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Versions: 00 draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll
Individual Submission G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: BCP APNIC
Expires: January 27, 2011 S. Kent
BBN
July 26, 2010
CA Key Rollover in the RPKI
draft-huston-sidr-keyroll-00.txt
Abstract
This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity who
undertakes the role of a Certification Authority in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure to perform a rollover of its key pair.
This document also notes the requirements placed on Relying Parties
who maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in
the distributed Resource Public Key Infrastructure repository
publication structure.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 27, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Relying Party Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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1. Introduction
This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity undertaking
the role of a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
Infrastucture (RPKI) [ID.ietf-sidr-arch] to perform a rollover of its
key pair.
The intent of this document is to define a conservative procedure for
such entities to follow when performing a key rollover so that
Relying Parties are in a position to be able to validate all
authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation procedure
described in [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] at all times.
1.1. Terminology and Concepts
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], and the
profile for RPKI Certificates [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] .
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure
A CA instance is associated with a single key pair
([ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]). The implication in the context of key
rollover is that, strictly speaking, a CA does not perform a key
rollover per se. In order to perform the equivalent of a key
rollover, the entity who undertakes the role of a CA needs to
instantiate a new instance of a CA, with the new key pair, and then
substitute this new CA into the RPKI hierarchy in place of the old
CA.
There are some considerations regarding this procedure that should be
followed by an entity performing a key rollover operation. The
critical consideration is that the RPKI has potential application in
the area of control of routing integrity [ID.ietf-sidr-arch], and key
rollover should not cause any transient hiatus where a Relying Party
is led to incorrect conclusions regarding the authenticity of
attestations and authorities made in the context of the RPKI. A CA
should not assume that Relying Parties will universally use one form
of construction of a potential validation path over any other, and
therefore the key rollover procedure should endeavour at all times to
preserve the integrity of the SIA and AIA pointers in RPKI
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certificates.
In the procedure described here, the entity creates a "new" CA
instance, and has the associated new public key published in the form
af a "new" CA certificate. While the "current" and "new" CA
instances share a single repository publication point, each CA has
its own CRL, and its own manifest. Initially, the "new" CA publishes
an empty CRL and a manifest that contains a single entry for the CRL.
The "current" CA also is
The entity should then wait for a period of time to allow Relying
Parties to discover and retrieve this "new" CA certificate and store
it in their local RPKI Repository cache instances (this period of
time is termed the "staging period"). During this period, the entity
will have a "new" CA instance, with no subordinate products, and an
"current" CA instance which has issued all subordinate products. At
the expiration of the staging period the "new" CA instance can re-
issue all subordinate products of the previous CA instance,
overwriting the old subordinate products in the CA's repository
publication point. When this is complete the "current" CA instance
can be retired, and the "new" CA instance can be re-termed the
"current" CA.
During the transition of the CA instances it is necessary for the
"new" CA instance to re-issue all subordinate products of the
"current" CA. The procedure described here specifies that, with the
exception of manifests and CRLs, the re-issued subordinate products
be published using the same repository publication point object
names, effectively overwriting the old subordinate objects with these
re-issued subordinate objects. The intent of this overwriting
operation is to ensure that the AIA pointers of indirect subordinate
products at lower levels in the PKI hierarchy remain correct, and
that CA rollover does not require any associated actions by any
subordinate CA.
There are four CA states described here:
CURRENT:
The CA is the active CA used to process certificate issuance and
revocation requests from subordinate entities.
NEW:
The CA is in the process of being created. The CA is unable to
process certificate issuance and revocation requests from
subordinate entities. The CA may issue a CRL and an EE
certificate in association with its Manifest, but has no other
subordinate products.
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PENDING:
The CA is in the process of being set up. The CA is able to able
to issue certificates that were previously issued with the old
key, but is not able to process new certificate issuance and
revocation requests from subordinate entities.
OLD:
The CA is in the process of being removed. The CA is able to
unable to process any certificate issuance and revocation requests
from subordinate entities. The CA will continue to issue
regularly scheduled CRLs and be permitted to issue an EE
certificate as part of the process of updating its manifest to
reflect the updated CRL.
To perform a key rollover operation the entity MUST perform the
following steps in the order given here. Unless specified otherwise
each step SHOULD be performed without any intervening delay. The
process MUST be run through to completion.
1. Generate a NEW key pair.
2. Generate a certificate request with the NEW key pair and pass
the request to the entity's immediate superior CA as the CA
certificate Issuer.
3. Request the entity's Issuer to generate and publish a NEW CA
certificate, with an issuer-selected Subject Name that is
distinct from the Subject Name used in the CURRENT CA
certificate for this entity.
4. Wait for a "Staging Period" following the completion of the
NEW CA certificate request. This "Staging Period is selected
by the entity, and MUST be no less than 24 hours.
5. Upon expiration of the Staging Period, suspend the processing
of subordinate certificate issuance requests and revocation
requests. Mark the CURRENT CA as OLD and the NEW CA as
PENDING. Halt the operation of the OLD CA for all operations
except the further issuance of subsequent CRLs and EE
certificates for Manifests.
6. Use the PENDING CA to generate new certificates for all
existing subordinate CA and EE certificates, and publish
those products in the same repository publication point and
with the same repository publication point name as the
previous OLD subordinate CA and EE certificates. The keys in
these reissued certificates must not change.
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7. Excluding manifests, where the signing structure uses a
packaging format that includes the EE certificate within the
signed data, signed objects that included OLD CA-issed EE
certificates in their signed data will need to be re-signed
using an EE certificate issued by the PENDING CA. In the
case where the OLD CA-issued EE certificate is a "single use"
EE certificate and the associated private key has been
previously destroyed, this will entail the generation of a
new key pair, the issuing of an EE certificate by the PENDING
CA, and the signing of the data by the newly generated
private key. In the case of a "multi-use" EE certificate,
the EE certificate should be issued using the PENDING CA.
The object, together with the issued EE certificate, should
be signed with the associated private key, and published in
the same repository publication point, using the same
repository publication point name, as the previously signed
object that it replaces (i.e. overwrite the old signed
object).
8. Use the OLD CA to issue a manifest that lists only the OLD
CA's CRL, and use the PENDING CA to issue a manifest that
lists all subordinate products that were issued by the
PENDING CA.
9. Mark the PENDING CA as CURRENT and resume processing
subordinate certificate issuance requests.
10. Generate a certificate revocation request for the OLD CA
certificate and pass it to the entity's Issuer.
11. Wait for completion of the OLD CA certificate revocation
request, then remove the OLD CA's CRL and Manifest and
destroy the OLD private key.
3. Relying Party Requirements
This procedure defines a "Staging Period" for CAs performing a key
rollover operation, which is defined as a period no shorter than 24
hours.
Relying Parties who maintain a local cache of the distributed RPKI
repository MUST perform a local cache synchronisation operation
against the distributed RPKI repository at regular intervals of no
longer than 24 hours.
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4. Security Considerations
[To be added]
5. IANA Considerations
[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this document.]
6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the review comments of Tim
Bruijnzeels in preparing this document.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
7.2. Informative References
[ID.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), March 2009.
[ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Internet
Draft draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt, February 2009.
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Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
Email: kent@bbn.com
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