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Versions: (draft-vucinic-6tisch-minimal-security) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

6TiSCH Working Group                                     M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                  University of Montenegro
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: April 26, 2019                                   Analog Devices
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                        October 23, 2018


                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-07

Abstract

   This document describes the minimal framework required for a new
   device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
   TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network.  The framework requires that
   the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
   entity), share a symmetric key.  How this key is provisioned is out
   of scope of this document.  Through a single CoAP (Constrained
   Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE
   (Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge
   requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with
   link-layer keying material and other parameters.  The JRC may at any
   time update the parameters through another request-response exchange
   secured by OSCORE.  This specification defines the Constrained Join
   Protocol and its CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) data
   structures and configures the rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack
   for this join process to occur in a secure manner.  Additional
   security mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal framework.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."




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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  One-Touch Assumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Join Process Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution . . .   9
     5.4.  The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Link-layer Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Network-layer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Identification of Join Request Traffic  . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Identification of Join Response Traffic . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Application-level Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Statelessness of the JP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.1.  Join Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.2.  Parameter Update Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.3.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.4.  CoJP Objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     9.5.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     9.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   11. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     12.1.  CoJP Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     12.2.  CoJP Key Usage Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     12.3.  CoJP Error Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38



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   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   Appendix A.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44

1.  Introduction

   This document presumes a 6TiSCH network as described by [RFC7554] and
   [RFC8180].  By design, nodes in a 6TiSCH network [RFC7554] have their
   radio turned off most of the time, to conserve energy.  As a
   consequence, the link used by a new device for joining the network
   has limited bandwidth [RFC8180].  The secure join solution defined in
   this document therefore keeps the number of over-the-air exchanges
   for join purposes to a minimum.

   The micro-controllers at the heart of 6TiSCH nodes have a small
   amount of code memory.  It is therefore paramount to reuse existing
   protocols available as part of the 6TiSCH stack.  At the application
   layer, the 6TiSCH stack already relies on CoAP [RFC7252] for web
   transfer, and on OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] for its end-
   to-end security.  The secure join solution defined in this document
   therefore reuses those two protocols as its building blocks.

   This document defines a secure join solution for a new device, called
   "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH network.  The specification
   defines the Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) used by the pledge to
   request admission into a network managed by the JRC, and for the JRC
   to configure the pledge with the necessary parameters and update them
   at a later time, a new CoAP option, and configures different layers
   of the 6TiSCH protocol stack for the join process to occur in a
   secure manner.

   The Constrained Join Protocol defined in this document is generic and
   can be used as-is in modes of IEEE Std 802.15.4 other than TSCH, that
   6TiSCH is based on.  The Constrained Join Protocol may as well be
   used in other (low-power) networking technologies where efficiency in
   terms of communication overhead and code footprint is important.  In
   such a case, it may be necessary to register configuration parameters
   specific to the technology in question, through the IANA process.
   The overall join process described in Section 5 and the configuration
   of the stack is, however, specific to 6TiSCH.

   The Constrained Join Protocol assumes the presence of a JRC (join
   registrar/coordinator), a central entity.  It further assumes that
   the pledge and the JRC share a symmetric key, called PSK (pre-shared
   key).  The PSK is used to configure OSCORE to provide a secure



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   channel to CoJP.  How the PSK is installed is out of scope of this
   document: this may happen through the one-touch provisioning process
   or by a key exchange protocol that may precede the execution of the
   6TiSCH Join protocol.

   When the pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH network, it first
   synchronizes to it, by initiating the passive scan defined in
   [IEEE802.15.4].  The pledge then exchanges messages with the JRC;
   these messages can be forwarded by nodes already part of the 6TiSCH
   network.  The messages exchanged allow the JRC and the pledge to
   mutually authenticate, based on the PSK.  They also allow the JRC to
   configure the pledge with link-layer keying material, short
   identifier and other parameters.  After this secure join process
   successfully completes, the joined node can interact with its
   neighbors to request additional bandwidth using the 6top Protocol
   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol] and start sending the application
   traffic.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  These
   words may also appear in this document in lowercase, absent their
   normative meanings.

   The reader is expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology], [RFC7252],
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and [RFC8152].

   The specification also includes a set of informative specifications
   using the Concise data definition language (CDDL)
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].

   The following terms defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology] are used
   extensively throughout this document:

   o  pledge

   o  joined node

   o  join proxy (JP)

   o  join registrar/coordinator (JRC)

   o  enhanced beacon (EB)

   o  join protocol



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   o  join process

   The following terms defined in [RFC6775] are also used throughout
   this document:

   o  6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR)

   The term "6LBR" is used interchangeably with the term "DODAG root"
   defined in [RFC6550], assuming the two entities are co-located, as
   recommended by [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture].

   The term "pledge", as used throughout the document, explicitly
   denotes non-6LBR devices attempting to join over an IEEE Std 802.15.4
   network interface.  The device that attempts to join as the 6LBR of
   the network and does so over another network interface is explicitly
   denoted as the "6LBR pledge".  When the text equally applies to the
   pledge and the 6LBR pledge, the "(6LBR) pledge" form is used.

   In addition, we use the generic terms "network identifier" and
   "pledge identifier".  See Section 3.

3.  Identifiers

   The "network identifier" identifies the 6TiSCH network.  The network
   identifier MUST be carried within Enhanced Beacon (EB) frames.
   Typically, the 16-bit Personal Area Network Identifier (PAN ID)
   defined in [IEEE802.15.4] is used as the network identifier.
   However, PAN ID is not considered a stable network identifier as it
   may change during network lifetime if a collision with another
   network is detected.  Companion documents can specify the use of a
   different network identifier for join purposes, but this is out of
   scope of this specification.

   The "pledge identifier" identifies the (6LBR) pledge.  The pledge
   identifier MUST be unique in the set of all pledge identifiers
   managed by a JRC.  The pledge identifier uniqueness is an important
   security requirement, as discussed in Section 10.  The pledge
   identifier is typically the globally unique 64-bit Extended Unique
   Identifier (EUI-64) of the IEEE Std 802.15.4 device.  This identifier
   is used to generate the IPv6 addresses of the (6LBR) pledge and to
   identify it during the execution of the join protocol.  For privacy
   reasons (see Section 11), it is possible to use a pledge identifier
   different from the EUI-64.  For example, a pledge identifier may be a
   random byte string, but care needs to be taken that such a string
   meets the uniqueness requirement.  How pledge identifier is
   configured at the pledge is out of scope of this specification.





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4.  One-Touch Assumption

   This document assumes a one-touch scenario.  The (6LBR) pledge is
   provisioned with certain parameters before attempting to join the
   network, and the same parameters are provisioned to the JRC.

   There are many ways by which this provisioning can be done.
   Physically, the parameters can be written into the (6LBR) pledge
   using a number of mechanisms, such as a JTAG interface, a serial
   (craft) console interface, pushing buttons simultaneously on
   different devices, over-the-air configuration in a Faraday cage, etc.
   The provisioning can be done by the vendor, the manufacturer, the
   integrator, etc.

   Details of how this provisioning is done is out of scope of this
   document.  What is assumed is that there can be a secure, private
   conversation between the JRC and the (6LBR) pledge, and that the two
   devices can exchange the parameters.

