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Network Working Group                                 P. M. Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft                                      ThresholdSecrets.com
Intended status: Informational                           13 January 2021
Expires: 17 July 2021


            Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema Reference
                    draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07

Abstract

   The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure
   infrastructure that facilitates the exchange of configuration and
   credential data between multiple user devices.  The core protocols of
   the Mesh are described with examples of common use cases and
   reference data.

   [Note to Readers]

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list
   (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh.

   This document is also available online at
   http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema.html.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 July 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Related Specifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Accounts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  Activation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Catalogs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.1.  Mesh Account  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.2.  SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.3.  Mail  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Bookmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.4.  Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.5.  Credential  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.6.  Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.7.  Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.8.  Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.9.  Task  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Spools  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  Outbound  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.2.  Inbound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.3.  Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.1.  Key Derivation from Seed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.2.  Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.  . . . . . . .  23
     6.3.  Proof of Knowledge of PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     6.4.  EARL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     6.5.  Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     6.6.  Service Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   7.  Mesh Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.1.  Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     7.2.  Mesh Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.3.  Mesh Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   8.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31



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     8.1.  Mesh Account  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       8.1.1.  Account Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     8.2.  Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       8.2.1.  The Device Catalog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
       8.2.2.  Mesh Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     8.3.  Mesh Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     8.4.  Mesh Messaging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.4.1.  Message Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.4.2.  Four Corner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       8.4.3.  Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   9.  Publications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     9.1.  Contact Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     9.2.  Device Preconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     9.3.  Device Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   10. Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     10.1.  Shared Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       10.1.1.  Classes describing keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       10.1.2.  Structure: KeyData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       10.1.3.  Structure: CompositePrivate  . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     10.2.  Assertion classes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       10.2.1.  Structure: Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       10.2.2.  Structure: Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.3.  Base Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.4.  Structure: Connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.5.  Structure: Activation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.6.  Structure: ActivationEntry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.7.  Mesh Profile Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       10.2.8.  Structure: Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       10.2.9.  Structure: ProfileDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       10.2.10. Structure: ProfileAccount  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       10.2.11. Structure: ProfileUser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       10.2.12. Structure: ProfileGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       10.2.13. Structure: ProfileService  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       10.2.14. Structure: ProfileHost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       10.2.15. Connection Assertions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       10.2.16. Structure: ConnectionDevice  . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       10.2.17. Structure: ConnectionApplication . . . . . . . . . .  46
       10.2.18. Structure: ConnectionGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       10.2.19. Structure: ConnectionService . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.20. Structure: ConnectionHost  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.21. Activation Assertions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.22. Structure: ActivationDevice  . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.23. Structure: ActivationAccount . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.24. Structure: ActivationApplication . . . . . . . . . .  47
     10.3.  Data Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       10.3.1.  Structure: Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       10.3.2.  Structure: Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       10.3.3.  Structure: TaggedSource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48



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       10.3.4.  Structure: ContactGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       10.3.5.  Structure: ContactPerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       10.3.6.  Structure: ContactOrganization . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       10.3.7.  Structure: OrganizationName  . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       10.3.8.  Structure: PersonName  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       10.3.9.  Structure: NetworkAddress  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.3.10. Structure: NetworkProtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.3.11. Structure: Role  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.3.12. Structure: Location  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.3.13. Structure: Bookmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       10.3.14. Structure: Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       10.3.15. Structure: Task  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     10.4.  Catalog Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       10.4.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       10.4.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       10.4.3.  Structure: CatalogedPublication  . . . . . . . . . .  53
       10.4.4.  Structure: CatalogedCredential . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       10.4.5.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork  . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       10.4.6.  Structure: CatalogedContact  . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       10.4.7.  Structure: CatalogedAccess . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       10.4.8.  Structure: CryptographicCapability . . . . . . . . .  54
       10.4.9.  Structure: CapabilityDecrypt . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       10.4.10. Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial  . . . . . . . .  54
       10.4.11. Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced . . . . . . . .  55
       10.4.12. Structure: CapabilitySign  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       10.4.13. Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate . . . . . . . . . .  55
       10.4.14. Structure: CapabilityFairExchange  . . . . . . . . .  55
       10.4.15. Structure: CatalogedBookmark . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       10.4.16. Structure: CatalogedTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.17. Structure: CatalogedApplication  . . . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.18. Structure: CatalogedMember . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.19. Structure: CatalogedGroup  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.20. Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH . . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.21. Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail  . . . . . . . .  56
       10.4.22. Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork . . . . . . .  57
     10.5.  Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       10.5.1.  Structure: DevicePreconfiguration  . . . . . . . . .  57
     10.6.  Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       10.6.1.  Structure: Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       10.6.2.  Structure: MessageError  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       10.6.3.  Structure: MessageComplete . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
       10.6.4.  Structure: MessagePinValidated . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       10.6.5.  Structure: MessagePin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       10.6.6.  Structure: RequestConnection . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       10.6.7.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection . . . . . . . . . .  58
       10.6.8.  Structure: RespondConnection . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       10.6.9.  Structure: MessageContact  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       10.6.10. Structure: GroupInvitation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59



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       10.6.11. Structure: RequestConfirmation . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       10.6.12. Structure: ResponseConfirmation  . . . . . . . . . .  60
       10.6.13. Structure: RequestTask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       10.6.14. Structure: MessageClaim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       10.6.15. Structure: ProcessResult . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   14. Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative)  .  61
     14.1.  Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       14.1.1.  Creating a new Mesh  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       14.1.2.  Adding an Account  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
       14.1.3.  Adding a Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     14.2.  Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       14.2.1.  Creating a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       14.2.2.  Adding an Account  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   15. Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption
        Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     15.1.  Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   16. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   17. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64

1.  Introduction

   This document describes the data structures of the Mathematical Mesh
   with illustrative examples.  For an overview of the Mesh objectives
   and architecture, consult the accompanying _Architecture Guide_
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].  For information on the
   implementation of the Mesh Service protocol, consult the accompanying
   _Protocol Reference_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]

   This document has two main sections.  The first section presents
   examples of the Mesh assertions, catalog entry and messages in use.
   The second section contains the schema reference.  All the material
   in both sections is generated from the Mesh reference implementation
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].

   Although some of the services described in this document could be
   used to replace existing Internet protocols including FTP and SMTP,
   the principal value of any communication protocol lies in the size of
   the audience it allows them to communicate with.  Thus, while the
   Mesh Messaging service is designed to support efficient and reliable
   transfer of messages ranging in size from a few bytes to multiple
   terabytes, the near-term applications of these services will be to
   applications that are not adequately supported by existing protocols
   if at all.





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2.  Definitions

   This section presents the related specifications and standard, the
   terms that are used as terms of art within the documents and the
   terms used as requirements language.

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.2.  Defined Terms

   The terms of art used in this document are described in the _Mesh
   Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

2.3.  Related Specifications

   The architecture of the Mathematical Mesh is described in the _Mesh
   Architecture Guide_ [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].  The Mesh
   documentation set and related specifications are described in this
   document.

2.4.  Implementation Status

   The implementation status of the reference code base is described in
   the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer].

3.  Actors

   The Mesh mediates interactions between three principal actors:
   *Accounts*, *Devices*, and *Services*.

   Currently two account types are specified, *user accounts* which
   belong to an individual user and *group accounts* that are used to
   share access to confidential information between a group of users.
   It may prove useful to define new types of account over time or to
   eliminate the distinction entirely.  When active a Mesh account is
   bound to a Mesh Service.  The service to which an account is bound
   MAY be changed over time but an account can only be bound to a single
   service at a time.









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   A Mesh account is an abstract construct that (when active) is
   instantiated across one or more physical machines called a device.
   Each device that is connected to an account has a separate set of
   cryptographic keys that are used to interact with other devices
   connected to the account and MAY be provisioned with access to the
   account private keys which MAY or MAY NOT be mediated by the current
   Mesh Service.

   A Mesh Service is an abstract construct that is provided by one or
   more physical machines called Hosts.  A Mesh Host is a device that is
   attached to a service rather than an account.

3.1.  Accounts

   A Mesh Account is described by a Profile descended from Profile
   Account and contains a set of Mesh stores.  Currently two account
   profiles are defined:

   ProfileUser  Describes a user account.

   ProfileGroup  Describes a group account used to share confidential
      information between a group of users.

   Both types of profile specify the following fields:

   ProfileSignature  The public signature key used to authenticate the
      profile itself

   AccountAddress  The account name to which the account is currently
      bound. (e.g. "alice@example.com", "@alice").

   ServiceUdf  If the account is active, specifies the fingerprint of
      the service profile to which the account is currently bound.

   AdministratorSignature  The public signature key used to verify
      administrative actions on the account.  In particular addition of
      devices to a user account or members to a group account.

   AccountEncryption  The public encryption key for the account.  All
      messages sent to the account MUST be encrypted under this key.  By
      definition, all data encrypted under this account is encrypted
      under this key.

   User accounts specify two additional public keys, "AccountSignature"
   and "AccountAuthentication" which allow signature and authentication
   operations under the account context.





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   Every account contains a set of catalogs and spools that are managed
   by the service as directed by the contents of the associated "Access"
   catalog.

   For example, the personal account profile Alice created is:

   {
     "ProfileUser":{
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"c3l96hFNVbXzQa7dohgp_X9YIIzaR4U0dPCfyocquFWnZ
     uiFdu9vl9UIgtYv-tjFVpmk6qRDj7mA"}}},
       "AccountAddress":"alice@example.com",
       "ServiceUdf":"MA36-TUJL-QRZJ-3M3L-SRBQ-BRYQ-W2YM",
       "AccountEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MDLO-JJ4B-RBY5-VYD7-LJZY-S3RK-DBM2",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"4Mi9X8mXI9mGh_7sjGZP0aFPRXJNSFexPBnIAK1BN__SX
     RxtWQTsXsgz1fl5Jc38ZYx7MVe2X9wA"}}},
       "AdministratorSignature":{
         "Udf":"MCCK-F2WZ-QAAC-C3NA-EVAW-SBL7-IHEQ",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"8TSZ7DNTM7FugJqAFft4FJD4WdjA9omHUDa7tntnJBkQ4
     kNW_tyS6QMGMYly4wHR1WFnUZvI5QmA"}}},
       "AccountAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MBB3-723K-DJKQ-G4HH-7PTN-5JXK-ZV6A",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"l674_n9ihg91rjgPisb3XuA78E_8hWzsHtYfoFQvGB2kZ
     3O1xSBFE2ppFjhS4hslA45yz7WpBzgA"}}},
       "AccountSignature":{
         "Udf":"MDA6-ELE2-T2AM-52RT-AN3R-LUDS-GJGX",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"AHStW8KGpbroZt5ez-wvbC_FMr9AjqI8gLigC5p3whHcE
     Q4jP9dW1xDwZ34j77qXNIfFEvOEWJMA"}}}}}






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3.2.  Device

   Every Mesh device has a set of private keys that are unique to that
   device.  These keys MAY be installed during manufacture, installed
   from an external source after manufacture or generated on the device.
   If the platform capabilities allow, device private keys SHOULD be
   bound to the device so that they cannot be extracted or exported
   without substantial effort.

   The public keys corresponding to the device private keys are
   specified in a ProfileDevice.  This MUST contain at least the
   following fields:

   ProfileSignature  The public signature key used to authenticate the
      profile itself.

