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Versions: 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                           J. Gould
Internet-Draft                                                R. Wilhelm
Intended status: Best Current Practice                    VeriSign, Inc.
Expires: December 27, 2019                                 June 25, 2019


Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Secure Authorization Information
                              for Transfer
             draft-gould-regext-secure-authinfo-transfer-00

Abstract

   The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in RFC 5730, defines the
   use of authorization information to authorize a transfer.  The
   authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in
   the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in RFC 5731, and the EPP Contact
   Mapping, in RFC 5733, as password-based authorization information.
   Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the
   password-based authorization information has been used by the
   authorization information being set at the time of object create,
   managed with the object update, and used to authorize an object
   transfer request.  What has not been fully considered is the security
   of the authorization information that includes the complexity of the
   authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL) of the
   authorization information, and where and how the authorization
   information is stored.  This document defines an operational
   practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong random
   authorization information values that are short-lived, that are not
   stored by the client, and that are stored using a cryptographic hash
   by the server to provide for secure authorization information used
   for transfers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2019.



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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Registrant, Registrar, Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Secure Authorization Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Secure Random Authorization Information . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL)  . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Authorization Information Storage and Transport . . . . .   7
   4.  Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information  . . .   7
     4.1.  Create Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Update Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Info Command and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Transfer Request Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     8.2.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in [RFC5730], defines the
   use authorization information to authorize a transfer.  The
   authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in
   the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in [RFC5731], and the EPP Contact
   Mapping, in [RFC5733], as password-based authorization information.
   Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the
   password-based authorization information has been used with the
   authorization information being set at the time of object create,



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   managed with the object update, and used to authorize an object
   transfer request.  What has not been considered is the security of
   the authorization information that includes the complexity of the
   authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL) of the
   authorization information, and where and how the authorization
   information is stored.  This document defines an operational
   practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong,
   random authorization information values that are short-lived, that
   are not stored by the client, and that are stored by the server using
   a cryptographic hash to provide, for secure authorization information
   used for transfers.  This operational practice can be used to support
   transfers of any EPP object, where the domain name object defined in
   [RFC5731] is used in this document for illustration purposes.

   The overall goal is to have strong, random authorization information
   values, that are short-lived, and that are either not stored or
   stored as a cryptographic hash values by the non-responsible parties.
   In a registrant, registrar, and registry model, the registrant
   registers the object through the registrar to the registry.  The
   registrant is the responsible party and the registrar and the
   registry are the non-responsible parties.  EPP is a protocol between
   the registrar and the registry, so the registrar is referred to as
   the client and the registry is referred to as the server.  The
   following are the elements of the operational practice and how the
   existing features of the EPP RFCs can be leveraged to satisfy them:

   "Strong Random Authorization Information":  The EPP RFCs define the
       password-based authorization information value using an XML
       schema "normalizedString" type, so they don't restrict what can
       be used in any way.  This operational practice defines the
       recommended mechanism for creating a strong random authorization
       value, that would be generated by the client.
   "Short-Lived Authorization Information":  The EPP RFCs don't
       explicitly support short-lived authorization information or a
       time-to-live (TTL) for authorization information, but there are
       EPP RFC features that can be leveraged to support short-lived
       authorization information.  If authorization information is set
       only when there is a transfer in process, the server needs to
       support empty authorization information on create, support
       setting and unsetting authorization information, and support
       automatically unsetting the authorization information upon a
       successful transfer.  All of these features can be supported by
       the EPP RFCs.
   "Storing Authorization Information Securely":  The EPP RFCs don't
       specify where and how the authorization information is stored in
       the client or the server, so there are no restrictions to define
       an operational practice for storing the authorization information
       securely.  The operational practice will not require the client



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       to store the authorization information and will require the
       server to store the authorization information using a
       cryptographic hash.  Returning the authorization information set
       in an EPP info response will not be supported.

1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   XML is case sensitive.  Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
   and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
   character case presented in order to develop a conforming
   implementation.

