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Versions: (draft-housley-web-pki-problems) 00 01 02 03 04 05

Internet Architecture Board                                   R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Informational                             K. O'Donoghue
Expires: May 4, 2017                                    Internet Society
                                                        October 31, 2016


  Improving the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the World Wide Web
                     draft-iab-web-pki-problems-05

Abstract

   The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for the World Wide Web (Web
   PKI) is a vital component of trust in the Internet.  In recent years,
   there have been a number of improvements made to this infrastructure,
   including improved certificate status checking, automation, and
   transparency of governance.  However, additional improvements are
   necessary.  This document identifies continuing areas of concern and
   provides recommendations to the Internet community for additional
   improvements, moving toward a more robust and secure Web PKI.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  A Brief Description of the Web PKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Improvements to the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Strong Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Preparing for Quantum Computers . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Avoiding Weak Cryptography  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Support for Enterprise PKIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Web PKI in the Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Governance Improvements to the Web PKI  . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  IAB Members at the Time of Approval  . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the World Wide Web (Web PKI)
   has evolved into a key component of the global Internet; it enables
   trusted business and individual transactions.  This global
   infrastructure has been growing and evolving for many years.  The
   success of Web PKI has contributed to significant Internet growth.
   The Web PKI impacts all aspects of our lives, and no one can imagine
   the web without the protections that the Web PKI enables.

   As with any maturing technology, there are several problems with the
   current Web PKI.  The Web PKI makes use of certificates as described
   in RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  These certificates are primarily used with
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) as described in RFC 5246 [RFC5246].

   The economics of the Web PKI value chain are discussed in [VFBH],
   [AV], and [AVAV].  This document does not investigate the economic
   issues further, but these economic issues provide motivation for
   correcting the other problems that are discussed in this document.
   One note of caution is that the references above assume the cost of
   acquiring a certificate is high.  These costs have been decreasing in
   recent years due to a number of factors including the Let's Encrypt
   initiative discussed later in this document.




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   Over the years, many technical improvements have been made to the Web
   PKI, but several challenges remain.  This document offers a general
   set of recommendations to the Internet community designed to be
   helpful in addressing these remaining challenges.

2.  A Brief Description of the Web PKI

   This section provides a very brief introduction to some of the key
   concepts of the Web PKI.  It is not intended to be a full description
   of Web PKI but rather to provide some basic concepts to help frame
   the remaining discussion.

   Web PKI is an infrastructure comprised of a number of PKIs that
   enables the establishment of trust relationships between
   communicating web entities.  This trust may be chained through
   multiple intermediate parties.  The root of that trust is referred to
   as a trust anchor.  A relying party is an entity that depends upon
   the trust provided by the infrastructure to make informed decisions.
   A complex set of technical, policy, and legal requirements can make
   up the qualificiations for a trust anchor in a specific situation.

   Certificates are digitally signed structures that contain the
   information required to communicate the trust.  Certificates are
   specified in RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  Certificates contain, among other
   things, a subject name, a public key, a limited validity lifetime,
   and the digital signature of the Certification Authority (CA).
   Certificate users require confidence that the private key associated
   with the certified public key is owned by the named subject.

   The architectural model used in the Web PKI includes:

   EE:   End Entity -- the subject of a certificate -- certificates are
         issued to end entities including Web servers and clients that
         need mutual authentication.

   CA:   Certification Authority -- the issuer of a certificate --
         issues certificates for end entities including Web servers and
         clients.

   RA:   Registration Authority -- an optional system to which a CA
         delegates some management functions such as identity validation
         or physical credential distribution.

   While in its simplest form, the Web PKI is fairly straightforward,
   there are a number of concepts that can complicate the relationships
   and the behavior.  As mentioned already, there can be intermediate
   certificates that represent delegation within the certification path.
   There can be cross-signing of certificates that creates



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   multidimensional relationships.  Browsers install numerous trust
   anchors associated with many different CAs in the Web PKI.  All of
   this results in a complex ecosystem of trust relationships that
   reflect different operational practices and underlying certificate
   policies.

   Certificates naturally expire since they contain a validity lifetime.
   In some situations, a certificate needs to be revoked before it
   expires.  Revocation usually happens because the private key is lost
   or compromised, but an intermediate CA certificate can be revoked for
   bad behavior.  All CAs are responsible for providing revocation
   status of the certificates that they issue throughout their lifetime
   of the certificate.  Revocation status information may be provided by
   certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [RFC5280], the Online Certificate
   Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960], or some other mechanism.

