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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                           O. Friel
Internet-Draft                                                   E. Lear
Intended status: Informational                               M. Pritikin
Expires: January 3, 2019                                           Cisco
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                           July 02, 2018


                         BRSKI over IEEE 802.11
                   draft-friel-brski-over-802dot11-01

Abstract

   This document outlines the challenges associated with implementing
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures over IEEE 802.11 and
   IEEE 802.1x networks.  Multiple options are presented for discovering
   and authenticating to the correct IEEE 802.11 SSID.  This initial
   draft is a discussion document and no final recommendations are made
   on the recommended approaches to take.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Discovery and Authentication Design Considerations  . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Incorrect SSID Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Leveraging BRSKI MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Relying on the Network Administrator  . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.3.  Requiring the Network to Demonstrate Knowledge of
               Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  IEEE 802.11 Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.1.  IP Address Assignment Considerations  . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Client and Server Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Potential SSID Discovery Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Well-known BRSKI SSID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  IEEE 802.11aq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  IEEE 802.11 Vendor Specific Information Element . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Reusing Existing IEEE 802.11u Elements  . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  IEEE 802.11u Interworking Information - Internet  . . . .  11
     3.6.  Define New IEEE 802.11u Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.7.  Wi-Fi Protected Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.8.  Define and Advertise a BRSKI-specific AKM in RSNE . . . .  12
     3.9.  Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Profile . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Potential Authentication Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Unauthenticated Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . .  14
     4.2.  PSK or SAE Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  MAC Address Bypass Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI . . .  15
     4.4.  EAP-TLS Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  New TEAP BRSKI mechanism  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.6.  New IEEE 802.11 Authentication Algorithm for BRSKI and
           EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.7.  New IEEE 802.1X EAPOL-Announcements to encapsulate BRSKI
           and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Appendix A.  IEEE 802.11 Primer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.1.  IEEE 802.11i  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.2.  IEEE 802.11u  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23






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1.  Introduction

   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] describes how a device can
   bootstrap against a local network using an Initial Device Identity
   X.509 [IEEE802.1AR] IDevID certificate that is pre-installed by the
   vendor on the device in order to obtain an [IEEE802.1AR] LDevID.  The
   BRSKI flow assumes the device can obtain an IP address, and thus
   assumes the device has already connected to the local network.
   Further, the draft states that BRSKI use of IDevIDs:

      allows for alignment with [IEEE802.1X] network access control
      methods, its use here is for Pledge authentication rather than
      network access control.  Integrating this protocol with network
      access control, perhaps as an Extensible Authentication Protocol
      (EAP) method (see [RFC3748], is out-of-scope.

   The draft does not describe any mechanisms for how an [IEEE802.11]
   enabled device would discover and select a suitable [IEEE802.11] SSID
   when multiple SSIDs are available.  A typical deployment scenario
   could involve a device begin deployed in a location were twenty or
   more SSIDs are being broadcast, for example, in a multi-tenanted
   building or campus where multiple independent organizations operate
   [IEEE802.11] networks.

   In order to reduce the administrative overhead of installing new
   devices, it is desirable that the device will automatically discover
   and connect to the correct SSID without the installer having to
   manually provision any network information or credentials on the
   device.  It is also desirable that the device does not discover,
   connect to, and automatically enroll with the wrong network as this
   could result in a device that is owned by one organization connecting
   to the network of a different organization in a multi-tenanted
   building or campus.

   Additionally, as noted above, the BRSKI draft does not describe how
   BRSKI could potentially align with [IEEE802.1X] authentication
   mechanisms.

   This document outlines multiple different potential mechanisms that
   would enable a bootstrapping device to choose between different
   available [IEEE802.11] SSIDs in order to execute the BRSKI flow.
   This document also outlines several options for how [IEEE802.11]
   networks enforcing [IEEE802.1X] authentication could enable the BRSKI
   flow, and describes the required device behaviour.

   This document presents both [IEEE802.11] mechanisms and Wi-Fi
   Alliance (WFA) mechanisms.  An important consideration when



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   determining what the most appropriate solution to device onboarding
   should be is what bodies need to be involved in standardisation
   efforts: IETF, IEEE and/or WFA.

1.1.  Terminology

   IEEE 802.11u: an amendment to the IEEE 802.11-2007 standard to add
   features that improve interworking with external networks.

   ANI: Autonomic Networking Infrastructure

   ANQP: Access Network Query Protocol

   AP: IEEE 802.11 Access Point

   CA: Certificate Authority

   EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol

   EST: Enrollment over Secure Transport

   HotSpot 2.0 / HS2.0: An element of the Wi-Fi Alliance Passpoint
   certificatoin program that enables cell phones to automatically
   discover capabilities and enroll into IEEE 802.11 guest networks
   (hotspots).

