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Versions: (draft-richardson-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join) 00 01

6tisch Working Group                                       M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                         February 25, 2017
Expires: August 29, 2017


                      6tisch Secure Join protocol
              draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join-01

Abstract

   This document describes a zero-touch mechanism to enroll a new device
   (the "pledge") into a IEEE802.15.4 TSCH network using the 6tisch
   signaling mechanisms.  The resulting device will obtain a domain
   specific credential that can be used with either 802.15.9 per-host
   pair keying protocols, or to obtain the network-wide key from a
   coordinator.  The mechanism describe her is an augmentation to the
   one-touch mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       1.2.1.  One-Touch Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       1.2.2.  Factory provided credentials (if any) . . . . . . . .   4
       1.2.3.  Credentials to be introduced  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  Network Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.3.1.  Security above and below IP . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.3.2.  Join network assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.3.3.  Number and cost of round trips  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.3.4.  Size of packets, number of fragments  . . . . . . . .   7
     1.4.  Target end-state for join process . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Join Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Key Agreement process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Provisional Enrollment process  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Key Distribution Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  YANG model for BRSKI objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Description of Pledge States in Join Process  . . . . . .  10
   4.  Definition of managed objects for zero-touch bootstrap  . . .  10
   5.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Privacy Considerations for Production network . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Privacy Considerations for New Pledges  . . . . . . . . .  11
       5.2.1.  EUI-64 derived address for join time IID  . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Privacy Considerations for Join Assistant . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Acknwoledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.3.  URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   Enrollment of new nodes into LLNs present unique challenges.  The
   constrained nodes has no user interfaces, and even if they did,
   configuring thousands of such nodes manually is undesireable from a
   human resources issue, as well as the difficulty in getting
   consistent results.




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   This document is about a standard way to introduce new nodes into a
   6tisch network that does not involve any direct manipulation of the
   nodes themselves.  This act has been called "zero-touch"
   provisioning, and it does not occur by chance, but requires
   coordination between the manufacturer of the node, the service
   operator running the LLN, and the installers actually taking the
   devices out of the shipping boxes.

   The act of doing "one-touch" provisioning, where a node undergoes a
   site-specific indoctrination process is described in
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

   The mechanism described here and in
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] can be discovered by a new node in
   a running network, so a device which has received a network-specific
   "one-touch" setup, but which is located in another network, and is
   capable of "zero-touch" operation could discovery this fact and
   operate in other mode.

   Many of the components of the zero-touch mechanisms described here
   are in common with [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] and
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch].  The on-the-wire pledge to join
   registrar protocols are different in this protocol from those
   described in ANIMA, but conceptually operate identically.  The
   vouchers are identical.  It is expected that the back-end network
   operator infrastructure would be able to bootstrap ANIMA-type devices
   over ethernet, while also being able bootstrap 6tisch devices over
   802.15.4 with few changes.

1.1.  Terminology

   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
   [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD
   implementations.

   The reader is expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology], [RFC7252],
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].  The following terms are
   imported: drop ship, imprint, enrollment, pledge, join proxy,
   ownership voucher, join registrar/coordinator.  The following terms
   are repeated here for readability, but this document is not
   authoritative for their definition:






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   pledge  the prospective device, which has the identity provided to at
      the factory.  Neither the device nor the network knows if the
      device yet knows if this device belongs with this network.

   Joined Node  the prospective device, after having completing the join
      process, often just called a Node.

   Join Proxy (JP):  a stateless relay that provides connectivity
      between the pledge and the join registrar/coordinator.

   Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC):  central entity responsible for
      authentication and authorization of joining nodes.

   Audit Token  A signed token from the manufacturer authorized signing
      authority indicating that the bootstrapping event has been
      successfully logged.  This has been referred to as an
      "authorization token" indicating that it authorizes bootstrapping
      to proceed.

   Ownership Voucher  A signed voucher from the vendor vouching that a
      specific domain "owns" the new entity as defined in
      [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch].

   MIC  manufacturer installed certificate.  An [ieee802-1AR] identity.

