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SPARTA, Inc.                                        Hugh Harney, Eric Harder
INTERNET-DRAFT                        SPARTA, Inc., National Security Agency
draft-harney-sparta-lkhp-sec-00.txt                               March, 1999


                       Logical Key Hierarchy Protocol




                            Status of this memo



This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working documents
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is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite
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Document expiration:  August 30, 1999


                                  Abstract

     This document presents a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) Compromise
    Recovery (CR) implementation for the key management protocol
    suggested in the paper "Key Management for Multicast:  Issues and
    Architectures"[10].  The goals of this paper include:  defining the
    CR method, identifying the requirements, defining the operational
    protocol, and recommending an implementation for an LKH CR
    implementation.


INTERNET-DRAFT                    LKH Protocol                   March, 1999

                              Copyright Notice

      Copyright Oc The Internet Society (1999).  All Rights Reserved.


















































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Contents

1 Background                                                               4
  1.1 Security for Multicast  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

2 Compromise Recovery                                                      5
  2.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
  2.2 Compromise Recovery Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
    2.2.1Restoration of Secure Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    2.2.2Restrict Comprise Recovery Actions to Authorized Individuals . . 6
    2.2.3Multiple Co-Located Compromises  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
    2.2.4Secure Compromise Recovery Life-Cycle  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
    2.2.5System Stability After a Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
  2.3 Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
    2.3.1Generation of LKH Arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    2.3.2Generation of Support Materials  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
    2.3.3Secure Compromise Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    2.3.4Normal Operation Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
3 LKH CR Protocol Specification                                          10
  3.1 Group Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
    3.1.1LKH Establishment Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
  3.2 CR Policy and Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    3.2.1Compromise Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
    3.2.2Single Message to Exclude Compromised Member . . . . . . . . . . 18
    3.2.3New Group Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

4 RECOMMENDATIONS                                                         19
  4.1 Develop Multicast Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
  4.2 Computer Trust Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Addresses of Authors                                                    22























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1 Background


Multicasting technology has been a promise for many years now, a blend
between unicast (point-to-point) and broadcast (on sender, many,
unidentifiable receivers), multicasting allows a group of participants to
communicate efficiently between themselves using public networks.  Security
has been a key area holding back widespread adoption of multicast.

Group communications can be obtained using unicast methods (e.g., send
an e-mail to each participant), but this has an impact on the network
infrastructure, requiring sufficient resources to send each message from
the sender to each recipient uniquely (an e-mail to 100 addresses requires
the sender to actually send 100 messages).  Using multicast, information is
sent once into the multicast infrastructure and the infrastructure creates
new messages/packets only when needed.  Depending upon the networking
technologies in use, multicast can be performed with a single message.

Group communications can also be obtained using broadcast methods, though
these methods tend to be simplex (one-way) in nature.  In this case, the
sender simply broadcasts his information and each receiver must determine
if the message is of interest to them.  This approach is inefficient due
to the processing required at each broadcast recipient to filter out the
wanted from unwanted messaging.  Broadcasting is also not practical with
some networking technologies (e.g., packet switched).

Multicasting, in general, provides the capability for information to
be disseminated to an identified group of participants efficiently.
Multicasting is typically performed by creating a group where participants
place information destined for all other participants.  This group can be in
the form of a newsgroup, IP address, or ATM address.

The security challenge for multicasting is in providing an effective
method of controlling access to the group (and it's information) that is as
efficient as the underlying multicast.  A primary method of limiting access
to information is through encryption and selective distribution of the keys
used to encrypt group information.  Control of the key distribution process
provides effective control of the group.  The controlling policy for key
distribution may differ among groups.  For instance, military organizations
may wish to distribute keys to particular individuals or units based on
location or permissions; banks may wish to limit key distribution to
particular trusted individuals; individuals may wish to limit distribution
to particular family members.  The range of options is limitless.

