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Network Working Group                                         S. Hartman
Internet-Draft                                         Painless Security
Intended status: Standards Track                                D. Zhang
Expires: April 21, 2011                                           Huawei
                                                        October 18, 2010


            Multicast Router Key Management Protocol (MRKMP)
                    draft-hartman-karp-mrkmp-00.txt

Abstract

   Several routing protocols engage in one-to-many communication.  In
   order to authenticate these communications using symmetric
   cryptography, a group key needs to be established.  This
   specification defines a group protocol for establishing and managing
   such keys.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



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   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Relationship to IKEv2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Relationship to GDOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Types of Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.1.  Key Encryption Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.1.2.  Protocol Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.2.  GCKS Election  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.3.  Initial Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.  Group Join Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.5.  Group Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  GCKS Election  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1.  A new GCKS is Elected  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2.  Merging Partitioned Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.  Key Download Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.  Initial Exchange Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  Group Management Unicast Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     6.1.  Group Join Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Group Key Management Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.1.  General operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.2.  Out of Sequence Space  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.3.  Changing the Active GCKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Interface to Routing Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     8.1.  Joining a Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     8.2.  Priority Adjustment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     8.3.  Leaving a Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22















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1.  Introduction

   Many routing protocols such as OSPF and IS-Is use a one-to-many or
   multicast model of communications.  The same message is sent to a
   number of recipients.

   These protocols have cryptographic authentication mechanisms that use
   a key shared among all members of a communicating group in order to
   protect messages sent within that group.  From a security standpoint,
   all routers in a group are considered equal.  Protecting against a
   misbehaving router that is part of the group is out of scope for this
   protocol.

   Routers need to be provisioned with some credentials for a one-to-one
   authentication protocol.  Preshared keys or asymmetric keys and an
   authorization list are expected to be common deployments.

   The members of a group elect a Group Controller/Key Server (GCKS).
   Potentially any member of the group may act as a GCKS.  Since
   protecting against misbehaving routers is out of scope, there is no
   need to protect against a node that is not currently the GCKS
   impersonating the GCKS.

   To prove membership in the group, a router authenticates using its
   provisioned credentials to the current GCKS.  If successful, the
   router is given the current key material for the group.  Group size
   is relatively small and need for forced eviction of members is rare.
   If a GCKS needs to evict a member, then it can simply re-authenticate
   with the existing members and provide them new key material.

1.1.  Terminology

   One key terminology question to answer is the definition of group.
   It appears that as used in this document, the term group corresponds
   to a routing protocol instance on a single link.  However, this needs
   to be confirmed with TE routing protocols and with PIM.  If that
   works out then a more precise term than group should be used in this
   document.

1.2.  Relationship to IKEv2

   IKEv2 [RFC5996]provides a protocol for authenticating IPsec security
   associations between two peers.  It currently provides no group
   keying.  IKev2 is attractive as a basis for this protocol because
   while it is much simpler than IKE, it provides all the needed
   flexibility in one-to-one authentication.

   Unlike IKE, IKEv2 is explicitly designed for IPsec.  The document



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   does not separate handling of aspects of the protocol that would be
   needed for IPsec from those that apply to general key management.
   IPsec specific rules are combined with more general requirements.
   While concepts and protocol payloads can be used in a different key
   management protocol, the current structure of IKEv2 does not provide
   a mechanism for applying IKEv2 to a domain of interpretation other
   than IPsec.  In addition, the complexity required in the IKE
   specification when compared to IKEv2 suggests that the generality of
   IKE may not be worth the complexity cost.

   For these reasons, this protocol borrows concepts and payloads from
   IKEv2 but does not normatively depend on the IKEv2 specification.

1.3.  Relationship to GDOI

   The IPsec Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [RFC3547] provides a
   protocol that is structurally very similar to this one.  As
   specified, IKE can be used to provide phase 1 authentication to a
   GCKS.  After that, GDOI provides phase 2 messages to establish key-
   encryption keys and traffic keys.  Key management operations can be
   accomplished via GDOI messages sent to the group after the phase 2
   exchange.