1.2.  Credentials

   In the zero-touch scenario, every device expected to be drop shipped
   would have an [ieee802-1AR] manufacturer installed certificate (MIC).
   The private key part of the certificate would either be generated in
   the device, or installed securely (and privately) as part of the
   manufacturing process.  [cullenCiscoPhoneDeploy] provides an example
   of process which has been active for a good part of a decade.

   The MIC would be signed by the manufacturer's CA, the public key
   component of that would be included in the firmware.

1.2.1.  One-Touch Assumptions

   This document interacts with the one-touch solution described in
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].

1.2.2.  Factory provided credentials (if any)

   When a manufacturer installed certificate is provided as the IDevID,
   it SHOULD contain a number of fields.
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] provides a detailed set of
   requirements.



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   A manufacturer unique serial number MUST be provided in the
   serialNumber SubjectAltName extension, and MAY be repeated in the
   Common Name.  There are no sequential or numeric requirements on the
   serialNumber, it may be any unique value that the manufacturer wants
   to use.  The serialNumber SHOULD be printed on the packaging and/or
   on the device in a discrete way so that failures can be physically
   traced to the relevant device.

1.2.3.  Credentials to be introduced

   The goal of the bootstrap process is to introduce one or more new
   locally relevant credentials:

   1.  a certificate signed by a local certificate authority/registrar.
       This is the LDevID of [ieee802-1AR].

   2.  alternatively, a network-wide key to be used to secure L2
       traffic.

   3.  alternatively, a network-wide key to be used to authenticate per-
       peer keying of L2 traffic using a mechanism such as provided by
       [ieee802159].

1.3.  Network Assumptions

   This document is about enrollment of constrained devices [RFC7228] to
   a constrained network.  Constrained networks is such as [ieee802154],
   and in particular the time-slotted, channel hopping (tsch) mode,
   feature low bandwidths, and limited opportunities to transmit.  A key
   feature of these networks is that receivers are only listening at
   certain times.

1.3.1.  Security above and below IP

   802.15.4 networks have three kinds of layer-2 security:

   o  a network key that is shared with all nodes and is used for
      unicast and multicast.  The key may be used for privacy, and it
      may be used in some cases for authentication only (in the case of
      enhanced beacons).

   o  a series of network keys that are shared (agreed to) between pairs
      of nodes (the per-peer key)

   o  a network key that is shared with all nodes (through a group key
      management system), and is used for multicast traffic only, while
      a per-pair key is used for unicast traffic




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   Setting up the credentials to bootstrap one of these kinds of
   security, (or directly configuring the key itself for the first case)
   is required.  This is the security below the IP layer.

   Security is required above the IP layer: there are three aspects
   which the credentials in the previous section are to be used.

   o  to provide for secure connection with a Path Computation Element
      [RFC4655], or other LLC (see ({RFC7554}} section 3).

   o  to initiate a connection between a Resource Server (RS) and an
      application layer Authorization Server (AS and CAS from
      [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]).

1.3.1.1.  Perfect Forward Secrecy

   Perfert Forward Secrecy (PFS) is the property of a protocol such that
   complete knowledge of the crypto state (for instance, via a memory
   dump) at time X does not imply that data from a disjoint time Y can
   also be recovered.  ([PFS]).

   PFS is important for two reasons: one is that it offers protection
   against the compromise of a node.  It does this by changing the keys
   in a non-deterministic way.  This second property also makes it much
   easier to remove a node from the network, as any node which has not
   participated in the key changing process will find itself no longer
   connected.

1.3.2.  Join network assumptions

   The network which the new pledge will connect to will have to have
   the following properties:

   o  a known PANID.  The PANID 0xXXXX where XXXX is the assigned RFC#
      for this document is suggested.

   o  a minimal schedule with some Aloha time.  This is usually in the
      same slotframe as the Enhanced Beacon, but a pledge MUST listen
      for an unencrypted Enhanced Beacon to so that it can synchronize.

1.3.3.  Number and cost of round trips

   TBD.








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1.3.4.  Size of packets, number of fragments

1.4.  Target end-state for join process

   At the end of the zero-touch join process there will be a symmetric
   key protected channel between the Join Registrar/Coordinator and the
   pledge, now known as a Joined Node.  This channel may be rekeyed via
   new exchange of asymmetric exponents (ECDH for instance),
   authenticated using the domain specific credentials created during
   the join process.