   The enrollment process used by a CA makes sure that the subject name
   in the certificate is appropriate and that the subject actually holds
   the private key.  The enrollment process should require the subject
   to use the private key; this can be accomplished with PKCS#10
   [RFC2986] or some other proof-of-possession mechanism such as
   [RFC6955].

3.  Improvements to the Web PKI

   Over the years, many technical improvements have been made to the Web
   PKI.  Despite this progress, several challenges remain.  This section
   discusses several unresolved problems, and it suggests general
   directions for tackling them.

3.1.  Strong Cryptography

   Quantum computers [WIKI-QC] exist today, but they are not yet able to
   solve real world problems faster that digital computers.  No one
   knows whether a large-scale quantum computer will be invented in the
   next decade or two that is able to break all of the public key
   algorithms that are used in the Web PKI, but it seems prudent to
   prepare for such a catastrophic event.

   In the mean time, the Web PKI needs to employ cryptographic
   algorithms that are secure against known cryptanalytic techniques and
   advanced digital computers.

3.1.1.  Preparing for Quantum Computers

   Hash-based signature algorithms [HASH-S1][HASH-S2] are quantum
   resistant, meaning that they are secure even if an attacker is able
   to build a large-scale quantum computer.  Hash-based signature



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   algorithms have small public and private keys, provide fast signing
   and verification operation, but they have very large signature values
   and one private key can produce a fixed number of signatures.  The
   number of signatures is set at the time the key pair is generated.

   As a result of these properties, hash-based signature algorithms are
   not ideal for signing certificates.  However, they are well suited
   for other uses, including signatures for software updates.  The use a
   quantum resistant signature algorithm for software updates ensures
   that new software can be securely deployed even if a large-scale
   quantum computer is invented during the lifetime of the system.

   Several signature and key establishment algorithms [WIKI-PQC] are
   being investigated that might prove to be quantum resistant and offer
   properties that are suitable for use in the Web PKI.  So far, none of
   these algorithms has achieved wide acceptance.  Further research is
   needed.

   While this research is underway, some security protocols allow a pre-
   shared key (PSK) to be mixed with a symmetric key that is established
   with a public key algorithms.  If the PSK is distributed without the
   use of a public key mechanism, the overall key establishment
   mechanism will be quantum resistant.  Consider the use of a PSK for
   information that requires decades of confidentiality protection, such
   as health care information.

   The Web PKI can prepare for the for quantum computing by:

   1.  Deploy hash-based signatures for software updates.

   2.  For information that requires decades of confidentiality
       protection, mix a pre-shared key (PSK) as part of the key
       establishment.

   3.  Continue research on quantum resistant public key cryptography.

3.1.2.  Avoiding Weak Cryptography

   Several digital signature algorithms, one-way hash functions, and
   public key sizes that were once considered strong are no longer
   considered adequate.  This is not a surprise.  Cryptographic
   algorithms age; they become weaker over time.  As new cryptanalysis
   techniques are developed and computing capabilities increase, the
   amount of time needed to break a particular cryptographic algorithm
   will decrease.  For this reason, the algorithms and key sizes used in
   the Web PKI need to migrate over time.





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   CAs and Browser vendors have been managing algorithm and key size
   transitions, but it is a significant challenge to maintain a very
   high degree of interoperability across the world wide web while
   phasing out aged cryptographic algorithms or too small key sizes.
   When these appear in a long-lived trust anchor or intermediate CA
   certificate, refusal to accept them can impact a very large tree of
   certificates.  In addition, if a certificate for a web site with a
   huge amount of traffic is in that tree, rejecting that certificate
   may impact too many users.

   Despite this situation, the MD5 and SHA-1 one-way hash functions have
   been almost completely eliminated from the Web PKI, and 1024-bit RSA
   public keys are essentially gone [MB2015] [MB2016].  It took a very
   long time to make this happen, and trust anchors and certificates
   that used these cryptographic algorithms were considered valid long
   after they were widely known to be too weak.

   Obviously, additional algorithm transitions will be needed in the
   future.  The algorithms and key sizes that are acceptable today will
   become weaker with time.  RFC 7696 [RFC7696] offers some guidelines
   regarding cryptographic algorithm agility.