Establishing this cryptographic group on an internet is not a trivial task.
The entire group must converge on a single suite of security mechanisms
for data protection.  The single cryptographic key must be created and
distributed to all members of the group in a secure manner.  Some type
of access control policy must be enforced as part of the key distribution
mechanism.  These policies must be created and disseminated to the groups in
a manner that that can be trusted.


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The decision to create a cryptographic group on the internet is a decision
based on the data that is going to be passed across the network and the
needs of the communicating group.  If the data being passed across the
network is extremely important and not time sensitive, the security
policy for creation, dissemination, and access control may be stringent.
Alternately, if the data is not very sensitive, the security policies of the
group may be more relaxed.  This is an important distinction because there
is a trade-off between security (assurance that the policy is in effect) and
performance (time and resources necessary to implement the policy).  The job
of coordinating that trade-off falls to a management protocol.



1.1 Security for Multicast


The issue of secure multicast communications for multicast groups has two
parts.  The first part consists of the mechanisms used to secure the data
while it is in transit between the multicast group members.  The second
part, is the management of the security groups.  Management in this case,
refers to:


1.  Creation and distribution of keys,

2.  Enforcement of access control policies, and

3.  Operational control (e.g., compromise recovery, rekey, identity
    infrastructure issues).


This document presents a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) Compromise Recovery
(CR) implementation for the key management protocol suggested in the
paper ``Key Management for Multicast:  Issues and Architectures''[10].
The goals of this paper include:  defining the CR method, identifying
the requirements, defining the operational protocol, and recommending an
implementation for an LKH CR implementation.


2 Compromise Recovery


2.1 Definitions


For the purpose of this document, a group is a gathering of communicating
members with a single key.  If the group key is compromised, then secure
communication must be restored through a recovery action.  A compromise
occurs when a member of the group can no longer be trusted (e.g.  group
member loses their key or a group member's key is stolen).  When this
happens, the group needs to change the compromised keys, without giving


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the new keys to the compromised member.  This document proposes as LKH CR
protocol for this purpose.



2.2 Compromise Recovery Policy


A compromise is an event that makes a trusted member of a group untrusted
and untrustable.  All keys in that member's possession are considered
``lost``.  Many different events may trigger a compromise including:
equipment loss, discovery of inappropriate data transfer and theft.
Compromising events are defined by the CR Policy.  The CR Policy must be
defined and understood prior to the compromise.  The policy should define
what type of compromise requires recovery, the speed with which recovery
must be completed, and the level of acceptable risk to the system.

The following sections identify the minimum CR Policy assumptions that would
be necessary to support the LKH CR protocol presented in this document.


2.2.1 Restoration of Secure Network Operations


Network operations should be restored with a minimal number of messages
and with minimal delay.  The goal of recovery is to resume operations in
a secure mode quickly and efficiently.  The size of the LKH array and the
extent of the compromise will determine the number of messages required to
recover the LKH.


2.2.2 Restrict Comprise Recovery Actions to Authorized Individuals


The CR process changes the group membership and common group keys.  An
unauthorized CR action could subvert the group into communicating with
unauthorized individuals or be used to deny service to the network.  In
order to prevent unauthorized CR actions and reduce system vulnerability,
only authorized individuals should be allowed to identify that a compromise
has occurred, assess the risk, and implement the necessary CR action.


2.2.3 Multiple Co-Located Compromises


The CR process shall provide mechanisms to allow recovery from single- and
multiple-entity compromises.  Historically, compromises have occurred due
to the breach of physical security measures at a particular location.  In
a group environment, it is possible that several group members will be
physically co-located.  The CR process should be capable of dealing with
multiple co-located compromises.


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2.2.4 Secure Compromise Recovery Life-Cycle


The entire life-cycle of the CR process must be secure.  This includes the
generation of CR materials, establishment of the CR group, execution of
recovery from an event, and termination of CR for a group.


