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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 draft-ietf-secevent-token

Network Working Group                                       P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track                              W. Denniss
Expires: February 12, 2017                                        Google
                                                               M. Ansari
                                                                   Cisco
                                                         August 11, 2016


                       Security Event Token (SET)
                      draft-hunt-idevent-token-02

Abstract

   This specification defines the Security Event token which may be
   distributed via a protocol such as HTTP.  A Security Event Token
   (SET) is based on the JSON Web Token and may be optionally signed
   and/or encrypted.  A SET describes a statement of fact that may be
   shared by an event publisher with registered subscribers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 12, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Events  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Core Event Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix C.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction and Overview

   This specification defines an extensible security event token (SET)
   format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP.  The
   specification builds on the JSON Web Token format [RFC7519] in order
   to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed using
   JSON Web Signature [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON Web
   Encryption [RFC7516].

   For the purpose of this specification an event is a statement of fact
   by a publisher (also known as the event issuer) that the state of a
   security subject (e.g. a web resource, token, IP address) it controls
   or is aware of, has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly).
   A security subject may be permanent (e.g. a User account) or
   temporary (e.g. a login session) in nature.  A state change may
   include direct changes of entity state, implicit changes to state or
   other higher-level security statements such as:

   o  The creation, modification, removal of a resource.

   o  The reseting or suspension of an account.

   o  The revoking of a security token prior to its expiry.

   o  The logout of a user session.  Or,



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   o  A cumulative conclusion such as to indicate that a user has taken
      over an email identifier that may have been used in the past by
      another user.

   Based on some agreed upon criteria for an event feed, the publisher
   distributes events to the appropriate subscribers.  While an event
   may be delivered via synchronous means (e.g.  HTTP POST), the
   distribution of the event often happens asynchronously to the change
   of state which generated the security event.  As an example, an
   OAuth2 Authorization server [RFC6749], having received a token
   revocation request [RFC7009], may issue a token revocation event to
   downstream web resource providers.  Having been informed of a token
   revocation, the OAuth2 web resource service provider may add the
   token identifier to its local revocation list assuming the token has
   not already expired.

   A subscriber having received an event, validates and interprets the
   event and takes its own independent action, if any.  For example,
   having been informed of a personal identifier now being associated
   with a different security subject (i.e. is being used by someone-
   else), the subscriber may choose to ensure that the new user is not
   granted access to resources associated with the previous user.  Or it
   may not have any relationship with the subject and no action is
   taken.

   While subscribers will often take actions upon receiving one or more
   events, events MUST NOT be assumed to be commands or requests.  To do
   so requires complex bi-directional signals and error recovery
   mechanisms which fall outside the scope of this specification.  The
   intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging
   statements of fact that subscribers may interpret for their own
   purposes.  Since events are typically historical statements by a
   publisher and are not commands, idempotency or lack there of, does
   not apply.

   Unless otherwise specified, this specification uses example events
   intended as non-normative examples showing how an event may be used.
   It is expected that other specifications will use this specification
   to define normative events.

   This specification is scoped to security and identity related events.
   While event tokens may be used for other purposes, the specification
   only considers security and privacy concerns relevant to identity and
   personal information.







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1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  These
   keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously specify
   requirements of the protocol or application features and behavior
   that affect the inter-operability and security of implementations.
   When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their
   natural-language sense.

   For purposes of readability examples are not URL encoded.
   Implementers MUST percent encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of
   [RFC3986].

   Throughout this documents all figures MAY contain spaces and extra
   line-wrapping for readability and space limitations.  Similarly, some
   URI's contained within examples, have been shortened for space and
   readability reasons.

1.2.  Definitions

   The following definitions are used with Identity Events:

   Feed Publisher
      The Feed Publisher provides events to be distributed to registered
      subscribers.  In JWT terminology, the Feed Publisher is also known
      as the issuer "iss").

   Event
      An event is a security event token that is a statement that is to
      be distributed to one or more registered subscribers.  An event is
      constructed as a JWT token and MAY be signed or encrypted using
      JWS/JWE for authentication and confidentiality reasons.

   Feed
      A feed a logical grouping of events or a context under which
      events may be issued.  An interested client registers with the
      Feed Publisher to subscribe to events associated with a feed.  How
      a feed is defined or the method for subscription is out-of-scope
      of this specification.