   The Web PKI can prepare for the next transition by:

   1.  Having experts periodically evaluate the current choices of
       algorithm and key size.  While it is not possible to predict when
       a new cryptanalysis technique will be discovered, the end of the
       useful lifetime of most algorithms and key sizes is known many
       years in advance.

   2.  Planning for a smooth and orderly transition from a weak
       algorithm or key size.  Experience has shown that many years are
       needed produce to specifications, develop implementations, and
       then deploy replacements.

   3.  Reducing the lifetime of end-entity certificates to create
       frequent opportunities to change an algorithm or key size.

3.2.  Support for Enterprise PKIs

   Many enterprises operate their own PKI.  These enterprises do not
   want to be part of the traditional Web PKI, but they face many
   challenges in order to achieve a similar user experience and level of
   security.

   Enterprise PKI users must install one or more enterprise trust
   anchors in their operating system or browser.  There is readily-
   available software that can install trust anchors for use by the



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   operating system and browser, but the enterprise PKI will not be
   trusted until the system administrator or end user does this step.

   Enterprise PKI users often experience greater latency than tradition
   Web PKI users.  Standards-based and proprietary revocation status
   checking approches might offer relief.

   The Status Request extension to TLS [RFC6066] allows the web server
   to provide status information about its certificate.  By including
   this extension in the TLS handshake, the browser asks the web server
   to provide OCSP responses in addition to the server certificate.
   This approach greatly reduces the latency since the browser does not
   need to generate an OCSP request or wait for an OCSP response to
   check the validity of the server certificate.  The inclusion of a
   time-stamped OCSP response in the TLS handshake is referred to as
   "OCSP stapling".  In addition, the MUST_STAPLE feature [TLSFEATURE]
   can be used to insist that OCSP stapling be used.

   While not widely implemented, the Multiple Certificate Status Request
   extension [RFC6961] allows the web server to provide status
   information about its own certificate and also the status of
   intermediate certificates in the certification path, further reducing
   latency.

   When OCSP stapling is used by an enterprise, the OCSP responder will
   not receive an enormous volume of OCSP requests because the web
   servers make a few requests and the responses are passed to the
   browsers in the TLS handshake.  In addition, OCSP stapling can
   improve user privacy, since the web server, not the browser, contacts
   the OCSP responder.  In this way, the OCSP responder is not able to
   determine which browsers are checking the validity of certificate for
   particular websites.

   Some browser vendors provide a proprietary revocation checking
   mechanism that obtains revocation status for the entire Web PKI in a
   very compact form.  This mechanism eliminates latency since no
   network traffic is generated at the time that a certificate is being
   validated.  However, these mechanisms cover only the trust anchor
   store for that browser vendor, excluding all enterprise PKIs.  In
   addition, measurements in 2015 [IMC2015] show that these mechanisms
   do not currently provide adequate coverage of the Web PKI.

   Several enterprises issue certificates to all of their employees, and
   among other uses, these certificates are used in TLS client
   authentication.  There is not a common way to import the private key
   and the client certificate into browsers.  In fact, the private key
   can be stored in many different formats depending on the software
   used to generate the public/private key pair.  PKCS#12 [RFC7292]



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   seems to be the most popular format at the moment.  A standard way to
   import the needed keying material and a standard format will make
   this task much easier, and the web might enjoy an increase in mutual
   authentication.  However, please note the privacy considerations in
   Section 5.

   Enterprise PKIs can be better supported if:

   1.  Each enterprise PKI offers an OCSP Responder, and enterprise
       websites make use of OCSP Stapling.

   2.  Operating system and browser vendors support a standard way to
       install private keys and certificates for use in client
       authentication.

   3.  In the event that browser vendors continue to offer latency-free
       proprietary revocation status checking mechanisms, then these
       mechanisms need to expand the coverage to all of the Web PKI and
       offer a means to include enterprise PKIs in the coverage.

3.3.  Web PKI in the Home

   More and more, web protocols are being used to manage devices in the
   home.  For example, homeowners can use a web browser to connect to a
   web site that is embedded in their home router to adjust various
   settings.  The router allows the browser to access web pages to
   adjust these setting as long as the connection originates from the
   home network and the proper password is provided.  However, there is
   no way for the browser to authenticate to the embedded web site.
   Authentication of the web site is normally performed during the TLS
   handshake, but the Web PKI is not equipped to issue certificates to
   home routers or the many other home devices that employ embedded web
   sites for homeowner management.