2.2.5 System Stability After a Compromise


The outcome of any compromise event and the resulting CR action must leave
the group capable of recovering from another compromise.



2.3 Requirements


The following sections present the requirements necessary to support the LKH
CR protocol.


2.3.1 Generation of LKH Arrays


The LKH array generation mechanisms, as well as the LKH arrays, must
be protected from unauthorized access.  The CR Manager will have the
only access to these mechanisms.  Further, the computers on which these
mechanisms reside must also be sufficiently protected from unauthorized
access.


2.3.2 Generation of Support Materials


The LKH CR process will be supported by certificates.  The certificate
registration process must provide mechanisms to ensure that there is
unambiguous identification of individuals and authorities.  The mechanisms
and processes within the certificate registration process must also be
verifiable and protected from unauthorized access and disclosure.


2.3.3 Secure Compromise Recovery


The CR process includes the exchange of sensitive materials (LKH key array).
To ensure that the compromise recovery process is secure, it must include
mechanisms for:


1.  Identifying all group members;

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2.  Identifying all CR agents;

3.  Verifying the authority for all sensitive acts;

4.  Verifying the integrity of all data exchanges;

5.  Protecting all information that could be used to attack the CR system;
    and

6.  Verifying the assurance level of all CR computer components.



2.3.4 Normal Operation Requirements


The requirements identified in this section support the distribution,
management and storage of the LKH arrays prior to a compromise event.  These
requirements must also be fully satisfied upon completion of a CR action.


2.3.4.1 Minimal Exposure of LKH Arrays


The LKH arrays are sensitive information and, if left unprotected, can be
used to attack or compromise the secure group.  The use of routers and
other network components to distribute the LKH arrays should take place
with the understanding that the compromise of the component could lead to
group attacks.  In order to help minimize the risk of exposure, the LKH
arrays should be held by as few computers as possible.  Each CR Manager
that maintains an LKH array must provide adequate physical, procedural, and
computer trust protection mechanisms to protect the array.


2.3.4.2 Authentication of Identities


For all key management actions, the identities of the receiving and sending
parties need to be mutually understood.  This requirement could be met by
verifying the public key of a party during key generation.


2.3.4.3 Verification of Authorization


The management actions supporting CR are critical to group security.  The
identification and participation authorization of each group member involved
in a critical action must be verified.  This requires a clear security
policy understood across the group.  This policy can be static or dynamic
based on a policy dissemination mechanism.



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2.3.4.4 Computer Security Trust Requirements


The LKH key arrays are critical.  If these arrays reside unencrypted on
a computer at any time, then that computer must be trusted to protect the
group's data.  This requirement would be supported by maintaining only the
LKH arrays on group member's computers.  Each group member's computer must
be trusted to protect the group's data.


2.3.4.5 Cryptographic Structure of Groups


It is anticipated that very large groups may choose to implement this LKH
CR technique to support their CR process.  In order to provide the best
management and oversight, the large group should be constructed as the union
of multiple smaller groups.  Each of the smaller groups will have its own
LKH array structures.  These smaller LKH array structures will provide the
capability to:


1.  Localize the CR processes;

2.  Generate and maintain smaller LKH arrays;

3.  Localize the CR reporting procedures;

4.  Localize CR management; and

5.  Implement cryptographic gateways to minimize any single group traffic
    key exposure.


2.3.4.6 CR Message Requirements


There are security requirements placed on CR messages to ensure that the
messages are sent and received by the individuals with the appropriate
authority levels.  CR messages should provide the following information:


1.  Source verification;

2.  Authority verification;

3.  Confidentiality of data from unauthorized access;

4.  Verifiable integrity of all data exchanges;

5.  Protection of all information that could be used to attack the CR
    system; and


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6.  Verifiable assurance levels of all CR computer components.


The CR messages do not have a secure association (SA) with the group and,
therefore, confidentiality must be provided within the recovery key schema.