   IE: Information Element

   IDevID: Initial Device Identifier

   LDevID: Locally Significant Device Identifier

   OI: Organization Identifier

   MASA: BRSKI Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority service

   SSID: IEEE 802.11 Service Set Identifier

   STA: IEEE 802.11 station

   WFA: Wi-Fi Alliance

   WLC: Wireless LAN Controller

   WPA/WPA2: Wi-Fi Protected Access / Wi-Fi Protected Access version 2

   WPS: Wi-Fi Protected Setup




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2.  Discovery and Authentication Design Considerations

2.1.  Incorrect SSID Discovery

   As will be seen in the following sections, there are several
   discovery scenarios where the device can choose an incorrect SSID and
   attempt to join the wrong network.  For example, the device is being
   deployed by one organization in a multi-tenant building, and chooses
   to connect to the SSID of a neighbor organization.  The device is
   dependent upon the incorrect network rejecting its BRSKI enrollment
   attempt.  It is possible that the device could end up enrolled with
   the wrong network.

2.1.1.  Leveraging BRSKI MASA

2.1.1.1.  Prevention

   BRSKI allows optional sales channel integration which could be used
   to ensure only the "correct" network can claim the device.  In
   theory, this could be achieved if the BRSKI MASA service has explicit
   knowledge of the network where every single device will be deployed.
   After connecting to the incorrect SSID and possibly authenticating to
   the network, the device would present network TLS information in its
   voucher-request, and the MASA server would have to reject the request
   based on this network TLS information and not issue a voucher.  The
   device could then reject that SSID and attempt to bootstrap against
   the next available SSID.

   This could possibly be acheieved via sales channel integration, where
   devices are tracked through the supply chain all the way from
   manufacturer factory to target deployment network operator.  In
   practice, this approach may be challenging to deploy as it may be
   extremely difficult to implement this tightly coupled sales channel
   integration and ensure that the MASA actually has accurate deployment
   network information.

   An alternative to sales channel integration is to provide the device
   owners with a, possibly authenticated, interface or API to the MASA
   service whereby they would have to explicitly claim devices prior to
   the MASA issuing vouchers for that device.  There are similar
   problems with this approach, as there could be a complex sales and
   channel partner chain between the MASA service operator and the
   device operator who owns and deploys the device.  This could make
   exposure of APIs by the MASA operator to the device operator
   untenable.






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2.1.1.2.  Detection

   If a device connects to the wrong network, the correct network
   operator could detect this after the fact by integration with MASA
   and checking audit logs for the device.  The MASA audit logs should
   indicate all networks that have been issued vouchers for a specific
   device.  This mechanism also relies on the correct network operater
   having a list, bill or materials, or similar of all device identities
   that should be connecting to their network in order to check MASA
   logs for devices that have not come online, but are known to be
   physically deployed.

2.1.2.  Relying on the Network Administrator

   An obvious mechanism is to rely on network administrators to be good
   citizens and explicitly reject devices that attempt to bootstrap
   against the wrong network.  This is not guaranteed to work for two
   main reasons:

   o  Some network administrators will configure an open policy on their
      network.  Any device that attempts to connect to the network will
      be automatically granted access.

   o  Some network administrators will be bad actors and will
      intentionally attempt to onboard devices that they do not own but
      that are in range of their networks.

2.1.3.  Requiring the Network to Demonstrate Knowledge of Device

   Protocols such as the WFA Device Provisioning Profile [DPP] require
   that a network provisoining entity demonstrate knowledge of device
   information such as the device's bootstrapping public key prior to
   the device attempting to connect to the network.  This gives a higher
   level of confidence to the device that it is connecting to the
   correct SSID.  These mechanisms could leverage a key that is printed
   on the device label, or included in a sales channel bill of
   materials.  The security of these types of key distribution
   mechanisms relies on keeping the device label or bill of materials
   content from being compromised prior to device installation.

2.2.  IEEE 802.11 Authentication Mechanisms

   [IEEE802.11i] allows an SSID to advertise different authentication
   mechanisms via the AKM Suite list in the RSNE.  A very brief
   introduction to [IEEE802.11i] is given in the appendices.  An SSID
   could advertise PSK or [IEEE802.1X] authentication mechanisms.  When
   a network operator needs to enforce two different authentication




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   mechanisms, one for pre-BRSKI devices and one for post-BRSKI devices,
   the operator has two options:

   o  configure two SSIDs with the same SSID string value, each one
      advertising a different authentication mechanism

   o  configure two different SSIDs, each with its own SSID string
      value, with each one advertising a different authentication
      mechanism

   If devices have to be flexible enough to handle both options, then
   this adds complexity to the device firmware and internal state
   machines.  Similarly, if network infrastructure (APs, WLCs, AAAs)
   potentially needs to support both options, then this adds complexity
   to network infrastructure configuration flexibility, software and
   state machines.  Consideration must be given to the practicalities of
   implementation for both devices and network infrastructure when
   designing the final bootstrap mechanism and aligning [IEEE802.11],
   [IEEE802.1X] and BRSKI protocol interactions.

