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Versions: (draft-hinden-6man-mtu-option) 00
01 02 03 04
Network Working Group R. Hinden
Internet-Draft Check Point Software
Intended status: Experimental G. Fairhurst
Expires: 26 April 2021 University of Aberdeen
23 October 2020
IPv6 Minimum Path MTU Hop-by-Hop Option
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-04
Abstract
This document specifies a new Hop-by-Hop IPv6 option that is used to
record the minimum Path MTU along the forward path between a source
host to a destination host. This collects a minimum Path MTU
recorded along the path to the destination. The value can then be
communicated back to the source using the return Path MTU field in
the option.
This Hop-by-Hop option is intended to be used in environments like
Data Centers and on paths between Data Centers, to allow them to
better take advantage of paths able to support a large Path MTU. The
method could also be useful in other environments, including the
general Internet.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 April 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Example Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Use of the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options Header . . . . . . . . 4
2. Motivation and Problem Solved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Applicability Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IPv6 Minimum Path MTU Hop-by-Hop Option . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Router, Host, and Transport Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Transport Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.1. Including the Option in an Outgoing Packet . . . . . 8
6.3.2. Validation by the Upper Layer Protocol . . . . . . . 10
6.3.3. Receiving the Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3.4. Using the Rtn-PMTU Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3.5. Detection of Dropping Packets that include the
Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Network Layer Host Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Validating use of the Option Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3. Direct use of the Rtn-PMTU Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.4. Using the Rtn-PMTU Value as a Hint for Probing . . . . . 14
8.5. Impact of Middleboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
This draft proposes a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option to be used to record
the minimum of the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) along the forward
path between the source and destination hosts. The source host
creates a packet with this option and fills the Min-PMTU field with
the value of the MTU for the outbound link that will be used to
forward the packet towards the destination host.
At each subsequent hop where the option is processed, the router
compares the value of the Min-PMTU Field in the option and the MTU of
its outgoing link. If the MTU of the link is less than the Min-PMTU,
it rewrites the value in the option data with the smaller value.
When the packet arrives at the destination host, the host can send
the value of the minimum reported MTU for the path back to the source
host using the Rtn-PMTU field in the option. The source host can
then use this value as an input to the method that sets the Path MTU
(PMTU) used by upper layer protocols.
1.1. Example Operation
The figure below illustrates the operation of the method. In this
case, the path between the source and destination hosts comprises
three links, the sender has a link MTU of size MTU-S, the link
between routers R1 and R2 has an MTU of size 9000 bytes, and the
final link to the destination has an MTU of size MTU-D.
+--------+ +----+ +----+ +-------+
| | | | | | | |
| Sender +---------+ R1 +--------+ R2 +-------- + Dest. |
| | | | | | | |
+--------+ MTU-S +----+ 9000B +----+ MTU-D +-------+
Three scenarios are described:
* Scenario 1, considers all links to have an 9000 byte MTU and the
method is supported by both routers. The PMTU is therefore 9000
bytes.
* Scenario 2, considers the link to the destination host (MTU-D) to
have an MTU of 1500 bytes. This is the smallest MTU, router R2
updates the Min-PMTU to 1500 bytes and the method correctly
updates the PMTU to 1500 bytes. Had there been another smaller
MTU at a link further along the path that also supports the
method, the lower MTU would also have been detected.
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* Scenario 3, considers the case where the router preceding the
smallest link (R2) does not support the method, and the link to
the destination host (MTU-D) has an MTU of 1500 bytes. Therefore,
router R2 does not update the Min-PMTU to 1500 bytes. The method
then fails to detect the actual PMTU.
In Scenarios 2 and 3, a lower PMTU would also fail to be detected in
the case where PMTUD had been used and an ICMPv6 Packet to Big (PTB)
message had not been delivered to the sender [RFC8201].
These scenarios are summarized in the table below.