   This channel is in the form of an OSCOAP protected connection with
   [I-D.ietf-core-comi] encoded objects.  This document includes
   definition of a [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] compatible objects for
   encoding of the relevant [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
   objects.

2.  Join Protocol

   The pledge join protocol state machine is described in
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], in section XYZ.  The pledge
   recognizes that it is in zero-touch configuration by the following
   situation:

   o  no PSK has been configured for the network in which it has joined.

   o  the pledge has no locally defined certificate (no LDevID), only an
      IDevID.

   o  the network asserts an identity that the pledge does not
      recognize.

   All of these conditions MUST be true.  If any of these are not true,
   then the pledge has either been connected to the wrong network, or it
   has already been bootstrapped into a different network, and it should
   wait until it finds that network.

   The zero-touch process consists of three stages:

   1.  the key agreement process

   2.  the provisional enrollment process

   3.  the key distribution process







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2.1.  Key Agreement process

   The key agreement process is identical to
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].  The process uses EDHOC with
   certificates.

   The pledge will have to trust the JRC provisionally, as described in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], section 3.1.2, and in
   section 4.1.1 of [RFC7030].

   The JRC will be able to validate the IDevID of the pledge using the
   manufacturer's CA.

   The pledge may not know if it is in a zero-touch or one-touch
   situation: the pledge may be able to verify the JRC based upon trust
   anchors that were installed at manufacturing time.  In that case, the
   pledge runs the simplified one-touch process.

   The pledge signals in the EDHOC message_2 if it has accepted the JRC
   certificate.  The JRC will in general, not trust the pledge with the
   network keys until it has provided the pledge with a voucher.  The
   pledge will notice the absence of the provisioning keys.

   XXX - there could be some disconnect here.  May need additional
   signals here.

2.2.  Provisional Enrollment process

   When the pledge determines that it can not verify the certificate of
   the JRC using built-in trust anchors, then it enters a provisional
   state.  In this state, it keeps the channel created by EDHOC open.

   A new EDHOC key derivation is done by the JRC and pledge using a new
   label, "6tisch-provisional".

   The pledge runs as a passive CoMI server, leaving the JRC to drive
   the enrollment process.  The JRC can interrogate the pledge in a
   variety of fashions as shown below: the process terminates when the
   JRC provides the pledge with an ownership voucher and the pledge
   leaves the provisional state.

   A typical interaction involves the following requests:









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       +-----------+ +----------+ +-----------+ +----------+
       |           | |          | | Circuit   | | New      |
       |  Vendor   | | Registrar| |  Proxy    | | Entity   |
       |  (MASA)   | |          | |           | |          |
       ++----------+ +--+-------+ +-----------+ +----------+
        |               |     GET  request voucher       |
        |               |-------------------------------->
        |               <----------voucher-token---------|
        |/requestvoucher|                                |
        <---------------+                                |
        +--------------->                                |
        |/requestlog    |                                |
        <---------------+                                |
        +--------------->                                |
        |               |        POST voucher            |
        |               |-------------------------------->
        |               <------------2.05 OK ------------+
        |               |                                |
        |               |        POST csr attributes     |
        |               |-------------------------------->
        |               <------------2.05 OK ------------+
        |               |                                |
        |               |        GET  cert request       |
        |               |-------------------------------->
        |     ????      <------------2.05 OK ------------+
        |<--------------|              CSR               |
        |-------------->|                                |
        |               |        POST certificate        |
        |               |-------------------------------->
        |               <------------2.05 OK ------------+
        |               |                                |

2.3.  Key Distribution Process

   The key distribution process utilizes the protocol described
   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey].  The process starts with the
   initial key, rather than an actual rekey.

   This protocol remains active for subsequent rekey operations.

