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Versions: 00 01 draft-ietf-dnssd-privacyscaling

Network Working Group                                         C. Huitema
Internet-Draft                                      Private Octopus Inc.
Intended status: Informational                             June 29, 2018
Expires: December 31, 2018


                    DNS-SD Privacy Scaling Tradeoffs
                 draft-huitema-dnssd-privacyscaling-01

Abstract

   DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about
   both the devices offering services and the devices requesting
   services.  This information includes host names, network parameters,
   and possibly a further description of the corresponding service
   instance.  Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service
   Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy
   problem arises.

   The draft currently progressing in the DNS-SD Working Group assumes
   peer-to-peer pairing between the service to be discovered and each of
   its clients.  This has good security properties, but creates scaling
   issues, because each server needs to publish as many announcements as
   it has paired clients.  This leads to large number of operations when
   servers are paired with many clients.

   Different designs are possible.  For example, if there was only one
   server "discovery key" known by each authorized client, each server
   would only have to announce a single record, and clients would only
   have to process one response for each server that is present on the
   network.  Yet, these designs will present different privacy profiles,
   and pose different management challenges.  This draft analyses the
   tradeoffs between privacy and scaling in a set of different designs,
   using either shared secrets or public keys.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any




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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Privacy and Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Pairing secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Group public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Shared symmetric secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Shared public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Scaling properties of different solutions . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Comparing privacy posture of different solutions  . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Effects of compromized client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Effect of compromized server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Summary of tradeoffs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Survey of Implementations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.1.  DNS-SD Privacy Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.2.  Private IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless
   service discovery in local networks.  It is very convenient for
   users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and



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   requesting identities along with information about the offered and
   requested services.  Parts of the published information can seriously
   breach the users' privacy.  These privacy issues and potential
   solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].

   A recent draft [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] proposes to solve this
   problem by relying on device pairing.  Only clients that have paired
   with a device would be able to discover that device, and the
   discovery would not be observable by third parties.  This design has
   a number of good privacy and security properties, but it has a cost,
   because each server must provide separate annoucements for each
   client.  In this draft, we compare scaling and privacy properties of
   three different designs:

   o  The individual pairing defined in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy],

   o  A single server discovery secret, shared by all authorized
      clients,

   o  A single server discovery public key, known by all authorized
      clients.

   After presenting briefly these three solutions, the draft presents
   the scaling and privacy properties of each of them.

2.  Privacy and Secrets

   Private discovery tries to ensure that clients and servers can
   discover each other in a potentially hostile network context, while
   maintaining privacy.  Unauthorized third parties must not be able to
   discover that a specific server or device is currently present on the
   network, and they must not be able to discover that a particular
   client is trying to discover a particular service.  This cannot be
   achieved without some kind of shared secret between client and
   servers.  We review here three particular designs for sharing these
   secrets.

2.1.  Pairing secrets

   The solution proposed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] relies on pairing
   secrets.  Each client obtains a pairing secret from each server that
   they are authorized to use.  The servers publish announcements of the
   form "nonce|proof", in which the proof is the hash of the nonce and
   the pairing secret.  The proof is of course different for each
   client, because the secrets are different.  For better scaling, the
   nonce is common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of
   time, such as the current 30 minutes interval.




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   Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing
   the current nonce and proof.  Servers respond to these queries if the
   nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the
   hash of the nonce with one of the pairing key of an authorized
   client.

2.2.  Group public keys

   In contrast to pair-wise shared secrets, applications may associate
   public and private key pairs with groups of equally authorized
   clients.  This is identical to the pairwise sharing case if each
   client is given a unique key pair.  However, this option permits
   multiple users to belong to the same group associated with a public
   key, depending on the type of public key and cryptographic scheme
   used.  For example, broadcast encryption is a scheme where many
   users, each with their own private key, can access content encrypted
   under a single broadcast key.  The scaling properties of this variant
   depend not only on how private keys are managed, but also on the
   associated cryptographic algorithm(s) by which those keys are used.

