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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                            S. Hyun
Internet-Draft                                                    S. Woo
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Y. Yeo
Expires: April 8, 2017                                          J. Jeong
                                                 Sungkyunkwan University
                                                                 J. Park
                                                                    ETRI
                                                         October 5, 2016


          Service Function Chaining-Enabled I2NSF Architecture
                 draft-hyun-i2nsf-sfc-enabled-i2nsf-01

Abstract

   This document describes an architecture of the I2NSF framework which
   enables traffic steering between NSFs for security policy
   enforcement.  Such traffic steering enables composite inspection of
   network traffic by steering the traffic through multiple types of
   security functions according to the information model for the NSF
   facing interface in the I2NSF framework.  This document explains the
   additional components integrated into the I2NSF framework and their
   functionalities to achieve NSF-triggered traffic steering.  It also
   describes representative use cases to address major benefits from the
   proposed architecture.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 8, 2017.



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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Objective  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.1.  NSF Operation Manager  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Developer's Management System  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Packet Forwarding Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.4.  Security Function Forwarder (SFF)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.1.  Enforcing Different NSFs Depending on a Packet
           Source's Trust Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  Effective Load Balancing with Dynamic NSF Instantiation  . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Changes from draft-hyun-i2nsf-sfc-enabled-i2nsf-00  . 12
















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1.  Introduction

   To effectively cope with emerging sophisticated network attacks, it
   is necessary that various security functions cooperatively analyze
   network traffic [sfc-ns-use-cases] [RFC7498] [i2nsf-ps-and-use-cases]
   [i2nsf-cap-interface-im].  In addition, depending on the
   characteristics of network traffic and their suspiciousness level,
   the different types of network traffic need to be analyzed through
   the different sets of security functions. [i2nsf-cap-interface-im]
   proposes an information model for NSF facing interface of the I2NSF
   framework that enables a network security function to trigger further
   inspection by calling another network security function based on its
   own analysis results [i2nsf-framework].  However, the current design
   of the I2NSF framework does not consider network traffic steering
   fully in order to enable such consecutive inspections through
   multiple security functions.

   In this document, we propose an architecture that integrates
   additional components for traffic steering over NSFs into the I2NSF
   framework.  We extend the security controller's functionalities such
   that it can interpret a high-level policy of NSF-triggered traffic
   steering into a low-level policy and manage them.  It also keeps
   track of the available network security function instances and their
   information (e.g., network information and workload), and makes a
   decision on which NSF instances to use for a given network security
   function.  Based on the forwarding information provided by the
   security controller, the security function forwarder performs network
   traffic steering through required security functions.  The security
   function forwarder is also responsible for interpreting inspection
   result from a network security function to enforce more advanced
   inspection.  We define an additional packet header format to specify
   security inspection results and advanced inspection requests.

2.  Objective

   o  Policy configuration for consecutive inspections: NSF-triggered
      traffic steering architecture allows policy configuration and
      management of network security function triggering.  Based on the
      triggering policy, relevant network traffic can be analyzed
      through various security functions in a composite, cooperative
      manner.

   o  Network traffic steering for consequtive inspection: NSF-triggered
      traffic steering architecture allows network traffic to be steered
      through multiple required network security functions based on the
      triggering policy.  Moreover, the I2NSF information model for NSF
      facing interface [i2nsf-cap-interface-im] requires a security
      function to call another security function for further inspection



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      based on its own inspection result.  To meet this requirement,
      NSF-triggered traffic steering architecture also enables traffic
      forwarding from one security function to another security
      function.

   o  Load balancing over network security function instances: NSF-
      triggered traffic steering architecture provides load balancing of
      incoming traffic over available network security function
      instances by leveraging the flexible traffic steering mechanism.
      For this objective, it also performs dynamic instantiation of a
      security function when there are an excessive amount of requests
      for that network security function.

