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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 RFC 4186

Network Working Group                                  H. Haverinen, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Expires: October 4, 2004                                 J. Salowey, Ed.
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                           April 5, 2004


 Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for GSM Subscriber Identity
                           Modules (EAP-SIM)
                 draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
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   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 4, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
   GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The mechanism specifies
   enhancements to GSM authentication and key agreement whereby multiple
   authentication triplets can be combined to create authentication
   responses and session keys of greater strength than the individual
   GSM triplets. The mechanism also includes network authentication,
   user anonymity support, result indications, and a fast
   re-authentication procedure.




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Table of Contents

   1.     Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.     Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.     Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.     Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.1    Version Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.2    Identity Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.2.1  Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities  . . . . .  10
   4.2.2  Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server  . . . . . .  17
   4.2.3  Message Sequence Examples (Informative)  . . . . . . . . .  22
   4.3    Fast Re-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   4.3.1  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   4.3.2  Comparison to UMTS AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   4.3.3  Fast Re-authentication Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   4.3.4  Fast Re-authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   4.3.5  Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too
          Small  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   4.4    EAP-SIM Notifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   4.4.1  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   4.4.2  Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   4.5    Error Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   4.5.1  Peer Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   4.5.2  Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   4.5.3  EAP-Failure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   4.5.4  EAP-Success  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   4.6    Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   5.     Message Format and Protocol Extensibility  . . . . . . . .  43
   5.1    Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   5.2    Protocol Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   6.     Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   6.1    EAP-Request/SIM/Start  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   6.2    EAP-Response/SIM/Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   6.3    EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
   6.4    EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   6.5    EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   6.6    EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   6.7    EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   6.8    EAP-Request/SIM/Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   6.9    EAP-Response/SIM/Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   7.     Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   7.1    Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   7.2    AT_VERSION_LIST  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   7.3    AT_SELECTED_VERSION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   7.4    AT_NONCE_MT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   7.5    AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   7.6    AT_ANY_ID_REQ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   7.7    AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54



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   7.8    AT_IDENTITY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   7.9    AT_RAND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   7.10   AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
   7.11   AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   7.12   AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   7.13   AT_RESULT_IND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   7.14   AT_MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   7.15   AT_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   7.16   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   7.17   AT_NONCE_S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   7.18   AT_NOTIFICATION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   7.19   AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   8.     IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   9.     Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   9.1    Identity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   9.2    Mutual Authentication and Triplet Exposure . . . . . . . .  65
   9.3    Flooding the Authentication Centre . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   9.4    Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   9.5    Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   9.6    Credentials Reuse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   9.7    Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality . . .  68
   9.8    Negotiation Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
   9.9    Protected Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
   9.10   Man-in-the-middle Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
   9.11   Generating Random Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
   10.    Security Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
   11.    Acknowledgements and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   11.1   Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   11.2   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   11.2.1 Contributors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
          Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
          Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
          Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   A.     Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   A.1    EAP-Request/Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   A.2    EAP-Response/Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   A.3    EAP-Request/SIM/Start  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
   A.4    EAP-Response/SIM/Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
   A.5    EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
   A.6    EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
   A.7    EAP-Success  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   A.8    Fast Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   A.9    EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   A.10   EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   B.     Pseudo-Random Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
          Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . .  86





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1. Introduction

   This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   [EAP] mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using
   the GSM Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).

   GSM authentication is based on a challenge-response mechanism. The
   A3/A8 authentication and key derivation algorithms that run on the
   SIM can be given a 128-bit random number (RAND) as a challenge. The
   SIM runs operator-specific algorithms, which take the RAND and a
   secret key Ki stored on the SIM as input, and produce a 32-bit
   response (SRES) and a 64-bit long key Kc as output. The Kc key is
   originally intended to be used as an encryption key over the air
   interface, but in this protocol it is used for deriving keying
   material and not directly used. Hence the secrecy of Kc is critical
   to the security of this protocol. Please find more information about
   GSM authentication in [GSM 03.20].

   The lack of mutual authentication is a weakness in GSM
   authentication. The 64 bit cipher key (Kc) that is derived is not
   strong enough for data networks where stronger and longer keys are
   required. Hence in EAP-SIM, several RAND challenges are used for
   generating several 64-bit Kc keys, which are combined to constitute
   stronger keying material. In EAP-SIM the client issues a random
   number NONCE_MT to the network, in order to contribute to key
   derivation, and to prevent replays of EAP-SIM requests from previous
   exchanges. The NONCE_MT can be conceived as the client's challenge to
   the network. EAP-SIM also extends the combined RAND challenges and
   other messages with a message authentication code in order to provide
   message integrity protection along with mutual authentication.

   EAP-SIM specifies optional support for protecting the privacy of
   subscriber identity using the same concept as GSM, which is using
   pseudonyms/temporary identifiers. It also specifies an optional fast
   re-authentication procedure.

   The security of EAP-SIM builds on underlying GSM mechanisms. The
   security properties of EAP-SIM are documented in Section 9 of this
   document. Implementers and users of EAP-SIM are advised to carefully
   study the security considerations in Section 9 in order to determine
   whether the security properties are sufficient for the environment in
   question, especially as the secrecy of Kc keys is key to the security
   of EAP-SIM. In brief, EAP-SIM is in no sense weaker than the GSM
   mechanisms. In some cases EAP-SIM provides better security properties
   than the underlying GSM mechanisms, particularly if the SIM
   credentials are only used for EAP-SIM and not re-used from GSM/GPRS.
   Many of the security features of EAP_SIM rely upon the secrecy of the
   Kc values in the SIM triplets, so protecting these values is key to



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   the security of the EAP-SIM protocol. In any case, if the GSM
   authentication mechanisms are considered to be sufficient for use on
   the cellular networks, then EAP-SIM is expected to be sufficiently
   secure for other networks.

   The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified an
   enhanced Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) architecture for the
   Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The UMTS AKA
   mechanism includes mutual authentication, replay protection and
   derivation of longer session keys. EAP-AKA [EAP-AKA]  specifies an
   EAP method that is based on UMTS AKA. EAP-AKA, which is a more secure
   protocol, may be used instead of EAP-SIM, if USIMs and 3G network
   infrastructure are available.

2. Terms

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication
   server", "EAP server", "peer", "Silently Discard", "Master Session
   Key (MSK)", and "Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [EAP].

   This document frequently uses the following terms and abbreviations:

   AAA protocol

         Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol

   AuC

         Authentication Centre. The GSM network element that provides the
         authentication triplets for authenticating the subscriber.

   Authentication vector

         GSM triplets can be alternatively called authentication vectors.


   EAP

         Extensible Authentication Protocol.

   Fast Re-authentication Identity

         A fast re-authentication identity of the peer, including an NAI realm



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         portion in environments where a realm is used. Used on fast re-
         authentication only.

   Fast Re-authentication Username

         The username portion of fast re-authentication identity, ie. not
         including any realm portions.

   GSM

         Global System for Mobile communications.

   GSM Triplet

         The tuple formed by the three GSM authentication values RAND, Kc
         and SRES

   IMSI

         International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in GSM to
         identify subscribers.

   MAC

         Message Authentication Code

   NAI

         Network Access Identifier

   Nonce

         A value that is used at most once or that is never repeated
         within the same cryptographic context. In general, a nonce can be
         predictable (e.g. a counter) or unpredictable (e.g. a random value).
         Since some cryptographic properties may depend on the randomness of
         the nonce, attention should be paid to whether a nonce is required
         to be random or not. In this document, the term nonce is only
         used to denote random nonces, and it is not used to denote counters.

   Permanent Identity

         The permanent identity of the peer, including an NAI realm
         portion in environments where a realm is used. The permanent
         identity is usually based on the IMSI. Used on full
         authentication only.

   Permanent Username



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         The username portion of permanent identity, ie. not including any
         realm portions.

   Pseudonym Identity

         A pseudonym identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion
         in environments where a realm is used. Used on full authentication
         only.

   Pseudonym Username

         The username portion of pseudonym identity, ie. not including any
         realm portions.

   SIM

         Subscriber Identity Module. The SIM is traditionally a smart card
         distributed by a GSM operator.


3. Overview

   Figure 1 shows an overview of the EAP-SIM full authentication
   procedure, when optional protected success indications are not used.
   The authenticator typically communicates with an EAP server that is
   located on a backend authentication server using an AAA protocol. The
   authenticator shown in the figure is often simply relaying EAP
   messages to and from the EAP server, but these back end AAA
   communications are not shown.






















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     Peer                                               Authenticator
       |                               EAP-Request/Identity       |
       |<---------------------------------------------------------|
       |                                                          |
       | EAP-Response/Identity                                    |
       |--------------------------------------------------------->|
       |                                                          |
       |                  EAP-Request/SIM/Start (AT_VERSION_LIST) |
       |<---------------------------------------------------------|
       |                                                          |
       | EAP-Response/SIM/Start (AT_NONCE_MT, AT_SELECTED_VERSION)|
       |--------------------------------------------------------->|
       |                                                          |
       |           EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge (AT_RAND, AT_MAC)    |
       |<---------------------------------------------------------|
   +-------------------------------------+                        |
   | Peer runs GSM algorithms, verifies  |                        |
   | AT_MAC and derives session keys     |                        |
   +-------------------------------------+                        |
       | EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge (AT_MAC)                      |
       |--------------------------------------------------------->|
       |                                                          |
       |                                             EAP-Success  |
       |<---------------------------------------------------------|
       |                                                          |


            Figure 1: EAP-SIM full authentication procedure

   The first EAP Request issued by the authenticator is EAP-Request/
   Identity. On full authentication, the peer's response includes either
   the user's International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or a
   temporary identity (pseudonym) if identity privacy is in effect, as
   specified in Section 4.2.

   Following the peer's EAP-Response/Identity packet, the peer receives
   EAP Requests of type 18 (SIM) from the EAP server and sends the
   corresponding EAP Responses. The EAP packets that are of the Type SIM
   also have a Subtype field. On full authentication, the first
   EAP-Request/SIM packet is of the Subtype 10 (Start). EAP-SIM packets
   encapsulate parameters in attributes, encoded in a Type, Length,
   Value format. The packet format and the use of attributes are
   specified in Section 5.

   The EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet contains the list of EAP-SIM version
   supported by the EAP server in the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute. This
   packet may also include attributes for requesting the subscriber
   identity, as specified in Section 4.2.



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   The peer responds to EAP-Request/SIM/Start with the EAP-Response/SIM/
   Start packet, which includes the AT_NONCE_MT attribute that contains
   a random number NONCE_MT, chosen by the peer, and the
   AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute that contains the version number
   selected by the peer. The version negotiation is protected by
   including the version list and the selected version in the
   calculation of keying material (Section 4.6).

   After receiving the EAP Response/SIM/Start, the EAP server obtains n
   GSM triplets for use in authenticating the subscriber, where n = 2 or
   n = 3. From the triplets, the EAP server derives the keying material,
   as specified in Section 4.6. The triplets may be obtained by
   contacting an Authentication Centre (AuC) on the GSM network; per GSM
   specifications, between 1 and 5 triplets may be obtained at a time.
   Triplets may be stored in the EAP server for use at a later time, but
   triplets may not be reused, except in some error cases that are
   specified in Section 7.9

   The next EAP Request the EAP Server issues is of the type SIM and
   subtype Challenge (11). It contains the RAND challenges and a message
   authentication code attribute AT_MAC to cover the challenges. The
   AT_MAC attribute is a general message authentication code attribute
   that is used in many EAP-SIM messages.

   On receipt of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message, the peer runs
   the GSM authentication algorithm and calculates a copy of the message
   authentication code. The peer then verifies that the calculated MAC
   equals the received MAC. If the MAC's do not match, then the peer
   sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet and the authentication
   exchange terminates.

   Since the RAND's given to a peer are accompanied with the message
   authentication code AT_MAC, and since the peer's NONCE_MT value
   contributes to AT_MAC, the peer is able to verify that the EAP-SIM
   message is fresh (not a replay) and that the sender possesses valid
   GSM triplets for the subscriber.

   If all checks out, the peer responds with the EAP-Response/SIM/
   Challenge, containing the AT_MAC attribute that covers the peer's
   SRES response values (Section 6.4). The EAP server verifies that the
   MAC is correct. Because protected success indications are not used in
   this example, the EAP server sends the EAP-Success packet, indicating
   that the authentication was successful. (Protected success
   indications are discussed in Section 4.4.2.) The EAP server may also
   include derived keying material in the message it sends to the
   authenticator. The peer has derived the same keying material, so the
   authenticator does not forward the keying material to the peer along
   with EAP-Success.



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   EAP-SIM also includes a separate fast re-authentication procedure,
   which does not make use of the A3/A8 algorithms or the GSM
   infrastructure. Fast re-authentication is based on keys derived on
   full authentication. If the peer has maintained state information for
   fast re-authentication and wants to use fast re-authentication, then
   the peer indicates this by using a specific fast re-authentication
   identity instead of the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity.
   The fast re-authentication procedure is described in Section 4.3.

4. Operation

4.1 Version Negotiation

   EAP-SIM includes version negotiation so as to allow future
   developments in the protocol. The version negotiation is performed on
   full authentication and it uses two attributes, AT_VERSION_LIST,
   which the server always includes in EAP-Request/SIM/Start, and
   AT_SELECTED_VERSION, which the peer includes in EAP- Response/SIM/
   Start on full authentication.

   AT_VERSION_LIST includes the EAP-SIM versions supported by the
   server. If AT_VERSION_LIST does not include a version that is
   implemented by the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy,
   then the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet
   (Section 6.7) to the server with the error code "unsupported
   version". If a suitable version is included, then the peer includes
   the AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute, containing the selected version,
   in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet. The peer MUST only indicate a
   version that is included in AT_VERSION_LIST. If several versions are
   acceptable, then the peer SHOULD choose the version that occurs first
   in the version list.

   The version number list of AT_VERSION_LIST and the selected version
   of AT_SELECTED_VERSION are included in the key derivation procedure
   (Section 4.6). If an attacker modifies either one of these
   attributes, then the peer and the server derive different keying
   material. Because K_aut keys are different, the server and peer
   calculate different AT_MAC values. Hence, the peer detects that
   AT_MAC included in EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge is incorrect and sends
   the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet. The authentication
   procedure terminates.

4.2 Identity Management

4.2.1 Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities






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4.2.1.1 General

   In the beginning of EAP authentication, the Authenticator or the EAP
   server usually issues the EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer.
   The peer responds with EAP-Response/Identity, which contains the
   user's identity. The formats of these packets are specified in [EAP].

   GSM subscribers are identified with the International Mobile
   Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [GSM 03.03]. The IMSI is composed of a
   three digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a two or three digit Mobile
   Network Code (MNC) and a not more than 10 digit Mobile Subscriber
   Identification Number (MSIN). In other words, the IMSI is a string of
   not more than 15 digits. MCC and MNC uniquely identify the GSM
   operator and  help identify the AuC from which the authentication
   vectors need to be retrieved for this subscriber.

   Internet AAA protocols identify users with the Network Access
   Identifier (NAI) [RFC2486]. When used in a roaming environment, the
   NAI is composed of a username and a realm, separated with "@"
   (username@realm). The username portion identifies the subscriber
   within the realm.

   This section specifies the peer identity format used in EAP-SIM. In
   this document, the term identity or peer identity refers to the whole
   identity string that is used to identify the peer. The peer identity
   may include a realm portion. "Username" refers to the portion of the
   peer identity that identifies the user, i.e. the username does not
   include the realm portion.

4.2.1.2 Identity Privacy Support

   EAP-SIM includes optional identity privacy (anonymity) support that
   can be used to hide the cleartext permanent identity and thereby to
   make the subscriber's EAP exchanges untraceable to eavesdroppers.
   Because the permanent identity never changes, revealing it would help
   observers to track the user. The permanent identity is usually based
   on the IMSI, which may further help the tracking, because the same
   identifier may be used in other contexts as well. Identity privacy is
   based on temporary identities, or pseudonyms, which are equivalent to
   but separate from the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identities (TMSI)
   that are used on cellular networks. Please see Section 9.1 for
   security considerations regarding identity privacy.

4.2.1.3 Username Types in EAP-SIM identities

   There are three types of usernames in EAP-SIM peer identities:

   (1) Permanent usernames. For example, 1123456789098765@myoperator.com



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   might be a valid permanent identity. In this example,
   1123456789098765 is the permanent username.

