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Versions: 00 draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility

Internet-Draft                                                R. Housley
Intended Status: Best Current Practice                    Vigil Security
Expires: 20 June 2014                                   20 December 2013


              Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility
                 <draft-housley-crypto-alg-agility-00.txt>

Abstract

   Many IETF protocols may use of cryptographic algorithms to provide
   confidentiality, integrity, or non-repudiation.  Communicating peers
   must support the same cryptographic algorithm or algorithms for these
   mechanisms to work properly.  This memo provides guidelines for
   ensuring that such a protocol has the ability to migrate from one
   algorithm to another over time.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.









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Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility             December 2013


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   Many IETF protocols may use of cryptographic algorithms to provide
   confidentiality, integrity, or non-repudiation.  For the mechanisms
   to work properly,communicating peers must support the same
   cryptographic algorithm or algorithms.  Yet, cryptographic algorithms
   become weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are
   developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to
   break a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  For the
   protocol implementer, this means that implementations should be
   modular to easily accommodate the insertion of new algorithms.  For
   the protocol designer, this means that one or more algorithm
   identifier must be carried, the set of mandatory to implement
   algorithms will change over time, and an IANA registry of algorithm
   identifiers will be needed.

1.1.  Terminology

   The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
   SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
   document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Guidelines

   These guidelines are for use by IETF working groups and protocol
   authors for IETF protocols that make use of cryptographic algorithms.

2.1.  Algorithm Identifiers

   IETF protocols that make use of cryptographic algorithms MUST carry
   one or more algorithm identifier.

   Some approaches carry one identifier for each algorithm that is used.
   Other approaches carry one identifier for a suite of algorithms.
   Either approach is acceptable; however, designers are encouraged to
   pick one of these approaches and use it consistently throughout the
   protocol.




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   An IANA registry SHOULD be used for these algorithm identifiers.

2.2.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms

   For interoperability, communicating peers must support the same
   cryptographic algorithm or algorithms.  For this reason, the protocol
   SHOULD specify one or more mandatory to implement algorithm.  This is
   not done for protocols that are embedded in other protocols.  For
   example, S/MIME [RFC5751] makes use of CMS [RFC5652].  Other
   protocols also make use of CMS.  S/MIME specifies the mandatory to
   implement algorithms, not CMS.

   The IETF must be able to change the mandatory to implement algorithms
   over time.  It is highly desirable to make this change without
   updating the base protocol specification.  Therefore the base
   protocol specification SHOULD reference a companion algorithms
   document, allowing the update of one document without necessarily
   requiring an update to the other.  This division also facilitates the
   advancement of the base protocol specification on the maturity ladder
   even if the algorithm document changes frequently.

   Some cryptographic algorithms are inherently tied to a specific key
   size, but others allows many different key sizes.  When more than one
   key size is available, the algorithm specification MUST identify the
   specific sizes that are to be supported.

   Guidance on cryptographic key size for public keys can be found in
   BCP 86 [RFC3766].

   Symmetric keys used for protection of long-term values SHOULD be at
   least 128 bits.

2.3.  Balance Security Strength

   When selecting a suite of cryptographic algorithms, the strength of
   each algorithm MUST be considered.

   In CMS [RFC5652], a previously distributed symmetric key-encryption
   key can be used to encrypt a content-encryption key, which is in turn
   used to encrypt the content.  The key-encryption and content-
   encryption algorithms are often different.  If, for example, a
   message content is encrypted with 168-bit Triple-DES key and the
   Triple-DES content-encryption key is wrapped with a 40-bit RC2 key,
   then at most 40 bits of protection is provided.  Thus, a trivial
   search to determine the value of the 40-bit RC2 key will recover
   Triple-DES key, and then the recovered Triple-DES key can be used to
   decrypt the content.  In this situation, the algorithm and key size
   selections should ensure that the key encryption is at least as



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   strong as the content encryption.

3.  Algorithm Agility Considerations

   Some attempts at algorithm agility have not been completely
   successful.  This section provides some of the insights based on
   protocol designs and deployments.

3.1.  Algorithm Identifiers

   If a protocol does not carry an algorithm identifier, then the
   protocol version number or some other major change is needed to
   transition from one algorithm to another.  The inclusion of an
   algorithm identifier is a minimal step toward cryptographic algorithm
   agility.  In addition, an IANA registry is needed to pair the
   identifier with an algorithm specification.

   Sometimes application layer protocols can make use of transport layer
   security protocols, such as TLS or DTLS.  This insulates the
   application layer protocol from the cryptography altogether, but it
   may still necessary to handle the transition to from unprotected to
   protected use of the the application layer protocol.

3.2.  Migration Mechanisms

   When a protocol specifies a single mandatory-to-implement algorithm
   for integrity and authentication algorithm, eventually that algorithm
   will be found to be weak.  Perhaps there will be a flaw found in the
   algorithm that greatly shortens its expected life.  Regardless, all
   algorithms age, and the advances in computing power available to the
   attacker will eventually make them obsolete.  For this reason,
   protocols need mechanisms to migrate from one algorithm to another
   over time.

   Extra care is needed when a mandatory-to-implement algorithm is used
   to provide integrity protection for the negotiation of other
   cryptographic algorithms used by the protocol.  In this situation, a
   flaw in the mandatory-to-implement algorithm may allow an attacker to
   influence the choices of other algorithms.

3.3.  Cryptographic Key Management

   Traditionally, protocol designers have avoided a more than one
   approach to key management because it makes the security analysis of
   the overall protocol more difficult.  However, with the increasing
   deployment of frameworks such as EAP and GSSAPI, the key management
   is very flexible, often hiding many of the details from the
   application.  As a result, more and more protocols support multiple



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   key management approaches.  In fact, the key management approach may
   be negotiable, which creates a design challenge to protect the
   negotiation of the key management approach before it is used to
   produce cryptographic keys for the cryptographic algorithm.

   Protocols can negotiate a key management approach, derive an initial
   cryptographic key, and then authenticate the negotiation.  However,
   if the authentication fails, the only recourse is to start the
   negotiation over from the beginning.

   Some environments will restriction the key management approaches by
   policy.  Such policies tend to improve interoperability within a
   particular environment, but they cause problems for individuals that
   need to work in multiple incompatible environments.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document provides guidance to working groups and protocol
   designers.  The security of the Internet is improved when broken or
   weak cryptographic algorithms can be easily replaced with strong
   ones.

5.  References

   This section contains normative and informative references.

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For Public
             Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", BCP 86, RFC 3766,
             April 2004.

5.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
             RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
             Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
             Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.








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Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Bernard Aboba for his review and insightful comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Russell Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170
   USA
   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com







































Housley                                                         [Page 6]


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