Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Firewall Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Parameter Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Solution Space for Congestion Control of Unreli-
able Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Providing Congestion Control Above UDP . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. The Burden on the Application Designer. . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Difficulties with ECN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3. The Evasion of Congestion Control . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Providing Congestion Control Below UDP . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Case 1: Congestion Feedback at the Applica-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Case 2: Congestion Feedback at a Layer
below UDP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Providing Congestion Control at the Transport
Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1. Modifying TCP?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.2. Unreliable Variants of SCTP?. . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.3. Modifying RTP?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.4. Designing a New Transport Protocol. . . . . . . . 14
4. Selling Congestion Control to Reluctant Applica-
tions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Additional Design Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Summary of Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Authors' Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
Historically, the great majority of Internet unicast traffic has
used congestion-controlled TCP, with UDP making up most of the
remainder. UDP has mainly been used for short, request-response
transfers, like DNS and SNMP, that wish to avoid TCP's three-way
handshake, retransmission, and/or stateful connections. UDP also
avoids TCP's built-in end-to-end congestion control, and UDP
applications tended not to implement their own congestion control.
However, since UDP traffic volume was small relative to congestion-
controlled TCP flows, the network didn't collapse.
Recent years have seen the growth of applications that use UDP in a
different way. These applications, including RealAudio, Internet
telephony, and on-line games such as Half Life, Quake, and
Starcraft, share a preference for timeliness over reliability. TCP
can introduce arbitrary delay because of its reliability and in-
order delivery requirements; thus, the applications use UDP instead.
This growth of long-lived non-congestion-controlled traffic,
relative to congestion-controlled traffic, poses a real threat to
the overall health of the Internet.
Applications could implement their own congestion control mechanisms
on a case-by-case basis, with encouragement from the IETF. Some
already do this. However, experience shows that congestion control
is difficult to get right, and many application writers would like
to avoid reinventing this particular wheel. We believe that a new
protocol is needed, one that combines unreliable datagram delivery
with built-in congestion control. This protocol would act as an
enabling technology: existing and new applications could easily use
it to transfer timely data without destabilizing the Internet.
This document provides a problem statement for such a protocol. We
list the properties the protocol should have, then explain why those
properties are necessary. We also describe why a new protocol is the
best solution for the more general problem of bringing congestion
control to unreliable flows of unicast datagrams.
This problem statement began as a formalization of the goals of
DCCP, a proposed protocol already described in several Internet-
Drafts. We intended DCCP to satisfy the problem statement laid out
here. However, we believe the problem should be solved whether or
not the chosen solution is DCCP, and the DCCP drafts should be
judged based on this document or its successors. Nevertheless, for
convenience, we write "DCCP" to mean "any protocol that satisfies
this problem statement".
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2. Problem Space
We perceive a number of problems related to the use of unreliable
data flows in the Internet. The major issues are:
o The potential for non-congestion-controlled datagram flows to
cause congestion collapse of the network.
o The difficulty of correctly implementing effective congestion
control mechanisms for unreliable datagram flows.
o The lack of a standard solution for performing reliable congestion
feedback for unreliable data flows.
o The need for a standard solution for negotiating ECN usage for
unreliable flows.
o The need for applications to have a choice of TCP-friendly
congestion control mechanisms.
While undoubtedly some application writers would prefer not to
perform congestion control at all for unreliable flows, we expect
that most responsible application writers would use congestion
control if it were available in a standard, easy to use form.
More minor problems are:
o The difficulty of deploying applications using UDP-based flows in
the presence of firewalls.
o The desire to have a single way to negotiate congestion control
parameters for unreliable flows, independently of the signalling
protocol used to set up the flow.
o The desire for low per-packet byte overhead.
The subsections below discuss these problems of providing congestion
control, traversing firewalls, and negotiating parameters in more
detail. A separate subsection also discusses the problem of
minimizing the overhead of packet headers.
2.1. Congestion Control for Unreliable Transfer
This project aims to bring easy-to-use congestion control mechanisms
to applications that generate long-lived, large flows of unreliable
datagrams, such as RealAudio, Internet telephony, and multiplayer
games. Our motivation is to avoid congestion collapse. (Request-
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response applications, such as DNS, SNMP, and SIP, are not our
concern; their short flows don't cause congestion in practice, and
any congestion control mechanism would take effect between flows,
not within a single end-to-end transfer of information.) However,
before designing a congestion control mechanism for these
applications, we must understand why they use unreliable datagrams
in the first place, lest we destroy the very properties they
require.
