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Network Working Group                                  O. Garcia-Morchon
Internet-Draft                                                   Philips
Intended status: Informational                                   T. Dahm
Expires: April 22, 2019                                           Google
                                                        October 19, 2018


                         Automated IoT Security
          draft-garciamorchon-t2trg-automated-iot-security-01

Abstract

   The Internet of Things (IoT) concept refers to the usage of standard
   Internet protocols to allow for human-to-thing and thing-to-thing
   communication.  The security needs are well-recognized but the design
   space of IoT applications and systems is complex and exposed to
   multiple types of threats.  In particular, threats keep evolving at a
   fast pace while many IoT systems are rarely updated and still remain
   operational for decades.

   This document describes a comprehensive agile security framework to
   integrate existing security processes such as risk assessment or
   vulnerability assessment in the lifecycle of a smart object in an IoT
   application.  The core of our agile security approach relies on two
   protocols: the Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration (PASC)
   and the Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA).  PASC
   is executed during the onboarding phase of a smart object in an IoT
   system and is in charge of automatically performing a risk assessment
   and assigning a security configuration - applicable to the device or
   the system - to defeat the identified risks.  The assigned security
   configuration fits the specific environment and threat model of the
   application in which the device has been deployed.  PAVA is executed
   during the operation of the IoT object and ensures that
   vulnerabilities in the smart object and IoT system are discovered in
   a proactive way.

   These two protocols can benefit users, manufactures and operators by
   automating IoT security.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.



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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document . . . . . .   2
   2.  Integrating automated security processes in the IoT lifecycle   3
     2.1.  Automated Security Processes for Manufacturers  . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Automated Security Processes for Users  . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Automated Security Processes for System Integrators . . .   4
   3.  Integrating security workflows in the IoT lifecycle . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Security workflows: which ones and how they are
           traditionally applied.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Automating security workflows . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Automated IoT security protocols: PASC and PAVA . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  PASC: Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration . . .   8
     4.2.  Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA)  .  10
   5.  Conclusions and security considerations . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Next steps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in
   RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].




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2.  Integrating automated security processes in the IoT lifecycle

   The lifecycle of many smart objects in IoT applications such as
   building automation follows the design and manufacturing processes of
   traditional hardware components.  This means that devices go through
   a number of phases in their lifecycles that are predefined and rigid,
   namely design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, or
   operation, to name a few of them [IOTSec].  This implies that
   security is often pre-configured, and this pre-configuration leads to
   a number of security problems for manufacturers, users, and system
   operators.

   To deal with these problems, we propose the definition of two
   protocols, PASC and PAVA.  PASC aims at automating the security
   configuration based on information provided by devices, users,
   manufactures, and system operators.  PAVA aims at automating the
   discovery of new bugs, potential vulnerabilities, and security
   misconfigurations by gathering information from the actual system,
   analyzing it, and updating security settings.

2.1.  Automated Security Processes for Manufacturers

   A manufacturer cannot be aware at design place about the security
   risks that might appear in the future.  Also, often a manufacturer
   cannot be absolutely certain how his product will be used later on
   and in what function.  A famous example is the newspaper which can
   also be used as fly swat.  Thus, it is very hard for the manufacturer
   to foresee and implement all security mechanisms and policies that
   would be applicable to its devices in a wide variety of use cases.

   This document introduces security automation into the IoT ecosystem
   by pursuing a Test Driven Development (TDD) approach as explained in
   [TDD].  The benefit of TDD for the manufacturer is that products,
   which pass all the tests, are ready to be shipped.  Additionally,
   manufacturers benefit from this automation approach since they do not
   need to decide which security mitigations they require on a product.
   Instead of it, they just need to describe the expected usage of the
   product, e.g., via MUD files, the PASC and PAVA protocols will then
   automatically configure the security settings in the system.

2.2.  Automated Security Processes for Users

   A user is often interested in buying, combining, and running devices
   from multiple manufacturers.  Uses might also have different security
   and privacy needs.  From this point of view, users might have issues
   making sure that the security settings of his purchased devices and
   subsystems work together.




