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Versions: (draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion) 00 01 draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload

DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                              K. Nishizuka
Expires: January 6, 2020                              NTT Communications
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                            July 5, 2019


  DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case and DOTS Deployment Considerations
               draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-usecase-01

Abstract

   This document describes a DDoS mitigation offload use case and DOTS
   deployment consideration of the use case.  This use case assumes that
   a DMS (DDoS Mitigation System) whose utilization rate is high sends
   its blocked traffic information to an orchestrator using DOTS
   protocols, then the orchestrator requests forwarding nodes such as
   routers to filter the traffic.  Doing so enables service providers to
   mitigate DDoS attack traffic automatically while ensuring
   interoperability and distributed filter enforcement.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home . . . . . .  11
       5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Volume-based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are critical threats to be handled by service
   providers.  When such attacks occur, service providers have to
   mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their services.

   Therefore, for the service providers to immediately protect their
   network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be
   automated.  To automate DDoS attack mitigation, it is desirable that
   multi-vendor elements involved in DDoS attack detection and
   mitigation collaborate and support standard interfaces to
   communicate.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data between the multi-
   vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
   This document describes an automated DDoS Mitigation offload use case



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   inherited from the DDoS orchestration use case
   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], which ambitions to enable cost-effective
   DDoS Mitigation.  Furthermore, this document describes deployment
   consideration for network operators who carry out this use-case using
   DOTS protocols in their network.

2.  Terminology

   The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]

   In addition, this document uses the terms defined below:

   Mitigation offload:  Getting rid of a DMS's mitigation action and
      assigning the action to another entity when the utilization rate
      of the DMS reaches a given threshold.  How such threshold is set
      is deployment-specific.

   Utilization rate:  A scale to measure load of an entity such as link
      utilization rate or CPU utilization rate.

3.  The Problem

   In general, DDoS countermeasures are divided into detection and
   filtering, and detection is technically difficult.  DDoS Mitigation
   System (DMS) can detect attack traffic based on the technology of
   their vendors, so service providers can increase DDoS countermeasure
   level by deploying the DMS in their network.

   However, the number/capacity of DMS instances that can be deployed in
   a service providers network is limited due to equipment cost and
   dimensioning matters.  Thus, DMS's utilization rate can reach its
   maximum capacity faster when the volume of DDoS attacks is enormous.
   When the rate reaches maximum capacity, the mitigation strategy needs
   to offload mitigation actions from the DMS to cost-effective
   forwarding nodes such as routers.

4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case

   This section describes offloading mitigation action from DMS whose
   utilization rate is high to cost-effective forwarding node using DOTS
   protocols.  This section does not consider deployments where the
   network orchestrator and DMS are co-located.

   Figures 1 and 2 show a component diagram and a sequence diagram of
   the use case, respectively.





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   +--------------+        +-----------+
   |              |        | DDoS      |+
   | Orchestrator |<-------| mitigation||
   |              |S DOTS C| systems   ||
   +--------------+        +-----------+|
          |                  +----------+
          | e.g., BGP, BGP Flowspec
          |
          |  +------------------+
          +->| Forwarding nodes |+
             +------------------+|
               +-----------------+
       * C is for DOTS Client function
       * S is for DOTS Server function

      Figure 1: Component Diagram of DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case

   The component diagram shown in Figure 1 differs from that of DDoS
   Orchestration use case in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] in some respects.
   First, the DMS embeds a DOTS client to send DOTS requests to the
   orchestrator.  Second, the orchestrator sends a request to underlying
   forwarding nodes to filter the attack traffic.

   +------------+          +----------+   +------------+
   |            |          |DDoS      |+  | Forwarding |+
   |Orchestrator|          |Mitigation||  | Nodes      ||
   |            |          |Systems   ||  |            ||
   +------------+          +----------+|  +------------+|
        |                   +----------+   +------------+
        |                         |              |
        | DOTS Request            |              |
        |S<----------------------C|              |
        |                         |              |
        | e.g., BGP, BGP Flowspec |              |
        | Filter Attack Traffic   |              |
        |-------------------------|------------->|
        |                         |              |
        * C is for DOTS Client function
        * S is for DOTS Server function

      Figure 2: Sequence Diagram of DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case

   In this use case, it is assumed that volume based attack already hits
   a network and attack traffic is detected and blocked by a DMS in the
   network.  When the volume-based attack becomes intense, DMS's
   utilization rate can reach a certain threshold (e.g., maximum
   capacity).  Then, the DMS sends a DOTS request as offload request to
   the orchestrator with the actions to enforce on the traffic.  After



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   that, the orchestrator requests the forwarding nodes to filter attack
   traffic by dissemination of flow specification rules protocols such
   as BGP Flowspec [RFC5575] on the basis of the blocked traffic
   information.

