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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements

I2RS working group                                              S. Hares
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                              D. Migault
Expires: January 4, 2016                                      J. Halpern
                                                                Ericsson
                                                            July 3, 2015


                   I2RS Security Related Requirements
                     draft-hares-i2rs-auth-trans-04

Abstract

   This presents security-related requirements for the I2RS protocol for
   mutual authentication, transport protocols, data transfer and
   transactions.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Security-Related Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Mutual authentication of I2RS client and I2RS Agent . . .   4
     2.2.  Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication . .   5
     2.3.  Data Confidentiality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Message Integrity Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.4.1.  Handling Multiple Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Role-Based Data Model Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   The Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) provides read and write
   access to information and state within the routing process.  The I2RS
   client interacts with one or more I2RS agents to collect information
   from network routing systems.

   This document describes the requirements for the I2RS protocol in the
   security-related areas of mutual authentication of the I2RS client
   and agent, the transport protocol carrying the I2RS protocol
   messages, and the atomicity of the transactions.  These requirements
   were initially described in the [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
   document.

   [I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs] discusses I2RS roles-based write
   conflict resolution in the ephemeral data store using the I2RS Client
   Identity, I2RS Secondary Identity and priority.  The draft
   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] describes the traceability framework and
   its requirements for I2RS.  The draft
   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements] describes the requirements for
   I2RS to be able to publish information or have a remote client
   subscribe to an information data stream.

1.1.  Definitions

   This document utilizes the definitions found in the following drafts:
   [RFC4949], and [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]

   Specifically, this document utilizes the following definitions:



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   Authentication

      [RFC4949] describes authentication as the process of verifying
      (i.e., establishing the truth of) an attribute value claimed by or
      for a system entity or system resource.  Authentication has two
      steps: identify and verify.

   Data Confidentiality

      [RFC4949] describes data confidentiality as having two properties:
      a) data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been
      authorized to know, and b) data is not disclosed to unauthorized
      individuals, entities or processes.  The key point is that
      confidentiality implies that the originator has the ability to
      authorize where the information goes.  Confidentiality is
      important for both read and write scope of the data.

   Data Privacy

      [RFC4949] describes data privacy as a synonym for data
      confidentiality.  This I2RS document will utilize data privacy as
      a synonym for data confidentiality.

   Mutual Authentication

      [RFC4949] implies that mutual authentication exists between two
      interacting system entities.  Mutual authentication in I2RS
      implies that both sides move from a state of mutual suspicion to
      mutually authenticated communication afte each system has been
      identified and validated by its peer system.

   Security audit trail

      [RFC4949] (page 254) describes a security audit trail as a
      chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to
      enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence
      environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
      operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
      from inception to final results.  Requirements to support a
      security audit is not covered in this document.  The draft
      [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] describes traceability for I2RS
      interface and protocol.  Traceability is not equivalent to a
      security audit trail.

   I2RS integrity

      The data transfer as it is transmitted between client and agent
      cannot be modified by unauthorized parties without detection.



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2.  Security-Related Requirements

   The security for the I2RS protocol requires mutually authenticated
   I2RS clients and I2RS agents.  The I2RS client and I2RS agent using
   the I2RS protocol MUST be able to exchange data over a secure
   transport, but some functions may operate on non-secure transport.
   The I2RS protocol MUST BE able to provide atomicity of a transaction,
   but it is not required to have multi-message atomicity and rollback
   mechanism transactions.  Multiple messages transactions may be
   impacted by the interdependency of data.  This section discusses
   these details of these security requirements.

