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Versions: 00 draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll

Individual Submission                                          G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: BCP                                               APNIC
Expires: January 27, 2011                                        S. Kent
                                                                     BBN
                                                           July 26, 2010


                      CA Key Rollover in the RPKI
                    draft-huston-sidr-keyroll-00.txt

Abstract

   This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity who
   undertakes the role of a Certification Authority in the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure to perform a rollover of its key pair.
   This document also notes the requirements placed on Relying Parties
   who maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in
   the distributed Resource Public Key Infrastructure repository
   publication structure.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 27, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Terminology and Concepts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  CA Key Rollover Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Relying Party Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
































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1.  Introduction

   This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity undertaking
   the role of a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastucture (RPKI) [ID.ietf-sidr-arch] to perform a rollover of its
   key pair.

   The intent of this document is to define a conservative procedure for
   such entities to follow when performing a key rollover so that
   Relying Parties are in a position to be able to validate all
   authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation procedure
   described in [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] at all times.

1.1.  Terminology and Concepts

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], and the
   profile for RPKI Certificates [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] .

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  CA Key Rollover Procedure

   A CA instance is associated with a single key pair
   ([ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]).  The implication in the context of key
   rollover is that, strictly speaking, a CA does not perform a key
   rollover per se.  In order to perform the equivalent of a key
   rollover, the entity who undertakes the role of a CA needs to
   instantiate a new instance of a CA, with the new key pair, and then
   substitute this new CA into the RPKI hierarchy in place of the old
   CA.

   There are some considerations regarding this procedure that should be
   followed by an entity performing a key rollover operation.  The
   critical consideration is that the RPKI has potential application in
   the area of control of routing integrity [ID.ietf-sidr-arch], and key
   rollover should not cause any transient hiatus where a Relying Party
   is led to incorrect conclusions regarding the authenticity of
   attestations and authorities made in the context of the RPKI.  A CA
   should not assume that Relying Parties will universally use one form
   of construction of a potential validation path over any other, and
   therefore the key rollover procedure should endeavour at all times to
   preserve the integrity of the SIA and AIA pointers in RPKI



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   certificates.

   In the procedure described here, the entity creates a "new" CA
   instance, and has the associated new public key published in the form
   af a "new" CA certificate.  While the "current" and "new" CA
   instances share a single repository publication point, each CA has
   its own CRL, and its own manifest.  Initially, the "new" CA publishes
   an empty CRL and a manifest that contains a single entry for the CRL.
   The "current" CA also is

   The entity should then wait for a period of time to allow Relying
   Parties to discover and retrieve this "new" CA certificate and store
   it in their local RPKI Repository cache instances (this period of
   time is termed the "staging period").  During this period, the entity
   will have a "new" CA instance, with no subordinate products, and an
   "current" CA instance which has issued all subordinate products.  At
   the expiration of the staging period the "new" CA instance can re-
   issue all subordinate products of the previous CA instance,
   overwriting the old subordinate products in the CA's repository
   publication point.  When this is complete the "current" CA instance
   can be retired, and the "new" CA instance can be re-termed the
   "current" CA.

   During the transition of the CA instances it is necessary for the
   "new" CA instance to re-issue all subordinate products of the
   "current" CA.  The procedure described here specifies that, with the
   exception of manifests and CRLs, the re-issued subordinate products
   be published using the same repository publication point object
   names, effectively overwriting the old subordinate objects with these
   re-issued subordinate objects.  The intent of this overwriting
   operation is to ensure that the AIA pointers of indirect subordinate
   products at lower levels in the PKI hierarchy remain correct, and
   that CA rollover does not require any associated actions by any
   subordinate CA.

   There are four CA states described here:

   CURRENT:
      The CA is the active CA used to process certificate issuance and
      revocation requests from subordinate entities.

   NEW:
      The CA is in the process of being created.  The CA is unable to
      process certificate issuance and revocation requests from
      subordinate entities.  The CA may issue a CRL and an EE
      certificate in association with its Manifest, but has no other
      subordinate products.




