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Versions: 00 01 02 03

Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                Salesforce
Updates: 6698,7671 (if approved)                             V. Dukhovni
Intended status: Standards Track                               Two Sigma
Expires: August 23, 2017                               February 19, 2017


            TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records
                    draft-huque-dane-client-cert-03

Abstract

   The DANE TLSA protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671] describes how to publish
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates or public keys in
   the DNS.  This document updates RFC 6698 and RFC 7671.  It describes
   how to additionally use the TLSA record to publish client
   certificates or public keys, and also the rules and considerations
   for using them with TLS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 23, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Associating Client Identities in TLSA Records . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Authentication Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Client Identifiers in X.509 certificates  . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Signaling the Client's DANE Identity in TLS . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Example TLSA records for clients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Changes to Client and Server behavior . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [RFC5246] optionally
   supports the authentication of clients using X.509 certificates
   [RFC5280] or raw public keys [RFC7250].  TLS applications that
   perform DANE authentication of servers using TLSA records may also
   desire to authenticate clients using the same mechanism, especially
   if the client identity is in the form of or can be represented by a
   DNS domain name.  Some design patterns from the Internet of Things
   (IoT) make use of this form of authentication, where large networks
   of physical objects identified by DNS names may authenticate
   themselves using TLS to centralized device management and control
   platforms.

   In this document, the term TLS is used generically to describe both
   the TLS and DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) [RFC6347]
   protocols.

2.  Associating Client Identities in TLSA Records

   When specifying client identities (i.e. client domain names) in TLSA
   records, the owner name of the TLSA record has the following format:


   _service.[client-domain-name]





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   The first label identifies the application service name.  The
   remaining labels are composed of the client domain name.

   Encoding the application service name into the owner name allows the
   same client domain name to have different authentication credentials
   for different application services.  There is no need to encode the
   transport label - the same name form is usable with both TLS and
   DTLS.

   The _service label could be a custom string for an application, but
   more commonly is expected to be a service name registered in the IANA
   Service Name Registry [SRVREG].

   The RDATA or data field portion of the TLSA record is formed exactly
   as specified in RFC 6698 and RFC 7671, and carries the same meaning.

3.  Authentication Model

   The authentication model assumed in this document is the following:

   The client is assigned an identity corresponding to a DNS domain
   name.  This domain name doesn't necessarily have any relation to its
   network layer addresses.  Clients often have dynamic or unpredictable
   addresses, and may move around the network, so tying their identity
   to network addresses is not feasible or wise in the general case.

   The client generates (or has generated for it) a private and public
   key pair.  Where client certificates are being used, the client also
   has a certificate binding the name to its public key.  The
   certificate or public key has a corresponding TLSA record published
   in the DNS, which allows it to be authenticated directly via the DNS
   (using the DANE-TA or DANE-EE certificate usage modes) or via a PKIX
   public CA system constraint (using the PKIX-TA or PKIX-EE certificate
   usage modes).

4.  Client Identifiers in X.509 certificates

   If the TLS DANE Client Identity extension (see Section 5) is not
   being used, the client certificate MUST have have the client's DNS
   name specified in the Subject Alternative Name extension's dNSName
   type.  Or, if an application specific identity is preferred or
   needed, the SRV-ID (PKIX OtherName SRVName) MUST be used to specify
   the application service and the client's name, e.g.  "_smtp-
   client.device1.example.com".  See [RFC6125] and [RFC4985] for a
   discussion of application specific identifiers in X.509 certificates.

   If the TLS DANE Client Identity extension is in use, then with DANE-
   EE(3), the subject name need not be present in the certificate.



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5.  Signaling the Client's DANE Identity in TLS

   In general, the client SHOULD explicitly signal its DANE identity via
   the TLS protocol.

   The most important reason is that the server may want an explicit
   indication from the client that it has a DANE record, so as to avoid
   unnecessary DNS queries in-band with the TLS handshake for clients
   that don't support this.  In principle, this indication could come in
   the form of a new X.509 certificate extension but there are a number
   of additional scenarios where this would not work.

   Where client certificate authentication is optional, in response to
   the server's Certificate Request message, the client can respond with
   a Client Certificate message with no certificate, and the server may
   at its discretion continue the handshake without client
   authentication.  However, in practice, problems may arise.  There are
   deployed client software implementations that do not react gracefully
   when encountering a certificate request message from the TLS server
   that they did not expect.

   DANE client authentication using raw public keys needs a separate
   mechanism to convey the domain name identity to the TLS server.

   Hence, to address this issue generally, a new client identity
   signaling solution is needed, whereby the client indicates its DANE
   identity (i.e. its domain name identity and the fact that this
   identity has an associated TLSA record) to the server.  A new TLS
   extension to convey such an identity [TLSCLIENTID] has been developed
   for this purpose.  Client implementations of this specification
   SHOULD use this extension.  This extension SHOULD also elicit a
   "Certificate Request" from servers that implement this protocol, and
   don't require client certificates otherwise.

6.  Example TLSA records for clients

   The following examples are provided in the textual presentation
   format of the TLSA record.

   An example TLSA record for the client "device1.example.com." and the
   application "smtp-client".  This record specifies the SHA-256 hash of
   the subject public key component of the end-entity certificate
   corresponding to the client.  The certificate usage for this record
   is 3 (DANE-EE) and thus is validated in accordance with section 5.1
   of RFC 7671.


   _smtp-client.device1.example.com. IN TLSA (



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      3 1 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9
            7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )


   An example TLSA record for the client "client2.example.com." and the
   application "localsvc".  This record specifies the SHA-512 hash of
   the subject public key component of a public certification authority
   that has issued the client's certificate.  The certificate usage for
   this record is 0 (PKIX-TA).