   BaseEncryption  Public encryption key used as a share contribution to
      generation of device encryption keys to be used in the context of
      an account and to decrypt data during the process of connecting to
      an account.

   BaseAuthentication  Public authentication key used as a share
      contribution to generation of device authentication keys to be
      used in the context of an account and to authenticate the device
      to a service during the process of connecting to an account.

   BaseSignature  Public signature key used as a share contribution to
      generation of device authentication keys to be used in the context
      of an account.

   For example, the device profile corresponding to Alice's coffee pot
   device is:



















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   {
     "ProfileDevice":{
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"s9IdDH2a_dArdBA8thg41Ctwc0qVo6w67bRrEI1LZgSlG
     pUSlXWZN8W-VY7hm40Xoq7TU5KEsQSA"}}},
       "BaseEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MD5F-Q3O6-KRGL-IS4V-IWVC-5SIN-S63R",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"aJSPUdraCO0yv2YXVKkQ4i1XUKVau-Apb7-OxXNb06Y-w
     9I420kkRzXhSfsifKPegX7kJMHDKZkA"}}},
       "BaseAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MDQC-JYXP-KZ3I-ETIO-KMWA-XIAP-3JRD",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"KABXGv_VuvLPRhfVpHd5qykjJDUNRiwhh5u3CJpwuAZXf
     vmeM0KXit5b6wNvYYsSoLeNfKy337IA"}}},
       "BaseSignature":{
         "Udf":"MDL3-Q7RU-USJR-QF3O-CJEF-6TPW-EVAN",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"2wXyHGACnTq5ee8mgXM_jADlpeRV7gcN3jTQc9LP3LP1Y
     zii2iSkUMgUTP8yF_KmibXs5pXvv0oA"}}}}}

3.2.1.  Activation

   The device private keys are only used to perform cryptographic
   operations during the process of connecting a device to an account.
   During that connection process, a threshold key generation scheme is
   used to generate a second set of device keys bound to the account by
   combining the base key held by the device with a second device
   private key provided by the administration device approving the
   connection of the device to the account.  The resulting key is
   referred to as the device key.  The process of combining the base
   keys with the contributions to form the device keys is called
   Activation.

   The activation record for Alice's coffee pot device is:






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   {
     "ActivationDevice":{
       "ActivationKey":"ZAAQ-HHIF-DKIU-F5UI-VEFB-G4XO-SZY6-JF4J-7QLL-2
   RFQ-QGUO-AJI7-I2FQ-CXO6",
       "AccountUdf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA"}}

   The Mesh protocols are designed so that there is never a need to
   export or escrow private keys of any type associated with a device,
   neither the base key, nor the device key nor the contribution from
   the administration device.

   This approach to device configuration ensures that the keys that are
   used by the device when operating within the context of the account
   are entirely separate from those originally provided by the device
   manufacturer or generated on the device, provided only that the key
   contributions from the administration device are sufficiently random
   and unguessable.

   The public keys corresponding to the composite keys generated during
   the connection process are described in a "ConnectionUser" assertion
   signed by the administration key of the corresponding account.

   The connection record for Alice's coffee pot device is:

   {
     "ConnectionDevice":{
       "DeviceSignature":{
         "Udf":"MCEL-HWST-PNFX-ENF4-ROL5-INQF-P2TK",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"4DHBHjQ8X2CadyazPhOx_kSM1IFwgkZEWwW6BK18UBsrr
     wURQg5QVOGbZl4hvQqu7dULB4tDjAIA"}}},
       "DeviceEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MDPR-ZBW2-AERR-PQIZ-2J3Z-5DLN-ALBM",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"Q7UKXQoRCr4eqDLi1WgyyO9JNtDmZ4AaFl6iaGB5IRGrF
     eMpv7LanAKnTNZUQP0fbnmpdoGvjG-A"}}},
       "DeviceAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MDS4-XJNU-HVTT-VR27-I4W3-DYDC-AFEK",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"F2Bv14NA0Qw_f2B1ktqMGUzAMKbiUNF8etfElLVN-FGYw
     V0PN9PMdE55ELOt0Y0YkKxP3CR0Kp4A"}}}}}




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   The "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used in the same fashion as an
   X.509v3/PKIX certificate to mediate interactions between devices
   connected to the same account without the need for interaction with
   the Mesh service.  Thus, a coffee pot device connected to the account
   can receive and authenticate instructions issued by a voice
   recognition device connected to that account.

   While the "ConnectionUser" assertion MAY be used to mediate external
   interactions, this approach is typically undesirable as it provides
   the external parties with visibility to the internal configuration of
   the account, in particular which connected devices are being used on
   which occasions.  Furthermore, the lack of the need to interact with
   the service means that the service is necessarily unable to mediate
   the exchange and enforce authorization policy on the interactions.

   Device keys are intended to be used to secure communications between
   devices connected to the same account.  All communication between
   Mesh accounts SHOULD be mediated by a Mesh service.  This enables
   abuse mitigation by applying access control to every outbound and
   every inbound message.

   Since Alice's coffee pot does not require the external communication
   right, the activation record for the coffee pot does not provide
   access to the account keys required to perform external
   communications.  Alice's watch device does require access to the
   account keys so it can receive messages and task updates.  But since
   it is a device that Alice has to carry on her person to use, it is a
   device that might easily be lost or stolen.  Accordingly, the
   activation record for Alice's watch provides access to the account
   decryption and signature keys but in the form of threshold key shares
   mediated by the Mesh service.  Thus, Alice's watch can sign and read
   message sent to the account but only under the control of the Mesh
   service.

3.3.  Service

   Mesh services are described by a "ProfileService".  This specifies
   the encryption, and signature authentication keys used to interact
   with the abstract service.

   Since Mesh accounts and services are both abstract constructs, they
   cannot interact directly.  A device connected to an account can only
   interact with a service by interacted with a device authorized to
   provide services on behalf of one or more accounts connected to the
   service.  Such a device is called a Mesh Host.






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   Mesh hosts MAY be managed using the same ProfileDevice and device
   connection mechanism provided for management of user devices or by
   whatever other management protocols prove convenient.  The only part
   of the Service/Host interaction that is visible to devices connected
   to a profile and to hosts connected to other services is the
   ConnectionHost structure that describes the set of device keys to use
   in interactions with that specific host.

4.  Catalogs

   Catalogs track sets of persistent objects associated with a Mesh
   Service Account.  The Mesh Service has no access to the entries in
   any Mesh catalog except for the Device and Contacts catalog which are
   used in device authentication and authorization of inbound messages.

   Each Mesh Catalog managed by a Mesh Account has a name of the form:

   "<prefix>_<name>"

   Where "<prefix>" is the IANA assigned service name.  The assigned
   service name for the Mathematical Mesh is mmm.  Thus, all catalogs
   specified by the Mesh schema have names prefixed with the sequence
   "mmm_".

   The following catalogs are currently specified within the
   Mathematical Mesh.

   Access: mmm_Access  Describes access control policy for performing
      operations on the account.  The Access catalog is the only Mesh
      catalog whose contents are readable by the Mesh Service under
      normal circumstances.

   Application: "mmm_Application"  Describes configuration information
      for applications including mail (SMTP, IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc)
      and SSH and for the MeshAccount application itself.

   Bookmark: "mmm_Bookmark"  Describes Web bookmarks and other citations
      allowing them to be shared between devices connected to the
      profile.

   Contact: "mmm_Contact"  Describes logical and physical contact
      information for people and organizations.

   Credential: "mmm_Credential"  Describes credentials used to access
      network resources.

   Device: "mmm_Device"  Describes the set of devices connected to the
      account and the permissions assigned to them



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   Network: "mmm_Network"  Describes network settings such as WiFi
      access points, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.

   Member: mmm_Member  Describes the set of members connected to a group
      account.

   Publication: mmm_Publication  Describes data published under the
      account context.  The data MAY be stored in the publication
      catalog itself or on a separate service (e.g. a Web server).

   Task: "mmm_CatalogTask"  Describes tasks assigned to the user
      including calendar entries and to do lists.

   The Access, Publication, Device and Member catalogs are involved in
   Mesh Service Protocol interactions.  These interactions are further
   described in the Protocol Reference
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

   In many cases, the Mesh Catalog offers capabilities that represent a
   superset of the capabilities of an existing application.  For
   example, the task catalog supports the appointment tracking functions
   of a traditional calendar application and the task tracking function
   of the traditional 'to do list' application.  Combining these
   functions allows tasks to be triggered by other events other than the
   passage of time such as completion of other tasks, geographical
   presence, etc.

   In such cases, the Mesh Catalog entries are designed to provide a
   superset of the data representation capabilities of the legacy
   formats and (where available) recent extensions.  Where a catalog
   entry is derived from input presented in a legacy format, the
   original data representation MAY be attached verbatim to facilitate
   interoperability.

4.1.  Access

   The access catalog "mmm_Access" contains a list of access control
   entries granting a party authenticated using a particular
   cryptographic credential a specific privilege such as:

   *  Accept Mesh Messages of particular types

   *  Perform an operation on a private key known to the service.








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   As with the publication catalog, the access catalog provides
   information that is necessary for the Mesh Service to act on behalf
   of the user.  It is therefore necessary to grant a decryption
   capability for this catalog during the process of binding the account
   to a service.

4.2.  Application

   The application catalog "mmm"_"Application" contains
   "CatalogEntryApplication" entries which describe the use of specific
   applications under the Mesh Service Account.  Multiple application
   accounts for a single application MAY be connected to a single Mesh
   Service Account.  Each account being specified in a separate entry.

   The "CatalogEntryApplication" entries only contain configuration
   information for the application as it applies to the account as a
   whole.  If the application requires separate configuration for
   individual devices, this is specified in separate activation records
   specified in the corresponding "ConnectionDevice".

4.2.1.  Mesh Account

   Mesh Accounts are described by "CatalogEntryAccount" entries.  The
   corresponding activation records for the connected devices contain
   the contributions used to derive the private keys for use of the
   account.

   The "CatalogEntryAccount" entry is described in the section
   describing Mesh accounts above.

4.2.2.  SSH

   SSH configuration profiles are described by
   "CatalogEntryApplicationSSH" entries.  The corresponding activation
   records for the connected devices contain the contributions used to
   derive the private keys.

   A user may have separate SSH configurations for separate purposes
   within a single Mesh Account.  This allows a system administrator
   servicing multiple clients to maintain separate SSH profiles for each
   of her customers allowing credentials to be easily (and verifiably)
   revoked at contract termination.

   The SSH profile contains the information that is stored in the
   "known_hosts" and "authorized_keys" files of SSH clients and servers.






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4.2.3.  Mail

   Mail configuration profiles are described by one or more
   "CatalogEntryApplicationMail" entries, one for each email account
   connected to the Mesh profile.  The corresponding activation records
   for the connected devices contain information used to provide the
   device with the necessary decryption information.

   Entries specify the email account address(es), the inbound and
   outbound server configuration and the cryptographic keys to be used
   for S/MIME and OpenPGP encryption.

4.3.  Bookmark

   The bookmark catalog "mmm_bookmark" contains "CatalogEntryBookmark"
   entries which describe Web bookmarks and other citations allowing
   them to be shared between devices connected to the profile.

