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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 3724

                                                              James Kempf
  Internet Draft                                              Rob Austein
  Document: draft-iab-e2e-futures-05.txt                              IAB
  Expires: August 2004                                      Feburary 2004
  
  
                  The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End to End:
               Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture
  
  
  
  Status of this Memo
  
     This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
     provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
  
     Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force
     (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
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     Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and
     may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time.  It
     is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite
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     The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
          http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
     The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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  Abstract
  
  The end to end principle is the core architectural guideline of the Internet.
  In this document, we briefly examine the development of the end to end
  principle as it has been applied to the Internet architecture over the years.
  We discuss current trends in the evolution of the Internet architecture in
  relation to the end to end principle, and try to draw some conclusion about the
  evolution of the end to end principle, and thus for the Internet architecture
  which it supports, in light of these current trends.
  
  Table of Contents
  
     1.0  Introduction..........................................................2
     2.0  A Brief History of the End to End Principle...........................2
     3.0  Trends Opposed to the End to End Principle............................4
     4.0  Whither the End to End Principle?.....................................7
     5.0  Internet Standards as an Arena for Conflict...........................8
     6.0  Conclusions...........................................................9
     7.0  Acknowledgements......................................................9
     8.0  References............................................................9
     9.0  Security Considerations..............................................10
     10.0  IANA Considerations................................................10
  
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     11.0  Author Information.................................................10
     12.0  Full Copyright Statement...........................................11
  
   1.0   Introduction
  
  One of the key architectural guidelines of the Internet is the end to end
  principle in the papers by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark [1][2]. The end to end
  principle was originally articulated as a question of where best not to put
  functions in a communication system. Yet, in the ensuing years, it has evolved
  to  address  concerns  of  maintaining  openness,  increasing  reliability  and
  robustness, and preserving the properties of user choice and ease of new
  service development as discussed by Blumenthal and Clark in [3]; concerns that
  were not part of the original articulation of the end to end principle.
  
  In this document, we examine how the interpretation of the end to end principle
  has evolved over the years, and where it stands currently. We examine trends in
  the development of the Internet that have led to pressure to define services in
  the network, a topic that has already received some amount of attention from
  the IAB in RFC 3238 [5]. We describe some considerations about how the end to
  end principle might evolve in light of these trends.
  
   2.0   A Brief History of the End to End Principle
  
  2.1 In the Beginning...
  
  The end to end principle was originally articulated as a question of where best
  to put functions in a communication system:
  
     The function in question can completely and correctly be implemented only
     with the knowledge and help of the application standing at the end points of
     the communication system. Therefore, providing that questioned function as a
     feature of the communication system itself is not possible. (Sometimes an
     incomplete version of the function provided by the communication system may
     be useful as a performance enhancement.) [1].
  
  A specific example of such a function is delivery guarantees [1]. The original
  ARPANET returned a message "Request for Next Message" whenever it delivered a
  packet. Although this message was found to be useful within the network as a
  form of congestion control, since the ARPANET refused to accept another message
  to the same destination until the previous acknowledgment was returned, it was
  never particularly useful as an indication of guaranteed delivery. The problem
  was that the host stack on the sending host typically doesn't want to know just
  that the network delivered a packet, but rather the stack layer on the sending
  host wants to know that the stack layer on the receiving host properly
  processed the packet. In terms of modern IP stack structure, a reliable
  transport  layer  requires  an  indication  that  transport  processing  has
  successfully completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [4], and not simply
  an indication from the IP layer that packet arrived. Similarly, an application
  layer  protocol  may  require  an  application-specific  acknowledgement  that
  contains, among other things, a status code indicating the disposition of the
  request.
  
  
  
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  The specific examples given in [1] and other references at the time [2]
  primarily  involve  transmission  of  data  packets:  data  integrity,  delivery
  guarantees,  duplicate  message  suppression,  per  packet  encryption,  and
  transaction management. From the viewpoint of today's Internet architecture, we
  would view most of these as transport layer functions (data integrity, delivery
  guarantees, duplicate message suppression, and perhaps transaction management),
  others as network layer functions with support at other layers where necessary
  (for example, packet encryption), and not application layer functions.
  
  2.2 ...In the Middle...
  