+-+-----+-----+----+----+----------+-----------------------+
| |MTU-S|MTU-D| R1 | R2 | Rec PMTU | Note |
+-+-----+-----+----+----+----------+-----------------------+
|1|9000B|9000B| H | H | 9000 B | Endpoints attempt to |
| | | | | | use an 9000 B PMTU. |
+-+-----+-----+----+----+----------+-----------------------+
|2|9000B|1500B| H | H | 1500 B | Endpoints attempt to |
| | | | | | | use a 1500 B PMTU. |
+-+-----+-----+----+----+----------+-----------------------+
|3|9000B|1500B| H | - | 9000 B | Endpoints attempt to |
| | | | | | | use an 9000 B PMTU, |
| | | | | | | but need to implement |
| | | | | | | a method to fall back |
| | | | | | | to discover and use a |
| | | | | | | 1500 B PMTU. |
+-+-----+-----+----+----+----------+-----------------------+
1.2. Use of the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options Header
IPv6 as specified in [RFC8200] allows nodes to optionally process
Hop-by-Hop headers. Specifically from Section 4:
* The Hop-by-Hop Options header is not inserted or deleted, but may
be examined or processed by any node along a packet's delivery
path, until the packet reaches the node (or each of the set of
nodes, in the case of multicast) identified in the Destination
Address field of the IPv6 header. The Hop-by-Hop Options header,
when present, must immediately follow the IPv6 header. Its
presence is indicated by the value zero in the Next Header field
of the IPv6 header.
* NOTE: While [RFC2460] required that all nodes must examine and
process the Hop-by-Hop Options header, it is now expected that
nodes along a packet's delivery path only examine and process the
Hop-by-Hop Options header if explicitly configured to do so.
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The Hop-by-Hop Option defined in this document is designed to take
advantage of this property of how Hop-by-Hop options are processed.
Nodes that do not support this Option SHOULD ignore them. This can
mean that the Min-PMTU value does not account for all links along a
path.
2. Motivation and Problem Solved
The current state of Path MTU Discovery on the Internet is
problematic. The mechanisms defined in [RFC8201] are known to not
work well in all environments. This fails to work in various cases,
including when nodes in the middle of the network do not send ICMP
PTB messages, or rate-limited messages to the point of not making
them a useful mechanism, or do not have a return path to the source
host.
This results in many transport connections being configured to use
smaller packets (e.g., 1280 bytes) by default and makes it difficult
to take advantage of paths with a larger PMTU where they do exist.
Applications that can gain benefit from sending large packets are
forced to use IPv6 Fragmentation [RFC8200], which can reduce the
reliability of Internet communication [RFC8900].
Transport encapsulations and network-layer tunnels further reduce the
the payload size available for a transport to use. Also, some use-
cases increase packet overhead, for example, Network Virtualization
Using Generic Routing Encapsulation (NVGRE) [RFC7637] encapsulates L2
packets in an outer IP header and does not allow IP Fragmentation.
Sending small packets can limit performance, e.g., when packet
processing is limited by the packet rate. The potential of multi-
gigabit Ethernet will not be realized if the packet size is limited
to 1280 bytes, because this exceeds the packet per second rate that
most nodes can process. For example, the packet per second rate
required to reach wire speed on a 10G Ethernet link with 1280 byte
packets is about 977K packets per second (pps), vs. 139K pps for 9000
byte packets. A significant difference.
The purpose of the this draft is to improve the situation by defining
a mechanism that does not rely on reception of ICMPv6 Packet Too Big
messages from nodes in the middle of the network. Instead, this
provides information to the destination host about the minimum Path
MTU, and sends this information back to the source host. This is
expected to work better than the current RFC8201-based mechanisms.
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3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. Applicability Statements
This Hop-by-Hop Option header is intended to be used in environments
such as Data Centers and on paths between Data Centers, to allow a
host to better take advantage of a path that is able to support a
large PMTU.
The design of the option is sufficiently simple that it could be
executed on a router's fast path. A strong pull from router vendors
customers will be required to create critical mass for this to
happen. This could initially be the case for connections within and
between Data Centers.
The method could also be useful in other environments, including the
general Internet, if and when this Hop-by-Hop Option is supported on
these paths.
5. IPv6 Minimum Path MTU Hop-by-Hop Option
The Minimum Path MTU Hop-by-Hop Option has the following format:
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Option Option Option
Type Data Len Data
+--------+--------+--------+--------+---------+-------+-+
|BBCTTTTT|00000100| Min-PMTU | Rtn-PMTU |R|
+--------+--------+--------+--------+---------+-------+-+
Option Type (see Section 4.2 of [RFC8200]):
BB 00 Skip over this option and continue processing.
C 1 Option data can change en route to the packet's final
destination.
TTTTT 10000 Option Type assigned from IANA [IANA-HBH].
Length: 4 The size of the each value field in Option Data
field supports PMTU values from 0 to 65,535 octets.
Min-PMTU: n 16-bits. The minimum MTU recorded along the path
in octets, reflecting the smallest link MTU that
the packet experienced along the path.
A value less than the IPv6 minimum link
MTU [RFC8200] should be ignored.