   Devices should be flexible enough to handle potential options defined
   by any final draft.  When discovering a pre-BRSKI SSID, the device
   should also discover the authentication mechanism enforced by the
   SSID that is advertising BRSKI support.  If the device supports the
   authentication mechanism being advertised, then the device can
   connect to the SSID in order to initiate the BRSKI flow.  For
   example, the device may support [IEEE802.1X] as a pre-BRSKI
   authentication mechanism, but may not support PSK as a pre-BRSKI
   authentication mechanism.

   Once the device has completed the BRKSI flow and has obtained an
   LDevID, a mechanism is needed to tell the device which SSID to use
   for post-BRSKI network access.  This may be a different SSID to the
   pre-BRSKI SSID.  The mechanism by which the post-BRSKI SSID is
   advertised to the device is out-of-scope of this version of this
   document.

2.2.1.  IP Address Assignment Considerations

   If a device has to perform two different authentications, one for
   pre-BRSKI and one for post-BRSKI, network policy will typically
   assign the device to different VLANs for these different stages, and
   may assign the device different IP addresses depending on which
   network segment the device is assigned to.  This could be true even
   if a single SSID is used for both pre-BRSKI and post-BRSKI
   connections.  Therefore, the bootstrapping device may need to
   completely reset its network connection and network software stack,




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   and obtain a new IP address between pre-BRSKI and post-BRSKI
   connections.

2.3.  Client and Server Implementations

   When evaluating all possible SSID discovery mechanism and
   authentication mechanisms outlined in this document, consideration
   must be given to the complexity of the required client and server
   implementation and state machines.  Consideration must also be given
   to the network operator configuration complexity if multiple
   permutations and combinations of SSID discovery and network
   authentication mechanisms are possible.

3.  Potential SSID Discovery Mechanisms

   This section outlines multiple different mechanisms that could
   potentially be leveraged that would enable a bootstrapping device to
   choose between multiple different available [IEEE802.11] SSIDs.  As
   noted previously, this draft does not make any final recommendations.

   The discovery options outlined in this document include:

   o  Well-known BRSKI SSID

   o  [IEEE802.11aq]

   o  [IEEE802.11] Vendor Specific Information Element

   o  Reusing Existing [IEEE802.11u] Elements

   o  [IEEE802.11u] Interworking Information - Internet

   o  Define New [IEEE802.11u] Extensions

   o  Wi-Fi Protected Setup

   o  Define and Advertise a BRSKI-specific AKM in RSNE

   o  Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Profile

   These mechanisms are described in more detail in the following
   sections.

3.1.  Well-known BRSKI SSID

   A standardized naming convention for SSIDs offering BRSKI services is
   defined such as:




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   o  BRSKI%ssidname

   Where:

   o  BRSKI: is a well-known prefix string of characters.  This prefix
      string would be baked into device firmware.

   o  %: is a well known delimiter character.  This delimiter character
      would be baked into device firmware.

   o  ssidname: is the freeform SSID name that the network operator
      defines.

   Device manufacturers would bake the well-known prefix string and
   character delimiter into device firmware.  Network operators
   configuring SSIDs which offer BRSKI services would have to ensure
   that the SSID of those networks begins with this prefix.  On
   bootstrap, the device would scan all available SSIDs and look for
   ones with this given prefix.

   If multiple SSIDs are available with this prefix, then the device
   could simply round robin through these SSIDs and attempt to start the
   BRSKI flow on each one in turn until it succeeds.

   This mechanism suffers from the limitations outlined in Section 2.1 -
   it does nothing to prevent a device enrolling against an incorrect
   network.

   Another issue with defining a specific naming convention for the SSID
   is that this may require network operators to have to deploy a new
   SSID.  In general, network operators attempt to keep the number of
   unique SSIDs deployed to a minimum as each deployed SSID eats up a
   percentage of available air time and network capacity.  A good
   discussion of SSID overhead and an SSID overhead [calculator] is
   available.

3.2.  IEEE 802.11aq

   [IEEE802.11aq] is currently being worked by the IEEE, but is not yet
   finalized, and is not yet supported by any vendors in shipping
   product.  [IEEE802.11aq] defines new elements that can be included in
   [IEEE802.11] Beacon, Probe Request and Probe Response frames, and
   defines new elements for ANQP frames.