   (2) Pseudonym usernames. For example, 3s7ah6n9q@myoperator.com might
   be a valid pseudonym identity. In this example, 3s7ah6n9q is the
   pseudonym username.

   (3) Fast re-authentication usernames. For example,
   53953754@myoperator.com might be a valid fast re-authentication
   identity. In this case, 53953754 is the fast re-authentication
   username.

   The first two types of identities are only used on full
   authentication and the last one only on fast re-authentication. When
   the optional identity privacy support is not used, the non-pseudonym
   permanent identity is used on full authentication. The fast
   re-authentication exchange is specified in Section 4.3.

4.2.1.4 Username Decoration

   In some environments, the peer may need to decorate the identity by
   prepending or appending the username with a string, in order to
   indicate supplementary AAA routing information in addition to the NAI
   realm. (The usage of a NAI realm portion is not considered to be
   decoration.) Username decoration is out of the scope of this
   document. However, it should be noted that username decoration might
   prevent the server from recognizing a valid username. Hence, although
   the peer MAY use username decoration in the identities the peer
   includes in EAP-Response/Identity, and the EAP server MAY accept a
   decorated peer username in this message, the peer or the EAP server
   MUST NOT decorate any other peer identities that are used in various
   EAP-SIM attributes. Only the identity used in EAP-Response/Identity
   may be decorated.

4.2.1.5 NAI Realm Portion

   The peer MAY include a realm portion in the peer identity, as per the
   NAI format. The use of a realm portion is not mandatory.

   If a realm is used, the realm MAY be chosen by the subscriber's home
   operator and it MAY be a configurable parameter in the EAP-SIM peer
   implementation. In this case, the peer is typically configured with
   the NAI realm of the home operator. Operators MAY reserve a specific
   realm name for EAP-SIM users. This convention makes it easy to
   recognize that the NAI identifies a GSM subscriber. Such reserved NAI
   realm may be useful as a hint as to the first authentication method
   to use during method negotiation. When the peer is using a pseudonym
   username instead of the permanent username, the peer selects the



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   realm name portion similarly as it select the realm portion when
   using the permanent username.

   If no configured realm name is available, the peer MAY derive the
   realm name from the MCC and MNC portions of the IMSI. A RECOMMENDED
   way to derive the realm from the IMSI using the realm 3gppnetwork.org
   will be specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003].

   Some old implementations derive the realm name from the IMSI by
   concatenating "mnc", the MNC digits of IMSI, ".mcc", the MCC digits
   of IMSI and ".owlan.org". For example, if the IMSI is
   123456789098765, and the MNC is three digits long, then the derived
   realm name is "mnc456.mcc123.owlan.org". As there are no DNS servers
   running at owlan.org, these realm names can only be used with
   manually configured AAA routing. New implementations SHOULD use the
   mechanism specified in [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003] instead of owlan.org as
   soon as the 3GPP specification is finalized.

   The IMSI is a string of digits without any explicit structure, so the
   peer may not be able to determine the length of the MNC portion. If
   the peer is not able to determine whether the MNC is two or three
   digits long, the peer MAY use a 3-digit MNC. If the correct length of
   the MNC is two, then the MNC used in the realm name includes the
   first digit of MSIN. Hence, when configuring AAA networks for
   operators that have 2-digit MNC's, the network SHOULD also be
   prepared for realm names with incorrect 3-digit MNC's.

4.2.1.6 Format of the Permanent Username

   The non-pseudonym permanent username SHOULD be derived from the IMSI.
   In this case, the permanent username MUST be of the format "1" |
   IMSI, where the character "|" denotes concatenation. In other words,
   the first character of the username is the digit one (ASCII value 31
   hexadecimal), followed by the IMSI. The IMSI is encoded as an ASCII
   string that consists of not more than 15 decimal digits (ASCII values
   between 30 and 39 hexadecimal), one character per IMSI digit, in the
   order as specified in [GSM 03.03]. For example, a permanent username
   derived from the IMSI 295023820005424 would be encoded as the ASCII
   string "1295023820005424"  (byte values in hexadecimal notation: 31
   32 39 35 30 32 33 38 32 30 30 30 35 34 32 34)

   The EAP server MAY use the leading "1" as a hint to try EAP-SIM as
   the first authentication method during method negotiation, rather
   than for example EAP/AKA. The EAP-SIM server MAY propose EAP-SIM even
   if the leading character was not "1".

   Alternatively, an implementation MAY choose a permanent username that
   is not based on the IMSI. In this case the selection of the username,



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   its format, and its processing is out of the scope of this document.
   In this case, the peer implementation MUST NOT prepend any leading
   characters to the username.

4.2.1.7 Generating Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities by
        the Server

   Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication identities are
   generated by the EAP server. The EAP server produces pseudonym
   usernames and fast re-authentication identities in an
   implementation-dependent manner. Only the EAP server needs to be able
   to map the pseudonym username to the permanent identity, or to
   recognize a fast re-authentication identity.

   EAP-SIM includes no provisions to ensure that the same EAP server
   that generated a pseudonym username will be used on the
   authentication exchange when the pseudonym username is used. It is
   recommended that the EAP servers implement some centralized mechanism
   to allow all EAP servers of the home operator to map pseudonyms
   generated by other severs to the permanent identity. If no such
   mechanism is available, then the EAP server failing to understand a
   pseudonym issued by another server can request the peer to send the
   permanent identity.

   When issuing a fast re-authentication identity, the EAP server may
   include a realm name in the identity to make the fast
   re-authentication request be forwarded to the same EAP server.

   When generating fast re-authentication identities, the server SHOULD
   choose a fresh new fast re-authentication identity that is different
   from the previous ones used within a same reauthentication context.
   The fast re-authentication identity SHOULD include a random
   component. The random component works as a full authentication
   context identifier. A context-specific fast re-authentication
   identity can help the server to detect whether its fast
   re-authentication state information matches the peer's fast
   re-authentication state information (in other words whether the state
   information is from the same full authentication exchange). The
   random component also makes the fast re-authentication identities
   unpredictable, so an attacker cannot initiate a fast
   re-authentication exchange to get the server's EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet.

   Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym username MUST
   conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an NAI.
   The fast re-authentication identity also MUST conform to the NAI
   grammar. The EAP servers that the subscribers of an operator can use
   MUST ensure that the pseudonym usernames and the username portions



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   used in fast re-authentication identities they generate are unique.

   In any case, it is necessary that permanent usernames, pseudonym
   usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are separate and
   recognizable from each other. It is also desirable that EAP-SIM and
   EAP-AKA [EAP-AKA] user names be recognizable from each other as an
   aid for the server to which method to offer.

   In general, it is the task of the EAP server and the policies of its
   administrator to ensure sufficient separation in the usernames.
   Pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames are both
   produced and used by the EAP server. The EAP server MUST compose
   pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication usernames so that it
   can recognize if a NAI username is an EAP-SIM pseudonym username or
   an EAP-SIM fast re-authentication username. For instance, when the
   usernames have been derived from the IMSI, the server could use
   different leading characters in the pseudonym usernames and fast
   re-authentication usernames (e.g. the pseudonym could begin with a
   leading "3" character). When mapping a fast re-authentication
   identity to a permanent identity, the server SHOULD only examine the
   username portion of the fast re-authentication identity and ignore
   the realm portion of the identity.

   Because the peer may fail to save a pseudonym username sent to in an
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, for example due to malfunction, the EAP
   server SHOULD maintain at least the most recently used pseudonym
   username in addition to the most recently issued pseudonym username.
   If the authentication exchange is not completed successfully, then
   the server SHOULD NOT overwrite the pseudonym username that was
   issued during the most recent successful authentication exchange.

4.2.1.8 Transmitting Pseudonyms and Fast Re-authentication Identities to
        the Peer

   The server transmits pseudonym usernames and fast re-authentication
   identities to the peer in cipher, using the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

   The EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message MAY include an encrypted
   pseudonym username and/or an encrypted fast re-authentication
   identity in the value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. Because
   identity privacy support and fast re-authentication are optional to
   implement, the peer MAY ignore the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute and always
   use the permanent identity. On fast re-authentication (discussed in
   Section 4.3), the server MAY include a new encrypted fast
   re-authentication identity in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication
   message.

   On receipt of the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, the peer MAY decrypt the



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   encrypted data in AT_ENCR_DATA. If the authentication exchange is
   successful, and the the encrypted data includes a pseudonym username,
   then the peer may use the obtained pseudonym username on the next
   full authentication. If a fast re-authentication identity is
   included, then the peer MAY save it together with other fast
   re-authentication state information, as discussed in Section 4.3, for
   the next re-authentication. If the authentication exchange does not
   complete successfully, the peer MUST ignore the received pseudonym
   username and the fast re-authentication identity.

   If the peer does not receive a new pseudonym username in the
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message, the peer MAY use an old pseudonym
   username instead of the permanent username on next full
   authentication. The username portions of fast re-authentication
   identities are one-time usernames, which the peer MUST NOT re-use.
   When the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity in an EAP
   exchange, the peer MUST discard the fast re-authentication identity
   and not re-use it in another EAP authentication exchange, even if the
   authentication exchange was not completed.

4.2.1.9 Usage of the Pseudonym by the Peer

   When the optional identity privacy support is used on full
   authentication, the peer MAY use a pseudonym username received as
   part of a previous full authentication sequence as the username
   portion of the NAI. The peer MUST NOT modify the pseudonym username
   received in AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM. However, as discussed above, the peer
   MAY need to decorate the username in some environments by appending
   or prepending the username with a string that indicates supplementary
   AAA routing information.

   When using a pseudonym username in an environment where a realm
   portion is used, the peer concatenates the received pseudonym
   username with the "@" character and a NAI realm portion. The
   selection of the NAI realm is discussed above. The peer can select
   the realm portion similarly regardless of whether it uses the
   permanent username or a pseudonym username.

4.2.1.10 Usage of the Fast Re-authentication Identity by the Peer

   On fast re-authentication, the peer uses the fast re-authentication
   identity, received as part of the previous authentication sequence. A
   new re-authentication identity may be delivered as part of both full
   authentication and fast re-authentication. The peer MUST NOT modify
   the username part of the fast re-authentication identity received in
   AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, except in cases when username decoration is
   required. Even in these cases, the "root" fast re-authentication
   username must not be modified, but it may be appended or prepended



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   with another string.

4.2.2 Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server

4.2.2.1 General

   The peer identity MAY be communicated to the server with the
   EAP-Response/Identity message. This message MAY contain the permanent
   identity, a pseudonym identity, or a fast re-authentication identity.
   If the peer uses the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity,
   which the server is able to map to the permanent identity, then the
   authentication proceeds as discussed in the overview of Section 3. If
   the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, and if the fast
   re-authentication identity matches with a valid fast
   re-authentication identity maintained by the server, and if the
   server agrees on using fast re-authentication, then a fast
   re-authentication exchange is performed, as described in Section 4.3.

   The peer identity can also be transmitted from the peer to the server
   using EAP-SIM messages instead of EAP-Response/Identity. In this
   case, the server includes an identity requesting attribute
   (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) in the
   EAP-Request/SIM/Start message, and the peer includes the AT_IDENTITY
   attribute, which contains the peer's identity, in the EAP-Response/
   SIM/Start message. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is a general identity
   requesting attribute, which the server uses if it does not specify
   which kind of an identity the peer should return in AT_IDENTITY. The
   server uses the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to request either the
   permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The server uses the
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to request the peer to send its
   permanent identity.

   The identity format in the AT_IDENTITY attribute is the same as in
   the EAP-Response/Identity packet (except that identity decoration is
   not allowed). The AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a permanent
   identity, a pseudonym identity or a fast re-authentication identity.

   Obtaining the subscriber identity via EAP-SIM messages is useful if
   the server does not have any EAP-SIM peer identity at the beginning
   of the EAP-SIM exchange or does not recognize the identity the peer
   used in EAP-Response/Identity.  This may happen if, for example, the
   EAP-Response/Identity has been issued by some EAP method other than
   EAP-SIM or if intermediate entities or software layers in the peer
   have modified the identity string in the EAP-Response/Identity
   packet. Also, some EAP layer implementations may cache the identity
   string from the first EAP authentication and do not obtain a new
   identity string from the EAP method implementation on subsequent
   authentication exchanges.



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   As the identity string is used in key derivation, any of these cases
   will result in failed authentication unless the EAP server uses
   EAP-SIM attributes to obtain an unmodified copy of the identity
   string.  Therefore, unless the EAP server can be certain that no
   intermediate element or software layer has modified the EAP-Response/
   Identity packet, the EAP server MUST use the EAP-SIM attributes to
   obtain the identity, even if the identity received in EAP-Response/
   Identity was valid.

   Please note that the EAP-SIM peer and the EAP-SIM server only process
   the AT_IDENTITY attribute and entities that only pass through EAP
   packets do not process this attribute. Hence, if the EAP server is
   not co-located in the authenticator, then the authenticator and other
   intermediate AAA elements (such as possible AAA proxy servers) will
   continue to refer to the peer with the original identity from the
   EAP-Response/Identity packet regardless of whether the AT_IDENTITY
   attribute is used in EAP-SIM to transmit another identity.

4.2.2.2 Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity

   If EAP-SIM peer is started upon receiving an EAP-Request/Identity
   message, then the peer performs the following steps.

   If the peer has maintained fast re-authentication state information
   and if the peer wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer
   transmits the fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/
   Identity.

   Else, if the peer has a pseudonym username available, then the peer
   transmits the pseudonym identity in EAP-Response/Identity.

   In other cases, the peer transmits the permanent identity in
   EAP-Response/Identity.

4.2.2.3 Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP-SIM Exchange

   If the EAP server has not received any EAP-SIM peer identity
   (permanent identity, pseudonym identity or fast re-authentication
   identity) from the peer when sending the first EAP-SIM request, or if
   the EAP server has received an EAP-Response/Identity packet but the
   contents do not appear to be a valid permanent identity, pseudonym
   identity or a re-authentication identity, then the server MUST
   request an identity from the peer using one of the methods below.

   The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message with the
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ message to indicate that the server wants the
   peer to include the permanent identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute
   of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This is done in the following



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   cases:

   o  The server does not support fast re-authentication or identity
      privacy.
   o  The server received an identity that it recognizes as a pseudonym
      identity but the server is not able to map the pseudonym identity
      to a permanent identity.

   The server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the
   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the
   peer to include a full authentication identity (pseudonym identity or
   permanent identity) in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/
   SIM/Start message.  This is done in the following cases:

   o  The server does not support fast re-authentication and the server
      supports identity privacy
   o  The server received an identity that it recognizes as a
      re-authentication identity but the server is not able to map the
      re-authentication identity to a permanent identity

   The server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the
   AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer to
   include an identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/
   SIM/Start message, and the server does not indicate any preferred
   type for the identity. This is done in other cases, such as when the
   server does not have any identity, or the server does not recognize
   the format of a received identity.

4.2.2.4 Processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Start by the Peer

   Upon receipt of an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message, the peer MUST
   perform the following steps.

   If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start does not include any identity request
   attribute, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start without
   AT_IDENTITY. The peer includes the AT_SELECTED_VERSION and
   AT_NONCE_MT attributes, because the exchange is a full authentication
   exchange.

   If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, and if the
   peer does not have a pseudonym available, then the peer MUST respond
   with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the permanent identity in
   AT_IDENTITY. If the peer has a pseudonym available then the peer MAY
   refuse to send the permanent identity; hence in this case the peer
   MUST either respond with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the
   permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY or respond with EAP-Response/SIM/
   Client-Error packet with code "unable to process packet".




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   If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT_FULL_AUTH_ID_REQ, and if the
   peer has a pseudonym available, then the peer SHOULD respond with
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start and include the pseudonym identity in
   AT_IDENTITY. If the peer does not have a pseudonym when it receives
   this message, then the peer MUST respond with EAP- Response/SIM/Start
   and include the permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY. The Peer MUST NOT
   use a re-authentication identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute.

   If the EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the peer
   has maintained fast re-authentication state information and the peer
   wants to use fast re-authentication, then the peer responds with
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start and includes the fast re-authentication
   identity in AT_IDENTITY. Else, if the peer has a pseudonym identity
   available, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and
   includes the pseudonym identity in AT_IDENTITY. Else, the peer
   responds with EAP-Response/SIM/Start and includes the permanent
   identity in AT_IDENTITY.