3.  Terminology

   This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7665]
   [sfc-ns-use-cases] [i2nsf-terminology][ONF-SFC-Architecture].

   o  Network Security Function (NSF): A function that is responsible
      for specific treatment of received packets.  A Network Security
      Function can act at various layers of a protocol stack (e.g., at
      the network layer or other OSI layers) [RFC7665].  Sample Network
      Security Service Functions are as follows: Firewall, Intrusion
      Prevention/Detection System (IPS/IDS), Deep Packet Inspection
      (DPI), Application Visibility and Control (AVC), network virus and
      malware scanning, sandbox, Data Loss Prevention (DLP), Distributed
      Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation and TLS proxy.

   o  Advanced Inspection/Action: As like the I2NSF information model
      for NSF facing interface [i2nsf-cap-interface-im], Advanced
      Inspection/Action means that a security function calls another
      security function for further inspection based on its own
      inspection result.

   o  Network Security Function Profile (NSF Profile): NSF Profile
      represents NSF's inspection capabilities.  Each NSF has its own
      NSF Profile to specify the type of security service it provides
      and its resource capacity etc.

   o  Network Security Function Operation Manager (NSF Operation
      Manager): NSF Operation Manager consistently manages information
      and state of NSF instances and provides NSF network access
      information to support advanced inspection request.  For example,
      the information includes the supported transport protocols, IP
      addresses, and locations for the NSF instances.  Also, NSF
      Operation Manager takes charge of dynamic management of a pool of
      NSF instances by consulting with Developer's Management System and
      load balancing over NSF instances.



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   o  Packet Forwarding Header/Encapsulation: Packet Forwarding Header
      is used to forward a packet from one NSF to another for further
      inspection.  The former NSF constructs a Packet Forwarding Header
      with the NSF profile of the latter NSF and transmits it to a SFF.
      The required fields are the action code, the number of the
      metadata, and the metadata.  In this context, the metadata is a
      part of NSF profile.

   o  Security Function Forwarder (SFF): A security function forwarder
      is responsible for forwarding traffic to one or more connected
      network security functions according to the information carried in
      the packet forwarding encapsulation when the traffic comes back
      from an NSF.  Additionally, an SFF is responsible for transporting
      traffic to another SFF (in the same or the different type of
      overlay), and terminating overlay inspection [RFC7665].

4.  Architecture

   This section describes an NSF-triggered traffic steering architecture
   and the basic operations of traffic steering.  It also includes
   details about each component of the architecture.

   Figure 1 describes the components of NSF-triggered traffic steering
   architecture.  Our architecture enables support a composite
   inspection of packets in transit.  According to the inspection result
   of each NSF, which is stored in the Packet Forwarding Header, the
   traffic packets could be steered to another NSF for futher detailed
   analysis.  It is also possible to reflect a high-level advanced
   inspection policy and a configuration from I2NSF Client which is a
   component of the original I2NSF framwork.  Moreover, the proposed
   architecture provides load balancing, auto supplementary NSF instance
   generation, and the elimination of unused NSF instances.  In order to
   achieve these design purposes, we integrate several components to the
   original I2NSF framwork.  In the following sections, we explain the
   details of each component.
















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   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Security Client                                                   |
   |              +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                    |
   |              |     I2NSF     |                                    |
   |              |     Client    |                                    |
   |              +-+-+-+^+-+-+-+-+                                    |
   |                     |                                             |
   |                     |                                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                         | Client Facing Interface
                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Security Management System                                        |
   |                     |                                             |
   |       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-v-+-+-+-+                                     |
   |       |Security Controller  |                                     |
   |       |    +-+-+-+-+-+-+    | Registration                        |
   |       |    | NSF       |    |   Interface  +-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+     |
   |       |    | Opeation  |    |<------------>| Developer's    |     |
   |       |    | Manager   |    |              | Mgnt System    |<--+ |
   |       |    +-+-+-+-+-+-+    |              +-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+   | |
   |       +-+-+-+-+-+-^-+-+-+-+-+                                   | |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                       | NSF Facing Interface                        |
                       |                                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Security Network   |                                             | |
   |                   +-------------------------------------+       | |
   |                   |                                     |       | |
   |             +-+-+-v-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         |       | |
   |             |  +---------+       +---------+  |         |       | |
   |             |  |   SFF   |  ...  |   SFF   |  |         |       | |
   |             |  +---------+       +---------+  |         |       | |
   |             +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-^-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         |       | |
   |                             |                           |       | |
   |       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-v-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+  |       | |
   |       |  +---------+  +---------+       +---------+  |<-+       | |
   |       |  |   NSF   |  |   NSF   |  ...  |   NSF   |  |          | |
   |       |  +---------+  +---------+       +---------+  |<---------+ |
   |       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