   The fields currently supported by the Bookmarks catalog are currently
   limited to the fields required for tracking Web bookmarks.
   Specification of additional fields to track full academic citations
   is a work in progress.

   {
     "CatalogedBookmark":{
       "Uri":"http://www.site1.com",
       "Title":"site1",
       "Path":"Sites.1"}}

4.4.  Contact

   The contact catalog "mmm_contact" contains "CatalogEntryContact"
   entries which describe

   {
     "CatalogedContact":{
       "Key":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
       "Self":true,
       "Contact":{
         "ContactPerson":{
           "Id":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
           "Anchors":[{
               "Udf":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
               "Validation":"Self"}
             ],
           "NetworkAddresses":[{
               "Address":"alice@example.com",
               "EnvelopedProfileAccount":[{



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                   "EnvelopeId":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
                   "dig":"S512",
                   "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQU1VLT
     VRWFAtVFdDRC03UEtJLVM0RkMtSUI3Ni1YQVNIIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiA
     iUHJvZmlsZVVzZXIiLAogICJjdHkiOiAiYXBwbGljYXRpb24vbW1tL29iamVjdCIs
     CiAgIkNyZWF0ZWQiOiAiMjAyMS0wMS0xM1QxNjozODoxOVoifQ"},
                 "ewogICJQcm9maWxlVXNlciI6IHsKICAgICJQcm9maWxlU2lnbm
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     JQjc2LVhBU0giLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAgICAi
     UHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogICAgI
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     NQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICA
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                 {
                   "signatures":[{
                       "alg":"S512",
                       "kid":"MAMU-5QXP-TWCD-7PKI-S4FC-IB76-XASH",
                       "signature":"_9tIDk5KvjeIuasHaXDawBB1VTw2YIzx
     BUxpLn78a0qfO9CjuWh7auyUMHrCGvpuQRjjQrDR_OeATnhDzrIG5xcQbFwvfge_r
     fqvUjqQc-CZqvT8lLDQ2clW6THP1Z0GcIZmxNEpYVkyyR-9AACDQAcA"}
                     ],
                   "PayloadDigest":"fb_iksIe0dM4IWIWZjmKlYQSF-XttjIA
     g8Bww4tJjpOE0P9bxX42pkNorLfHQ8XyD8x9IHT-FKh-_lhLJNAUzA"}
                 ],
               "Protocols":[{



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                   "Protocol":"mmm"}
                 ]}
             ],
           "Sources":[{
               "Validation":"Self",
               "EnvelopedSource":[{
                   "dig":"S512",
                   "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb2
     50YWN0UGVyc29uIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAo
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     l0U0ZWRVlUZAogIDBiblJ1U2tKclVUUnJUbGRmZEhsVENpQWdObEZOUjAxWmJIazB



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     kMGhTTVZkR2JsVmFka2sxVVcxQkluMTlmCiAgU3dLSUNBZ0lDSkJZMk52ZFc1MFFY
     VjBhR1Z1ZEdsallYUnBiMjRpT2lCN0NpQWdJQ0FnSUNKVlpHWWlPaUEKICBpVFVKQ
     015MDNNak5MTFVSS1MxRXRSelJJU0MwM1VGUk9MVFZLV0VzdFdsWTJRU0lzQ2lBZ0
     lDQWdJQ0pRZAogIFdKc2FXTlFZWEpoYldWMFpYSnpJam9nZXdvZ0lDQWdJQ0FnSUN
     KUWRXSnNhV05MWlhsRlEwUklJam9nZXdvCiAgZ0lDQWdJQ0FnSUNBZ0ltTnlkaUk2
     SUNKWU5EUTRJaXdLSUNBZ0lDQWdJQ0FnSUNKUWRXSnNhV01pT2lBaWIKICBEWTNOR
     jl1T1dsb1p6a3hjbXBuVUdsellqTllkVUUzT0VWZk9HaFhlbk5JZEZsbWIwWlJka2
     RDTW10YU0wOAogIHhlRk5DUmdvZ0lFVXljSEJHYW1oVE5HaHpiRUUwTlhsNk4xZHd
     RbnBuUVNKOWZYMHNDaUFnSUNBaVFXTmpiCiAgM1Z1ZEZOcFoyNWhkSFZ5WlNJNklI
     c0tJQ0FnSUNBZ0lsVmtaaUk2SUNKTlJFRTJMVVZNUlRJdFZESkJUUzAKICAxTWxKV
     UxVRk9NMUl0VEZWRVV5MUhTa2RZSWl3S0lDQWdJQ0FnSWxCMVlteHBZMUJoY21GdF
     pYUmxjbk1pTwogIGlCN0NpQWdJQ0FnSUNBZ0lsQjFZbXhwWTB0bGVVVkRSRWdpT2l
     CN0NpQWdJQ0FnSUNBZ0lDQWlZM0oySWpvCiAgZ0lrVmtORFE0SWl3S0lDQWdJQ0Fn
     SUNBZ0lDSlFkV0pzYVdNaU9pQWlRVWhUZEZjNFMwZHdZbkp2V25RMVoKICBYb3RkM
     1ppUTE5R1RYSTVRV3B4U1RoblRHbG5RelZ3TTNkb1NHTkZVVFJxVURsa1Z3b2dJRE
     Y0UkhkYU16UgogIHFOemR4V0U1SlprWkZkazlGVjBwTlFTSjlmWDE5ZlEiLAogICA
     gICAgICAgewogICAgICAgICAgICAic2lnbmF0dXJlcyI6IFt7CiAgICAgICAgICAg
     ICAgICAiYWxnIjogIlM1MTIiLAogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgImtpZCI6ICJNQU1VL
     TVRWFAtVFdDRC03UEtJLVM0RkMtSUI3Ni1YQVNIIiwKICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC
     JzaWduYXR1cmUiOiAiXzl0SURrNUt2amVJdWFzSGFYRGF3QkIxVlR3MllJenhCVXh
     wTG43OGEwcWZPOUNqdQogIFdoN2F1eVVNSHJDR3ZwdVFSampRckRSX09lQVRuaER6
     cklHNXhjUWJGd3ZmZ2VfcmZxdlVqcVFjLUNacXZUCiAgOGxMRFEyY2xXNlRIUDFaM
     EdjSVpteE5FcFlWa3l5Ui05QUFDRFFBY0EifV0sCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJQYXlsb2
     FkRGlnZXN0IjogImZiX2lrc0llMGRNNElXSVdaam1LbFlRU0YtWHR0aklBZzhCd3c
     0dEpqcE9FMAogIFA5YnhYNDJwa05vckxmSFE4WHlEOHg5SUhULUZLaC1fbGhMSk5B
     VXpBIn1dLAogICAgICAgICJQcm90b2NvbHMiOiBbewogICAgICAgICAgICAiUHJvd
     G9jb2wiOiAibW1tIn1dfV19fQ",
                 {
                   "signatures":[{
                       "alg":"S512",
                       "kid":"MDA6-ELE2-T2AM-52RT-AN3R-LUDS-GJGX",
                       "signature":"TNxwW6yniJfw_8hNE_6bssF6HiT_Ian7
     y755E1N-X9t88aU2FzbsOHvILoehWLnSUYd8FSWnRw4AwOkXeNnSOC0vP_ORtgCVF
     tNjqyjvTSVqlH2qUa5u_ad8cTe9iEEc8Kw34jIjJ3vGG5T-zoEhpCcA"}
                     ],
                   "PayloadDigest":"unXsJJuUAUZ6Sd8nfRYOnUvFQjsevfU9
     8Dj6NJn3ul30f6mwwaHcsWojEr2F1lfeHbkA4vksAX2seekIjNH7Ww"}
                 ]}
             ]}}}}

   The fields of the contact catalog provide a superset of the
   capabilities of vCard [RFC2426].

   The Contact catalog is typically used by the MeshService as a source
   of authorization information to perform access control on inbound and
   outbound message requests.  For this reason, Mesh Service SHOULD be
   granted read access to the contacts catalog by providing a decryption
   entry for the service.



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4.5.  Credential

   The credential catalog "mmm_credential" contains
   "CatalogEntryCredential" entries which describe credentials used to
   access network resources.

   {
     "CatalogedCredential":{
       "Service":"ftp.example.com",
       "Username":"alice1",
       "Password":"password"}}

   Only username/password credentials are stored in the credential
   catalog.  If public key credentials are to be used, these SHOULD be
   managed as an application profile allowing separate credentials to be
   created for each device.

4.6.  Device

   The device catalog "mmm_Device" contains "CatalogEntryDevice" entries
   which describe the devices connected to the account and the
   permissions assigned to them.

   Each device connected to a Mesh Account has an associated
   CatalogEntryDevice entry that includes the activation and connection
   records for the account.  These records are described in further
   detail in section REF _Ref54628559 \r \h 0.

4.7.  Network

   The network catalog contains "CatalogEntryNetwork" entries which
   describe network settings, IPSEC and TLS VPN configurations, etc.

   {
     "CatalogedNetwork":{
       "Service":"myWiFi",
       "Password":"securePassword"}}

4.8.  Publication

   The publication catalog "mmm_Publication" contains
   "CatalogEntryPublication" entries which describe content published
   through the account.








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4.9.  Task

   The Task catalog "mmm_Task" contains "CatalogEntryTask" entries which
   describe tasks assigned to the user including calendar entries and to
   do lists.

   The fields of the task catalog currently reflect those offered by the
   iCalendar specification [RFC5545].  Specification of additional
   fields to allow task triggering on geographic location and/or
   completion of other tasks is a work in progress.

   {
     "CatalogedTask":{
       "Title":"SomeItem",
       "Key":"NC44-73RX-SL65-EFN4-E6ZD-JL47-CZ3A"}}

5.  Spools

   Spools are DARE Containers containing an append only list of messages
   sent or received by an account.  Three spools are currently defined:

   Inbound  Messages sent to the account.  These are encrypted under the
      account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
      current at the time the message was sent.

   Outbound  Messages sent from the account.  These are encrypted under
      the account encryption keys of the sender and receiver that were
      current at the time the message was sent.

   Local  Messages sent from the account for internal use.  These are
      encrypted under the encryption key of the intended recipient
      alone.  This is either the account administration encryption key
      or a device encryption key.

   Every Mesh Message has a unique message identifier.  Messages created
   at the beginning of a new messaging protocol interaction are assigned
   a random message identifier.  Responses to previous messages are
   assigned message identifiers formed from the message identifier to
   which they respond by means of a message digest function.

   Every Mesh Message stored in a spool is encapsulated in an envelope
   which bears a unique identifier that is formed by applying a message
   digest function to the message identifier.  Each stored message has
   an associated state which is initially set to the state "Initial" and
   MAY be subsequently altered by one or more "MessageComplete" messages
   subsequently appended to the spool.  The allowable message states
   depending upon the spool in question.




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5.1.  Outbound

   The outbound spool stores messages that are to be or have been sent
   and "MessageComplete" messages reporting changes to the status of the
   messages stored on the spool.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Sent,
   Received or Refused:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Sent  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to the
      Mesh Service of the recipient which accepted it.

   Received  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
      the Mesh Service of the recipient and the recipient has
      acknowledged receipt.

   Refused  The Mesh Service of the sender has delivered the message to
      the Mesh Service of the recipient which refused to accept it.

   "MessageComplete" messages are only valid when posted to the spool by
   the service.