   Parameters that are provisioned to the (6LBR) pledge include:

   o  Pre-Shared Key (PSK).  The JRC additionally needs to store the
      pledge identifier bound to the given PSK.  Each (6LBR) pledge MUST
      be provisioned with a unique PSK.  The PSK SHOULD be a
      cryptographically strong key, at least 128 bits in length,
      indistinguishable by feasible computation from a random uniform
      string of the same length.  How the PSK is generated and/or
      provisioned is out of scope of this specification.  This could be
      done during a provisioning step or companion documents can specify
      the use of a key agreement protocol.  Common pitfalls when
      generating PSKs are discussed in Section 10.

   o  Optionally, a network identifier.  Provisioning the network
      identifier is RECOMMENDED.  However, due to the operational
      constraints the network identifier may not be known at the time
      when the provisioning is done.  In case this parameter is not
      provisioned to the pledge, the pledge attempts to join one network
      at a time, which significantly prolongs the join process.  In case
      this parameter is not provisioned to the 6LBR pledge, the 6LBR
      pledge can receive it from the JRC as part of the join protocol.

   o  Optionally, any non-default algorithms.  The default algorithms
      are specified in Section 9.6.  When algorithm identifiers are not
      exchanged, the use of these default algorithms is implied.

   Additionally, the 6LBR pledge that is not co-located with the JRC
   needs to be provisioned with:




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   o  Global IPv6 address of the JRC.  This address is used by the 6LBR
      pledge to address the JRC during the join process.  The 6LBR
      pledge may also obtain the IPv6 address of the JRC through other
      available mechanisms, such as DHCPv6, GRASP, mDNS, the use of
      which is out of scope of this document.  Pledges do not need to be
      provisioned with this address as they discover it dynamically
      during the join process.

5.  Join Process Overview

   This section describes the steps taken by a pledge in a 6TiSCH
   network.  When a pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH network, the
   following exchange occurs:

   1.  The pledge listens for an Enhanced Beacon (EB) frame
       [IEEE802.15.4].  This frame provides network synchronization
       information, and tells the device when it can send a frame to the
       node sending the beacons, which acts as a Join Proxy (JP) for the
       pledge, and when it can expect to receive a frame.  The Enhanced
       Beacon provides the L2 address of the JP and it may also provide
       its link-local IPv6 address.

   2.  The pledge configures its link-local IPv6 address and advertises
       it to the JP using Neighbor Discovery.  This step may be omitted
       if the link-local address has been derived from a known unique
       interface identifier, such as an EUI-64 address.

   3.  The pledge sends a Join Request to the JP in order to securely
       identify itself to the network.  The Join Request is forwarded to
       the JRC.

   4.  In case of successful processing of the request, the pledge
       receives a Join Response from the JRC (via the JP).  The Join
       Response contains configuration parameters necessary for the
       pledge to join the network.

   From the pledge's perspective, joining is a local phenomenon - the
   pledge only interacts with the JP, and it needs not know how far it
   is from the 6LBR, or how to route to the JRC.  Only after
   establishing one or more link-layer keys does it need to know about
   the particulars of a 6TiSCH network.

   The join process is shown as a transaction diagram in Figure 1:








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     +--------+                 +-------+                 +--------+
     | pledge |                 |  JP   |                 |  JRC   |
     |        |                 |       |                 |        |
     +--------+                 +-------+                 +--------+
        |                          |                          |
        |<---Enhanced Beacon (1)---|                          |
        |                          |                          |
        |<-Neighbor Discovery (2)->|                          |
        |                          |                          |
        |-----Join Request (3a)----|----Join Request (3a)---->| \
        |                          |                          | | CoJP
        |<----Join Response (3b)---|----Join Response (3b)----| /
        |                          |                          |

     Figure 1: Overview of a successful join process.  CoJP stands for
                        Constrained Join Protocol.

   As other nodes in the network, the 6LBR node may act as the JP.  The
   6LBR may in addition be co-located with the JRC.

   The details of each step are described in the following sections.

5.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon

   The pledge synchronizes to the network by listening for, and
   receiving, an Enhanced Beacon (EB) sent by a node already in the
   network.  This process is entirely defined by [IEEE802.15.4], and
   described in [RFC7554].

   Once the pledge hears an EB, it synchronizes to the joining schedule
   using the cells contained in the EB.  The pledge can hear multiple
   EBs; the selection of which EB to use is out of the scope for this
   document, and is discussed in [RFC7554].  Implementers should make
   use of information such as: what network identifier the EB contains,
   the value of the Join Metric field within EBs, whether the source
   link-layer address of the EB has been tried before, what signal
   strength the different EBs were received at, etc.  In addition, the
   pledge may be pre-configured to search for EBs with a specific
   network identifier.

   If the pledge is not provisioned with the network identifier, it
   attempts to join one network at a time, as described in
   Section 9.3.1.

   Once the pledge selects the EB, it synchronizes to it and transitions
   into a low-power mode.  It follows the provided schedule which
   indicates the slots that the pledge may use for the join process.




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   During the remainder of the join process, the node that has sent the
   EB to the pledge acts as the JP.

   At this point, the pledge may proceed to step 2, or continue to
   listen for additional EBs.

5.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery

   The pledge forms its link-local IPv6 address based on the interface
   identifier, as per [RFC4944].  The pledge MAY perform the Neighbor
   Solicitation / Neighbor Advertisement exchange with the JP, as per
   Section 5.5.1 of [RFC6775].  The pledge and the JP use their link-
   local IPv6 addresses for all subsequent communication during the join
   process.

   Note that Neighbor Discovery exchanges at this point are not
   protected with link-layer security as the pledge is not in possession
   of the keys.  How JP accepts these unprotected frames is discussed in
   Section 6.

5.3.  Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution

   The pledge triggers the join exchange of the Constrained Join
   Protocol (CoJP).  The join exchange consists of two messages: the
   Join Request message (Step 3a), and the Join Response message
   conditioned on the successful security processing of the request
   (Step 3b).

   All CoJP messages are exchanged over a secure end-to-end channel that
   provides confidentiality, data authenticity and replay protection.
   Frames carrying CoJP messages are not protected with link-layer
   security when exchanged between the pledge and the JP as the pledge
   is not in possession of the link-layer keys in use.  How JP and
   pledge accept these unprotected frames is discussed in Section 6.
   When frames carrying CoJP messages are exchanged between nodes that
   have already joined the network, the link-layer security is applied
   according to the security configuration used in the network.

5.3.1.  Step 3a - Join Request

   The Join Request is a message sent from the pledge to the JP, and
   which the JP forwards to the JRC.  The pledge indicates in the Join
   Request the role it requests to play in the network as well as the
   identifier of the network it requests to join.  The JP forwards the
   Join Request to the JRC on the existing 6TiSCH network.  How exactly
   this happens is out of scope of this document; some networks may wish
   to dedicate specific slots for this join traffic.




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5.3.2.  Step 3b - Join Response

   The Join Response is sent by the JRC to the pledge, and is forwarded
   through the JP.  The packet containing the Join Response travels from
   the JRC to JP using the operating routes in the 6TiSCH network.  The
   JP delivers it to the pledge.  The JP operates as the application-
   layer proxy, and does not keep any state to forward the message.

   The Join Response contains different parameters needed by the pledge
   to become a fully operational network node.  For example, these
   parameters are the link-layer key(s) currently in use in the network,
   the short link-layer address assigned to the pledge, the IPv6 address
   of the JRC needed by the pledge to operate as the JP, and others.

5.4.  The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining

   The 6LBR pledge performs Section 5.3 of the join process described
   above, just as any other pledge, albeit over another network
   interface.  There is no JP intermediating the communication between
   the 6LBR pledge and the JRC, as described in Section 7.  The other
   steps of the described join process do not apply to the 6LBR pledge.
   How the 6LBR pledge obtains an IPv6 address and triggers the
   execution of the CoJP protocol is out of scope of this document.