There are several reasons why protocols currently use UDP instead of
TCP, amongst them:
o Startup Delay: they wish to avoid the delay of a three-way
handshake.
o Statelessness: they wish to avoid holding connection state, and
the potential state-holding attacks that come with this.
o Trading of Reliability against Timing: the data being sent is
timely in the sense that if it is not delivered by some deadline
(typically a small number of RTTs) then the data will not be
useful at the receiver.
Of these, our target applications -- media transfer, games, and the
like -- mostly care about having control over the tradeoff between
timing and reliability. Such applications use UDP because when they
send a datagram, they wish to send the most appropriate data in that
datagram. If the datagram is lost, they may or may not resend the
same data, depending on whether the data will still be useful at the
receiver. Data may no longer be useful for many reasons:
o In a telephony or streaming video session, data in a packet
comprises a timeslice of a continuous stream. Once a timeslice
has been played out, the next timeslice is required immediately.
If the data comprising that timeslice arrives at some later time,
then it is no longer useful. Such applications can cope with
masking the effects of missing packets to some extent, so when the
sender transmits its next packet, it is important for it to only
send data that has a good chance of arriving in time for its
playout.
o In a interactive game or VR session, position information is
transient. If a datagram containing position information is lost,
resending the old position does not usually make sense -- rather,
every position information datagram should contain the latest
position information.
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In a congestion-controlled flow, the allowed packet sending rate
depends on measured network congestion. Thus, applications must give
up some control to the congestion control mechanism, which
determines precisely when packets can be sent. However, applications
could still decide, at transmission time, which information to put
in a packet. TCP doesn't allow control over this; these applications
demand it.
Often, these applications (especially games and telephony
applications) work on very short playout timescales. Whilst they
are usually able to adjust their transmission rate based on
congestion feedback, they do have constraints on how this adaptation
can be performed so that it has minimal impact on the quality of the
session. Thus, they tend to need some control over the short-term
dynamics of the congestion control algorithm, whilst being fair to
other traffic on medium timescales. This control includes, but is
not limited to, some influence on which congestion control algorithm
should be used -- for example, TFRC rather than strict TCP-like
congestion control.
2.2. Overhead
The applications we are concerned with often send compressed data,
or send frequent small packets. For example, when internet telephony
or streaming media are used over low-bandwidth modem links, highly
compressing the payload data is essential. For internet telephony
applications and for games, the requirement is for low delay, and
hence small packets are sent frequently.
For example, a telephony application sending a 20Kb/s packet stream
wanting moderately low delay may send a packet every 20ms, and so
each packet would be only 50 bytes. Of this, 20 bytes is taken up
by the IP header, leaving only 30 bytes for the transport header and
payload. Of course this is a relatively extreme example, but it
serves to illustrate the degree to which some of these applications
care that the transport protocol is low overhead.
In some cases the correct solution would be to use link-based packet
header compression to compress the packet headers, although we
cannot guarantee the availability of such compression schemes on any
particular link.
The delay of data until after the completion of a handshake also
represents potentially unnecessary overhead. A new protocol might
therefore allow senders to include some data on their initial
datagrams.
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2.3. Firewall Traversal
Applications requiring a flow of unreliable datagrams currently tend
to use signalling protocols such as RTSP, SIP and H.323 in
conjunction with UDP for the data flow. The initial setup request
uses a signalling protocol to locate the correct remote end-system
for the data flow, sometimes being redirected or relayed to other
machines, before the data flow is established.
As UDP flows contain no explicit setup and teardown, it is hard for
firewalls to handle them correctly. Typically the firewall needs to
parse RTSP, SIP and H.323 to obtain the information necessary to
open a hole in the firewall. Alternatively, for bi-directional
flows, the firewall can open a bi-directional hole if it receives a
UDP packet from inside the firewall, but in this case the firewall
can't easily know when to close the hole again.