   GDOI is defined for IKE not for IKEv2.  In addition, GDOI's phase 2
   uses its own hashing mechanism and nonce mechanism to provide
   integrity protection and replay protection.  Like IKE, GDOI has
   significant complexity to support phase 2 identities that are
   different than the phase 1 identity.  GDOI requires a GCKS to have a
   signature key used to sign GDOI messages when the rekey protocol is
   used.  Since attacks caused by members of the group masquerading as
   the GCKS are out of scope, this is significant unnecessary complexity
   in the protocol.

   This protocol can be thought of as a simplified GDOI based on IKEv2
   rather than IKE.  However, integrity and replay mechanisms are taken
   from IKEv2.  Support for phase 2 identities is removed as unneeded
   complexity.  Security for the group key management messages is
   provided using symmetric primitives rather than asymmetric
   signatures.  Phase 1 authentication will often still involve
   asymmetric signatures.











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2.  Overview

   MRKMP is composed of several parts.  There is an initial exchange
   used to establish a shared key with a GCKS and authenticate the
   identities of both parties.  Unicast key management exchanges provide
   the ability to join a group or request updates to the group; group
   joins can also be combined with the initial exchange.  There is an
   election protocol used by routers to determine which router will act
   as the GCKS; this protocol is not integrity protected, but a GCKS
   confirms its role when a member uses the unicast exchange to join the
   group.  Finally, a GCKS uses multicast exchanges to update parameters
   of the group.  This section briefly describes each of these parts of
   MRKMP.  The later sections in the document describe the details of
   the protocols.

2.1.  Types of Keys

   MRKMP manipulates several different types of symmetric keys:

   preshared:  Preshared keys are one mechanism for authenticating one
      router to another during the initial exchange.  These keys are
      configured by some mechanism such as manual configuration or a
      management application outside of the scope of MRKMP.  A single
      preshared key can be used for all members of a group.
      Alternatively each pair of routers can have a different preshared
      key.



   peer key management key:  Routers share a key with the GCKS that is a
      result of the mrkmp_init exchange.

   KEK:  A Key encryption Key (KEK) is a key used to encrypt group key
      management messages to the current members of a group.  A KEK is
      learned as the product of establishing an MRKMP association or
      through a group key management message encrypted in a previous
      KEK.  A KEK has an explicit expiration but may also be retired by
      a message encrypted in the KEK sent by the GCKS.



   protocol master key:  A protocol master key is the key exported by
      MRKMP for use by a routing protocol such as OSPF or IS-IS.  The
      Protocol master key is the key that would be manually configured
      if a routing protocol is used without key management.






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   transport key:  The transport key is the key used to integrity
      protect routing messages in a protocol such as IS-IS or OSPF.  In
      today's routing protocol cryptographic authentication mechanisms
      the transport key is the same as the protocol master key.  A
      disadvantage of this approach is that replay prevention is
      challenging with this architecture.  Ideally some key derivation
      step would be used to establish a fresh transport key among all
      the participants in the group.

2.1.1.  Key Encryption Key

   When a router wishes to join a group, the router performs the
   mrkmp_init and mrkmp_auth exchange with a GCKS.  During this process
   the router can establish an association with a specific group.  Part
   of that association will be delivery of a KEK and associated
   parameters.

   Group key management messages are sent to a group address not unicast
   to an individual peer.  The group key management messages are
   protected using the KEK.  The group key management messages need to
   provide both integrity and confidentiality protection using the KEK.

   As part of establishing the association, the router joining the group
   is given an expiration time for the KEK.  A group key management
   message may establish a new KEK with new parameters.

   From time to time, a GCKS may wish to either force early expiration
   of a KEK or allow a KEK to expire.  Protocol master keys are
   permitted to be valid for somewhat longer than the KEK that created
   them so as to avoid disrupting routing when this happens.  When a KEK
   is retired or expires without being replaced by a new KEK announced
   in the old KEK, group members need to perform a new initial exchange
   to the GCKS.  This is useful for example if a router is no longer
   authorized to be part of the group.

   Other mechanisms such as LKH (section 5.4 [RFC2627]) could be used to
   permit removal of a group member while avoiding new initial
   authentications.  However these mechanisms come at a complexity cost
   that is not justified for a small number of routers participating in
   a single multicast link.

2.1.2.  Protocol Keys

   Current routing protocols directly use the protocol master key to
   integrity protect messages.  One advantage for this approach is that
   the initial hello messages used for discovery and capability exchange
   can be protected using the same mechanism as other messages.
   Typically a sequence number is used for replay detection.  Without



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   changing the key, the existing protocols are vulnerable to a number
   of serious denial of service attacks from replays.

