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Versions: (draft-previdi-6man-segment-routing-header) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Network Working Group                                    S. Previdi, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                               C. Filsfils
Intended status: Standards Track                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: August 5, 2017                                         B. Field
                                                                 Comcast
                                                                I. Leung
                                                   Rogers Communications
                                                              J. Linkova
                                                                  Google
                                                                E. Aries
                                                                Facebook
                                                               T. Kosugi
                                                                     NTT
                                                               E. Vyncke
                                                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                               D. Lebrun
                                        Universite Catholique de Louvain
                                                        February 1, 2017


                   IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)
               draft-ietf-6man-segment-routing-header-05

Abstract

   Segment Routing (SR) allows a node to steer a packet through a
   controlled set of instructions, called segments, by prepending an SR
   header to the packet.  A segment can represent any instruction,
   topological or service-based.  SR allows to enforce a flow through
   any path (topological, or application/service based) while
   maintaining per-flow state only at the ingress node to the SR domain.

   Segment Routing can be applied to the IPv6 data plane with the
   addition of a new type of Routing Extension Header.  This draft
   describes the Segment Routing Extension Header Type and how it is
   used by SR capable nodes.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.




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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Segment Routing Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Data Planes supporting Segment Routing  . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Segment Routing (SR) Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.2.1.  SR Domain in a Service Provider Network . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  SR Domain in a Overlay Network  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH)  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  SRH TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.1.  Ingress Node TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.2.  Egress Node TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.3.  Opaque Container TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.4.  Padding TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.1.5.  HMAC TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.2.  SRH and RFC2460 behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  SRH Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Source SR Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Transit Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  SR Segment Endpoint Node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16



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     5.1.  Threat model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.1.  Source routing threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.2.  Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH  . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.3.  Service stealing threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.1.4.  Topology disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.1.5.  ICMP Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Security fields in SRH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.2.1.  Selecting a hash algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.2.2.  Performance impact of HMAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       5.2.3.  Pre-shared key management . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.3.  Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.3.1.  Nodes within the SR domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.3.2.  Nodes outside of the SR domain  . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.3.3.  SR path exposure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       5.3.4.  Impact of BCP-38  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   7.  Manageability Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

1.  Segment Routing Documents

   Segment Routing terminology is defined in
   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].

   Segment Routing use cases are described in [RFC7855] and
   [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].

   Segment Routing protocol extensions are defined in
   [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions], and
   [I-D.ietf-ospf-ospfv3-segment-routing-extensions].

2.  Introduction

   Segment Routing (SR), defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing],
   allows a node to steer a packet through a controlled set of
   instructions, called segments, by prepending an SR header to the
   packet.  A segment can represent any instruction, topological or
   service-based.  SR allows to enforce a flow through any path
   (topological or service/application based) while maintaining per-flow
   state only at the ingress node to the SR domain.  Segments can be
   derived from different components: IGP, BGP, Services, Contexts,
   Locators, etc.  The list of segment forming the path is called the
   Segment List and is encoded in the packet header.



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   SR allows the use of strict and loose source based routing paradigms
   without requiring any additional signaling protocols in the
   infrastructure hence delivering an excellent scalability property.

   The source based routing model described in
   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] is inherited from the ones proposed
   by [RFC1940] and [RFC2460].  The source based routing model offers
   the support for explicit routing capability.

2.1.  Data Planes supporting Segment Routing

   Segment Routing (SR), can be instantiated over MPLS
   ([I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]) and IPv6.  This document
   defines its instantiation over the IPv6 data-plane based on the use-
   cases defined in [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases].

   This document defines a new type of Routing Header (originally
   defined in [RFC2460]) called the Segment Routing Header (SRH) in
   order to convey the Segment List in the packet header as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing].  Mechanisms through which segment
   are known and advertised are outside the scope of this document.

   A segment is materialized by an IPv6 address.  A segment identifies a
   topological instruction or a service instruction.  A segment can be
   either:

   o  global: a global segment represents an instruction supported by
      all nodes in the SR domain and it is instantiated through an IPv6
      address globally known in the SR domain.

   o  local: a local segment represents an instruction supported only by
      the node who originates it and it is instantiated through an IPv6
      address that is known only by the local node.

2.2.  Segment Routing (SR) Domain

   We define the concept of the Segment Routing Domain (SR Domain) as
   the set of nodes participating into the source based routing model.
   These nodes may be connected to the same physical infrastructure
   (e.g.: a Service Provider's network) as well as nodes remotely
   connected to each other (e.g.: an enterprise VPN or an overlay).

   A non-exhaustive list of examples of SR Domains is:

   o  The network of an operator, service provider, content provider,
      enterprise including nodes, links and Autonomous Systems.





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   o  A set of nodes connected as an overlay over one or more transit
      providers.  The overlay nodes exchange SR-enabled traffic with
      segments belonging solely to the overlay routers (the SR domain).
      None of the segments in the SR-enabled packets exchanged by the
      overlay belong to the transit networks

   The source based routing model through its instantiation of the
   Segment Routing Header (SRH) defined in this document equally applies
   to all the above examples.