   The extensions allow an AP to broadcast support for backend services,
   where allowed services are those registered in the [IANA] Service
   Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry.  The services can
   be advertised in [IEEE802.11] elements that include either:



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   o  SHA256 hashes of the registered service names

   o  a bloom filter of the SHA256 hashes of the registered service
      names

   Bloom filters simply serve to reduce the size of Beacon and Probe
   Response frames when a large number of services are advertised.  If a
   bloom filter is used by the AP, and a device discovers a potential
   service match in the bloom filter, then the device can query the AP
   for the full list of service name hashes using newly defined ANQP
   elements.

   If BRSKI were to leverage [IEEE802.11aq], then the [IEEE802.11aq]
   specification would need to be pushed and supported, and a BRSKI
   service would need to be defined in [IANA].

   This mechanism suffers from the limitations outlined in Section 2.1 -
   it does nothing to prevent a device enrolling against an incorrect
   network.

3.3.  IEEE 802.11 Vendor Specific Information Element

   [IEEE802.11] defines Information Element (IE) number 221 for carrying
   Vendor Specific information.  The purpose of this document is to
   define an SSID discovery mechanism that can be used across all
   devices and vendors, so use of this IE is not an appropriate long
   term solution.

3.4.  Reusing Existing IEEE 802.11u Elements

   [IEEE802.11u] defines mechanisms for interworking.  An introduction
   to [IEEE802.11u] is given in the appendices.  Existing IEs in
   [IEEE802.11u] include:

   o  Roaming Consortium IE

   o  NAI Realm IE

   These existing IEs could be used to advertise a well-known, logical
   service that devices implicitly know to look for.

   In the case of NAI Realm, a well-known service name such as
   "_bootstrapks" could be defined and advertised in the NAI Realm IE.
   In the case of Roaming Consortium, a well-known Organization
   Identifier (OI) could be defined and advertised in the Roaming
   Consortium IE.





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   Device manufacturers would bake the well-known NAI Realm or Roaming
   Consortium OI into device firmware.  Network operators configuring
   SSIDs which offer BRSKI services would have to ensure that the SSID
   offered this NAI Realm or OI.  On bootstrap, the device would scan
   all available SSIDs and use ANQP to query for NAI Realms or Roaming
   Consortium OI looking for a match.

   The key concept with this proposal is that BRSKI uses a well-known
   NAI Realm name or Roaming Consortium OI more as a logical service
   advertisement rather than as a backhaul internet provider
   advertisement.  This is conceptually very similar to what
   [IEEE802.11aq] is attempting to achieve.

   Leveraging NAI Realm or Roaming Consortium would not require any
   [IEEE802.11] specification changes, and could possibly be defined by
   this IETF draft.  Note that the authors are not aware of any
   currently defined IETF or IANA namespaces that define NAI Realms or
   OIs.

   Additionally (or alternatively...) as NAI Realm includes advertising
   the EAP mechanism required, if a new EAP-BRSKI were to be defined,
   then this could be advertised.  Devices could then scan for an NAI
   Realm that enforced EAP-BRSKI, and ignore the realm name.

   This mechanism suffers from the limitations outlined in Section 2.1 -
   it does nothing to prevent a device enrolling against an incorrect
   network.

   Additionally, as the IEEE is attempting to standardize logical
   service advertisement via [IEEE802.11aq], [IEEE802.11aq] would seem
   to be the more appropriate option than overloading an existing IE.
   However, it is worth noting that configuration of these IEs is
   supported today by WLCs, and this mechanism may be suitable for
   demonstrations or proof-of-concepts.

3.5.  IEEE 802.11u Interworking Information - Internet

   It is possible that an SSID may be configured to provide unrestricted
   and unauthenticated internet access.  This could be advertised in the
   Interworking Information IE by including:

   o  internet bit = 1

   o  ASRA bit = 0

   If such a network were discovered, a device could attempt to use the
   BRSKI well-known vendor cloud Registrar.  Possibly this could be a




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   default fall back mechanism that a device could use when determining
   which SSID to use.

3.6.  Define New IEEE 802.11u Extensions

   Of the various elements currently defined by [IEEE802.11u] for
   potentially advertising BRSKI, NAI Realm and Roaming Consortium IE
   are the two existing options that are a closest fit, as outlined
   above.  Another possibility that has been suggested in the IETF
   mailers is defining an extension to [IEEE802.11u] specifically for
   advertising BRSKI service capability.  Any extensions should be
   included in Beacon and Probe Response frames so that devices can
   discover BRSKI capability without the additional overhead of having
   to explicitly query using ANQP.

   [IEEE802.11aq] appears to be the proposed mechanism for generically
   advertising any service capability, provided that service is
   registered with [IANA].  It is probably a better approach to
   encourage adoption of [IEEE802.11aq] and register a service name for
   BRSKI with [IANA] rather than attempt to define a completely new
   BRSKI-specific [IEEE802.11u] extension.