   In examples, "C:" represents lines returned by a protocol client.
   Indentation and white space in examples are provided only to
   illustrate element relationships and are not a REQUIRED feature of
   this protocol.

   The examples reference XML namespace prefixes that are used for the
   associated XML namespaces.  Implementations MUST NOT depend on the
   example XML namespaces and instead employ a proper namespace-aware
   XML parser and serializer to interpret and output the XML documents.
   The example namespace prefixes used and their associated XML
   namespaces include:

   "domain":  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
   "contact":  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:contact-1.0

2.  Registrant, Registrar, Registry

   The EPP RFCs refer to client and server, but when it comes to
   transfers, there are three actors that are involved.  This document
   will refer to the actors as registrant, registrar, and registry.
   [RFC8499] defines these terms formally for the Domain Name System
   (DNS).  The terms are further described below to cover their roles as
   actors of using the authorization information in the transfer process
   of any object in the registry, such as a domain name or a contact:

   "registrant":  [RFC8499] defines the registrant as "an individual or
       organization on whose behalf a name in a zone is registered by
       the registry".  The registrant can be the owner of any object in
       the registry, such as a domain name or a contact.  The registrant
       interfaces with the registrar for provisioning the objects.  A
       transfer is coordinated by the registrant to transfer the
       sponsorship of the object from one registrar to another.  The



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       authorization information is meant to authenticate the registrant
       as the owner of the object to the non-sponsoring registrar and to
       authorize the transfer.
   "registrar":  [RFC8499] defines the registrar as "a service provider
       that acts as a go-between for registrants and registries".  The
       registrar interfaces with the registrant for the provisioning of
       objects, such as domain names and contacts, and with the
       registries to satisfy the registrant's provisioning requests.  A
       registrar may directly interface with the registrant or may
       indirectly interface with the registrant, typically through one
       or more resellers.  Implementing a transfer using secure
       authorization information extends through the registrar's
       reseller channel up to the direct interface with the registrant.
       The registrar's interface with the registries uses EPP.  The
       registrar's interface with its reseller channel or the registrant
       is registrar-specific.  In the EPP RFCs, the registrar is
       referred to as the "client", since EPP is the protocol used
       between the registrar and the registry.  The sponsoring registrar
       is the authorized registrar to manage objects on behalf of the
       registrant.  A non-sponsoring registrar is not authorized to
       manage objects on behalf of the registrant.  A transfer of an
       object's sponsorship is from one registrar, referred to as the
       "losing" registrar, to another registrar, referred to as the
       "gaining" registrar.
   "registry":  [RFC8499] defines the registry as "the administrative
       operation of a zone that allows registration of names within the
       zone".  The registry typically interfaces with the registrars
       over EPP and generally does not interact directly with the
       registrant.  In the EPP RFCs, the registry is referred to as the
       "server", since EPP is the protocol used between the registrar
       and the registry.  The registry has a record of the sponsoring
       registrar for each object and provides the mechanism (over EPP)
       to coordinate a transfer of an object's sponsorship between
       registrars.

3.  Secure Authorization Information

   The authorization information in the EPP RFCs ([RFC5731] and
   [RFC5733]) that support transfer use password-based authorization
   information.  Other EPP objects that support password-based
   authorization information for transfer can use the Secure
   Authorization Information defined in this document.  For the
   authorization information to be secure it must be a strong random
   value and must have a short time-to-live (TTL).  The security of the
   authorization information is defined in the following sections.






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3.1.  Secure Random Authorization Information

   For authorization information to be secure, it MUST be generated
   using a secure random value.  The authorization information is
   treated as a password, where according to [RFC4086] a high-security
   password must have at least 49 bits of randomness or entropy.  The
   required length L of a password, rounded up to the largest whole
   number, is based on the set of characters N and the desired entropy
   H, in the equation L = ROUNDUP(H / log2 N).  With a target entropy of
   49, the required length can be calculated after deciding on the set
   of characters that will be randomized.  The following are a set of
   possible character sets and the calculation of the required length.

   Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with
   the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which
   consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E.