While we do not consider these to be major problems, they are
nonetheless issues that application designers face. Currently
streaming media players such as RealPlayer attempt UDP first, and
then switch to TCP if UDP is not successful. Streaming media over
TCP is undesirable, and can result in the receiver needing to
temporarily halt playout while it "rebuffers" data. Telephony
applications don't even have this option.
2.4. Parameter Negotiation
Different applications have different requirements of congestion
control, which may map into different congestion feedback. Examples
are the ECN capability, and desired congestion control dynamics,
which in turn determines the choice of congestion control algorithm
and the form of feedback information required. Such parameters need
to be reliably negotiated before congestion control can function
correctly.
While this negotiation could be performed using signalling protocols
such as SIP, RTSP and H.323, it would be desirable to have a single
standard way of negotiating these transport parameters. This is of
particular importance with ECN, where sending ECN-marked packets to
a non-ECN-capable receiver can cause significant congestion problems
to other flows. We discuss the ECN issue in more detail below.
3. Solution Space for Congestion Control of Unreliable Flows
We thus want to provide congestion control for unreliable flows,
providing both ECN and the choice of different forms of congestion
control, and providing moderate overhead in terms of packet size,
state, and CPU processing. There are a number of options for
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providing end-to-end congestion control for the unicast traffic that
currently uses UDP, in terms of the layer that provides the
congestion control mechanism:
o Congestion control above UDP.
o Congestion control below UDP.
o Congestion control at the transport layer as an alternative to
UDP.
We explore these alternatives in the sections below. The concerns
from the discussions below have convinced us that the best way to
provide congestion control for unreliable flows is to provide
congestion control at the transport layer, as an alternative to the
use of UDP and TCP.
3.1. Providing Congestion Control Above UDP
One possibility would be to provide congestion control at the
application layer, or at some other layer above UDP. Implementing
congestion control at a layer above UDP would allow the congestion
control mechanism to be closely integrated with the application
itself.
3.1.1. The Burden on the Application Designer
A key disadvantage of providing congestion control above UDP is that
it places an unnecessary burden on the application-level designer,
who might be just as happy to use the congestion control provided by
a lower layer. If the application can rely on a lower layer that
gives a choice between TCP-like or TFRC-like congestion control, and
that offers ECN, then this might be highly satisfactory to many
application designers.
The long history of debugging TCP implementations [RFC 2525] [TBIT]
makes the difficulties in implementing end-to-end congestion control
abundantly clear. It is clearly more robust for congestion control
to be provided for the application by a lower layer. In rare cases
there might be compelling reasons for the congestion control
mechanism to be implemented in the application itself, but we do not
expect this to be the general case. For example, applications that
use RTP over UDP might be just as happy if RTP itself implemented
end-to-end congestion control. (See Section 3.3.3 for more
discussion of RTP.)
In addition to congestion control issues, we also note the problems
with firewall traversal and parameter negotiation discussed in
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sections 2.3 and 2.4. Implementing on top of UDP requires that the
application designer also address these issues.
3.1.2. Difficulties with ECN
A second problem of providing congestion control above UDP is that
it would require either giving up the use of ECN, or giving the
application direct control over setting and reading the ECN field in
the IP header. Giving up the use of ECN would be problematic, since
ECN can be particularly useful for unreliable flows, where a dropped
packet will not be retransmitted by the data sender.
With the development of the ECN nonce, ECN can also be useful even
in the absence of ECN support from the network. The data sender can
use the ECN nonce, along with feedback from the data receiver, to
verify that the data receiver is correctly reporting all lost
packets. This use of ECN can be particularly useful for an
application using unreliable delivery, where the receiver might
otherwise have little incentive to report lost packets.
In order to allow the use of ECN by a layer above UDP, the UDP
socket would have to allow the application to control the ECN field
in the IP header. In particular, the UDP socket would have to allow
the application to specify whether or not the ECN-Capable Transport
(ECT) codepoints should be set in the ECN field of the IP header.
The ECT codepoint can only safely be set in the packet header of a
UDP packet if the following is guaranteed:
o If the Congestion Experienced (CE) codepoint is set by a router,
the receiving UDP will pass that CE status to the receiving
application at the data receiver, and:
o Upon receiving a packet that had the CE codepoint set, the
receiving application will take the appropriate congestion control
action, such as informing the data sender.