  As the Internet developed, the end to end principle gradually widened to
  concerns about where best to put the state associated with applications in the
  Internet: in the network or at end nodes. The best example is the description
  in RFC 1958 [6]:
  
     This principle has important consequences if we require applications to
     survive partial network failures. An end-to-end protocol design should not
     rely on the maintenance of state (i.e. information about the state of the
     end-to-end communication) inside the network. Such state should be
     maintained only in the endpoints, in such a way that the state can only be
     destroyed when the endpoint itself breaks (known as fate-sharing). An
     immediate consequence of this is that datagrams are better than classical
     virtual circuits.  The network's job is to transmit datagrams as efficiently
     and flexibly as possible. Everything else should be done at the fringes.
  
  The original articulation of the end to end principle - that knowledge and
  assistance of the end point is essential and that omitting such knowledge and
  implementing a function in the network without such knowledge and assistance is
  not possible - took a while to percolate through the engineering community, and
  had evolved by this point to a broad architectural statement about what belongs
  in the network and what doesn't. RFC 1958 uses the term "application" to mean
  the entire network stack on the end node, including network, transport, and
  application layers, in contrast to the earlier articulation of the end to end
  principle as being about the communication system itself.  "Fate-sharing"
  describes  this  quite  clearly:  the  fate  of  a  conversation  between  two
  applications is only shared between the two applications; the fate does not
  depend on anything in the network, except for the network's ability to get
  packets from one application to the other.
  
  The end to end principle in this formulation is specifically about what kind of
  state is maintained where:
  
     To perform its services, the network maintains some state information:
     routes, QoS guarantees that it makes, session information where that is used
     in header compression, compression histories for data compression, and the
     like. This state must be self-healing; adaptive procedures or protocols must
     exist to derive and maintain that state, and change it when the topology or
     activity of the network changes. The volume of this state must be minimized,
     and the loss of the state must not result in more than a temporary denial of
     service given that connectivity exists.  Manually configured state must be
     kept to an absolute minimum.[6]
  
  
  
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  In this formulation of the end to end principle, state involved in getting
  packets from one end of the network to the other is maintained in the network.
  The state is "soft state," in the sense that it can be quickly dropped and
  reconstructed (or even required to be periodically renewed) as the network
  topology changes due to routers and switches going on and off line. "Hard
  state", state upon which the proper functioning of the application depends, is
  only maintained in the end nodes. This formulation of the principle is a
  definite change from the original formulation of the principle, about end node
  participation being required for proper implementation of most functions.
  
  In summary, the general awareness both of the principle itself and of its
  implications for how unavoidable state should be handled grew over time to
  become a (if not the) foundation principle of the Internet architecture.
  
  2.3 ...And Now.
  
  An interesting example of how the end to end principle continues to influence
  the technical debate in the Internet community is IP mobility. The existing
  Internet routing architecture severely constrains how closely IP mobility can
  match the end to end principle without making fundamental changes. Mobile IPv6,
  described in the Mobile IPv6 specification by Johnson, Perkins, and Arkko [7],
  requires a routing proxy in the mobile node's home network (the Home Agent) for
  maintaining the mapping between the mobile node's routing locator, the care of
  address, and the mobile node's node identifier, the home address. But the local
  subnet routing proxy (the Foreign Agent), which was a feature of the older
  Mobile IPv4 design that compromised end to end routing, has been eliminated.
  The end node now handles its own care of address. In addition, Mobile IPv6
  includes secure mechanisms for optimizing routing to allow end to end routing
  between the mobile end node and the correspondent node, removing the need to
  route through the global routing proxy at the home agent. These features are
  all based on end to end considerations. However, the need for the global
  routing proxy in the Home Agent in Mobile IPv6 is determined by the aliasing of
  the global node identifier with the routing identifier in the Internet routing
  architecture, a topic that was discussed in an IAB workshop and reported in RFC
  2956 [9], and that hasn't changed in IPv6.
  
  Despite this constraint, the vision emerging out of the IETF working groups
  developing standards for mobile networking is of a largely autonomous mobile
  node with multiple wireless link options, among which the mobile node picks and
  chooses. The end node is therefore responsible for maintaining the integrity of
  the communication, as the end to end principle implies. This kind of innovative
  application  of  the  end  to  end  principle  derives  from  the  same  basic
  considerations of reliability and robustness (wireless link integrity, changes
  in connectivity and service availability with movement, etc.) that motivated
  the  original  development  of  the  end  to  end  principle.  While  the  basic
  reliability of wired links and routing and switching equipment has improved
  considerably since the end to end principle was formalized 15 years ago, the
  reliability or unreliability of wireless links is governed more strongly by the
  basic physics of the medium and the instantaneous radio propagation conditions.
  