2.1.  Mutual authentication of I2RS client and I2RS Agent

   The I2RS architecture [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] sets the following
   requirements:

   o  SEC-REQ-01: All I2RS clients and I2RS agents MUST have at least
      one unique identifier that uniquely identifies each party.

   o  SEC-REQ-02: The I2RS protocol MUST utilize these identifiers for
      mutual identification of the I2RS client and I2RS agent.

   o  SEC-REQ-03:An I2RS agent, upon receiving an I2RS message from a
      client, MUST confirm that the client has a valid identity.

   o  SEC-REQ-04: The client, upon receiving an I2RS message from an
      agent, MUST confirm the I2RS agent's identity.

   o  SEC-REQ-05: Identity distribution and the loading of these
      identities into I2RS agent and I2RS Client SHOULD occur outside
      the I2RS protocol.

   o  SEC-REQ-06: The I2RS protocol SHOULD assume some mechanism (IETF
      or private) will distribute or load identities so that the I2RS
      client/agent has these identities prior to the I2RS protocol
      establishing a connection between I2RS client and I2RS agent.

   o  SEC-REQ-07: Each Identity MUST be linked to one priority

   o  SEC-REQ-08: Each Identity is associated with one secondary
      identity during a particular read/write sequence, but the
      secondary identity may vary during the time a connection between
      the I2RS client and I2RS agent is active.  The variance of the
      secondary identity allows the I2rs client to be associated with
      multiple applications and pass along an identifier for these
      applications in the secondary identifier.




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2.2.  Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication

   SEC-REQ-09: The data security of the I2RS protocol MUST be able to
   support transfer of the data over a secure transport and optionally
   be able to support a non-security transport.  A security transport is
   defined to have the qualities of confidentiality, has message
   integrity, prevents replay attakc, and supports end-to-end integrity
   of the I2RS client-agent session.

   SEC-REQ-10: A secure transport MUST be be associated with a key
   management solution that can guarantee that only the entities having
   sufficient privileges can get the keys to encrypt/decrypt the
   sensitive data.  Pre-shared keys is considered for this document to
   be a key management system.  In addition, the key management
   mechanisms need to be able to update the keys before they have lost
   sufficient security strengths, without breaking the connection
   between the agents and clients.

   SEC-REQ-11: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to support multiple secure
   transport sessions providing protocol and data communication between
   an I2RS Agent and an I2RS client.  However, a single I2RS Agent to
   I2RS client connection MAY elect to use a single secure transport
   session or a single non-secure transport session.

   SEC-REQ-12: The I2RS Client and I2RS Agent protocol SHOULD implement
   mechanisms that mitigate DoS attacks

2.3.  Data Confidentiality Requirements

   SEC-REQ-13: In a critical infrastructure, certain data within routing
   elements is sensitive and read/write operations on such data MUST be
   controlled in order to protect its confidentiality.  For example,
   most carriers do not want a router's configuration and data flow
   statistics known by hackers or their competitors.  While carriers may
   share peering information, most carriers do not share configuration
   and traffic statistics.  To achieve this, access control to sensitive
   data needs to be provided, and the confidentiality protection on such
   data during transportation needs to be enforced.

2.4.  Message Integrity Requirements

   SEC-REQ-14: An integrity protection mechanism for I2RS SHOULD be able
   to ensure the following: 1) the data being protected is not modified
   without detection during its transportation and 2) the data is
   actually from where it is expected to come from 3) the data is not
   repeated from some earlier interaction of the protocol.  That is,
   when both confidentiality and integrity of data is properly




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   protected, it is possible to ensure that encrypted data is not
   modified or replayed without detection.

   sec-REQ-15: The integrity that the message data is not repeated means
   that I2RS client to I2RS agent transport SHOULD protect against
   replay attack

   Requirements SEC-REQ-13 and SEC-REQ-14 are SHOULD requirements only
   because it is recognized that some I2RS Client to I2RS agent
   communication occurs over a non-secure channel.  The I2RS client to
   I2RS agent over a secure channel would implement these features.  In
   order to provide some traceability or notification for the non-secure
   protocol, SEC-REQ-16 suggests traceability and notification are
   important to include for any non-secure protocol.