3.  YANG model for BRSKI objects

   module ietf-6tisch-brski { yang-version 1.1;

   namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:6tisch-brski"; prefix
   "ietf6brski";





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   //import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } //import ietf-inet-types {
   prefix inet; }

   organization "IETF 6tisch Working Group";

   contact "WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/6tisch/ WG List:
   6tisch@ietf.org [2] Author: Michael Richardson mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   [3]";

   description "This module defines an interface to set and retrieve
   BRSKI objects using CoMI.  This interface is used as part of an
   enrollment process for constrained nodes and networks.";

   revision "2017-03-01" { description "Initial version"; reference "RFC
   XXXX: 6tisch zero-touch bootstrap"; }

   // top-level container container ietf6brski { leaf requestnonce {
   type binary; length XX; // how big can/should it be? mandatory true;
   description "Request Nonce."; } leaf voucher { type binary;
   description "The voucher as a serialized COSE object"; }

   leaf csrattributes {
     type binary;
     description "A list of attributes that MUST be in the CSR";
   }

   leaf certificaterequest {
     type binary;
     description "A PKIX format Certificate Request";
   }

   leaf certificate {
     type binary;
     description "The LDevID certificate";
   }   } }

3.1.  Description of Pledge States in Join Process

   TBD

4.  Definition of managed objects for zero-touch bootstrap

   The following is relevant YANG for use in the bootstrap protocol.
   The objects identified are identical in format to the named objects
   from [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].






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5.  Privacy Considerations

   [I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations] details a number of privacy
   considerations important in Resource Constrained nodes.  There are
   two networks and three sets of constrained nodes to consider.  They
   are: 1. the production nodes on the production network.  2. the new
   pledges, which have yet to enroll, and which are on a join network.
   3. the production nodes which are also acting as proxy nodes.

5.1.  Privacy Considerations for Production network

   The details of this are out of scope for this document.

5.2.  Privacy Considerations for New Pledges

   New Pledges do not yet receive Router Advertisements with PIO
   options, and so configure link-local addresses only based upon
   layer-2 addresses using the normal SLAAC mechanisms described in
   [RFC4191].

   These link-local addresses are visible to any on-link eavesdropper
   (who is synchronized to the same Join Assistant), so regardless of
   what is chosen they can be seen.  This link-layer traffic is
   encapsulated by the Join Assistant into IPIP packets and carried to
   the JCE.  The traffic SHOULD never leave the operator's network, and
   no outside traffic should enter, so it should not be possible to do
   any ICMP scanning as described in
   [I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations].

   The join process described herein requires that some identifier
   meaningful to the network operator be communicated to the JCE via the
   Neighbor Advertisement's ARO option.  This need not be a manufacturer
   created EUI-64 as assigned by IEEE; it could be another value with
   higher entropy and less interesting vendor/device information.
   Regardless of what is chosen, it can be used to track where the
   device attaches.

   For most constrained device, network attachment occurs very
   infrequently, often only once in their lifetime, so tracking
   opportunities may be rare.

   Further, during the enrollment process, a DTLS connection connection
   will be created.  Unless TLS1.3 is used, the device identity will be
   visible to passive observers in the 802.11AR IDevID certificate that
   is sent.  Even when TLS1.3 is used, an active attacker could collect
   the information by simply connecting to the device; it would not have
   to successful complete the negotiation either, or even attempt to
   Man-In-The-Middle the device.



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   There is, at the same time, significant value in avoiding a link-
   local DAD process by using an IEEE assigned EUI-64, and there is also
   significant advantage to the operator being able to see what the
   vendor of the new device is.

5.2.1.  EUI-64 derived address for join time IID

   It is therefore suggested that the IID used in the link-local address
   used during the join process be a vendor assigned EUI-64.  After the
   join process has concluded, the device SHOULD be assigned a unique
   randomly generated long address, and a unique short address (not
   based upon the vendor EUI-64) for use at link-layer.  At that point,
   all layer-3 content is encrypted by the layer-2 key.

5.3.  Privacy Considerations for Join Assistant

6.  Security Considerations

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document allocates one value from the subregistry "Address
   Registration Option Status Values": ND_NS_JOIN_DECLINED Join
   Assistant, JOIN DECLINED (TBD-AA)

8.  Protocol Definition

9.  Acknwoledgements

   Kristofer Pister helped with many non-IETF references.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [cullenCiscoPhoneDeploy]
              Jennings, C., "Transitive Trust Enrollment for Constrained
              Devices", 2012, <http://www.lix.polytechnique.fr/hipercom/
              SmartObjectSecurity/papers/CullenJennings.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations]
              Thaler, D., "Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation
              Layer Mechanisms", draft-ietf-6lo-privacy-
              considerations-04 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal]
              Vilajosana, X., Pister, K., and T. Watteyne, "Minimal
              6TiSCH Configuration", draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-21 (work
              in progress), February 2017.