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   Users benefit from integrating security into the full IoT lifecycle
   since security configuration is transparently done in an automatic
   way by means of the PASC and PAVA protocols - they need to do
   nothing.  Security settings are automatically configured according to
   the specific deployment environment that a user only needs to
   confirm.

2.3.  Automated Security Processes for System Integrators

   System integrators and operators have to make sure that the overall
   system - including multiple devices from different manufactures and
   interacting with many users - is deployed and executed in a secure
   way.  Sometimes, it is also necessary or desired to use products not
   according to their original purpose, but to repurpose them for a more
   beneficial use case.  Fixed configurations hinder those tasks and
   make it also difficult to rapidly act in the event of security
   vulnerabilities.

   System operators benefit of PASC and PAVA since they minimize
   operational cost while ensuring that the system remains secure at any
   moment: PASC allows them to configure security automatically; PAVA
   allows for automated vulnerability detection A potential
   instantiation of part of these protocols follows a Software Defined
   Network methodology in which network interactions are enabled/
   disabled by the network controller depending on the information
   available in the collected MUD files from the devices.  Operators can
   also adopt the TDD approach and proof compliance with existing
   security policies for any IoT device by running continuous PAVA tests
   against the existing IoT installation.  If events like software
   updates introduce an unexpected behavior, the SDN infrastructure will
   immediately catch and report it.

3.  Integrating security workflows in the IoT lifecycle

   This section first discusses existing security workflows and how they
   are usually applied and then it explains how to integrate those
   security workflows in the IoT lifecycle.

3.1.  Security workflows: which ones and how they are traditionally
      applied.

   Dealing with security threats and finding suitable security
   mitigations is challenging: there are very sophisticated threats that
   a very powerful attacker could use; also, new threats and exploits
   appear in a daily basis.  Therefore, the existence of proper secure
   product creation processes that allow managing and minimizing risks
   during the lifecycle of the IoT devices is at least as important as




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   being aware of the threats.  A non-exhaustive list of relevant
   processes include:

   1.  A Business Impact Analysis (BIA) assesses the consequences of
       loss of basic security attributes, namely, confidentiality,
       integrity and availability in an IoT system.  These consequences
       might include impact on data lost, sales lost, increased
       expenses, regulatory fines, customer dissatisfaction, etc.
       Performing a business impact analysis allow determining the
       business relevance of having a proper security design placing
       security in the focus.

   2.  A Risk Assessment (RA) analyzes security threats to the IoT
       system, considering their likelihood and impact, and deriving for
       each of them a risk level.  Risks classified as moderate or high
       must be mitigated, i.e., security architecture should be able to
       deal with that threat bringing the risk to a low level.  Note
       that threats are usually classified according to their goal:
       confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  For instance, a
       specific threat to recover a symmetric-key used in the system
       relates to confidentiality.

   3.  A privacy impact assessment (PIA) aims at assessing Personal
       Identifiable Information (PII) that is collected, processed, or
       used in the IoT system.  By doing so, the goals is to fulfill
       applicable legal requirements, determine risks and effects of the
       manipulation of PII, and evaluate proposed protections.

   4.  Procedures for vulnerability assessment (VA) aim at assessing
       whether the IoT system is secure or any vulnerabilities are
       present.  This can be due to changes in the context information
       such as people involved in the IoT system or new software
       vulnerabilities discovered.

   5.  Procedures for incident reporting (IR) and mitigation refer to
       the methodologies that allow becoming aware of any security
       issues that affect an IoT system.

   Traditionally, BIA, RA, PIA or VA are to be realized during the
   creation of a new IoT system, introduction of new technologies in the
   IoT system, or deployment of significant system upgrades.  In
   general, it is recommended to re-assess them on a regular basis
   taking into account new use cases or threats.  VA is also often
   realized before deployment, e.g., by performing a penetration test
   before the new product release is deployed.  Incident reporting is
   done during operation of the IoT system, when a vulnerability is
   discovered.