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   PENDING:
      The CA is in the process of being set up.  The CA is able to able
      to issue certificates that were previously issued with the old
      key, but is not able to process new certificate issuance and
      revocation requests from subordinate entities.

   OLD:
      The CA is in the process of being removed.  The CA is able to
      unable to process any certificate issuance and revocation requests
      from subordinate entities.  The CA will continue to issue
      regularly scheduled CRLs and be permitted to issue an EE
      certificate as part of the process of updating its manifest to
      reflect the updated CRL.

   To perform a key rollover operation the entity MUST perform the
   following steps in the order given here.  Unless specified otherwise
   each step SHOULD be performed without any intervening delay.  The
   process MUST be run through to completion.


      1.   Generate a NEW key pair.

      2.   Generate a certificate request with the NEW key pair and pass
           the request to the entity's immediate superior CA as the CA
           certificate Issuer.

      3.   Request the entity's Issuer to generate and publish a NEW CA
           certificate, with an issuer-selected Subject Name that is
           distinct from the Subject Name used in the CURRENT CA
           certificate for this entity.

      4.   Wait for a "Staging Period" following the completion of the
           NEW CA certificate request.  This "Staging Period is selected
           by the entity, and MUST be no less than 24 hours.

      5.   Upon expiration of the Staging Period, suspend the processing
           of subordinate certificate issuance requests and revocation
           requests.  Mark the CURRENT CA as OLD and the NEW CA as
           PENDING.  Halt the operation of the OLD CA for all operations
           except the further issuance of subsequent CRLs and EE
           certificates for Manifests.

      6.   Use the PENDING CA to generate new certificates for all
           existing subordinate CA and EE certificates, and publish
           those products in the same repository publication point and
           with the same repository publication point name as the
           previous OLD subordinate CA and EE certificates.  The keys in
           these reissued certificates must not change.



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      7.   Excluding manifests, where the signing structure uses a
           packaging format that includes the EE certificate within the
           signed data, signed objects that included OLD CA-issed EE
           certificates in their signed data will need to be re-signed
           using an EE certificate issued by the PENDING CA.  In the
           case where the OLD CA-issued EE certificate is a "single use"
           EE certificate and the associated private key has been
           previously destroyed, this will entail the generation of a
           new key pair, the issuing of an EE certificate by the PENDING
           CA, and the signing of the data by the newly generated
           private key.  In the case of a "multi-use" EE certificate,
           the EE certificate should be issued using the PENDING CA.
           The object, together with the issued EE certificate, should
           be signed with the associated private key, and published in
           the same repository publication point, using the same
           repository publication point name, as the previously signed
           object that it replaces (i.e. overwrite the old signed
           object).

      8.   Use the OLD CA to issue a manifest that lists only the OLD
           CA's CRL, and use the PENDING CA to issue a manifest that
           lists all subordinate products that were issued by the
           PENDING CA.

      9.   Mark the PENDING CA as CURRENT and resume processing
           subordinate certificate issuance requests.

      10.  Generate a certificate revocation request for the OLD CA
           certificate and pass it to the entity's Issuer.

      11.  Wait for completion of the OLD CA certificate revocation
           request, then remove the OLD CA's CRL and Manifest and
           destroy the OLD private key.



3.  Relying Party Requirements

   This procedure defines a "Staging Period" for CAs performing a key
   rollover operation, which is defined as a period no shorter than 24
   hours.

   Relying Parties who maintain a local cache of the distributed RPKI
   repository MUST perform a local cache synchronisation operation
   against the distributed RPKI repository at regular intervals of no
   longer than 24 hours.





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4.  Security Considerations

   [To be added]


5.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this document.]


6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the review comments of Tim
   Bruijnzeels in preparing this document.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

7.2.  Informative References

   [ID.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
              progress), March 2009.

   [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
              Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt, February 2009.











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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson

   Email: ggm@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA  02138
   USA

   Email: kent@bbn.com





























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