6.  Link-layer Configuration

   In an operational 6TiSCH network, all frames MUST use link-layer
   frame security [RFC8180].  The IEEE Std 802.15.4 security attributes
   MUST include frame authenticity, and MAY include frame
   confidentiality (i.e. encryption).

   The pledge does not initially do any authenticity check of the EB
   frames, as it does not possess the link-layer key(s) in use.  The
   pledge is still able to parse the contents of the received EBs and
   synchronize to the network, as EBs are not encrypted [RFC8180].

   When sending frames during the join process, the pledge sends
   unencrypted and unauthenticated frames.  The JP accepts these
   unsecured frames for the duration of the join process.  This behavior
   may be implemented by setting the "secExempt" attribute in the IEEE
   Std 802.15.4 security configuration tables.  How the JP learns
   whether the join process is ongoing is out of scope of this
   specification.

   As the EB itself cannot be authenticated by the pledge, an attacker
   may craft a frame that appears to be a valid EB, since the pledge can
   neither verify the freshness nor verify the address of the JP.  This
   opens up a possibility of DoS attack, as discussed in Section 10.



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7.  Network-layer Configuration

   The pledge and the JP SHOULD keep a separate neighbor cache for
   untrusted entries and use it to store each other's information during
   the join process.  Mixing neighbor entries belonging to pledges and
   nodes that are part of the network opens up the JP to a DoS attack,
   as the attacker may fill JP's neighbor table and prevent the
   discovery of legitimate neighbors.

   Once the pledge obtains link-layer keys and becomes a joined node, it
   is able to securely communicate with its neighbors, obtain the
   network IPv6 prefix and form a global IPv6 address.  The joined node
   then undergoes an independent process to bootstrap the neighbor cache
   entries, possibly with a node that formerly acted as a JP, following
   [RFC6775].  From the point of view of the JP, there is no relation
   between the neighbor cache entry belonging to a pledge and the joined
   node that formerly acted as a pledge.

   The pledge does not communicate with the JRC at the network layer.
   This allows the pledge to join without knowing the IPv6 address of
   the JRC.  Instead, the pledge communicates with the JP at the network
   layer using link-local addressing, and with the JRC at the
   application layer, as specified in Section 8.

   The JP communicates with the JRC over global IPv6 addresses.  The JP
   discovers the network IPv6 prefix and configures its global IPv6
   address upon successful completion of the join process and the
   obtention of link-layer keys.  The pledge learns the actual IPv6
   address of the JRC from the Join Response, as specified in
   Section 9.1.2; it uses it once joined in order to operate as a JP.

   As a special case, the 6LBR pledge is expected to have an additional
   network interface that it uses in order to obtain the configuration
   parameters from the JRC and start advertising the 6TiSCH network.
   This additional interface needs to be configured with a global IPv6
   address, by a mechanism that is out of scope of this document.  The
   6LBR pledge uses this interface to directly communicate with the JRC
   using global IPv6 addressing.

   The JRC can be co-located on the 6LBR.  In this special case, the
   IPv6 address of the JRC can be omitted from the Join Response message
   for space optimization.  The 6LBR then MUST set the DODAGID field in
   the RPL DIOs [RFC6550] to its IPv6 address.  The pledge learns the
   address of the JRC once joined and upon the reception of the first
   RPL DIO message, and uses it to operate as a JP.






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7.1.  Identification of Join Request Traffic

   The join request traffic that is proxied by the Join Proxy (JP) comes
   from unauthenticated nodes, and there may be an arbitrary amount of
   it.  In particular, an attacker may send fraudulent traffic in
   attempt to overwhelm the network.

   When operating as part of a [RFC8180] 6TiSCH minimal network using
   distributed scheduling algorithms, the join request traffic present
   may cause intermediate nodes to request additional bandwidth.  An
   attacker could use this property to cause the network to overcommit
   bandwidth (and energy) to the join process.

   The Join Proxy is aware of what traffic is join request traffic, and
   so can avoid allocating additional bandwidth itself.  The Join Proxy
   SHOULD implement a bandwidth cap on outgoing join request traffic.
   This cap will not protect intermediate nodes as they can not tell
   join request traffic from regular traffic.  Despite the bandwidth cap
   implemented separately on each Join Proxy, the aggregate join request
   traffic from many Join Proxies may cause intermediate nodes to decide
   to allocate additional cells.  It is undesirable to do so in response
   to the join request traffic.  In order to permit the intermediate
   nodes to avoid this, the traffic needs to be tagged.

   [RFC2597] defines a set of per-hop behaviors that may be encoded into
   the Diffserv Code Points (DSCPs).  The Join Proxy SHOULD set the DSCP
   of join request packets that it produces as part of the relay process
   to AF43 code point (See Section 6 of [RFC2597]).

   A Join Proxy that does not set the DSCP on traffic forwarded should
   set it to zero so that it is compressed out.

   A Scheduling Function (SF) running on 6TiSCH nodes SHOULD NOT
   allocate additional cells as a result of traffic with code point
   AF43.  Companion SF documents SHOULD specify how this recommended
   behavior is achieved.

7.2.  Identification of Join Response Traffic

   The JRC SHOULD set the DSCP of join response packets addressed to the
   Join Proxy to AF42 code point.  Join response traffic can not be
   induced by an attacker as it is generated only in response to
   legitimate pledges (see Section 9.3.1).  AF42 has lower drop
   probability than AF43, giving join response traffic priority in
   buffers over join request traffic.

   Due to the convergecast nature of the DODAG, the 6LBR links are often
   the most congested, and from that point down there is progressively



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   less (or equal) congestion.  If the 6LBR paces itself when sending
   join response traffic then it ought to never exceed the bandwidth
   allocated to the best effort traffic cells.  If the 6LBR has the
   capacity (if it is not constrained) then it should provide some
   buffers in order to satisfy the Assured Forwarding behavior.

   Companion SF documents SHOULD specify how traffic with code point
   AF42 is handled with respect to cell allocation.

8.  Application-level Configuration

   The CoJP join exchange in Figure 1 is carried over CoAP [RFC7252] and
   the secure channel provided by OSCORE
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].  The (6LBR) acts as a CoAP client;
   the JRC acts as a CoAP server.  The JP implements CoAP forward proxy
   functionality [RFC7252].  Because the JP can also be a constrained
   device, it cannot implement a cache.

   The pledge designates a JP as a proxy by including the Proxy-Scheme
   option in CoAP requests it sends to the JP.  The pledge also includes
   in the requests the Uri-Host option with its value set to the well-
   known JRC's alias, as specified in Section 9.1.1.

   The JP resolves the alias to the IPv6 address of the JRC that it
   learned when it acted as a pledge, and joined the network.  This
   allows the JP to reach the JRC at the network layer and forward the
   requests on behalf of the pledge.

   The JP also tags all packets carrying the Join Request message at the
   network layer, as specified in Section 7.1.

8.1.  Statelessness of the JP

   The CoAP proxy defined in [RFC7252] keeps per-client state
   information in order to forward the response towards the originator
   of the request.  This state information includes at least the CoAP
   token, the IPv6 address of the client, and the UDP source port
   number.  Since the JP can be a constrained device that acts as a CoAP
   proxy, memory limitations make it prone to Denial-of-Service (DoS)
   attacks.

   The DoS risk on the JP can be mitigated by making the JP act as a
   stateless CoAP proxy.  The JP can wrap the state it needs to keep for
   a given pledge throughout the network stack in a "state object" and
   include it as a CoAP token in the forwarded request to the JRC (i.e.
   origin server).  The JP may use the CoAP token as defined in
   [RFC7252], if the size of the serialized state object permits, or use
   the extended CoAP token being defined in [I-D.hartke-core-stateless].