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   All these processes, namely BIA, RA, PIA, VA, and IR, are a must in
   the design of any IoT system.  If they are not performed, the risk of
   not having a secure enough system is very high.  However, even if
   these procedures are in place, the IoT systems can still have an
   unsatisfactory security level because of two main reasons: fixed
   design decisions do not necessarily apply to all deployments due to
   specific requirements of users and operators or the nature of the
   final system.  new vulnerabilities might appear.

   _Manufactured           _SW update          _Decommissioned
   /                       /                   /
   |   _Installed          |   _ Application   |   _Removed &
   |  /                    |  / reconfigured   |  /  replaced
   |  |   _Commissioned    |  |                |  |
   |  |  /                 |  |                |  |   _Reownership &
   |  |  |    _Application |  |   _Application |  |  / recommissioned
   |  |  |   /   running   |  |  / running     |  |  |
   |  |  |   |             |  |  |             |  |  |             \\
   +##+##+###+#############+##+##+#############+##+##+##############>>>
   \   \/  \______________________________________/ /   time //
   \   \                        \                 /
   BIA   \               Continuous VA--->IR      /
   RA and PIA <__________|           RA and PIA


    Figure 1: Security workflows integrated in the lifecycle of a thing
                        in the Internet of Things.

3.2.  Automating security workflows

   Automating IoT security means integrating IoT security workflows in
   the IoT lifecycle.  Figure 1 depicts this concept: on the top part of
   that figure, we see the traditional steps in the lifecycle of a
   device: manufacturing, installation, commissioning, application
   running, etc.  Usually, the security workflows discussed in
   Section 2.1 would only happen at the beginning.  The goal is to move
   integrate them during the lifecycle - as shown on the bottom part of
   the figure.  With this we aim at:

   1.  making sure that the security settings, methods and policies
       applied to a given IoT deployment fit the requirements and
       threats in that specific deployment.

   2.  ensuring fast reaction in case of new vulnerabilities or changes
       in the security requirements.

   In the figure, we observe that RA and PIA are moved from the design
   phase to the installation and commissioning phases of the devices



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   since it is then when the actual environment in which smart objects
   are deployed is really known.  At this point of time, it is possible
   to gather information about the security requirements of the users,
   other devices in the system that my pose a threat to the new devices
   or even new vulnerabilities that might have appeared since the
   manufacturing of the device till the installation phase.

   The VA is executed not only during implementation, but it keeps
   running during the operation of the IoT system.  Information gathered
   during VA is fed into the RA and PIA processes to update security
   settings.  Similarly, security incidents found out during continuous
   VA lead to IR.  When smart objects are sold or the system updated,
   this triggers again RA and PIA.

4.  Automated IoT security protocols: PASC and PAVA

   This section introduces the two protocols for automated IoT security
   that this document proposes: Protocol for Automatic Security
   Configuration (PASC) and Protocol for Automated Vulnerability
   Assessment (PAVA).

   The underlying idea of the protocols is shown at a very high level in
   Figure 2.  PASC is used initially when a device first joins the IoT
   system to adjust the system and device security settings.  Then PAVA
   starts its operation monitoring potential vulnerabilities.  If
   changes in security settings are required, those are then applied by
   means of PASC messages.
























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   ______________________________________________________________
   |                                         |                  |
   | IoT device         Controller         Router         Information
   |                                         |               source
   |                                         |                  |
   |    ++ PASC onboarding ++>               |                  |
   |                          <++PASC  device info     +++++    |
   |                                         |                  |
   |            Risk & privacy assessment    |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |     <+++++  PASC security config. +++++>|                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |     +++ PAVA  log ++++++>               |                  |
   |         <++ PAVA active monitoring  ++> |                  |
   |                          <++ PAVA vulnerabilities +++++    |
   |                                         |                  |
   |            Risk & privacy assessment    |                  |
   |                                         |                  |
   |     <+++++  PASC security config. +++++>|                  |
   |                                                            |
   | ____________________________________________________________


                   Figure 2: PASC and PAVA interactions.

   In the event of a PAVA_VULNERABILITY being received from an
   INFORMATION SOURCE which is not already patched in the IoT device,
   the CONTROLLER SHOULD aim to mitigate this PAVA_VULNERABILITY by
   blocking access to the vulnerable IoT device temporary until the
   device can be updated.