   Subscriber
      A Subscriber registers to receive event notifications from a Feed
      Publisher using a protocol such as HTTP.  The method of
      registration and delivery is out-of-scope of this specification.

   Security Subject



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      The security subject about which the event is about.  A security
      subject may be a principle (e.g.  Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519]), a web
      resource, or other thing such as an IP address about which an
      Event is about.

2.  Events

   A SET conveys a statement (in the form of a JWT token [RFC7519])
   about a Security Subject that may be of interest to a subscriber or
   set of subscribers receiving events from a Feed Publisher.

   The schema and structure of an event follows the JWT [RFC7519]
   specification.  An event token has the following characteristics:

   o  a common set of attributes common to every event at the top level
      including an events attribute describing the type of event, and

   o  one or more JSON sub-objects that attributes associated with an
      event URI value.  The attributes to be included with any
      particular event are to be defined by the event as specified by
      the event URI value in the "events" attribute.

   In addition to the JWT attributes "iss" and "aud", an SET contains
   the attribute "events" with at least one URI value used to indicate
   the type of event that has occurred and what information (attributes)
   may be present in the event token.  and what type of event (e.g.
   resource modified) is contained in the event token.

   An event MAY contain an attribute for each value of "events" whose
   value is a JSON object (also known as an event extension object) that
   contains additional attributes relevant to the specified event URI.
   For example, many events will include an "iss" that identifies the
   context of the Security Subject being reported (as distinct from the
   issuer of the SET), and a "sub" or "jti" or some other attribute that
   uniquely identifies the Security Subject.
















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   The following is a non-normative example showing a password change
   event that conveys a SCIM event (see [idevent-scim]):

   {
     "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
     "events":[
       "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset",
       "https://example.com/scim/event/password"
     ],
     "iat": 1458496025,
     "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
     "aud":[
       "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
       "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
     ],
     "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset":{
       "id":"44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
       "sub":
         "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"
     },
     "https://example.com/scim/event/password":{
        "resetAttempts":5
     }
   }

                Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event

   The event in the figure above expresses hypothetical password reset
   event for SCIM [RFC7644].  The JWT consists of:

   o  An _events_ attribute specifying the hypothetical SCIM urn
      ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset,
      and a custom extension, "https://example.com/scim/event/password",
      that is used to provide additional event information presumably
      specified by the location URI provided.

   o  An "iss" attribute which denotes the event publisher.

   o  The "aud" attribute specifies the intended audience for the event.
      In practical terms this MAY be the URI for the event feed that a
      client has subscribed to.

   Additional extensions to an event may be added by adding more values
   to the "events" attribute.  For each event URI value specified, there
   MAY be a corresponding attribute that has a JSON object that contains
   the attributes associated with that event (e.g.
   "https://example.com/scim/event/password").  In this example, the
   SCIM event indicates that a password has been updated and the current



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   password reset count is 5.  Notice that the value for "resetAttempts"
   is actually part of its own JSON object
   "https://example.com/scim/event/password".

   Here is another example event token, this one for a Logout Token:

   {
     "iss": "https://server.example.com",
     "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
     "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
     "iat": 1458668180,
     "exp": 1458668580,
     "events": [
       "https://specs.openid.net/logout"
     ],
     "https://specs.openid.net/logout": {
       "iss": "https://token.example.com",
       "sub": "248289761001",
       "jti": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02"
     }
   }

                   Figure 2: Example OpenID Logout Event

   In the above example, the event has its own issuer,
   "https://server.example.com" while the event is about the logging out
   of a user session identified in the event extension by "jti" that was
   issued by "https://token.example.com".























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   In the following example, a fictional medical service collects
   consent for medical actions and notifies other parties.  The
   individual for whom consent is identified was originally
   authenticated via OpenID Connect.  In this case, the issuer of the
   SET event is an application rather than the OpenID provider:

   {
     "jti": "fb4e75b5411e4e19b6c0fe87950f7749",
     "events":[
       "https://openid.net/heart/consent.html"
     ],
     "iat": 1458496025,
     "iss": "https://my.examplemed.com",
     "aud":[
       "https://examplemedlab/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754"
     ],
     "https://openid.net/heart/consent":{
       "iss": "https://token.example.com",
       "sub": "248289761001",
       "consentUri":[
         "https://terms.examplemed.com/labdisclosure.html#Agree"
       ]
     }
   }

                      Figure 3: Example Consent Event

   In the above example "iss" and "sub" contained within the attribute
   "https://openid.net/heart/consent", refer to the subject and issuer
   of the original OpendID Provider.  They are distinct from the top
   level value of "iss" which always refers to the issuer of the event;
   a medical consent service that is a relying party to the OpenID
   Provider.