5.2.  Inbound

   The inbound spool stores messages that have been received by the Mesh
   service servicing the account and MessageComplete messages reporting
   changes to the status of the messages stored on the spool.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the state Initial, Read:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Read  The message has been read.

   A message previously marked as read MAY be returned to the unread
   state by marking it as being in the Initial state.

5.3.  Local

   The local spool stores messages that are used for administrative
   functions.  In normal circumstances, only administrator devices and
   the Mesh Service require access to the local spool.







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   The local spool is used to store MessagePin messages used to notify
   administration devices that a PIN code has been registered for some
   purpose and RespondConnection messages used to inform a device of the
   result of a connection request.

   The local spool is used in a device connection operation to provide a
   device with the activation and connection records required to access
   the service as an authorized client.  Servicing these requests
   requires that the service be able to access messages stored in the
   spool by envelope id.

   Messages posted to the outbound spool have the states Initial,
   Closed:

   Initial  The initial state of a message posted to the spool.

   Closed  The action associated with the message has been completed.

6.  Cryptographic Operations

   The Mesh makes use of various cryptographic operations including
   threshold operations.  For convenience, these are gathered here and
   specified as functions that are referenced by other parts of the
   specification.

6.1.  Key Derivation from Seed

   Mesh Keys that derived from a seed value use the mechanism described
   in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].  Use of the "keyname" parameter
   allows multiple keys for different uses to be derived from a single
   key.  Thus escrow of a single seed value permits recovery of all the
   private keys associated with the profile.

   The keyname parameter is a string formed by concatenating identifiers
   specifying the key type, the actor that will use the key and the key
   operation:

6.2.  Message Envelope and Response Identifiers.

   Every Mesh message has a unique Message Identifier "MessageId".  The
   "MakeID()" function is used to calculate the value of Envelope
   Identifier and Response identifier from the message identifier as
   follows:








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   static string MakeID(string udf, string content) {
       var (code, bds) = UDF.Parse(udf);
       return code switch
           {
               UdfTypeIdentifier.Digest_SHA_3_512 =>
                   UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
                   bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
                       CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_3_512),
               _ => UDF.ContentDigestOfDataString(
               bds, content, cryptoAlgorithmId:
                       CryptoAlgorithmId.SHA_2_512),
               };

   Where the values of content are given as follows:

   String String

   For example:

   MessageID
       = NBPS-TE2K-5BQZ-3HWA-PJNU-WYOX-DAMW

   EnvelopeID
       = MAD4-DQE5-PU4Y-QCTJ-D5U2-ZZVS-WBYC

   ResponseID
       = MDDB-CUZ4-QYCA-BEZB-3BPQ-PYOM-GPUM

6.3.  Proof of Knowledge of PIN

   Mesh Message classes that are subclasses of "MessagePinValidated" MAY
   be authenticated by means of a PIN.  Currently two such messages are
   defined: "MessageContact" used in contact exchange and
   "RequestConnection" message used in device connection.

   The PIN codes used to authenticate "MessagePinValidated" messages are
   UDF Authenticator strings.  The type code of the identifier specifies
   the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code and the Binary
   Data Sequence value specifies the key.

   The inputs to the PIN proof of knowledge functions are:

   PIN: string  A UDF Authenticator.  The type code of the identifier
      specifies the algorithm to be used to authenticate the PIN code
      and the Binary Data Sequence value specifies the key.

   Action: string  A code determining the specific action that the PIN




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      code MAY be used to authenticate.  By convention this is the name
      of the Mesh message type used to perform the action.

   Account: string  The account for which the PIN code is issued.

   ClientNonce: binary  Nonce value generated by the client using the
      PIN code to authenticate its message.

   PayloadDigest: binary  The PayloadDigest of a DARE Envelope that
      contains the message to be authenticated.  Note that if the
      envelope is encrypted, this value is calculated over the
      ciphertext and does not provide proof of knowledge of the
      plaintext.

   The following values of Action are currently defined:

   String String

   These inputs are used to derive values as follows:

   alg =           UdfAlg (PIN)
   pinData =       UdfBDS (PIN)
   saltedPINData = MAC (Action, pinData)
   saltedPIN =     UDFPresent (HMAC_SHA_2_512 + saltedPINData)
   PinId =         UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))

   The issuer of the PIN code stores the value saltedPIN for retrieval
   using the key PinId.

   The witness value for a Dare Envelope with payload digest
   PayloadDigest authenticated by a PIN code whose salted value is
   saltedPINData, issued by account Account is given by PinWitness() as
   follows:

   witnessData =   Account.ToUTF8() + ClientNonce + PayloadDigest
   witnessValue =  MAC (witnessData , saltedPINData)

   For example, to generate saltedPIN for the pin AB23-ZBOI-CEIZ-MTD4-VQ
   used to authenticate a an action of type Device:












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   pin = AB23-ZBOI-CEIZ-MTD4-VQ
   action = message.

   alg = UdfAlg (PIN)
       = Authenticator_HMAC_SHA_2_512

   hashalg = default (alg, HMAC_SHA_2_512)

   pinData = UdfBDS (PIN)
       = System.Byte[]

   saltedPINData
       = hashalg(pinData, hashalg);
       = System.Byte[]

   saltedPIN = UDFPresent (hashalg + saltedPINData)
       = AANT-HAQW-KDUY-GUMW-YFY2-YWB5-23YC

   The PinId binding the pin to the account alice@example.com is

   Account =  alice@example.com

   PinId = UDFPresent (MAC (Account, saltedPINData))
       = ABVQ-HJHJ-UUIJ-SLQE-KMK4-XUVP-DTVG

   Where "MAC(data, key)" is the message authentication code algorithm
   specified by the value of "alg".

   When an administrative device issues a PIN code, a Message PIN is
   appended to the local spool.  This has the MessageId PinId and
   specifies the value "saltedPIN" in the field of that name.

   When PIN code authentication is used, a message of type
   "MessagePinValidated" specifies the values "ClientNonce",
   "PinWitness" and "PinId" in the fields of those names.  These values
   are used to authenticate the inner message data specified by the
   "AuthenticatedData" field.

6.4.  EARL

   The UDF Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locator mechanism is used to
   publish data and provide means of authentication and access through a
   static identifier such as a QR code.

   This mechanism is used to allow contact exchange by means of a QR
   code printed on a business card and to connect a device to an account
   using a static identifier printed on the device in the form of a QR
   code.



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   In both cases, the information is passed using the EARL format
   described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf].

6.5.  Key Agreement

   All Mesh Protocol requests except for the HelloRequest and every
   response MUST be authenticated under the device key of the host or
   device making the request.

   Initial authentication is achieved by performing a Key agreement
   under the "DeviceAuthentication" key of each of the hosts and
   combining the result with nonce values provided by the requestor and
   respondent using a KDF function as follows:

   Two bindings are currently planned.

   DARE Envelope over HTTPS  The request or response is encapsulated in
      a DARE Envelope that is exchanged by means of a HTTP POST method
      over a TLS transport.  The shared secret is used as the key on
      Message Authentication Code that authenticates the request
      payload.

   UDP Transport  Presents the same information as for the DARE Envelope
      over HTTPS case but in a compact encoding using the shared secret
      and an authenticated encryption scheme to pass the required
      information.

   Once authentication has been performed, the same pair of devices MAY
   re-authenticate using the previously agreed key.  To facilitate
   stateless implementation, a host specifies an opaque identifier to be
   used to identify the shared secret on subsequent uses which MAY be
   used to recover the shared secret from the opaque identifier.

   [To be specified]

6.6.  Service Cryptographic Operations

   A Mesh Service acts as the counterparty for threshold operations
   allowing mitigation of the risk of compromise of an individual device
   connected to a user account or an insider threat from an individual
   member of a group account.

   When acting in this role, the Mesh service controls the use of the
   cryptographic function but does not have the ability to perform the
   action either by itself or by collaborating with other services to
   which the account has been bound in the past.





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   Note that this approach limits rather than eliminates trust in the
   service.  As with services presenting themselves as 'zero trust', a
   Mesh service becomes a trusted service after a sufficient number of
   breaches in other parts of the system have occurred.  And the user
   trusts the service to provide availability of the service.

   Three service cryptographic operations are currently specified:

   Threshold Key Share  A private key share _s_, held by the service is
      split into key shares _x_, _y_ such that _a_ = _x_ + _y_. One key
      share is encrypted under a decryption key held by the service.
      The other is encrypted under a public key specified by the party
      making the request.

   Threshold Key Agreement  A private key share s, held by the service
      is used to calculate the value (_sl_+ _c_)._P_ where _l_, _c_ are
      integers specified by the requestor and _P_ is a point on the
      curve.

   Threshold Signature  A private key share s, held by the service is
      used to calculate a contribution to a threshold signature scheme.

   The implementation of the cryptographic operations described above is
   described in [draft-hallambaker-threshold] and
   [draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs].

7.  Mesh Assertions

   Mesh Assertions are signed DARE Envelopes that contain one of more
   claims.  Mesh Assertions provide the basis for trust in the
   Mathematical Mesh.

   Mesh Assertions are divided into two classes.  Mesh Profiles are
   self-signed assertions.  Assertions that are not self-signed are
   called declarations.  The only type of declaration currently defined
   is a Connection Declaration describing the connection of a device to
   an account.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

                     Figure 1: Profiles And Connections

7.1.  Encoding

   The payload of a Mesh Assertion is a JSON encoded object that is a
   subclass of the Assertion class which defines the following fields:




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   Identifier  An identifier for the assertion.

   Updated  The date and time at which the assertion was issued or last
      updated

   NotaryToken  An assertion may optionally contain one or more notary
      tokens issued by a Mesh Notary service.  These establish a proof
      that the assertion was signed after the date the notary token was
      created.

   Conditions  A list of conditions that MAY be used to verify the
      status of the assertion if the relying party requires.

   The implementation of the NotaryToken and Conditions mechanisms is to
   be specified in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary] at a future date.

   Note that the implementation of Conditions differs significantly from
   that of SAML.  Relying parties are required to process condition
   clauses in a SAML assertion to determine validity.  Mesh Relying
   parties MAY verify the conditions clauses or rely on the
   trustworthiness of the provider.

   The reason for weakening the processing of conditions clauses in the
   Mesh is that it is only ever possible to validate a conditions clause
   of any type relative to a ground truth.  In SAML applications, the
   relying party almost invariably has access to an independent source
   of ground truth.  A Mesh device connected to a Mesh Service does not.
   Thus the types of verification that can be achieved in practice are
   limited to verifying the consistency of current and previous
   statements from the Mesh Service.

7.2.  Mesh Profiles

   Mesh Profiles perform a similar role to X.509v3 certificates but with
   important differences:

   *  Profiles describe credentials, they do not make identity
      statements

   *  Profiles do not expire, there is therefore no need to support
      renewal processing.

   *  Profiles may be modified over time, the current and past status of
      a profile being recorded in an append only log.







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   Profiles provide the axioms of trust for the Mesh PKI.  Unlike in the
   PKIX model in which all trust flows from axioms of trust held by a
   small number of Certificate Authorities, every part in the Mesh
   contributes their own axiom of trust.

   It should be noted however that the role of Certificate Authorities
   is redefined rather than eliminated.  Rather than making assertions
   whose subject is represented by identities which are inherently
   mutable and subjective, Certificate Authorities can now make
   assertions about immutable cryptographic keys.