   A solution in this environment cannot depend on the homeowner to
   perform duties that are normally associated with a web site
   administrator.  However, some straightforward tasks could be done at
   the time the device is installed in the home.  These tasks cannot be
   more complex than the initial setup of a new printer in the home,
   otherwise they will be skipped or done incorrectly.

   There are three very different approaches to certificates for home
   devices that have been discussed over the years.  In the first
   approach, a private key and certificate are installed in the device
   at the factory.  The certificate has an unlimited lifetime.  Since it
   never expires, no homeowner action is needed to renew it.  Also,
   since the certificate never changes, the algorithms are selected by
   the factory for the lifetime of the device.  The subject name in the



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   certificate is quite generic, as it must be comprised of information
   that is known in the factory.  The subject name is often based on
   some combination of the manufacturer, model, serial number, and MAC
   address.  While these do uniquely identify the device, they have
   little meaning to the homeowner.  A secure device identifier, as
   defined in [IEEE802.1AR], is one example of a specification where
   locally significant identities can be securely associated with a
   manufacturer-provisioned device identifier.

   In the second approach, like the first one, a private key and a
   certificate that are installed in the device at the factory, but the
   homeowner is unaware of them.  This factory-installed certificate is
   used only to authenticate to a CA operated by the manufacturer.  At
   the time the device is installed, the homeowner can provide a portion
   of the subject name for the device, and the manufacturer CA can issue
   a certificate that includes a subject name that the homeowner will
   recognize.  The certificate can be renewed without any action by the
   homeowner at appropriate intervals.  Also, following a software
   update, the algorithms used in the TLS handshake and the certificate
   can be updated.

   In the third approach, which is sometimes used today in Internet of
   Things devices, the device generates a key pair at the time the
   device is configured for the home network, and then a controller on
   the local network issues a certificate for the device that contains
   the freshly generated public key and a name selected by the user.  If
   the device is passed on to another user, then a new key pair will be
   generated and a new name can be assigned when the device is
   configured for that user's network.

   Section 3.1.2 of this document calls for the ability to transition
   from weak cryptographic algorithms over time.  For this reason, and
   the ability to use a subject name that the homeowner will recognize,
   the second or third approaches are preferred.

   One potential problem with the second approach is continuity of
   operations of the manufacturer CA.  After the device is deployed, the
   manufacturer might go out of business or stop offering CA services,
   and then come time for renewal of the certificate, there will not be
   a CA to issue the new certificate.  Some people see this as a way to
   end-of-life old equipment, but the users want to choose the end date,
   not have one imposed upon them.  One possible solution might be
   modeled on the domain name business, where other parties will
   continue to provide needed services if the original provider stops
   doing so.

   The Web PKI can prepare for the vast number of home devices that need
   certificates by:



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   1.  Building upon the work being done in the IETF ACME Working Group
       [ACMEWG] to facilitate the automatic renewal of certificates for
       home devices without any actions by the homeowner beyond the
       initial device setup.

   2.  Establish conventions for the names that appear in certificates
       that accomodate the approaches discussed above and also ensure
       uniqueness without putting a burden on the homeowner.

   3.  Working with device manufacturers to establish scalable CAs that
       will continue to issue certificates for the deployed devices even
       if the manufacturer goes out of business.

   4.  Working with device manufacturers to establish OCSP Responders so
       that the web sites that are embedded in the devices can provide
       robust authentication and OCSP stapling in a manner that is
       compatible with traditional web sites.

3.4.  Governance Improvements to the Web PKI

   As with many other technologies, Web PKI technical issues are tangled
   up with policy and process issues.  Policy and process issues have
   evolved over time, sometimes eroding confidence and trust in the Web
   PKI.  Governance structures are needed that increase transparency and
   trust.

   Web PKI users are by definition asked to trust CAs.  This includes
   what CAs are trusted to do properly, and what they are trusted not to
   do.  The system for determining which CAs are added to or removed
   from the trust anchor store in browsers is opaque and confusing to
   most Web PKI users.  The CA/Browser Forum has developed baseline
   requirements for the management and issuance of certificates
   [CAB2014] for individual CAs.  However, the process by which an
   individual CA gets added to the trust anchor store by each of the
   browser vendors is somewhat mysterious.  The individual browser
   vendors determine what should and should not be trusted by including
   the CA certificate in their trust anchor store.  They do this by
   reviewing the CA CPS and reports of audits conducted using the CPA
   Canada WebTrust for Certification Authorities criteria [WEBTRUST] or
   the ETSI EN 319 411 requirements [ESTI].  The WebTrust for CAs
   program also provides a trust mark for CAs meet all the criteria.
   Failure to pass an audit can result in the CA being removed from the
   trust store.