3.7.  Wi-Fi Protected Setup

   Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) only works with Wi-Fi Protected Access
   (WPA) and WPA2 when in Personal Mode.  WPS does not work when the
   network is in Enterprise Mode enforcing [IEEE802.1X] authentication.
   WPS is intended for consumer networks and does not address the
   security requirements of enterprise or IoT deployments.

3.8.  Define and Advertise a BRSKI-specific AKM in RSNE

   [IEEE802.11i] introduced the RSNE element which allows an SSID to
   advertise multiple authentication mechanisms.  A new Authentication
   and Key Management (AKM) Suite could be defined that indicates the
   STA can use BRSKI mechanisms to authenticate against the SSID.  The
   authentication handshake could be an [IEEE802.1X] handshake, possibly
   leveraging an EAP-BRSKI mechanism, the key thing here is that a new
   AKM is defined and advertised to indicate the specific BRSKI-capable
   EAP method that is supported by [IEEE802.1X], as opposed to the
   current [IEEE802.1X] AKMs which give no indication of the supported
   EAP mechanisms.  It is clear that such method would limit the SSID to
   BRSKI-supporting clients.  This would require an additional SSID
   specifically for BRSKI clients.







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3.9.  Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Profile

   The [DPP] specification defines how an entity that is already trusted
   by a network can assist an untrusted entity in enrolling with the
   network.  The description below assumes the [IEEE802.11] network is
   in infrastructure mode.  DPP introduces multiple key roles including:

   o  Configurator: A logical entity that is already trusted by the
      network that has capabilities to enroll and provision devices
      called Enrollees.  A Configurator may be a STA or an AP.

   o  Enrollee: A logical entity that is being provisioned by a
      Configurator.  An Enrollee may be a STA or an AP.

   o  Initiator: A logical entity that initiates the DPP Authentication
      Protocol.  The Initiator may be the Configurator or the Enrollee.

   o  Responder: A logical entity that responds to the Initiator of the
      DPP Authentication Protocol.  The Responder may be the
      Configurator or the Enrollee.

   In order to support a plug and play model for installation of
   devices, where the device is simply powered up for the first time and
   automatically discovers the network without the need for a helper or
   supervising application, for example an application running on a
   smart cell phone or tablet that performs the role of Configurator,
   then this implies that the AP must perform the role of the
   Configurator and the device or STA performs the role of Enrollee.
   Note that the AP may simply proxy DPP messages through to a backend
   WLC, but from the perspective of the device, the AP is the
   Configurator.

   The DPP specification also mandates that the Initiator must be
   bootstrapped the bootstrapping public key of the Responder.  For
   BRSKI purposes, the DPP bootstrapping public key will be the
   [IEEE802.1AR] IDevID of the device.  As the boostrapping device
   cannot know in advance the bootstrapping public key of a specific
   operators network, this implies that the Configurator must take on
   the role of the Initiator.  Therefore, the AP must take on the roles
   of both the Configurator and the Initiator.

   More details to be added...

4.  Potential Authentication Options

   When the bootstrapping device determines which SSID to connect to,
   there are multiple potential options available for how the device




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   authenticates with the network while bootstrapping.  Several options
   are outlined in this section.  This list is not exhaustive.

   At a high level, authentication can generally be split into two
   phases using two different credentials:

   o  Pre-BRSKI: The device can use its [IEEE802.1AR] IDevID to connect
      to the network while executing the BRSKI flow

   o  Post-BRSKI: The device can use its [IEEE802.1AR] LDevID to connect
      to the network after completing BRSKI enrollment

   The authentication options outlined in this document include:

   o  Unauthenticated Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   o  PSK or SAE Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   o  MAC Address Bypass Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   o  EAP-TLS Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   o  New TEAP BRSKI mechanism

   o  New [IEEE802.11] Authentication Algorithm for BRSKI and EAP-TLS
      Post-BRSKI

   o  New [IEEE802.1X] EAPOL-Announcements to encapsulate BRSKI prior to
      EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   These mechanisms are described in more detail in the following
   sections.  Note that any mechanisms leveraging [IEEE802.1X] are
   [IEEE802.11] MAC layer authentication mechanisms and therefore the
   SSID must advertise WPA2 capability.

   When evaluating the multiple authentication options outlined below,
   care and consideration must be given to the complexity of the
   software state machine required in both devices and services for
   implementation.

4.1.  Unauthenticated Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   The device connects to an unauthenticated network pre-BRSKI.  The
   device connects to a network enforcing EAP-TLS post-BRSKI.  The
   device uses its LDevID as the post-BRSKI EAP-TLS credential.

   To be completed..