2.3.4.7 Compromise Event Discovery and Reporting


A deliberate compromise event may be difficult to discover because it is
in the interest of the attacker to keep the compromise a secret.  As long
as the compromise remains undiscovered, the attacker will continue to have
access to the group's data.  An accidental or unintentional compromise will
likely be reported as soon as the action is identified.  However, regardless
of the source of the compromise, the CR Manager must have sufficient
mechanisms established to identify a compromise.  The CR Manager must then
assess the extent of the compromise to identify the necessary CR actions for
recovery.

All CR actions will result in a temporary disruption of the group while
the group member's identities are verified and the keys are changed and
disseminated.  A complete discussion of compromise discovery and reporting
is outside the scope of this document.  Formal compromise discovery and
reporting policies should be developed to support this process.  The LKH
CR technique presented in this document relies on input from a compromise
discovery action to identify the compromised group member.



3 LKH CR Protocol Specification


The logical definition of a secure group is multiple members communicating
via a common key scheme.  The focus of the LKH CR protocol is the CR
protocol of this group.  The methods used to create, distribute, verify, and
authenticate the common group key are outside the scope of this document.


3.1 Group Establishment


A large group can be serviced by several independent CR Agents each
controlling a subset of the CR domain.  This architecture distributes the
processing and communication requirements of CR actions across the group
thus avoiding communication and processing bottle-necks.

For example, in an hierarchical tree CR protocol, a 2-layered LKH structure
with the CR Manager, ``Member 1``, at the top.  The second layer members
(1.1 to 1.5) are all subject to CR actions initiated by ``Member 1``.  Each
of the second tier members themselves have sub-nodes and hence, have LKH


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databases.

The top node in the LKH is identified as ``Member 1`` for the discussion in
the following sections.  ``Member 1`` (Node 1 in the LKH schematic) will act
as the CR Manager.  The second level nodes act as CR Agents.


3.1.1 LKH Establishment Protocol


The CR Manager and each of the CR Agents, will either create or obtain
the LKH databases and distribute the appropriate keys to the members in
their domain.  These keys are extremely important to the continued secure
operation of the group.  As such, the distribution of these keys needs to be
a secure process.  The keys must be kept confidential.  All the members need
to have an unambiguous identification of any party downloading keys to them.
The CR Manager and CR Agents need to have unambiguous identification of the
members to which they will distribute keys.  The members need to verify that
the CR Manager and CR Agents are authorized to act in those roles.  Each
of these requirements is similar if not exactly equal to the requirements
needed to distribute the original group key.  To avoid redundancy of action,
wherever possible, the CR data will be distributed with the symmetric key.


3.1.1.1 Generation of LKH Array


The CR Manager generates the keys needed to construct a LKH array.  There
are two methods for generating an LKH array for very large groups.  First,
the CR Manager could generate a very deep array capable of encompassing all
the potential members of the group.  Second, the CR Manager can generate a
smaller array capable of recovering the first tier of a group.  These first
tier members can act as delegated CR Agents, each generating LKH arrays for
group members in branches below them.

Of the two methods for generating an LKH array for large groups, the
delegated CR mechanism provides greater scalability.  The issue with this
delegated approach is the CR Manager and CR Agents must be identified to
the group members prior to the establishment of a group.  One mechanism for
accomplishing this is the use of a group policy token.  The CR Manger and
CR Agents could be identified and a single group authority could authorize
them.

This method of establishing LKH arrays will be illustrated in the following
specification.  The CR Manager generates and stores the list of keys.








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3.1.1.2 Distribution of LKH Array to Group Members


The distribution of LKH array material should involve a peer-to-peer session
association.  The security of the group is built from a collection of
peer-to-peer access control decisions.

It is important to note that all access control decisions do not need to be
made by the CR Manager or any central point.  A multicast group can easily
be constructed by a number of peer-to-peer access control decisions.  The
critical issue is to ensure that the access control decisions are made by
members authorized to make such a decision for the group.