   An EAP-SIM exchange may include several EAP/SIM/Start rounds. The
   server may issue a second EAP-Request/SIM/Start, if it was not able
   to recognize the identity the peer used in the previous AT_IDENTITY
   attribute. At most three EAP/SIM/Start rounds can be used, so the
   peer MUST NOT respond to more than three EAP-Request/SIM/Start
   messages within an EAP exchange. The peer MUST verify that the
   sequence of EAP-Request/SIM/Start packets the peer receives comply
   with the sequencing rules defined in this document. That is,
   AT_ANY_ID_REQ can only be used in the first EAP-Request/SIM/Start, in
   other words AT_ANY_ID_REQ MUST NOT be used in the second or third
   EAP-Request/SIM/Start. AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ MUST NOT be used if the
   previous EAP-Request/SIM/Start included AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. The peer
   operation in cases when it receives an unexpected attribute or an
   unexpected message is specified in Section 4.5.1.

4.2.2.5 Attacks against Identity Privacy

   The section above specifies two possible ways the peer can operate
   upon receipt of AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. This is because a received
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ does not necessarily originate from the valid
   network, but an active attacker may transmit an EAP- Request/SIM/
   Start packet with an AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to the peer, in an
   effort to find out the true identity of the user. If the peer does
   not want to reveal its permanent identity, then the peer sends the
   EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "unable to
   process packet", and the authentication exchange terminates.

   Basically, there are two different policies that the peer can employ
   with regard to AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. A "conservative" peer assumes
   that the network is able to maintain pseudonyms robustly. Therefore,



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   if a conservative peer has a pseudonym username, the peer responds
   with EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error to the EAP packet with
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, because the peer believes that the valid network
   is able to map the pseudonym identity to the peer's permanent
   identity. (Alternatively, the conservative peer may accept
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ in certain circumstances, for example if the
   pseudonym was received a long time ago.) The benefit of this policy
   is that it protects the peer against active attacks on anonymity. On
   the other hand, a "liberal" peer always accepts the
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ and responds with the permanent identity. The
   benefit of this policy is that it works even if the valid network
   sometimes loses pseudonyms and is not able to map them to the
   permanent identity.

4.2.2.6 Processing of AT_IDENTITY by the Server

   When the server receives an EAP-Response/SIM/Start message with the
   AT_IDENTITY (in response to the server's identity requesting
   attribute), the server MUST operate as follows.

   If the server used AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY does
   not contain a valid permanent identity, then the server sends
   EAP-Request/SIM/Notification with AT_NOTIFICATION code 16384, and the
   EAP exchange terminates. If the server recognizes the permanent
   identity and is able to continue, then the server proceeds with full
   authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

   If the server used AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a
   valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
   map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full
   authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge. If AT_IDENTITY
   contains a pseudonym identity that the server is not able to map to a
   valid permanent identity, or an identity that the server is not able
   to recognize or classify, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start
   with AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY contains a
   valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
   map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with full
   authentication by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a valid
   fast re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using re-
   authentication, then the server proceeds with fast re-authentication
   by sending EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication (Section 4.3).

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the peer sent an
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start with only AT_IDENTITY (indicating re-



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   authentication), but the server is not able to map the identity to a
   permanent identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with
   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a valid
   fast re-authentication identity, which the server is able to map to a
   permanent identity, and if the server does not want to use fast
   re-authentication, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start
   without any identity requesting attributes.

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
   identity that the server recognizes as a pseudonym identity but the
   server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to a permanent
   identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.

   If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
   identity that the server is not able to recognize or classify, then
   the server sends EAP-Request/SIM/Start with AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.

4.2.3 Message Sequence Examples (Informative)

   This section contains non-normative message sequence examples to
   illustrate how the peer identity can be communicated to the server.

4.2.3.1 Full Authentication

   This case for full authentication is illustrated below in Figure 2.
   In this case, AT_IDENTITY contains either the permanent identity or a
   pseudonym identity. The same sequence is also used in case the server
   uses the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ in EAP-Request/SIM/Start.




















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        Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not have any     |
          |                            | Subscriber identity available|
          |                            | When starting EAP-SIM        |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |          EAP-Request/SIM/Start                        |
          |          (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)             |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY, AT_NONCE_MT,                            |
          |  AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                 |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

         Figure 2: Requesting any identity, full authentication

   If the peer uses its full authentication identity and the AT_IDENTITY
   attribute contains a valid permanent identity or a valid pseudonym
   identity that the EAP server is able to map to the permanent
   identity, then the full authentication sequence proceeds as usual
   with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

4.2.3.2 Fast Re-authentication

   The case when the server uses the AT_ANY_ID_REQ and the peer wants to
   perform fast re-authentication is illustrated below in Figure 3.




















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        Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not have any     |
          |                            | Subscriber identity available|
          |                            | When starting EAP-SIM        |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |        EAP-Request/SIM/Start                          |
          |        (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)               |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY containing a fast re-auth. identity)     |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

       Figure 3: Requesting any identity, fast re-authentication

   On fast re-authentication, if the AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a
   valid fast re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using
   fast re-authentication, then the server proceeds with the fast
   re-authentication sequence and issues the EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet, as specified in Section 4.3.

4.2.3.3 Fall Back to Full Authentication

   The case when the server does not recognize the fast
   re-authentication identity the peer used in AT_IDENTITY, and issues a
   second EAP- Request/SIM/Start message is illustrated in Figure 4.




















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        Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not have any     |
          |                            | Subscriber identity available|
          |                            | When starting EAP-SIM        |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |        EAP-Request/SIM/Start                          |
          |        (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)               |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY containing a fast re-auth. identity)     |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not recognize    |
          |                            | The fast re-auth.            |
          |                            | Identity                     |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |     EAP-Request/SIM/Start                             |
          |     (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)             |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY with a full-auth. identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
          |  AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                 |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

               Figure 4: Fall back to full authentication


4.2.3.4 Requesting the Permanent Identity 1

   Figure 5  illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to map the
   pseudonym identity included in the EAP-Response/Identity packet to a
   valid permanent identity.









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       Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                               EAP-Request/Identity    |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/Identity                                 |
          | (Includes a pseudonym)                                |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server fails to map the      |
          |                            | Pseudonym to a permanent id. |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |  EAP-Request/SIM/Start                                |
          |  (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)               |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, AT_NONCE_MT,    |
          |  AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                 |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

              Figure 5: Requesting the permanent identity

   If the server recognizes the permanent identity, then the
   authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing
   the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

4.2.3.5 Requesting the Permanent Identity 2

   Figure 6  illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to map the
   pseudonym included in the AT_IDENTITY attribute to a valid permanent
   identity.

















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       Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not have any     |
          |                            | Subscriber identity available|
          |                            | When starting EAP-SIM        |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |        EAP-Request/SIM/Start                          |
          |        (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)               |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          |EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                 |
          |(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity, AT_NONCE_MT,   |
          | AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                  |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                           +-------------------------------+
          |                           | Server fails to map the       |
          |                           | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY      |
          |                           | to a valid permanent identity |
          |                           +-------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |                EAP-Request/SIM/Start                  |
          |                (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity,                 |
          |  AT_NONCE_MT, AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                    |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

  Figure 6: Requesting a permanent identity (two EAP-SIM Start rounds)


4.2.3.6 Three EAP-SIM/Start Roundtrips

   In the worst case, there are three EAP/SIM/Start round trips before
   the server has obtained an acceptable identity. This case is
   illustrated in Figure 7.












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         Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not have any     |
          |                            | Subscriber identity available|
          |                            | When starting EAP-SIM        |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |        EAP-Request/SIM/Start                          |
          |        (Includes AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)      |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY with fast re-auth. identity)             |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |                            | Server does not accept       |
          |                            | The fast re-auth.            |
          |                            | Identity                     |
          |                            +------------------------------+
          |     EAP-Request/SIM/Start                             |
          |     (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)             |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          :                                                       :
          :                                                       :

























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          :                                                       :
          :                                                       :
          |EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                 |
          |(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity, AT_NONCE_MT,   |
          | AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                  |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |                           +-------------------------------+
          |                           | Server fails to map the       |
          |                           | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY      |
          |                           | to a valid permanent identity |
          |                           +-------------------------------+
          |           EAP-Request/SIM/Start                       |
          |           (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST)      |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Start                                |
          | (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, AT_NONCE_MT,    |
          |  AT_SELECTED_VERSION)                                 |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |

                  Figure 7: Three EAP-SIM Start rounds

   After the last EAP-Response/SIM/Start message, the full
   authentication sequence proceeds as usual. If the EAP Server
   recognizes the permanent identity and is able to proceed, the server
   issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message.

4.3 Fast Re-Authentication

4.3.1 General

   In some environments, EAP authentication may be performed frequently.
   Because the EAP-SIM full authentication procedure makes use of the
   GSM SIM A3/A8 algorithms, and it therefore requires 2 or 3 fresh
   triplets from the Authentication Centre, the full authentication
   procedure is not very well suitable for frequent use. Therefore,
   EAP-SIM includes a more inexpensive fast re-authentication procedure
   that does not make use of the SIM A3/A8 algorithms and does not need
   new triplets from the Authentication Centre. Re-authentication can be
   performed in fewer roundtrips than the full authentication.

   Fast re-authentication is optional to implement for both the EAP-SIM
   server and peer. On each EAP authentication, either one of the
   entities may also fall back on full authentication if they do not
   want to use fast re-authentication.




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   Fast re-authentication is based on the keys derived on the preceding
   full authentication. The same K_aut and K_encr keys as in full
   authentication are used to protect EAP-SIM packets and attributes,
   and the original Master Key from full authentication is used to
   generate a fresh Master Session Key, as specified in Section 4.6.

   The fast re-authentication exchange makes use of an unsigned 16-bit
   counter, included in the AT_COUNTER attribute. The counter has three
   goals: 1) it can be used to limit the number of successive
   reauthentication exchanges without full authentication  2) it
   contributes to the keying material, and 3) it protects the peer and
   the server from replays. On full authentication, both the server and
   the peer initialize the counter to one. The counter value of at least
   one is used on the first fast re-authentication. On subsequent fast
   re-authentications, the counter MUST be greater than on any of the
   previous re-authentications. For example, on the second fast
   re-authentication, counter value is two or greater etc. The
   AT_COUNTER attribute is encrypted.

   Both the peer and the EAP server maintain a copy of the counter. The
   EAP server sends its counter value to the peer in the fast
   re-authentication request. The peer MUST verify that its counter
   value is less than or equal to the value sent by the EAP server.

   The server includes an encrypted server random nonce (AT_NONCE_S) in
   the fast re-authentication request. The AT_MAC attribute in the
   peer's response is calculated over NONCE_S to provide a challenge/
   response authentication scheme. The NONCE_S also contributes to the
   new Master Session Key.

   Both the peer and the server SHOULD have an upper limit for the
   number of subsequent fast re-authentications allowed before a full
   authentication needs to be performed. Because a 16-bit counter is
   used in fast re-authentication, the theoretical maximum number of
   re-authentications is reached when the counter value reaches FFFF
   hexadecimal.

   In order to use fast re-authentication, the peer and the EAP server
   need to store the following values: Master Key, latest counter value
   and the next fast re-authentication identity. K_aut, K_encr may
   either be stored or derived again from MK. The server may also need
   to store the permanent identity of the user.

4.3.2 Comparison to UMTS AKA

   When analyzing the fast re-authentication exchange, it may be helpful
   to compare it with the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
   exchange, which it resembles closely. The counter corresponds to the



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   UMTS AKA sequence number, NONCE_S corresponds to RAND, and AT_MAC in
   EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication corresponds to AUTN, the AT_MAC in
   EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication corresponds to RES,
   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL corresponds to AUTS, and encrypting the counter
   corresponds to the usage of the Anonymity Key. Also the key
   generation on fast re-authentication with regard to random or fresh
   material is similar to UMTS AKA -- the server generates the NONCE_S
   and counter values, and the peer only verifies that the counter value
   is fresh.

   It should also be noted that encrypting the AT_NONCE_S, AT_COUNTER or
   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attributes is not important to the security of
   the fast re-authentication exchange.

4.3.3 Fast Re-authentication Identity

   The fast re-authentication procedure makes use of separate
   re-authentication user identities. Pseudonyms and the permanent
   identity are reserved for full authentication only. If a
   re-authentication identity is lost and the network does not recognize
   it, the EAP server can fall back on full authentication.

   If the EAP server supports fast re-authentication, it MAY include the
   skippable AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute in the encrypted data of
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message (Section 6.3). This attribute
   contains a new fast re-authentication identity for the next fast
   re-authentication. The attribute also works as a capability flag that
   indicates the fact that the server supports fast re-authentication,
   and that the server wants to continue using fast re-authentication
   within the current context. The peer MAY ignore this attribute, in
   which case it MUST use full authentication next time. If the peer
   wants to use re- authentication, it uses this fast re-authentication
   identity on next authentication. Even if the peer has a fast
   re-authentication identity, the peer MAY discard the fast
   re-authentication identity and use a pseudonym or the permanent
   identity instead, in which case full authentication MUST be
   performed. If the EAP server does not include the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
   in the encrypted data of EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Request/
   SIM/Re-authentication, then the peer MUST discard its current fast
   re-authentication state information and perform a full authentication
   next time.

   In environments where a realm portion is needed in the peer identity,
   the fast re-authentication identity received in AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
   MUST contain both a username portion and a realm portion, as per the
   NAI format. The EAP Server can choose an appropriate realm part in
   order to have the AAA infrastructure route subsequent fast
   re-authentication related requests to the same AAA server. For



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   example, the realm part MAY include a portion that is specific to the
   AAA server. Hence, it is sufficient to store the context required for
   fast re-authentication in the AAA server that performed the full
   authentication.

   The peer MAY use the fast re-authentication identity in the
   EAP-Response/Identity packet or, in response to server's
   AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute, the peer MAY use the fast re-authentication
   identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start
   packet. The peer MUST NOT modify the username portion of the fast
   re-authentication identity, but the peer MAY modify the realm portion
   or replace it with another realm portion.

   Even if the peer uses a fast re-authentication identity, the server
   may want to fall back on full authentication, for example because the
   server does not recognize the fast re-authentication identity or does
   not want to use fast re-authentication. In this case, the server
   starts the full authentication procedure by issuing an EAP-Request/
   SIM/Start packet. This packet always starts a full authentication
   sequence if it does not include the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute. If the
   server was not able to recover the peer's identity from the fast
   re-authentication identity, the server includes either the
   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute in this EAP
   request.

4.3.4 Fast Re-authentication Procedure

   Figure 8  illustrates the fast re-authentication procedure. In this
   example, the optional protected success indication is not used.
   Encrypted attributes are denoted with '*'. The peer uses its
   re-authentication identity in the EAP-Response/Identity packet. As
   discussed above, an alternative way to communicate the re-
   authentication identity to the server is for the peer to use the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This
   latter case is not illustrated in the figure below, and it is only
   possible when the server requests the peer to send its identity by
   including the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start
   packet.

   If the server recognizes the identity as a valid fast
   re-authentication identity, and if the server agrees on using fast
   re-authentication, then the server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet to the peer. This packet MUST include the
   encrypted AT_COUNTER attribute, with a fresh counter value, the
   encrypted AT_NONCE_S attribute that contains a random number chosen
   by the server, the AT_ENCR_DATA and the AT_IV attributes used for
   encryption, and the AT_MAC attribute that contains a message
   authentication code over the packet. The packet MAY also include an



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   encrypted AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute that contains the next fast
   re-authentication identity.

   Fast re-authentication identities are one-time identities. If the
   peer does not receive a new fast re-authentication identity, it MUST
   use either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity on the next
   authentication to initiate full authentication.

   The peer verifies that AT_MAC is correct, and that the counter value
   is fresh (greater than any previously used value). The peer MAY save
   the next fast re-authentication identity from the encrypted
   AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID for next time. If all checks are successful, the
   peer responds with the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet,
   including the AT_COUNTER attribute with the same counter value and
   the AT_MAC attribute.