   The MRKMP can solve this replay problem by changing the protocol
   master key whenever a peer is about to exhaust its sequence number
   space or whenever a peer loses information about what sequence
   numbers it used.  This could potentially involve changing the
   protocol master key whenever a router reboots that was part of the
   group using the current protocol master key.  Since key changes will
   not disrupt active adjacencies and can be accomplished relatively
   quickly, this is not expected to be a huge problem.  Note that after
   one key change, others routers can boot without causing additional
   key changes; a flurry of key changes would not be required if several
   routers reboot near each other.

   Another approach would be to separate the protocol master key from
   the transport keys.  For example the transport key used by a given
   peer could be a fresh key derived from the protocol master key and
   nonces announced by that peer.  Some mechanism would need to make
   sure that the peer's announcement of its nonce was fresh; this
   mechanism would almost certainly involve some form of interaction
   with the router wishing to guarantee freshness.  There are two key
   advantages of this separation between transport keys and protocol
   master keys.  The first is that the interaction between the MRKMP and
   routing protocol can be simplified significantly.  The second is that
   even when manually configured protocol master keys are used, replay
   and adequate DOS protection can be achieved.

2.2.  GCKS Election

   Before a MRKMP system actually starts working, the routers in the
   multicast group need to select a GCKS so that they can obtain
   cryptographic keys to secure subsequent exchanges of routing
   information.  MRKMP specifies an election protocol that dynamically
   assigns the responsibility of key management to one of the group
   members.  Note that there are already announcer-electing mechanisms
   provided in some routing protocols (e.g., OSPF and IS-IS).  However,
   much involvement between a MRKMP system and a routing protocol
   implementation will be introduced if the MRKMP system reuses the
   announcer-electing mechanism for the election of the GCKS.  The state
   machine of the routing protocol also has to be modified.  For
   instance, in OSPF, after a DR has been elected, routers need to halt
   their OSPF executions, and carry out the initial exchange to
   authenticate the DR and collect the keys for subsequent
   communications.  After this step, the routers need to re-start their
   OSPF state machines so as to exchange routing information.  As a
   consequence of such cases, an individual GCKS electing solution
   within MRKMP is preferable.



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   Each router has a GCKS priority.  Higher priorities are more
   preferred GCKSes.  As discussed in Section 8, the routing protocol
   can influence the GCKS election protocol by manipulating the priority
   so that it is likely that the same router will be the announcer for
   the routing protocol and the GCKS.  Even if two different routers are
   elected as the announcer and GCKS, then the routing protocol and
   MRKMP will function correctly.

2.3.  Initial Exchange

   The initial exchange is based on IKEv2's IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_SA_AUTH
   exchanges.  During this exchange, an initiating router attempts to
   authenticate to the router it believes is a GCKS for a group that the
   initiating router wants to join.  Messages are unicast from the
   initiator to the responding GCKS.  Unicast MRKMP P messages form a
   request/response protocol; the party sending the messages is
   responsible for retransmissions.

   The initial exchange provides capability negotiation, specifically
   including supported cryptographic suites for the key management
   protocol.  Identification of the initiator and responder is also
   exchanged.  A symmetric key is established to integrity protect and
   encrypt key management messages.  While routing security does not
   typically require confidentiality, the key management protocol does
   because keys are exchanged and these must be protected.

   Then the identities of each party are cryptographically verified.
   This can be done using a preshared key or symmetric keys.  Other
   mechanisms may be added as a future extension.

   The authentication exchange also provides an opportunity to join a
   group as part of the initial exchange.  In the typical case, a router
   can obtain the needed key material for a group in two round-trips.

2.4.  Group Join Exchange

   The primary purpose of the unicast MRKMP messages is to get an
   initiator the information it needs to join a group and participate in
   a routing protocol.  The initiator indicates what group it wants to
   join.  XXX we need to discuss group naming--if MRKMP is limited to a
   subnet this may be as simple as saying that initiator wants to join
   the OSPF group or the IS-IS group.