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   Since the CoAP token is echoed back in the response, the JP is able
   to decode the token and configure the state needed to forward the
   response to the pledge.  The information that the JP needs to encode
   in the state object to operate in a fully stateless manner with
   respect to a given pledge is implementation specific.  In all cases,
   the state object communicated in the token SHOULD be integrity
   protected, with a key that is known only to the JP, and SHOULD
   include a freshness indicator.  It is RECOMMENDED that the JP
   operates in a stateless manner and signals the per-pledge state
   within the CoAP token, for every request it forwards into the network
   on behalf of unauthenticated pledges.

   Note, however, that in some networking stack implementations, a fully
   stateless operation of the JP may be challenging from the
   implementation point of view.  In those cases, the JP may operate as
   a statefull proxy that stores the per-pledge state until the response
   is received or timed out, but this comes at an increased risk of DoS
   attacks.

8.2.  OSCORE Security Context

   Before the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC may start exchanging CoAP
   messages protected with OSCORE, they need to derive the OSCORE
   security context from the parameters provisioned out-of-band, as
   discussed in Section 4.

   The OSCORE security context MUST be derived as per Section 3 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

   o  the Master Secret MUST be the PSK.

   o  the Master Salt MUST be the empty byte string.

   o  the ID of the pledge MUST be set to the byte string 0x00.  This
      identifier is used as the OSCORE Sender ID of the pledge in the
      security context derivation, as the pledge initially acts as a
      CoAP client.

   o  the ID of the JRC MUST be set to the byte string 0x4a5243 ("JRC"
      in ASCII).  This identifier is used as the OSCORE Recipient ID of
      the pledge in the security context derivation, as the JRC
      initially acts as a CoAP server.

   o  the ID Context MUST be set to the pledge identifier.

   o  the Algorithm MUST be set to the value from [RFC8152], agreed out-
      of-band by the same mechanism used to provision the PSK.  The
      default is AES-CCM-16-64-128.



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   o  the Key Derivation Function MUST be agreed out-of-band.  Default
      is HKDF SHA-256 [RFC5869].

   The derivation in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] results in traffic
   keys and a common IV for each side of the conversation.  Nonces are
   constructed by XOR'ing the common IV with the current sequence number
   and sender identifier.  For details on nonce construction, refer to
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

   Implementations MUST ensure that multiple CoAP requests to different
   JRCs are properly incrementing the sequence numbers in the OSCORE
   security context for each message, so that the same sequence number
   is never reused in distinct requests.  The pledge typically sends
   requests to different JRCs if it is not provisioned with the network
   identifier and attempts to join one network at a time.  A simple
   implementation technique is to instantiate the OSCORE security
   context with a given PSK only once and use it for all subsequent
   requests.  Failure to comply will break the security guarantees of
   the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm
   due to the nonce reuse.

   This OSCORE security context is used for initial joining of the
   (6LBR) pledge, where the (6LBR) pledge acts as a CoAP client, as well
   as for any later parameter updates, where the JRC acts as a CoAP
   client and the joined node as a CoAP server, as discussed in
   Section 9.2.  The (6LBR) pledge and the JRC use the OSCORE security
   context parameters (e.g. sender and recipient identifiers) as they
   were used at the moment of context derivation, regardless of whether
   they currently act as a CoAP client or a CoAP server.  A (6LBR)
   pledge is expected to have exactly one OSCORE security context with
   the JRC.

8.2.1.  Replay Window and Persistency

   Both (6LBR) pledge and the JRC MUST implement a replay protection
   mechanism.  The use of the default OSCORE replay protection mechanism
   specified in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] is
   RECOMMENDED.

   Implementations MUST ensure that mutable OSCORE context parameters
   (Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window) are stored in persistent
   memory.  A technique that prevents reuse of sequence numbers,
   detailed in Section 7.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], MUST be
   implemented.  Each update of the OSCORE Replay Window MUST be written
   to persistent memory.

   This is an important security requirement in order to guarantee nonce
   uniqueness and resistance to replay attacks across reboots and



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   rejoins.  Traffic between the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC is rare,
   making security outweigh the cost of writing to persistent memory.

9.  Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP)

   Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) is a lightweight protocol over CoAP
   [RFC7252] and a secure channel provided by OSCORE
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].  CoJP allows the (6LBR) pledge to
   request admission into a network managed by the JRC, and for the JRC
   to configure the pledge with the parameters necessary for joining the
   network, or advertising it in the case of 6LBR pledge.  The JRC may
   update the parameters at any time, by reaching out to the joined node
   that formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge.  For example, network-wide
   rekeying can be implemented by updating the keying material on each
   node.

   This section specifies how the CoJP messages are mapped to CoAP and
   OSCORE, CBOR data structures carrying different parameters,
   transported within CoAP payload, and the parameter semantics and
   processing rules.

   CoJP relies on the security properties provided by OSCORE.  This
   includes end-to-end confidentiality, data authenticity, replay
   protection, and a secure binding of responses to requests.

               +-----------------------------------+
               |  Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) |
               +-----------------------------------+
               +-----------------------------------+  \
               |         Requests / Responses      |  |
               |-----------------------------------|  |
               |               OSCORE              |  | CoAP
               |-----------------------------------|  |
               |           Messaging Layer         |  |
               +-----------------------------------+  /
               +-----------------------------------+
               |                UDP                |
               +-----------------------------------+

                   Figure 2: Abstract layering of CoJP.

   When a (6LBR) pledge requests admission to a given network, it
   undergoes the CoJP join exchange that consists of:

   o  the Join Request message, sent by the (6LBR) pledge to the JRC,
      potentially proxied by the JP.  The Join Request message and its
      mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 9.1.1.




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   o  the Join Response message, sent by the JRC to the (6LBR) pledge if
      the JRC successfully processes the Join Request using OSCORE and
      it determines through a mechanism that is out of scope of this
      specification that the (6LBR) pledge is authorized to join the
      network.  The Join Response message is potentially proxied by the
      JP.  The Join Response message and its mapping to CoAP is
      specified in Section 9.1.2.

   When the JRC needs to update the parameters of a joined node that
   formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge, it executes the CoJP parameter
   update exchange that consists of:

   o  the Parameter Update message, sent by the JRC to the joined node
      that formerly acted as a (6LBR) pledge.  The Parameter Update
      message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in Section 9.2.1.

   o  the Parameter Update Response message, sent by the joined node to
      the JRC in response to the Parameter Update message to signal
      successful reception of the updated parameters.  The Parameter
      Update Response message and its mapping to CoAP is specified in
      Section 9.2.2.

   The payload of CoJP messages is encoded with CBOR [RFC7049].  The
   CBOR data structures that may appear as the payload of different CoJP
   messages are specified in Section 9.4.

9.1.  Join Exchange

   This section specifies the messages exchanged when the (6LBR) pledge
   requests admission and configuration parameters from the JRC.

9.1.1.  Join Request Message

   The Join Request message SHALL be mapped to a CoAP request:

   o  The request method is POST.

   o  The type is Non-confirmable (NON).

   o  The Proxy-Scheme option is set to "coap".

   o  The Uri-Host option is set to "6tisch.arpa".  This is an anycast
      type of identifier of the JRC that is resolved to its IPv6 address
      by the JP or the 6LBR pledge.

   o  The Uri-Path option is set to "j".





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   o  The Object-Security option SHALL be set according to
      [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].  The OSCORE security context used
      is the one derived in Section 8.2.  The OSCORE kid context allows
      the JRC to retrieve the security context for a given pledge.

   o  The payload is a Join_Request CBOR object, as defined in
      Section 9.4.1.