   The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute and also verifies that the
   counter value is the same that it used in the EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet. If these checks are successful, the
   re-authentication has succeeded and the server sends the EAP-Success
   packet to the peer.

   If protected success indications (Section 4.4.2) were used, the
   EAP-Success packet would be preceded by an EAP-SIM notification
   round.

       Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                                                       |
          |                               EAP-Request/Identity    |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/Identity                                 |
          | (Includes a fast re-authentication identity)          |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |                          +--------------------------------+
          |                          | Server recognizes the identity |
          |                          | and agrees on using fast       |
          |                          | re-authentication              |
          |                          +--------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          :                                                       :
          :                                                       :








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          :                                                       :
          :                                                       :
          |  EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication                    |
          |  (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER,                   |
          |   *AT_NONCE_S, *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, AT_MAC)            |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
     +-----------------------------------------------+            |
     | Peer verifies AT_MAC and the freshness of     |            |
     | the counter. Peer MAY store the new fast re-  |            |
     | authentication identity for next re-auth.     |            |
     +-----------------------------------------------+            |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication                    |
          | (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER with same value,    |
          |  AT_MAC)                                              |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                          +--------------------------------+
          |                          | Server verifies AT_MAC and     |
          |                          | the counter                    |
          |                          +--------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |                                          EAP-Success  |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |

                    Figure 8: Fast Re-authentication


4.3.5 Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too Small

   If the peer does not accept the counter value of EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication, it indicates the counter synchronization problem
   by including the encrypted AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL in EAP-Response/SIM/
   Re-authentication. The server responds with EAP-Request/SIM/Start to
   initiate a normal full authentication procedure. This is illustrated
   in Figure 9. Encrypted attributes are denoted with '*'.














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       Peer                                             Authenticator
          |                               EAP-Request/Identity    |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/Identity                                 |
          | (Includes a fast re-authentication identity)          |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |                                                       |
          |  EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication                    |
          |  (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER,                   |
          |   *AT_NONCE_S, *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, AT_MAC)            |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
     +-----------------------------------------------+            |
     | AT_MAC is valid but the counter is not fresh. |            |
     +-----------------------------------------------+            |
          |                                                       |
          | EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication                    |
          | (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL,          |
          |  *AT_COUNTER, AT_MAC)                                 |
          |------------------------------------------------------>|
          |            +----------------------------------------------+
          |            | Server verifies AT_MAC but detects           |
          |            | That peer has included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL  |
          |            +----------------------------------------------+
          |                                                       |
          |                        EAP-Request/SIM/Start          |
          |                        (AT_VERSION_LIST)              |
          |<------------------------------------------------------|
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+
     |                Normal full authentication follows.            |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                       |

         Figure 9: Fast Re-authentication, counter is not fresh

   In the figure above, the first three messages are similar to the
   basic fast re-authentication case. When the peer detects that the
   counter value is not fresh, it includes the AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL
   attribute in EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication. This attribute
   doesn't contain any data but it is a request for the server to
   initiate full authentication. In this case, the peer MUST ignore the
   contents of the server's AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute.

   On receipt of AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, the server verifies AT_MAC and
   verifies that AT_COUNTER contains the same counter value as in the
   EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet. If not, the server
   terminates the authentication exchange by sending the EAP-Request/
   SIM/Notification with AT_NOTIFICATION code 16384. If all checks on



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   the packet are successful, the server transmits a new EAP-Request/
   SIM/Start packet and the full authentication procedure is performed
   as usual. Since the server already knows the subscriber identity, it
   MUST NOT include AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or
   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start.

4.4 EAP-SIM Notifications

4.4.1 General

   The EAP server can use EAP-SIM notifications to convey localizable
   notifications and result indications (Section 4.4.2) to the peer.

   The server MUST use notifications in cases discussed in Section
   4.5.2. When the EAP server issues an EAP-Request/SIM/Notification
   packet to the peer, the peer MUST process the notification packet.
   The peer MAY show a notification message to the user and the peer
   MUST respond to the EAP server with an EAP-Response/SIM/Notification
   packet, even if the peer did not recognize the notification code.

   An EAP-SIM full authentication exchange or a fast re-authentication
   exchange MUST NOT include more than one EAP-SIM notification round.

   The notification code is a 16-bit number. The most significant bit is
   called the Failure bit (F bit). The F bit specifies whether the
   notification implies failure. The code values with the F bit set to
   zero (code values 0...32767) are used on unsuccessful cases. The
   receipt of a notification code from this range implies failed EAP
   exchange, so the peer can use the notification as a failure
   indication. After receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Notification for
   these notification codes, the server MUST send the EAP-Failure
   packet.

   The receipt of a notification code with the F bit set to one (values
   32768...65536) does not imply failure. Notification code 32768 has
   been reserved as a general notification code to indicate successful
   authentication.

   The second most significant bit of the notification code is called
   the Phase bit (P bit). It specifies at which phase of the EAP-SIM
   exchange the notification can be used. If the P bit is set to zero,
   the notification can only be used after a successful EAP/SIM/
   Challenge round in full authentication or a successful EAP/SIM/
   Re-authentication round in reautentication. A re-authentication round
   is considered successful only if the peer has successfully verified
   AT_MAC and AT_COUNTER attributes, and does not include the
   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute in EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication.




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   If the P bit is set to one, the notification can only by used before
   the EAP/SIM/Challenge round in full authentication, or before the
   EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round in reauthentication.

   Section 6.8  and Section 6.9 specify what other attributes must be
   included in the notification packets.

   Some of the notification codes are authorization related and hence
   not usually considered as part of the responsibility of an EAP
   method. However, they are included as part of EAP-SIM because there
   are currently no other ways to convey this information to the user in
   a localizable way, and the information is potentially useful for the
   user. An EAP-SIM server implementation may decide never to send these
   EAP-SIM notifications.

4.4.2 Result Indications

   As discussed in Section 4.5, the server and the peer use explicit
   error messages in all error cases. If the server detects an error
   after successful authentication, the server uses an EAP-SIM
   notification to indicate failure to the peer. In this case, the
   result indication is integrity and replay protected.

   By sending an EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet or an EAP-Response/
   SIM/Re-authentication packet (without AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL), the peer
   indicates that it has successfully authenticated the server and that
   the peer's local policy accepts the EAP exchange. In other words,
   these packets are implicit success indications from the peer to the
   server.

   EAP-SIM also supports optional protected success indications from the
   server to the peer. If the EAP server wants to use protected success
   indications, it includes the AT_RESULT_IND attribute in the
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication
   packet. This attribute indicates that the EAP server would like to
   use result indications in both successful and unsuccessful cases. If
   the peer also wants this, the peer includes AT_RESULT_IND in
   EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication. The
   peer MUST NOT include AT_RESULT_IND if it did not receive
   AT_RESULT_IND from the server. If both the peer and the server used
   AT_RESULT_IND, then the EAP exchange is not complete yet, but an
   EAP-SIM notification round will follow. The following EAP-SIM
   notification may indicate either failure or success.

   Success indications with the AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768 can only be
   used if both the server and the peer indicate they want to use them
   with AT_RESULT_IND. If the server did not include AT_RESULT_IND in
   the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge or EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication



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   packet, or if the peer did not include AT_RESULT_IND in the
   corresponding response packet, then the server MUST NOT use protected
   success indications.

   Because the AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768 is used to indicate success,
   the server MUST ignore the contents of the EAP-SIM response it
   receives to the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification with this code.
   Regardless of the contents of the EAP-SIM response, the server MUST
   send EAP-Success as the next packet.

4.5 Error Cases

   This section specifies the operation of the peer and the server in
   error cases. The subsections below require the EAP-SIM peer and
   server to send an error packet (EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error or
   EAP-Request/SIM/Notification) in error cases. However,
   implementations SHOULD NOT rely upon the correct error reporting
   behavior of the peer, authenticator, or the server.  It is possible
   for error and other messages to be lost in transit or for a malicious
   participant to attempt to consume resources by not issuing error
   messages.  Both the peer and the EAP server SHOULD have a mechanism
   to clean up state even if an error message or EAP-Success is not
   received after a timeout period.

4.5.1 Peer Operation

   In general, if an EAP-SIM peer detects an error in a received EAP-SIM
   packet, the EAP-SIM implementation responds with the EAP-Response/
   SIM/Client-Error packet. In response to the EAP-Response/SIM/
   Client-Error, the EAP server MUST issue the EAP-Failure packet and
   the authentication exchange terminates.

   By default, the peer uses the client error code 0, "unable to process
   packet". This error code is used in the following cases:

   o  EAP exchange is not acceptable according to the peer's local
      policy.
   o  the peer is not able to parse the EAP request, i.e. the EAP
      request is malformed
   o  the peer encountered a malformed attribute
   o  wrong attribute types or duplicate attributes have been included
      in the EAP request
   o  a mandatory attribute is missing
   o  unrecognized non-skippable attribute
   o  unrecognized or unexpected EAP-SIM Subtype in the EAP request
   o  A RAND challenge repeated in AT_RAND
   o  invalid AT_MAC




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   o  invalid pad bytes in AT_PADDING
   o  the peer does not want to process AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ

   Separate error codes have been defined for the following error cases
   in Section 7.19:

   As specified in Section 4.1, when processing the AT_VERSION_LIST
   attribute, which lists the EAP-SIM versions supported by the server,
   if the attribute does not include a version that is implemented by
   the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy, then the peer
   MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error
   code "unsupported version".

   When processing the AT_RAND attribute, the peer MUST send the EAP-
   Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "insufficient
   number of challenges", if the number of RAND challenges is smaller
   than what is required by peer's local policy.

   If the peer believes that the RAND challenges included in AT_RAND are
   not fresh e.g. because it is capable of remembering some previously
   used RANDs, the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error
   packet with the error code "RANDs are not fresh".

4.5.2 Server Operation

   If an EAP-SIM server detects an error in a received EAP-SIM response,
   the server MUST issue the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an
   AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure. By default, the server
   uses one of the general failure codes (0 or 16384). The choice
   between these two codes depends on the phase of the EAP-SIM exchange,
   see Section 4.4. The error cases when the server issues an
   EAP-Request/SIM/Notification that implies failure include the
   following:

   o  the server is not able to parse the peer's EAP response
   o  the server encounters a malformed attribute, a non-recognized
      non-skippable attribute, or a duplicate attribute
   o  a mandatory attribute is missing or an invalid attribute was
      included
   o  unrecognized or unexpected EAP-SIM Subtype in the EAP Response
   o  invalid AT_MAC
   o  invalid AT_COUNTER

4.5.3 EAP-Failure

   The EAP-SIM server sends EAP-Failure in two cases:

   1) In response to an EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet the server



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   has received from the peer, or

   2) Following an EAP-SIM notification round, when the AT_NOTIFICATION
   code implies failure.

   The EAP-SIM server MUST NOT send EAP-Failure in other cases than
   these two. However, it should be noted that even though the EAP-SIM
   server would not send an EAP-Failure, an authorization decision that
   happens outside EAP-SIM, such as in the AAA server or in an
   intermediate AAA proxy, may result in a failed exchange.

   The peer MUST accept the EAP-Failure packet in case 1) and case 2)
   above. The peer SHOULD silently discard the EAP-Failure packet in
   other cases.

4.5.4 EAP-Success

   On full authentication, the server can only send EAP-Success after
   the EAP/SIM/Challenge round. The peer MUST silently discard any
   EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
   successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/SIM/
   Challenge packet.

   If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success
   indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.4.2) on
   full authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a
   successful EAP/SIM/Challenge round.

   If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success
   indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.4.2), then
   the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/
   Challenge round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept EAP-Success
   after receiving an EAP-SIM Notification with the AT_NOTIFICATION code
   32768.

   On fast re-authentication, EAP-Success can only be sent after the
   EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round. The peer MUST silently discard any
   EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
   successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-Response/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet.

   If the peer did not indicate that it wants to use protected success
   indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.4.2) on
   fast re-authentication, then the peer MUST accept EAP-Success after a
   successful EAP/SIM/Re-authentication round.

   If the peer indicated that it wants to use protected success
   indications with AT_RESULT_IND (as discussed in Section 4.4.2), then



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   the peer MUST NOT accept EAP-Success after a successful EAP/SIM/
   Re-authentication round. In this case, the peer MUST only accept
   EAP-Success after receiving an EAP-SIM Notification with the
   AT_NOTIFICATION code 32768.

   If the peer receives an EAP-SIM notification (Section 4.4) that
   indicates failure, then the peer MUST no longer accept the
   EAP-Success packet even if the server authentication was successfully
   completed.

4.6 Key Generation

   This section specifies how keying material is generated.

   On EAP-SIM full authentication, a Master Key (MK) is derived from the
   underlying GSM authentication values (Kc keys), the NONCE_MT and
   other relevant context as follows.

   MK = SHA1(Identity|n*Kc| NONCE_MT| Version List| Selected Version)

   In the formula above, the "|" character denotes concatenation.
   Identity denotes the peer identity string without any terminating
   null characters. It is the identity from the AT_IDENTITY attribute
   from the last EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, or, if AT_IDENTITY was
   not used, the identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The
   identity string is included as-is, without any changes and including
   the possible identity decoration. The notation n*Kc denotes the n Kc
   values concatenated. The Kc keys are used in the same order as the
   RAND challenges in AT_RAND attribute. NONCE_MT denotes the NONCE_MT
   value (not the AT_NONCE_MT attribute but just the nonce value). The
   Version List includes the 2-byte supported version numbers from
   AT_VERSION_LIST, in the same order as in the attribute. The Selected
   Version is the 2-byte selected version from AT_SELECTED_VERSION.
   Network byte order is used, just as in the attributes. The hash
   function SHA-1 is specified in [SHA-1]. If several EAP/SIM/Start
   roundtrips are used in an EAP-SIM exchange, then the NONCE_MT,
   Version List and Selected version from the last EAP/SIM/Start round
   are used, and the previous EAP/SIM/Start rounds are ignored.

   The Master Key is fed into a Pseudo-Random number Function (PRF)
   which generates separate Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) for protecting
   EAP-SIM packets, as well as a Master Session Key (MSK) for link layer
   security and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) for other
   purposes. On fast re-authentication, the same TEKs MUST be used for
   protecting EAP packets, but a new MSK and a new EMSK MUST be derived
   from the original MK and new values exchanged in the fast
   re-authentication.




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   EAP-SIM requires two TEKs for its own purposes, the authentication
   key K_aut to be used with the AT_MAC attribute, and the encryption
   key K_encr, to be used with the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. The same
   K_aut and K_encr keys are used in full authentication and subsequent
   fast re-authentications.

   Key derivation is based on the random number generation specified in
   NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
   186-2 [PRF]. The pseudo-random number generator is specified in the
   change notice 1 (2001 October 5) of [PRF] (Algorithm 1). As specified
   in the change notice (page 74), when Algorithm 1 is used as a
   general-purpose pseudo-random number generator, the "mod q" term in
   step 3.3 is omitted. The function G used in the algorithm is
   constructed via Secure Hash Standard as specified in Appendix 3.3 of
   the standard. It should be noted that the function G is very similar
   to SHA-1, but the message padding is different. Please refer to [PRF]
   for full details. For convenience, the random number algorithm with
   the correct modification is cited in Appendix B.

   160-bit XKEY and XVAL values are used, so b = 160. On each full
   authentication, the Master Key is used as the initial secret seed-key
   XKEY. The optional user input values (XSEED_j) in step 3.1 are set to
   zero.

   On full authentication, the resulting 320-bit random numbers x_0,
   x_1, ..., x_m-1 are concatenated and partitioned into suitable-sized
   chunks and used as keys in the following order: K_encr (128 bits),
   K_aut (128 bits), Master Session Key (64 bytes), Extended Master
   Session Key (64 bytes).

   On fast re-authentication, the same pseudo-random number generator
   can be used to generate a new Master Session Key and a new Extended
   Master Session Key. The seed value XKEY' is calculated as follows:

   XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|counter|NONCE_S| MK)

   In the formula above, the Identity denotes the fast re-authentication
   identity, without any terminating null characters, from the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, or, if
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start was not used on fast re-authentication, the
   identity string from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The counter
   denotes the counter value from AT_COUNTER attribute used in the
   EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet. The counter is used in
   network byte order. NONCE_S denotes the 16-byte NONCE_S value from
   the AT_NONCE_S attribute used in the EAP-Request/SIM/
   Re-authentication packet. The MK is the Master Key derived on the
   preceding full authentication.