   ROUNDUP(49 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(49 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(7.48) = 8

   Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with
   the set of case-insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists
   of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9).

   ROUNDUP(49 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(49 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(9.48) = 10

   Considering the age of [RFC4086], the evolution of security
   practices, and that the authorization information is a machine-
   generated value, the recommendation is to use at least 128 bits of
   entropy.  The lengths are recalculated below using 128 bits of
   entropy.

   Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with
   the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which
   consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E.

   ROUNDUP(128 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(128 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(19.54) = 20

   Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with
   the set of case insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists
   of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9).

   ROUNDUP(128 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(128 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(24.76) = 25

   The strength of the random authorization information is dependent on
   the actual entropy of the underlying random number generator.  For
   the random number generator, the practices defined in [RFC4086] and
   section 4.7.1 of the NIST Federal Information Processing Standards
   (FIPS) Publication 140-2 [1] SHOULD be followed to produce random



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   values that will be resistant to attack.  A random number generator
   (RNG) is preferable over the use of a pseudorandom number generator
   (PRNG) to reduce the predictability of the authorization information.
   The more predicable the random number generator is, the lower the
   true entropy, and the longer the required length for the
   authorization information.

3.2.  Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL)

   The authorization information SHOULD only be set when there is a
   transfer in process.  This implies that the authorization information
   has a Time-To-Live (TTL) by which the authorization information is
   cleared when the TTL expires.  The EPP RFCs have no definition of
   TTL, but since the server supports the setting and unsetting of the
   authorization information by the sponsoring registrar, then the
   sponsoring registrar can apply a TTL based on client policy.  The TTL
   client policy may be based on proprietary registrar-specific criteria
   which provides for a transfer-specific TTL tuned for the particular
   circumstances of the transaction.  The sponsoring registrar will be
   aware of the TTL and the sponsoring registrar MUST inform the
   registrant of the TTL when the authorization information is provided
   to the registrant.

3.3.  Authorization Information Storage and Transport

   To protect the disclosure of the authorization information, the
   authorization information MUST be stored by the registry using a
   strong one-way cryptographic hash and MUST NOT be stored by the
   registrar.  The plain text version of the authorization information
   MUST NOT be written to any logs by the registrar or the registry.
   All communication that includes the authorization information MUST be
   over an encrypted channel, such as [RFC5734] for EPP.  The
   registrar's interface for communicating the authorization information
   with the registrant MUST be over an authenticated and encrypted
   channel.

4.  Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information

   To make the transfer process secure using secure authorization
   information, as defined in Section 3, the client and server need to
   implement steps where the authorization information is set only when
   a transfer is actively in process and ensure that the authorization
   information is stored securely and transported only over secure
   channels.  The steps in management of the authorization information
   for transfers include:






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   1.  Registrant requests to register the object with the registrar.
       Registrar sends the create command, with empty authorization
       information, to the registry, as defined in Section 4.1.
   2.  Registrant requests from the losing registrar the authorization
       information to provide to the gaining registrar.
   3.  Losing registrar generates a secure random authorization
       information value, sends it to the registry as defined in
       Section 4.2, and provides it to the registrant.
   4.  Registrant provides the authorization information value to the
       gaining registrar.
   5.  Gaining registrar optionally verifies the authorization
       information with the info command to the registry, as defined in
       Section 4.3.
   6.  Gaining registrar sends the transfer request with the
       authorization information to the registry, as defined in
       Section 4.4.
   7.  If the transfer successfully completes, the registry
       automatically unsets the authorization information; otherwise the
       losing registrar unsets the authorization information when the
       TTL expires, as defined in Section 4.2.

   The following sections outline the practices of the EPP commands and
   responses between the registrar and the registry that supports secure
   authorization information for transfer.

4.1.  Create Command

   For a Create Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of an
   empty authorization information and MAY disallow for the passing of a
   non-empty authorization information.  By having an empty
   authorization information on create, the object is initially not in
   the transfer process.  Any EPP object extension that supports setting
   the authorization information with a "eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element,
   can have an empty authorization information passed, such as [RFC5731]
   and [RFC5733].
