   It is assumed in this document that the SRH is added to the packet by
   its source, consistently with the source routing model defined in
   [RFC2460].  For example:

   o  At the node originating the packet (host, server).

   o  At the ingress node of an SR domain where the ingress node
      receives an IPv6 packet and encapsulates it into an outer IPv6
      header followed by a Segment Routing header.

2.2.1.  SR Domain in a Service Provider Network

   The following figure illustrates an SR domain consisting of an
   operator's network infrastructure.

     (-------------------------- Operator 1 -----------------------)
     (                                                             )
     (  (-----AS 1-----)  (-------AS 2-------)  (----AS 3-------)  )
     (  (              )  (                  )  (               )  )
 A1--(--(--11---13--14-)--(-21---22---23--24-)--(-31---32---34--)--)--Z1
     (  ( /|\  /|\  /| )  ( |\  /|\  /|\  /| )  ( |\  /|\  /| \ )  )
 A2--(--(/ | \/ | \/ | )  ( | \/ | \/ | \/ | )  ( | \/ | \/ |  \)--)--Z2
     (  (  | /\ | /\ | )  ( | /\ | /\ | /\ | )  ( | /\ | /\ |   )  )
     (  (  |/  \|/  \| )  ( |/  \|/  \|/  \| )  ( |/  \|/  \|   )  )
 A3--(--(--15---17--18-)--(-25---26---27--28-)--(-35---36---38--)--)--Z3
     (  (              )  (                  )  (               )  )
     (  (--------------)  (------------------)  (---------------)  )
     (                                                             )
     (-------------------------------------------------------------)

                   Figure 1: Service Provider SR Domain

   Figure 1 describes an operator network including several ASes and
   delivering connectivity between endpoints.  In this scenario, Segment
   Routing is used within the operator networks and across the ASes
   boundaries (all being under the control of the same operator).  In
   this case segment routing can be used in order to address use cases
   such as end-to-end traffic engineering, fast re-route, egress peer



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   engineering, data-center traffic engineering as described in
   [RFC7855], [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases] and
   [I-D.ietf-spring-resiliency-use-cases].

   Typically, an IPv6 packet received at ingress (i.e.: from outside the
   SR domain), is classified according to network operator policies and
   such classification results into an outer header with an SRH applied
   to the incoming packet.  The SRH contains the list of segment
   representing the path the packet must take inside the SR domain.
   Thus, the SA of the packet is the ingress node, the DA (due to SRH
   procedures described in Section 4) is set as the first segment of the
   path and the last segment of the path is the egress node of the SR
   domain.

   The path may include intra-AS as well as inter-AS segments.  It has
   to be noted that all nodes within the SR domain are under control of
   the same administration.  When the packet reaches the egress point of
   the SR domain, the outer header and its SRH are removed so that the
   destination of the packet is unaware of the SR domain the packet has
   traversed.

   The outer header with the SRH is no different from any other
   tunneling encapsulation mechanism and allows a network operator to
   implement traffic engineering mechanisms so to efficiently steer
   traffic across his infrastructure.

2.2.2.  SR Domain in a Overlay Network

   The following figure illustrates an SR domain consisting of an
   overlay network over multiple operator's networks.

       (--Operator 1---)  (-----Operator 2-----)  (--Operator 3---)
       (               )  (                    )  (               )
   A1--(--11---13--14--)--(--21---22---23--24--)--(-31---32---34--)--C1
       ( /|\  /|\  /|  )  (  |\  /|\  /|\  /|  )  ( |\  /|\  /| \ )
   A2--(/ | \/ | \/ |  )  (  | \/ | \/ | \/ |  )  ( | \/ | \/ |  \)--C2
       (  | /\ | /\ |  )  (  | /\ | /\ | /\ |  )  ( | /\ | /\ |   )
       (  |/  \|/  \|  )  (  |/  \|/  \|/  \|  )  ( |/  \|/  \|   )
   A3--(--15---17--18--)--(--25---26---27--28--)--(-35---36---38--)--C3
       (               )  (  |    |         |  )  (               )
       (---------------)  (--|----|---------|--)  (---------------)
                             |    |         |
                             B1   B2        B3

                        Figure 2: Overlay SR Domain






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   Figure 2 describes an overlay consisting of nodes connected to three
   different network operators and forming a single overlay network
   where Segment routing packets are exchanged.

   The overlay consists of nodes A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2 and C3.
   These nodes are connected to their respective network operator and
   form an overlay network.

   Each node may originate packets with an SRH which contains, in the
   segment list of the SRH or in the DA, segments identifying other
   overlay nodes.  This implies that packets with an SRH may traverse
   operator's networks but, obviously, these SRHs cannot contain an
   address/segment of the transit operators 1, 2 and 3.  The SRH
   originated by the overlay can only contain address/segment under the
   administration of the overlay (e.g. address/segments supported by A1,
   A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1,C2 or C3).

   In this model, the operator network nodes are transit nodes and,
   according to [RFC2460], MUST NOT inspect the routing extension header
   since they are not the DA of the packet.