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   On fast re-authentication, the pseudo-random number generator is run
   with the new seed value XKEY', and the resulting 320-bit random
   numbers x_0, x_1, ..., x_m-1 are concatenated and partitioned into
   two 64-byte chunks and used as the new 64-byte Master Session Key and
   the new 64-byte Extended Master Session Key. Note that because K_encr
   and K_aut are not derived on fast re-authentication, the Master
   Session Key and the Extended Master Session key are obtained from the
   beginning of the key stream x_0, x_1, ....

   The first 32 bytes of the MSK can be used as the Pairwise Master Key
   (PMK) for IEEE 802.11i.

   When the RADIUS attributes specified in [RFC2548]  are used to
   transport keying material, then the first 32 bytes of the MSK
   correspond to MS-MPPE-RECV-KEY and the second 32 bytes to
   MS-MPPE-SEND-KEY. In this case, only 64 bytes of keying material (the
   MSK) are used.

   When generating the initial Master Key, the hash function is used as
   a mixing function to combine several session keys (Kc's) generated by
   the GSM authentication procedure and the random number NONCE_MT into
   a single session key. There are several reasons for this. The current
   GSM session keys are at most 64 bits, so two or more of them are
   needed to generate a longer key. By using a one-way function to
   combine the keys, we are assured that even if an attacker managed to
   learn one of the EAP-SIM session keys, it wouldn't help him in
   learning the original GSM Kc's. In addition, since we include the
   random number NONCE_MT in the calculation, the peer is able to verify
   that the EAP-SIM packets it receives from the network are fresh and
   not a replay. (Please see also Section 9.)

5. Message Format and Protocol Extensibility

5.1 Message Format

   As specified in [EAP], EAP packets begin with the Code, Identifiers,
   Length, and Type fields, which are followed by EAP method specific
   Type-Data. The Code field in the EAP header is set to 1 for EAP
   requests, and to 2 for EAP Responses. The usage of the Length and
   Identifier fields in the EAP header are also specified in [EAP]. In
   EAP-SIM, the Type field is set to 18.

   In EAP-SIM, the Type-Data begins with an EAP-SIM header that consists
   of a 1-octet Subtype field and a 2-octet reserved field. The Subtype
   values used in EAP-SIM are defined in Section 8. The formats of the
   EAP header and the EAP-SIM header are shown below.





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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     Type      |    Subtype    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The rest of the Type-Data, immediately following the EAP-SIM header,
   consists of attributes that are encoded in Type, Length, Value
   format. The figure below shows the generic format of an attribute.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |      Type     |    Length     |  Value...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Attribute Type

         Indicates the particular type of attribute. The attribute type
         values are listed in
   Section 8
   .

   Length

         Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of four
         bytes. The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The
         length includes the Attribute Type and Length bytes.

   Value

         The particular data associated with this attribute. This field is
         always included and it may be two or more bytes in length. The
         type and length fields determine the format and length of the
         value field.

   Attributes numbered within the range 0 through 127 are called
   non-skippable attributes. When an EAP-SIM peer encounters a
   non-skippable attribute that the peer does not recognize, the peer
   MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet which terminates
   the authentication exchange. If an EAP-SIM server encounters a
   non-skippable attribute that the server does not recognize, then the
   server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification packet with an
   AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies general failure (0 or 16384
   depending on the phase of the exchange), which terminates the
   authentication exchange.



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   Attributes within the range of 128 through 255 are called skippable
   attributes. When a skippable attribute is encountered that is not
   recognized it is ignored. The rest of the attributes and message data
   MUST still be processed. The Length field of the attribute is used to
   skip the attribute value in searching for the next attribute.

   Unless otherwise specified, the order of the attributes in an EAP-SIM
   message is insignificant and an EAP-SIM implementation should not
   assume a certain order to be used.

   Attributes can be encapsulated within other attributes. In other
   words, the value field of an attribute type can be specified to
   contain other attributes.

5.2 Protocol Extensibility

   EAP-SIM can be extended by specifying new attribute types. If
   skippable attributes are used, it is possible to extend the protocol
   without breaking old implementations.

   However, any new attributes added to the EAP-Request/SIM/Start or
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start packets would not be integrity protected.
   Therefore, these messages MUST NOT be extended in the current version
   of EAP-SIM. If the list of supported EAP-SIM versions in
   AT_VERSION_LIST does not include other versions than 1, then the
   server MUST NOT include other attributes besides those specified in
   this document in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message. Note that future
   versions of this protocol might specify new attributes for
   EAP-Request/SIM/Start and still support version 1 of the protocol. In
   this case, the server might send an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message
   that includes new attributes, and indicate support for protocol
   version 1 and some other version in the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute. If
   the peer selects version 1, then the peer MUST ignore any other
   attributes included in EAP-Request/SIM/Start besides those specified
   in this document. If the selected EAP-SIM version in peer's
   AT_SELECTED_VERSION is 1, then the peer MUST NOT include other
   attributes besides those specified in this document in the
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start message.

   When specifying new attributes, it should be noted that EAP-SIM does
   not support message fragmentation. Hence, the sizes of the new
   extensions MUST be limited so that the maximum transfer unit (MTU) of
   the underlying lower layer is not exceeded. According to [EAP], lower
   layers must provide an EAP MTU of 1020 bytes or greater, so any
   extensions to EAP-SIM SHOULD NOT exceed the EAP MTU of 1020 bytes.

   Because EAP-SIM supports version negotiation, new versions of the
   protocol can also be specified by using a new version number.



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6. Messages

   This section specifies the messages used in EAP-SIM. It specifies
   when a message may be transmitted or accepted, which attributes are
   allowed in a message, which attributes are required in a message, and
   other message specific details. The general message format is
   specified in Section 5.1.

6.1 EAP-Request/SIM/Start

   In full authentication the first SIM specific EAP Request is EAP-
   Request/SIM/Start. The EAP/SIM/Start roundtrip is used for two
   purposes. In full authentication this packet is used to request the
   peer to send the AT_NONCE_MT attribute to the server. In addition, as
   specified in Section 4.2, the Start round trip may be used by the
   server for obtaining the peer identity. As discussed in Section 4.2,
   several Start rounds may be required in order to obtain a valid peer
   identity.

   The server MUST always include the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute.

   The server MAY include one of the following identity requesting
   attributes: AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, and
   AT_ANY_ID_REQ. These three attributes are mutually exclusive, so the
   server MUST NOT include more than one of the attributes.

   If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
   issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet if it has either previously
   issued an EAP-Request/SIM/Start message without any identity
   requesting attributes or with the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute.

   If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
   issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ or
   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attributes if it has previously issued an
   EAP-Request/SIM/Start message with the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute

   If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
   issue a new EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ
   attribute if the server has previously issued an EAP-Request/SIM/
   Start message with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute.

   This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.

6.2 EAP-Response/SIM/Start

   The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Start in response to a valid
   EAP-Request/SIM/Start from the server.




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   If and only if the server's EAP-Request/SIM/Start includes one of the
   identity requesting attributes, then the peer MUST include the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute. The usage of AT_IDENITY is defined in Section
   4.2.

   The AT_NONCE_MT attribute MUST NOT be included if the AT_IDENTITY
   with a fast re-authentication identity is present for fast
   re-authentication. AT_NONCE_MT MUST be included in all other cases
   (full authentication).

   The AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute MUST NOT be included if the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute with a fast re-authentication identity is
   present for fast re-authentication. In all other cases,
   AT_SELECTED_VERSION MUST be included (full authentication). This
   attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in Section
   4.1.

   This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.

6.3 EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge

   The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge after receiving a
   valid EAP-Response/SIM/Start, containing AT_NONCE_MT and
   AT_SELECTED_VERSION, and after successfully obtaining the subscriber
   identity.

   The AT_RAND attribute MUST be included.

   The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this
   attribute is discussed in Section 4.4.2.

   The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge,
   the MAC code is calculated over the following data:

   EAP packet| NONCE_MT

   The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. It is
   followed by the 16-byte NONCE_MT value from the peer's AT_NONCE_MT
   attribute.

   The EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet MAY include encrypted attributes
   for identity privacy and for communicating the next fast
   re-authentication identity. In this case, the AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA
   attributes are included (Section 7.12).

   The plaintext of the AT_ENCR_DATA value field consists of nested
   attributes. The nested attributes MAY include AT_PADDING (as
   specified in Section 7.12). If the server supports identity privacy



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   and wants to communicate a pseudonym to the peer for the next full
   authentication, then the nested encrypted attributes include the
   AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM attribute. If the server supports re-
   authentication and wants to communicate a fast re-authentication
   identity to the peer, then the nested encrypted attributes include
   the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute.

   When processing this message, the peer MUST process AT_RAND before
   processing other attributes. Only if AT_RAND is verified to be valid,
   the peer derives keys and verifies AT_MAC. The operation in case an
   error occurs is specified in Section 4.5.1.

6.4 EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge

   The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge in response to a valid
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.

   Sending this packet indicates, that the peer has successfully
   authenticated the server and that the EAP exchange will be accepted
   by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these conditions are not met,
   then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, but the peer
   MUST send EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error.

   The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP- Response/SIM/
   Challenge, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:

   EAP packet| n*SRES

   The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. The EAP
   packet bytes are immediately followed by the two or three SRES values
   concatenated, denoted above with the notation n*SRES. The SRES values
   are used in the same order as the corresponding RAND challenges in
   server's AT_RAND attribute.

   The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in
   EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge. The usage of this attribute is discussed
   in Section 4.4.2.

   Later versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT_ENCR_DATA and
   AT_IV attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable)
   attributes. The EAP server MUST process EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge
   messages that include these attributes even if the server did not
   implement these optional attributes.

6.5 EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication

   The server sends the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication message if it
   wants to use fast re-authentication, and if it has received a valid



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   fast re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity or
   EAP-Response/SIM/Start.

   AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
   MAC calculation. See Section 7.14.

   The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included. The usage of this
   attribute is discussed in Section 4.4.2.

   The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST be included. The plaintext
   consists of the following nested encrypted attributes, which MUST be
   included: AT_COUNTER and AT_NONCE_S. In addition, the nested
   encrypted attributes MAY include the following attributes:
   AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID and AT_PADDING.

6.6 EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication

   The client sends the EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication packet in
   response to a valid EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication.

   The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Response/SIM/
   Re-authentication, the MAC code is calculated over the following
   data:

   EAP packet| NONCE_S

   The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. It is
   followed by the 16-byte NONCE_S value from the server's AT_NONCE_S
   attribute.

   The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST be included. The nested
   encrypted attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER attribute. The
   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute MAY be included in the nested
   encrypted attributes, and it is included in cases specified in
   Section 4.3. The AT_PADDING attribute MAY be included.

   The AT_RESULT_IND attribute MAY be included, if it was included in
   EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication. The usage of this attribute is
   discussed in Section 4.4.2.

   Sending this packet without AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL indicates, that the
   peer has successfully authenticated the server and that the EAP
   exchange will be accepted by the peer's local policy. Hence, if these
   conditions are not met, then the peer MUST NOT send EAP-Response/SIM/
   Re-authentication, but the peer MUST send EAP-Response/SIM/
   Client-Error.





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6.7 EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error

   The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error in error cases, as
   specified in Section 4.5.1.

   The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute MUST be included.

   The AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST NOT be used with
   this packet.

6.8 EAP-Request/SIM/Notification

   The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.4.

   The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute MUST be included.

   The AT_MAC attribute MUST beincluded if the P bit of the notification
   code in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included in
   cases when the P bit is set to one. The P bit is discussed in Section
   4.4.

   No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation. See
   Section 7.14.

   If EAP-Request/SIM/Notification is used on fast a re-authentication
   exchange, and if the P bit in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then
   AT_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the
   AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV attributes MUST be included, and the
   encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER
   attribute. The counter value included in AT_COUNTER MUST be the same
   as in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet on the same fast
   re-authentication exchange.

6.9 EAP-Response/SIM/Notification

   The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.4. This packet is
   an acknowledgement of EAP-Request/SIM/Notification.

   The AT_MAC attribute MUST included in cases when the P bit of the
   notification code in AT_NOTIFICATION of EAP-Request/SIM/Notification
   is set to zero, and MUST NOT be included in cases when the P bit is
   set to one. The P bit is discussed in Section 4.4.

   No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation, see
   Section 7.14.

   If EAP-Request/SIM/Notification is used on fast a re-authentication
   exchange, and if the P bit in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero, then



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   AT_COUNTER is used for replay protection. In this case, the
   AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV attributes MUST be included, and the
   encapsulated plaintext attributes MUST include the AT_COUNTER
   attribute. The counter value included in AT_COUNTER MUST be the same
   as in the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet on the same fast
   re-authentication exchange.

7. Attributes

   This section specifies the format of message attributes. The
   attribute type numbers are specified in Section 8.

7.1 Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
   in which kinds of messages, and in what quantity. Messages are
   denoted with numbers in parentheses as follows: (1) EAP-Request/SIM/
   Start, (2) EAP-Response/SIM/Start, (3) EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge, (4)
   EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge, (5) EAP-Request/SIM/Notification, (6)
   EAP-Response/SIM/Notification, (7) EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error (8)
   EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication, and (9) EAP-Response/SIM/
   Re-authentication. The column denoted with "Encr" indicates whether
   the attribute is a nested attribute that MUST be included within
   AT_ENCR_DATA, and the column denoted with "Skip" indicates whether
   the attribute is a skippable attribute.

   "0" indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be included in the message,
   "1" indicates that the attribute MUST be included in the message,
   "0-1" indicates that the attribute is sometimes included in the
   message, and "0*" indicates that the attribute is not included in the
   message in cases specified in this document, but MAY be included in
   the future versions of the protocol.



















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              Attribute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  Encr Skip
        AT_VERSION_LIST  1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
    AT_SELECTED_VERSION  0  0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
            AT_NONCE_MT  0  0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
    AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ 0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
          AT_ANY_ID_REQ 0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
     AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ 0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
            AT_IDENTITY  0  0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
                AT_RAND  0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   N     N
      AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM  0   0  0-1  0   0   0   0   0   0   Y     Y
      AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID  0   0  0-1  0   0   0   0  0-1  0   Y     Y
                  AT_IV  0   0  0-1  0* 0-1 0-1  0   1   1   N     Y
           AT_ENCR_DATA  0   0  0-1  0* 0-1 0-1  0   1   1   N     Y
             AT_PADDING  0   0  0-1  0* 0-1 0-1  0  0-1 0-1  Y     N
          AT_RESULT_IND  0   0  0-1 0-1  0   0   0  0-1 0-1  N     Y
                 AT_MAC  0   0   1   1  0-1 0-1  0   1   1   N     N
             AT_COUNTER  0   0   0   0  0-1 0-1  0   1   1   Y     N
   AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  0-1  Y     N
             AT_NONCE_S  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   Y     N
        AT_NOTIFICATION  0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   N     N
   AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE  0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   N     N

   It should be noted that attributes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_ANY_ID_REQ
   and AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ are mutually exclusive, so that only one of
   them can be included at the same time. If one of the attributes AT_IV
   and AT_ENCR_DATA is included, then both of the attributes MUST be
   included.

7.2 AT_VERSION_LIST

   The format of the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_VERSION_L..| Length        | Actual Version List Length    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Supported Version 1          |  Supported Version 2          |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    .                                                               .
    .                                                               .
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Supported Version N           |     Padding                   |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in
   Section 4.1. The attribute contains the version numbers supported by
   the EAP-SIM server. The server MUST only include versions that it



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   implements and that are allowed in its security policy. The server
   SHOULD list the versions in the order of preference, most preferred
   versions first. At least one version number MUST be included. The
   version number for the protocol described in this document is one
   (0001 hexadecimal).

   The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte Actual Version
   List Length, which specifies the length of the Version List in bytes,
   not including the Actual Version List Length attribute length. This
   field is followed by the list of the versions supported by the
   server, which each have a length of 2 bytes. For example, if there is
   only one supported version, then the Actual Version List Length is 2.
   Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes,
   the sender pads the value field with zero bytes when necessary.