2.3.  Shared symmetric secret

   Instead of using a different secret for each client as in
   Section 2.1, another design is to have a single secret per server,
   shared by all authorized clients of that server.  As in the previous
   solution, the servers publish announcements of the form
   "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single
   announcement per server, because each server maintains a single
   discovery secret.  Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and
   defined as a coarse function of time.

   Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing
   the current nonce and proof.  Servers respond to these queries if the
   nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the
   hash of the nonce with one of the discovery secrets.

2.4.  Shared public key

   Instead of a discovery secret used in Section 2.3, clients could
   obtain the public keys of the servers that they are authorized to
   use.

   Many public key systems assume that the public key of the server is,
   well, not secret.  But if adversaries know the public key of a
   server, they can use that public key as a unique identifier to track
   the server.  Moreover, they could use variations of the padding
   oracle to observe discovery protocol messages and attribute them to a
   specific public key, thus breaking server privacy.  For these



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   reasons, we assume here that the discovery public key is kept secret,
   only known to authorized clients.

   As in the previous solution, the servers publish announcements of the
   form "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single
   announcement per server, because each server maintains a single
   discovery secret.  The proof is obtained by either hashing the nonce
   with the public key, or using the public key to encrypt the nonce --
   the point being that both clients and server can construct the proof.
   Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and defined as a
   coarse function of time.

   The advantage of public key based solutions is that the clients can
   easily verify the identity of the server, for example if the service
   is accessed over TLS.  On the other hand, just using standard TLS
   would disclose the certificate of the server to any client that
   attempts a connection, not just to authorized clients.  The server
   should thus only accept connections from clients that demonstrate
   knowledge of its public key.

3.  Scaling properties of different solutions

   To analyze scaling issues we will use the following variables:

   N: The average number of authorized clients per server.

   G: The average number of authorized groups per server.

   M: The average number of servers per client.

   P: The average total number of servers present during discovery.

   The big difference between the three proposals is the number of
   records that need to be published by a server when using DNS-SD in
   server mode, or the number of broadcast messages that needs to be
   announced per server in mDNS mode:

   Pairing secrets:  O(N): One record per client.

   Group public keys:  O(G): One record per group.

   Shared symmetric secret:  O(1): One record for all (shared) clients.

   Shared public key:  O(1): One record for all (shared) clients.

   There are other elements of scaling, linked to the mapping of the
   privacy discovery service to DNS-SD.  DNS-SD identifies services by a
   combination of a service type and an instance name.  In classic



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   mapping behavior, clients send a query for a service type, and will
   receive responses from each server instance supporting that type:

   Pairing secrets:  O(P*N): There are O(P) servers present, and each
      publishes O(N) instances.

   Group public keys:  O(P*G): There are O(P) servers present, and each
      publishes O(G) instances.

   Shared symmetric secret:  O(P): One record per server present.

   Shared public secret:  O(P): One record per server present.

   The DNS-SD Privacy draft suggests an optimization that considerably
   reduces the considerations about scaling of responses -- see section
   4.6 of [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy].  In that case, clients compose the
   list of instance names that they are looking for, and specifically
   query for these instance names:

   Pairing secrets:  O(M): The client will compose O(M) queries to
      discover all the servers that it is interested in.  There will be
      at most O(M) responses.

   Group public keys:  O(M): The client will compose O(M) queries to
      discover all the servers that it is interested in.  There will be
      at most O(M) responses.

   Shared symmetric secret:  O(M): Same behavior as in the pairing
      secret case.

   Shared public secret:  O(M): Same behavior as in the pairing secret
      case.

   Finally, another element of scaling is cacheability.  Responses to
   DNS queries can be cached by DNS resolvers, and mDNS responses can be
   cached by mDNS resolvers.  If several clients send the same queries,
   and if previous responses could be cached, the client can be served
   immediately.  There are of course differences between the solutions:

   Pairing secrets:  No caching possible, since there are separate
      server instances for separate clients.

   Group public keys:  Caching is possible for among members of a group.