Rtn-PMTU: n 15-bits. The returned Path MTU field, carrying the 15
most significant bits of the latest received Min-PMTU
field for the forward path. The value zero means that
no Reported MTU is being returned.
R n 1-bit. R-Flag. Set by the source to signal that
the destination host should include the received
Rtn-PMTU field updated by the reported Min-PMTU value.
NOTE: The encoding of the final two octets (Rtn-PMTU and R-Flag)
could be implemented by a mask of the latest received Min-PMTU value
with 0xFFFE, discarding the right-most bit and then performing a
logical 'OR' with the R-Flag value of the sender.
6. Router, Host, and Transport Behaviors
6.1. Router Behavior
Routers that are not configured to support Hop-by-Hop Options SHOULD
ignore this option and SHOULD forward the packet.
Routers that support Hop-by-Hop Options, but that are not configured
to support this option SHOULD ignore the option and SHOULD forward
the packet.
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Routers that recognize this option SHOULD compare the value of the
Min-PMTU field with the MTU configured for the outgoing link. If the
MTU of the outgoing link is less than the Min-PMTU, the router
rewrites the Min-PMTU in the Option to use the smaller value.
A router MUST ignore and MUST NOT change the Rtn-PMTU field or the
R-Flag in the option.
Discussion:
* The design of this option makes it feasible to be implemented
within the fast path of a router, because the processing
requirements are minimal.
6.2. Host Behavior
When requested to send an IPv6 packet with the Minimum Path MTU
option, the source host includes the option in an outgoing packet.
The source host SHOULD fill the Min-PMTU field with the MTU
configured for the link over which it will send the packet on the
next hop towards the destination host. If this value is not updated,
the field MUST be set to zero.
The source host SHOULD set the Rtn-PMTU field to the cached value of
the reported Min-PMTU value for the flow ( see Section 6.3.3). If
this value is not set, for example, because there is no cached
reported Min-PMTU value, the field MUST be set to zero.
The source host MAY request the destination host to return the
reported Min-PMTU value by setting the R-Flag in the option of an
outgoing packet.
6.3. Transport Behavior
6.3.1. Including the Option in an Outgoing Packet
The upper layer protocol can request the Minimum Path MTU option is
included in an outgoing IPv6 packet. This option does not need to be
included in all packets belonging to a flow. A transport protocol
(or upper layer protocol) can include this option only on specific
packets used to test the path.
When it includes the option, the host supplies the previously cached
value of the received Minimum Path MTU for the flow to set the Rtn-
PMTU field (see Section 6.3.3). If a valid cached received Minimum
Path MTU is not available, the Rtn-PMTU field value MUST be set to
zero.
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The source host MAY request the destination host to send a packet
carrying the option by setting the R-Flag. The R-Flag SHOULD NOT be
set when the Minimum Path MTU Option was sent solely to feedback the
return Path MTU.
NOTE: Including this option in a large packet (e.g., one larger than
the present PMTU) is not likely to be useful, since the large packet
would itself be dropped by any link along the path with a smaller
MTU, preventing the Min-PMTU information from reaching the
destination host.
Discussion:
* In the case of TCP, the option could be included in packets
carrying a SYN segment as part of the connection set up, or can
periodically be sent in packets carrying other segments.
Including this packet in a SYN could increase the probability that
the SYN segment is lost when routers on the path drop packets with
this option (see Section 6.3.5). NOTE: A TCP connection can also
negotiate the Maximum Segment Size (MSS), which acts as an upper
limit to the packet size that can be sent by a TCP sender.
* The use with datagram transport protocols (e.g., UDP) is harder to
characterize because applications using datagram transports range
from very short-lived (low data-volume applications) exchanges, to
longer (bulk) exchanges of packets between the source and
destination hosts [RFC8085].
* Simple-exchange protocols (i.e., low data-volume applications
[RFC8085] that only send one or a few packets per transaction,
might assume that the PMTU is symmetrical. That is, the PMTU is
the same in both directions, or at least not smaller for the
return path. This optimization does not hold when the paths are
not symmetric.
* The use of this option with DNS and DNSSEC over UDP ought to work
for paths where the PMTU is symmetric. The DNS server will learn
the PMTU from the DNS query messages. If the Rtn-PMTU value is
smaller, then a large DNSSEC response might be dropped and the
known problems with PMTUD will then occur. DNS and DNSSEC over
transport protocols that can carry the PMTU ought to work.
* Applications that use Anycast should include this option in all
packets, because the actual destination host will vary due to the
nature of Anycast.