   This use case is divided into two cases based on type of link between
   the DMS and the orchestrator: "out-of-band case" and "in-band case".

   "Out-of-band case" is that the DMS sends a DOTS request to the
   orchestrator with blocked traffic information by the DMS via out-of-
   band link.  The link is not congested when it is under volume attack-
   time, so the link can convey a lot of information.

   On the other hand, "in-band case" is that the DMS sends a mitigation
   request to the orchestrator with blocked traffic information by the
   DMS via in-band channel.  The link can be congested when it is under
   volume attack-time, so the link can convey limited information.

5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations

   This section describes deployment considerations: what type of DOTS
   protocol can be used and what type of information can be conveyed by
   DOTS protocol in this use case.  Figure 3 shows overview of the DOTS
   signaling method and conveyed information for the out-of-band case
   and in-band case.

   The volume of information should be considered carefully when DOTS
   protocol is used in in-band-case.  What type of information can be
   conveyed by DMS relys on attack type detected by the DMS: reflection
   attack or non-reflection attack.  When it is under non-reflection
   attack, src_ip and src_port information cannot be conveyed because
   attackers usually randomize the parameters so number of its become
   enormous.  On the other hand, when it is under reflection attack,
   dst_port information cannot be conveyed because attackers usually
   randomize src_port so the number of dst_port of attack packets
   reached to victim become enormous.  Furthermore, when it is under
   reflection attack, src_ip information cannot be conveyed when number
   of reflector is enormous.













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  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |             |        Reflection Attack          |  Non-Reflection  |
  |             |                                   |     Attack       |
  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  | Out-of-band | Attack Time                                          |
  |     case    | Method : Data Channel                                |
  |             | Info : src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port, protocol  |
  +-------------+-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |   In-band   | Attack Time                       | Attack Time      |
  |    case     | (Number of reflector is small)    | Method : Signal  |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel Call Home |          Channel |
  |             | Info : src_ip, src_port,          | Info : dst_ip,   |
  |             |        dst_ip, protocol           |        dst_port, |
  |             +-----------------------------------+        protocol  |
  |             | Attack Time                       |                  |
  |             | (Number of reflector is enormous) |                  |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel Call Home |                  |
  |             | Info : src_port, dst_ip, protocol |                  |
  |             +-----------------------------------+------------------+
  |             | Peace Time                        | Peace Time       |
  |             | Method : Data Channel             | Method : Data    |
  |             | Info : src_port,                  |          Channel |
  |             |        dst_ip, protocol           | Info : dst_ip,   |
  |             |                                   |        dst_port, |
  |             |                                   |        protocol  |
  |             |                                   |                  |
  |             | Attack Time                       | Attack Time      |
  |             | Method : Signal Channel           | Method : Signal  |
  |             |          Control Filtering        |          Channel |
  |             | Info : ACL name                   | Control Filtering|
  |             |                                   | Info : ACL name  |
  |-------------+------------------------------------------------------+


            Figure 3: Signaling Method and Conveyed Information

   About offloading DMS against reflection attack, the current signal
   channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is insufficient in terms of
   conveying src information.  On the other hand, both call home
   expansion [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] and Filtering control
   expansion [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] can convey src
   information.

   Signal channel expansion of call home defines source-* clauses so it
   can convey src_ip information and src_port information in attack
   time.  On the other hand, filtering control expansion can activate
   filtering rule configured in peacetime.  Filtering rule for well-
   known port numbers abused for reflection attack can be configured to



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   DOTS server in peacetime.  However, filtering rule for reflector's ip
   address in attack time can't be known in peace time.  So filtering
   control expansion can convey src_port information but can't send
   src_ip information against reflection attack.  About sending src
   information in the DMS offload use case, the capability of the call
   home extension encompasses the capabilities of the filtering control
   extension.

