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Versions: (draft-hardt-distributed-oauth) 00

Network Working Group                                           D. Hardt
Internet-Draft                                                    Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track                       November 14, 2017
Expires: May 18, 2018


                           Distributed OAuth
                    draft-hardt-oauth-distributed-00

Abstract

   The OAuth client credentials grant The Distributed OAuth profile
   enables an OAuth client using the client credentials grant to
   discover what authorization server to use for a given resource
   server, and what attribute values to provide in the access token
   request.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2018.

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1.  Introduction

   In [RFC6749], there is a single resource server and authorization
   server.  In more complex and distributed systems, a clients may
   access many different resource servers, which have different
   authorization servers managing access.  For example, a client may be
   accessing two different resources that provides similar
   funcationility, but each is in a different geopolitical region, which
   requires authorization from authorization servers located in each
   geopolitical region.

   A priori knownledge by the client of the relationships between
   resource servers and authorizations servers is not practical as the
   number of resource servers and authorization servers scales up.  The
   client needs to discover on-demand which authorization server to
   request authorization for a given resource, and what attributes to
   pass.  Being able to discover how to access a protected resource also
   enables more flexible software development as changes to the scopes,
   realms and authorization servers can happen dynamically with no
   change to client code.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14,
   [RFC2119].

1.2.  Terminology

   Issuer: the party issuing the access token, also known as the
   authorization server.

   All other terms are as defined in [RFC6749] and [RFC6750]

1.3.  Protocol Overview

   Figure 1 shows an abstract flow of distributed OAuth.













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    +--------+                               +---------------+
    |        |--(A)-- Discovery Request ---->|   Resource    |
    |        |                               |    Server     |
    |        |<-(B)-- Discovery Response ----|               |
    |        |                               +---------------+
    |        |
    |        |                               +---------------+
    |        |--(C)- Authorization Request ->| Authorization |
    | Client |                               |     Server    |
    |        |<-(D)----- Access Token -------|               |
    |        |                               +---------------+
    |        |
    |        |                               +---------------+
    |        |--(E)----- Access Token ------>|    Resource   |
    |        |                               |     Server    |
    |        |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|               |
    +--------+                               +---------------+

               Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow

   There are three steps where there are changes from the OAuth client
   credential grant:

   1) A discovery request (A) and discovery resopnse (B) where the
   client discovers what is required to make an authenticated request.
   The client makes a request to the protected resource without
   supplying the Authorization header.  The resource server responds
   with a HTTP 401 response code and the "iss" attribute in the "WWW-
   Authenticate" header.  The client notes the "host" value from the TLS

   2) An authorization request (C) to an authorization server listed in
   the "iss" attribute and includes the "host" attribute.  The
   authorization servers provides an access token that includes the
   "host" value.

   3) An authenticated request (E) to the resource server that confirms
   the "host" matches expected values.

2.  Authorization Server Discovery

   Figure 1, step (A)

   To access a protected resource, the client needs to learn the
   authorization servers or issuers that can issue access tokens that
   are acceptable to the protected resource.  There may be one or more
   issuers that can issue access tokens for the protected resource.  To
   discover the issuers, the client makes an unauthenticated call to the
   protected resource, with no HTTP "Authorization" request header field



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   as defined in [RFC6750] section 2.1.  The client notes the hostname
   of the protected resource that was confirmed by the TLS connection,
   and saves it as the "host" attribute.

   Figure 1, step (B)

   The resource server responds with the "WWW-Authenticate" HTTP header
   that MAY incldue the "scope" and "realm" attribute per [RFC6750]
   section 3, and MUST include the "iss" attribute.  The "iss" attribute
   has one or more space delimited URLs.

   For example (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

       HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
       WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example_realm",
                                iss="http://issuer.example.com/token",
                                scope="example_scope",
                                error="invalid_token"

3.  Access Token Request

   Figure 1, step (C)

   The client makes an access token request to the issuer URL specified
   by the "iss" attribute, or if more than one value, a randomly
   selected URL from the list.  If the client is unable to connect to
   the issuer, then the client MAY try to connect to another URL from
   the list.

   The client SHOULD authenticate to the issuer using a proof of
   possession mechanism such as mutual TLS or a signed token containing
   the issuer as the audience

   The client makes the access token request per [RFC6749] section 4.4,
   Client Credentials Grant and MUST include the "host" attribute, for
   example (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

       POST /token HTTP/1.1
       Host: issuer.example.com
       Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
       Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

       grant_type=client_credentials
       &scope="example scope"
       &host=resource.example.com
       &realm="example_realm"

   Figure 1, step (D)



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   The authorization server returns an access token that MUST include
   the "host" attribute or a reference that includes the "host"
   attribute.

4.  Accessing Protected Resource

   Figure 1, step (E)

   The client access the protected resource per [RFC6750] section 2.1.
   The distributed oauth profile SHALL only use the authorization
   request header field for passing the access token.

   Figure 1, step (F)

   The protected resource MUST verify the "host" attribute is the host
   of the resource server the protected resource is hosted.

5.  New Threats

   THree new threats emerge when the client is dynamically discovering
   the authorization server and the request attributes: access token
   reuse, resource server impersonation, and malicious issuer.

5.1.  Access Token Reuse

   A malicious resource server impersonates the client and reuses the
   access token provided by the client to the malicious resource server
   with another resource server.

   This is mitigated by inclusion of the "host" property in the acces
   token, so that only the access token is only accepted at the intended
   host.

5.2.  Resource Server Impersonation

   A malicious resource server tells a client to obtain an access token
   that can be used at a different resource server.  When the client
   presents the acces token, the malicious resource server uses the
   access token to access another resource server.

   This is mitigated by the client obtaining the "host" value from the
   TLS certificate rather than being declared by the resource server.

5.3.  Malicious Issuer

   A malicious resource server could redirect the client to a malicious
   issuer, or the issuer may be malicious.  The malicious issuer may




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   replay the client credentials with a valid issuer and obtain a valid
   access token for a protected resource.

   This attack is mitigated by the client using a proof of possion
   authentication mechanism with the issuer such as mutual TLS or a
   signed token containing the issuer as the audience.

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD.

7.  Acknowledgements

   TBD.

8.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

Appendix A.  Document History

A.1.  draft-hardt-oauth-distributed-00

   o  Initial version.

Author's Address

   Dick Hardt
   Amazon

   Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com








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