9.1.2.  Join Response Message

   The Join Response message that the JRC sends SHALL be mapped to a
   CoAP response:

   o  The response Code is 2.04 (Changed).

   o  The payload is a Configuration CBOR object, as defined in
      Section 9.4.2.

9.2.  Parameter Update Exchange

   During the network lifetime, parameters returned as part of the Join
   Response may need to be updated.  One typical example is the update
   of link-layer keying material for the network, a process known as
   rekeying.  This section specifies a generic mechanism when this
   parameter update is initiated by the JRC.

   At the time of the join, the (6LBR) pledge acts as a CoAP client and
   requests the network parameters through a representation of the "/j"
   resource, exposed by the JRC.  In order for the update of these
   parameters to happen, the JRC needs to asynchronously contact the
   joined node.  The use of the CoAP Observe option for this purpose is
   not feasible due to the change in the IPv6 address when the pledge
   becomes the joined node and obtains a global address.

   Instead, once the (6LBR) pledge receives and successfully validates
   the Join Response and so becomes a joined node, it becomes a CoAP
   server.  The joined node exposes the "/j" resource that is used by
   the JRC to update the parameters.  Consequently, the JRC operates as
   a CoAP client when updating the parameters.  The request/response
   exchange between the JRC and the (6LBR) pledge happens over the
   already-established OSCORE secure channel.

9.2.1.  Parameter Update Message

   The Parameter Update message that the JRC sends to the joined node
   SHALL be mapped to a CoAP request:

   o  The request method is POST.



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   o  The type is Confirmable (CON).

   o  The Uri-Path option is set to "j".

   o  The Object-Security option SHALL be set according to
      [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].  The OSCORE security context used
      is the one derived in Section 8.2.  When a joined node receives a
      request with the Sender ID set to 0x4a5243 (ID of the JRC), it is
      able to correctly retrieve the security context with the JRC.

   o  The payload is a Configuration CBOR object, as defined in
      Section 9.4.2.

   The JRC has implicit knowledge on the global IPv6 address of the
   joined node, as it knows the pledge identifier that the joined node
   used when it acted as a pledge, and the IPv6 network prefix.  The JRC
   uses this implicitly derived IPv6 address of the joined node to
   directly address CoAP messages to it.

   In case the JRC does not receive a response to a Parameter Update
   message, it will attempt multiple retransmissions, as configured by
   the underlying CoAP retransmission mechanism triggered for
   confirmable messages.  Finally, if the CoAP implementation declares
   that the destination is unreachable, the JRC may consider this as a
   hint that the joined node is no longer in the network.  How JRC
   decides when to stop managing a given joined node is out of scope of
   this specification but security considerations on the reuse of
   assigned resources apply, as discussed in Section 10.

9.2.2.  Parameter Update Response Message

   The Parameter Update Response message that the joined node sends to
   the JRC SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

   o  The response Code is 2.04 (Changed).

   o  The payload is empty.

9.3.  Error Handling

9.3.1.  OSCORE Error Handling and Retransmission

   This section describes handling of errors raised by the underlying
   OSCORE.

   Since the Join Request is mapped to a Non-confirmable CoAP message,
   OSCORE processing at the JRC will silently drop the request in case
   of a failure.  This may happen for a number of reasons, including



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   failed lookup of an appropriate security context (e.g. the pledge
   attempting to join a wrong network), failed decryption, positive
   replay window lookup, formatting errors (possibly due to malicious
   alterations in transit).  Silently dropping the Join Request at the
   JRC prevents a DoS attack where an attacker could force the pledge to
   attempt joining one network at a time, until all networks have been
   tried.

   Using a Non-confirmable CoAP message to transport the Join Request
   also helps minimize the required CoAP state at the pledge and the
   Join Proxy, keeping it to a minimum typically needed to perform CoAP
   congestion control.  It does, however, introduce some complexity as
   the pledge needs to implement a retransmission mechanism.

   The following binary exponential back-off algorithm is inspired by
   the one described in [RFC7252].  For each Join Request the pledge
   sends while waiting for a Join Response, the pledge MUST keep track
   of a timeout and a retransmission counter.  For a new Join Request,
   the timeout is set to a random value between TIMEOUT_BASE and
   (TIMEOUT_BASE * TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR).  The retransmission counter
   is set to 0.  When the timeout is triggered and the retransmission
   counter is less than MAX_RETRANSMIT, the Join Request is
   retransmitted, the retransmission counter is incremented, and the
   timeout is doubled.  Note that the retransmitted Join Request passes
   new OSCORE processing, such that the sequence number in the OSCORE
   context is properly incremented.  If the retransmission counter
   reaches MAX_RETRANSMIT on a timeout, the pledge SHOULD attempt to
   join the next advertised 6TiSCH network.  If the pledge receives a
   Join Response that successfully passes OSCORE processing, it cancels
   the pending timeout and processes the response.  The pledge MUST
   silently discard any response not protected with OSCORE, including
   error codes.  For default values of retransmission parameters, see
   Section 9.5.

   If all join attempts to advertised networks have failed, the pledge
   SHOULD signal to the user the presence of an error condition, through
   some out-of-band mechanism.

9.3.2.  CoJP CBOR Object Processing

   This section describes error handling when processing CoJP CBOR
   objects that are transported within the payload of different CoJP
   messages.  See Section 9.3.1 for the handling of errors that may be
   raised by the underlying OSCORE implementation.

   CoJP CBOR objects are transported both within CoAP requests and
   responses.  When an error is detected while processing CoJP objects
   in a CoAP request (Join Request message, Parameter Update message),



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   Error Response message MUST be returned.  Error Response message maps
   to a CoAP response and is specified in Section 9.3.3.

   When an error is detected while processing a CoJP object in a CoAP
   response (Join Response message), a (6LBR) pledge SHOULD reattempt to
   join.  In this case, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD enclose an Error CBOR
   object within the Join Request object in the following Join Request
   message.  A (6LBR) pledge MUST NOT attempt more than MAX_RETRANSMIT
   number of attempts to join if the processing of the Join Response
   message fails.  If MAX_RETRANSMIT number of attempts is reached
   without success, the (6LBR) pledge SHOULD signal to the user the
   presence of an error condition, through some out-of-band mechanism.

9.3.3.  Error Response Message

   The Error Response Message is returned for any CoJP request when the
   processing of the payload failed.  Note that the Error Response
   message is protected by OSCORE as any other CoJP protocol message.

   The Error Response message SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

   o  The response Code is 4.00 (Bad Request).

   o  The payload is an Error CBOR object, as defined in Section 9.4.5,
      containing the error code that triggered the sending of this
      message.

9.3.4.  Failure Handling

   The Parameter Update exchange may be triggered at any time during the
   network lifetime that may span several years.  During this period, it
   may occur that a joined node or the JRC experience unexpected events
   such as reboots or complete failures.

   This document mandates that the mutable parameters in the security
   context are written to persistent memory (see Section 8.2.1) by both
   the JRC and pledges (joined nodes).  In case of a reboot on either
   side, the retrieval of mutable security context parameters is
   feasible from the persistent memory such that there is no risk of
   AEAD nonce reuse due to a reinitialized Sender Sequence number, or of
   a replay attack due to the reinitialized replay window.