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4.2.  PSK or SAE Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   The device connects to a network enforcing PSK pre-BRSKI.  The
   mechanism by which the PSK is provisioned on the device for pre-BRSKI
   authentication is out-of-scope of this version of this document.  The
   device connects to a network enforcing EAP-TLS post-BRSKI.  The
   device uses the LDevID obtained via BRSKI as the post-BRSKI EAP-TLS
   credential.

   When the device connects to the post-BRSKI network that is enforcing
   EAP-TLS, the device uses its LDevID as its credential.  The device
   should verify the certificate presented by the server during that
   EAP-TLS exchange against the trusted CA list it obtained during
   BRSKI.

   If the [IEEE802.1X] network enforces a tunneled EAP method, for
   example [RFC7170], where the device must present an additional
   credential such as a password, the mechanism by which that additional
   credential is provisioned on the device for post-BRSKI authentication
   is out-of-scope of this version of this document.  NAI Realm may be
   used to advertise the EAP methods being enforced by an SSID.  It is
   to be determined if guidelines should be provided on use of NAI Realm
   for advertising EAP method in order to streamline BRSKI.

4.3.  MAC Address Bypass Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   Many AAA server state machine logic allows for the network to
   fallback to MAC Address Bypass (MAB) when initial authentication
   against the network fails.  If the device does not present a valid
   credential to the network, then the network will check if the
   device's MAC address is whitelisted.  If it is, then the network may
   grant the device access to a network segment that will allow it to
   complete the BRSKI flow and get provisioned with an LDevID.  Once the
   device has an LDevID, it can then reauthenticate against the network
   using its EAP-TLS and its LDevID.

4.4.  EAP-TLS Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS Post-BRSKI

   The device connects to a network enforcing EAP-TLS pre-BRSKI.  The
   device uses its IDevID as the pre-BRSKI EAP-TLS credential.  The
   device connects to a network enforcing EAP-TLS post-BRSKI.  The
   device uses its LDevID as the post-BRSKI EAP-TLS credential.

   When the device connects to a pre-BRSKI network that is enforcing
   EAP-TLS, the device uses its IDevID as its credential.  The deivce
   should not attempt to verify the certificate presented by the server
   during that EAP-TLS exchange, as it has not yet discovered the local
   domain trusted CA list.



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   When the device connects to the post-BRSKI network that is enforcing
   EAP-TLS, the device uses its LDevID as its credential.  The device
   should verify the certificate presented by the server during that
   EAP-TLS exchange against the trusted CA list it obtained during
   BRSKI.

   Again, if the post-BRSKI network enforces a tunneled EAP method, the
   mechanism by which that second credential is provisioned on the
   device is out-of-scope of this version of this document.

4.5.  New TEAP BRSKI mechanism

   New TEAP TLVs are defined to transport BRSKI messages inside an outer
   EAP TLS tunnel such as TEAP [RFC7170].  [I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski]
   outlines a proposal for how BRSKI messages could be transported
   inside TEAP TLVs.  At a high level, this enables the device to obtain
   an LDevID during the Layer 2 authentication stage.  This has multiple
   advantages including:

   o  avoids the need for the device to potentially connect to two
      different SSIDs during bootstrap

   o  the device only needs to handle one authentication mechanism
      during bootstrap

   o  the device only needs to obtain one IP address, which it obtains
      after BRSKI is complete

   o  avoids the need for the device to have to disconnect from the
      network, reset its network stack, and reconnect to the network

   o  potentially simplifies network policy configuration

   There are two suboptions to choose from when tunneling BRSKI messages
   inside TEAP:

   o  define new TLVs for transporting BRSKI messages inside the TEAP
      tunnel

   o  define a new EAP BRSKI method type that is tunneled within the
      outer TEAP method

   This section assumes that new TLVs are defined for transporting BRSKI
   messages inside the TEAP tunnel and that a new EAP BRSKI method type
   is not defined.

   The device discovers and connects to a network enforcing TEAP.  A
   high level TEAP with BRSKI extensions flow would look something like:



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   o  Device starts the EAP flow by sending the EAP TLS ClientHello
      message

   o  EAP server replies and includes CertificateRequest message, and
      may specify certificate_authorities in the message

   o  if the device has an LDevID and the LDevID issuing CA is allowed
      by the certificate_authorities list (i.e. the issuing CA is
      explicitly included in the list, or else the list is empty) then
      the device uses its LDevID to establish the TLS tunnel

   o  if the device does not have an LDevID, or certificate_authorities
      prevents it using its LDevID, then the device uses its IDevID to
      establish the TLS tunnel

   o  if certificate_authorities prevents the device from using its
      IDevID (and its LDevID if it has one) then the device fails to
      connect

   The EAP server continues with TLS tunnel establishment:

   o  if the device certificate is invalid or expired, then the EAP
      server fails the connection request.