   3.0   Trends Opposed to the End to End Principle
  
  While the end to end principle continues to provide a solid foundation for much
  IETF design work, the specific application of the end to end principle
  
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  described  in  RFC  1958  has  increasingly  come  into  question  from  various
  directions. The IAB has been concerned about trends opposing the end to end
  principle for some time, for example RFC 2956 [9] and RFC 2775 [12]. The
  primary focus of concern in these documents is the reduction in transparency
  due to the introduction of NATs and other address translation mechanisms in the
  Internet, and the consequences to the end to end principle of various scenarios
  involving full, partial, or no deployment of IPv6. More recently, the topic of
  concern has shifted to the consequences of service deployment in the network.
  The IAB opinion on Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) in RFC 3238 [5] is
  intended to assess the architectural desirability of defining services in the
  network and to raise questions about how such services might result in
  compromises of privacy, security, and end-to-end data integrity. Clark, et al.
  in [10] and Carpenter in RFC 3234 [11] also take up the topic of service
  definition in the network.
  
  Perhaps the best review of the forces militating against the end to end
  principle is by Blumenthal and Clark in [3]. The authors make the point that
  the Internet originally developed among a community of like-minded technical
  professionals who trusted each other, and was administered by academic and
  government institutions who enforced a policy of no commercial use. The major
  stakeholders in the Internet are quite different today. As a consequence, new
  requirements have evolved over the last decade. Examples of these requirements
  are discussed in the following subsections. Other discussions about pressures
  on the end to end principle in today's Internet can be found in the discussion
  by Reed [13] and Moors' paper in the 2002 IEEE International Communications
  Conference [14].
  
  3.1 Need for Authentication
  
  Perhaps the single most important change from the Internet of 15 years ago is
  the lack of trust between users. Because the end users in the Internet of 15
  years ago were few, and were largely dedicated to using the Internet as a tool
  for academic research and communicating research results (explicit commercial
  use of the Internet was forbidden when it was run by the US government), trust
  between end users (and thus authentication of end nodes that they use) and
  between network operators and their users was simply not an issue in general.
  Today, the motivations of some individuals using the Internet are not always
  entirely ethical, and, even if they are, the assumption that end nodes will
  always co-operate to achieve some mutually beneficial action, as implied by the
  end to end principle, is not always accurate. In addition, the growth in users
  who are either not technologically sophisticated enough or simply uninterested
  in maintaining their own security has required network operators to become more
  proactive in deploying measures to prevent naive or uninterested users from
  inadvertently or intentionally generating security problems.
  
  While the end to end principle does not require that users implicitly trust
  each other, the lack of trust in the Internet today requires that application
  and system designers make a choice about how to handle authentication, whereas
  that choice was rarely apparent 15 years ago. One of the most common examples
  of network elements interposing between end hosts are those dedicated to
  security: firewalls, VPN tunnel endpoints, certificate servers, etc. These
  intermediaries are designed to protect the network from unimpeded attack or to
  allow two end nodes whose users may have no inherent reason to trust each other
  to achieve some level of authentication. At the same time, these measures act
  
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  as impediments for end to end communications. Third party trust intermediaries
  are not a requirement for security, as end to end security mechanisms, such as
  S/MIME [15], can be used instead, and where third party measures such as PKI
  infrastructure or keys in DNS are utilized to exchange keying material, they
  don't necessarily impinge on end to end traffic after authentication has been
  achieved. Even if third parties are involved, ultimately it is up to the
  endpoints and their users in particular, to determine which third parties they
  trust.
  
  3.2 New Service Models
  
  New service models inspired by new applications require achieving the proper
  performance level as a fundamental part of the delivered service. These service
  models are a significant change from the original best effort service model.
  Email, file transfer, and even Web access aren't perceived as failing if
  performance degrades, though the user may become frustrated at the time
  required to complete the transaction. However, for streaming audio and video,
  to say nothing of real time bidirectional voice and video, achieving the proper
  performance level, whatever that might mean for an acceptable user experience
  of the service, is part of delivering the service, and a customer contracting
  for the service has a right to expect the level of performance for which they
  have contracted. For example, content distributors sometimes release content
  via content distribution servers that are spread around the Internet at various
  locations to avoid delays in delivery if the server is topologically far away
  from the client. Retail broadband and multimedia services are a new service
  model for many service providers.
  