7.3 AT_SELECTED_VERSION

   The format of the AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_SELECTED...| Length = 1    |    Selected Version           |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in
   Section 4.1. The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte
   version number, which indicates the EAP-SIM version that the peer
   wants to use.

7.4 AT_NONCE_MT

   The format of the AT_NONCE_MT attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_NONCE_MT    | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                           NONCE_MT                            |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of the NONCE_MT attribute contains two reserved bytes
   followed by a random number generated by the peer (16 bytes long)
   freshly for this EAP-SIM authentication exchange. The random number



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   is used as a seed value for the new keying material. The reserved
   bytes are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.

   The peer MUST NOT re-use the NONCE_MT value from a previous EAP-SIM
   authentication exchange. If an EAP-SIM exchange includes several EAP/
   SIM/Start rounds, then the peer SHOULD use the same NONCE_MT value in
   all EAP-Response/SIM/Start packets. The peer SHOULD use a good source
   of randomness to generate NONCE_MT. Please see [RFC1750]  for more
   information about generating random numbers for security
   applications.

7.5 AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ

   The format of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_PERM..._REQ | Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The use of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The
   value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
   on sending and ignored on reception.

7.6 AT_ANY_ID_REQ

   The format of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_ANY_ID_REQ  | Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The use of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The value
   field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on
   sending and ignored on reception.

7.7 AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ

   The format of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_FULLAUTH_...| Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
    +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+



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   The use of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The
   value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
   on sending and ignored on reception.

7.8 AT_IDENTITY

   The format of the AT_IDENTITY attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_IDENTITY   | Length        | Actual Identity Length        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .                       Identity (optional)                     .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The use of the AT_IDENTITY is defined in Section 4.2. The value field
   of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual identity length, which
   specifies the length of the identity in bytes. This field is followed
   by the subscriber identity of the indicated actual length. The
   identity is the permanent identity, a pseudonym identity or a fast
   re-authentication identity. The identity format is specified in
   Section 4.2.1. The same identity format is used in the AT_IDENTITY
   attribute and the EAP-Response/Identity packet, with the exception
   that the peer MUST NOT decorate the identity it includes in
   AT_IDENTITY. The identity does not include any terminating null
   characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of
   4 bytes, the sender pads the identity with zero bytes when necessary.

7.9 AT_RAND

   The format of the AT_RAND attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_RAND       | Length        |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .                            n*RAND                             .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes



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   followed by n GSM RANDs, each 16 bytes long. The value of n can be
   determined by the attribute length. The reserved bytes are set to
   zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.

   The number of RAND challenges (n) MUST be two or three. The peer MUST
   verify that the number of RAND challenges is sufficient according to
   the peer's policy. The server MUST use different RAND values. In
   other words, a RAND value can only be included once in AT_RAND. When
   processing the AT_RAND attribute, the peer MUST check that the RANDs
   are different.

   The EAP server MUST obtain fresh RANDs for each EAP-SIM full
   authentication exchange. More specifically, the server MUST consider
   RANDs it included in AT_RAND to be consumed if the server receives an
   EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge packet with a valid AT_MAC, or an
   EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error with the code "insufficient number of
   challenges" or "RANDs are not fresh". However, in other cases (if the
   server does not receive any response to its EAP- Request/SIM/
   Challenge packet, or if the server receives some other kind of
   response than the cases listed above), the server does not need to
   consider the RANDs to be consumed, and the server MAY re-use the
   RANDs in the AT_RAND attribute of the next full authentication
   attempt.

7.10 AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM

   The format of the AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_NEXT_PSEU..| Length        | Actual Pseudonym Length       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .                          Next Pseudonym                       .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual pseudonym
   length, which specifies the length of the following pseudonym in
   bytes. This field is followed by a pseudonym username that the peer
   can use in the next authentication. The username MUST NOT include any
   realm portion. The username does not include any terminating null
   characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple of
   4 bytes, the sender pads the pseudonym with zero bytes when
   necessary. The username encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation
   format [RFC2279]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by



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   encapsulating it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

7.11 AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID

   The format of the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_NEXT_REAU..| Length        | Actual Re-Auth Identity Length|
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .               Next Fast Re-authentication Username            .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual
   re-authentication identity length which specifies the length of the
   following fast re-authentication identity in bytes. This field is
   followed by a fast re-authentication identity that the peer can use
   in the next fast re-authentication, as described in Section 4.3. In
   environments where a realm portion is required, the fast
   re-authentication identity includes both a username portion and a
   realm name portion. The fast re-authentication identity does not
   include any terminating null characters. Because the length of the
   attribute must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the fast
   re-authentication identity with zero bytes when necessary. The
   identity encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation format
   [RFC2279]. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating
   it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

7.12 AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING

   AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes can be used to transmit encrypted
   information between the EAP-SIM peer and server.

   The value field of AT_IV contains two reserved bytes followed by a
   16-byte initialization vector required by the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
   The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and ignored on
   reception. The AT_IV attribute MUST be included if and only if the
   AT_ENCR_DATA is included. Section 4.5 specifies the operation if a
   packet that does not meet this condition is encountered.

   The sender of the AT_IV attribute chooses the initialization vector
   at random. The sender MUST NOT reuse the initialization vector value
   from previous EAP-SIM packets. The sender SHOULD use a good source of
   randomness to generate the initialization vector. Please see



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   [RFC1750] for more information about generating random numbers for
   security applications. The format of AT_IV is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     AT_IV     | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                 Initialization Vector                         |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute consists of two
   reserved bytes followed by cipher text bytes encrypted using the
   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] with a 128-bit key in the
   Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation using the
   initialization vector from the AT_IV attribute. The reserved bytes
   are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. Please see
   [CBC]  for a description of the CBC mode. The format of the
   AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_ENCR_DATA  | Length        |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    .                    Encrypted Data                             .
    .                                                               .
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The derivation of the encryption key (K_encr) is specified in Section
   4.6.

   The plaintext consists of nested EAP-SIM attributes.

   The encryption algorithm requires the length of the plaintext to be a
   multiple of 16 bytes. The sender may need to include the AT_PADDING
   attribute as the last attribute within AT_ENCR_DATA. The AT_PADDING
   attribute is not included if the total length of other nested
   attributes within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is a multiple of 16
   bytes. As usual, the Length of the Padding attribute includes the
   Attribute Type and Attribute Length fields. The length of the Padding
   attribute is 4, 8 or 12 bytes. It is chosen so that the length of the
   value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute becomes a multiple of 16



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   bytes. The actual pad bytes in the value field are set to zero (00
   hexadecimal) on sending. The recipient of the message MUST verify
   that the pad bytes are set to zero. If this verification fails on the
   peer, then it MUST send the EAP-Response/SIM/Client-Error packet with
   the error code "unable to process packet" to terminate the
   authentication exchange. If this verification fails on the server,
   then the server sends the peer the EAP-Request/SIM/Notification
   packet with an AT_NOTIFICATION code that implies failure to terminate
   the authentication exchange. The format of the AT_PADDING attribute
   is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  AT_PADDING   | Length        | Padding...                    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


7.13 AT_RESULT_IND

   The format of the AT_RESULT_IND attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  AT_RESULT_...| Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes,
   which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This
   attribute is always sent unencrypted, so it MUST NOT be encapsulated
   within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

7.14 AT_MAC

   The AT_MAC attribute is used for EAP-SIM message authentication.
   Section 6 specifies which messages AT_MAC MUST be included.

   The value field of the AT_MAC attribute contains two reserved bytes
   followed by a keyed message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is
   calculated over the whole EAP packet concatenated with optional
   message-specific data, with the exception that the value field of the
   MAC attribute is set to zero when calculating the MAC. The EAP packet
   includes the EAP header that begins with the Code field, the EAP-SIM
   header that begins with the Subtype field, and all the attributes, as



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   specified in Section 5.1. The reserved bytes in AT_MAC are set to
   zero when sending and ignored on reception. The contents of the
   message-specific data that may be included in the MAC calculation are
   specified separately for each EAP-SIM message in Section 6.

   The format of the AT_MAC attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     AT_MAC    | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                           MAC                                 |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA1-128 [RFC2104]  keyed hash value. (The
   HMAC-SHA1-128 value is obtained from the 20-byte HMAC-SHA1 value by
   truncating the output to the first 16 bytes. Hence, the length of the
   MAC is 16 bytes.) The derivation of the authentication key (K_aut)
   used in the calculation of the MAC is specified in Section 4.6.

   When the AT_MAC attribute is included in an EAP-SIM message, the
   recipient MUST process the AT_MAC attribute before looking at any
   other attributes, except when processing EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge.
   The processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge is specified in Section
   6.3. If the message authentication code is invalid, then the
   recipient MUST ignore all other attributes in the message and operate
   as specified in Section 4.5.

7.15 AT_COUNTER

   The format of the AT_COUNTER attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  AT_COUNTER   | Length = 1    |           Counter             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of the AT_COUNTER attribute consists of a 16-bit
   unsigned integer counter value, represented in network byte order.
   This attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within
   the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.





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7.16 AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL

   The format of the AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  AT_COUNTER...| Length = 1    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute consists of two reserved bytes,
   which are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception. This
   attribute MUST always be encrypted by encapsulating it within the
   AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

7.17 AT_NONCE_S

   The format of the AT_NONCE_S attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | AT_NONCE_S    | Length = 5    |           Reserved            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    |                            NONCE_S                            |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of the AT_NONCE_S attribute contains two reserved
   bytes followed by a random number generated by the server (16 bytes)
   freshly for this EAP-SIM fast re-authentication. The random number is
   used as challenge for the peer and also a seed value for the new
   keying material. The reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and
   ignored upon reception. This attribute MUST always be encrypted by
   encapsulating it within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.

   The server MUST NOT reuse the NONCE_S value from any previous EAP-SIM
   fast re-authentication exchange. The server SHOULD use a good source
   of randomness to generate NONCE_S. Please see [RFC1750] for more
   information about generating random numbers for security
   applications.

7.18 AT_NOTIFICATION

   The format of the AT_NOTIFICATION attribute is shown below.



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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_NOTIFICATION| Length = 1    |F|P|  Notification Code        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte notification
   code. The first and second bit (F and P) of the notification code are
   interpreted as described in Section 4.4.

   The notification code values listed below have been reserved. The
   descriptions below illustrate the semantics of the notifications. The
   peer implementation MAY use different wordings when presenting the
   notifications to the user. The "requested service" depends on the
   environment where EAP-SIM is applied.

   0 - General failure. (implies failure, used after successful
   authentication)

   16384 - General failure. (implies failure, used before
   authentication)

   32768 - User has been successfully authenticated. (does not imply
   failure, used after successful authentication). The usage of this
   code is discussed in Section 4.4.2.

   1026 - User has been temporarily denied access to the requested
   service. (Implies failure, used after successful authentication)

   1031 - User has not subscribed to the requested service (implies
   failure, used after successful authentication)

7.19 AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE

   The format of the AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |AT_CLIENT_ERR..| Length = 1    |     Client Error Code         |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte client error
   code. The following error code values have been reserved.







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    0    "unable to process packet": a general error code

    1    "unsupported version": the peer does not support any of
         the versions listed in AT_VERSION_LIST

    2    "insufficient number of challenges": the peer's policy
         requires more triplets than the server included in AT_RAND

    3    "RANDs are not fresh": the peer believes that the RAND
         challenges included in AT_RAND were not fresh


8. IANA Considerations

   IANA has assigned the EAP type number 18 for this protocol.

   EAP-SIM messages include a Subtype field. The Subtype is a new
   numbering space for which IANA administration is required. The
   following Subtypes are specified in this document:

      Start..........................................10
      Challenge......................................11
      Notification...................................12
      Re-authentication..............................13
      Client-Error...................................14

   The messages are composed of attributes, which have attribute type
   numbers. The EAP-SIM attribute type number is a new numbering space
   for which IANA administration is required. The following attribute
   types are specified in this document:





















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      AT_RAND.........................................1
      AT_PADDING......................................6
      AT_NONCE_MT.....................................7
      AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ............................10
      AT_MAC.........................................11
      AT_NOTIFICATION................................12
      AT_ANY_ID_REQ..................................13
      AT_IDENTITY....................................14
      AT_VERSION_LIST................................15
      AT_SELECTED_VERSION............................16
      AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.............................17
      AT_COUNTER.....................................19
      AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL...........................20
      AT_NONCE_S.....................................21
      AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE...........................22
      AT_IV.........................................129
      AT_ENCR_DATA..................................130
      AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM.............................132
      AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID.............................133
      AT_RESULT_IND.................................135

   The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute contains a notification code value. The
   notification code is a new numbering space for which IANA
   administration is required. Values 0, 1024, 1026, 1031, 16384 and
   32768 have been specified in Section 7.18 of this document.

   The AT_VERSION_LIST and AT_SELECTED_VERSION attributes contain
   version numbers. The EAP-SIM version number is a new numbering space
   for which IANA administration is required. Version 1 has been
   specified in Section 7.2 of this document.

   The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute contains a client error code. The
   client error code is a new numbering space for which IANA
   administration is required. Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 have been specified
   in Section 7.19 of this document.

   All requests for value assignment from the various number spaces
   described in this document require proper documentation, according to
   the "Specification Required" policy described in [RFC2434]. Requests
   must be specified in sufficient detail so that interoperability
   between independent implementations is possible. Possible forms of
   documentation include, but are not limited to, RFCs, the products of
   another standards body (e.g. 3GPP), or permanently and readily
   available vendor design notes.

   EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA [EAP-AKA] are "sister" protocols with similar
   message structure and protocol numbering spaces. Many attributes and
   message Subtypes have the same protocol numbers in these two



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   protocols. Hence, it is recommended that the same protocol number
   value SHOULD NOT be allocated for two different purposes in EAP-AKA
   and EAP-SIM.

9. Security Considerations

   The EAP base protocol [EAP] highlights several attacks that are
   possible against the EAP protocol as there is no inherent security
   mechanisms provided. This section discusses the claimed security
   properties of EAP-SIM as well as vulnerabilities and security
   recommendations.

9.1 Identity Protection

   EAP-SIM includes optional identity privacy support that protects the
   privacy of the subscriber identity against passive eavesdropping.
   This document only specifies a mechanism to deliver pseudonyms from
   the server to the peer as part of an EAP-SIM exchange. Hence, a peer
   that has not yet performed any EAP-SIM exchanges does not typically
   have a pseudonym available. If the peer does not have a pseudonym
   available, then the privacy mechanism cannot be used, but the
   permanent identity will have to be sent in the clear. The terminal
   SHOULD store the pseudonym in a non-volatile memory so that it can be
   maintained across reboots. An active attacker that impersonates the
   network may use the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to attempt to learn
   the subscriber's permanent identity. However, as discussed in Section
   4.2.2, the terminal can refuse to send the cleartext permanent
   identity if it believes that the network should be able to recognize
   the pseudonym.

   If the peer and server cannot guarantee that the pseudonym will be
   maintained reliably and identity privacy is required then additional
   protection from an external security mechanism such as Protected
   Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [PEAP] may be used. If an
   external security mechanism is in use the identity privacy features
   of EAP-SIM may not be useful. The security considerations of using an
   external security mechanism with EAP-SIM are beyond the scope of this
   document.

9.2 Mutual Authentication and Triplet Exposure

   EAP-SIM provides mutual authentication. The peer believes that the
   network is authentic because the network can calculate a correct
   AT_MAC value in the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge packet. To calculate
   AT_MAC it is sufficient to know the RAND and Kc values from the GSM
   triplets (RAND, SRES, Kc) used in the authentication. Because the
   network selects the RAND challenges and the triplets, an attacker
   that knows n (2 or 3) GSM triplets for the subscriber is able to



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   impersonate a valid network to the peer. (Some peers MAY employ an
   implementation-specific counter-measure against impersonating a valid
   network by re-using a previously used RAND; see below.) Given
   physical access to the SIM card, it is easy to obtain any number of
   GSM triplets. Another way to obtain triplets is to mount an attack on
   the peer platform via a virus or other malicious piece of software.
   The peer SHOULD be protected against triplet querying attacks by
   malicious software.

   If the same SIM credentials are also used for GSM traffic, the
   triplets could be revealed in the GSM network; see Section 9.6.