4.1.  PASC: Protocol for Automatic Security Configuration

   Figure 1 depicts the main parties involved in an IoT system: an IoT
   DEVICE, a device controlling the IoT domain called CONTROLLER, a
   ROUTER towards the IoT domain, and an INFORMATION SOURCE such as it
   might be a local user, the manufacturer of the IoT device or a cloud
   IoT management system.

   The protocol flow is as follows:

   o  The IoT DEVICE performs a PASC ONBOARDING exchange in which the
      system CONTROLLER obtains information about the device from the
      IoT DEVICE itself.



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   o  The CONTROLLER can also receive PASC DEVICE INFO from other
      INFORMATION SOURCES such as a local user, the manufacturer,
      vulnerability cloud,

   o  The CONTROLLER automatically performs a RISK ASSESSMENT and
      PRIVACY IMPACT ANALYSIS based on the information about the new IOT
      DEVICE, system, and information

   o  Finally, the CONTROLLER configures the system security by means of
      PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGE.  Configuration can apply to
      the new IoT DEVICES, existing IoT devices, or networking
      infrastructure such as the ROUTER.

   In certain IoT environments, a simple practical instantiation of PASC
   can be created by extending and combining a number of protocols.
   PASC ONBOARDING resemble steps of the Manufacturer Usage Descriptor
   (MUD) protocol by explicitly listing any internal and external
   accesses the device needs to make, and/or clearly specify if there's
   an intentionally open server (e.g., HTTPS port exposed) and might be
   reused after potential enhancements.  Additionally the PASC
   ONBOARDING needs to include the security policy of the environment
   the IoT devices are deployed within, for example by verifying the
   exposed HTTPS server includes a non-vulnerable TLS 1.2 implementation
   with the desired cipher suites.  PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGE
   might be instantiated in a SDN fashion by means of influencing the
   routing flows . PASC SECURITY CONFIGURATION MESSAGES might also apply
   to end devices, and they might realized with extensions of ACE.
   Another alternative consists in changing actual software
   configurations in the end devices although this is a less realistic
   approach for IoT use cases.

   The Test Specification must therefore be a description of the
   expected behavior of the IoT device that can be used to adjust tests
   accordingly.  For example, the specification should explicitly list
   any internal and external accesses the device needs to make, and/or
   clearly specify if there's an intentionally open server (e.g., HTTPS
   port exposed).  This Thing description SHOULD come from Manufacturer
   Usage Description (MUD).  Additionally the Test Specification needs
   to include the security policy of the environment the IoT devices are
   deployed within, for example additional tests to verify the exposed
   HTTPS server includes a non-vulnerable TLS 1.2 implementation with
   the desired cipher suites.

   Network Services modules on the SDN Controller provide for core
   network services (such as DHCP, DNS, NTP) and mediated access to
   external resources (e.g., cloud services).  A set of "foundational
   tests" (e.g., DHCP timeouts) SHOULD be part of any Test
   Specification.  The system can capture a packet trace for the



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   individual device, which can be analyzed during the RISK ASSESSMENT
   as described in point 3 of section 3.1.

4.2.  Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA)

   The Protocol for Automatic Vulnerability Assessment (PAVA) aims at
   assessing for vulnerability when the IoT DEVICES are operational.
   PAVA is designed to be a key factor for Test Driven Development (TDD)
   [TDD].  The main aspects of PAVA are as follows:

   1.  PAVA relies on each IoT DEVICE sending standardized reports
       PAVA_LOG of potential vulnerabilities to CONTROLLER, e.g., the
       SDN controller managing the IoT security domain.  Such reports
       would build on RFC5424 (Syslog protocol), RFC5425 (TLS for
       Syslog) and RFC5426 (Syslog over UDP).

   2.  The CONTROLLER can also perform PAVA_ACTIVE_MONITORING that
       refers to messages aiming at verifying that the IoT DEVICE does
       not suffer known vulnerabilities.

