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Network Working Group                                          G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Updates: 6487 (if approved)                                        APNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                         October 9, 2015
Expires: April 11, 2016


                       Update to RPKI Validation
                   draft-huston-sidr-validity-00.txt

Abstract

   This document updates the RPKI certificate validation procedure as
   specified in Section 7.2 of RFC6487.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  The RPKI Certification Path Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5










































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1.  Introduction

   This document updates the RPKI certificate validation procedure as
   specified in Section 7.2 of [RFC6487], by replacing the section 7.2
   of [RFC6487] with the specification contained here.


2.  The RPKI Certification Path Validation

   Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
   certificate, and a specific set of number resources, consists of
   verifying that the digital signature of the signed resource data is
   valid, using the public key of the target resource certificate, and
   also validating the resource certificate in the context of the RPKI,
   using the path validation process.  This path validation process
   verifies, among other things, that a prospective certification path
   (a sequence of n certificates) satisfies the following conditions:



      1.  for all 'x' in {1, ..., n-1}, the Subject of certificate 'x'
          is the Issuer of certificate ('x' + 1);


      2.  certificate '1' is issued by a trust anchor;


      3.  certificate 'n' is the certificate to be validated; and


      4.  for all 'x' in {1, ..., n}, certificate 'x' is valid for the
          specific set of resources.

   RPKI validation for a specific set of resources entails verifying
   that all of the following conditions hold, in addition to the
   Certification Path Validation criteria specified in Section 6 of
   [RFC5280]:




      1.  The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key
          and the signature algorithm


      2.  The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From
          and To values.




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      3.  The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present, as
          specified by [RFC6487], and contains values for selected
          fields that are defined as allowable values by this
          specification.


      4.  No field, or field value, that the [RFC6487] specification
          defines as MUST NOT be present is used in the certificate.


      5.  The Issuer has not revoked the certificate.  A revoked
          certificate is identified by the certificate's serial number
          being listed on the Issuer's current CRL, as identified by the
          CRLDP of the certificate, the CRL is itself valid, and the
          public key used to verify the signature on the CRL is the same
          public key used to verify the certificate itself.


      6.  The resource extension data contained in this certificate
          "encompasses" the entirety of the resources in the specific
          resource set ("encompass" in this context is defined in
          Section 7.1 of [RFC6487]).


      7.  The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by
          a trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
          Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate 'x' in the
          Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate 'x + 1'
          in the Certification Path, and the public key in Certificate
          'x' can verify the signature value in Certificate 'x+1'.

   A certificate validation algorithm MAY perform these tests in any
   chosen order.

   There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
   are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
   means of creating a potential denial-of-service (DOS) attack on an
   Relying Party (RP).  An RP executing this procedure MAY apply further
   heuristics to guide the certification path validation process to a
   halt in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts to
   validate such malformed certification path structures.
   Implementations of resource certificate validation MAY halt with a
   validation failure if the certification path length exceeds a locally
   defined configuration parameter.







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3.  Security Considerations

   This update is intended to improve the robustness of the RPKI
   framework by altering the procedure of the original validation path
   that included an "encompassing" condition applied pairwise to the
   certificates used in the validation path.

   The intent of this update is to ensure that all certificates on a
   validation path encompass the resources that are included in the
   validation query, but to remove the "encompassing" constraint on the
   resources used in pairwise comparison.  This change to the validation
   procedure reduces the criticality of strict orchestration of the
   sequence of certificate issuance and revocation in those
   circumstances, and can thereby improve the robustness of the RPKI as
   a consequence, without altering the underlying semnatics of the
   association of a public key value across a collection of number
   resources.


4.  IANA Considerations

   No updates to the registries are suggested by this document.


5.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks


6.  Normative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC6487, February 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.










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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane, QLD  4101
   Australia

   Phone: +61 7 3858 3100
   Email: gih@apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane, QLD  4101
   Australia

   Phone: +61 7 3858 3100
   Email: ggm@apnic.net































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