   It is a common practice in operators networks to filter out, at
   ingress, any packet whose DA is the address of an internal node and
   it is also possible that an operator would filter out any packet
   destined to an internal address and having an extension header in it.

   This common practice does not impact the SR-enabled traffic between
   the overlay nodes as the intermediate transit networks never see a
   destination address belonging to their infrastructure.  These SR-
   enabled overlay packets will thus never be filtered by the transit
   operators.

   In all cases, transit packets (i.e.: packets whose DA is outside the
   domain of the operator's network) will be forwarded accordingly
   without introducing any security concern in the operator's network.
   This is similar to tunneled packets.

3.  Segment Routing Extension Header (SRH)

   A new type of the Routing Header (originally defined in [RFC2460]) is
   defined: the Segment Routing Header (SRH) which has a new Routing
   Type, (suggested value 4) to be assigned by IANA.

   The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is defined as follows:







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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Next Header   |  Hdr Ext Len  | Routing Type  | Segments Left |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | First Segment |     Flags     |           RESERVED            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |            Segment List[0] (128 bits IPv6 address)            |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
                                  ...
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |            Segment List[n] (128 bits IPv6 address)            |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    //                                                             //
    //         Optional Type Length Value objects (variable)       //
    //                                                             //
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Next Header: 8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header
      immediately following the SRH.

   o  Hdr Ext Len: 8-bit unsigned integer, is the length of the SRH
      header in 8-octet units, not including the first 8 octets.

   o  Routing Type: TBD, to be assigned by IANA (suggested value: 4).

   o  Segments Left.  Defined in [RFC2460], it contains the index, in
      the Segment List, of the next segment to inspect.  Segments Left
      is decremented at each segment.

   o  First Segment: contains the index, in the Segment List, of the
      first segment of the path which is in fact the last element of the
      Segment List.

   o  Flags: 8 bits of flags.  Following flags are defined:




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          0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
         |U|P|O|A|H|  U  |
         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

         U: Unused and for future use.  SHOULD be unset on transmission
         and MUST be ignored on receipt.

         P-flag: Protected flag.  Set when the packet has been rerouted
         through FRR mechanism by an SR endpoint node.

         O-flag: OAM flag.  When set, it indicates that this packet is
         an operations and management (OAM) packet.

         A-flag: Alert flag.  If present, it means important Type Length
         Value (TLV) objects are present.  See Section 3.1 for details
         on TLVs objects.

         H-flag: HMAC flag.  If set, the HMAC TLV is present and is
         encoded as the last TLV of the SRH.  In other words, the last
         36 octets of the SRH represent the HMAC information.  See
         Section 3.1.5 for details on the HMAC TLV.

   o  RESERVED: SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   o  Segment List[n]: 128 bit IPv6 addresses representing the nth
      segment in the Segment List.  The Segment List is encoded starting
      from the last segment of the path.  I.e., the first element of the
      segment list (Segment List [0]) contains the last segment of the
      path while the last segment of the Segment List (Segment List[n])
      contains the first segment of the path.  The index contained in
      "Segments Left" identifies the current active segment.

   o  Type Length Value (TLV) are described in Section 3.1.

3.1.  SRH TLVs

   This section defines TLVs of the Segment Routing Header.

   Type Length Value (TLV) contain optional information that may be used
   by the node identified in the DA of the packet.  It has to be noted
   that the information carried in the TLVs is not intended to be used
   by the routing layer.  Typically, TLVs carry information that is
   consumed by other components (e.g.: OAM) than the routing function.

   Each TLV has its own length, format and semantic.  The code-point
   allocated (by IANA) to each TLV defines both the format and the



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   semantic of the information carried in the TLV.  Multiple TLVs may be
   encoded in the same SRH.

   The "Length" field of the TLV is primarily used to skip the TLV while
   inspecting the SRH in case the node doesn't support or recognize the
   TLV codepoint.  The "Length" defines the TLV length in octets and not
   including the "Type" and "Length" fields.

   The primary scope of TLVs is to give the receiver of the packet
   information related to the source routed path (e.g.: where the packet
   entered in the SR domain and where it is expected to exit).

   Additional TLVs may be defined in the future.

3.1.1.  Ingress Node TLV

   The Ingress Node TLV is optional and identifies the node this packet
   traversed when entered the SR domain.  The Ingress Node TLV has
   following format:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type     |    Length     |   RESERVED    |     Flags     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                 Ingress Node (16 octets)                      |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 1).

   o  Length: 18.

   o  RESERVED: 8 bits.  SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.

   o  Flags: 8 bits.  No flags are defined in this document.

   o  Ingress Node: 128 bits.  Defines the node where the packet is
      expected to enter the SR domain.  In the encapsulation case
      described in Section 2.2.1, this information corresponds to the SA
      of the encapsulating header.