           Figure 1: NSF-triggered Traffic Steering Architecture







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4.1.  NSF Operation Manager

   NSF Operation Manager is a core component in our system.  It is
   responsible for the following three things: (1) Maintaining the
   information of every available NSF instance such as IP address,
   supported transport protocol, NSF profile, and load status. (2)
   Responding the queries of available NSF instances from SFF so as to
   help to conduct advanced inspection relevant to a given NSF profile.
   (3) Requesting Developer's Management System for the dynamic
   instantiation of supplementary NSF instances to avoid service
   congestion or the elimination of an existing NSF instance to avoid
   resource waste.  As Figure 1 describes, NSF Operation Manager is a
   sub-module of Security Controller.

   Whenever a new NSF instance is registered, Developer's Management
   System passes the information of the registered NSF instance to NSF
   Operation Manager, so NSF Operation Manager maintains a list of the
   information of every available NSF instance.  NSF Operation Manger
   will receive the request packet containing NSF profile for advanced
   inspection from SFF.  Once receiving a query of a certain NSF profile
   from SFF, NSF Operation Manager searches for all the available NSF
   instances applicable for that NSF profile and then finds the best
   instance with selection criteria like location and load status.
   After finding the best instance, it returns the search result to SFF.

   In our system, each NSF instance periodically reports its load status
   to NSF Operation Manager.  Based on such reports, NSF Operation
   Manager updates the information of the NSF instances and manages the
   pool of NSF instances by requesting Developer's Management System for
   the additional instantiation or elimination of the NSF instances.
   Consequently, NSF Operation Manager enables efficient resource
   utilization by avoiding congestion and resource waste.

4.2.  Developer's Management System

   We extend Developer's Management System for additional
   functionalities as follows.  As mentioned above, NSF Operation
   Manager requests Developer's Management System to create additional
   NSF instances when the existing instances of that security function
   are congested.  On the other hand, when there are an excessive number
   of instances for a certain security function, NSF Operation Manager
   requests Developer's Management System to eliminate some of the NSF
   instances.  As a response to such requests, Developer's Management
   System creates and/or removes NSF instances.  Once it creates a new
   NSF instance or removes an existing NSF instance, the changes must be
   notified to NSF Operation Manager.





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4.3.  Packet Forwarding Header


   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Outer Encapsulation | Packet Forwarding Header| Origin Packet |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                        /                           \
             +---------+                             +-----------+
            /                                                     \
           /                                                       \
          +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
          | Action Code | SpecInfo Num| SpecInfo 0| ... | SpecInfo n|
          +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                 Figure 2: Packet Forwarding Header Format

   Packet Forwarding Header is used to convey inspection result and
   required inspection to an SFF, so it has variable length of fields
   like Figure 2.  It contains fixed Action and the SpecInfo Num fields
   and variable SpecInfo fields.  Action field has a value out of
   "allow", "deny", "advanced", and "mirror".  SpecInfo Num field
   represents how many SpecInfos are included in the Packet Forwarding
   Header and each SpecInfo can include a part of NSF Profile which is
   required for the next inspection.  For instance, SepcInfo can be
   "syn-flood-mitigate", "udp-flood-mitigate", "content-matching-tcp"
   etc, which are the service profile of an NSF.

4.4.  Security Function Forwarder (SFF)

   It is responsible for the following two functionalities: (1)
   Initially forwarding the incoming traffic/packets to Network Security
   Sub-Module, as described in the I2NSF information model for NSF
   facing interface [i2nsf-cap-interface-im]. (2) Forwarding the
   traffic/packets to the matched NSF with the NSF profile which is
   specified in a Packet Forwarding Header.