   o  if the device certificate is valid but is not allowed due to a
      configured policy on the EAP server, then the EAP server fails the
      connection request

   o  if the device certificate is accepted, then the EAP server
      establishes the TLS tunnel and starts the tunneled EAP-BRSKI
      procedures

   At this stage, the EAP server has some policy decisions to make:

   o  if network policy indicates that the device certificate is
      sufficient to grant network access, whether it is an LDevID or an
      IDevID, then the EAP server simply initiates the Crypto-Binding
      TLV and 'Success' Result TLV exchange.  The device can now obtain
      an IP address and connect to the network.

   o  the EAP server may instruct the device to initialise a full BRSKI
      flow.  Typically, the EAP server will instruct the device to
      initialize a BRSKI flow when it presents an IDevID, however, the
      EAP server may instruct the device to initialize a BRSKI flow even
      if it presented a valid LDevID.  The device sends all BRSKI
      messages, for example 'requestvoucher', inside the TLS tunnel
      using new TEAP TLVs.  Assuming the BRSKI flow completes
      successfully and the device is issued an LDevID, the EAP server



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      completes the exchange by initiating the Crypto-Binding TLV and
      'Success' Result TLV exchange.

   Once the EAP flow has successfully completed, then:

   o  network policy will automatically assign the device to the correct
      network segment

   o  the device obtains an IP address

   o  the device can access production service

   It is assumed that the device will automatically handle LDevID
   certificate reenrolment via standard EST [RFC7030] outside the
   context of the EAP tunnel.

   An item to be considered here is what information is included in
   Beacon or Probe Response frames to explicitly indicate that
   [IEEE802.1X] authentication using TEAP supporting BRSKI extensions is
   allowed.  Currently, the RSNE included in Beacon and Probe Response
   frames can only indicate [IEEE802.1X] support.

4.6.  New IEEE 802.11 Authentication Algorithm for BRSKI and EAP-TLS
      Post-BRSKI

   [IEEE802.11] supports multiple authentication algorithms in its
   Authentication frame including:

   o  Open System

   o  Shared Key

   o  Fast BSS Transition

   o  Simultaneous Authentication of Equals

   Shared Key authentication is used to indicate that the legacy WEP
   authentication mechanism is to be used.  Simultaneous Authentication
   of Equals is used to indicate that the Dragonfly-based shared
   passphrase authentication mechanism introduced in [IEEE802.11s] is to
   be used.  One thing that these two methods have in common is that a
   series of handshake data exchanges occur between the device and the
   AP as elements inside Authentication frames, and these Authentication
   exchanges happen prior to [IEEE802.11] Association.

   It would be possible to define a new Authentication Algorithm and
   define new elements to encapsulate BRSKI messages inside
   Authentication frames.  For example, new elements could be defined to



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   encapsulate BRSKI requestvoucher, voucher and voucher telemetry JSON
   messages.  The full BRSKI flow completes and the device gets issued
   an LDevID prior to associating with an SSID, and prior to doing full
   [IEEE802.1X] authentication using its LDevID.

   The high level flow would be something like:

   o  SSID Beacon / Probe Response indicates in RSNE that it supports
      BRSKI based Authentication Algorithm

   o  SSIDs could also advertise that they support both BRSKI based
      Authentication and [IEEE802.1X]

   o  device discovers SSID via suitable mechanism

   o  device completes BRSKI by sending new elements inside
      Authentication frames and obtains an LDevID

   o  device associates with the AP

   o  device completes [IEEE802.1X] authentication using its LDevID as
      credential for EAP-TLS or TEAP

4.7.  New IEEE 802.1X EAPOL-Announcements to encapsulate BRSKI and EAP-
      TLS Post-BRSKI

   [IEEE802.1X] defines multiple EAPOL packet types, including EAPOL-
   Announcement and EAPOL-Announcement-Req messages.  EAPOL-Annoncement
   and EAPOL-Announcement-Req messages can include multiple TLVs.
   EAPOL-Annoncement messages can be sent prior to starting any EAP
   authentication flow.  New TLVs could be defined to encapsulate BRSKI
   messages inside EAPOL-Announcement and EAPOL-Announcement-Req TLVs.
   For example, new TLVs could be defined to encapsulate BRSKI
   requestvoucher, voucher and voucher telemetry JSON messages.  The
   full BRSKI flow could complete inside EAPOL-Announcement exchanges
   prior to sending EAPOL-Start or EAPOL-EAP messages.

   The high level flow would be something like:

   o  SSID Beacon / Probe Response indicates somehow in RSNE that it
      supports [IEEE802.1X] including BRSKI extensions.

   o  device connects to SSID and completes standard Open System
      Authentication and Association

   o  device starts [IEEE802.1X] EAPOL flow and uses new EAPOL-
      Announcement frames to encapsulate and complete BRSKI flow to
      obtain an LDevID



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   o  device completes [IEEE802.1X] authentication using its LDevID as
      credential for EAP-TLS or TEAP

5.  IANA Considerations

   [[ TODO ]]

6.  Security Considerations

   [[ TODO ]]

7.  Informative References

   [calculator]
              Revolution Wi-Fi, "SSID Overhead Calculator", n.d.,
              <http://www.revolutionwifi.net/revolutionwifi/p/
              ssid-overhead-calculator.html>.