However, the UDP implementation at the data sender has no way of
knowing if the UDP implementation at the data receiver has been
upgraded to pass a CE status up to the receiving application, let
alone whether or not the application will use the conformant end-to-
end congestion control that goes along with use of ECN.
In the absence of the widespread deployment of mechanisms in routers
to detect flows that are not using conformant congestion control,
allowing applications arbitrary control of the ECT codepoints for
UDP packets would seem like an unnecessary opportunity for
applications to use ECN while evading the use of end-to-end
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congestion control. Thus, there is an inherent "chicken-and-egg"
problem of whether first to deploy policing mechanisms in routers,
or first to enable the use of ECN by UDP flows. Without the
policing mechanisms in routers, we would not advise adding ECN-
capability to UDP sockets at this time.
3.1.3. The Evasion of Congestion Control
A third problem of providing congestion control above UDP is that
relying on congestion control at the application level makes it
somewhat easier for some users to evade end-to-end congestion
control. We do not claim that a transport protocol such as DCCP
would always be implemented in the kernel, and do not attempt to
evaluate the relative difficulty of modifying code inside the kernel
vs. outside the kernel in any case. However, we believe that
putting the congestion control at the transport level rather than at
the application level makes it just slightly less likely that users
will go to the trouble of modifying the code in order to avoid using
end-to-end congestion control.
3.2. Providing Congestion Control Below UDP
Instead of providing congestion control above UDP, a second
possibility would be to provide congestion control for unreliable
applications at a layer below UDP, and the applications would use
UDP as their transport protocol. Given that UDP does not itself
provide sequence numbers or congestion feedback, there are two
possible forms for this congestion feedback:
o (1) Feedback at the application: The application above UDP could
provide sequence numbers and feedback to the sender, which would
then communicate loss information to the congestion control
mechanism. This is the approach currently standardized by the
Congestion Manager [RFC 3124].
o (2) Feedback at the layer below UDP: The application could use
UDP, and a protocol could be implemented using a shim header
between IP and UDP to provide sequence number information for data
packets and return feedback to the data sender. The original
proposal for the Congestion Manager [Bala99] suggested providing
this layer for applications that did not have their own feedback
about dropped packets.
We discuss these two cases separately below.
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3.2.1. Case 1: Congestion Feedback at the Application
In this case, the application provides sequence numbers and
congestion feedback above UDP, but communicates that feedback to a
congestion manager below UDP, which regulates when packets can be
sent. This approach suffers from most of the problems described in
section 3.1, namely forcing the application designer to reinvent the
wheel each time for packet formats and parameter negotiation, and
problems with ECN usage, firewalls and evasion.
It would avoid the application writer needing to implement the
control part of the congestion control mechanism, but it is unclear
how easily multiple congestion control algorithms (such as receiver-
based TFRC) can be supported, given that the form of congestion
feedback usually needs to be closely coupled to the congestion
control algorithm being used.
3.2.2. Case 2: Congestion Feedback at a Layer below UDP
Providing feedback at a layer below UDP would require an additional
packet header below UDP to carry sequence numbers in addition to the
eight-byte header for UDP itself. Unless this header were an IP
option (which is likely to cause problems for many IPv4 routers)
then its presence would need to be indicated using a different IP
protocol value from UDP. Thus, the packets would no longer look
like UDP on the wire.
To use this mechanism most effectively, the semantics of the UDP
socket API (Application Programming Interface) would also need
changing, both to support a late decision on what to send, and to
provide access to the sequence numbers to avoid the application
needing to duplicate them for its own purposes. Thus, the socket
API would no longer look like UDP in the end hosts. This would
effectively be a new transport protocol.
Given these complications, it seems cleaner to actually design a new
transport protocol, which also allows us to address the issues of
firewall traversal, flow setup, and parameter negotiation. We note
that any new transport protocol could also use a Congestion Manager
approach to share congestion state between flows using the same
congestion control algorithm, if this were deemed to be desirable.