   In the case of a complete failure, where the mutable security context
   parameters cannot be retrieved, it is expected that a failed joined
   node is replaced with a new physical device, using a new pledge
   identifier and a PSK.  When such an event occurs at the JRC, it is
   likely that the information about joined nodes, their assigned short
   identifiers and mutable security context parameters is lost.  If this



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   is the case, during the process of JRC replacement, the network
   administrator MUST force all the networks managed by the failed JRC
   to rejoin, through e.g. the reinitialization of the 6LBR nodes.
   Since the joined nodes kept track of their mutable security context
   parameters, they will use these during the (re)join exchange without
   a risk of AEAD nonce reuse.  However, even after all the nodes
   rejoined, an AEAD nonce reuse risk exists during the first Parameter
   Update exchange, as the new JRC does not possess the last Sender
   Sequence number used, and can only initialize it to zero.  Since the
   loss of security properties including confidentiality for this
   message is likely the JRC MUST limit the information that may be
   exposed within.

   When such a message arrives at the joined node, the OSCORE
   implementation rejects it due to the Partial IV being largely below
   the acceptable replay window state.  When this is detected, the
   joined node MUST send an Error Response message with error code set
   to "Invalid parameter: OSCORE partial IV" from Table 4 and Additional
   information set to the next Partial IV it will expect.  When
   protecting this error response by OSCORE, the joined node MUST use
   the value of its Sender Sequence number to generate the Partial IV
   and include it in the CoAP OSCORE option, as specified by
   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].  Upon successful OSCORE verification
   of the received CoJP message, the JRC processes the error response
   and configures the Sender Sequence number to the one indicated in the
   Additional information field.  The next Parameter Update exchange
   triggered by the JRC will therefore use the proper Sender Sequence
   number and will be accepted by the joined node.

9.4.  CoJP Objects

   This section specifies the structure of CoJP CBOR objects that may be
   carried as the payload of CoJP messages.  Some of these objects may
   be received both as part of the CoJP join exchange when the device
   operates as a (CoJP) pledge, or the parameter update exchange, when
   the device operates as a joined (6LBR) node.

9.4.1.  Join Request Object

   The Join_Request structure is built on a CBOR map object.

   The set of parameters that can appear in a Join_Request object is
   summarized below.  The labels can be found in "CoJP Parameters"
   registry Section 12.1, initially populated with the values from
   Table 2.

   o  role: The identifier of the role that the pledge requests to play
      in the network once it joins, encoded as an unsigned integer.



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      Possible values are specified in Table 1.  This parameter MAY be
      included.  In case the parameter is omitted, the default value of
      0, i.e. the role "6TiSCH Node", MUST be assumed.

   o  network identifier: The identifier of the network, as discussed in
      Section 3, encoded as a CBOR byte string.  This parameter may
      appear both in the Join_Request and in the Configuration objects.
      When present in the Join_Request, it hints to the JRC the network
      that the pledge is requesting to join, enabling the JRC to manage
      multiple networks.  The pledge obtains the value of the network
      identifier from the received EB frames.  This parameter MUST be
      included in a Join_Request object if the role parameter is set to
      "6TiSCH Node".  This parameter MAY be included if the role
      parameter is set to "6LBR".  The inclusion of this parameter by
      the 6LBR pledge depends on whether the parameter was exchanged
      during the one-touch process, which in turn depends on the
      operational constraints.

   o  response processing error: The identifier of the error from the
      previous join attempt, encoded as an Error object described in
      Section 9.4.5.  This parameter MAY be included.  If a (6LBR)
      pledge previously attempted to join and received a valid Join
      Response message over OSCORE but failed to process its payload
      (Configuration object), it SHOULD include this parameter to
      facilitate the debugging process.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Join_Request
   follows.

   Join_Request = {
       ? 1 : uint,              ; role
       ? 5 : bstr,              ; network identifier
       ? 7 : Error,             ; response processing error
   }

   +--------+-------+-------------------------------------+------------+
   |   Name | Value |                         Description | Reference  |
   +--------+-------+-------------------------------------+------------+
   | 6TiSCH | 0     |     The pledge requests to play the | [[this     |
   |   Node |       | role of a regular 6TiSCH node, i.e. | document]] |
   |        |       |                      non-6LBR node. |            |
   |        |       |                                     |            |
   |   6LBR | 1     |     The pledge requests to play the | [[this     |
   |        |       |       role of 6LoWPAN Border Router | document]] |
   |        |       |                             (6LBR). |            |
   +--------+-------+-------------------------------------+------------+

                           Table 1: Role values.



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9.4.2.  Configuration Object

   The Configuration structure is built on a CBOR map object.  The set
   of parameters that can appear in a Configuration object is summarized
   below.  The labels can be found in "CoJP Parameters" registry
   Section 12.1, initially populated with the values from Table 2.

   o  link-layer key set: An array encompassing a set of cryptographic
      keys and their identifiers that are currently in use in the
      network, or that are scheduled to be used in the future.  The
      encoding of individual keys is described in Section 9.4.3.  The
      link-layer key set parameter MAY be included in a Configuration
      object.  When present, the link-layer key set parameter MUST
      contain at least one key.  How the keys are installed and used
      differs for the 6LBR and other nodes.  When 6LBR receives this
      parameter, it MUST remove any old keys it has installed from the
      previous key set and immediately install and start using the new
      keys for all outgoing and incoming traffic.  When a non-6LBR node
      receives this parameter, it MUST install the keys, use them for
      any incoming traffic matching the key identifier, but keep using
      the old keys for all outgoing traffic.  A non-6LBR node accepts
      any frames for which it has keys: both old and new keys.  Upon
      reception and successful security processing of a link-layer frame
      secured with a key from the new key set, a non-6LBR node MUST
      remove any old keys it has installed from the previous key set.
      From that moment on, a non-6LBR node MUST use the keys from the
      new key set for all outgoing traffic.  In the case when the pledge
      is joining for the first time, before sending the first outgoing
      frame secured with a received key, the pledge needs to
      successfully complete the security processing of an incoming
      frame.  To do so, the pledge can wait to receive a new frame or it
      can also store an EB frame that it used to find the JP and use it
      for immediate security processing upon reception of the key set.
      The described mechanism permits the JRC to provision the new key
      set to all the nodes while the network continues to use the
      existing keys.  When the JRC is certain that all (or enough) nodes
      have been provisioned with the new keys, then the JRC updates the
      6LBR.  In the special case when the JRC is co-located with the
      6LBR, it can simply trigger the sending of a new broadcast frame
      (e.g.  EB), secured with a key from the new key set.  The frame
      goes out with the new key, and upon reception and successful
      security processing of the new frame all receiving nodes will
      switch to the new active keys.  Outgoing traffic from those nodes
      will then use the new key, which causes an update of additional
      peers, and the network will switch over in a flood-fill fashion.

   o  short identifier: a compact identifier assigned to the pledge.
      The short identifier structure is described in Section 9.4.4.  The



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      short identifier parameter MAY be included in a Configuration
      object.

   o  JRC address: the IPv6 address of the JRC, encoded as a byte
      string, with the length of 16 bytes.  If the length of the byte
      string is different than 16, the parameter MUST be discarded.  If
      the JRC is not co-located with the 6LBR and has a different IPv6
      address than the 6LBR, this parameter MUST be included.  In the
      special case where the JRC is co-located with the 6LBR and has the
      same IPv6 address as the 6LBR, this parameter MAY be included.  If
      the JRC address parameter is not present in the Configuration
      object, this indicates that the JRC has the same IPv6 address as
      the 6LBR.  The joined node can then discover the IPv6 address of
      the JRC through network control traffic.  See Section 7.

   o  network identifier: the identifier of the network, as discussed in
      Section 3, encoded as a byte string.  When present in the
      Configuration object, this parameter is only valid when received
      by the 6LBR pledge.  The parameter indicates to the 6LBR the value
      of the network identifier it should advertise at the link layer.
      This parameter MUST NOT be included in the Configuration object if
      the role parameter from the corresponding Join_Request object
      indicated 0, i.e. the role "6TiSCH Node".  In the case where the
      corresponding Join_Request object does not contain the network
      identifier parameter, this parameter MUST be included.  When the
      corresponding Join_Request object does contain the network
      identifier parameter, this parameter MAY be included in the
      Configuration object.  This may happen if the JRC decides to
      overwrite the network identifier provisioned during the one-touch
      process.  The value of the network identifier parameter from the
      Configuration object SHOULD take precedence over the value
      provisioned during the one-touch process.

   o  network prefix: the IPv6 network prefix, encoded as a byte string.
      The length of the byte string determines the prefix length.  This
      parameter is only valid when received by the 6LBR pledge.  The
      parameter indicates to the 6LBR the value of the IPv6 network
      prefix.  This parameter MAY be included in the Configuration
      object if the role parameter from the corresponding Join_Request
      object indicated 1, i.e. the role "6LBR".  This parameter MUST NOT
      be included in the Configuration object if the role parameter from
      the corresponding Join_Request object indicated 0, i.e. the role
      "6TiSCH Node".