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   Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5731]
   domain name create command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <domain:create
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw/>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

































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   Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5733]
   contact create command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <contact:create
   C:       xmlns:contact="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:contact-1.0">
   C:        <contact:id>sh8013</contact:id>
   C:        <contact:postalInfo type="int">
   C:          <contact:name>John Doe</contact:name>
   C:          <contact:org>Example Inc.</contact:org>
   C:          <contact:addr>
   C:            <contact:street>123 Example Dr.</contact:street>
   C:            <contact:street>Suite 100</contact:street>
   C:            <contact:city>Dulles</contact:city>
   C:            <contact:sp>VA</contact:sp>
   C:            <contact:pc>20166-6503</contact:pc>
   C:            <contact:cc>US</contact:cc>
   C:          </contact:addr>
   C:        </contact:postalInfo>
   C:        <contact:voice x="1234">+1.7035555555</contact:voice>
   C:        <contact:fax>+1.7035555556</contact:fax>
   C:        <contact:email>jdoe@example.com</contact:email>
   C:        <contact:authInfo>
   C:          <contact:pw/>
   C:        </contact:authInfo>
   C:        <contact:disclose flag="0">
   C:          <contact:voice/>
   C:          <contact:email/>
   C:        </contact:disclose>
   C:      </contact:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

4.2.  Update Command

   For an Update Command, the registry MUST allow for the setting and
   unsetting of the authorization information.  The registrar sets the
   authorization information by first generating a strong, random
   authorization information value, based on Section 3.1, and setting it
   in the registry in the update command.  The registry SHOULD validate
   the randomness of the authorization information based on the length
   and character set required by the registry.  For example, a registry
   that requires 20 random printable ASCII characters except space



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   (0x20), should validate that the authorization information contains
   at least one upper case alpha character, one lower case alpha
   character, and one non-alpha numeric character.  If the authorization
   information fails the randomness validation, the registry MUST return
   an EPP error result code of 2202.

   Often the registrar has the "clientTransferProhibited" status set, so
   to start the transfer process, the "clientTransferProhibited" status
   needs to be removed, and the strong, random authorization information
   value needs to be set.  The registrar MUST define a time-to-live
   (TTL), as defined in Section 3.2, where if the TTL expires the
   registrar will unset the authorization information.

   Example of removing the "clientTransferProhibited" status and setting
   the authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update
   command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:rem>
   C:          <domain:status s="clientTransferProhibited"/>
   C:        </domain:rem>
   C:        <domain:chg>
   C:          <domain:authInfo>
   C:            <domain:pw>LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
   C:            </domain:pw>
   C:          </domain:authInfo>
   C:        </domain:chg>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345-XYZ</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   When the registrar-defined TTL expires, the sponsoring registrar
   cancels the transfer process by unsetting the authorization
   information value and may add back statuses like the
   "clientTransferProbited" status.  Any EPP object extension that
   supports setting the authorization information with a
   "eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element, can have an empty authorization
   information passed, such as [RFC5731] and [RFC5733].  Setting an
   empty authorization information unsets the value.  [RFC5731] supports
   an explicit mechanism of unsetting the authorization information, by



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   passing the <domain:null> authorization information value.  The
   registry MUST support unsetting the authorization information by
   either accepting an empty authorization information value and
   accepting an explicit unset element if it is supported by the object
   extension.

