[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements

Network Working Group                                         S. Hartman
Internet-Draft                                         Painless Security
Intended status: Experimental                                   D. Zhang
Expires: January 16, 2014                                         Huawei
                                                            M. Wasserman
                                                       Painless Security
                                                           July 15, 2013


                     Security Requirements of NVO3
              draft-hartman-nvo3-security-requirements-01

Abstract

   This draft discusses the security requirements and several issues
   which need to be considered in securing a virtualized data center
   network for multiple tenants (a NVO3 network for short).  In
   addition, the draft also attempts to discuss how such issues could be
   addressed or mitigated.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.









Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  NVO3 Overlay Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Outsider Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Insider Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Basic Security Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Securing the Communications between NVEs and TSes . . . .   7
     5.2.  Securing the Communications within Overlays . . . . . . .   8
       5.2.1.  Control Plane Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.2.2.  Data Plan Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security Issues Imposed by the New Overlay Design
       Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Scalability Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Influence on Security Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  Security Issues with VM Migration . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Security is the key issue which needs to be considered in the design
   of a data center network.  This document first lists the security
   risks that a NVO3 network may encounter and the security requirements
   that a NVO3 network need to fulfill.  Then, this draft discusses the



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   essential security approaches which could be applied to fulfill such
   requirements.

   The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  (Section 4)
   introduces the attack model of this work and the properties that a
   NOV3 security mechanism needs to enforce.  Section 5 describes the
   essential security mechanisms which should be provide in the
   generation of a NVO3 network.  Then, in Section 6, we analyze the
   challenges brought by the new features mentioned
   in[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement].

2.  Terminology

   This document uses the same terminology as found in the NVO3
   Framework document [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework] and
   [I-D.kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp].  Some of the terms defined in
   the framework document have been repeated in this section for the
   convenience of the reader, along with additional terminology that is
   used by this document.

   Tenant System (TS): A physical or virtual system that can play the
   role of a host, or a forwarding element such as a router, switch,
   firewall, etc.  It belongs to a single tenant and connects to one or
   more VNs of that tenant.

   End System (ES): An end system of a tenant, which can be, e.g., a
   virtual machine(VM), a non-virtualized server, or a physical
   appliance.  A TS is attached to a Network Virtualization Edge(NVE)
   node.

   Network Virtualization Edge (NVE): An NVE implements network
   virtualization functions that allow for L2/L3 tenant separation and
   tenant-related control plane activity.  An NVE contains one or more
   tenant service instances whereby a TS interfaces with its associated
   instance.  The NVE also provides tunneling overlay functions.

   Virtual Network (VN): This is a virtual L2 or L3 domain that belongs
   to a tenant.

   Information Mapping Authority (IMA).  A back-end system that is
   responsible for distributing and maintaining the mapping information
   for the entire overlay system.  Note that the WG never reached
   consensus on what to call this architectural entity within the
   overlay system, so this term is subject to change.  In [I-D.ietf-nvo3
   -overlay-problem-statement], such a back-end system is referred to as
   a "oracle".





Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


3.  NVO3 Overlay Architecture

          Please view in a fixed-width font such as Courier.

          Please view in a fixed-width font such as Courier.

                      ..................................
                      .                                .
                      .                                .
                      .                                .
                    +-+--+                          +--+-++--------+
    +--------+      | NV |                          | NV || Tenant |
    | Tenant +------+Edge|       L3 Overlay         |Edge|| System |
    | System |      +-+--+        Network           +--+-++--------+
    +--------+        .                                .
                      .                                .
                      .                                .
                      ..................................



   This figure illustrates a simple nov3 overlay example where NVEs
   provide a logical L2/L3 interconnect for the TSes that belong to a
   specific tenant network over L3 networks.  A packet from a tenant
   system is encapsulated when they reach the egress NVE.  Then
   encapsulated packet is then sent to the remote NVE through a proper
   tunnel.  When reaching the ingress NVE, the packet is decapsulated
   and forwarded to the target tenant system.  The address
   advertisements and tunnel mappings are distributed amonge the NVEs
   through either distributed control protocols or by certain
   centralized servers (called Information Mapping Authorities).