   The responder performs several checks.  First, the responder confirms
   that the responder is currently acting as GCKS for the group in
   question.  Then, the responder confirms that the initiator is
   permitted to join the group.  If these checks pass, then the
   responder provides a key download payload to the initiator encrypted



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   in the peer key management key.  As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the
   GCKS MUST change the protocol master key if a router was part of the
   group under the current protocol master key and reboots.  In this
   case, the GCKS SHOULD provide the new and old protocol master key to
   the initiator, setting the validity times for the old key to permit
   reception but not transmission.  The GCKS MUST use the mechanism in
   the next section to flood the new key to the rest of the group.

   A group association created by this exchange may last beyond the
   unicast MRKMP association used to create it.  Once membership in a
   group is established, resources are not required to maintain the
   unicast association with the GCKS.

   A member of a group can also use the unicast exchange to request a
   GCKS to change the protocol master key because that group has
   exhausted its available sequence space.  For protocols where the
   protocol master key is the same as the transport key, it is critical
   that no two messages be sent by the same router with the same
   sequence number and protocol master key.  The sequence number space
   is finite.  So if a router is running low on available sequence space
   it needs to request a new protocol master key be generated.

2.5.  Group Key Management

   The GCKS shares a KEK with all members of a group.  The GCKS can send
   a multicast message to the group to update the set of protocol master
   keys, update the KEK, or retire the KEK and request new group join
   exchanges.

   Typically the protocol master key is changed only when needed to
   provide replay protection or when the KEK changes.  The KEK changes
   whenever a new GCKS is elected or whenever it is administratively
   desirable to change the keys.  For example if an employee leaves an
   organization it might be desirable to change the KEKs.  A KEK is
   retired whenever forward security is desired: whenever the
   authorization of who is permitted to be in a group changes and the
   GCKS needs to make sure that the router is no longer participating.
   Most authorization changes such as removing a router from service do
   not require forward security in practical deployments.












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3.  GCKS Election

   The GCKS election process selects a single router on a link to act as
   GCKS for a group.Similar with other popular announcer electing
   mechanisms (e.g., VRRP, HSRP), in MRKMP, only GCKSes use multicast to
   periodically send Advertisement messages.  Such advertisements can be
   used as heart beat packets to indicate the aliveness of GCKSes.  In
   addition, a state machine with three states (Initial, GCKS, and
   Member) is specified for GCKS election.  When a router is initially
   connected to a multicast network, its state is set as Initial.  The
   router then sends a multicast initial advertisement, if a GCKS is
   working on the network, it will reply the router with an
   advertisement using unicast.  After receiving the advertisement from
   the GCKS, the router will try to register with the GCKS using the
   initial exchange, and then the state of the router is transferred to
   Member.  Note that when the router receives the advertisement it does
   not have the traffic distributed in the group.  Thus, the integrity
   of the unicast advertisement does not have to be protected.  After a
   certain period, if the router still does not receive any
   advertisement from a GCKS or other group members, the router then
   believe there is no other group member on the network and set its
   state as GCKS.  If during the period the router does not receive any
   advertisement from a GCKS but receives advertisements from other
   routers on the network, router believes that the group is involved in
   a GCKS election process.  Apart from the initialization of a
   multicast network, the fail-over of a GCKS can also trigger an
   election process.  For instance, if a router does not receive the
   heart beat advertisement for a certain period, it will transfer its
   state to Initial and try to elect a new one.  In a GCKS electing
   process, a router has to stay in the Initial state until a new GCKS
   is allocated.  Particularly, the router first sends its initial
   advertisement with its priority and waits for a certain period.
   During the period, if a router receives an initial advertisement
   which consists of a lower priority, the router then sends the
   advertisement again with a limited rate.  After period, if the router
   does not find any router with a higher priority, it announces itself
   as the GCKS.  If two routers have the same priority, the one with the
   lowest IP source address used for messages on the link will be the
   GCKS.  After a router transfer its state to GCKS, it will reply to
   the initial advertisements from other routers with GCKS
   advertisements, even when the initial advertisements consist of
   properties priorities than its priority.  This approach guarantees
   that a GCKS will not be changed frequently after it has been elected.
   After receiving the GCKS advertisement of the new elected GCKS, other
   routers transfer their states to Member.  However, if a GCKS G1
   receives a GCKS advertisement from another router G2 and G2 is a more
   preferred GCKS, G1 follows the procedure in Section 3.2.