   _localsvc.client2.example.com. IN TLSA (
      0 1 2 0f8b48ff5fd94117f21b6550aaee89c8
            d8adbc3f433c8e587a85a14e54667b25
            f4dcd8c4ae6162121ea9166984831b57
            b408534451fd1b9702f8de0532ecd03c )


7.  Changes to Client and Server behavior

   A TLS Client conforming to this specification MUST have a signed DNS
   TLSA record published corresponding to its DNS name and X.509
   certificate or public key.  The client presents this certificate or
   public key in the TLS handshake with the server.  The client should
   not offer ciphersuites that are incompatible with its certificate or
   public key.  If the client's certificate has a DANE record with a
   certificate usage other than DANE-EE, then the presented client
   certificate MUST have have the client's DNS name specified either in
   the Subject Alternative Name extension's dNSName type, or the SRVName
   type.

   Additionally the client SHOULD use the TLS DANE Client Identity
   extension [TLSCLIENTID] to explicitly indicate its DNS name.

   A TLS Server implementing this specification performs the following
   steps:

   o  Request a client certificate in the TLS handshake (the "Client
      Certificate Request" message).  This could be done
      unconditionally, or only when it receives the TLS DANE Client
      Identity extension from the client.

   o  If the client has sent the DANE Client Identity extension, then
      extract the client's domain name from the extension.  Otherwise,
      extract the client identity from the Subject Alternative Name
      extension's dNSName or SRVName type in the client certificate.





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   o  Construct the DNS query name for the corresponding TLSA record.
      If the TLS DANE client identity extension was present, then this
      name should be used.  Otherwise, identities from the client
      certificate are used.  For dNSName, the underscored application
      service label is prepended to the domain name, corresponding to
      the application in use.  For SRVName, the DNS query name is
      identical to the content of the SRVName identifier.  See Section 2
      for the proposed owner name format.

   o  Look up the TLSA record set in the DNS.  The response MUST be
      cryptographically validated using DNSSEC.  The server could
      perform the DNSSEC validation itself.  It could also be configured
      to trust responses obtained via a validating resolver to which it
      has a secure connection.

   o  Extract the RDATA of the TLSA records and match them to the
      presented client certificate according to the rules specified in
      the DANE TLS protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671].  If successfully
      matched, the client is authenticated and the TLS session proceeds.
      If unsuccessful, the server MUST treat the client as
      unauthenticated (e.g. it could terminate the session, or proceed
      with the session giving the client access to resources as a
      generic unauthenticated user).

   o  If there are multiple records in the TLSA record set, then the
      client is authenticated as long as at least one of the TLSA
      records matches, subject to RFC7671 digest agility, which SHOULD
      be implemented.

   If the DANE Client Identity extension is not present, and the
   presented client certificate has multiple distinct reference
   identifier types (e.g. a dNSName, and an rfc822Name) then TLS servers
   configured to perform DANE authentication according to this
   specification should only examine and authenticate the dNSName or
   SRVName identity.  If the certificate contains both dNSName and
   SRVName identities, SRVName should be preferred.  See [RFC6125] for a
   description of reference identifiers and matching rules.

   If the presented client certificate has multiple dNSName or SRVName
   identities, then the client MUST use the TLS DANE client identity
   extension to unambiguously indicate its intended name to the server.

   Specific applications may be designed to require additional
   validation steps.  For example, a server might want to verify the
   client's IP address is associated with the certificate in some
   manner, e.g. by confirming that a secure reverse DNS lookup of that
   address ties it back to the same domain name, or by requiring an
   iPAddress component to be included in the certificate.  Such details



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   are outside the scope of this document, and should be outlined in
   other documents specific to the applications that require this
   behavior.

   Servers may have their own whitelisting and authorization rules for
   which certificates they accept.  For example a TLS server may be
   configured to only allow TLS sessions from clients with certificate
   identities within a specific domain or set of domains.

8.  Raw Public Keys

   When using raw public keys in TLS [RFC7250], this specification
   requires the use of the TLS DANE Client Identity extension.  The
   associated DANE TLSA records employ only certificate usage 3 (DANE-
   EE) and a selector value of 1 (SPKI), as described in [RFC7671].

9.  Acknowledgements

   This document benefited from discussions with the following people:
   Dan James, Duane Wessels, Allison Mankin, Casey Deccio, and Warren
   Kumari.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document includes no request to IANA.

11.  Security Considerations

   This document makes a narrow update to RFC 6698 by defining the use
   of the TLSA record for client TLS certificates.  There are no
   security considerations for this document beyond those described in
   RFC 6698 and RFC 7671 and in the specifications for TLS and DTLS
   [RFC5246], [RFC6347].

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4985]  Santesson, S., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Subject Alternative Name for Expression of Service Name",
              RFC 4985, August 2007.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.



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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.

   [RFC7218]  Gudmundsson, O., "Adding Acronyms to Simplify
              Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named
              Entities (DANE)", RFC 7218, April 2014.

   [RFC7250]  Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
              T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.

   [RFC7671]  Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
              and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
              October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.

   [TLSCLIENTID]
              Huque, S. and V. Dukhovni, "TLS Extension for DANE Client
              Identity", , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huque-tls-
              dane-clientid>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
              2003.

   [SRVREG]   IANA, ., "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
              Registry", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-
              names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.txt>.





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Authors' Addresses

   Shumon Huque
   Salesforce

   Email: shuque@gmail.com


   Viktor Dukhovni
   Two Sigma

   Email: ietf-dane@dukhovni.org







































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