4.  Threat Model

   To benefit the discussion, in this analysis work, attacks are
   classified into two categories: inside attacks and outside attacks.
   An attack is considered as an inside attack if the adversary
   performing the attack (inside attacker or insider) has got certain
   privileges in changing the configuration or software of a NVO3 device
   (or a network devices of the underlying network where the overlay is
   located upon) and initiates the attack within the overlay security
   perimeter.  In contrast, an attack is referred to as an outside
   attack if the adversary performing the attack (outside attacker or
   outsider) has no such privilege and can only initiate the attacks
   from compromised TSes.  Note that in a complex attack inside and
   outside attacking operations may be performed in a well organized way
   to expand the damages caused by the attack.




Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   This analysis assumes that security protocols, algorithms, and
   implementations provide the security properties for which they are
   designed; attacks depending on a failure of this assumption are out
   of scope.  As an example, an attack caused by a weakness in a
   cryptographic algorithm is out of scope, while an attack caused by
   failure to use confidentiality when confidentiality is a security
   requirement is in scope.

4.1.  Outsider Capabilities

   The following capabilities of outside attackers MUST be considered in
   the design of a NOV3 security mechanism:

   1.  Eavesdropping on the packets,

   2.  Replaying the intercepted packets, and

   3.  Generating illegal packets and injecting them into the network.

   With a successful outside attack, an attacker may be able to:

   1.  Analyze the traffic pattern of a tenant or an end device,

   2.  Disrupt the network connectivity or degrade the network service
       quality, or

   3.  Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are not
       encrypted.

4.2.  Insider Capabilities

   It is assumed that an inside attacker can perform any types of
   outside attacks from the inside or outside of the overlay perimeter.
   In addition, in an inside attack, an attacker may use already
   obtained privilege to, for instance,

   1.  Interfere with the normal operations of the overlay as a legal
       entity, by sending packets containing invalid information or with
       improper frequencies,

   2.  Perform spoofing attacks and impersonate another legal device to
       communicate with victims using the cryptographic information it
       obtained, and

   3.  Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are
       encrypted with the keys held by the attacker.





Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   Note that in practice an insider controlling an underlying network
   device may break the communication of the overlays by discarding or
   delaying the delivery of the packets passing through it.  However,
   this type of attack is out of scope.

4.3.  Security Properties

   When encountering an attack, a virtual data center network MUST
   guarantee the following security properties:

   1.  Isolation of the VNs: In
       [I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], the data plane
       isolation requirement amongst different VNs has been discussed.
       The traffic within a virtual network can only be transited into
       another one in a controlled fashion (e.g., via a configured
       router and/or a security gateway).  In addition, it MUST be
       ensured that an entity cannot make use of its privilege obtained
       within a VN to manipulate the overlay control plane to affect on
       the operations of other VNs.

   2.  Spoofing detection: Under the attacks performed by a privileged
       inside attacker, the attacker cannot use the obtained
       cryptographic materials to impersonate another one.

   3.  Integrity protection and message origin authentication for the
       control packets: The implementation of an overlay control plane
       MUST support the integrity protection on the signaling packets.
       No entity can modify a overlay signaling packet during its
       transportation without being detected.  Also, an attacker cannot
       impersonate a legal victim (e.g., a NVE or another servers within
       the overlay) to send signaling packets without detection.

   4.  Availability of the control plane: The design of the control plan
       must consider the DoS/DDoS attacks.  Especially when there are
       centralized servers in the control plan of the overlay, the
       servers need to be well protected and make sure that they will
       not become the bottle neck of the control plane especially under
       DDOS attacks.

   The following properties SHOULD be optionally provided:











Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   1.  Confidentiality and integrity of the data traffic of TSes.  In
       some conditions, the cryptographic protection on the TS traffic
       is not necessary.  For example, if most of the ES data is headed
       towards the Internet and nothing is confidential, encryption or
       integrity protection on such data may be unnecessary.  In
       addition, in the cases where the underlay network is secure
       enough, no additional cryptographic protection needs to be
       provided.