   Example of unsetting the authorization information explicitly in an
   [RFC5731] domain name update command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:add>
   C:          <domain:status s="clientTransferProhibited"/>
   C:        </domain:add>
   C:        <domain:chg>
   C:          <domain:authInfo>
   C:            <domain:null/>
   C:          </domain:authInfo>
   C:        </domain:chg>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345-XYZ</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>






















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   Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty
   authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <domain:update
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:add>
   C:          <domain:status s="clientTransferProhibited"/>
   C:        </domain:add>
   C:        <domain:chg>
   C:          <domain:authInfo>
   C:            <domain:pw/>
   C:          </domain:authInfo>
   C:        </domain:chg>
   C:      </domain:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345-XYZ</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty
   authorization information in an [RFC5733] contact update command.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <update>
   C:      <contact:update
   C:        xmlns:contact="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:contact-1.0">
   C:        <contact:id>sh8013</contact:id>
   C:        <contact:chg>
   C:          <contact:authInfo>
   C:            <contact:pw/>
   C:          </contact:authInfo>
   C:        </contact:chg>
   C:      </contact:update>
   C:    </update>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345-XYZ</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>







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4.3.  Info Command and Response

   For an Info Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of a
   non-empty authorization information for verification.  The gaining
   registrar can pre-verify the authorization information provided by
   the registrant prior to submitting the transfer request with the use
   of the Info Command.  The registry compares the hash of the passed
   authorization information with the hashed authorization information
   value stored for the object.  When the authorization information is
   not set or the passed authorization information does not match the
   previously set value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result
   code of 2202 [RFC5730].

   Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an
   [RFC5731] domain name info command to verify the authorization
   information value.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <info>
   C:      <domain:info
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw>LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
   C:          </domain:pw>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:info>
   C:    </info>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   The Info Response in object extensions, such as [RFC5731] and
   [RFC5733], MUST NOT include the optional the authorization
   information element.  The authorization information is stored as a
   hash in the registry, so returning the plain text authorization
   information is not possible.  The registry MUST NOT return any
   indication of whether the authorization information is set or unset
   by not returning the authorization information element in the
   response.

4.4.  Transfer Request Command

   For a Transfer Request Command, the registry MUST allow for the
   passing of a non-empty authorization information to authorize a
   transfer.  The registry compares the hash of the passed authorization



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   information with the hashed authorization information value stored
   for the object.  When the authorization information is not set or the
   passed authorization information does not match the previously set
   value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result code of 2202
   [RFC5730].  Whether the transfer occurs immediately or is pending is
   up to server policy.  When the transfer occurs immediately, the
   registry MUST return the EPP success result code of 1000 and when the
   transfer is pending, the registry MUST return the EPP success result
   code of 1001.  The losing registrar MUST be informed of a successful
   transfer request using an EPP poll message.

   Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an
   [RFC5731] domain name transfer request command to authorize the
   transfer.

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <transfer op="request">
   C:      <domain:transfer
   C:        xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:        <domain:name>example1.com</domain:name>
   C:        <domain:authInfo>
   C:          <domain:pw>LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP
   C:          </domain:pw>
   C:        </domain:authInfo>
   C:      </domain:transfer>
   C:    </transfer>
   C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   Upon successful completion of the transfer, the registry MUST
   automatically unset the authorization information.  If the transfer
   does not complete within the time-to-live (TTL) (Section 3.2), the
   registrar MUST unset the authorization information as defined in
   Section 4.2.

5.  Implementation Status

   Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and the reference to
   RFC 7942 [RFC7942] before publication.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
   [RFC7942].  The description of implementations in this section is
   intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing



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   drafts to RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual
   implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
   Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information
   presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not
   intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available
   implementations or their features.  Readers are advised to note that
   other implementations may exist.

   According to RFC 7942 [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and
   working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the
   benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
   experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
   more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups to use this
   information as they see fit".

6.  Security Considerations

   TBD

7.  Acknowledgements

   TBD

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
              STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.

   [RFC5731]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
              Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc5731>.






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   [RFC5733]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
              Contact Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5733, DOI 10.17487/RFC5733,
              August 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5733>.

   [RFC5734]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
              Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc5734>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

8.2.  URIs

   [1] https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final

Appendix A.  Change History

Authors' Addresses

   James Gould
   VeriSign, Inc.
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190
   US

   Email: jgould@verisign.com
   URI:   http://www.verisign.com


   Richard Wilhelm
   VeriSign, Inc.
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190
   US

   Email: rwilhelm@verisign.com
   URI:   http://www.verisign.com







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