   SEC-REQ-16: The I2RS message traceability and notification
   requirements requirements found in [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] and
   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements] SHOULD be supported in
   communication channel that is non-secure to trace or notify about
   potential security issues

2.4.1.  Handling Multiple Messages

   Section 7.9 of the [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] states the I2RS
   architecture does not include multi-message atomicity and rollback
   mechanisms, but suggests an I2RS client may indicate one of the
   following error handling techniques for a given message sent to the
   I2RS client:

   1.  Perform all or none: All operations succeed or none of them will
       be applied.  This useful when there are mutual dependencies.

   2.  Perform until error: Operations are applied in order, and when
       error occurs the processing stops.  This is useful when
       dependencies exist between multiple-message operations, and order
       is important.

   3.  Perform all storing errors: Perform all actions storing error
       indications for errors.  This method can be used when there are
       no dependencies between operations, and the client wants to sort
       it out.

2.5.  Role-Based Data Model Security

   The [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] defines a role or security role as
   specifying read, write, or notification access by a I2RS client to
   data within an agent's data model.




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   SEC-REQ-18: The rules around what role is permitted to access and
   manipulate what information plus a secure transport (which protects
   the data in transit) SHOULD ensure that data of any level of
   sensitivity is reasonably protected from being observed by those
   without permission to view it, so that privacy requirements are met.
   Observers without permission can refer to other I2RS clients,
   attackers, or assorted MITM (man-in-the-middle) monkeys.

   SEC-REQ-19: Role security MUST work when multiple transport
   connections are being used between the I2RS client and I2RS agent as
   the I2RS architecture [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] states.  These
   transport message streams may start/stop without affecting the
   existence of the client/agent data exchange.  TCP supports a single
   stream of data.  SCTP [RFC4960] provides security for multiple
   streams plus end-to-end transport of data.

   SEC-REQ-20: I2RS clients MAY be used by multiple applications to
   configure routing via I2RS agents, receive status reports, turn on
   the I2RS audit stream, or turn on I2RS traceability.  Application
   software using I2RS client functions may host several multiple secure
   identities, but each connection will use only one identity with one
   priority.  Therefore, the security of each I2RS Client to I2RS Agent
   connection is unique.

   Please note the security of the application to I2RS client connection
   is outside of the I2RS protocol or I2RS interface.

3.  Acknowledgement

   The author would like to thank Wes George, Ahmed Abro, Qin Wu, Eric
   Yu, Joel Halpern, Scott Brim, Nancy Cam-Winget, DaCheng Zhang, Alia
   Atlas, and Jeff Haas for their contributions to the I2RS security
   requirements discussion and this document.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This draft includes no request to IANA.

5.  Security Considerations

   This is a document about security requirements for the I2RS protocol
   and data modules.  The whole document is security considerations.

6.  References







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6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs]
              Haas, J., "I2RS Ephemeral State Requirements", draft-haas-
              i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs-00 (work in progress), May 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
              Atlas, A., Halpern, J., Hares, S., Ward, D., and T.
              Nadeau, "An Architecture for the Interface to the Routing
              System", draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-09 (work in
              progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem-statement]
              Atlas, A., Nadeau, T., and D. Ward, "Interface to the
              Routing System Problem Statement", draft-ietf-i2rs-
              problem-statement-06 (work in progress), January 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements]
              Voit, E., Clemm, A., and A. Prieto, "Requirements for
              Subscription to YANG Datastores", draft-ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-
              requirements-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model]
              Bahadur, N., Folkes, R., Kini, S., and J. Medved, "Routing
              Information Base Info Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-rib-info-
              model-06 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability]
              Clarke, J., Salgueiro, G., and C. Pignataro, "Interface to
              the Routing System (I2RS) Traceability: Framework and
              Information Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-traceability-03 (work
              in progress), May 2015.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
              4949, August 2007.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC
              4960, September 2007.








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Authors' Addresses

   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176
   USA

   Email: shares@ndzh.com


   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC  HAP 2N2
   Canada

   Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com


   Joel Halpern
   Ericsson
   US

   Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com


























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