The identity of group access control points is a matter for group policy.
The simplest policy is that one site makes all group access decisions.  A
more scaleable solution identifies multiple points authorized to make these
decisions for the group.  An even more scaleable solution allows any group
member (with proof that they have been accepted into the group) to make an
access control decision for the group.  Essentially, known group members
could be allowed to vouch for new group members.

In the case of distribution of CR material, the generator of the LKH array
could distribute pieces of the array to authorized distribution points
within the group for subsequent distribution.


3.1.1.2.1 Establishment of a Secure Association Modern SA protocols like the
Internet Secure Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) are suited to
this task.  The security characteristics of the establishment protocol for
the SA should include:


1.  Verification of all identities;

2.  Validation of public certificates (if used);

3.  Creation of a pairwise traffic confidentiality key; and

4.  Transfer of identity and certificate information to multicast security
    management protocol.


Once the SA is established, the multicast security management protocol can
use that SA for secure confidential communications.


3.1.1.2.2 Data Structure of LKH Array Download Message When the identities
of each side of the SA are known to the multicast security protocol,
the multicast security protocol can use these identities along with the
verified information on the public certificates to enforce group security
policy.  The group security policy includes information about authorized


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CR mechanisms and distribution authorities.  The management protocol needs
to verify that the CR Manager is authorized to download the LKH CR arrays.
The management protocol will take the identity and authority information
verified in the establishment of the SA and make sure that it meets the
policy criteria.

In order to verify authority, there has to be something that identifies
authorized CR Agents.  This could be an internal configuration file or
it could be a data structure that dynamically conveys a policy from an
authorized source.  In the case of a data structure, this policy data
structure (token) could be sent with the LKH array.

The data structure of the LKH array and (optional) Policy Token is:



2 bytes        Data ID
16 bytes       Grp ID
8 bytes        Date/Time
1 byte         Sig Alg ID
2 bytes        Cert Infra ID
1 byte         LKH Version
4 bytes        LKH array length
Variable       LKH array
1 byte         (policy token)
4 bytes        (# packets)
Variable       (Packets 1-n)
1 byte         (Pub Cert)
2 byte         (# Packets)
1 byte         (Packets 1-n)
Variable       Sig



where:


















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Data ID:                          Identifies the packet as a CR data item.
                                  1=LKH array, 2=LKH array with policy
                                  token, 3=LKH array with policy token and
                                  public certificate of signer
Grp ID:                           Specifies the group the LKH array will
                                  address
Date/Time:                        Self-explanatory
Sig Alg ID:                       Specifies the signature algorithm used
                                  in this data item
Cert Infra ID:                    Specifies the certificate infrastructure
                                  needed for verifying signature
LKH ver:                          Version of the LKH CR protocol
LKH Array Length:                 Total number of bytes in the LKH array
LKH Array:                        Data

                       ( ) signifies optional fields

(Policy Token):                   Identifies the Policy Token
(# Packets):                      Self-explanatory
(Policy Token Packets 1-n):       Self-explanatory
(Pub Cert):                       Identifies public certificate data being
                                  sent
(# Packets):                      Self-explanatory
(Packets 1-n):                    Self-explanatory
Sig:                              Signature field as identified earlier


3.2 CR Policy and Enforcement


3.2.1 Compromise Event


The CR Manager, designated as Member 1, manages compromises occurring in the
second tier of the hierarchy.  In the second tier member designations (eg.,
1.1), the number to the left of the decimal refers to the CR Manager.  The
number to the right of the decimal is the unique identifier of the CR Agent.
The third tier is comprised of group members who do not act as CR Agents.
In the third tier designations (eg., 1.1.5), the first number refers to the
CR Manager.  The second number designates the second tier CR Agent that owns
the domain on which this particular member resides.  The third number, in
this example 5, is a unique identifier.  This numbering scheme is useful for
reporting compromises and allows the member designation of the bottom tier
member to uniquely identify that member, the CR Manager, and the delegated
CR Agent in the hierarchy above.