   Hereafter, this document describes example of use DOTS protocol in
   each case.

5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link

   In this case, the link is not congested when it is under volume
   attack-time, so DOTS data channel [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] is
   suitable because DOTS data channel has capability of conveying the
   drop-listed filtering rules including (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
   dst_port, protocol) information (and other actions such as 'rate-
   limit').

5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel

   The procedure to use DOTS Data Channel in such case is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of flow (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
      dst_port, protocol) information which the DMS is blocking/rate-
      limiting and wants to offload.

   o  The DMS creates data-channel ACL such as shown figure 4.

   o  The DMS sends the data-channel ACL to the orchestrator.

       {
         "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
           "acl": [
             {
               "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL",
               "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
               "activation-type": "immediate",
               "aces": {
                 "ace": [
                   {
                     "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACE_00",
                     "matches": {
                       "ipv4": {
                         "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                         "source-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.2/32",
                         "protocol":17



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                       },
                       "udp": {
                         "source-port": {
                           "operator": "eq",
                           "port": 53
                         }
                       }
                     },
                     "actions": {
                       "forwarding": "drop"
                     }
                   },
                   {
                     "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACE_01",
                     "matches": {
                       "ipv4": {
                         "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                         "source-ipv4-network": "203.0.113.3/32",
                         "protocol":17
                       },
                       "udp": {
                         "source-port": {
                           "operator": "eq",
                           "port": 53
                         }
                       }
                     },
                     "actions": {
                       "forwarding": "drop"
                     }
                   }
                 ]
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       }

    Figure 4: JSON Example of ACL including (src_ip, src_port, dst_ip,
       dst_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS data channel

5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link

   In this case, the link can be congested when it is under volume
   attack-time, so DOTS data channel can't be used to convey the drop-
   listed filtering rules as blocked traffic information [Interop].  On
   the other hand, DOTS signal channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel],
   the source-* clauses defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] and



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   flitering control [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] can be used
   to communicate the policies to the orchestrator.

5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel

   DOTS signal channel has capability to send (dst_ip, dst_port,
   protocol) information.  The procedure to use DOTS Signal Channel in
   this case is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown figure 5.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.



































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   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
              "lower-port": 80
             },
             {
              "lower-port": 443
             }
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         },
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-port-range": [
             {
              "lower-port": 53
             },
             {
              "lower-port": 123
             }
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             17
           ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

       Figure 5: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip,
      dst_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel








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5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home

   DOTS signal channel call home [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home] has
   capability to send (dst_ip, dst_port, src_ip, src_port, protocol)
   information.  The channel can convey src_ip information when number
   of reflector detected by DMS is small.  The procedure to use DOTS
   call home in the situation is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_ip, src_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown figure 6.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "source-prefix": [
            "203.0.113.2/32"
            ],
            "source-port-range" : [
            {
             "lower-port": 53
            },
            {
             "lower-port": 123
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         },
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "source-prefix": [
            "203.0.113.3/32"



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            ],
            "source-port-range" : [
            {
             "lower-port": 19
            },
            {
             "lower-port": 11211
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 6: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip, src_ip,
      src_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel

   On the other hand, signal channel call home cannot convey src_ip
   information when number of reflector detected by DMS is enormous.
   The procedure to use DOTS call home in the situation is as follows:

   o  The DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_port, protocol)
      information which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.

   o  The DMS creates mitigation request such as shown figure 7.

   o  The DMS sends the mitigation requests to the orchestrator.






















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   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
           "192.0.2.2/32"
           ],
           "target-protocol": [
             6
           ],
            "source-port-range" : [
            {
             "lower-port": 53
            },
            {
             "lower-port": 123
            },
            {
             "lower-port": 19
            },
            {
             "lower-port": 11211
            }
            ],
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

       Figure 7: JSON Example of offload request including (dst_ip,
      src_port, protocol) information conveyed by DOTS signal channel

5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering

   DOTS signal channel controlling filtering
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] has capability to activate or
   deactivate ACL configured by Data Channel.  Against reflection
   attack, DOTS client configures ACL including (dst_ip, src_port,
   protocol) information in peace time by Data Channel, and DOTS client
   activate the ACL in attack time by Signal Channel controlling
   filtering.  Note that the src_port is well known port abused to carry
   out reclection attack by attacker.  The procedure to use DOTS data
   channel and signal channel controlling filtering is as follows:

   o  In peace time, the DMS sends the ACL including (dst_ip, src_port,
      protocol) information such as figure 8.