  3.3 Rise of the Third Party
  
  Academic and government institutions ran the Internet of 15 years ago. These
  institutions  did  not  expect  to  make  a  profit  from  their  investment  in
  networking technology. In contrast, the network operator with which most
  Internet users deal today is the commercial ISP. Commercial ISPs run their
  networks as a business, and their investors rightly expect the business to turn
  a profit. This change in business model has led to a certain amount of pressure
  on ISPs to increase business prospects by deploying new services.
  
  In particular, the standard retail dialup bit pipe account with email and shell
  access has become a commodity service, resulting in low profit margins. While
  many ISPs are happy with this business model and are able to survive on it,
  others would like to deploy different service models that have a higher profit
  potential and provide the customer with more or different services. An example
  is retail broadband bit pipe access via cable or DSL coupled with streaming
  multimedia.  Some  ISPs  that  offer  broadband  access  also  deploy  content
  distribution networks to increase the performance of streaming media. These
  services are typically deployed so that they are only accessible within the
  ISP's network, and as a result, they do not contribute to open, end to end
  service. From an ISP's standpoint, however, offering such service is an
  incentive for customers to buy the ISP's service.
  
  ISPs are not the only third party intermediary that has appeared within the
  last 10 years. Unlike the previous involvement of corporations and governments
  in running the Internet, corporate network administrators, and governmental
  officials have become increasingly demanding of opportunities to interpose
  
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  between two parties in an end to end conversation. A benign motivation for this
  involvement is to mitigate the lack of trust, so the third party acts as a
  trust anchor or enforcer of good behavior between the two ends. A less benign
  motivation is for the third parties to insert policy for their own reasons,
  perhaps taxation or even censorship. The requirements of third parties often
  have little or nothing to do with technical concerns, but rather derive from
  particular social and legal considerations.
  
   4.0   Whither the End to End Principle?
  
  Given the pressures on the end to end principle discussed in the previous
  section, a question arises about the future of the end to end principle. Does
  the end to end principle have a future in the Internet architecture or not? If
  it does have a future, how should it be applied? Clearly, an unproductive
  approach to answering this question is to insist upon the end to end principle
  as  a  fundamentalist  principle  that  allows  no  compromise.  The  pressures
  described above are real and powerful, and if the current Internet technical
  community chooses to ignore these pressures, the likely result is that a market
  opportunity will be created for a new technical community that does not ignore
  these pressures but which may not understand the implications of their design
  choices. A more productive approach is to return to first principles and re-
  examine what the end to end principle is trying to accomplish, and then update
  our  definition  and  exposition  of  the  end  to  end  principle  given  the
  complexities of the Internet today.
  
  4.1 Consequences of the End to End Principle
  
  In this section, we consider the two primary desirable consequences of the end
  to end principle: protection of innovation and provision of reliability and
  robustness.
  
  4.1.1   Protection of Innovation
  
  One desirable consequence of the end to end principle is protection of
  innovation. Requiring modification in the network in order to deploy new
  services is still typically more difficult than modifying end nodes. The
  counterargument - that many end nodes are now essentially closed boxes which
  are not updatable and that most users don't want to update them anyway - does
  not  apply  to  all  nodes  and  all  users.  Many  end  nodes  are  still  user
  configurable and a sizable percentage of users are "early adopters," who are
  willing to put up with a certain amount of technological grief in order to try
  out  a  new  idea.  And,  even  for  the  closed  boxes  and  uninvolved  users,
  downloadable code that abides by the end to end principle can provide fast
  service innovation. Requiring someone with a new idea for a service to convince
  a bunch of ISPs or corporate network administrators to modify their networks is
  much more difficult than simply putting up a Web page with some downloadable
  software implementing the service.
  
  4.1.2   Reliability and Trust
  
  Of increasing concern today, however, is the decrease in reliability and
  robustness  that  results  from  deliberate,  active  attacks  on  the  network
  infrastructure and end nodes. While the original developers of the Internet
  were concerned by large-scale system failures, attacks of the subtlety and
  
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  variety that the Internet experiences today were not a problem during the
  original development of the Internet. By and large, the end to end principle
  was not addressed to the decrease in reliability resulting from attacks
  deliberately engineered to take advantage of subtle flaws in software. These
  attacks are part of the larger issue of the trust breakdown discussed in
  Section 3.1. Thus, the issue of the trust breakdown can be considered another
  forcing function on the Internet architecture.
  