   Shared symmetric secret:  Caching is possible, since there is just
      one server instance.





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   Shared public secret:  Caching is possible, since there is just one
      server instance.

4.  Comparing privacy posture of different solutions

   The analysis of scaling issues in Section 3 shows that the solutions
   base on a common discovery secret or discovery public key scale much
   better than the solutions based on pairing secret.  All these
   solutions protect against tracking of clients or servers by third
   parties, as long as the secret on which they rely are kept secret.
   There are however significant differences in privacy properties,
   which become visible when one of the clients becomes compromised.

4.1.  Effects of compromized client

   If a client is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the
   secrets owned by that client.  The effects will be the following:

   Pairing secrets:  With a valid pairing key, the adversary can issue
      queries and parse announcements.  It will be able to track the
      presence of all the servers to which the compromised client was
      paired.  It may be able to track other clients of these servers if
      it can infer that multiple independent instances are tied to the
      same server, for example by assessing the IP address associated
      with a specific instance.  It will not be able to impersonate the
      servers for other clients.

   Group public keys:  With a valid group private key, the adversary can
      issue queries and parse announcements.  It will be able to track
      the presence of all the servers with which the compromised group
      was authenticated.  It may be able to track other clients of these
      servers if it can infer that multiple independent instances are
      tied to the same server, for example by assessing the IP address
      associated with a specific instance.  It will not be able to
      impersonate the servers for other clients or groups.

   Shared symmetric secret:  With a valid discovery secret, the
      adversary can issue queries and parse announcements.  It will be
      able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised
      client could discover.  It will also be able to detect the clients
      that try to use one of these servers.  This will not reveal the
      identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network
      analysis.  The adversary will also be able to spoof the server's
      announcements, which could be the first step in a server
      impersonation attack.

   Shared public secret:  With a valid discovery public key, the
      adversary can issue queries and parse announcements.  It will be



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      able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised
      client could discover.  It will also be able to detect the clients
      that try to use one of these servers.  This will not reveal the
      identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network
      analysis.  The adversary will not be able to spoof the server's
      announcements, or to impersonate the server.

4.2.  Revocation

   Assume an administrator discovers that a client has been compromised.
   As seen in Section 4.1, compromising a client entails a loss of
   privacy for all the servers that the client was authorized to use,
   and also to all other users of these servers.  The worse situation
   happens in the solutions based on "discovery secrets", but no
   solution provides a great defense.  The administrator will have to
   remedy the problem, which means different actions based on the
   different solutions:

   Pairing secrets:  The administrator will need to revoke the pairing
      keys used by the compromised client.  This implies contacting the
      O(M) servers to which the client was paired.

   Group public key:  The administrator must revoke the private key
      associated with the compromised group members and, depending on
      the cryptographic scheme in use, generate new private keys for
      each existing, non-compromised group member.  The latter is
      necessary for public key encryption schemes wherein group access
      is permitted based on ownership (or not) to an included private
      key.  Some public key encryption schemes permit revocation without
      rotating any non-compromised group member private keys.

   Shared symmetric secret:  The administrator will need to revoke the
      discovery secrets used by the compromised client.  This implies
      contacting the O(M) servers that the client was authorized to
      discover, and then the O(N) clients of each of these servers.
      This will require a total of O(N*M) management operations.

   Shared public secret:  The administrator will need to revoke the
      discovery public keys used by the compromised client.  This
      implies contacting the O(M) servers that the client was authorized
      to discover, and then the O(N) clients of each of these servers.
      Just as in the case of discovery secrets, this will require O(N*M)
      management operations.

   The revocation of public keys might benefit from some kind of
   centralized revocation list, and thus may actually be easier to
   organize than simple scaling considerations would dictate.




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4.3.  Effect of compromized server

   If a server is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the
   secrets owned by that server.  The effects are pretty much the same
   in all configurations.  With a set of valid credentials, the
   adversary can impersonate the server.  It can track all of the
   server's clients.  There are no differences between the various
   solutions.