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3.1.2.  Egress Node TLV

   The Egress Node TLV is optional and identifies the node this packet
   is expected to traverse when exiting the SR domain.  The Egress Node
   TLV has following format:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type     |    Length     |   RESERVED    |     Flags     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                  Egress Node (16 octets)                      |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 2).

   o  Length: 18.

   o  RESERVED: 8 bits.  SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.

   o  Flags: 8 bits.  No flags are defined in this document.

   o  Egress Node: 128 bits.  Defines the node where the packet is
      expected to exit the SR domain.  In the encapsulation case
      described in Section 2.2.1, this information corresponds to the
      last segment of the SRH in the encapsulating header.

3.1.3.  Opaque Container TLV

   The Opaque Container TLV is optional and has the following format:















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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type     |    Length     |   RESERVED    |     Flags     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |             Opaque Container (16 octets)                      |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 3).

   o  Length: 18.

   o  RESERVED: 8 bits.  SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.

   o  Flags: 8 bits.  No flags are defined in this document.

   o  Opaque Container: 128 bits of opaque data not relevant for the
      routing layer.  Typically, this information is consumed by a non-
      routing component of the node receiving the packet (i.e.: the node
      in the DA).

3.1.4.  Padding TLV

   The Padding TLV is optional and with the purpose of aligning the SRH
   on a 8 octet boundary.  The Padding TLV has the following format:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    Length     |      Padding (variable)       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                    Padding (variable)                       //
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 4).

   o  Length: 1 to 7






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   o  Padding: from 1 to 7 octets of padding.  Padding bits have no
      semantic.  They SHOULD be set to 0 on transmission and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.

   The following applies to the Padding TLV:

   o  Padding TLV is optional and MAY only appear once in the SRH.  If
      present, it MUST have a length between 1 and 7 octets.

   o  The Padding TLV is used in order to align the SRH total length on
      the 8 octet boundary.

   o  When present, the Padding TLV MUST appear as the last TLV before
      the HMAC TLV (if HMAC TLV is present).

   o  When present, the Padding TLV MUST have a length from 1 to 7 in
      order to align the SRH total lenght on a 8-octet boundary.

   o  When a router inspecting the SRH encounters the Padding TLV, it
      MUST assume that no other TLV (other than the HMAC) follow the
      Padding TLV.

3.1.5.  HMAC TLV

   HMAC TLV is optional and contains the HMAC information.  The HMAC TLV
   has the following format:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type     |     Length    |          RESERVED             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      HMAC Key ID (4 octets)                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                              //
   |                      HMAC (32 octets)                        //
   |                                                              //
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   where:

   o  Type: to be assigned by IANA (suggested value 5).

   o  Length: 38.

   o  RESERVED: 2 octets.  SHOULD be unset on transmission and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.




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   o  HMAC Key ID: 4 octets.

   o  HMAC: 32 octets.

   o  HMAC and HMAC Key ID usage is described in Section 5

   The Following applies to the HMAC TLV:

   o  When present, the HMAC TLV MUST be encoded as the last TLV of the
      SRH.

   o  If the HMAC TLV is present, the SRH H-Flag (Figure 4) MUST be set.

   o  When the H-flag is set in the SRH, the router inspecting the SRH
      MUST find the HMAC TLV in the last 38 octets of the SRH.

3.2.  SRH and RFC2460 behavior

   The SRH being a new type of the Routing Header, it also has the same
   properties:

      SHOULD only appear once in the packet.

      Only the router whose address is in the DA field of the packet
      header MUST inspect the SRH.

   Therefore, Segment Routing in IPv6 networks implies that the segment
   identifier (i.e.: the IPv6 address of the segment) is moved into the
   DA of the packet.

   The DA of the packet changes at each segment termination/completion
   and therefore the final DA of the packet MUST be encoded as the last
   segment of the path.

4.  SRH Procedures

   In this section we describe the different procedures on the SRH.

4.1.  Source SR Node

   A Source SR Node can be any node originating an IPv6 packet with its
   IPv6 and Segment Routing Headers.  This include either:

      A host originating an IPv6 packet.

      An SR domain ingress router encapsulating a received IPv6 packet
      into an outer IPv6 header followed by an SRH.




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   The mechanism through which a Segment List is derived is outside of
   the scope of this document.  As an example, the Segment List may be
   obtained through:

      Local path computation.

      Local configuration.

      Interaction with a centralized controller delivering the path.

      Any other mechanism.

   The following are the steps of the creation of the SRH:

      Next Header and Hdr Ext Len fields are set according to [RFC2460].

      Routing Type field is set as TBD (to be allocated by IANA,
      suggested value 4).

      The Segment List is built with the FIRST segment of the path
      encoded in the LAST element of the Segment List.  Subsequent
      segments are encoded on top of the first segment.  Finally, the
      LAST segment of the path is encoded in the FIRST element of the
      Segment List.  In other words, the Segment List is encoded in the
      reverse order of the path.

      The final DA of the packet is encoded as the last segment of the
      path (encoded in the first element of the Segment List).

      The DA of the packet is set with the value of the first segment
      (found in the last element of the segment list).

      The Segments Left field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
      elements in the Segment List.

      The First Segment field is set to n-1 where n is the number of
      elements in the Segment List.