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3.2.1.1 Compromised Discovery


After a compromise is discovered, a compromised report is received by Member
1, the CR Manager.  The contents of this message include, at a minimum,
the identity of the compromised member and, in the case of a multi-tiered
architecture, a path to that member.

The active member in this example is the CR Manager (Member 1).  The CR
Manager will verify that the CR report was received and is authentic.  It
will then initiate CR actions.


3.2.1.2 Recovery Protocol


The CR Manager creates the CR message based on the information that was
passed within the CR report.  The CR Manager sends this message to all
members of its domain utilizing the multicast communication address of the
group.

The CR message is sent on the group address and to the common key management
port routing to the key management application resident at each member.
Each member verifies that the CR message is authentic and that the signature
on that message comes from a party that is authorized to send a CR message.
This authorization decision is based on some known policy that has been
previously configured for the group.  One mechanism that is useful for
configuring group policy is a policy token.

Each CR message will contain a Date/Time stamp.  A CR action may only be
processed if its Date/Time stamp is later than the Date/Time stamp of
the last CR action processed for the group.  In the event of multiple CR
actions, the CR messages should be processed in ascending order according
to their date/time stamp.

After the CR message has been verified, each member will decrypt their
portion of the CR message.  That single CR message will recover some portion
of the compromised group and provide the first tier members the means to the
reset group traffic keys to a new secure key.  Any member in the path of a
compromised member and will be unable to decrypt the new group traffic key.

The LKH shown in Figure 1 represents virtual nodes as letters and members
nodes as numerals.  Assuming Member 1 is compromised, the symbolic form of
the recovery message is:

  CompHdr{[Sec HdrB(MGK')B], [Sec HdrD(MGK',A')D], [Sec Hdr2
(MGK',C',A')2]}Siglkhc

Notation:

  CompHdr{} = CR message header for message between {}


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                               LKHController
                                     |
                                     |
                              A------------B
                              |            |
                              |            |
                           C------D     E------F
                           |      |     |      |
                         1---2  3---4 5---6  7---8

                        Figure 1:  Sample Compromise


  [SecHdr*(MGK').] = Data packet containing a security header that allows
the decryption of the data package encrypted in key * (in this case, the
data packet contains MGK: Multicast Group Key Prime)

  {}SigXo = Public key signature of data contained within {}, public key to
verify is Xo.

The data structure of the CR message follows:


1 byte         CR Msg ID
16 bytes       Grp ID
8 bytes        Date/Time
1 byte         Encr Alg ID
1 byte         Sig Alg ID
1 byte         Hash ID
2 bytes        Cert Infra ID
1 byte         CR Msg Type
1 byte         Tree type
1 byte         LKH Ver
4 bytes        # Packets
Variable       Packets 1-n
Variable       Sig

