2.1.  Core Event Attributes

   The following are attributes that are based on [RFC7519] claim
   definitions and are profiled for use in an event token:

   jti
      As defined by Section 4.1.7 [RFC7519] contains a unique identifier
      for an event.  The identifier SHOULD be unique within a particular
      event feed and MAY be used by clients to track whether a
      particular event has already been received.  This attribute is
      REQUIRED.

   iss




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      A single valued String containing the URI of the service provider
      publishing the event (the issuer).  This attribute is REQUIRED.

   aud
      A multi-valued String containing the URIs representing the
      audience of the event.  Values are typically URLs of the feeds the
      event is associated with.  When an event has multiple audiences
      that go to the same subscriber, the publisher is not obligated to
      deliver repeated events to the same subscriber.  This attribute is
      RECOMMENDED.

   iat
      As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a
      NumericDate which represents when the event was issued.  Unless
      otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted by the
      subscriber as equivalent to the actual time of the event.  This
      attribute is REQUIRED.

   nbf
      As defined by Section 4.1.5 [RFC7519], a value containing a
      NumericDate which represents a future date when the event will
      occur.  This attribute is OPTIONAL.

   The following is a new attribute defined by this specification:

   events
      A multi-valued String that contains the URIs of event types
      contained within the JWT.  Values in this attribute further
      indicate what other JSON objects are present within the parent
      JSON event structure.  Each OPTIONAL JSON sub-object is denoted by
      an attribute that matches a value in "events".  This attribute is
      REQUIRED.

2.2.  Security Event Token Construction

   A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is constructed by building a JSON
   structure that constitutes an event object and which is then used as
   the body of a JWT.

   While this specification uses JWT to convey a SET, implementers SHALL
   NOT use SETs to convey authentication or authorization assertions.










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   The following is an example event token (it has been modified for
   readability):

  {
    "jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
    "iat": 1458496404,
    "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
    "aud":[
     "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
     "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
    ],

    "events":[
      "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create"
    ],
    "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create":{
      "ref": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
      "attributes":["id","name","userName","password","emails"],
      "values":{
        "emails":[
         {"type":"work","value":"jdoe@example.com"}
        ],
        "password":"not4u2no",
        "userName":"jdoe",
        "id":"44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
        "name":{
          "givenName":"John",
          "familyName":"Doe"
        }
      }
    }
  }

                     Figure 4: Example Event JSON Data

   When transmitted, the above JSON body must be converted into a JWT as
   per [RFC7519].  In this example, because the event contains attribute
   values, the token MUST be encrypted per JWE (see [RFC7516]) before
   transmission.

   The following is an example of a SCIM Event expressed in an unsecured
   JWT token.  The JWT header of:

   {"alg":"none"}







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   Base64url encoding of the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the
   header yields:

   eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0

   The example JSON Event Data is encoded as follows:

   eyAgCiAgImp0aSI6ICI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsCiAg
   ImlhdCI6IDE0NTg0OTY0MDQsCiAgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5j
   b20iLCAgCiAgImF1ZCI6WwogICAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRz
   Lzk4ZDUyNDYxZmE1YmJjODc5NTkzYjc3NTQiLAogICAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1w
   bGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciCiAgXSwgIAogIAog
   ICJldmVudHMiOlsKICAgICJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVhdGUi
   CiAgXSwKICAidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6Y3JlYXRlIjp7CiAgICAi
   cmVmIjogImh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9Vc2Vycy80NGY2MTQyZGY5NmJk
   NmFiNjFlNzUyMWQ5IiwKICAgICJhdHRyaWJ1dGVzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJO
   YW1lIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiXSwKICAgICJ2YWx1ZXMiOnsKICAgICAgImVt
   YWlscyI6WwogICAgICAgeyJ0eXBlIjoid29yayIsInZhbHVlIjoiamRvZUBleGFtcGxl
   LmNvbSJ9CiAgICAgIF0sCiAgICAgICJwYXNzd29yZCI6Im5vdDR1Mm5vIiwKICAgICAg
   InVzZXJOYW1lIjoiamRvZSIsCiAgICAgICJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3
   NTIxZDkiLAogICAgICAibmFtZSI6ewogICAgICAgICJnaXZlbk5hbWUiOiJKb2huIiwK
   ICAgICAgICAiZmFtaWx5TmFtZSI6IkRvZSIKICAgICAgfQogICAgfSAgCiAgfQp9