   Every Profile MUST contain a "SignatureKey" field and MUST be signed
   by the key specified in that field.

   A Profile is valid if and only if:

   *  There is a "SignatureKey" field.

   *  The profile is signed under the key specified in the
      "SignatureKey" field.

   A profile has the status "current" if and only if:

   *  The Profile is valid

   *  Every Conditions clause in the profile is understood by the
      relying party and evaluates to "true".

7.3.  Mesh Connections

   A Mesh connection is an assertion describing the connection of a
   device or a member to an account.

   Mesh connections provide similar functionality to 'end-entity'
   certificates in PKIX but with the important proviso that they are
   only used to provide trust between a device connected to an account
   and the service to which that account is bound and between the
   devices connected to an account.

   A connection is valid with respect to an account with profile _P_ if
   and only if:

   *  The profile _P_ is valid

   *  The "AuthorityUdf" field of the connection is consistent with the
      UDF of _P_





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   *  The profile is signed under the key specified in the
      "AdministrationKey" field of _P_.

   *  Any conditions specified in the profile are met

   A connection has the status current with respect to an account with
   profile if and only if:

   *  The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
      _P_.

   *  The profile "P" is current.

   A device is authenticated with respect to an account with profile P
   if and only if:

   *  The connection is valid with respect to the account with profile
      _P_.

   *  The device has presented an appropriate proof of knowledge of the
      "DeviceAuthentication" key specified in the connection.

8.  Architecture

   The Mesh architecture has four principal components:

   Mesh Account  A collection of information (contacts, calendar
      entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) belonging to a user
      who uses the Mesh to management.

   Mesh Device Management  The various functions that manage binding of
      devices to a Mesh to grant access to information and services
      bound to that account.

   Mesh Service  Provides network services through which devices and
      other Mesh users may interact with a Mesh Account.

   Mesh Messaging  An end to end secure messaging service that allows
      short messages (less than 32KB) to be exchanged between Mesh
      Accounts and between the Mesh devices connected to a particular
      account.

   The separation of accounts and services as separate components is a
   key distinction between the Mesh and earlier Internet applications.
   A Mesh account belongs to the owner of the Mesh and not the Mesh
   Service Provider which the user may change at any time of their
   choosing.




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   A Mesh Account May be active or inactive.  By definition, an active
   Mesh account is serviced by exactly one Mesh Service, an inactive
   Mesh account is not serviced by a Mesh Service.  A Mesh Service
   Provider MAY offer a backup service for accounts hosted by other
   providers.  In this case the backup provider is connected to the
   account as a Mesh device, thus allowing the backup provider to
   maintain a copy of the stores contained in the account and
   facilitating a rapid transfer of responsibility for servicing the
   account should that be desired.  The use of backup providers is
   described further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery].

8.1.  Mesh Account

   Mesh Accounts contains all the stateful information (contacts,
   calendar entries, inbound and outbound messages, etc.) related to a
   particular persona used by the owner.

   By definition a Mesh Account is active if it is serviced by a Mesh
   Service and inactive otherwise.  A Mesh user MAY change their service
   provider at any time.  An active Mesh Account is serviced by exactly
   one Mesh Service at once but a user MAY register a 'backup' service
   provider to their account in the same manner as adding an advice.
   This ensures that the backup service is pre-populated with all the
   information required to allow the user to switch to the new provider
   without interruption of service.

   Each Mesh account is described by an Account Profile.  Currently
   separate profile Account Profile are defined for user accounts and
   group accounts.  It is not clear if this distinction is a useful one.

8.1.1.  Account Profile

   A Mesh account profile provides the axiom of trust for a mesh user.
   It contains a Master Signature Key and one or more Administration
   Signature Keys.  The unique identifier of the master profile is the
   UDF of the Master Signature Key.

   An Account Profile MUST specify an "EscrowEncryption" key.  This key
   MAY be used to escrow private keys used for encryption of stored
   data.  They SHOULD NOT be used to escrow authentication keys and MUST
   NOT be used to escrow signature keys.










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   A user should not need to replace their account profile unless they
   intend to establish a separate identity.  To minimize the risk of
   disclosure, the Profile Signature Key is only ever used to sign
   updates to the account profile itself.  This allows the user to
   secure their Profile Signature Key by either keeping it on hardware
   token or device dedicated to that purpose or by using the escrow
   mechanism and paper recovery keys as described in this document.

8.1.1.1.  Creating a ProfileMaster

   Creating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of:

   0.  Creating a Master Signature key.

   1.  Creating an Online Signing Key

   2.  Signing the "ProfileMaster" using the Master Signature Key

   3.  Persisting the "ProfileMaster" on the administration device to
       the "CatalogHost".

   4.  (Optional) Connecting at least one Administration Device and
       granting it the "ActivationAdministration" activation.

8.1.1.2.  Updating a ProfileMaster

   Updating a "ProfileMaster" comprises the steps of:

   0.  Making the necessary changes.

   1.  Signing the ProfileMaster using the Master Signature Key

   2.  Persisting the ProfileMaster on the administration device to the
       CatalogHost.

8.2.  Device Management

   Device management allows a collection of devices belonging to a user
   to function as a single personal Mesh.

   The device management functions are principally concerned with the
   catalog containing the entries describing the connected devices.









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8.2.1.  The Device Catalog

   Each Mesh Account has a Device Catalog "CatalogDevice" associated
   with it.  The Device Catalog is used to manage the connection of
   devices to the Personal Mesh and has a "CatalogEntryDevice" for each
   device currently connected to the catalog.

   Each Administration Device MUST have access to an up-to-date copy of
   the Device Catalog in order to manage the devices connected to the
   Mesh.  The Mesh Service protocol MAY be used to synchronize the
   Device Catalog between administration devices in the case that there
   is more than one administration device.

   The "CatalogEntryDevice" contains fields for the device profile,
   device private and device connection.

8.2.2.  Mesh Devices

   The principle of radical distrust requires us to consider the
   possibility that a device might be compromised during manufacture.
   Once consequence of this possibility is that when an administration
   device connects a new device to a user's personal Mesh, we cannot put
   our full trust in either the device being connected or the
   administration device connecting it.

   This concern is resolved by (at minimum) combining keying material
   generated from both sources to create the keys to be used in the
   context of the user's personal Mesh with the process being fully
   verified by both parties.

   Additional keying material sources could be added if protection
   against the possibility of compromise at both devices was required
   but this is not supported by the current specifications.

   A device profile provides the axiom of trust and the key
   contributions of the device.  When bound to an account, the base keys
   specified in the Device Profile are combined with the key data
   provided in the Activation device to construct the keys the device
   will use in the context of the account.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

      Figure 2: Mapping of Device Profile and Device Private to Device
                              Connection Keys.






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   Unless exceptional circumstances require, a device should not require
   more than one Device profile even if the device supports use by
   multiple users under different accounts.  But a device MAY have
   multiple profiles if this approach is more convenient for
   implementation.

   {
     "ProfileDevice":{
       "ProfileSignature":{
         "Udf":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"s9IdDH2a_dArdBA8thg41Ctwc0qVo6w67bRrEI1LZgSlG
     pUSlXWZN8W-VY7hm40Xoq7TU5KEsQSA"}}},
       "BaseEncryption":{
         "Udf":"MD5F-Q3O6-KRGL-IS4V-IWVC-5SIN-S63R",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"aJSPUdraCO0yv2YXVKkQ4i1XUKVau-Apb7-OxXNb06Y-w
     9I420kkRzXhSfsifKPegX7kJMHDKZkA"}}},
       "BaseAuthentication":{
         "Udf":"MDQC-JYXP-KZ3I-ETIO-KMWA-XIAP-3JRD",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"X448",
             "Public":"KABXGv_VuvLPRhfVpHd5qykjJDUNRiwhh5u3CJpwuAZXf
     vmeM0KXit5b6wNvYYsSoLeNfKy337IA"}}},
       "BaseSignature":{
         "Udf":"MDL3-Q7RU-USJR-QF3O-CJEF-6TPW-EVAN",
         "PublicParameters":{
           "PublicKeyECDH":{
             "crv":"Ed448",
             "Public":"2wXyHGACnTq5ee8mgXM_jADlpeRV7gcN3jTQc9LP3LP1Y
     zii2iSkUMgUTP8yF_KmibXs5pXvv0oA"}}}}}

   The derivation of the Connection encryption and signature keys from
   the Profile and Private contributions in this example is shown in
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography].

8.2.2.1.  Creating a ProfileDevice

   Creating a "ProfileDevice" comprises the steps of:

   0.  Creating the necessary key

   1.  Signing the "ProfileDevice" using the Master Signature Key



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   2.  Once created, a "ProfileDevice" is never changed.  In the
       unlikely event that any modification is required, a completely
       new "ProfileDevice" MUST be created.

8.2.2.2.  Connection to a Personal Mesh

   Devices are only connected to a personal Mesh by an administration
   device.  This comprises the steps of:

   0.  Generating the PrivateDevice keys.

   1.  Creating the ConnectionDevice data from the public components of
       the ProfileDevice and PrivateDevice keys and signing it using the
       administration key.

   2.  Creating the Activations for the device and signing them using
       the administration key.

   3.  Creating the "CatalogEntryDevice" for the device and adding it to
       the "CatalogDevice" of the Personal Mesh.

   4.  If the Personal Mesh has accounts that are connected to a Mesh
       Service, synchronizing the "CatalogEntryDevice" to those
       services.

   These steps are usually performed through use of the Mesh Protocol
   Connection mechanism.  However, Mesh clients MAY support additional
   mechanisms as circumstances require provided that the appropriate
   authentication and private key protection controls are provided.

8.3.  Mesh Services

   A Mesh Service provides one or more Mesh Hosts that support Mesh
   Accounts through the Mesh Web Service Protocol.

   Mesh Services and Hosts are described by Service Profiles and Host
   Profiles.  The means by which services manage the hosts through which
   they provide service is outside the scope of this document.

   As with a Device connected to a Mesh Account, a the binding of a Host
   to the service it supports is described by a connection record:

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

          Figure 3: Service Profile and Delegated Host Assertion.





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   The credentials provided by the ProfileService and ProfileHost are
   distinct from those provided by the WebPKI that typically services
   TLS requests.  WebPKI credentials provide service introduction and
   authentication while a Mesh ProfileHost only provides authentication.

   Unless exceptional circumstances require, a service should not need
   to revise its Service Profile unless it is intended to change its
   identity.  Service Profiles MAY be countersigned by Trusted Third
   Parties to establish accountability.

8.4.  Mesh Messaging

   Mesh Messaging is an end-to-end secure messaging system used to
   exchange short (32KB) messages between Mesh devices and services.  In
   cases where exchange of longer messages is required, Mesh Messaging
   MAY be used to provide a control plane to advise the intended message
   recipient(s) of the type of data being offered and the means of
   retrieval (e.g an EARL).

   All communications between Mesh accounts takes the form of a Mesh
   Message carried in a Dare Envelope.  Mesh Messages are stored in two
   spools associated with the account, the SpoolOutbound and the
   SpoolInbound containing the messages sent and received respectively.