3.3. Providing Congestion Control at the Transport Layer
The concerns from the discussions above have convinced us that the
best way to provide congestion control to applications that
currently use UDP is to provide congestion control at the transport
layer, in a transport protocol used as an alternative to UDP. One
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advantage of providing end-to-end congestion control in an
unreliable transport protocol is that it could be used easily by a
wide range of the applications that currently use UDP, with minimal
changes to the application itself. The application itself would not
have to provide the congestion control mechanism, or even the
feedback from the data receiver to the data sender about lost or
marked packets.
The question then arises of whether to adapt TCP for use by
unreliable applications, to use an unreliable variant of SCTP or a
version of RTP with built-in congestion control, or to design a new
transport protocol.
As we argue below, the desire for minimal overhead results in the
design decision to use a transport protocol containing only the
minimal necessary functionality, and to leave other functionality
such as reliability, semi-reliability, or Forward Error Correction
(FEC) to be layered on top.
3.3.1. Modifying TCP?
One alternative to be considered would be to create an unreliable
variant of TCP, with the reliability layered on top for applications
desiring reliable delivery. However, our requirement is not simply
for TCP minus the in-order reliable delivery, but also for the
application to be able to choose congestion control algorithms.
TCP's feedback mechanism works well for TCP-like congestion control,
but is inappropriate (or at the very least, inefficient) for TFRC.
In addition, TCP sequence numbers are in bytes, which is not optimal
for an unreliable datagram protocol. Finally, there is the issue of
whether a modified TCP would require a new IP protocol number as
well; a significantly modified TCP using the same IP protocol number
could have unwanted interactions with some of the middleboxes
already deployed in the network.
In conclusion, it seems best simply to leave TCP as it is, and to
create a new congestion control protocol for unreliable transfer.
3.3.2. Unreliable Variants of SCTP?
SCTP was in part designed to accommodate multiple streams within a
single end-to-end connection, modifying TCP's semantics of reliable,
in-order delivery to allow out-of-order delivery. However, explicit
support for multiple streams over a single flow at the transport
layer is not necessary for an unreliable transport protocol such as
DCCP, which of necessity allows out-of-order delivery. Because an
unreliable transport does not need streams support, applications
should not have to pay the penalties in terms of increased header
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size that accompany the use of streams in SCTP.
The basic underlying structure of the SCTP packet, into a common
SCTP header followed by chunks for data, SACK information, and so
on, is motivated by SCTP's goal of accommodating multiple streams,
However, this use of chunks comes at the cost of an increased header
size for packets, as each chunk must be aligned on 32-bit
boundaries, and therefore requires a fixed-size 4-byte chunk header.
For example, for a connection using ECN, SCTP includes separate
control chunks for the Explicit Congestion Notification Echo and
Congestion Window Reduced functions, with the ECNE and CWR chunks
each requiring 8 bytes. As another example, the common header
includes a 4-byte verification tag to validate the sender. The
issue of a minimal header size is just one of the ways that the
underlying framework of SCTP does not fit the needs of an unreliable
transport as outlined in this document.
As a second concern, SCTP as currently specified uses TCP-like
congestion control, and does not provide support for alternative
congestion control algorithms such as TFRC that would be more
attractive to some of the applications currently using UDP flows.
Thus, the current version of SCTP would not meet the requirements
for a choice between forms of end-to-end congestion control.
One could suggest adding support for alternative congestion control
mechanisms as an option to SCTP, and adding a fully-unreliable
variant that does not include the mechanisms for multiple streams.
However, that path leads one to a choice between a ``kitchen sink''
protocol that tries to include options to accommodate all
applications (i.e., the modified version of SCTP), and a clean and
minimal protocol that provides only end-to-end congestion control
and any other mechanisms that cannot be provided in a higher layer.
We would argue against the ``kitchen sink'' approach in this case.
Applications that desire limited retransmission with multi-stream
support, or that desire multi-homing support, might be good
candidates for a semi-reliable version of SCTP such as U-SCTP.
However, we believe that variants of SCTP are not suitable for
fully-unreliable applications, or for the bulk of applications that
today use UDP. We would argue that instead, an additional transport
protocol is needed for unreliable transfer.
3.3.3. Modifying RTP?
Several of our target applications currently use RTP layered above
UDP to transfer their data. Why not modify RTP to provide end-to-end
congestion control?