      The packet is sent out towards the first segment (i.e.:
      represented in the packet DA).

      HMAC TLV may be set according to Section 5.

4.2.  Transit Node

   According to [RFC2460], the only node who is allowed to inspect the
   Routing Extension Header (and therefore the SRH), is the node
   corresponding to the DA of the packet.  Any other transit node MUST



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   NOT inspect the underneath routing header and MUST forward the packet
   towards the DA and according to the IPv6 routing table.

   In the example case described in Section 2.2.2, when SR capable nodes
   are connected through an overlay spanning multiple third-party
   infrastructure, it is safe to send SRH packets (i.e.: packet having a
   Segment Routing Header) between each other overlay/SR-capable nodes
   as long as the segment list does not include any of the transit
   provider nodes.  In addition, as a generic security measure, any
   service provider will block any packet destined to one of its
   internal routers, especially if these packets have an extended header
   in it.

4.3.  SR Segment Endpoint Node

   The SR segment endpoint node is the node whose address is in the DA.
   The segment endpoint node inspects the SRH and does:

   1.   IF DA = myself (segment endpoint)
   2.      IF Segments Left > 0 THEN
              decrement Segments Left
              update DA with Segment List[Segments Left]
   3.      ELSE continue IPv6 processing of the packet
                End of processing.
   4.   Forward the packet out

5.  Security Considerations

   This section analyzes the security threat model, the security issues
   and proposed solutions related to the new Segment Routing Header.

   The Segment Routing Header (SRH) is simply another type of the
   routing header as described in RFC 2460 [RFC2460] and is:

   o  Added by an SR edge router when entering the segment routing
      domain or by the originating host itself.  The source host can
      even be outside the SR domain;

   o  inspected and acted upon when reaching the destination address of
      the IP header per RFC 2460 [RFC2460].

   Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], routers on the path that simply forward an
   IPv6 packet (i.e. the IPv6 destination address is none of theirs)
   will never inspect and process the content of the SRH.  Routers whose
   one interface IPv6 address equals the destination address field of
   the IPv6 packet MUST parse the SRH and, if supported and if the local
   configuration allows it, MUST act accordingly to the SRH content.




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   According to RFC2460 [RFC2460], the default behavior of a non SR-
   capable router upon receipt of an IPv6 packet with SRH destined to an
   address of its, is to:

   o  ignore the SRH completely if the Segment Left field is 0 and
      proceed to process the next header in the IPv6 packet;

   o  discard the IPv6 packet if Segment Left field is greater than 0,
      it MAY send a Parameter Problem ICMP message back to the Source
      Address.

5.1.  Threat model

5.1.1.  Source routing threats

   Using an SRH is similar to source routing, therefore it has some
   well-known security issues as described in RFC4942 [RFC4942] section
   2.1.1 and RFC5095 [RFC5095]:

   o  amplification attacks: where a packet could be forged in such a
      way to cause looping among a set of SR-enabled routers causing
      unnecessary traffic, hence a Denial of Service (DoS) against
      bandwidth;

   o  reflection attack: where a hacker could force an intermediate node
      to appear as the immediate attacker, hence hiding the real
      attacker from naive forensic;

   o  bypass attack: where an intermediate node could be used as a
      stepping stone (for example in a De-Militarized Zone) to attack
      another host (for example in the datacenter or any back-end
      server).

5.1.2.  Applicability of RFC 5095 to SRH

   First of all, the reader must remember this specific part of section
   1 of RFC5095 [RFC5095], "A side effect is that this also eliminates
   benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be facilitated
   by future Routing Header specifications.".  In short, it is not
   forbidden to create new secure type of Routing Header; for example,
   RFC 6554 (RPL) [RFC6554] also creates a new Routing Header type for a
   specific application confined in a single network.

   In the segment routing architecture described in
   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing] there are basically two kinds of
   nodes (routers and hosts):





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   o  nodes within the SR domain, which is within one single
      administrative domain, i.e., where all nodes are trusted anyway
      else the damage caused by those nodes could be worse than
      amplification attacks: traffic interception, man-in-the-middle
      attacks, more server DoS by dropping packets, and so on.

   o  nodes outside of the SR domain, which is outside of the
      administrative segment routing domain hence they cannot be trusted
      because there is no physical security for those nodes, i.e., they
      can be replaced by hostile nodes or can be coerced in wrong
      behaviors.

   The main use case for SR consists of the single administrative domain
   where only trusted nodes with SR enabled and configured participate
   in SR: this is the same model as in RFC6554 [RFC6554].  All non-
   trusted nodes do not participate as either SR processing is not
   enabled by default or because they only process SRH from nodes within
   their domain.

   Moreover, all SR nodes ignore SRH created by outsiders based on
   topology information (received on a peering or internal interface) or
   on presence and validity of the HMAC field.  Therefore, if
   intermediate nodes ONLY act on valid and authorized SRH (such as
   within a single administrative domain), then there is no security
   threat similar to RH-0.  Hence, the RFC 5095 [RFC5095] attacks are
   not applicable.