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6.3.2. Validation by the Upper Layer Protocol
An upper layer protocol (e.g., transport endpoint) using this option
needs to provide protection from data injection attacks by off-path
devices [RFC8085]. This requires a method to assure that the
information in the Option Data is provided by a node on the path.
For example, a TCP connection or UDP application that maintains the
related state and uses a randomized ephemeral port would provide this
basic validation to protect from off-path data injection. IPsec
[RFC4301] and TLS [RFC8446] provide greater assurance.
The Upper Layer discards any received packet when the packet
validation fails. When packet validation fails, the Upper Layer MUST
also discard the associated Option Data from the minimum Path MTU
option without further processing.
6.3.3. Receiving the Option
An upper layer protocol that receives a Minimum Path MTU Option
included with a valid packet caches the value of the last received
Min-PMTU. This value is specific to the instance of the upper layer
protocol (i.e., matching the IPv6 flow ID, port-fields in UDP or the
SPI in IPsec [RFC4301], etc), not to the pair of source and
destination addresses, because network devices can make forwarding
decisions that impact the PMTU of a flow based on the presence and
value of the packet's upper layer fields.
For a connection-oriented upper layer protocol, caching of the
received Min-PMTU could be implemented by saving the value in the
connection context at the transport layer. A connection-less upper
layer (e.g., one using UDP), requires the upper layer protocol to
cache the value for each flow it uses.
A destination host that receives a Minimum Path MTU Option with the
R-Flag SHOULD include the Minimum Path MTU option in the next
outgoing IPv6 packet for the corresponding flow.
A simple mechanism could only include this option (with the Rtn-PMTU
field set) the first time this option is received or when it notifies
a change in the Minimum Path MTU. This limits the number of packets
including the option packets that are sent. However, this does not
provide robustness to packet loss or recovery after a sender looses
state.
Path characteristics can change and the actual PMTU could increase or
decrease over time. For instance, following a path change when
packets are then forwarded over a link with a different MTU than that
previously used. To bound the delay in discovering a change in the
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actual PMTU, a sender with a link MTU larger than the current PMTU
SHOULD periodically send the Minimum Path MTU Option with the R-bit
set. DPLPMTUD provides recommendations concerning how this could be
implemented (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8899]). Since the option
consumes less capacity than a full-sized probe packet, there can be
advantage in using this to detect a change in the path
characteristics.
Discussion:
* Some upper layer protocols send packets less frequently than
packets that the host receives packets. This provides less
frequent feedback of the received Rtn-PMTU value. However, a host
always sends the most recent Rtn-PMTU value.
6.3.4. Using the Rtn-PMTU Field
The Rtn-PMTU field provides an indication of the PMTU from on-path
routers. It does not necessarily reflect the actual PMTU between the
sender and destination. Care therefore needs to be exercised in
using the Rtn-PMTU value. Specifically:
* The actual PMTU can be lower than the Rtn-PMTU value because Min-
PMTU field was not updated by a router on the path that did not
process the option.
* The actual PMTU may be lower than the Rtn-PMTU value because the
there is a layer 2 device with a lower MTU that does not perform
IPv6 forwarding.
* The actual PMTU may be larger than the Rtn-PMTU value because of a
corrupted, delayed or mis-ordered response. A source host SHOULD
ignore a Rtn-PMTU value larger than the MTU configured for the
outgoing link.
Using the method has the potential to complete discovery of the
correct value in a single round trip time, even over paths that have
successive links each configured with a lower MTU.
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To avoid unintentional dropping of packets that exceed the actual
PMTU (e.g., Scenario 3 in Section 1.1), the source host can delay
increasing the PMTU until a probe packet with the size of the Rtn-
PMTU value has been successfully acknowledged by the upper layer,
confirming that the path supports the larger PMTU. This probing
increases robustness, but adds one additional path round trip time
before the PMTU is updated. This use resembles that of PTB messages
in section 4.6 of DPLPMTUD [RFC8899] (with the important difference
that a PTB message can only seek to lower the PMTU, whereas this
option could trigger a probe packet to seek to increase the PMTU.)
Section 5.2 of [RFC8201] provides guidance on the caching of PMTU
information and also the relation to IPv6 flow labels.
Implementations should consider the impact of Equal Cost Multipath
(ECMP) [RFC6438]. Specifically, whether a PMTU ought be maintained
for each transport endpoint, or for each network address.