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As RTP lives above UDP, modifying it to support congestion control
might encounter some of the problems described in Section 3.1. In
particular, user-level RTP implementations would want access to ECN
bits in UDP datagrams. It might be difficult or undesirable to allow
that access for RTP, but not for other user-level programs.
Kernel implementations of RTP would not suffer from this problem. In
the end, the argument against modifying RTP is the same as that
against modifying SCTP: Some applications, such as the export of
flow information from routers, need congestion control but don't
need much of RTP's functionality. From these applications' point of
view, RTP would induce unnecessary overhead. Again, we would argue
for a clean and minimal protocol focused on end-to-end congestion
control.
RTP would commonly be used as a layer above any new transport
protocol, however. The design of that new transport protocol should
take this into account, either by avoiding undue duplication of
information available in the RTP header, or by suggesting
modifications to RTP.
3.3.4. Designing a New Transport Protocol
In the first half of this document we have argued for providing
congestion control at the transport layer as an alternative to UDP,
instead of relying on congestion control supplied only above or
below UDP. In this section, we have examined the possibilities of
modifying SCTP, modifying TCP, and designing a new transport
protocol. In large part because of the requirement for unreliable
transport, and for accommodating TFRC and well as TCP-like
congestion control, we have concluded that modifications of SCTP or
TCP are not the best answer, and that a new transport protocol is
needed. Thus, we have argued for the need for a new transport
protocol that offers unreliable delivery; accommodates TFRC as well
as TCP-like congestion control; accommodates the use of ECN; and
requires minimal overhead in packet size and in the state and CPU
processing required at the data receiver.
This is the line of reasoning that has lead us to the development of
DCCP. Both the problem statement presented in this document, and
the detailed design decisions made in the design of DCCP, have been
brought to the IETF for further feedback. This document addresses
only the problem statement; the design decisions resulting from this
problem statement will be addressed in a later document.
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4. Selling Congestion Control to Reluctant Applications
The goal of this work is to provide general congestion control
mechanisms that will actually be used by many of the applications
that currently use UDP. This may include applications that are
perfectly happy without end-to-end congestion control. Several of
our design requirements follow from a desire to design and deploy a
congestion-controlled protocol that is actually attractive to these
"reluctant" applications. These include the use of Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) and the ECN Nonce, which both provide
positive benefit to the application itself; the choice between
different forms of congestion control; and moderate overhead in the
size of the packet header.
There will always be a few flows that are resistant to the use of
end-to-end congestion control, preferring an environment where end-
to-end congestion control is used by everyone else, but not by
themselves. There has been substantial agreement [RFC 2309] [FF99]
that in order to maintain the continued use of end-to-end congestion
control, router mechanisms are needed to detect and penalize
uncontrolled high-bandwidth flows in times of high congestion; these
router mechanisms are colloquially known as `penalty boxes'.
However, before undertaking a concerted effort towards the
deployment of penalty boxes in the Internet, it seems reasonable,
and more effective, to first make a concerted effort to make end-to-
end congestion control easily available to applications currently
using UDP.
5. Additional Design Considerations
This section mentions some additional design considerations that
should be considered in designing a new transport protocol.
o Mobility: Mechanisms for multi-homing and mobility are one area of
additional functionality that cannot necessarily be layered
cleanly and effectively on top of a transport protocol. Thus, one
outstanding design decision with any new transport protocol
concerns whether to incorporate mechanisms for multi-homing and
mobility into the protocol itself.
o Defense against DoS attacks and spoofing: A reliable handshake for
connection setup and teardown offers protection against DoS and
spoofing attacks. Mechanisms allowing a server to avoid holding
any state for unacknowledged connection attempts or already-
finished connections offers additional protection against DoS
attacks. Thus, in designed a new transport protocol, even one
designed to provide minimal functionality, the requirements for
providing defense against DoS attacks and spoofing need to be
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considered.
o Interoperation with RTP: As Section 3.3.3 describes, attention
should be paid to the changes that would be required by RTP in
order to use any new protocol.
o API: Some functionality required by the protocol, or useful for
applications using the protocol, may require the definition of new
API mechanisms. Examples include allowing applications to decide
what information to put in a packet at transmission timer, and
providing applications with some information about packet sequence
numbers.
o Consider general experiences with unicast transport: A
Requirements for Unicast Transport/Sessions (ruts) BOF was held at
the IETF meeting in December, 1998, with the goal of understanding
the requirements of applications whose needs were not met by TCP
[RUTS]. Not all of those unmet needs are relevant to or
appropriate for a unicast, congestion-controlled, unreliable flow
of datagrams designed for long-lived transfers. Some are, however,
and any new protocol should address those needs, and other
requirements derived from the community's experience. We believe
that the DCCP problem statement addresses the relevant
requirements brought up at the ruts BOF.