   An SFF takes a gateway functionality, so it receives incoming
   traffic/packets first and attachs outter encapsulation in order to
   forward the traffic/packets to Network Sub-Module
   [i2nsf-cap-interface-im].  The example of Network Sub-Moudle is a
   firewall which performs packet header inspection.  This Network
   Security Sub-Module attachs a Packet Forwarding Header between the
   outter encapsulation and the original packet and specifies NSF
   Profile in that header so that it can be forwarded to Content
   Security Sub-Module or Mitigate Sub-Module for advanced inspection.

   When receiving a packet attached with a packet forwarding header of a



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   specific NSF profile, an SFF searches for an available NSF instance
   which provides the network security service corresponding to
   (matching with) the NSF profile and forward the packet to the NSF
   instance.  If an NSF decides that the packet requires further
   inspection via another type of network security function, it
   constructs a packet forwarding header specified with (including) the
   NSF profile of the advanced network security function, attaches the
   header to the packet, and then sends the resulting packet to the SFF.
   Once receiving the packet, the SFF checks the NSF profile specified
   in the packet forwarding header.  Then it searches for an NSF
   instance matching with the NSF profile by consulting with NSF
   Operation Manager, and finally forwards the packet to the NSF
   instance.

5.  Use Cases

   This section introduces two use cases for the NSF-triggered Traffic
   Steering Framework: (1) Enforcing Different NSFs Depending on a
   Packet Source's Trust Level, (2) Effective Load Balancing with
   Dynamic NSF Instantiation.

5.1.  Enforcing Different NSFs Depending on a Packet Source's Trust
      Level

   In the proposed architecture, all incoming packets initially arrive
   at the SFF.  We assume that the current security policy forces all
   incoming packets to be by default inspected by a firewall in this
   scenario.  Thus the SFF forwards the received packets to a firewall
   instance.  Then the firewall identifies the source of the traffic and
   evaluates the trust level of the source.  If the traffic comes from a
   trusted source, it is likely to be benign.  In this case, the traffic
   is just forwarded to the destination without further detailed
   inspection via different types of security functions as illustrated
   in Figure 3-(a).  Otherwise if the traffic comes from an untrusted
   source, the firewall attaches a packet forwarding header including
   the NSF profile corresponding to DPI to the packet and returns the
   resulting packet to the SFF.  Once receiving the packet, the SFF
   forwards the packet to the DPI instance which will perform detailed
   inspection for the packet payload.  Figure 3-(b) illustrates this
   case.











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   +-+-+-+-+-+            +-+-+-+-+-+             +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Source  |----------->|Firewall |------------>| Destination |
   +-+-+-+-+-+            +-+-+-+-+-+             +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

             (a) Traffic flow of trusted source


   +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Source  |---->|Firewall |---->|   DPI   |---->| Destination |
   +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

             (b) Traffic flow of untrusted source


    Figure 3:  Different path allocation depending on source of traffic

5.2.  Effective Load Balancing with Dynamic NSF Instantiation

   In a large-scale network domain, there typically exist a large number
   of NSF instances that provide various security services.  It is
   possible that a specific NSF instance experiences an excessive amount
   of traffic beyond its capacity.  In this case, it is required to
   allocate some of the traffic to another available instance of the
   same security function.  If there are no additional instances of the
   same security function available, we need to create a new NSF
   instance and then direct the subsequent traffic to the new instance.
   In this way, we can avoid service congestion and achieve more
   efficient resource utilization.

   This process is commonly called load balancing.  In our proposed
   architecture, NSF Operation Manager performs periodic monitoring of
   the load status of available NSF instances.  In addition, it is
   possible to dynamically generate a new NSF instance through
   Developer's Management System.  With these functionalities along with
   the flexible traffic steering mechanism, we can eventually provide
   load balancing service.

   The following describes the detailed process of load balancing when
   congestion occurs at the firewall instance:

   1.  NSF Operation Manager detects that the firewall instance is
       receiving too much requests.  Currently, there are no additional
       firewall instances available.