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CR Msg ID:                    CR Message ID distinguishes this message
                              from other key management messages.  Suggest
                              an integer value with:  66=CR.
Grp ID:                       Group identification value is a 16 byte
                              string that identifies the specific group
                              the CR message is to recover.  Suggest this
                              field be the group common name.
Date/ Time:                   This field specifies the date/time this
                              message was sent.
Encr Alg ID:                  Encryption Algorithm Identification.  This
                              field specifies the exact cryptographic
                              algorithm to be used by this message.  An
                              integer value suffices.  1=DES CBC, 2=triple
                              DES.
Sig Alg ID:                   Signature Algorithm Identification.  This
                              field identifies the algorithm used to sign
                              this message.  Suggestion 1=DSS.
Hash ID:                      Hash Identification specifies the hash
                              algorithm used.  Suggestion 1=SHA.
Cert Infra ID:                Certificate Infrastructure Identification
                              specifies type and location of certificate
                              infrastructures.
CR Msg Type:                  CR Message Type specifies type of CR
                              message.  Suggest:  1=Group Recovery,
                              2=Individual Recovery, 3=Maintenance,
                              4=Delete Group Key.
Tree Type:                    This specifies the mechanism used by the CR
                              process.
LKH Ver:                      LKH Protocol Version.  Suggestion 1=first.
# Packets:                    Number of Packets specifies the number of
                              information data items in the payload of the
                              CR message.
Packets 1-n:                  Each individual packet will take the
                              following form:
                              1 byte Packet type
                              4 bytes Length of packet
                              Variable Data
Packet type:                  Specifies the data within the packet.
                              Suggest:  1=encrypted key(s),
                              2=cryptographic changeover time,
                              3=unencrypted data.
Packet Length:                An integer specifying the number of bytes in
                              the data packet.
Sig:                          The signature block contains the actual
                              signature in the algorithm specified in the
                              Sig Alg ID data field.  It should take the
                              following form:
                              1 byte Signature format
                              4 bytes Length of data
                              Variable Data
Signature format:             This field defines the exact data contained
                              in the data field.  Suggest:  1=DSS, 2=DSS
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3.2.2 Single Message to Exclude Compromised Member


The CR Manager has been notified of the compromised status of a tertiary
member (eg., 1.1.1).  The CR Agent in the compromise path generates a
message using keys stored in its database that will exclude the compromised
member from receiving the new group key.

CompHdr{[SecHdrB(MGK0)B];[SecHdrD(MGK0;A0)D];[SecHdr1:1:2(MGK0; C0; A0)1:1:2]}SigX1:1

The CR message is sent out over the multicast communication address.  All
nodes in the group and in the subgroup receive that message and each
authorized member decrypts the new traffic key.  It is possible that
the CR Agent could act as a cryptographic gateway for its sub-nodes.  A
cryptographic gateway changes the cryptographic traffic key for a branch of
a group.  A message encrypted with the group key of the second tier would
come to the CR Agent who would then take all the data and re-encrypt that
data in the group key common for its branch.

The CR Agent's CR message will be restricted only to group members in its
domain.  There are two possible scenarios to support this restriction.
In the first, the CR Agent could be a cryptographic gateway and therefore
would have a group address for it's branch.  The group address could offer
a limited distribution option to preclude external transmission.  In the
second scenario, the CR Agent could establish a special local group address
for the branch.


3.2.3 New Group Key


When suborninate CR Agents are used all members in the path of a compromise
must be brought back into the secure group.  To accomplish this, the CR
Manager (Member 1) creates a SA with the delegated CR Agent using a SA
protocol like ISAKMP.

Once a SA is established, the CR Manager sends a combination message to
the delegated CR Agent (Member 1.1).  This combination message tells the
CR Agent that one of a its sub-nodes has been compromised and also passes
the new secure group key.  The CR Agent verifies that the CR Manager is the
originator of this message and then updates it's group key.  The CR Agent
then begins CR actions for his domain.

The symbolic form of the message is:

  CompHdr[(SecHdr1 (MGK')1, CompRpt)Sig1]1

Notation:


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  CompHdr{} = CR message header for message between {}

  SecHdr*(MGK') = Data packet containing a security header that allows the
decryption of the data package encrypted in key * (in this case, the data
packet contains MGK: Multicast Group Key Prime)

  {}SigXo = Public key signature of data contained within {}, public key to
verify is Xo.

The message structure for this combination message is exactly the same as
the group recovery message defined in Section 3.2.2.  This message utilized
a new data packet type, Packet Type 3, to transmit the CR report to the CR
Manager.



4 RECOMMENDATIONS


4.1 Develop Multicast Framework


In the interest of standardization and efficiency, it is reasonable to
propose a standard multicast security framework that could organize the
establishment of security for multicast groups.  In such a framework, CR
would be a component of the overall security profile for a group.  The
LKH CR protocol could be an option for supporting CR within a standardized
framework architecture.

