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Versions: 00 draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-usecase

DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Experimental                               K. Nishizuka
Expires: April 18, 2019                               NTT Communications
                                                        October 15, 2018


  DDoS mitigation offload usecase and YANG module expansion in signal
                                channel
              draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion-00

Abstract

   This document describes a DDoS Mitigation offload usecase and an
   expansion of the YANG module in the DOTS signal channel for
   mitigating DDoS attack traffic correctly with general routers or
   switches.  The proposed usecase and YANG module enhance DOTS
   capability to send attacker information and enable service providers
   to mitigate DDoS attack traffic by using general routers or switches
   in their intra-domain NW.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Usecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Expansion of DOTS Signal Channel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Expansion of YANG Module of DOTS Signal Channel . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Expansion of Mapping Parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Volume based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are threats for internet service providers
   because of their impact on network services.  When such attacks
   occur, service providers have to mitigate them immediately to protect
   or recover their service.  Therefore, for the service providers to
   immediately protect their network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS
   mitigation needs to be automated.  To automate DDoS attack
   mitigation, it is desirable that multi-vendor elements concerned with
   DDoS attack detection, mitigation and so on collaborate.

   On the other hand, the number of DDoS Mitigation Systems (DMS) that
   can be deployed in a service providers network is limited due to
   equipment cost.  Thus, DMS's utilization rate can reach maximum
   capacity soon when the volume of DDoS attacks is enormous.  When the
   rate reaches maximum capacity, the network needs to offload
   mitigation action from the DMS to cost-effective network devices such
   as switches and routers.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a protocol to standardize real-
   time signaling, threat-handling requests, and data between the multi-
   vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].  This document describes
   an automated DDoS Mitigation offload usecase inherited from a DOTS
   usecase [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], which enables cost-effective DDoS
   Mitigation in an intra-domain network.  Furthermore, this document
   describes an expansion of the YANG module in the DOTS signal channel



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   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], which enables a service provider's
   network to mitigate attack traffic correctly in the usecase.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119]

   The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]

   The terminology related to YANG data modules is defined in [RFC7950]

   In addition, this document uses the terms defined below:

   Mitigation offload:  Getting rid of a DMS's mitigation action and
      assigning the action to another entity when the utilization rate
      of the DMS reaches an inacceptable level.

   DDoS attackers:  Devices that carry out DDoS attacks.

   Utilization rate:  A scale to measure load of an entity such as link
      utilization rate and CPU utilization rate.

   Top Talker:  A top N list of attackers who attack the same target.
      The list is ordered in terms of a two-tuple bandwidth such as bps
      or pps.

3.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Usecase

   The purpose of this usecase is to protect intra-domain network from
   volume-based DDoS attacks automatically, cost-effectively, and
   vendor-independently.  The usecase is inherited from the DDoS
   Orchestration usecase in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] and works on an
   intra-domain network.

   Figure 1 and Figure 2 show a component diagram and C-plane sequence
   diagram of the usecase, respectively.











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       +----------+
       | network  |C
       | adminis  |-+
       | trator   | |
       +----------+ |
                    |
       +----------+ |  S+--------------+C   S+-----------+
       |telemetry/| +-->|              |---->| DDoS      |+
       |monitoring|---->| Orchestrator |<----| mitigation||
       |systems   |C   S|              |S   C| systems   ||
       +----------+     +--------------+     +-----------+|
                                     |         +----------+
                                     | ex. BGP, BGP Flowspec
                                     |
                                     |  +------------------+
                                     +->| Routers/Switches |+
                                        +------------------+|
                                          +-----------------+
       * C is for DOTS Client functionality
       * S is for DOTS Server functionality


      Figure 1: Component diagram of DDoS Mitigation offload usecase

   This component diagram shown in Figure 1 differs from that of DDoS
   Orchestration usecase in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] in some respects.
   First, the DDoS mitigation systems have a DOTS client function to
   send mitigation requests to the orchestrator.  Second, the
   orchestrator sends a request to routers or switches to block attack
   traffic.





















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+-------+    +----------+   +------------+   +----------+   +----------+
|network|    |telemetry/|+  |            |   |DDoS      |+  |Routers  |+
|adminis|    |monitoring||  |Orchestrator|   |Mitigation||  |Switches ||
|trator |    |systems   ||  |            |   |Systems   ||  |         ||
+-------+    +----------+|  +------------+   +----------+|  +---------+|
    |         +----------+       |            +----------+   +---------+
    |            | DOTS:         |                    |              |
    |            | Mitigation    |                    |              |
    |            | Request       |                    |              |
    | DOTS:      |C------------>S|                    |              |
    | Mitigation |               | ex. BGP:           |              |
    | Request    |               | Redirect           |              |
    |C------------------------->S| Attack Traffic     |              |
    |            |               | to DMS             |              |
    |            |               |---------------------------------->|
    |            |               |                    |              |
    |            |               | DOTS:              |              |
    |            |               | Mitigation Request |              |
    |            |               |S<-----------------C|              |
    |            |               |                    |              |
    |            |               | ex. BGP Flowspec   |              |
    |            |               | Mitigate           |              |
    |            |               | Attack Traffic     |              |
    |            |               |---------------------------------->|
    |            |               |                    |              |