   [DPP]      Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Protocol",
              n.d., <https://www.wi-fi.org/file/wi-fi-device-
              provisioning-protocol-dpp-draft-technical-specification-
              v0023>.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-16 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski]
              Lear, E., Friel, O., and N. Cam-Winget, "Bootstrapping Key
              Infrastructure over EAP", draft-lear-eap-teap-brski-00
              (work in progress), June 2018.

   [IANA]     Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Service Name and
              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-
              numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml>.

   [IEEE802.11]
              IEEE, ., "Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
              Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", 2016.

   [IEEE802.11aq]
              IEEE, ., "802.11 Amendment 5 Pre-Association Discovery",
              2017.





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   [IEEE802.11i]
              IEEE, ., "802.11 Amendment 6 Medium Access Control (MAC)
              Security Enhancements", 2004.

   [IEEE802.11s]
              IEEE, ., "802.11 Amendment 10 Mesh Networking", 2011.

   [IEEE802.11u]
              IEEE, ., "802.11 Amendment 9 Interworking with External
              Networks", 2011.

   [IEEE802.1AR]
              IEEE, ., "Secure Device Identity", 2017.

   [IEEE802.1X]
              IEEE, ., "Port-Based Network Access Control", 2010.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.

   [RFC4282]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
              Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4282, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4282>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7170]  Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
              "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
              1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.

Appendix A.  IEEE 802.11 Primer

A.1.  IEEE 802.11i

   802.11i-2004 is an IEEE standard from 2004 that improves connection
   security. 802.11i-2004 is incorporated into 802.11-2014. 802.11i
   defines the Robust Security Network IE which includes information on:

   o  Pairwise Cipher Suites (WEP-40, WEP-104, CCMP-128, etc.)

   o  Authentication and Key Management Suites (PSK, 802.1X, etc.)



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   The RSN IEs are included in Beacon and Probe Response frames.  STAs
   can use this frame to determine the authentication mechanisms offered
   by a particular AP e.g.  PSK or 802.1X.

A.2.  IEEE 802.11u

   802.11u-2011 is an IEEE standard from 2011 that adds features that
   improve interworking with external networks. 802.11u-2011 is
   incorporated into 802.11-2016.

   STAs and APs advertise support for 802.11u by setting the
   Interworking bit in the Extended Capabilities IE, and by including
   the Interworking IE in Beacon, Probe Request and Probe Response
   frames.

   The Interworking IE includes information on:

   o  Access Network Type (Private, Free public, Chargeable public,
      etc.)

   o  Internet bit (yes/no)

   o  ASRA (Additional Step required for Access - e.g.  Acceptance of
      terms and conditions, On-line enrollment, etc.)

   802.11u introduced Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP) which enables
   STAs to query APs for information not present in Beacons/Probe
   Responses.

   ANQP defines these key IEs for enabling the STA to determine which
   network to connect to:

   o  Roaming consortium IE: includes the Organization Identifier(s) of
      the roaming consortium(s).  The OI is typically provisioned on
      cell phones by the SP, so the cell phone can automatically detect
      802.11 networks that provide access to its SP's consortium.

   o  3GPP Cellular Network IE: includes the Mobile Country Code (MCC)
      and Mobile Network Code (MNC) of the SP the AP provides access to.

   o  Network Access Identifier Realm IE: includes [RFC4282] realm names
      that the AP provides access to (e.g. wifi.service-provider.com).
      The NAI Realm IE also includes info on the EAP type required to
      access that realm e.g.  EAP-TLS.

   o  Domain name IE: the domain name(s) of the local AP operator.  Its
      purpose is to enable a STA to connect to a domain operator that
      may have a roaming agreement with STA's Service Provider.



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   STAs can use one or more of the above IEs to make a suitable decision
   on which SSID to pick.

   HotSpot 2.0 is an example of a specification built on top of 802.11u
   and defines 10 additional ANQP elements using the standard vendor
   extensions mechanisms defined in 802.11.  It also defines a HS2.0
   Indication element that is included in Beacons and Probe Responses so
   that STAs can immediately tell if an SSID supports HS2.0.

Authors' Addresses

   Owen Friel
   Cisco

   Email: ofriel@cisco.com


   Eliot Lear
   Cisco

   Email: lear@cisco.com


   Max Pritikin
   Cisco

   Email: pritikin@cisco.com


   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca


















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