   The security of EAP-SIM is based on the secrecy of Kc keys, which are
   considered secret intermediate results in the EAP-SIM cryptographic
   calculations. Care should be taken not to expose Kc keys to attackers
   when they are transmitted between entities, stored or handled. Steps
   should be taken to limit the transport, storage and handling of these
   values outside a protected environment. These considerations are
   important at both the peer and EAP server implementations.

   In GSM, the network is allowed to reuse the RAND challenge in
   consecutive authentication exchanges. This is not allowed in EAP-SIM.
   The EAP-SIM server is mandated to use fresh triplets (RAND
   challenges) in consecutive authentication exchanges, as specified in
   Section 3. EAP-SIM does not mandate any means for the peer to check
   if the RANDs are fresh, so the security of the scheme leans on the
   secrecy of the triplets. However, the peer MAY employ
   implementation-specific mechanisms to remember some of the previously
   used RANDs, and the peer MAY check the freshness of the server's
   RANDs. The operation in cases when the peer detects that the RANDs
   are not fresh is specified in Section 4.5.1.

   Preventing the re-use of authentication vectors has been taken into
   account in the design of the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement
   (AKA), which is used in EAP-AKA [EAP-AKA]. In cases when the triplet
   re-use properties of EAP-SIM are not considered sufficient, it is
   advised to use EAP-AKA.

9.3 Flooding the Authentication Centre

   The EAP-SIM server typically obtains authentication vectors from the
   Authentication Centre (AuC). EAP-SIM introduces a new usage for the
   AuC. The protocols between the EAP-SIM server and the AuC are out of
   the scope of this document. However, it should be noted that a
   malicious EAP-SIM peer may generate a lot of protocol requests to
   mount a denial of service attack. The EAP-SIM server implementation
   SHOULD take this into account and SHOULD take steps to limit the
   traffic that it generates towards the AuC, preventing the attacker



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   from flooding the AuC and from extending the denial of service attack
   from EAP-SIM to other users of the AuC.

9.4 Key Derivation

   EAP-SIM supports key derivation. The key hierarchy is specified in
   Section 4.6. EAP-SIM combines several GSM triplets in order to
   generate stronger keying material and stronger AT_MAC values. The
   actual strength of the resulting keys depends, among other things, on
   some operator specific parameters including authentication
   algorithms, the strength of the Ki key, and the quality of the RAND
   challenges. For example, some SIM cards generate Kc keys with 10 bits
   set to zero. Such restrictions may prevent the concatenation
   technique from yielding strong session keys. Because the strength of
   the Ki key is 128 bits, the ultimate strength of any derived secret
   key material is never more than 128 bits.

   It should also be noted that a security policy that allows n=2 to be
   used may compromise the security of a future policy that requires
   three triplets, because adversaries may be able to exploit the
   messages exchanged when the weaker policy was applied.

   There is no known way to obtain complete GSM triplets by mounting an
   attack against EAP-SIM. A passive eavesdropper can learn n*RAND and
   AT_MAC and may be able to link this information to the subscriber
   identity. An active attacker that impersonates a GSM subscriber can
   easily obtain n*RAND and AT_MAC values from the EAP server for any
   given subscriber identity. However, calculating the Kc and SRES
   values from AT_MAC would require the attacker to reverse the keyed
   message authentication code function HMAC-SHA1-128.

   As EAP-SIM does not expose any values calculated from an individual
   GSM Kc keys, it is not possible to mount a brute force attack on just
   one of the Kc keys in EAP-SIM. Therefore, when considering brute
   force attacks on the values exposed in EAP-SIM, the effective length
   of EAP-SIM session keys is not compromised by the fact that they are
   combined from several shorter keys, i.e the effective length of 128
   bits may be achieved. For additional considerations see Section 9.6.
   The EAP Transient Keys used to protect EAP-SIM packets (K_encr,
   K_aut) and the Master Session Key are cryptographically separate. An
   attacker cannot derive any non-trivial information from K_encr or
   K_aut based on the Master Session Key or vice versa. An attacker also
   cannot calculate the pre-shared secret from the GSM Kc keys used,
   EAP-SIM K_encr, EAP-SIM K_aut, or from the Master Session Key.

   Each EAP-SIM exchange generates fresh keying material. The EAP-SIM
   peer contributes to the keying material with the NONCE_MT parameter,
   which must be chosen freshly for each full authentication exchange.



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   Hence, even if the RAND challenges were reused from a previous
   session, the session keys will be different. On fast
   re-authentication, freshness is provided with a counter. Please see
   Section 9.2 for more information about RAND reuse.

9.5 Dictionary Attacks

   Because EAP-SIM is not a password protocol, it is not vulnerable to
   dictionary attacks. (The pre-shared symmetric secret stored on the
   SIM card shall not be a weak password.)

9.6 Credentials Reuse

   EAP-SIM cannot prevent attacks over the GSM or GPRS radio networks.
   If the same SIM credentials are also used in GSM or GPRS, it is
   possible to mount attacks over the cellular interface.

   A passive attacker can eavesdrop GSM or GPRS traffic and obtain RAND,
   SRES pairs. He can then use a brute force attack or other
   cryptanalysis techniques to obtain the 64-bit Kc keys used to encrypt
   the GSM or GPRS data. This makes it possible to attack each 64-bit
   key separately.

   An active attacker can mount a "rogue GSM/GPRS base station attack",
   replaying previously seen RAND challenges to obtain SRES values. He
   can then use a brute force attack to obtain the Kc keys. If
   successful, the attacker can impersonate a valid network or decrypt
   previously seen traffic, because EAP-SIM does not provide perfect
   forward secrecy (PFS).

   Because this attack requires the attacker to build a rogue GSM base
   station (or at least eavesdrop the GSM traffic), the cost of the
   attack is not negligible; it is the same cost as usually in GSM.
   However, due to several weaknesses in the GSM encryption algorithms,
   the effective key strength of the Kc keys is much less than the
   expected 64 bits (no more than 40 bits if the A5/1 GSM encryption
   algorithm is used; an active attacker can force the peer to use the
   weaker A5/2 algorithm that can be broken in less than a second).

   Because the A5 encryption algorithm is not used in EAP-SIM, and
   because EAP-SIM does not expose any values calculated from individual
   Kc keys, it should be noted that these attacks are not possible if
   the SIM credentials used in EAP-SIM are not shared in GSM/GPRS.

9.7 Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality

   AT_MAC, AT_IV,  AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_COUNTER attributes are used to
   provide integrity, replay and confidentiality protection for EAP-SIM



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   requests and responses. Integrity protection with AT_MAC includes the
   EAP header. These attributes cannot be used during the EAP/SIM/Start
   roundtrip. However, the protocol values (user identity string,
   NONCE_MT and version negotiation parameters) are (implicitly)
   protected by later EAP-SIM messages by including them in key
   derivation.

   Integrity protection (AT_MAC) is based on a keyed message
   authentication code. Confidentiality (AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV) is
   based on a block cipher.

   Confidentiality protection is applied only to a part of the protocol
   fields. The table of attributes in Section 7.1 summarizes which
   fields are confidentiality protected. It should be noted that the
   error and notification code attributes AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE and
   AT_NOTIFICATION are not confidential but they are transmitted in the
   clear. Identity protection is discussed in Section 9.1.

   On full authentication, replay protection of the EAP exchange is
   provided by the RAND values from the underlying GSM authentication
   scheme and the use of the NONCE_MT value. Protection against replays
   of EAP-SIM messages is also based on the fact that messages that can
   include AT_MAC can only be sent once with a certain EAP-SIM Subtype,
   and on the fact that a different K_aut key will be used for
   calculating AT_MAC in each full authentication exchange.

   On fast re-authentication, a counter included in AT_COUNTER and a
   server random nonce is used to provide replay protection. The
   AT_COUNTER attribute is also included in EAP-SIM notifications, if
   they are used after successful authentication in order to provide
   replay protection between re-authentication exchanges.

   Because EAP-SIM is not a tunneling method, EAP-Request/Notification,
   EAP-Response/Notification, EAP-Success or EAP-Failure packets are not
   confidential, integrity protected or replay protected in EAP-SIM. On
   physically insecure networks, this may enable an attacker to send
   false notifications to the peer and to mount denial of service
   attacks by spoofing these packets. As discussed in Section 4.5, the
   peer will only accept EAP-Success after successful authentication.
   Hence, the attacker cannot force the peer to believe successful
   authentication has occurred when mutual authentication failed or has
   not happened yet.

   The security considerations of EAP-SIM result indications are covered
   in Section 9.9

   An eavesdropper will see the EAP-Request/Notification, EAP-Response/
   Notification, EAP-Success and EAP-Failure packets sent in the clear.



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   With EAP-SIM, confidential information MUST NOT be transmitted in EAP
   Notification packets.

9.8 Negotiation Attacks

   EAP-SIM does not protect the EAP-Response/Nak packet. Because EAP-SIM
   does not protect the EAP method negotiation, EAP method downgrading
   attacks may be possible, especially if the user uses the same
   identity with EAP-SIM and other EAP methods.

   EAP-SIM includes a version negotiation procedure. In EAP-SIM the
   keying material derivation includes the version list and selected
   version to ensure that the protocol cannot be downgraded and that the
   peer and server use the same version of EAP-SIM.

   EAP-SIM does not support ciphersuite negotiation.

9.9 Protected Result Indications

   EAP-SIM supports optional protected success indications, and
   acknowledged failure indications. If a failure occurs after
   successful authentication, then the EAP-SIM failure indication is
   integrity and replay protected.

   Even if an EAP-Failure packet is lost when using EAP-SIM over an
   unreliable medium, then the EAP-SIM failure indications will help
   ensure that the peer and EAP server will know the other parties
   authentication decision. If protected success indications are used,
   then the loss of Success packet will also be addressed by the
   acknowledged, integrity and replay protected EAP-SIM success
   indication. If the optional success indications are not used, then
   the peer may end up believing the server succeeded authentication
   when it actually failed. Since access will not be granted in this
   case protected result indications are not needed unless the client is
   not able to realize it does not have access for an extended period of
   time.

9.10 Man-in-the-middle Attacks

   In order to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and session hijacking,
   user data SHOULD be integrity protected on physically insecure
   networks. The EAP-SIM Master Session Key or keys derived from it MAY
   be used as the integrity protection keys, or, if an external security
   mechanism such as PEAP is used, then the link integrity protection
   keys MAY be derived by the external security mechanism.

   There are man-in-the-middle attacks associated with the use of any
   EAP method within a tunneled protocol such as PEAP, or within a



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   sequence of EAP methods followed by each other. This specification
   does not address these attacks. If EAP-SIM is used with a tunneling
   protocol or as part of a sequence of methods, there should be
   cryptographic binding provided between the protocols and EAP-SIM to
   prevent man-in-the-middle attacks through rogue authenticators being
   able to setup one-way authenticated tunnels. The EAP-SIM Master
   Session Key MAY be used to provide the cryptographic binding. However
   the mechanism how the binding is provided depends on the tunneling or
   sequencing protocol and is beyond the scope of this document.

9.11 Generating Random Numbers

   An EAP-SIM implementation SHOULD use a good source of randomness to
   generate the random numbers required in the protocol. Please see
   [RFC1750] for more information on generating random numbers for
   security applications.

10. Security Claims

   This section provides the security claims required by [EAP].

   Auth. mechanism: EAP-SIM is based on the GSM SIM mechanism, which is
   a challenge/response authentication and key agreement mechanism based
   on a symmetric 128-bit pre-shared secret. EAP-SIM also makes use of a
   peer challenge to provide mutual authentication.

   Ciphersuite negotiation: No

   Mutual authentication: Yes (Section 9.2)

   Integrity protection: Yes (Section 9.7)

   Replay protection: Yes  (Section 9.7)

   Confidentiality: Yes, except method specific success and failure
   indications (Section 9.1, Section 9.7)

   Key derivation: Yes

   Key strength: EAP-SIM supports key derivation with 128-bit effective
   key strength. However, as discussed in Section 9, if the same
   credentials are used in GSM/GPRS and in EAP-SIM, then the key
   strength may be reduced considerably, basically to the same level as
   in GSM, by mounting attacks over GSM/GPRS. For example an active
   attack using a false GSM/GPRS base station reduces the effective key
   strength to almost zero.

   Description of key hierarchy: Please see Section 4.6.



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   Dictinary attack protection: N/A (Section 9.5)

   Fast reconnect: Yes

   Cryptographic binding:  N/A

   Session independence: Yes (Section 9.4, Section 9.2)

   Fragmentation: No

   Channel binding: No

   Indication of vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities are discussed in
   Section 9.

11. Acknowledgements and Contributions

11.1 Contributors

   In addition to the editors, Nora Dabbous, Jose Puthenkulam, and
   Prasanna Satarasinghe were significant contributors to this document.

   Pasi Eronen and Jukka-Pekka Honkanen contributed Appendix A.

11.2 Acknowledgements

   Juha Ala-Laurila, N. Asokan, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Patrik Flykt, Jukka-
   Pekka Honkanen, Antti Kuikka, Jukka Latva, Lassi Lehtinen, Jyri
   Rinnemaa, Timo Takamäki and Raimo Vuonnala contributed many original
   ideas and concepts to this protocol.

   N. Asokan, Pasi Eronen and Jukka-Pekka Honkanen contributed and
   helped in innumerable ways during the development of the protocol.

   Valtteri Niemi and Kaisa Nyberg contributed substantially to the
   design of the key derivation and the fast re-authentication
   procedure, and have also provided their cryptographic expertise in
   many discussions related to this protocol.

   Simon Blake-Wilson provided most helpful comments on key derivation
   and version negotiation.

   Thanks to Greg Rose for his most valuable comments to an early
   version of this specification [S3-020125], and for reviewing and
   providing very useful comments on draft version 12.

   Thanks to Bernard Aboba, Vladimir Alperovich, Florent Bersani,
   Jacques Caron, Gopal Dommety, Augustin Farrugia, Mark Grayson, Max de



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   Groot, Prakash Iyer, Nishi Kant, Victor Lortz, Sarvar Patel, Tom
   Porcher, Michael Richardson, Stefan Schr•der, Jesse Walker and Thomas
   Wieland for their contributions and critiques. Special thanks to Max
   for proposing improvements to the MAC calculation.

   Thanks to Glen Zorn for reviewing this document and for providing
   most useful comments on the protocol.

   The identity privacy support is based on the identity privacy support
   of [EAP-SRP]. The attribute format is based on the extension format
   of Mobile IPv4 [RFC3344].

   This protocol has been partly developed in parallel with EAP-AKA
   [EAP-AKA], and hence this specification incorporates many ideas from
   Jari Arkko.

11.2.1 Contributors' Addresses

   Nora Dabbous
   Gemplus
   34 rue Guynemer
   92447 Issy les Moulineaux
   France
   EMail: nora.dabbous@gemplus.com
   Phone: +33 1 4648 2000


   Jose Puthenkulam
   Intel Corporation
   2111 NE 25th Avenue, JF2-58
   Hillsboro, OR 97124
   USA
   EMail: jose.p.puthenkulam@intel.com
   Phone: +1 503 264 6121


   Prasanna Satarasinghe
   Transat Technologies
   180 State Street, Suite 240
   Southlake, TX 76092
   USA
   EMail: prasannas@transat-tech.com
   Phone: + 1 817 4814412

Normative References

   [GSM 03.20]
              European Telecommunications Standards  Institute, "GSM



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              Technical Specification GSM 03.20 (ETS 300 534):  "Digital
              cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Security
              related network functions"", August 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [GSM 03.03]
              European Telecommunications Standards Institute, "GSM
              Technical Specification GSM 03.03 (ETS 300 523): "Digital
              cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Numbering,
              addressing and identification"", April 1997.

   [RFC2486]  Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier",
              RFC 2486, January 1999.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
              Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [AES]      National Institute of  Standards and Technology, "Federal
              Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 197,
              "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"", November 2001.

              http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
              fips-197.pdf

   [CBC]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
              Special Publication 800-38A, "Recommendation for Block
              Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques"",
              December 2001.

              http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/
              sp800-38a.pdf

   [SHA-1]    National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Federal Information Processing
              Standard (FIPS) Publication 180-1, "Secure Hash
              Standard"", April 1995.