   2.  NSF Operation Manager requests Developer's Management System to
       create a new firewall instance.





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   3.  Developer's Management System creates a new firewall instance and
       then registers the information of the new firewall instance to
       NSF Operation Manager.

   4.  NSF Operation Manager updates the SFC Information Table to
       reflect the new firewall instance, and notifies NSF and SFF of
       this update.

   5.  According to the new forwarding information, the SFF forwards the
       subsequent traffic to the new firewall instance.  As a result, we
       can effectively alleviate the burden of the existing firewall
       instance.

6.  Security Considerations

   To enable security function chaining in the I2NSF framework, we adopt
   the additional components in the SFC architecture.  Thus, this
   document shares the security considerations of the SFC architecture
   that are specified in [RFC7665] for the purpose of achieving secure
   communication among components in the proposed architecture.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
   Technology Promotion(IITP) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIP)
   (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology
   Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning).

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC7665]                 Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
                             Defined Networking: A Perspective from
                             within a Service Provider Environment",
                             RFC 7665, March 2014.

   [sfc-ns-use-cases]        Wang, E., Leung, K., Felix, J., and J.
                             Iyer, "Service Function Chaining Use Cases
                             for Network Security",
                             draft-wang-sfc-ns-use-cases-01 (work in
                             progress), March 2016.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7498]                 Quinn, P. and T. Nadeau, "Problem Statement
                             for Service Function Chaining", RFC 7498,
                             April 2015.



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   [i2nsf-cap-interface-im]  Xia, L., Strassner, J., Li, K., Zhang, D.,
                             Lopez, E., Bouthors, N., and L. Fang,
                             "Information Model of Interface to Network
                             Security Functions Capability Interface",
                             draft-xia-i2nsf-capability-interface-im-06
                             (work in progress), June 2016.

   [i2nsf-framework]         Lopez, E., Lopez, D., Dunbar, L.,
                             Strassner, J., Zhuang, X., Parrott, J.,
                             Krishnan, R., Durbha, S., Kumar, R., and A.
                             Lohiya, "Framework for Interface to Network
                             Security Functions",
                             draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-03 (work in
                             progress), August 2016.

   [i2nsf-ps-and-use-cases]  Hares, S., Dunbar, L., Lopez, D., Zarny,
                             M., and C. Jacquenet, "I2NSF Problem
                             Statement and Use cases",
                             draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-02
                             (work in progress), October 2016.

   [i2nsf-terminology]       Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., and L.
                             Xia, "Interface to Network Security
                             Functions (I2NSF) Terminology",
                             draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-01 (work in
                             progress), July 2016.

   [ONF-SFC-Architecture]    ONF, "L4-L7 Service Function Chaining
                             Solution Architecture", June 2015.

Appendix A.  Changes from draft-hyun-i2nsf-sfc-enabled-i2nsf-00

   The following changes were made from
   draft-hyun-i2nsf-sfc-enabled-i2nsf-00:

   o  This version reflects the framework for I2NSF in
      draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-03.

   o  As a term change, Security Function (SF) is replaced by Network
      Security Function (NSF).  As new terms, the following terms are
      added, such as Advanced Inspection/Action, NSF Profile, NSF
      Operation Manager, and Packet Forwarding Header.

   o  As an architecture change, the next NSF in service function
      chaining is determined by both the policy from I2NSF Client and
      the result of the current NSF.





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   o  As a use case change, the first two use cases in the previous
      version is integrated into one use case.

Authors' Addresses

   Sangwon Hyun
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 290 7222
   Fax:   +82 31 299 6673
   EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu
   URI:   http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/


   SangUk Woo
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 290 7222
   Fax:   +82 31 299 6673
   EMail: suwoo@imtl.skku.ac.kr,
   URI:   http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/index.php?mid=member_student


   YunSuk Yeo
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 290 7222
   Fax:   +82 31 299 6673
   EMail: yunsuk@imtl.skku.ac.kr,
   URI:   http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/index.php?mid=member_student









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   Jaehoon Paul Jeong
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Fax:   +82 31 290 7996
   EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php


   Jung-Soo Park
   Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
   218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
   Daejeon  305-700
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 42 860 6514
   EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr






























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