   3.  The CONTROLLER can also receive PAVA_VULNERABILITIES messages
       from any INFORMATION SOURCE.

   4.  Based on the above information, the CONTROLLER can update RISK
       and PRIVACY ASSESSMENTS.  The CONTROLLER reports and methodology
       can be based on related work such as RFC6872.

   5.  If needed, the controller can update security settings with a
       PASC_SECURITY_CONFIGURATION message.  Output of this decision can
       result in 4 different actions:

       *  incident report towards the user

       *  update of security profiles in IoT DEVICES of the IoT security
          domain.

       *  automatic incident reporting towards the manufacturer

       *  automatic incident reporting towards the platform provider

5.  Conclusions and security considerations

   Security is a key factor in the acceptance and long-term success of
   IoT systems.  Non-smart versions of physical objects in the real
   word, for example light switches or door locks, can benefit from the
   modern approach to software engineering.  he building and
   manufacturing industry for example are relatively slowly changing
   industry sectors due to high demands and regulations on safety and



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   security of the physical products they produce, e. g. bridges or
   houses, however, the IT and Web industry are one of the most dynamic
   industry sectors currently existing and can bring capabilities to
   make products even safer.

   Additionally, there is a fundamental difference of traditional
   connected and networked devices "for people" vs. IoT devices which
   are typically headless.  E. g., many standard application layer
   authentication mechanisms like OAuth assume a person is there to "do
   something" in a challenge response sequence.  Also, people have an
   identity, that typically links to authorization of resources, while
   an IoT device is more single-purpose and typically has no intrinsic
   sense of other resources it might/should communicate with.  This
   distinction between devices lends itself to a number of
   considerations in terms of authentication, access control,
   manageability, and other challenges that will take time to properly
   normalize in a modern IoT enabled world.

   From a security perspective, it is important to ensure that IoT
   devices can be trusted.  There are simply too many of them, and due
   to their constrained nature there are often compromises that weaken
   security overall.

   The main contribution of this document is to describe and propose
   protocols to automate IoT security to deal with the complex IoT
   security design space.  This is done in two steps.  First, the PASC
   protocol allows to automatically configure devices and deploying
   security profiles - sets of security configurations - to the devices
   and system infrastructure.  Most IoT devices are typically focused on
   their physical task rather than on being general purpose computing
   platforms.  Therefore, the security profiles described in this
   document aim to bridge the initial risk analysis gap between the
   involved industry sectors and put a higher emphasis on the minimizing
   risk and containing the blast radius factors.  Second, the PAVA
   protocol allows to automatically monitor and audit the operation of
   the network and system.  This ensures fast reaction to any potential
   vulnerabilities and attacks.

6.  Next steps

   This draft proposes to automate IoT security by means of PASC & PAVA
   protocols.  IoT security automation would have clear benefits for
   manufactures, users, and system operators.

   If this direction is attractive and supported, we envision the
   following IETF work:





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   1.  Definition of IoT use cases, overall architecture for IoT
       security automation, and applicable techniques(e.g., MUD, SDN,
       ACE,...) to realize PASC & PAVA.

   2.  Define minimum viable PASC & PAVA protocols, i.e., protocols that
       allow realizing the concept of automated security with the
       smallest amount of work.  This definition will target building
       automation use cases.  This work requires the following:

       *  specifying the information required during onboarding: (1)
          general provisioning information, for example QR codes
          containing information like MAC address of the IoT device for
          easy ingestion of those information into hardware databases;
          (2) a description of the expected behavior of the IoT device
          from Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD); (3) environment
          specific requirements, for example a security policy that is
          machine-readable; (4) network & application specific
          information including the definition of the supported
          protocols, e.g., IPv4, IPv6, application specific networking
          information, e.g., SSID, and authentication and authorization
          methodology, e.g., using WPA2 or 802.1X.

       *  describing the required input for the automation part: (1)
          end-users should be allowed to enter security and privacy
          preferences that should be easily convertible into a machine
          readable policy; (2) manufacturers provide MUD files
          potentially with some extensions to support automated security
          uses cases; (3) system integrators provide the environment
          specific network and security specifications as listed above.