   Once the browser has shipped, regular updates may add or delete CAs.
   This is generally not something that a user would monitor.  For an
   informed user, information about which CAs have been added to or
   deleted from the browser trust anchor store can be found in the



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   browser release notes.  Users can also examine the policies,
   practices, and audit reports of the various CAs that have been
   developed and posted for the WebTrust Program.  How does an
   individual, organization, or enterprise really determine if a
   particular CA is trustworthy?  Do the default choices inherited from
   the browser vendors truly represent the organization's trust model?
   What constitutes sufficiently bad behavior by a CA to cause removal
   from the trust anchor store?

   In addition, it can be hazardous for users to remove CAs from the
   browser trust anchor store.  If a user removes a CA from the browser
   trust anchor store, some web sites may become completely inaccessible
   or require the user to take explicit action to accept warnings or
   bypass browser protections related to untrusted certificates.

   CAs can be removed from a trust anchor store as part of the
   maintenance of acceptable CAs.  There may be a few very large CAs
   that are critical to significant portions of the Web PKI.  Removing
   one of these CAs can have a significant impact on a huge number of
   websites.  As discussed in briefly in Section 4, users are already
   struggling to understand the implications of untrusted certificates,
   so they often ignore warnings presented by the browser.

   There are a number of organizations that play significant roles in
   the operation of the Web PKI, including the CA/Browser Forum, the
   WebTrust Task Force, ETSI, and the browser and operating system
   vendors.  These organizations act on behalf of the entire Internet
   community; therefore, transparency in these operations is fundamental
   to confidence and trust in the Web PKI.  In particular, transparency
   in both the CA/Browser Forum and the browser vendor processes would
   be helpful.  Recently the CA/Browser Forum made some changes to their
   operational procedures to make it easier for people to participate
   and to improve visibility into their process [CAB1.2].  This is a
   significant improvement, but these processes need to continue to
   evolve in an open, inclusive, and transparent manner.  Currently, as
   the name implies, the CA/Browser Forum members primarily represent
   CAs and browser vendors.  It would be better if relying parties also
   have a voice in this forum.  Additionally, some browser vendors are
   more transparent in their decision processes than others, and it is
   felt that all should be more transparent.

   Since the Web PKI is widespread, applications beyond the World Wide
   Web are making use of the Web PKI.  For example, the Web PKI is used
   to secure connections between SMTP servers.  In these environments,
   the browser-centric capabilities are unavailable.  The current
   governance structure does not provide a way for the relying parties
   in these applications to participate.




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   The Web PKI governance structures can be made more open and
   transparent by:

   1.  Browser vendors providing additional visibility and tools to
       support the management of the trust anchor store.

   2.  Governance organizations providing a way for all relying parties,
       including ones associated with non-browser applications, to
       participate.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document considers some areas for improvement of the Web PKI.
   Some of the risks associated with doing nothing or continuing down
   the current path are articulated.  The Web PKI is a vital component
   of a trusted Internet, and as such needs to be improved to sustain
   continued growth of the Internet.

   Many users find browser error messages related to certificates
   confusing.  Good man-machine interfaces are always difficult, but in
   this situation users are unable to fully understand the risks that
   they are accepting, and as a result they do not make informed
   decisions about when to proceed and when to stop.  This aspect of
   browser usability has improved over the years, and there is an
   enormous amount of ongoing work on this complex topic.  It is hoped
   that further improvements will allow users to make better security
   choices.

5.  Privacy Considerations

   Client certificates can be used for mutual authentication.  While
   mutual authentication is usually consider better than unilateral
   authentication, there is a privacy concern in this situation.  When
   mutual authentication is used, the browser sends the client
   certificate in plaintext to the webserver in the TLS handshake.  This
   allows the browser user's identity to be tracked across many
   different sites by anyone that can observe the traffic.

6.  IANA Considerations

   None.

   {{{ RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication. }}}








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7.  Informative References

   [ACMEWG]   IETF, "Charter for Automated Certificate Management
              Environment (acme) Working Group", June 2015,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-acme/>.