  The immediate reaction to this trust breakdown has been to try to back fit
  security into existing protocols. While this effort is necessary, it is not
  sufficient. The issue of trust must become as firm an architectural principle
  in protocol design for the future as the end to end principle is today. Trust
  isn't simply a matter of adding some cryptographic protection to a protocol
  after it is designed. Rather, prior to designing the protocol, the trust
  relationships between the network elements involved in the protocol must be
  defined, and boundaries must be drawn between those network elements that share
  a trust relationship. The trust boundaries should be used to determine what
  type of communication occurs between the network elements involved in the
  protocol and which network elements signal each other. When communication
  occurs across a trust boundary, cryptographic or other security protection of
  some sort may be necessary. Additional measures may be necessary to secure the
  protocol when communicating network elements do not share a trust relationship.
  For example, a protocol might need to minimize state in the recipient prior to
  establishing the validity of the credentials from the sender in order to avoid
  a memory depletion DoS attack.
  
  4.2 The End to End Principle in Applications Design
  
  The concern expressed by the end to end principle is applicable to applications
  design too. Two key points in designing application protocols are to ensure
  they don't have any dependencies that would break the end to end principle and
  to ensure that they can identify end points in a consistent fashion. An example
  of the former is layer violations - creating dependencies that would make it
  impossible for the transport layer, for example, to do its work appropriately.
  Another issue is the desire to insert more applications infrastructure into the
  network. Architectural considerations around this issue are discussed in RFC
  3238 [5]. This desire need not result in a violation the end to end principle
  if the partitioning of functioning is done so that services provided in the
  network operate with the explicit knowledge and involvement of endpoints, when
  such knowledge and involvement is necessary for the proper functioning of the
  service. The result becomes a distributed application, in which the end to end
  principle applies to each connection involved in implementing the application.
  
   5.0   Internet Standards as an Arena for Conflict
  
  Internet standards have increasingly become an arena for conflict [10]. ISPs
  have certain concerns, businesses and government have others, and vendors of
  networking hardware and software still others. Often, these concerns conflict,
  and sometimes they conflict with the concerns of the end users. For example,
  ISPs are reluctant to deploy interdomain QoS services because, among other
  reasons, every known instance creates a significant and easily exploited
  DoS/DDoS vulnerability. However, some end users would like to have end-to-end,
  Diffserv or Intserv-style QoS available to improve support for voice and video
  multimedia applications between end nodes in different domains, as discussed by
  
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  Huston in RFC 2990 [16]. In this case, the security, robustness and reliability
  concerns of the ISP conflict with the desire of users for a different type of
  service.
  
  These conflicts will inevitably be reflected in the Internet architecture going
  forward. Some of these conflicts are impossible to resolve on a technical
  level, nor would it even be desirable, because they involve social and legal
  choices that the IETF is not empowered to make (for a counter argument in the
  area of privacy, see Goldberg, et al. [17]). But for those conflicts that do
  involve  technical  choices,  the  important  properties  of  user  choice  and
  empowerment, reliability and integrity of end to end service, supporting trust
  and "good network citizen behavior," and fostering innovation in services
  should be the basis upon which resolution is made. The conflict will then play
  out on the field of the resulting architecture.
  
   6.0   Conclusions
  
  
  The end to end principle continues to guide technical development of Internet
  standards, and remains as important today for the Internet architecture as in
  the past. In many cases, unbundling of the end to end principle into its
  consequences leads to a distributed approach in which the end to end principle
  applies to interactions between the individual pieces of the application, while
  the  unbundled  consequences,  protection  of  innovation  and  reliability  and
  robustness, apply to the entire application. While the end to end principle
  originated  as  a  focused  argument  about  the  need  for  the  knowledge  and
  assistance of end nodes to properly implement functions in a communication
  system, particular second order properties developed by the Internet as a
  result of the end to end principle have come to be recognized as being as
  important, if not more so, than the principle itself. End user choice and
  empowerment, integrity of service, support for trust, and "good network citizen
  behavior" are all properties that have developed as a consequence of the end to
  end principle. Recognizing these properties in a particular proposal for
  modifications to the Internet has become more important than before as the
  pressures to incorporate services into the network have increased. Any proposal
  to  incorporate  services  in  the  network  should  be  weighed  against  these
  properties before proceeding.
  