     * C is for DOTS Client functionality
     * S is for DOTS Server functionality


   Figure 2: C-plane Sequence diagram of DDoS Mitigation offload usecase

   In this usecase, when the telemetry/monitoring system detects a
   volume-based DDoS attack in the network, it sends a DOTS mitigation
   request to the orchestrator with target information such as target-
   prefix.  Then, the network administrator confirms the request and
   sends a DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator with the target
   information.

   After that, the orchestrator requests the routers or switches to
   redirect attack traffic to the DMS by a configuration protocol such
   as a routing protocol like BGP [RFC4271] on the basis of the target
   information.  Then the DMS analyzes attack traffic in detail and
   detects not only target but also attacker information, such as top-
   talker, and mitigates the attack traffic on the basis of the detected
   information.





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   When the volume-based attack becomes intense, DMS's utilization rate
   can reach maximum capacity.  Then the DMS sends a DOTS mitigation
   request to the orchestrator as an offload request with the detection
   information.  After that, the orchestrator requests the routers or
   switches to block attack traffic to the DMS by dissemination of flow
   specification rules protocols such as BGP flowspec [RFC5575] on the
   basis of the detected information.

4.  Expansion of DOTS Signal Channel

   It is desirable that the routers or switches mitigate attack traffic
   correctly after the DMS sends a DOTS Mitigation Request as an offload
   request in the usecase described in Section 3.  For mitigating attack
   traffic correctly, this document proposes expanding DOTS signal
   channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] so that it can send not only
   target information but also representative attacker information such
   as top talker.  Note that it is difficult to send all attacker
   information because there is an enormous number of attackers when a
   volume-based DDoS attack occurs.

   This section describes expansion of the YANG module [RFC7950] and
   mapping parameters to CBOR [RFC7049] of the DOTS Signal Channel.

4.1.  Expansion of YANG Module of DOTS Signal Channel

   Figure 3 shows an expanded YANG Module of the DOTS Signal Channel.
   Note that the "augment" statement allows a module to insert
   additional nodes into existing data models.  The module defines a new
   grouping "attacker" and adds the grouping to an existing Signal
   Channel module by using an "augment" statement.


module ietf-dots-signal-channel-mitigation-offload-expansion {
     yang-version 1.1;

     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:
                ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-offload-expansion";

     import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
       prefix signal;
     }

     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
     }

     organization
       "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";



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     contact
       "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
        WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
        Editor:  Yuhei Hayashi
                 <mailto:hayashi.yuhei@lab.ntt.co.jp>
     description
       "This module contains the YANG definition for expanding signaling
        messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.

        Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
        to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
        set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
        the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2018-07-30 {
       description
         "Initial revision.";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: ietf-dots-signal-channel";
     }

    /*
     * Groupings
     */
     grouping attacker {
       description
         "Specifies the attackers of the mitigation request.";
       leaf-list attacker-top-talker-prefix {
         type inet:ip-prefix;
         description
           "IPv4/IPv6 prefix identifying the top-talker in attackers.";
       }
     }

    /*
     * Main Container for DOTS Signal Channel Expansion
     */
     augment "/signal:dots-signal/signal:scope/"{
       uses attacker;
     }



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}


         Figure 3: Expansion of YANG Module of DOTS Signal Channel

4.2.  Expansion of Mapping Parameters to CBOR

   Figure 4 shows expansion of Mapping Parameters to CBOR [RFC7049]
   related to Figure 3.


   +----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+
   | Parameter Name       | YANG        | CBOR| CBOR Major    | JSON   |
   |                      | Type        | Key |    Type &     | Type   |
   |                      |             |     | Information   |        |
   +----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+
   | ...                  | ...         |  ...| ...           | ...    |
   | attacker-top-talker  | leaf-list   |  XX | 4 array       | Array  |
   | -prefix              | inet:       |     |               |        |
   |                      |  ip-prefix  |     | 3 text string | String |
   +----------------------+-------------+-----+---------------+--------+


             Figure 4: Expansion of Mapping Parameters to CBOR

5.  Security Considerations

   TBD

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD

7.  Acknowledgement

   TBD

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.






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   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and R. K, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-15 (work in
              progress), August 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
              ietf-dots-signal-channel-25 (work in progress), September
              2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
              Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
              Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
              Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-16 (work
              in progress), July 2018.

Authors' Addresses

   Yuhei Hayashi
   NTT
   3-9-11, Midori-cho
   Musashino-shi , Tokyo   180-8585
   Japan

   Email: hayashi.yuhei@lab.ntt.co.jp, yuuhei.hayashi@gmail.com



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   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo   108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp












































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