   2.  Confidentiality of the control plane.  On many occasions, the
       signaling messages can be transported in plaintext.  However,
       when the information contained within the signaling messages are
       sensitive or valuable to attackers (e.g., the location of a ES,
       when a VM migration happens), the signaling messages related with
       that tenant SHOULD be encrypted.

5.  Basic Security Approaches

   This section introduces the security mechanisms which could be used
   to provided in order to guarantee the security properties mentioned
   in section 4 when encountering attacks.

5.1.  Securing the Communications between NVEs and TSes

   Assume there is a VNE providing a logical L2/L3 interconnect for a
   set of TSes.  Apart from data traffics, the NVE and the TSes also
   need to exchange signaling messages in order to facilitate, e.g., VM
   online detection, VM migration detection, or auto-provisioning/
   service discovery [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework].

   The NVE and its associated TSes can be deployed in a distributed way
   (e.g., a NVE is implemented in an individual device, and VMs are
   located on servers) or in a co-located way (e.g., a NVE and the TSes
   it serves are located on the same server).

   In the former case, the data and control traffic between the NVE and
   the TSes are exchanged over network.  If the NVE supports multiple
   VNs concurrently, the data/control traffics in different VNs MUST be
   isolated physically or by using VPN technologies.  If the network
   connecting the NVE and the TSes is potentially accessible to
   attackers, the security properties of data traffic (e.g., integrity,
   confidentiality, and message origin authenticity) SHOULD be provided.
   The security mechanisms such as IPsec, SSL, and TCP-AO, can be used
   according to different security requirements.

   In order to guarantee the integrity and the origin authentication of
   signaling messages, integrated security mechanisms or additional
   security protocols need to be provided.  In order to secure the data/



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   control traffic, cryptographic keys need to be distributed to
   generate digests or signatures for the control packets.  Such
   cryptographic keys can be manually deployed in advance or dynamically
   generated with certain automatic key management protocols (e.g., TLS
   [RFC5246]).  The TSes belonging to different VNs MUST use different
   keys to secure the control packets exchanges with their NVE.
   Therefore, an attacker cannot use the keys it obtained from a
   compromised TS to generate bogus signaling messages and inject them
   into other VNs without being detected.  For a better damage
   confinement capability, different TSes SHOULD use different keys to
   secure their control packet exchanges with NVEs, even if they belong
   to the same VN.

   In the co-located case, all the information exchanges between the NVE
   and the TSes are within the same device, and no standardized protocol
   need to be provided for transporting control/data packets.  It is
   also important to keep the isolation of the TS traffic in different
   VNs.  In addition, in the co-location fashion, because the NVE, the
   hypervisor, and the VMs are deployed on the same device, the
   computing and memory resources used by the NVE , the hypervisor, and
   the TSes need to be isolated to prevents a malicious or compromised
   TS from, e.g., accessing the memory of the NVE or affecting the
   performance of the NVE by occupying large amounts of computing
   resources.

5.2.  Securing the Communications within Overlays

   This section analyzes the security issues in the control and data
   plans of a NVO3 overlay.

5.2.1.  Control Plane Security

   It is the responsibility of the NVO3 network to protect the control
   plane packets transported over the underlay network against the
   attacks from the underlying network.  The integrity and origin
   authentication of the messages MUST be guaranteed.  The signaling
   packets SHOULD be encrypted when the signaling messages are
   confidential.  To achieve such objectives, when the network devices
   exchange control plane packets, integrated security mechanisms or
   security protocols need to provided.  In addition, cryptographic keys
   need to be deployed manually in advance or dynamically generated by
   using certain automatic key management protocols (e.g., TLS
   [RFC5246]).

   In order to enforce the security boundary of different VNs in the
   existence of inside adversaries, the signaling messages belonging to
   different VNs need to be secured by different keys.  Otherwise, an
   inside attacker may try to use the keys obtained within a VN to



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   impersonate the NVEs in other VNs and generate illegal signaling
   messages without being detected.  If we expect to provide a better
   attack confinement capability and prevent a compromised NVE to
   impersonate other NVEs in the same VN, different NVEs working inside
   a VN need to secure their signaling messages with different keys.
   When there are centralized servers providing mapping information
   (IMAs) within the overlay, it will be important to prevent a
   compromised NVE from impersonating the centralized servers to
   communicate with other NVEs.  A straightforward solution is to
   associate different NVEs with different keys when they exchange
   information with the centralized servers.