   The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the
   Configuration follows.  Structures Link_Layer_Key and
   Short_Identifier are specified in Section 9.4.3 and Section 9.4.4.




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   Configuration = {
       ? 2 : [ +Link_Layer_Key ],   ; link-layer key set
       ? 3 : Short_Identifier,      ; short identifier
       ? 4 : bstr                   ; JRC address
       ? 5 : bstr                   ; network identifier
       ? 6 : bstr                   ; network prefix
   }

   +------------+-------+----------+----------------------+------------+
   |       Name | Label |     CBOR | Description          | Reference  |
   |            |       |     type |                      |            |
   +------------+-------+----------+----------------------+------------+
   |       role | 1     | unsigned | Identifies the role  | [[this     |
   |            |       |  integer | parameter.           | document]] |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   | link-layer | 2     |    array | Identifies the array | [[this     |
   |    key set |       |          | carrying one or more | document]] |
   |            |       |          | link-level           |            |
   |            |       |          | cryptographic keys.  |            |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   |      short | 3     |    array | Identifies the       | [[this     |
   | identifier |       |          | assigned short       | document]] |
   |            |       |          | identifier           |            |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   |        JRC | 4     |     byte | Identifies the IPv6  | [[this     |
   |    address |       |   string | address of the JRC   | document]] |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   |    network | 5     |     byte | Identifies the       | [[this     |
   | identifier |       |   string | network identifier   | document]] |
   |            |       |          | parameter            |            |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   |    network | 6     |     byte | Identifies the IPv6  | [[this     |
   |     prefix |       |   string | prefix of the        | document]] |
   |            |       |          | network              |            |
   |            |       |          |                      |            |
   |      error | 7     |    array | Identifies the error | [[this     |
   |            |       |          | parameter            | document]] |
   +------------+-------+----------+----------------------+------------+

                   Table 2: CoJP parameters map labels.

9.4.3.  Link-Layer Key

   The Link_Layer_Key structure encompasses the parameters needed to
   configure the link-layer security module: the key identifier; the
   value of the cryptographic key; the link-layer algorithm identifier
   and the security level and the frame types that it should be used




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   with, both for outgoing and incoming security operations; and any
   additional information that may be needed to configure the key.

   For encoding compactness, Link_Layer_Key object is not enclosed in a
   top-level CBOR object.  Rather, it is transported as a sequence of
   CBOR elements, with some being optional.

   The set of parameters that can appear in a Link_Layer_Key object is
   summarized below, in order:

   o  key_id: The identifier of the key, encoded as a CBOR unsigned
      integer.  This parameter MUST be included.  If the decoded CBOR
      unsigned integer value is larger than the maximum link-layer key
      identifier, the key is considered invalid.  In case the key is
      considered invalid, the implementation MUST discard the key and
      attempt to decode the next key in the array.

   o  key_usage: The identifier of the link-layer algorithm, security
      level and link-layer frame types that can be used with the key,
      encoded as a CBOR unsigned or negative integer.  This parameter
      MAY be included.  Possible values and the corresponding link-layer
      settings are specified in IANA "CoJP Key Usage" registry
      (Section 12.2).  In case the parameter is omitted, the default
      value of 0 from Table 3 MUST be assumed.

   o  key_value: The value of the cryptographic key, encoded as a byte
      string.  This parameter MUST be included.  If the length of the
      byte string is different than the corresponding key length for a
      given algorithm specified by the key_usage parameter, the key MUST
      be discarded and the decoder should attempt to decode the next key
      in the array.

   o  key_addinfo: Additional information needed to configure the link-
      layer key, encoded as a byte string.  This parameter MAY be
      included.  The processing of this parameter is dependent on the
      link-layer technology in use and a particular keying mode.

   To be able to decode the keys that are present in the link-layer key
   set, and to identify individual parameters of a single Link_Layer_Key
   object, the CBOR decoder needs to differentiate between elements
   based on the CBOR type.  For example, a uint that follows a byte
   string signals to the decoder that a new Link_Layer_Key object is
   being processed.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the
   Link_Layer_Key follows.





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   Link_Layer_Key = (
         key_id             : uint,
       ? key_usage          : uint / nint,
         key_value          : bstr,
       ? key_addinfo        : bstr,
   )

   +-----------------+-----+------------------+-------------+----------+
   |            Name | Val |        Algorithm | Description | Referenc |
   |                 | ue  |                  |             | e        |
   +-----------------+-----+------------------+-------------+----------+
   |     6TiSCH-K1K2 | 0   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-32  | [[this d |
   |      -ENC-MIC32 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | ENC-MIC-32  | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | for DATA    |          |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL |          |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |     6TiSCH-K1K2 | 1   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-64  | [[this d |
   |      -ENC-MIC64 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | ENC-MIC-64  | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | for DATA    |          |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL |          |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |     6TiSCH-K1K2 | 2   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-128 | [[this d |
   |     -ENC-MIC128 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | ENC-MIC-128 | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | for DATA    |          |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL |          |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |         6TiSCH- | 3   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-32  | [[this d |
   |      K1K2-MIC32 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |
   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |         6TiSCH- | 4   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-64  | [[this d |
   |      K1K2-MIC64 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |
   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |         6TiSCH- | 5   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-128 | [[this d |
   |     K1K2-MIC128 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs,    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |



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   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K1-MIC32 | 6   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-32  | [[this d |
   |                 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs.    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  |             | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K1-MIC64 | 7   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-64  | [[this d |
   |                 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs.    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  |             | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K1-MIC12 | 8   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-128 | [[this d |
   |               8 |     |          CCM-128 | for EBs.    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  |             | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K2-MIC32 | 9   |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-32  | [[this d |
   |                 |     |          CCM-128 | for DATA    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K2-MIC64 | 10  |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-64  | [[this d |
   |                 |     |          CCM-128 | for DATA    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   | 6TiSCH-K2-MIC12 | 11  |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use MIC-128 | [[this d |
   |               8 |     |          CCM-128 | for DATA    | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | and ACKNOWL | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | EDGMENT.    |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |  6TiSCH-K2-ENC- | 12  |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use ENC-    | [[this d |
   |           MIC32 |     |          CCM-128 | MIC-32 for  | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |
   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |  6TiSCH-K2-ENC- | 13  |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use ENC-    | [[this d |
   |           MIC64 |     |          CCM-128 | MIC-64 for  | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |
   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   |                 |     |                  |             |          |
   |  6TiSCH-K2-ENC- | 14  |  IEEE802154-AES- | Use ENC-    | [[this d |
   |          MIC128 |     |          CCM-128 | MIC-128 for | ocument] |
   |                 |     |                  | DATA and AC | ]        |
   |                 |     |                  | KNOWLEDGMEN |          |
   |                 |     |                  | T.          |          |
   +-----------------+-----+------------------+-------------+----------+




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                        Table 3: Key Usage values.