   The encoded JWS signature is the empty string.  Concatenating the
   parts yields:

   eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
   .
   eyAgCiAgImp0aSI6ICI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsCiAg
   ImlhdCI6IDE0NTg0OTY0MDQsCiAgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5j
   b20iLCAgCiAgImF1ZCI6WwogICAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRz
   Lzk4ZDUyNDYxZmE1YmJjODc5NTkzYjc3NTQiLAogICAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1w
   bGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciCiAgXSwgIAogIAog
   ICJldmVudHMiOlsKICAgICJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVhdGUi
   CiAgXSwKICAidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6Y3JlYXRlIjp7CiAgICAi
   cmVmIjogImh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9Vc2Vycy80NGY2MTQyZGY5NmJk
   NmFiNjFlNzUyMWQ5IiwKICAgICJhdHRyaWJ1dGVzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJO
   YW1lIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiXSwKICAgICJ2YWx1ZXMiOnsKICAgICAgImVt
   YWlscyI6WwogICAgICAgeyJ0eXBlIjoid29yayIsInZhbHVlIjoiamRvZUBleGFtcGxl
   LmNvbSJ9CiAgICAgIF0sCiAgICAgICJwYXNzd29yZCI6Im5vdDR1Mm5vIiwKICAgICAg
   InVzZXJOYW1lIjoiamRvZSIsCiAgICAgICJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3
   NTIxZDkiLAogICAgICAibmFtZSI6ewogICAgICAgICJnaXZlbk5hbWUiOiJKb2huIiwK
   ICAgICAgICAiZmFtaWx5TmFtZSI6IkRvZSIKICAgICAgfQogICAgfSAgCiAgfQp9
   .

                  Figure 5: Example Unsecured Event Token





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   To create and or validate a signed or encrypted SET follow the
   instructions in section 7 of [RFC7519].

3.  Security Considerations

   SETs may often contain sensitive information.  Therefore methods for
   distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
   security mechanism when distributing events.  Parties MUST support
   TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
   mechanisms meeting its security requirements.  When using TLS, the
   client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per
   [RFC6125].  Implementation security considerations for TLS can be
   found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].

   Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry
   personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
   [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.

   Security Events distributed without authentication over the channel,
   such as via TLS ([RFC5246] and [RFC6125]), and/or OAuth2 [RFC6749],
   or Basic Authentication [RFC7617], MUST be signed using JWS [RFC7515]
   so that individual events MAY be authenticated and validated by the
   subscriber.

4.  Privacy Considerations

   If an SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
   provide verification of its authenticity.

   Event Publishers should attempt to specialize feeds so that the
   content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of
   subscribers.

   When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
   is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, the
   publishers and subscribers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
   and user consent in place.

   The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
   identifiable information.  Where possible, publishers and subscribers
   should devise approaches the prevents propagation.  For example the
   passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to already know
   the subject.








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5.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA requirements.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.




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6.2.  Informative References

   [idevent-scim]
              Oracle Corporation, "SCIM Event Extensions (work in
              progress)".

   [RFC7009]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
              2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
              August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7644]  Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
              and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
              Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
              September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

Appendix A.  Contributors

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   The editor would like to thank the participants in the id-events
   mailing list and related working groups for their support of this
   specification.

Appendix C.  Change Log

   Draft 00 - PH - First Draft

   Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT.  Remove event
   type attribute.






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   Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, Removed questions,
   clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy
   section.

Authors' Addresses

   Phil Hunt (editor)
   Oracle Corporation

   Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com


   William Denniss
   Salesforce.com

   Email: wdenniss@google.com


   Morteza Ansari
   Cisco

   Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com





























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