5.1.3.  Service stealing threat

   Segment routing is used for added value services, there is also a
   need to prevent non-participating nodes to use those services; this
   is called 'service stealing prevention'.

5.1.4.  Topology disclosure

   The SRH may also contains IPv6 addresses of some intermediate SR-
   nodes in the path towards the destination, this obviously reveals
   those addresses to the potentially hostile attackers if those
   attackers are able to intercept packets containing SRH.  On the other
   hand, if the attacker can do a traceroute whose probes will be
   forwarded along the SR path, then there is little learned by
   intercepting the SRH itself.

5.1.5.  ICMP Generation

   Per section 4.4 of RFC2460 [RFC2460], when destination nodes (i.e.
   where the destination address is one of theirs) receive a Routing
   Header with unsupported Routing Type, the required behavior is:



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   o  If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header
      and proceed to process the next header in the packet.

   o  If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and
      send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's
      Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Routing Type.

   This required behavior could be used by an attacker to force the
   generation of ICMP message by any node.  The attacker could send
   packets with SRH (with Segment Left set to 0) destined to a node not
   supporting SRH.  Per RFC2460 [RFC2460], the destination node could
   generate an ICMP message, causing a local CPU utilization and if the
   source of the offending packet with SRH was spoofed could lead to a
   reflection attack without any amplification.

   It must be noted that this is a required behavior for any unsupported
   Routing Type and not limited to SRH packets.  So, it is not specific
   to SRH and the usual rate limiting for ICMP generation is required
   anyway for any IPv6 implementation and has been implemented and
   deployed for many years.

5.2.  Security fields in SRH

   This section summarizes the use of specific fields in the SRH.  They
   are based on a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC).

   The security-related fields in the SRH are instantiated by the HMAC
   TLV, containing:

   o  HMAC Key-id, 32 bits wide;

   o  HMAC, 256 bits wide (optional, exists only if HMAC Key-id is not
      0).

   The HMAC field is the output of the HMAC computation (per RFC 2104
   [RFC2104]) using a pre-shared key identified by HMAC Key-id and of
   the text which consists of the concatenation of:

   o  the source IPv6 address;

   o  First Segment field;

   o  an octet of bit flags;

   o  HMAC Key-id;

   o  all addresses in the Segment List.




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   The purpose of the HMAC TLV is to verify the validity, the integrity
   and the authorization of the SRH itself.  If an outsider of the SR
   domain does not have access to a current pre-shared secret, then it
   cannot compute the right HMAC field and the first SR router on the
   path processing the SRH and configured to check the validity of the
   HMAC will simply reject the packet.

   The HMAC TLV is located at the end of the SRH simply because only the
   router on the ingress of the SR domain needs to process it, then all
   other SR nodes can ignore it (based on local policy) because they
   trust the upstream router.  This is to speed up forwarding operations
   because SR routers which do not validate the SRH do not need to parse
   the SRH until the end.

   The HMAC Key-id field allows for the simultaneous existence of
   several hash algorithms (SHA-256, SHA3-256 ... or future ones) as
   well as pre-shared keys.  The HMAC Key-id field is opaque, i.e., it
   has neither syntax nor semantic except as an index to the right
   combination of pre-shared key and hash algorithm and except that a
   value of 0 means that there is no HMAC field.  Having an HMAC Key-id
   field allows for pre-shared key roll-over when two pre-shared keys
   are supported for a while when all SR nodes converged to a fresher
   pre-shared key.  It could also allow for interoperation among
   different SR domains if allowed by local policy and assuming a
   collision-free HMAC Key Id allocation.

   When a specific SRH is linked to a time-related service (such as
   turbo-QoS for a 1-hour period) where the DA, Segment ID (SID) are
   identical, then it is important to refresh the shared-secret
   frequently as the HMAC validity period expires only when the HMAC
   Key-id and its associated shared-secret expires.

5.2.1.  Selecting a hash algorithm

   The HMAC field in the HMAC TLV is 256 bit wide.  Therefore, the HMAC
   MUST be based on a hash function whose output is at least 256 bits.
   If the output of the hash function is 256, then this output is simply
   inserted in the HMAC field.  If the output of the hash function is
   larger than 256 bits, then the output value is truncated to 256 by
   taking the least-significant 256 bits and inserting them in the HMAC
   field.

   SRH implementations can support multiple hash functions but MUST
   implement SHA-2 [FIPS180-4] in its SHA-256 variant.

   NOTE: SHA-1 is currently used by some early implementations used for
   quick interoperations testing, the 160-bit hash value must then be




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   right-hand padded with 96 bits set to 0.  The authors understand that
   this is not secure but is ok for limited tests.