   7.0   Acknowledgements
  
  Many of the ideas presented here originally appeared in the works of Dave
  Clark, John Wroclawski, Bob Braden, Karen Sollins, Marjory Blumenthal, and Dave
  Reed on forces currently influencing the evolution of the Internet. The authors
  would particularly like to single out the work of Dave Clark, who was the
  original articulator of the end to end principle and who continues to inspire
  and guide the evolution of the Internet architecture, and John Wroclawski, with
  whom conversations during the development of this paper helped to clarify
  issues involving tussle and the Internet.
  
   8.0   References
  
       [1] Saltzer, J.H., Reed, D.P., and Clark, D.D., "End to End Arguments in
           System Design," ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November 1984, pp 277-288.
  
  
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       [2] Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols,"
           Proc SIGCOMM 88, ACM CCR Vol 18, Number 4, August 1988, pp. 106-114.
       [3] Blumenthal, M., Clark, D.D., "Rethinking the design of the Internet:
           The end to end arguments vs. the brave new world", ACM Transactions on
           Internet Technology, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2001, pp 70-109.
       [4] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol," RFC 793, September, 1981.
       [5] Floyd, S., and Daigle, L., "IAB Architectural and Policy Considerations
           for Open Pluggable Edge Services", RFC 3238, January 2002.
       [6] Carpenter, B. (editor), "Architectural Principles of the Internet," RFC
           1958, June, 1996.
       [7] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and Arkko, J., "Mobility Support in IPv6,"
           draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-20.txt, a work in progress.
       [8] Perkins, C., editor, "Mobility Support in IPv4", RFC 3220, August,
           2002.
       [9] Kaat, M., "Overview of 1999 IAB Network Layer Workshop," RFC 2956,
           October, 2000.
      [10] Clark, D.D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K., and Braden, B., "Tussle in
           Cyberspace: Defining Tommorow's Internet", Proceedings of Sigcomm 2002.
      [11] Carpenter, B., and Brim, S., "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues," RFC
           3234, February, 2002.
      [12] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency," RFC 2775, February, 2000.
      [13] Reed, D., "The End of the End-to-End Argument?",
           http://www.reed.com/dprframeweb/dprframe.asp?section=paper&fn=endofendt
           oend.html, April, 2000.
      [14] Moors, T., "A Critical Review of End-to-end Arguments in System
           Design," Proc. 2000 IEEE International Conference on Communications,
           pp. 1214-1219, April, 2002.
      [15] Ramsdell, B. (editor), "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification", RFC
           2633, June, 1999.
      [16] Huston, G., "Next Steps for the IP QoS Architecture", RFC 2990,
           November, 2000.
      [17] Goldberg, I., Wagner, D., and Brewer, E., "Privacy-enhancing
           technologies for the Internet," Proceedings of IEEE COMPCON 97, pp.
           103-109, 1997.
  
  
   9.0   Security Considerations
  
  This document does not propose any new protocols, and therefore does not
  involve any security considerations in that sense.  However, throughout this
  document there are discussions of the privacy and integrity issues and the
  architectural requirements created by those issues.
  
   10.0  IANA Considerations
  
  There are no IANA considerations regarding this document.
  
   11.0  Author Information
  
  
  Internet Architecture Board
  EMail:  iab@iab.org
  
  IAB Membership at time this document was completed:
  
     Kempf and Austein      Expires August 2004                        [Page 10]


     Internet Draft        Future of End to End                  Feburary, 2004
  
  
        Bernard Aboba
        Harald Alvestrand
        Rob Austein
        Leslie Daigle
        Patrik F„ltstr÷m
        Sally Floyd
        Jun-ichiro Itojun Hagino
        Mark Handley
        Geoff Huston
        Charlie Kaufman
        James Kempf
        Eric Rescorla
        Mike St. Johns
  
  This draft was created in Feburary 2004.
  
   12.0  Full Copyright Statement
  
     Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.  This
     document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and
     derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its
     implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole
     or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above
     copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and
     derivative works.  However, this document itself may not be modified in any
     way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet
     Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
     developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
     defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required
     to translate it into languages other than English.  The limited permissions
     granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society
     or its successors or assigns.  This document and the information contained
     herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
     INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
     IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
     INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
     MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
     Kempf and Austein      Expires August 2004                        [Page 11]
  

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