   [AV]       Arnbak, A. and N. van Eijk, "Certificate Authority
              Collapse: Regulating Systemic Vulnerabilities in the HTTPS
              Value Chain", 2012 TRPC , August 2012,
              <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031409>.

   [AVAV]     Asghari, H., van Eeten, M., Arnbak, A., and N. van Eijk,
              "Security Economics in the HTTPS Value Chain", Workshop on
              Economics of Information Security (WEIS) 2013 , 2013,
              <http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/
              AsghariWEIS2013.pdf>.

   [CAB1.2]   CA/Browser Forum, "Bylaws of the CA/Browser Forum",
              October 2014, <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-
              Browser-Forum-Bylaws-v.1.2.pdf>.

   [CAB2014]  CA/Browser Forum, "CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements
              for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
              Certificates, v.1.2.2", October 2014,
              <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/BRv1.2.2.pdf>.

   [IEEE802.1AR]
              IEEE Standards Association, "IEEE Standard for Local and
              Metropolitan Area Networks -- Secure Device Identity",
              2009.

   [HASH-S1]  McGrew, D. and M. Curcio, "Hash-Based Signatures", draft-
              mcgrew-hash-sigs-04 (work in progress), March 2016.

   [HASH-S2]  Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., and A. Mohaisen,
              "Hash-Based Signatures", draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-
              signatures-06 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [IMC2015]  Liu, Y., Tome, W., Zhang, L., Choffnes, D., Levin, D.,
              Maggs, B., Mislove, A., Schulman, A., and C. Wilson, "An
              End-to-End Measurement of Certificate Revocation in the
              Web's PKI", October 2015,
              <http://conferences2.sigcomm.org/imc/2015/papers/
              p183.pdf>.







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   [MB2015]   Wilson, K., "Phase 2: Phasing out Certificates with
              1024-bit RSA Keys", January 2015,
              <https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/01/28/phase-2-
              phasing-out-certificates-with-1024-bit-rsa-keys/>.

   [MB2016]   Barnes, R., "Payment Processors Still Using Weak Crypto",
              February 2016,
              <https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/02/24/payment-
              processors-still-using-weak-crypto/>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC6961]  Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.

   [RFC6955]  Schaad, J. and H. Prafullchandra, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-
              of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 6955, DOI 10.17487/RFC6955,
              May 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6955>.






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   [RFC7292]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A.,
              and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange
              Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7292>.

   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
              BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.

   [TLSFEATURE]
              Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 TLS Feature Extension", draft-
              hallambaker-tlsfeature-10 (work in progress), July 2015.

   [VFBH]     Vratonjic, N., Freudiger, J., Bindschaedler, V., and J.
              Hubaux, "The Inconvenient Truth About Web Certificates",
              Workshop on Economics of Information Security (WEIS)
              2011 , 2011,
              <http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2011/papers/The%20
              Inconvenient%20Truth%20about%20Web%20Certificates.pdf>.

   [WEBTRUST]
              CPA Canada, "WebTrust Program for Certification
              Authorities", August 2015, <http://www.webtrust.org/
              homepage-documents/item27839.aspx>.

   [WIKI-PQC]
              Wikipedia, "Post-quantum cryptography", October 2016,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography>.

   [WIKI-QC]  Wikipedia, "Quantum computing", October 2016,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_computing>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   This document has been developed within the IAB Privacy and Security
   Program.  The authors greatly appreciate the review and suggestions
   provided by Rick Andrews, Mary Barnes, Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
   Peter Bowen, Alissa Cooper, Nick Doty, Stephen Farrell, Joe Hall, Ted
   Hardie, Paul Hoffman, Ralph Holz, Lee Howard, Christian Huitema,
   Eliot Lear, Xing Li, Lucy Lynch, Gervase Markham, Eric Rescorla,
   Andrei Robachevsky, Thomas Roessler, Jeremy Rowley, Christine
   Runnegar, Jakob Schlyter, Wendy Seltzer, Dave Thaler, Brian Trammell,
   and Juan Carlos Zuniga.







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Appendix B.  IAB Members at the Time of Approval

   {{{ RFC Editor: Please add the names to the IAB members at the time
   that this document is put into the RFC Editor queue. }}}

Authors' Addresses

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA  20170
   USA

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com


   Karen O'Donoghue
   Internet Society
   1775 Wiehle Ave #201
   Reston, VA  20190
   USA

   Email: odonoghue@isoc.org




























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