The LKH CR protocol is part of a complete multicast security management
protocol.  It provides CR services for a group without respect to the
distribution methodologies or underlying communication protocols.  The
LKH CR protocol does make some assumptions about services provided by the
more general multicast security management protocol.  This protocol should
include mechanisms to support the following requirements:


 -  Verifiable and understandable security policy;

 -  Unambiguous identification of members;

 -  Verification of authority to perform relevant actions; and

 -  Confidential delivery of information to group members.


These basic services are fundamental to securing groups with keys.  A
well-orchestrated protocol should incur the overhead of these services once
and pass all necessary information to the group members.  The LKH CR does
not implement these mechanisms due to the assumption that these services
are available during secure key establishment.  Implementing these services


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within the LKH CR protocol is redundant.



4.2 Computer Trust Requirements


Multicast security protocols do not allow each member of a group to verify
the identity and authority of every other member of the group.  This means
that each member of the group must \trust"some other party (group member
or not) to verify another group member.  This cooperative enforcement of
security policy across the group requires a base-level of trust in those
verifying authorities.

It is important that every group member, CR Agent, or CR Manager with
access to either the group key or the LKH key array (in unencrypted form),
is capable of protecting that information from unauthorized disclosure.
This requires that all proper rules must be enforced as part of the group
security protocol.  These computers must also be trusted not to divulge
the keys via an unofficial route (e.g., a hacker exploiting a weakness in
another application).
































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The following documents were used in the preparation of this document:



References


 [1] [RFC 2093] Harney H., Muckenhirn C., and Rivers T., Group Key,
     Management Protocol Specification, RFC 2093, Experimental, July 1997.

 [2] [RFC 2094] Harney H., Muckenhirn C., and Rivers T., Group Key
     Management Protocol Architecture, RFC 2094, Experimental, July 1997.

 [3] [RFC 2408] Maughan D., Schertler M., Schneider M., and Turner J.,
     Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP),
     RFC 2408, Proposed Standard, November 1998.

 [4] [RFC 2412] Orman H. K., The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol, RFC
     2412, Informational, November 1998.

 [5] [RFC 2409] Harkins D., and Carrel D., The Internet Key Exchange (IKE),
     RFC 2409, Proposed Standard, November 1998.

 [6] SDNS Protocol and Signaling Working Group, SP3 Sub-Group, SDNS Secure
     Data Network System, Security Protocol 3 (SP3) Addendum 1, Cooperating
     Families, SDN.301.1, Rev. 1.2, 1988-07-12.

 [7] SDNS Protocol and Signaling Working Group, SP3 Sub-Group, SDNS Secure
     Data Network System, Security Protocol 3 (SP3), SDN.301, Rev. 1.5,
     1989-05-15.

 [8] [RFC 1949] Ballardie, A., Scalable Multicast Key Distribution, RFC
     1949, Experimental, May 1996.

 [9] [RFC 2459] Housley R., Ford W., Polk T., and Solo D., Internet X.509
     Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile, RFC 2450,
     Proposed Standard, January 1999.

[10] Wallner, D., Harder E., and Agee R., Key Management for Multicast:
     Issues and Architectures, Internet Draft, Informational, September
     1998.












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5 Addresses of Authors

Hugh Harney (point-of-contact)
SPARTA, Inc.
Secure Systems Engineering Division
9861 Broken Land Parkway, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046-1170
United States
telephone:        +1 410 381 9400 (ext.  203)
electronic mail:  hh@columbia.sparta.com




Eric J. Harder
R231 National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road
Suite 6534
Fort Meade, MD 20755
United States
telephone:        +1 301 688 0847
electronic mail:  ejh@tycho.ncsc.mil


Document expiration:  August 30, 1999




























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