       *  defining the output required or desired by users, routing
          infrastructure and end devices.  This includes routing and
          firewalling policies for routing infrastructure; security
          policies and configurations for the end devices including
          blocked services, whitelist of services in other devices;
          security configurations and security reports for end users,
          system operators, and manufacturers (see Section 3.2 point
          #5).

       *  standardizing the PASC Messages, message fields, and
          interactions between new device, controller, and routing
          infrastructure including transport protocol for PASC and PAVA
          messages as well as encoding of security configuration using
          YANG.

       *  creating the RA and PIA logic to generate the (SDN) security
          configuration in controller and deploy to routers.  This can
          include individual pre-computed flow tables per routing device



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          determining which end-devices can talk to each other and which
          services are available to each other.  Non-allowed
          communication patterns are blocked.

       *  standardizing the PAVA policy and messages for vulnerability
          assessment as well as messages/Information required from
          services to perform PAVA.  This involves the definition of a
          policy that determines the behaviour of PAVA regarding the
          monitoring capabilities (active vs passive), data collection
          capabilities, and reporting capabilities.

   There are several groups within IETF and IRTF working on aspects
   related to the ideas presented in this group and for which this work
   can be interesting:

   1.  IRRF Thing to Thing Research Group (T2TRG) [T2TRG] investigates
       open research issues in turning a true "Internet of Things" into
       reality, an Internet where llow-resource nodes ("things",
       "constrained nodes") can communicate among themselves and with
       the wider Internet, in order to partake in permissionless
       innovation.

   2.  IETF Automated Networking Integrated Model and Approach (ANIMA)
       [ANIMA] develops a system of autonomic functions that carry out
       the intentions of the network operator without the need for
       detailed low-level management of individual devices.

   3.  IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group
       (OPSAWG)[OPSAWG] receives occasional proposals for the
       development and publication of RFCs dealing with operational and
       management topics that are not in scope of an existing working
       group and do not justify the formation of a new working group.

   4.  IETF Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) [I2RS] facilitates
       real-time or event driven interaction with the routing system
       through a collection of protocol-based control or management
       interfaces.  These allow information, policies, and operational
       parameters to be injected into and retrieved (as read or by
       notification) from the routing system while retaining data
       consistency and coherency across the routers and routing
       infrastructure,

   5.  IETF Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) [SACM].
       In their charter, they write: "Securing information and the
       systems that store, process, and transmit that information is a
       challenging task for enterprises of all sizes, and many security
       practitioners spend much of their time on manual processes.
       Standardized protocols and models aiding collection and



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       evaluation of endpoint elements enable automation, thus freeing
       practitioners to focus on high priority tasks.  Due to the
       breadth of this work, the working group will address enterprise
       use cases pertaining to the assessment of endpoint posture (using
       the definitions of Endpoint and Posture from RFC 5209)."

   An open question for the authors is where this work could be done
   best.

7.  Informative References

   [ACE]      "IETF Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
              Environments",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ace/charter/, n.d..

   [ANIMA]    "IETF Automated Networking Integrated Model and Approach",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/about/, n.d..

   [I2RS]     "IETF Interface to the Routing System",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/i2rs/about/, n.d..

   [ID-MUD]   Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Domascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", March 2017.

   [IOTSec]   Garcia-Morchon, O., Kumar, S., and M. Sethi, "State-of-
              the-Art and Challenges for the Internet of Things
              Security", draft-irtf-t2trg-iot-seccons-15 , May 2018.

   [OPSAWG]   "IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/about/, n.d..

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [SACM]     "IETF Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sacm/about/, n.d..

   [T2TRG]    "IRTF Thing-to-Thing (T2TRG) Research Group",
              Web https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/t2trg/charter/, n.d..

   [TDD]      Janzen, D. and H. Saiedian, "Test-driven development
              concepts, taxonomy, and future direction",
              Web https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1510569,
              n.d..





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Authors' Addresses

   Oscar Garcia-Morchon
   Philips
   High Tech Campus 5
   Eindhoven,   5656 AA
   The Netherlands

   Email: oscar.garcia-morchon@philips.com


   Thorsten Dahm
   Google
   todo
   Dublin
   Ireland

   Email: thorstendlux@google.com

































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