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   If a node in state member fails to perform an initial exchange with
   the router it believes to be GCKS, it resets its state to initial but
   ignores advertisements from that router.  This way an attacker cannot
   disrupt communications indefinitely by masquerading as a GCKS.

   If a node transitions to GCKS state, it performs the procedure in
   Section 3.1.

3.1.  A new GCKS is Elected

3.2.  Merging Partitioned Networks

   Whenever a GCKS finds that a more preferred router is also acting as
   a GCKS for the same group, then the group is partitioned.  Typically
   if there is already an active GCKS for a group, even if a more
   preferred GCKS joins, the GCKS will not change.  Two situations can
   result in multiple GCKSes active for a group.  The first is that
   members of the group do not share common authentication credentials.
   The second is that the group was previously partitioned so that some
   nodes could not see election messages from other nodes.  After the
   problem resulting in the partition is fixed, then both active GCKSes
   will see each others election announcements.  The group needs to
   merge.

   The less preferred GCKS performs a unicast mrkmp_merge_sa unicast key
   management message to the more preferred GCKS.  In this message the
   less preferred GCKS includes its key download payload, so the more
   preferred GCKS learns the protocol master keys of the less preferred
   GCKS.

   The more preferred GCKS generates a new key download payload
   including a KEK and the union of all the protocol master keys.  The
   GCKS SHOULD mark the existing protocol master keys as expiring for
   usage in transmitted packets in a relatively short time.  The GCKS
   SHOULD introduce a new protocol master key.  This key download
   payload is returned to the less preferred GCKS and is sent out in the
   current KEK using a group key management message.

   The less preferred GCKS sends the received key download payload
   encrypted in its existing KEK.  XXX how many retransmits.  After all
   retransmissions of this payload the less preferred GCKS sets its
   state to member.

   As a result of this procedure, members learn the protocol master keys
   of both GCKSes and converge on a single KEK and GCKS.  Changing the
   protocol master keys during a merge is important for protocols that
   use the protocol master key as a transport key.  The new GCKS does
   not know which routers have joined the group with the other GCKS.



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   Therefore, it could not correctly detect one of these routers
   rebooting and change the protocol master key at that point.  If the
   key is changed as part of the merge, replays are handled.
















































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4.  Key Download Payload

   What all is actually in the message you get at the end of phase 2 and
   that is sent out periodically during group key management

   For the KEK, this needs to include the key itself, the algorithm
   (presumably drawn from the IKEv2 symmetric algorithms), key ID, group
   ID and the four lifetimes.

   The protocol master keys include the key, an algorithm ID, the key ID
   and the four lifetimes.

   By four lifetimes we mean receive start, send start, send end and
   receive end.  It's important that a key can be flooded out to all
   potential receivers before it is used for sending.




































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5.  Initial Exchange Details


















































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6.  Group Management Unicast Exchanges

6.1.  Group Join Exchange

   If a router receives a group join exchange for a group for which it
   is not the GCKS, it MUST return a notification.  If it knows the GCKS
   for the group then it returns MRKMP_WRONG_GCKS including the address
   of the GCKS in the notification payload.  The initiator tries the
   group join exchange (probably with a new initial exchange) with the
   indicated router.  If the responder does not know the GCKS for the
   group, either because it is not a member of the group or because its
   GCKS election state is initial, it returns the MRKMP_GCKS_UNKNOWN
   notification.  If the responder is not trying to be a member of this
   group or has seen a more preferred GCKS advertisement in the election
   process then the potential_candidate bit is clear, otherwise it is
   set.  The initiator sets its GCKS election state to initial when
   receiving this notification.  If the potential candidate bit is set
   in the notification then the initiator will accept GCKS election
   advertisements from the responder.  If the potential candidate bit is
   clear, then the initiator will discard GCKS election advertisements
   from the responder until BLACKLIST_TIMEOUT seconds have elapsed or
   until the initiator successfully joins the group.





























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7.  Group Key Management Operation

   Group key management messages are multicast from the GCKS to the
   group.  The message contains the key identifier of a KEK, as well as
   encrypted/integrity-protected payloads.  Inside the encrypted/
   integrity-protected payloads is a monotonically increasing sequence
   number, and payloads specific to the message being sent.  Group
   members MUST ignore a message with a sequence number that is the same
   or less than the sequence number of the most recent message they have
   received.