   As remedy, once the compromise is discovered, the administrator will
   have to revoke the credentials of O(N) clients, or O(G) groups,
   connected to that server.  In all cases, this could be done by
   notifying all potential clients to not trust this particular server
   anymore.

5.  Summary of tradeoffs

   In the preceding sections, we have reviewed the scaling and privacy
   properties of three possible secret sharing solutions for privacy
   discovery.  The comparison can be summed up as follow:

     +-------------------------+---------+------------+-------------+
     |         Solution        | Scaling | Resistance | Remediation |
     +-------------------------+---------+------------+-------------+
     |      Pairing secret     |   Poor  |    Bad     |     Good    |
     |     Group public key    |  Medium |    Bad     |    Maybe    |
     | Shared symmetric secret |   Good  | Really bad |     Poor    |
     |   Shared public secret  |   Good  |    Bad     |    Maybe    |
     +-------------------------+---------+------------+-------------+

              Table 1: Comparison of secret sharing solutions

   All four types of solutions provide reasonable privacy when the
   secrets are not compromised.  They all have poor resistance to the
   compromise of a client, as explained in Section 4.1, but sharing a
   symmetric secret is much worse because it does not prevent server
   impersonation.  The pairing secret solution scales worse than the
   discovery secret and discovery public key solutions.  The group
   public key scales as the number of groups for the total set of
   clients; this depends on group assignment and will be intermediate
   between the pairing secret and shared secret solutions.  The pairing
   secret solution can recover from a compromise with a smaller number
   of updates, but the public key solutions may benefit from a simple
   recovery solution using some form of "revocation list".







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6.  Security Considerations

   This document does not specify a solution, but discusses future
   choices when providing privacy for discovery protocols.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This draft does not require any IANA action.

8.  Acknowledgments

   This draft results from initial feedback in the DNS SD working group
   on [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy].  The text on Group public keys is based
   on Chris Wood's contributions.

9.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing]
              Huitema, C. and D. Kaiser, "Device Pairing Using Short
              Authentication Strings", draft-ietf-dnssd-pairing-04 (work
              in progress), April 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]
              Huitema, C. and D. Kaiser, "Privacy Extensions for DNS-
              SD", draft-ietf-dnssd-privacy-04 (work in progress), April
              2018.

   [KW14a]    Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Adding Privacy to Multicast
              DNS Service Discovery", DOI 10.1109/TrustCom.2014.107,
              2014, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
              articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7011331>.

   [KW14b]    Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Efficient Privacy Preserving
              Multicast DNS Service Discovery",
              DOI 10.1109/HPCC.2014.141, 2014,
              <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
              articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7056899>.

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.






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   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [SIGMA]    Krawczyk, H., "SIGMA: The 'SIGn-and-MAc'approach to
              authenticated Diffie-Hellman and its use in the IKE
              protocols", 2003, <http://link.springer.com/content/
              pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24.pdf>.

   [Wu16]     Wu, D., Taly, A., Shankar, A., and D. Boneh, "Privacy,
              discovery, and authentication for the internet of things",
              2016, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1604.06959.pdf%22>.

Appendix A.  Survey of Implementations

   This section surveys several private service discovery designs in the
   context of the threat model detailed above.

A.1.  DNS-SD Privacy Extensions

   Huitema and Kaiser [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] decompose private service
   discovery into two stages: (1) identify specific peers offering
   private services, and (2) issue unicast DNS-SD queries to those hosts
   after connecting over TLS using a previously agreed upon pre-shared
   key (PSK), or pairing key.  Any out-of-band pairing mechanism will
   suffice for PSK establishment, though the authors specifically
   mention [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing] as the pairing mechanism.  Step (1)
   is done by broadcasting "private instance names" to local peers,
   using service-specific pairing keys.  A private instance name N' for
   some service with name N is composed of a unique nonce r and
   commitment to r using N_k.  Commitments are constructed by hashing
   N_k with the nonce.  Only owners of N_k may verify its correctness
   and, upon doing so, answer as needed.  The draft recommends
   randomizing hostnames in SRV responses along with other identifiers,
   such as MAC addresses, to minimize likability to specific hosts.
   Note that this alone does not prevent fingerprinting and tracking
   using that hostname.  However, when done in conjunction with steps
   (1) and (2) above, this mitigates fingerprinting and tracking since
   different hostnames are used across venues and real discovered
   services remain hidden behind private instance names.