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   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
              Vucinic, M., Simon, J., and K. Pister, "Minimal Security
              Framework for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-
              security-01 (work in progress), February 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]
              Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang,
              "Terminology in IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE
              802.15.4e", draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-08 (work in
              progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-04 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
              Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
              grasp-09 (work in progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-core-comi]
              Stok, P., Bierman, A., Veillette, M., and A. Pelov, "CoAP
              Management Interface", draft-ietf-core-comi-00 (work in
              progress), January 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-ietf-core-
              object-security-01 (work in progress), December 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
              Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "Keystore Model", draft-ietf-
              netconf-keystore-00 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
              Watsen, K. and M. Abrahamsson, "Zero Touch Provisioning
              for NETCONF or RESTCONF based Management", draft-ietf-
              netconf-zerotouch-12 (work in progress), January 2017.

   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon]
              Richardson, M., "802.15.4 Informational Element
              encapsulation of 6tisch Join Information", draft-
              richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon-00 (work in
              progress), February 2017.





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   [I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey]
              Richardson, M., "Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for
              6TiSCH", draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-00 (work in
              progress), February 2017.

   [I-D.richardson-anima-6join-discovery]
              Richardson, M., "GRASP discovery of Registrar by Join
              Assistant", draft-richardson-anima-6join-discovery-00
              (work in progress), October 2016.

   [iec62591]
              IEC, ., "62591:2016 Industrial networks - Wireless
              communication network and communication profiles -
              WirelessHART", 2016, <https://webstore.iec.ch/
              publication/24433>.

   [ieee802-1AR]
              IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [ieee802154]
              IEEE Standard, ., "802.15.4-2015 - IEEE Standard for Low-
              Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)", 2015,
              <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.15.4-2015.html>.

   [ieee802159]
              IEEE Standard, ., "802.15.9-2016 - IEEE Approved Draft
              Recommended Practice for Transport of Key Management
              Protocol (KMP) Datagrams", 2016,
              <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.15.9-2016.html>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6775]  Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
              Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
              Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
              RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.







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   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7217]  Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
              Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [duckling]
              Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The resurrecting duckling:
              security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks", 1999,
              <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/1999-StajanoAnd-
              duckling.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]
              Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C. Bormann, "An
              architecture for authorization in constrained
              environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-04 (work in
              progress), September 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-roll-useofrplinfo]
              Robles, I., Richardson, M., and P. Thubert, "When to use
              RFC 6553, 6554 and IPv6-in-IPv6", draft-ietf-roll-
              useofrplinfo-10 (work in progress), December 2016.

   [ISA100]   "The Technology Behind the ISA100.11a Standard", June
              2010, <http://www.isa100wci.org/Documents/PDF/
              The-Technology-Behind-ISA100-11a-v-3_pptx>.

   [PFS]      Wikipedia, ., "Forward Secrecy", August 2016,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/
              index.php?title=Forward_secrecy&oldid=731318899>.




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   [pledge]   Dictionary.com, ., "Dictionary.com Unabridged", 2015,
              <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pledge>.

   [RFC4191]  Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
              More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
              November 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.

   [RFC4655]  Farrel, A., Vasseur, J., and J. Ash, "A Path Computation
              Element (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4655, August 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4655>.

   [RFC7554]  Watteyne, T., Ed., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using
              IEEE 802.15.4e Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) in the
              Internet of Things (IoT): Problem Statement", RFC 7554,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7554, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7554>.

   [RFC7731]  Hui, J. and R. Kelsey, "Multicast Protocol for Low-Power
              and Lossy Networks (MPL)", RFC 7731, DOI 10.17487/RFC7731,
              February 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7731>.

10.3.  URIs

   [2] mailto:6tisch@ietf.org

   [3] mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

Appendix A.  appendix

   insert appendix here

Author's Address

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca













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