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   o  In attack time, the DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, src_port,
      protocol) which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.  After that, the DMS sends the mitigation requests to
      activate corresponding ACL configured to the orchestrator such as
      figure 9.

   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL_DNS_amp",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 53
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               },
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL_NTP_amp",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":17
                   },
                   "udp": {
                     "source-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 123
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {



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                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 8: JSON Example of ACL including (dst_ip, src_port, protocol)
                 information conveyed by DOTS data channel

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
              "192.0.2.2/32"
            ],
            "target-protocol": [
              17
            ],
            "acl-list": [
              {
                "acl-name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL_DNS_amp",
                "activation-type": "immediate"
              }
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 9: JSON Example of including acl name conveyed by DOTS signal
                                  channel

   Against non-reflection attack, DOTS client configures ACL including
   (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol) information in peace time by Data
   Channel, and DOTS client activate the acl in attack time by Signal
   Channel.  Note that the dst_port is well known port abused to carry
   out non-reclection attack by attacker.  The procedure to use DOTS
   data channel and signal channel controlling filtering is as follows:

   o  In peace time, the DMS sends the ACL including (dst_ip, dst_port,
      protocol) information such as figure 10.





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   o  In attack time, the DMS generates a list of (dst_ip, dst_port,
      protocol) which the DMS is blocking/rate-limiting and wants to
      offload.  After that, the DMS sends the mitigation requests to
      activate corresponding ACL configured to the orchestrator such as
      figure 11.

   {
     "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
       "acl": [
         {
           "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_ACL",
           "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
           "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
           "aces": {
             "ace": [
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_HTTP_GET_Flooding",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 80
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {
                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               },
               {
                 "name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_SYN_Flooding_FTP",
                 "matches": {
                   "ipv4": {
                     "destination-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.2/32",
                     "protocol":6
                   },
                   "tcp": {
                     "destination-port": {
                       "operator": "eq",
                       "port": 20
                     }
                   }
                 },
                 "actions": {



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                   "forwarding": "drop"
                 }
               }
             ]
           }
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 10: JSON Example of ACL including (dst_ip, dst_port, protocol)
                 information conveyed by DOTS data channel

   {
     "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
       "scope": [
         {
           "target-prefix": [
              "192.0.2.2/32"
            ],
            "target-protocol": [
              6
            ],
            "acl-list": [
              {
                "acl-name": "DMS_Offload_use_case_HTTP_GET_Flooding",
                "activation-type": "immediate"
              }
           "lifetime": 3600
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   Figure 11: JSON Example of including ACL name conveyed by DOTS signal
                                  channel

6.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] and
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] are to be taken into account.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.






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8.  Acknowledgement

   Thanks to Tirumaleswar Reddy, Shunsuke Homma for the comments.
   Thanks to Koichi Sakurada for demonstrating proof of concepts of this
   .

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
              Boucadair, M. and R. K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service
              Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification",
              draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-29 (work in progress), May
              2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., K, R., and R. Moskowitz, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-22 (work in
              progress), March 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., and J. Shallow, "Distributed Denial-
              of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
              Call Home", draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-02 (work in
              progress), May 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
              ietf-dots-signal-channel-34 (work in progress), May 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control]
              Nishizuka, K., Boucadair, M., K, R., and T. Nagata,
              "Controlling Filtering Rules Using Distributed Denial-of-
              Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel",
              draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control-01 (work in
              progress), May 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
              Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
              Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
              Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17 (work
              in progress), January 2019.





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9.2.  Informative References

   [Interop]  Nishizuka, K., Shallow, J., and L. Xia , "DOTS Interop
              test report, IETF 103 Hackathon", November 2018,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/
              slides-103-dots-interop-report-from-ietf-103-hackathon-
              00>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.

Authors' Addresses

   Yuhei Hayashi
   NTT
   3-9-11, Midori-cho
   Musashino-shi, Tokyo  180-8585
   Japan

   Email: yuuhei.hayashi@gmail.com


   Kaname Nishizuka
   NTT Communications
   GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
   Tokyo  108-8118
   Japan

   Email: kaname@nttv6.jp


   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com







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