6.3.5. Detection of Dropping Packets that include the Option
There is evidence that some middleboxes drop packets that include
Hop-by-Hop options. For example, a firewall might drop a packet that
carries an unknown extension header or option. This practice is
expected to decrease as an option becomes more widely used. It could
result in generation of an ICMPv6 message indicating the problem.
This could be used to (temporarily) suspend use of this option.
A middlebox that silently discards a packet with this option results
in dropping of any packet using the option. This dropping be avoided
by appropriate configuration in a controlled environment, such as
within a data centre, but needs to be considered for Internet usage.
Section 6.2 recommends that this option is not used on packets where
loss might adversely impact performance.
7. IANA Considerations
No IANA actions are requested in this document.
IANA has assigned and registered a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option type
from the "Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options" registry
[IANA-HBH]. This assignment is shown in Section 5.
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8. Security Considerations
This section discusses the security considerations. It first reviews
host processing when receiving this option at the network layer. It
then considers two ways in which the Option Data can be processed,
followed by two approaches for using the Option Data. Finally, it
discusses middlebox implications related to use in the general
Internet.
8.1. Network Layer Host Processing
A malicious attacker can forge a packet directed at a host that
carries the minimum Path MTU option. By design, the fields of this
IP option can be modified by the network.
Reception of this packet will incur receive processing as the network
stack parses the packet before the packet is delivered to the upper
layer protocol. This network layer option processing is normally
completed before any upper layer protocol delivery checks are
performed.
The network layer does not normally have sufficient information to
validate that the packet carrying an option originated from the
destination (or an on-path node). It also does not typically have
sufficient context to demultiplex the packet to identify the related
transport flow. This can mean that any changes resulting from
reception of the option apply to all flows between a pair of
endpoints.
These considerations are no different to other uses of Hop-by-Hop
options, and this is the use case for PMTUD. The following section
describes a mitigation for this attack.
8.2. Validating use of the Option Data
Transport protocols should be designed to provide protection from
data injection attacks by off-path devices and mechanisms should be
described in the Security Considerations for each transport
specification (see Section 5.1 of the UDP Guidelines [RFC8085]). For
example, a TCP or UDP application that maintains the related state
and uses a randomized ephemeral port would provide basic protection.
TLS [RFC8446] or IPsec [RFC4301] provide cryptographic
authentication. An upper layer protocol that validates each received
packet discards any packet when this validation fails. In this case,
the host MUST also discard the associated Option Data from the
minimum Path MTU option without further processing (Section 6.3).
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A network node on the path has visibility of all packets it forwards.
By observing the network packet payload, the node might be able to
construct a packet that might be validated by the destination host.
Such a node would also be able to drop or limit the flow in other
ways that could be potentially more disruptive. Authenticating the
packet, for example, using IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS [RFC8446] mitigates
this attack.
8.3. Direct use of the Rtn-PMTU Value
The simplest way to utilize the Rtn-PMTU value is to directly use
this to update the PMTU. This approach results in a set of security
issues when the option carries malicious data:
* A direct update of the PMTU using the Rtn-PMTU value could result
in an attacker inflating or reducing the size of the host PMTU for
the destination. Forcing a reduction in the PMTU can decrease the
efficiency of network use, might increase the number of packets/
fragments required to send the same volume of payload data, and
prevents sending an unfragmented datagram larger than the PMTU.
Increasing the PMTU can result in black-holing (see Section 1.1 of
[RFC8899]) when the source sends packets larger than the actual
PMTU. This persists until the PMTU is next updated.
* The method can be used to solicit a response from the destination
host. A malicious attacker could forge a packet that cause the
sender to add the option to a packet sent to the source. A forged
value of Rtn-PMTU in the Option Data might also impact the remote
endpoint, as described in the previous bullet. This persists
until a valid minimum Path MTU option is received. This attack
could be mitigated by limiting the sending of the minimum Path MTU
option in reply to incoming packets that carry the option.
8.4. Using the Rtn-PMTU Value as a Hint for Probing
Another way to utilize the Rtn-PMTU value is to indirectly trigger a
probe to determine if the path supports a PMTU of size Rtn-PMTU.
This approach needs context for the flow, and hence assumes an upper
layer protocol that validates the packet that carries the option
Section 8.2. This is the case when used in combination with DPLPMTUD
[RFC8899]. A set of security considerations result when an option
carries malicious data:
* If the forged packet carries a validated option with a non-zero
Rtn-PMTU field, the upper layer protocol could utilize the
information in the Rtn-PMTU field. A Rtn-PMTU larger than the
current PMTU can trigger a probe for a new size.