5.2.2.  Performance impact of HMAC

   While adding an HMAC to each and every SR packet increases the
   security, it has a performance impact.  Nevertheless, it must be
   noted that:

   o  the HMAC field is used only when SRH is added by a device (such as
      a home set-up box) which is outside of the segment routing domain.
      If the SRH is added by a router in the trusted segment routing
      domain, then, there is no need for an HMAC field, hence no
      performance impact.

   o  when present, the HMAC field MUST only be checked and validated by
      the first router of the segment routing domain, this router is
      named 'validating SR router'.  Downstream routers may not inspect
      the HMAC field.

   o  this validating router can also have a cache of <IPv6 header +
      SRH, HMAC field value> to improve the performance.  It is not the
      same use case as in IPsec where HMAC value was unique per packet,
      in SRH, the HMAC value is unique per flow.

   o  Last point, hash functions such as SHA-2 have been optimized for
      security and performance and there are multiple implementations
      with good performance.

   With the above points in mind, the performance impact of using HMAC
   is minimized.

5.2.3.  Pre-shared key management

   The field HMAC Key-id allows for:

   o  key roll-over: when there is a need to change the key (the hash
      pre-shared secret), then multiple pre-shared keys can be used
      simultaneously.  The validating routing can have a table of <HMAC
      Key-id, pre-shared secret> for the currently active and future
      keys.

   o  different algorithms: by extending the previous table to <HMAC
      Key-id, hash function, pre-shared secret>, the validating router
      can also support simultaneously several hash algorithms (see
      section Section 5.2.1)

   The pre-shared secret distribution can be done:



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   o  in the configuration of the validating routers, either by static
      configuration or any SDN oriented approach;

   o  dynamically using a trusted key distribution such as [RFC6407]

   The intent of this document is NOT to define yet-another-key-
   distribution-protocol.

5.3.  Deployment Models

5.3.1.  Nodes within the SR domain

   An SR domain is defined as a set of interconnected routers where all
   routers at the perimeter are configured to add and act on SRH.  Some
   routers inside the SR domain can also act on SRH or simply forward
   IPv6 packets.

   The routers inside an SR domain can be trusted to generate SRH and to
   process SRH received on interfaces that are part of the SR domain.
   These nodes MUST drop all SRH packets received on an interface that
   is not part of the SR domain and containing an SRH whose HMAC field
   cannot be validated by local policies.  This includes obviously
   packet with an SRH generated by a non-cooperative SR domain.

   If the validation fails, then these packets MUST be dropped, ICMP
   error messages (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
   limited) and SHOULD be logged.

5.3.2.  Nodes outside of the SR domain

   Nodes outside of the SR domain cannot be trusted for physical
   security; hence, they need to request by some trusted means (outside
   of the scope of this document) a complete SRH for each new connection
   (i.e. new destination address).  The received SRH MUST include an
   HMAC TLV which is computed correctly (see Section 5.2).

   When an outside node sends a packet with an SRH and towards an SR
   domain ingress node, the packet MUST contain the HMAC TLV (with a
   Key-id and HMAC fields) and the the destination address MUST be an
   address of an SR domain ingress node .

   The ingress SR router, i.e., the router with an interface address
   equals to the destination address, MUST verify the HMAC TLV.

   If the validation is successful, then the packet is simply forwarded
   as usual for an SR packet.  As long as the packet travels within the
   SR domain, no further HMAC check needs to be done.  Subsequent




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   routers in the SR domain MAY verify the HMAC TLV when they process
   the SRH (i.e. when they are the destination).

   If the validation fails, then this packet MUST be dropped, an ICMP
   error message (parameter problem) SHOULD be generated (but rate
   limited) and SHOULD be logged.

5.3.3.  SR path exposure

   As the intermediate SR nodes addresses appears in the SRH, if this
   SRH is visible to an outsider then he/she could reuse this knowledge
   to launch an attack on the intermediate SR nodes or get some insider
   knowledge on the topology.  This is especially applicable when the
   path between the source node and the first SR domain ingress router
   is on the public Internet.

   The first remark is to state that 'security by obscurity' is never
   enough; in other words, the security policy of the SR domain MUST
   assume that the internal topology and addressing is known by the
   attacker.  A simple traceroute will also give the same information
   (with even more information as all intermediate nodes between SID
   will also be exposed).  IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
   [RFC4303] cannot be use to protect the SRH as per RFC4303 the ESP
   header must appear after any routing header (including SRH).

   To prevent a user to leverage the gained knowledge by intercepting
   SRH, it it recommended to apply an infrastructure Access Control List
   (iACL) at the edge of the SR domain.  This iACL will drop all packets
   from outside the SR-domain whose destination is any address of any
   router inside the domain.  This security policy should be tuned for
   local operations.

5.3.4.  Impact of BCP-38

   BCP-38 [RFC2827], also known as "Network Ingress Filtering", checks
   whether the source address of packets received on an interface is
   valid for this interface.  The use of loose source routing such as
   SRH forces packets to follow a path which differs from the expected
   routing.  Therefore, if BCP-38 was implemented in all routers inside
   the SR domain, then SR packets could be received by an interface
   which is not expected one and the packets could be dropped.