6. Summary of Recommendations
Our problem statement has discussed the need for implementing
congestion control for unreliable flows. Additional problems
concern the need for low overhead, the problems of firewall
traversal, and the need for reliable parameter negotiation. Our
consideration of the problem statement has resulted in the following
general recommendations:
o A unicast transport protocol for unreliable datagrams should be
developed, including mandatory, built-in congestion control.
o The protocol must provide a set of congestion control mechanisms
from which the application may choose. These mechanisms should
include, at minimum, TCP-like congestion control and a more
slowly-responding congestion control such as TFRC.
o Important features of the connection, such as the congestion
control mechanism in use, should be reliably negotiated by both
endpoints.
o Support for ECN should be included.
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o The overhead must be low, in terms of both packet size and
protocol complexity.
o Some DoS protection for servers must be included. In particular,
servers can make themselves invulnerable to spoofed connection
attacks ("SYN floods").
o Connection setup and teardown must use explicit handshakes,
facilitating transmission through stateful firewalls.
If there is a consensus about the need for a new unicast transport
protocol for unreliable datagrams, then the next step can be the
consideration of more detailed architectural issues.
7. References
[Bala99] H. Balakrishnan, H. Rahul, and S. Seshan, An Integrated
Congestion Management Architecture for Internet Hosts, SIGCOMM,
Sept. 1999.
[MEASWEB] Ramon Caceres and Sally Floyd, Measurement Studies of End-
to-End Congestion Control in the Internet, Web Page, 2001.
[FF99] S. Floyd and K. Fall, Promoting the Use of End-to-End
Congestion Control in the Internet, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, August 1999.
[MC01] S. McCreary and K.C. Claffy, Trends in Wide Area IP Traffic
Patterns: A View from Ames Internet Exchange, ITC Specialist
Seminar, 2001. URL
``http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2000/AIX0005/''.
[RFC 2026] S. Bradner. The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3.
RFC 2026.
[RFC 2481] K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd. A Proposal to add Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 2481.
[RFC 1191] J. C. Mogul, S. E. Deering. Path MTU Discovery. RFC 1191.
[RFC 2309] B. Braden et al., Recommendations on Queue Management and
Congestion Avoidance in the Internet. RFC 2309, April 1998.
[RFC 2525] V. Paxson et al., Known TCP Implementation Problems, RFC
2525, March 1999.
[RFC 2914] S. Floyd. Congestion Control Principles. RFC 2914, Sept.
2000.
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[RFC 2960] R. Stewart, Q. Xie, K. Morneault, C. Sharp, H.
Schwarzbauer, T. Taylor, I. Rytina, M. Kalla, L. Zhang, V.
Paxson. Stream Control Transmission Protocol. RFC 2960.
[RFC 3124] H. Balakrishnan, S. Seshan. The Congestion Manager. RFC
3124.
[RUTS] Requirements for Unicast Transport/Sessions (ruts) BOF, Dec.
7, 1998. URL "http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/98dec/43rd-
ietf-98dec-142.html".
[TBIT] J. Padhye and S. Floyd, Identifying the TCP Behavior of Web
Servers, SIGCOMM 2001.
[WES01] David Wetherall, David Ely, Neil Spring. Robust ECN
Signaling with Nonces. draft-ietf-tsvwg-tcp-nonce-03.txt, work
in progress, April 2002.
8. Authors' Addresses
Sally Floyd <floyd@icir.org>
Mark Handley <mjh@icir.org>
Eddie Kohler <kohler@icir.org>
ICSI Center for Internet Research (ICIR),
International Computer Science Institute,
1947 Center Street, Suite 600
Berkeley, CA 94704.
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