   In the cases where there are a large amount of NVEs working within a
   NVO3 overlay, manual key management may become infeasible.  First, it
   could be burdensome to deploy pre-shared keys for thousands of NVEs,
   not to mention that multiple keys may need to be deployed on a single
   device for different purposes.  Key derivation can be used to
   mitigate this problem.  Using key derivation functions, multiple keys
   for different usages can be derived from a pre-shared master key.
   However, key derivation cannot protect against the situation where a
   system was incorrectly trusted to have the key used to perform the
   derivation.  If the master key were somehow compromised, all the
   resulting keys would need to be changed.  In addition, VM migration
   will introduce challenges to manual key management.  The migration of
   a VM in a VN may cause the change of the NVEs which are involved
   within the NV.  When a NVE is newly involved within a VN, it needs to
   get the key to join the operations within the VN.  If a NVE stops
   supporting a VN, it should not keep the keys associated with that VN.
   All those key updates need to be performed at run time, and difficult
   to be handled by human beings.  As a result, it is reasonable to
   introduce automated key management solutions such as EAP [RFC4137]
   for NVO3 overlays.

   When an automated key management solution for NVO3 overlays is
   deployed, as a part of the key management protocol, mutual
   authentication needs to be performed before two network devices in
   the overlay (NVEs or IMAs) start exchanging the control packets.
   After an authentication, an device can find out whether its peer
   holds valid security credentials is is the one who it has claimed.
   The authentication results is also necessary for authorization; it is
   important for a device to clarify the roles (e.g., a NVE or a IMA)
   that its authentication peer acts as in the overlay.  Therefore, a
   compromised NVE cannot use it credential to impersonate an IMA to
   communicate with other NVEs.  Only the control messages from the
   authenticated entity will be adopted.  In addition, authorization MAY
   need to be performed.  For instance, before accepting a control
   message, the receiver NVE needs to verify whether the message comes
   from one which is authorized to send that message.  If the



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


   authorization fail, the control message will be discarded.  For
   instance, if a control packet about a VN is sent from a NVE which is
   not authorized to support the VN, the packet will be discarded.

   The issues of DDOS attacks also need to be considered in designing
   the overlay control plane.  For instance, in the VXLAN
   solution[I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan], an attacker attached to a
   NVE can try to manipulate the NVE to keep multicasting control
   messages by sending a large amount of ARP packets to query the
   inexistent VMs.  In order to mitigate this type of attack, the NVEs
   SHOULD be only allowed to send signaling message in the overlay with
   a limited frequency.  When there are centralized servers (e.g., the
   backend oracles providing mapping information for
   NVEs[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], or the SDN
   controllers) are located within the overlay, the potential security
   risks caused by DDOS attack on such servers can be more serious.

   In addition, during the design of the control plane, it is important
   to consider the amplification effects which may potential be used by
   attackers to carry out reflection attacks.

5.2.2.  Data Plan Security

   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework] specifies a NVO3 overlay needs to generate
   tunnels between NVEs for data transportation.  When a data packet
   reaches the boundary of a overlay, it will be encapsulated and
   forwarded to the destination NVE through a proper tunnel.  It is
   normally assume that the underlying network connecting NVEs are
   secure to outside attacks since it is under the management of DC
   vendor and cannot be directly accessed by tenants.  However, when
   facing inside attacks, conditions could be complex.  For instance, an
   inside attacker compromising a underlying network device may
   intercept an encapsulated data packet transported a tunnel, modify
   the contents in the encapsulating tunnel packet and, transfer it into
   another tunnel without being detected.  When the modified packet
   reaches a NVE, the NVE may decapsulated the data packet and forward
   it into a VN according to the information within the encapsulating
   header generated by the attacker.  Similarly, a compromised NVE may
   try to redirect the data packets within a VN into another VN by
   adding improper encapsulating tunnel headers to the data packets.
   Under such circumstances, in order to enforce the VN isolation
   property, signatures or digests need to be generated for both data
   packets and the encapsulating tunnel headers in order to provide data
   origin authentication and integrity protection.  In addition, NVEs
   SHOULD use different keys to secure the packets transported in
   different tunnels.





Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


6.  Security Issues Imposed by the New Overlay Design Characteristics

6.1.  Scalability Issues

   NOV3 WG requires an overlay be able to work in an environment where
   there are many thousands of NVEs (e.g. residing within the
   hypervisors) and large amounts of trust domains (VNs).  Therefore,
   the scalability issues should be considered.  In the cases where a
   NVE only has a limited number of NVEs to communicate with, the
   scalability problem brought by the overhead of generating and
   maintaining the security channels with the remote NVEs is not
   serious.  However, if a NVE needs to communicate with a large number
   of peers, the scalability issue could be serious.  For instance,
   in[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem], it has been demonstrated it is
   not trivial to enabling a large number of systems to communicate
   directly using IPsec to protect the traffic between them.

6.2.  Influence on Security Devices

   If the data packets transported through out an overlay are encrypted
   (e.g., by NVEs), it is difficult for a security device, e,g., a
   firewall deployed on the path connecting two NVEs to inspect the
   contents of the packets.  The firewall can only know which VN the
   packets belong to through the VN ID transported in the outer header.
   If a firewall would like to identify which end device sends a packets
   or which end device a packet is sent to, the firewall can be deployed
   in some place where it can access the packet before it is
   encapsulated or un-encapsulated by NVEs.  However, in this case, the
   firewall cannot get VN ID from the packet.  If the firewall is used
   to process two VNs concurrently and there are IP or MAC addresses of
   the end devices in the two VNs overlapped, confusion will be caused.
   If a firewall can generate multiple firewalls instances for different
   tenants respectively, this issue can be largely addressed.

6.3.  Security Issues with VM Migration

   The support of VM migration is an important issue considered in NVO3
   WG.  The migration may also cause security risks.  Because the VMs
   within a VN may move from one server to another which connects to a
   different NVE, the packets exchanging between two VMs may be
   transferred in a new path.  If the security policies deployed on the
   firewalls of the two paths are conflict or the firewalls on the new
   path lack essential state to process the packets.  The communication
   between the VMs may be broken.  To address this problem, one option
   is to enable the state migration and policy confliction detection
   between firewalls.  The other one is to force all the traffic within
   a VN be processed by a single firewall.  However this solution may
   cause traffic optimization issues.



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.

8.  Security Considerations

   TBD

9.  Acknowledgements

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem]
              Hanna, S. and V. Manral, "Auto Discovery VPN Problem
              Statement and Requirements", draft-ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-
              problem-08 (work in progress), July 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework]
              Lasserre, M., Balus, F., Morin, T., Bitar, N., and Y.
              Rekhter, "Framework for DC Network Virtualization", draft-
              ietf-nvo3-framework-03 (work in progress), July 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement]
              Narten, T., Gray, E., Black, D., Fang, L., Kreeger, L.,
              and M. Napierala, "Problem Statement: Overlays for Network
              Virtualization", draft-ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-
              statement-03 (work in progress), May 2013.

   [I-D.kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp]
              Kreeger, L., Narten, T., and D. Black, "Network
              Virtualization Hypervisor-to-NVE Overlay Control Protocol
              Requirements", draft-kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp-01
              (work in progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan]
              Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
              L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "VXLAN: A
              Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over



Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                NVO3 security                    July 2013


              Layer 3 Networks", draft-mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan-04
              (work in progress), May 2013.

   [RFC4137]  Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
              "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

Authors' Addresses

   Sam Hartman
   Painless Security
   356 Abbott Street
   North Andover, MA  01845
   USA

   Email: hartmans@painless-security.com
   URI:   http://www.painless-security.com


   Dacheng Zhang
   Huawei
   Beijing
   China

   Email: zhangdacheng@huawei.com


   Margaret Wasserman
   Painless Security
   356 Abbott Street
   North Andover, MA  01845
   USA

   Phone: +1 781 405 7464
   Email: mrw@painless-security.com
   URI:   http://www.painless-security.com












Hartman, et al.         Expires January 16, 2014               [Page 13]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.124, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/