7.1.  General operation

   Periodically the GCKS will send out an update message encrypted in
   the current KEK including the current group key download payload and
   parameters.  If a new KEK is about to be valid for receiving
   messages, this is included.  Any protocol master keys that are valid
   for sending or receiving SHOULD be included.

   If a previous KEK is still valid for sending, then an update message
   is sent encrypted in the old KEK.  This message MUST include the new
   KEK.  This message SHOULD include the protocol master keys.

7.2.  Out of Sequence Space

7.3.  Changing the Active GCKS

























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8.  Interface to Routing Protocol

   This section describes signaling between MRKMP and the routing
   protocol.  The primary communication between these protocols is that
   MRKMP populates rows in the key table making protocol master keys
   available to the routing protocol.  However additional signaling is
   also required from the routing protocol to MRKMP.  This section
   discusses that signaling.  All required communication from MRKMP to
   the routing protocol can be accomplished by manipulating the key
   table.  However an implementation MAY wish to signal MRKMP failures
   to the routing protocol in order to provide consistent management
   feedback.

8.1.  Joining a Group

   When a routing protocol instance wishes to begin communicating on a
   multicast group, it signals a group join event to MRKMP.  This event
   includes the identity of the group as well as this router's priority
   for being a GCKS for the group.  When MRKMP receives this event, it
   starts MRKMP for this group and attempts to find a GCKS.

8.2.  Priority Adjustment

   It is desirable that the GCKS function track the functions within a
   routing protocol.  For example for protocols such as OSPF that
   designate a router on a link to manage adjacencies for that link, it
   would be desirable for the GCKS role to be assigned to that router.
   The routing protocol provides a priority input to the GCKS election
   process.  Initially the routing protocol should map any priority
   mechanism within the routing protocol to the GCKS election procedure
   so that routers favored as announcer for a link will also be favored
   as a GCKS.

   However, the routing protocol SHOULD also dynamically manipulate the
   GCKS election priority based on what happens within the routing
   protocol.  The router actually elected as the announcer SHOULD have a
   GCKS election priority higher than any other group member.
   Typically, by the time the routing protocol is able to elect an
   announcer, a GCKS will already be chosen.  However, if a GCKS
   election is triggered when the routing protocol is already
   operational, then the election can choose the routing protocol's
   announcer.

8.3.  Leaving a Group

   If a routing protocol terminates on an interface, MRKMP needs to be
   notified that group is no longer joined.  MRKMP MUST stop
   participating in the GCKS election process, stop monitoring for key



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   management messages and if the current router is a GCKS, stop acting
   in that role.

















































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9.  Security Considerations

   An attacker who can suppress packets sent to the group can create a
   denial of service condition.  One attack is to suppress GCKS election
   packets and cause two routers to believe they are both the GCKS for
   the group.  If the least preferred router never hears the GCKS
   advertisement from the more preferred router, then the group will
   remain partitioned.  Such an attacker is likely to be able to mount
   more direct denial of service, for example suppressing the actual
   routing protocol packets.

   The security of the system as a whole depends on the pair-wise
   security between the router currently in the GCKS role and the other
   routers in the group.  Since any router can potentially act as GCKS,
   the pair-wise security between all members of the group is critical
   to the security of the system.  In practical deployments, information
   used by the router acting as GCKS to authorize a member joining the
   group will be configured by some management application.  In these
   deployments, the security of the system depends on the management
   application correctly maintaining this information on all routers
   potentially in the group.






























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10.  Acknowledgements

   This draft is the result of a design discussion held after the IETF
   78 KARMP meeting.  The authors, David Mcgrew, Brian Weis and Gregory
   Lebovitz all contributed to the design meeting.














































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11.  Informative References

   [RFC2627]  Wallner, D., Harder, E., and R. Agee, "Key Management for
              Multicast: Issues and Architectures", RFC 2627, June 1999.

   [RFC3547]  Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
              Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
              RFC 5996, September 2010.








































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Authors' Addresses

   Sam Hartman
   Painless Security

   Email: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu


   Dacheng Zhang
   Huawei

   Email: zhangdacheng@huawei.com







































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