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* If the forged packet carries a non-zero Min-PMTU field, the upper
layer protocol would change the cached information about the path
from the source. The cached information at the destination host
will be overwritten when the host receives another packet that
includes a minimum Path MTU option corresponding to the flow.
* Processing of the option could cause a destination host to add the
minimum Path MTU option to a packet sent to the source host. This
option will carry a Rtn-PMTU value that could have been updated by
the forged packet. The impact of the source host receiving this
resembles that discussed previously.
8.5. Impact of Middleboxes
There is evidence that some middleboxes drop packets that include
Hop-by-Hop options. For example, a firewall might drop a packet that
carries an unknown extension header or option. This practice is
expected to decrease as the option becomes more widely used. Methods
to address this are discussed in Section 6.3.5.
When a forged packet cause a packet to be sent including the minimum
Path MTU option, and the return path does not forward packets with
this option, the packet will be dropped Section 6.3.5. This attack
is mitigated by validating the option data before use and by limiting
the rate of responses generated. An upper layer could further
mitigate the impact by responding to a R-Flag by including the option
in a packet that does not carry application data.
9. Acknowledgments
A somewhat similar mechanism was proposed for IPv4 in 1988 in
[RFC1063] by Jeff Mogul, C. Kent, Craig Partridge, and Keith
McCloghire. It was later obsoleted in 1990 by [RFC1191] the current
deployed approach to Path MTU Discovery.
Helpful comments were received from Tom Herbert, Tom Jones, Fred
Templin, Ole Troan, [Your name here], and other members of the 6MAN
working group.
10. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-04, 2020-Oct-23
* Fixes for typos.
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-03, 2020-Sept-14
* Rewrite to make text and terminology more consistent.
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* Added the notion of validating the packet before use of the HBH
option data.
* Method aligned with the way common APIs send/receive HBH option
data.
* Added reference to DPLPMTUD and clarified upper layer usage.
* Completed security considerations section.
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-02, 2020-March-9
* Editorial changes to make text and terminology more consistent.
* Added reference to DPLPMTUD.
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-01, 2019-September-13
* Changes to show IANA assigned code point.
* Editorial changes to make text and terminology more consistent.
* Added a reference to RFC8200 in Section 2 and a reference to
RFC6438 in Section 6.3.
draft-ietf-6man-mtu-option-00, 2019-August-9
* First 6man w.g. draft version.
* Changes to request IANA allocation of code point.
* Editorial changes.
draft-hinden-6man-mtu-option-02, 2019-July-5
* Changed option format to also include the Returned PMTU value and
Return flag and made related text changes in Section 6.2 to
describe this behavior.
* ICMP Packet Too Big messages are no longer used for feedback to
the source host.
* Added to Acknowledgements Section that a similar mechanism was
proposed for IPv4 in 1988 in [RFC1063].
* Editorial changes.
draft-hinden-6man-mtu-option-01, 2019-March-05
* Changed requested status from Standards Track to Experimental to
allow use of experimental option type (11110) to allow for
experimentation. Removed request for IANA Option assignment.
* Added Section 2 "Motivation and Problem Solved" section to better
describe what the purpose of this document is.
* Added appendix describing planned experiments and how the results
will be measured.
* Editorial changes.
draft-hinden-6man-mtu-option-00, 2018-Oct-16
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* Initial draft.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[IANA-HBH] "Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/
ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC1063] Mogul, J., Kent, C., Partridge, C., and K. McCloghrie, "IP
MTU discovery options", RFC 1063, DOI 10.17487/RFC1063,
July 1988, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1063>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
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[RFC6438] Carpenter, B. and S. Amante, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label
for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in
Tunnels", RFC 6438, DOI 10.17487/RFC6438, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6438>.
[RFC7637] Garg, P., Ed. and Y. Wang, Ed., "NVGRE: Network
Virtualization Using Generic Routing Encapsulation",
RFC 7637, DOI 10.17487/RFC7637, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7637>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8899] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T.
Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.
[RFC8900] Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile",
BCP 230, RFC 8900, DOI 10.17487/RFC8900, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8900>.
Authors' Addresses
Robert M. Hinden
Check Point Software
959 Skyway Road
San Carlos, CA 94070
United States of America
Email: bob.hinden@gmail.com
Godred Fairhurst
University of Aberdeen
School of Engineering
Fraser Noble Building
Aberdeen
AB24 3UE
United Kingdom
Email: gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk
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