   This document only describes the representation of the messages
   within the message spool.  The Mesh Service protocol by which the
   messages are exchanged between devices and services and between
   services is described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

8.4.1.  Message Status

   As previously described in section ###, every message stored in a
   spool has a specified state.  The range of allowable states is
   defined by the message type.  New message states MAY be defined for
   new message types as they are defined.

   By default, messages are appended to a spool in the "Initial" state,
   but a spool entry MAY specify any state that is valid for that
   message type.

   The state of a message is changed by appending a completion message
   to the spool as described in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

   Services MAY erase or redact messages in accordance with local site
   policy.  Since messages are not removed from the spool on being
   marked deleted, they may be undeleted by marking them as read or
   unread.  Marking a message deleted MAY make it more likely that the
   message will be removed if the sequence is subsequently purged.



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8.4.2.  Four Corner Model

   A four-corner messaging model is enforced.  Mesh Services only accept
   outbound messages from devices connected to accounts that it
   services.  Inbound messages are only accepted from other Mesh
   Services.  This model enables access control at both the outbound and
   inbound services

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

                   Figure 4: Four Corner Messaging Model

   The outbound Mesh Service checks to see that the request to send a
   message does not violate its acceptable use policy.  Accounts that
   make a large number of message requests that result in complaints
   SHOULD be subject to consequences ranging from restriction of the
   number and type of messages sent to suspending or terminating
   messaging privileges.  Services that fail to implement appropriate
   controls are likely to be subject to sanctions from either their
   users or from other services.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

          Figure 5: Performing Access Control on Outbound Messages

   The inbound Mesh Service also checks to see that messages received
   are consistent with the service Acceptable Use Policy and the user's
   personal access control settings.

   Mesh Services that fail to police abuse by their account holders
   SHOULD be subject to consequences in the same fashion as account
   holders.

   (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see
   draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema-07.html for artwork.)

          Figure 6: Performing Access Control on Inbound Messages

8.4.3.  Traffic Analysis

   The Mesh Messaging protocol as currently specified provides only
   limited protection against traffic analysis attacks.  The use of TLS
   to encrypt communication between Mesh Services limits the
   effectiveness of na?ve traffic analysis mechanisms but does not
   prevent timing attacks unless dummy traffic is introduced to
   obfuscate traffic flows.



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   The limitation of the message size is in part intended to facilitate
   use of mechanisms capable of providing high levels of traffic
   analysis such as mixmaster and onion routing but the current Mesh
   Service Protocol does not provide support for such approaches and
   there are no immediate plans to do so.

9.  Publications

   Static QR codes MAY be used to allow contact exchange or device
   connection.  In either case, the QR code contains an EARL providing
   the means of locating, decrypting and authenticating the published
   data.

   The use of EARLs as a means of publishing encrypted data and the use
   of EARLs for location, decryption and authentication is discussed in
   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] .

9.1.  Contact Exchange

   When used for contact exchange, the envelope payload is a
   CatalogedContact record.

   Besides allowing for exchange of contact information on a business
   card, a user might have their contact information printed on personal
   property to facilitate return of lost property.

9.2.  Device Preconfiguration

   The static QR code device connection interaction allows a device with
   no keyboard, display or other user affordances to be connected to a
   Mesh account.

   The information necessary to establish communication with the device
   and to complete a device connection workflow is provided by means of
   a DevicePreconfiguration record accessed by means of an EARL.

   For example, Alice's coffee pot was preconfigured for connection to a
   Mesh account at the factory and the following DevicePreconfiguration
   record created:

   {
     "DevicePreconfiguration":{
       "EnvelopedProfileDevice":[{
           "EnvelopeId":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA",
           "dig":"S512",
           "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJVbmlxdWVJZCI6ICJNQVFPLTJTSkMtUE
     dYNC1LVkhDLVRFUTMtSTJOUC1HWUJBIiwKICAiTWVzc2FnZVR5cGUiOiAiUHJvZml
     sZURldmljZSIsCiAgImN0eSI6ICJhcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9tbW0vb2JqZWN0IiwKICAi



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     Q3JlYXRlZCI6ICIyMDIxLTAxLTEzVDE2OjM4OjM5WiJ9"},
         "ewogICJQcm9maWxlRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIlByb2ZpbGVTaWduYXR1cm
     UiOiB7CiAgICAgICJVZGYiOiAiTUFRTy0yU0pDLVBHWDQtS1ZIQy1URVEzLUkyTlA
     tR1lCQSIsCiAgICAgICJQdWJsaWNQYXJhbWV0ZXJzIjogewogICAgICAgICJQdWJs
     aWNLZXlFQ0RIIjogewogICAgICAgICAgImNydiI6ICJFZDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgI
     CAiUHVibGljIjogInM5SWRESDJhX2RBcmRCQTh0aGc0MUN0d2MwcVZvNnc2N2JSck
     VJMUxaZ1NsR3BVU2xYV1oKICBOOFctVlk3aG00MFhvcTdUVTVLRXNRU0EifX19LAo
     gICAgIkJhc2VFbmNyeXB0aW9uIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1ENUYtUTNPNi1L
     UkdMLUlTNFYtSVdWQy01U0lOLVM2M1IiLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVyc
     yI6IHsKICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOi
     AiWDQ0OCIsCiAgICAgICAgICAiUHVibGljIjogImFKU1BVZHJhQ08weXYyWVhWS2t
     RNGkxWFVLVmF1LUFwYjctT3hYTmIwNlktdzlJNDIwa2sKICBSelhoU2ZzaWZLUGVn
     WDdrSk1IREtaa0EifX19LAogICAgIkJhc2VBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgI
     CAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRFFDLUpZWFAtS1ozSS1FVElPLUtNV0EtWElBUC0zSlJEIiwKIC
     AgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREg
     iOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6
     ICJLQUJYR3ZfVnV2TFBSaGZWcEhkNXF5a2pKRFVOUml3aGg1dTNDSnB3dUFaWGZ2b
     WVNMEtYCiAgaXQ1YjZ3TnZZWXNTb0xlTmZLeTMzN0lBIn19fSwKICAgICJCYXNlU2
     lnbmF0dXJlIjogewogICAgICAiVWRmIjogIk1ETDMtUTdSVS1VU0pSLVFGM08tQ0p
     FRi02VFBXLUVWQU4iLAogICAgICAiUHVibGljUGFyYW1ldGVycyI6IHsKICAgICAg
     ICAiUHVibGljS2V5RUNESCI6IHsKICAgICAgICAgICJjcnYiOiAiRWQ0NDgiLAogI
     CAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICIyd1h5SEdBQ25UcTVlZThtZ1hNX2pBRGxwZVJWN2
     djTjNqVFFjOUxQM0xQMVl6aWkyaVNrCiAgVU1nVVRQOHlGX0ttaWJYczVwWHZ2MG9
     BIn19fX19",
         {
           "signatures":[{
               "alg":"S512",
               "kid":"MAQO-2SJC-PGX4-KVHC-TEQ3-I2NP-GYBA",
               "signature":"Rk-jBj3zvSUIYSTkVcq1BL134IBOKSFw0exQnv1Y
     26U42dKutmhV5HahY40oJ3qlnaj6ZNuW0OSAKeoNbCJH--_3IggojgroQT_YHR3xe
     G2nr5QcKNdrM9MenLukm4vj9Kk-CiQIsr4LE8rXnx-ICAIA"}
             ],
           "PayloadDigest":"cdJ8Gs61LhDMaKD_H4s-4BLas3GVu5ktraeMhbgZ
     AcKpYK-WOslevSZZ1B73P_gwHsMoltGo8hIL6CBQydwyuw"}
         ],
       "EnvelopedConnectionDevice":[{
           "dig":"S512",
           "ContentMetaData":"ewogICJNZXNzYWdlVHlwZSI6ICJDb25uZWN0aW
     9uRGV2aWNlIiwKICAiY3R5IjogImFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL21tbS9vYmplY3QiLAogICJ
     DcmVhdGVkIjogIjIwMjEtMDEtMTNUMTY6Mzg6NDBaIn0"},
         "ewogICJDb25uZWN0aW9uRGV2aWNlIjogewogICAgIkRldmljZVNpZ25hdH
     VyZSI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNREwzLVE3UlUtVVNKUi1RRjNPLUNKRUYtNlR
     QVy1FVkFOIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1
     YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIkVkNDQ4IiwKICAgICAgI
     CAgICJQdWJsaWMiOiAiMndYeUhHQUNuVHE1ZWU4bWdYTV9qQURscGVSVjdnY04zal
     RRYzlMUDNMUDFZemlpMmlTawogIFVNZ1VUUDh5Rl9LbWliWHM1cFh2djBvQSJ9fX0
     sCiAgICAiRGV2aWNlRW5jcnlwdGlvbiI6IHsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRDVGLVEz
     TzYtS1JHTC1JUzRWLUlXVkMtNVNJTi1TNjNSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZ



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     XRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0tleUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3
     J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpYyI6ICJhSlNQVWRyYUNPMHl2Mll
     YVktrUTRpMVhVS1ZhdS1BcGI3LU94WE5iMDZZLXc5STQyMGtrCiAgUnpYaFNmc2lm
     S1BlZ1g3a0pNSERLWmtBIn19fSwKICAgICJEZXZpY2VBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiI6I
     HsKICAgICAgIlVkZiI6ICJNRDVGLVEzTzYtS1JHTC1JUzRWLUlXVkMtNVNJTi1TNj
     NSIiwKICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY1BhcmFtZXRlcnMiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIlB1YmxpY0t
     leUVDREgiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgICAiY3J2IjogIlg0NDgiLAogICAgICAgICAgIlB1
     YmxpYyI6ICJhSlNQVWRyYUNPMHl2MllYVktrUTRpMVhVS1ZhdS1BcGI3LU94WE5iM
     DZZLXc5STQyMGtrCiAgUnpYaFNmc2lmS1BlZ1g3a0pNSERLWmtBIn19fX19",
         {
           "signatures":[{
               "alg":"S512",
               "kid":"MC3W-C4WT-J4SR-F6W7-HOZN-ATJT-DNJZ",
               "signature":"7PK0VTzj2A-WQsV2rJB13o4GERF2RsAS0lvE_dEo
     gSU9ntXlphGKq2_HG1mRl_ST384i_850aeMASEBUeNmpAC7Int1Dhd6SIWIlPV0ro
     xGnfqWQz-0Q44yxoyb10peN8sXApzotLOIcub3tN4q5vS8A"}
             ],
           "PayloadDigest":"kDW0uaxyl9h89xhwA62Yj0SNOCfdpScINyvRrehg
     -kFMn6NCEA69AFtawZ2gwKPRZfV30dAi-cQ47ACH0b3V-g"}
         ],
       "PrivateKey":{
         "PrivateKeyUDF":{
           "PrivateValue":"ZAAQ-AQWW-7FV6-RK7V-XWUH-5LCF-DMRU-GHAT-5FD
   P-PABH-3SD5-3UNJ-I6NO-BYFB",
           "KeyType":"MeshProfileDevice"}},
       "ConnectUri":"mcu://maker@example.com/EAQN-I5LT-6YG6-RR5F-57CG-
   B755-RFUR-JVQQ-IW5N-X5FR-57BA-SJS6-X2PF-A"}}

   To connect to the coffee pot, Alice first scans the QR code with her
   administrative device which uses the PIN code and service to
   retrieve, decrypt and authenticate the DevicePreconfiguration record.
   Future versions of the specification will allow this record to
   specify means by which the administration device can establish direct
   peer-to-peer communication to complete the connection process by any
   communication modality supported by both devices (e.g.  IR,
   Bluetooth, WiFi-Direct, etc.)