   As an SR domain is usually a subset of one administrative domain, and
   as BCP-38 is only deployed at the ingress routers of this
   administrative domain and as packets arriving at those ingress
   routers have been normally forwarded using the normal routing
   information, then there is no reason why this ingress router should




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   drop the SRH packet based on BCP-38.  Routers inside the domain
   commonly do not apply BCP-38; so, this is not a problem.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes the following registrations in the Internet
   Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters "Routing Type" registry
   maintained by IANA:

   Suggested            Description             Reference
     Value
   ----------------------------------------------------------
      4         Segment Routing Header (SRH)    This document

   In addition, this document request IANA to create and maintain a new
   Registry: "Segment Routing Header Type-Value Objects".  The following
   code-points are requested from the registry:

   Registry: Segment Routing Header Type-Value Objects

   Suggested         Description            Reference
     Value
   -----------------------------------------------------
      1         Ingress Node TLV          This document
      2         Egress Node  TLV          This document
      3         Opaque Container TLV      This document
      4         Padding TLV               This document
      5         HMAC TLV                  This document

7.  Manageability Considerations

   TBD

8.  Contributors

   Dave Barach, John Leddy, John Brzozowski, Pierre Francois, Nagendra
   Kumar, Mark Townsley, Christian Martin, Roberta Maglione, James
   Connolly, Aloys Augustin contributed to the content of this document.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Ole Troan, Bob Hinden, Fred Baker,
   Brian Carpenter, Alexandru Petrescu and Punit Kumar Jaiswal for their
   comments to this document.







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10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS180-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS
              180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", March 2012,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/
              fips-180-4.pdf>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC5095]  Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
              of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5095>.

   [RFC6407]  Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
              of Interpretation", RFC 6407, DOI 10.17487/RFC6407,
              October 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6407>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions]
              Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Bashandy, A., Gredler, H.,
              Litkowski, S., Decraene, B., and j. jefftant@gmail.com,
              "IS-IS Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-ietf-isis-
              segment-routing-extensions-09 (work in progress), October
              2016.

   [I-D.ietf-ospf-ospfv3-segment-routing-extensions]
              Psenak, P., Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Gredler, H.,
              Shakir, R., Henderickx, W., and J. Tantsura, "OSPFv3
              Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-
              segment-routing-extensions-07 (work in progress), October
              2016.




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   [I-D.ietf-spring-ipv6-use-cases]
              Brzozowski, J., Leddy, J., Townsley, W., Filsfils, C., and
              R. Maglione, "IPv6 SPRING Use Cases", draft-ietf-spring-
              ipv6-use-cases-08 (work in progress), January 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-spring-resiliency-use-cases]
              Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., and R. Shakir,
              "Resiliency use cases in SPRING networks", draft-ietf-
              spring-resiliency-use-cases-08 (work in progress), October
              2016.

   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
              Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S.,
              and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", draft-ietf-
              spring-segment-routing-10 (work in progress), November
              2016.

   [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-mpls]
              Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Bashandy, A., Decraene, B.,
              Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., Shakir, R.,
              jefftant@gmail.com, j., and E. Crabbe, "Segment Routing
              with MPLS data plane", draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-
              mpls-06 (work in progress), January 2017.

   [RFC1940]  Estrin, D., Li, T., Rekhter, Y., Varadhan, K., and D.
              Zappala, "Source Demand Routing: Packet Format and
              Forwarding Specification (Version 1)", RFC 1940,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1940, May 1996,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1940>.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

   [RFC4942]  Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
              Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4942, September 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4942>.







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Internet-Draft      IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)      February 2017


   [RFC6554]  Hui, J., Vasseur, JP., Culler, D., and V. Manral, "An IPv6
              Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol
              for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)", RFC 6554,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6554, March 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6554>.

   [RFC7855]  Previdi, S., Ed., Filsfils, C., Ed., Decraene, B.,
              Litkowski, S., Horneffer, M., and R. Shakir, "Source
              Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) Problem Statement
              and Requirements", RFC 7855, DOI 10.17487/RFC7855, May
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7855>.

Authors' Addresses

   Stefano Previdi (editor)
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Via Del Serafico, 200
   Rome  00142
   Italy

   Email: sprevidi@cisco.com


   Clarence Filsfils
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Brussels
   BE

   Email: cfilsfil@cisco.com


   Brian Field
   Comcast
   4100 East Dry Creek Road
   Centennial, CO  80122
   US

   Email: Brian_Field@cable.comcast.com


   Ida Leung
   Rogers Communications
   8200 Dixie Road
   Brampton, ON  L6T 0C1
   CA

   Email: Ida.Leung@rci.rogers.com




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Internet-Draft      IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)      February 2017


   Jen Linkova
   Google
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA 94043
   US

   Email: furry@google.com


   Ebben Aries
   Facebook
   US

   Email: exa@fb.com


   Tomoya Kosugi
   NTT
   3-9-11, Midori-Cho Musashino-Shi,
   Tokyo  180-8585
   JP

   Email: kosugi.tomoya@lab.ntt.co.jp


   Eric Vyncke
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   De Kleetlaann 6A
   Diegem  1831
   Belgium

   Email: evyncke@cisco.com


   David Lebrun
   Universite Catholique de Louvain
   Place Ste Barbe, 2
   Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
   Belgium

   Email: david.lebrun@uclouvain.be










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