   [PRF]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal
              Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication  186-2
              (with change notice); Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",
              January 2000.

              Available on-line at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
              fips/fips186-2/fips186-2-change1.pdf




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   [RFC2434]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
              October 1998.

   [RFC2279]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.

   [EAP]      Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Aboba, B., Carlson, J. and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-09 (work in progress), February
              2004.

Informative References

   [Draft 3GPP TS 23.003]
              3rd Generation Partnership Project, "Draft 3GPP Technical
              Specification 3GPP TS 23.003 V 6.1.0: "3rd Generation
              Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core
              Network; Numbering, addressing and identification (Release
              6)"", December 2003.

              work in progress

   [PEAP]     Palekar, A., Simon, D., Zorn, G., Salowey, J., Zhou, H.
              and S. Josefsson, "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)",
              draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-07 (work in progress),
              October 2003.

   [RFC1750]  Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
              Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.

   [S3-020125]
              Qualcomm, "Comments on draft EAP/SIM, 3rd Generation
              Partnership Project document 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security
              S3#22, S3-020125", February 2002.

   [RFC3344]  Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
              August 2002.

   [EAP-AKA]  Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "EAP-AKA Authentication",
              draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-12 (work in progress), Arpil
              2004.

   [RFC2548]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
              RFC 2548, March 1999.

   [EAP-SRP]  Carlson, J., Aboba, B. and H. Haverinen, "EAP SRP-SHA1
              Authentication Protocol", Internet-Draft



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              draft-ietf-pppext-eap-srp-03, July 2001.


Authors' Addresses

   Henry Haverinen (editor)
   Nokia Enterprise Solutions
   P.O. Box 12
   FIN-40101 Jyvaskyla
   Finland

   EMail: henry.haverinen@nokia.com


   Joseph Salowey (editor)
   Cisco Systems
   2901 Third Avenue
   Seattle, WA  98121
   USA

   Phone: +1 206 256 3380
   EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com

Appendix A. Test Vectors

   Test vectors for the NIST FIPS 186-2 pseudo-random number generator
   [PRF] are available at the following URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/
   encryption/dss/Examples-1024bit.pdf

   The following examples show the contents of EAP-SIM packets on full
   authentication and fast re-authentication.

A.1 EAP-Request/Identity

   The first packet is a plain Identity Request:

      01                   ; Code: Request
      00                   ; Identifier: 0
      00 05                ; Length: 5 octets
      01                   ; Type: Identity


A.2 EAP-Response/Identity

   The client's identity is "1244070100000001@eapsim.foo", so it
   responds with the following packet:





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      02                   ; Code: Response
      00                   ; Identifier: 0
      00 20                ; Length: 32 octets
      01                   ; Type: Identity
         31 32 34 34       ; "1244070100000001@eapsim.foo"
         30 37 30 31
         30 30 30 30
         30 30 30 31
         40 65 61 70
         73 69 6d 2e
         66 6f 6f


A.3 EAP-Request/SIM/Start

   The server's first packet looks like this:

      01                   ; Code: Request
      01                   ; Identifier: 1
      00 10                ; Length: 16 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0a                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Start
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         0f                ; Attribute type: AT_VERSION_LIST
            02             ; Attribute length: 8 octets (2*4)
            00 02          ; Actual version list length: 2 octets
            00 01          ; Version: 1
            00 00          ; (attribute padding)


A.4 EAP-Response/SIM/Start

   The client selects a nonce and responds with the following packet:

      02                   ; Code: Response
      01                   ; Identifier: 1
      00 20                ; Length: 32 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0a                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Start
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         07                ; Attribute type: AT_NONCE_MT
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            01 23 45 67    ; NONCE_MT value
            89 ab cd ef
            fe dc ba 98
            76 54 32 10
         10                ; Attribute type: AT_SELECTED_VERSION



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            01             ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
            00 01          ; Version: 1


A.5 EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge

   Next, the server selects three authentication triplets

         (RAND1,SRES1,Kc1) = (10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c1d1e1f,
                              d1d2d3d4,
                              a0a1a2a3 a4a5a6a7)
         (RAND2,SRES2,Kc2) = (20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f,
                              e1e2e3e4,
                              b0b1b2b3 b4b5b6b7)
         (RAND3,SRES3,Kc3) = (30313233 34353637 38393a3b 3c3d3e3f,
                              f1f2f3f4,
                              c0c1c2c3 c4c5c6c7)

   Next, the MK is calculated as specified in Section 4.6.

   MK = e576d5ca 332e9930 018bf1ba ee2763c7 95b3c712

   And the other keys are derived using the PRNG:

         K_encr = 536e5ebc 4465582a a6a8ec99 86ebb620
         K_aut =  25af1942 efcbf4bc 72b39434 21f2a974
         MSK =    39d45aea f4e30601 983e972b 6cfd46d1
                  c3637733 65690d09 cd44976b 525f47d3
                  a60a985e 955c53b0 90b2e4b7 3719196a
                  40254296 8fd14a88 8f46b9a7 886e4488
         EMSK =   5949eab0 fff69d52 315c6c63 4fd14a7f
                  0d52023d 56f79698 fa6596ab eed4f93f
                  bb48eb53 4d985414 ceed0d9a 8ed33c38
                  7c9dfdab 92ffbdf2 40fcecf6 5a2c93b9

   Next, the server selects a pseudonym and a fast re-authentication
   identity (in this case, "w8w49PexCazWJ&xCIARmxuMKht5S1sxR
   DqXSEFBEg3DcZP9cIxTe5J4OyIwNGVzxeJOU1G" and
   "Y24fNSrz8BP274jOJaF17WfxI8YO7QX0
   0pMXk9XMMVOw7broaNhTczuFq53aEpOkk3L0dm@eapsim.foo", respectively).

   The following plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the
   AT_ENCR_DATA attribute:








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         84               ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM
            13            ; Attribute length: 76 octets (19*4)
            00 46         ; Actual pseudonym length: 70 octets
            77 38 77 34 39 50 65 78 43 61 7a 57 4a 26 78 43
            49 41 52 6d 78 75 4d 4b 68 74 35 53 31 73 78 52
            44 71 58 53 45 46 42 45 67 33 44 63 5a 50 39 63
            49 78 54 65 35 4a 34 4f 79 49 77 4e 47 56 7a 78
            65 4a 4f 55 31 47
            00 00          ; (attribute padding)
         85                ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
            16             ; Attribute length: 88 octets (22*4)
            00 51          ; Actual re-auth identity length: 81 octets
            59 32 34 66 4e 53 72 7a 38 42 50 32 37 34 6a 4f
            4a 61 46 31 37 57 66 78 49 38 59 4f 37 51 58 30
            30 70 4d 58 6b 39 58 4d 4d 56 4f 77 37 62 72 6f
            61 4e 68 54 63 7a 75 46 71 35 33 61 45 70 4f 6b
            6b 33 4c 30 64 6d 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
            6f
            00 00 00       ; (attribute padding)
         06                ; Attribute type: AT_PADDING
            03             ; Attribute length: 12 octets (3*4)
            00 00 00 00
            00 00 00 00
            00 00

   The EAP packet looks like this:

      01                   ; Code: Request
      02                   ; Identifier: 2
      01 18                ; Length: 280 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0b                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Challenge
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         01                ; Attribute type: AT_RAND
            0d             ; Attribute length: 52 octets (13*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            10 11 12 13    ; first RAND
            14 15 16 17
            18 19 1a 1b
            1c 1d 1e 1f
            20 21 22 23    ; second RAND
            24 25 26 27
            28 29 2a 2b
            2c 2d 2e 2f
            30 31 32 33    ; third RAND
            34 35 36 37
            38 39 3a 3b
            3c 3d 3e 3f



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         81                ; Attribute type: AT_IV
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            9e 18 b0 c2    ; IV value
            9a 65 22 63
            c0 6e fb 54
            dd 00 a8 95
         82               ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
            2d            ; Attribute length: 180 octets (45*4)
            00 00         ; (reserved)
            55 f2 93 9b bd b1 b1 9e a1 b4 7f c0 b3 e0 be 4c
            ab 2c f7 37 2d 98 e3 02 3c 6b b9 24 15 72 3d 58
            ba d6 6c e0 84 e1 01 b6 0f 53 58 35 4b d4 21 82
            78 ae a7 bf 2c ba ce 33 10 6a ed dc 62 5b 0c 1d
            5a a6 7a 41 73 9a e5 b5 79 50 97 3f c7 ff 83 01
            07 3c 6f 95 31 50 fc 30 3e a1 52 d1 e1 0a 2d 1f
            4f 52 26 da a1 ee 90 05 47 22 52 bd b3 b7 1d 6f
            0c 3a 34 90 31 6c 46 92 98 71 bd 45 cd fd bc a6
            11 2f 07 f8 be 71 79 90 d2 5f 6d d7 f2 b7 b3 20
            bf 4d 5a 99 2e 88 03 31 d7 29 94 5a ec 75 ae 5d
            43 c8 ed a5 fe 62 33 fc ac 49 4e e6 7a 0d 50 4d
         0b                ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            fe f3 24 ac    ; MAC value
            39 62 b5 9f
            3b d7 82 53
            ae 4d cb 6a

   The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set
   to zero), followed by the NONCE_MT value (a total of 296 bytes).

A.6 EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge

   The client's response looks like this:

      02                   ; Code: Response
      02                   ; Identifier: 2
      00 1c                ; Length: 28 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0b                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Challenge
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         0b                ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            f5 6d 64 33    ; MAC value
            e6 8e d2 97
            6a c1 19 37



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            fc 3d 11 54

   The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set
   to zero), followed by the SRES values (a total of 40 bytes).

A.7 EAP-Success

   The last packet is an EAP-Success:

      03                   ; Code: Success
      02                   ; Identifier: 2
      00 04                ; Length: 4 octets


A.8 Fast Re-authentication

   When performing fast re-authentication, the EAP-Request/Identity
   packet is the same as usual. The EAP-Response/Identity contains the
   fast re-authentication identity (from AT_ENCR_DATA attribute above):

      02                   ; Code: Response
      00                   ; Identifier: 0
      00 56                ; Length: 86 octets
      01                   ; Type: Identity
         59 32 34 66 4e 53 72 7a 38 42 50 32 37 34 6a 4f
         4a 61 46 31 37 57 66 78 49 38 59 4f 37 51 58 30
         30 70 4d 58 6b 39 58 4d 4d 56 4f 77 37 62 72 6f
         61 4e 68 54 63 7a 75 46 71 35 33 61 45 70 4f 6b
         6b 33 4c 30 64 6d 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
         6f


A.9 EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication

   The server recognizes the reauthentication identity, so it will
   respond with EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication. It retrieves the
   associated counter value, generates a nonce, and picks a new
   reauthentication identity (in this case,
   "uta0M0iyIsMwWp5TTdSdnOLvg2XDVf21OYt1vnfiMcs5dnIDHOIFVavIRzMR
   yzW6vFzdHW@eapsim.foo").

   The following plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the
   AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. Note that AT_PADDING is not used because the
   length of the plaintext is a multiple of 16 bytes.







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         13                ; Attribute type: AT_COUNTER
            01             ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
            00 01          ; Counter value
         15                ; Attribute type: AT_NONCE_S
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            01 23 45 67    ; NONCE_S value
            89 ab cd ef
            fe dc ba 98
            76 54 32 10
         85                ; Attribute type: AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
            16             ; Attribute length: 88 octets (22*4)
            00 51          ; Actual re-auth identity length: 81 octets
            75 74 61 30 4d 30 69 79 49 73 4d 77 57 70 35 54
            54 64 53 64 6e 4f 4c 76 67 32 58 44 56 66 32 31
            4f 59 74 31 76 6e 66 69 4d 63 73 35 64 6e 49 44
            48 4f 49 46 56 61 76 49 52 7a 4d 52 79 7a 57 36
            76 46 7a 64 48 57 40 65 61 70 73 69 6d 2e 66 6f
            6f
            00 00 00       ; (attribute padding)

   The EAP packet looks like this:





























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      01                   ; Code: Request
      01                   ; Identifier: 1
      00 a4                ; Length: 164 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0d                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Re-authentication
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         81                ; Attribute type: AT_IV
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            d5 85 ac 77    ; IV value
            86 b9 03 36
            65 7c 77 b4
            65 75 b9 c4
         82                ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
            1d             ; Attribute length: 116 octets (29*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            68 62 91 a9 d2 ab c5 8c aa 32 94 b6 e8 5b 44 84
            6c 44 e5 dc b2 de 8b 9e 80 d6 9d 49 85 8a 5d b8
            4c dc 1c 9b c9 5c 01 b9 6b 6e ca 31 34 74 ae a6
            d3 14 16 e1 9d aa 9d f7 0f 05 00 88 41 ca 80 14
            96 4d 3b 30 a4 9b cf 43 e4 d3 f1 8e 86 29 5a 4a
            2b 38 d9 6c 97 05 c2 bb b0 5c 4a ac e9 7d 5e af
            f5 64 04 6c 8b d3 0b c3 9b e5 e1 7a ce 2b 10 a6
         0b                ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            48 3a 17 99    ; MAC value
            b8 3d 7c d3
            d0 a1 e4 01
            d9 ee 47 70

   The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set
   to zero; a total of 164 bytes).

   Finally, the server derives new keys. The XKEY' is calculated as
   described in Section 4.6:

   XKEY' = 863dc120 32e08343 c1a2308d b48377f6 801f58d4

   The new MSK and EMSK are derived using the PRNG (note that K_encr and
   K_aut stay the same).


         MSK   =  6263f614 973895e1 335f7e30 cff028ee
                  2176f519 002c9abe 732fe0ef 00cf167c
                  756d9e4c ed6d5ed6 40eb3fe3 8565ca07
                  6e7fb8a8 17cfe8d9 adbce441 d47c4f5e
         EMSK  =  3d8ff786 3a630b2b 06e2cf20 9684c13f



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                  6b82f992 f2b06f1b 54bf51ef 237f2a40
                  1ef5e0d7 e098a34c 533eaebf 34578854
                  b7721526 20a777f0 e0340884 a294fb73


A.10 EAP-Response/SIM/Re-authentication

   The client's response includes the counter as well. The following
   plaintext will be encrypted and stored in the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute:

         13                ; Attribute type: AT_COUNTER
            01             ; Attribute length: 4 octets (1*4)
            00 01          ; Counter value
         06                ; Attribute type: AT_PADDING
            03             ; Attribute length: 12 octets (3*4)
            00 00 00 00
            00 00 00 00
            00 00

   The EAP packet looks like this:

      02                   ; Code: Response
      01                   ; Identifier: 1
      00 44                ; Length: 68 octets
      12                   ; Type: EAP-SIM
         0d                ; EAP-SIM subtype: Re-authentication
         00 00             ; (reserved)
         81                ; Attribute type: AT_IV
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            cd f7 ff a6    ; IV value
            5d e0 4c 02
            6b 56 c8 6b
            76 b1 02 ea
         82                ; Attribute type: AT_ENCR_DATA
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            b6 ed d3 82
            79 e2 a1 42
            3c 1a fc 5c
            45 5c 7d 56
         0b                ; Attribute type: AT_MAC
            05             ; Attribute length: 20 octets (5*4)
            00 00          ; (reserved)
            fa f7 6b 71    ; MAC value
            fb e2 d2 55
            b9 6a 35 66
            c9 15 c6 17



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   The MAC is calculated over the EAP packet above (with MAC value set
   to zero), followed by the NONCE_S value (a total of 84 bytes).

   The next packet will be EAP-Success:

      03                   ; Code: Success
      01                   ; Identifier: 1
      00 04                ; Length: 4 octets


Appendix B. Pseudo-Random Number Generator

   The "|" character denotes concatenation, and "^" denotes
   exponentiation.

   Step 1: Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key, XKEY

   Step 2: In hexadecimal notation let
       t = 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0
       This is the initial value for H0|H1|H2|H3|H4
       in the FIPS SHS <xref target="SHA-1"/>

   Step 3: For j = 0 to m - 1 do
         3.1 XSEED_j = 0 /* no optional user input */
         3.2 For i = 0 to 1 do
             a. XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED_j) mod 2^b
             b. w_i = G(t, XVAL)
             c. XKEY = (1 + XKEY + w_i) mod 2^b
         3.3 x_j = w_0|w_1






















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   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
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