   The use of the publication mechanism in device connection is
   discussed further in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol].

9.3.  Device Description

   The device description publication is a JSON Record that describes a
   device that is available for connection.

   [Not yet implemented.]





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10.  Schema

10.1.  Shared Classes

   The following classes are used as common elements in Mesh profile
   specifications.

10.1.1.  Classes describing keys

10.1.2.  Structure: KeyData

   The KeyData class is used to describe public key pairs and trust
   assertions associated with a public key.

   Udf: String (Optional)  UDF fingerprint of the public key parameters

   X509Certificate: Binary (Optional)  List of X.509 Certificates

   X509Chain: Binary [0..Many]  X.509 Certificate chain.

   X509CSR: Binary (Optional)  X.509 Certificate Signing Request.

   NotBefore: DateTime (Optional)  If present specifies a time instant
      that use of the private key is not valid before.

   NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional)  If present specifies a time
      instant that use of the private key is not valid on or after.

10.1.3.  Structure: CompositePrivate

   Inherits: Key

   DeviceKeyUdf: String (Optional)  UDF fingerprint of the bound device
      key (if used).

10.2.  Assertion classes

   Classes that are derived from an assertion.

10.2.1.  Structure: Assertion

   Parent class from which all assertion classes are derived

   Names: String [0..Many]  Fingerprints of index terms for profile
      retrieval.  The use of the fingerprint of the name rather than the
      name itself is a precaution against enumeration attacks and other
      forms of abuse.




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   Updated: DateTime (Optional)  The time instant the profile was last
      modified.

   NotaryToken: String (Optional)  A Uniform Notary Token providing
      evidence that a signature was performed after the notary token was
      created.

10.2.2.  Structure: Condition

   Parent class from which all condition classes are derived.

   [No fields]

10.2.3.  Base Classes

   Abstract classes from which the Profile, Activation and Connection
   classes are derrived.

10.2.4.  Structure: Connection

   Inherits: Assertion

   SubjectUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection target.

   AuthorityUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the connection source.

10.2.5.  Structure: Activation

   Inherits: Assertion

   Contains the private activation information for a Mesh application
   running on a specific device

   ActivationKey: String (Optional)  Secret seed used to derive keys
      that are not explicitly specified.

   Entries: ActivationEntry [0..Many]  Activation of named resources.

10.2.6.  Structure: ActivationEntry

   Resource: String (Optional)  Name of the activated resource

   Key: KeyData (Optional)  The activation key or key share

10.2.7.  Mesh Profile Classes

   Classes describing Mesh Profiles.  All Profiles are Assertions
   derrived from Assertion.



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10.2.8.  Structure: Profile

   Inherits: Assertion

   Parent class from which all profile classes are derived

   ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional)  The permanent signature key
      used to sign the profile itself.  The UDF of the key is used as
      the permanent object identifier of the profile.  Thus, by
      definition, the KeySignature value of a Profile does not change
      under any circumstance.

10.2.9.  Structure: ProfileDevice

   Inherits: Profile

   Describes a mesh device.

   Description: String (Optional)  Description of the device

   BaseEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for
      encryption keys.  Also used to decrypt activation data sent to the
      device during connection to an account.

   BaseAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for
      authentication keys.  Also used to authenticate the device during
      connection to an account.

   BaseSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Base key contribution for
      signature keys.

10.2.10.  Structure: ProfileAccount

   Base class for the account profiles ProfileUser and ProfileGroup.
   These subclasses may be merged at some future date.

   Inherits: Profile

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)  The account address.  This is
      either a DNS service address (e.g. alice@example.com) or a Mesh
      Name (@alice).

   ServiceUdf: String (Optional)  The fingerprint of the service profile
      to which the account is currently bound.

   EscrowEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Escrow key associated with the
      account.




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   AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key currently used to encrypt
      data under this profile

   AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign
      connection assertions to the account.

10.2.11.  Structure: ProfileUser

   Inherits: ProfileAccount

   Account assertion.  This is signed by the service hosting the
   account.

   AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      requests made under this user account.

   AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign data under the
      account.

10.2.12.  Structure: ProfileGroup

   Inherits: ProfileAccount

   Describes a group.  Note that while a group is created by one person
   who becomes its first administrator, control of the group may pass to
   other administrators over time.

   [No fields]

10.2.13.  Structure: ProfileService

   Inherits: Profile

   Profile of a Mesh Service

   ServiceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      service connections.

   ServiceEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to encrypt data under
      this profile

   ServiceSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to sign data under the
      account.

10.2.14.  Structure: ProfileHost

   Inherits: Profile




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   KeyAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to authenticate
      service connections.

   KeyEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Key used to pass encrypted data to
      the device such as a

10.2.15.  Connection Assertions

   Connection assertions are used to authenticate and authorize
   interactions between devices and the service currently servicing the
   account.  They SHOULD NOT be visible to external parties.

10.2.16.  Structure: ConnectionDevice

   Inherits: Connection

   Connection assertion used to authenticate service requests made by a
   device.

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)  The account address

   DeviceSignature: KeyData (Optional)  The signature key for use of the
      device under the profile

   DeviceEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  The encryption key for use of
      the device under the profile

   DeviceAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  The authentication key for
      use of the device under the profile

10.2.17.  Structure: ConnectionApplication

   Inherits: Connection

   Connection assertion stating that a particular device is

   [No fields]

10.2.18.  Structure: ConnectionGroup

   Describes the connection of a member to a group.

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]






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10.2.19.  Structure: ConnectionService

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

10.2.20.  Structure: ConnectionHost

   Inherits: Connection

   [No fields]

10.2.21.  Activation Assertions

10.2.22.  Structure: ActivationDevice

   Contains activation data for device specific keys used in the context
   of a Mesh account.

   Inherits: Activation

   AccountUdf: String (Optional)  The UDF of the account

10.2.23.  Structure: ActivationAccount

   Inherits: Activation

   ProfileSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to profile online
      signing key used to sign updates to the profile.

   AdministratorSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to Profile
      administration key used to make changes to administrator catalogs.

   AccountEncryption: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to ProfileUser
      account encryption key

   AccountAuthentication: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to
      ProfileUser account authentication key

   AccountSignature: KeyData (Optional)  Grant access to ProfileUser
      account signature key

10.2.24.  Structure: ActivationApplication

   Inherits: Activation

   [No fields]




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10.3.  Data Structures

   Classes describing data used in cataloged data.

10.3.1.  Structure: Contact

   Inherits: Assertion

   Base class for contact entries.

   Id: String (Optional)  The globally unique contact identifier.

   Anchors: Anchor [0..Many]  Mesh fingerprints associated with the
      contact.

   NetworkAddresses: NetworkAddress [0..Many]  Network address entries

   Locations: Location [0..Many]  The physical locations the contact is
      associated with.

   Roles: Role [0..Many]  The roles of the contact

   Bookmark: Bookmark [0..Many]  The Web sites and other online
      presences of the contact

   Sources: TaggedSource [0..Many]  Source(s) from which this contact
      was constructed.

10.3.2.  Structure: Anchor

   Trust anchor

   Udf: String (Optional)  The trust anchor.

   Validation: String (Optional)  The means of validation.

10.3.3.  Structure: TaggedSource

   Source from which contact information was obtained.

   LocalName: String (Optional)  Short name for the contact information.

   Validation: String (Optional)  The means of validation.

   BinarySource: Binary (Optional)  The contact data in binary form.

   EnvelopedSource: Enveloped (Optional)  The contact data in enveloped
      form.  If present, the BinarySource property is ignored.



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10.3.4.  Structure: ContactGroup

   Inherits: Contact

   Contact for a group, including encryption groups.

   [No fields]

10.3.5.  Structure: ContactPerson

   Inherits: Contact

   CommonNames: PersonName [0..Many]  List of person names in order of
      preference

10.3.6.  Structure: ContactOrganization

   Inherits: Contact

   CommonNames: OrganizationName [0..Many]  List of person names in
      order of preference

10.3.7.  Structure: OrganizationName

   The name of an organization

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current
      use.

   RegisteredName: String (Optional)  The registered name.

   DBA: String (Optional)  Names that the organization uses including
      trading names and doing business as names.

10.3.8.  Structure: PersonName

   The name of a natural person

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current
      use.

   FullName: String (Optional)  The preferred presentation of the full
      name.

   Prefix: String (Optional)  Honorific or title, E.g.  Sir, Lord, Dr.,
      Mr.

   First: String (Optional)  First name.



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   Middle: String [0..Many]  Middle names or initials.

   Last: String (Optional)  Last name.

   Suffix: String (Optional)  Nominal suffix, e.g.  Jr., III, etc.

   PostNominal: String (Optional)  Post nominal letters (if used).

10.3.9.  Structure: NetworkAddress

   Provides all means of contacting the individual according to a
   particular network address

   Inactive: Boolean (Optional)  If true, the name is not in current
      use.

   Address: String (Optional)  The network address, e.g.
      alice@example.com

   NetworkCapability: String [0..Many]  The capabilities bound to this
      address.

   EnvelopedProfileAccount: Enveloped (Optional)  The account profile

   Protocols: NetworkProtocol [0..Many]  Public keys associated with the
      network address

10.3.10.  Structure: NetworkProtocol

   Protocol: String (Optional)  The IANA protocol|identifier of the
      network protocols by which the contact may be reached using the
      specified Address.

10.3.11.  Structure: Role

   OrganizationName: String (Optional)  The organization at which the
      role is held

   Titles: String [0..Many]  The titles held with respect to that
      organization.

   Locations: Location [0..Many]  Postal or physical addresses
      associated with the role.

10.3.12.  Structure: Location

   Appartment: String (Optional)




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   Street: String (Optional)

   District: String (Optional)

   Locality: String (Optional)

   County: String (Optional)

   Postcode: String (Optional)

   Country: String (Optional)

10.3.13.  Structure: Bookmark

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Role: String [0..Many]

10.3.14.  Structure: Reference

   MessageId: String (Optional)  The received message to which this is a
      response

   ResponseId: String (Optional)  Message that was generated in response
      to the original (optional).

   Relationship: String (Optional)  The relationship type.  This can be
      Read, Unread, Accept, Reject.

10.3.15.  Structure: Task

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Start: DateTime (Optional)

   Finish: DateTime (Optional)

   StartTravel: String (Optional)

   FinishTravel: String (Optional)

   TimeZone: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Description: String (Optional)



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   Location: String (Optional)

   Trigger: String [0..Many]

   Conference: String [0..Many]

   Repeat: String (Optional)

   Busy: Boolean (Optional)

10.4.  Catalog Entries

10.4.1.  Structure: CatalogedEntry

   Base class for cataloged Mesh data.