   After discovering its peers, a node will directly connect to each
   device using TLS, authenticated with a PSK derived from each
   associated pairing key, and issue DNS-SD queries per usual.  DNS
   messages are formulated as per [RFC7858].





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   As an optimization, the authors recommend that each nonce be
   deterministically derived based on time so that commitment proofs may
   be precomputed asynchronously.  This avoids O(N*M) computation, where
   N is the number of nodes in a local network and M is the number of
   per-node pairings.

   This system has the following properties:

   1.  Symmetric work load: clients and servers can pre-compute private
       instance names as a function of their pairing secret and
       predictable nonce.

   2.  Mutual identity privacy: Both client and server identities are
       hidden from active and passive attackers that do not subvert the
       pairing process.

   3.  No client set size hiding: The number of private instance names
       reveals the number of unique pairings a server has with its
       clients.  (Servers may pad the list of records with random
       instance names, though this introduces more work for clients.)

   4.  Unlinkability: Private service names are unlinkable to post-
       discovery TLS connections.  (Note that if deterministic nonces
       repeat, servers risk linkability across private service names.)

   5.  No fingerprinting: Assuming servers use fresh nonces per private
       instance name, advertisements change regularly.

A.2.  Private IoT

   Boneh et al.  [Wu16] developed an approach for private service
   discovery that reduces to private mutual authentication.  Moreover,
   it should be infeasible for any adversary to forge advertisements or
   impersonate anyone else on the network.  Specifically, service
   discoverers only wish to reveal their identity to services they
   trust, and vice versa.  Existing protocols such as TLS, IKE, and
   SIGMA [SIGMA] require that one side reveal its identity first.  Their
   approach first allocates, via some policy manager, key pairs
   associated with human-readable policy names.  For example, user Alice
   might have a key pair associated with the names /Alice, /Alice/
   Family, and /Alice/Device.  Her key is bound to each of these names.
   Authentication policies (and trust models) are then expressed as
   policy prefix patterns, e.g., /Alice/*. Broadcast messages are
   encrypted to policies.  For example, Alice might encrypt a message m
   to the policy /Bob/*. Only Bob, who owns a private key bound to,
   e.g., /Bob/Devices, can decrypt m.  (This procedure uses a form of
   identity-based encryption called prefix-based encryption.  Readers
   are referred to [Wu16] for a thorough description.)



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   Using prefix- and policy-based encryption, service discovery is
   decomposed into two steps: (1) service announcement and (2) key
   exchange, similar to [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy].  Announcements carry
   service identities, ephemeral key shares, and a signature, all
   encrypted under the service's desired policy prefix, e.g., /Alice/
   Family/*. Upon receipt of an announcement, clients with matching
   policy private keys can decrypt the announcement and use the
   ephemeral key share to perform an Authenticated Diffie Hellman key
   exchange with the service.  Upon completion, the derived shared
   secret may be used for any further communication, e.g., DNS-SD
   queries, if needed.

   This system has the following properties:

   1.  Asymmetric work load: computation for clients is on the order of
       advertisements.

   2.  Mutual identity privacy: Both client and server identities are
       hidden from active and passive attackers.

   3.  Client set size hiding: Policy-based encryption advertisements
       hides the number of clients with matching policy keys.

   4.  Unlinkability: Client initiated connections are unlinkable to
       service advertisements (modulo network-layer connection
       information, such as advertisement origin and connection
       destination).

Author's Address

   Christian Huitema
   Private Octopus Inc.
   Friday Harbor, WA  98250
   U.S.A.

   Email: huitema@huitema.net















Huitema                 Expires December 31, 2018              [Page 13]


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