   Labels: String [0..Many]  The set of labels describing the entry

10.4.2.  Structure: CatalogedDevice

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Public device entry, indexed under the device ID Hello

   Udf: String (Optional)  UDF of the signature key of the device in the
      Mesh

   DeviceUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the offline signature key of the
      device

   SignatureUdf: String (Optional)  UDF of the account online signature
      key

   EnvelopedProfileUser: Enveloped (Optional)  The Mesh profile

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device profile

   EnvelopedConnectionUser: Enveloped (Optional)  The public assertion
      demonstrating connection of the Device to the Mesh

   EnvelopedActivationDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

   EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

   EnvelopedActivationApplication: Enveloped [0..Many]  Application
      activations granted to the device.



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10.4.3.  Structure: CatalogedPublication

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   A publication.

   Id: String (Optional)  Unique identifier code

   Authenticator: String (Optional)  The witness key value to use to
      request access to the record.

   EnvelopedData: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Dare Envelope containing the
      entry data.  The data type is specified by the envelope metadata.

   NotOnOrAfter: DateTime (Optional)  Epiration time (inclusive)

10.4.4.  Structure: CatalogedCredential

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Password: String (Optional)

10.4.5.  Structure: CatalogedNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Protocol: String (Optional)

   Service: String (Optional)

   Username: String (Optional)

   Password: String (Optional)

10.4.6.  Structure: CatalogedContact

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

   Self: Boolean (Optional)  If true, this catalog entry is for the user
      who created the catalog.



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10.4.7.  Structure: CatalogedAccess

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   [No fields]

10.4.8.  Structure: CryptographicCapability

   Id: String (Optional)  The identifier of the capability.  If this is
      a user capability, MUST match the KeyData identifier.  If this is
      a serviced capability, MUST match the value of ServiceId on the
      corresponding service capability.

   KeyData: KeyData (Optional)  The key that enables the capability

   EnvelopedKeyShares: Enveloped [0..Many]  One or more enveloped key
      shares.

   SubjectId: String (Optional)  The identifier of the resource that is
      controlled using the key.

   SubjectAddress: String (Optional)  The address of the resource that
      is controlled using the key.

10.4.9.  Structure: CapabilityDecrypt

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a decryption key

   [No fields]

10.4.10.  Structure: CapabilityDecryptPartial

   Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt

   The corresponding key is an encryption key

   ServiceId: String (Optional)  The identifier used to claim the
      capability from the service.[Only present for a partial
      capability.]

   ServiceAddress: String (Optional)  The service account that supports
      a serviced capability.  [Only present for a partial capability.]







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10.4.11.  Structure: CapabilityDecryptServiced

   Inherits: CapabilityDecrypt

   The corresponding key is an encryption key

   AuthenticationId: String (Optional)  UDF of trust root under which
      request to use a serviced capability must be authorized.  [Only
      present for a serviced capability]

10.4.12.  Structure: CapabilitySign

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is an administration key

   [No fields]

10.4.13.  Structure: CapabilityKeyGenerate

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a key that may be used to generate key
   shares.

   [No fields]

10.4.14.  Structure: CapabilityFairExchange

   Inherits: CryptographicCapability

   The corresponding key is a decryption key to be used in accordance
   with the Micali Fair Electronic Exchange with Invisible Trusted
   Parties protocol.

   [No fields]

10.4.15.  Structure: CatalogedBookmark

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Uri: String (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Path: String (Optional)





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10.4.16.  Structure: CatalogedTask

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   EnvelopedTask: Enveloped (Optional)

   Title: String (Optional)

   Key: String (Optional)  Unique key.

10.4.17.  Structure: CatalogedApplication

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

   Key: String (Optional)

   EnvelopedCapabilities: DareEnvelope [0..Many]  Enveloped keys for use
      with Application

10.4.18.  Structure: CatalogedMember

   ContactAddress: String (Optional)

   MemberCapabilityId: String (Optional)

   ServiceCapabilityId: String (Optional)

   Inherits: CatalogedEntry

10.4.19.  Structure: CatalogedGroup

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   EnvelopedProfileGroup: Enveloped (Optional)  The Mesh profile

   EnvelopedActivationAccount: Enveloped (Optional)  The activation of
      the device within the Mesh account

10.4.20.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationSSH

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

10.4.21.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationMail

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication




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   [No fields]

10.4.22.  Structure: CatalogedApplicationNetwork

   Inherits: CatalogedApplication

   [No fields]

10.5.  Publications

10.5.1.  Structure: DevicePreconfiguration

   A data structure that is passed

   EnvelopedProfileDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device profile

   EnvelopedConnectionDevice: Enveloped (Optional)  The device
      connection

   ConnectUri: String (Optional)  The connection URI.  This would
      normally be printed on the device as a QR code.

10.6.  Messages

10.6.1.  Structure: Message

   MessageId: String (Optional)  Unique per-message ID.  When
      encapsulating a Mesh Message in a DARE envelope, the envelope
      EnvelopeID field MUST be a UDF fingerprint of the MessageId value.

   Sender: String (Optional)

   Recipient: String (Optional)

10.6.2.  Structure: MessageError

   Inherits: Message

   ErrorCode: String (Optional)

10.6.3.  Structure: MessageComplete

   Inherits: Message

   References: Reference [0..Many]






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10.6.4.  Structure: MessagePinValidated

   Inherits: Message

   AuthenticatedData: DareEnvelope (Optional)  Enveloped data that is
      authenticated by means of the PIN

   ClientNonce: Binary (Optional)  Nonce provided by the client to
      validate the PIN

   PinId: String (Optional)  Pin identifier value calculated from the
      PIN code, action and account address.

   PinWitness: Binary (Optional)  Witness value calculated as KDF
      (Device.Udf + AccountAddress, ClientNonce)

10.6.5.  Structure: MessagePin

   Account: String (Optional)

   Inherits: Message

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

   Automatic: Boolean (Optional)  If true, authentication against the
      PIN code is sufficient to complete the associated action without
      further authorization.

   SaltedPin: String (Optional)  PIN code bound to the specified action.

   Action: String (Optional)  The action to which this PIN code is
      bound.

10.6.6.  Structure: RequestConnection

   Connection request message.  This message contains the information

   Inherits: MessagePinValidated

   AccountAddress: String (Optional)

10.6.7.  Structure: AcknowledgeConnection

   Connection request message generated by a service on receipt of a
   valid MessageConnectionRequestClient

   Inherits: Message




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   EnvelopedRequestConnection: Enveloped (Optional)  The client
      connection request.

   ServerNonce: Binary (Optional)

   Witness: String (Optional)

10.6.8.  Structure: RespondConnection

   Respond to RequestConnection message to grant or refuse the
   connection request.

   Inherits: Message

   Result: String (Optional)  The response to the request.  One of
      "Accept", "Reject" or "Pending".

   CatalogedDevice: CatalogedDevice (Optional)  The device information.
      MUST be present if the value of Result is "Accept".  MUST be
      absent or null otherwise.

10.6.9.  Structure: MessageContact

   Inherits: MessagePinValidated

   Reply: Boolean (Optional)  If true, requests that the recipient
      return their own contact information in reply.

   Subject: String (Optional)  Optional explanation of the reason for
      the request.

   PIN: String (Optional)  One time authentication code supplied to a
      recipient to allow authentication of the response.

10.6.10.  Structure: GroupInvitation

   Inherits: Message

   Text: String (Optional)

10.6.11.  Structure: RequestConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Text: String (Optional)






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10.6.12.  Structure: ResponseConfirmation

   Inherits: Message

   Request: Enveloped (Optional)

   Accept: Boolean (Optional)

10.6.13.  Structure: RequestTask

   Inherits: Message

   [No fields]

10.6.14.  Structure: MessageClaim

   Inherits: Message

   PublicationId: String (Optional)

   ServiceAuthenticate: String (Optional)

   DeviceAuthenticate: String (Optional)

   Expires: DateTime (Optional)

10.6.15.  Structure: ProcessResult

   For future use, allows logging of operations and results

   Inherits: Message

   Success: Boolean (Optional)

   ErrorReport: String (Optional)  The error report code.

11.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh
   services and applications are described in the Mesh Security
   Considerations guide [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security].

12.  IANA Considerations

   All the IANA considerations for the Mesh documents are specified in
   this document





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13.  Acknowledgements

   A list of people who have contributed to the design of the Mesh is
   presented in [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture].

14.  Appendix A: Example Container Organization (not normative)

   The means by which profiles are stored on devices is outside the
   scope of the specification.  Only catalogs that are required to be
   shared between machines by means of accounts need to be standardized.

14.1.  Device

   Host Catalog: Host.dare  Catalog of all the Mesh Profiles that the
      user has registered with the device and the latest version of the
      device profile for this device.

   MeshCatalog: [UDF-Mesh].dcat  Catalog containing the Account Entries
      for the Mesh [UDF-Mesh].

   Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/mmm_Device.dcat  The device catalog
      associated with the specified account

   Account Catalogs: [UDF-Account]/[Catalog name].dcat  The set of
      account catalogs that are shared verbatim between the devices
      connected to the account.

14.1.1.  Creating a new Mesh

   Create new Mesh Profile, Device Profile, Add to Host Catalog

   Create MeshCatalog

14.1.2.  Adding an Account

   Create new Account Profile, Add to MeshCatalog

   Create new Account Device Catalog

   For each device to be added to the account: Create Account Connection
   Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog.

14.1.3.  Adding a Device

   Create a Device Connection Assertion.

   For each account the device is to be added to: Create Account
   Connection Assertion, add to Account Device Catalog.



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14.2.  Service

   Master Catalog  Catalog of all services on machine

   Service Catalog  Catalog of accounts in the service.

14.2.1.  Creating a Service

   Create a Service Description, add to Master Catalog

14.2.2.  Adding an Account

   Create the account entry, add to Service Catalog

   Create the Account Directory



15.  Appendix B: Collected Authentication and Encryption Requirements

15.1.  Mesh Messaging


          +=======================+=========+==================+
          | Message               | Signer  | Recipients       |
          +=======================+=========+==================+
          | RequestConnection     | Device  | Service          |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | AcknowledgeConnection | Service | Device, Receiver |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | OfferGroup            | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | RequestContact        | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | ReplyContact          | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | RequestConfirmation   | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | ResponseConfirmation  | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | RequestTask           | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+
          | ResponseTask          | Sender  | Receiver         |
          +-----------------------+---------+------------------+

                                 Table 1





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16.  Normative References

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I:
              Architecture Guide", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-15, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              architecture-15>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VIII:
              Cryptographic Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography-07, 2 November
              2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              cryptography-07>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data
              At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-10, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-
              10>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: Mesh
              Discovery Service", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-discovery-00, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              discovery-00>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-notary]
              "[Reference Not Found!]".

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol
              Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-protocol-07, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              protocol-07>.

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII:
              Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-06, 2 November
              2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              security-06>.





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   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform
              Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-11, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-
              11>.

   [draft-hallambaker-threshold]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Modes in Elliptic Curves",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-
              threshold-04, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
              04>.

   [draft-hallambaker-threshold-sigs]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Threshold Signatures in Elliptic
              Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-threshold-sigs-05, 2 November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-threshold-
              sigs-05>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

17.  Informative References

   [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference
              Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              hallambaker-mesh-developer-10, 27 July 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hallambaker-mesh-
              developer-10>.

   [RFC2426]  Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
              RFC 2426, DOI 10.17487/RFC2426, September 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2426>.

   [RFC5545]  Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and Scheduling
              Core Object Specification (iCalendar)", RFC 5545,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5545, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5545>.








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