9.4.3.1.  Use in IEEE Std 802.15.4

   When Link_Layer_Key is used in the context of [IEEE802.15.4],
   following considerations apply.

   Signaling of different keying modes of [IEEE802.15.4] is done based
   on the parameter values present in a Link_Layer_Key object.

   o  Key ID Mode 0x00 (Implicit, pairwise): key_id parameter MUST be
      set to 0.  key_addinfo parameter MUST be present.  key_addinfo
      parameter MUST be set to the link-layer address(es) of a single
      peer with whom the key should be used.  Depending on the
      configuration of the network, key_addinfo may carry the peer's
      long link-layer address (i.e. pledge identifier), short link-layer
      address, or their concatenation with the long address being
      encoded first.  Which address is carried is determined from the
      length of the byte string.

   o  Key ID Mode 0x01 (Key Index): key_id parameter MUST be set to a
      value different than 0.  key_addinfo parameter MUST NOT be
      present.

   o  Key ID Mode 0x02 (4-byte Explicit Key Source): key_id parameter
      MUST be set to a value different than 0.  key_addinfo parameter
      MUST be present.  key_addinfo parameter MUST be set to a byte
      string, exactly 4 bytes long.  key_addinfo parameter carries the
      Key Source parameter used to configure [IEEE802.15.4].

   o  Key ID Mode 0x03 (8-byte Explicit Key Source): key_id parameter
      MUST be set to a value different than 0.  key_addinfo parameter
      MUST be present.  key_addinfo parameter MUST be set to a byte
      string, exactly 8 bytes long.  key_addinfo parameter carries the
      Key Source parameter used to configure [IEEE802.15.4].

   In all cases, key_usage parameter determines how a particular key
   should be used in respect to incoming and outgoing security policies.

   For Key ID Modes 0x01 - 0x03, parameter key_id sets the "secKeyIndex"
   parameter of {{IEEE802.15.4} that is signaled in all outgoing frames
   secured with a given key.  The maximum value key_id can have is 254.
   The value of 255 is reserved in {{IEEE802.15.4} and is therefore
   considered invalid.

   Key ID Mode 0x00 (Implicit, pairwise) enables the JRC to act as a
   trusted third party and assign pairwise keys between nodes in the
   network.  How JRC learns about the network topology is out of scope



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   of this specification, but could be done through 6LBR - JRC signaling
   for example.  Pairwise keys could also be derived through a key
   agreement protocol executed between the peers directly, where the
   authentication is based on the symmetric cryptographic material
   provided to both peers by the JRC.  Such a protocol is out of scope
   of this specification.

9.4.4.  Short Identifier

   The Short_Identifier object represents an identifier assigned to the
   pledge.  It is encoded as a CBOR array object, containing, in order:

   o  identifier: The short identifier assigned to the pledge, encoded
      as a byte string.  This parameter MUST be included.  The
      identifier MUST be unique in the set of all identifiers assigned
      in a network that is managed by a JRC.  In case the identifier is
      invalid, the decoder MUST silently ignore the Short_Identifier
      object.

   o  lease_time: The validity of the identifier in hours after the
      reception of the CBOR object, encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer.
      This parameter MAY be included.  The node MUST stop using the
      assigned short identifier after the expiry of the lease_time
      interval.  It is up to the JRC to renew the lease before the
      expiry of the previous interval.  The JRC updates the lease by
      executing the Parameter Update exchange with the node and
      including the Short_Identifier in the Configuration object, as
      described in Section 9.2.  In case the lease expires, the node
      SHOULD initiate a new join exchange, as described in Section 9.1.
      In case this parameter is omitted, the value of positive infinity
      MUST be assumed, meaning that the identifier is valid for as long
      as the node participates in the network.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the
   Short_Identifier follows.

   Short_Identifier = [
         identifier        : bstr,
       ? lease_time        : uint
   ]

9.4.4.1.  Use in IEEE Std 802.15.4

   When Short_Identifier is used in the context of [IEEE802.15.4],
   following considerations apply.

   The identifier MUST be used to set the short address of IEEE Std
   802.15.4 module.  When operating in TSCH mode, the identifier MUST be



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   unique in the set of all identifiers assigned in multiple networks
   that share link-layer key(s).  If the length of the byte string
   corresponding to the identifier parameter is different than 2, the
   identifier is considered invalid.  The values 0xfffe and 0xffff are
   reserved by [IEEE802.15.4] and their use is considered invalid.

   The security properties offered by the [IEEE802.15.4] link-layer in
   TSCH mode are conditioned on the uniqueness requirement of the short
   identifier (i.e. short address).  The short address is one of the
   inputs in the construction of the nonce, which is used to protect
   link-layer frames.  If a misconfiguration occurs, and the same short
   address is assigned twice under the same link-layer key, the loss of
   security properties is eminent.  For this reason, practices where the
   pledge generates the short identifier locally are not safe and are
   likely to result in the loss of link-layer security properties.

   The JRC MUST ensure that at any given time there are never two same
   short identifiers being used under the same link-layer key.  If the
   lease_time parameter of a given Short_Identifier object is set to
   positive infinity, care needs to be taken that the corresponding
   identifier is not assigned to another node until the JRC is certain
   that it is no longer in use, potentially through out-of-band
   signaling.  If the lease_time parameter expires for any reason, the
   JRC should take into consideration potential ongoing transmissions by
   the joined node, which may be hanging in the queues, before assigning
   the same identifier to another node.

9.4.5.  Error Object

   The Error object is encoded as a CBOR array object, containing in
   order:

   o  error_code: Error code for the first encountered error while
      processing a CoJP object, encoded as an unsigned integer.  This
      parameter MUST be included.  This parameter MUST be set to the
      "Value" column of the "CoJP Error Registry" (Section 12.3).

   o  error_addinfo: Additional information relevant to the error.  This
      parameter MUST be included.  This parameter MUST be set as
      described by the "Additional info" column of the "CoJP Error
      Registry" (Section 12.3).

   o  error_description: Human-readable description of the error,
      encoded as a text string.  This parameter MAY be included.  The
      RECOMMENDED setting of this parameter is the "Description" column
      of the "CoJP Error Registry" Section 12.3).





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   The CDDL fragment that represents the text above for the Error object
   follows.

   Error = [
           error_code        : int,
           error_addinfo     : int / bstr / tstr / nil,
         ? error_description : tstr,
   ]

   +-----------------+-------+---------------+------------+------------+
   |     Description | Value |    Additional | Additional |  Reference |
   |                 |       |          info | info type  |            |
   +-----------------+-------+---------------+------------+------------+
   |         Invalid | 0     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |    Join_Request |       |               |            | document]] |
   |          object |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 1     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |   Configuration |       |               |            | document]] |
   |          object |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 2     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   | parameter: role |       |               |            | document]] |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 3     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |      parameter: |       |               |            | document]] |
   |         network |       |               |            |            |
   |      identifier |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 4     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |      parameter: |       |               |            | document]] |
   |  link-layer key |       |               |            |            |
   |             set |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 5     |  Index of the | uint       |     [[this |
   |      parameter: |       |   invalid key |            | document]] |
   |  link-layer key |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 6     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |      paramater: |       |               |            | document]] |
   |           short |       |               |            |            |
   |      identifier |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 7     |          None | nil        |     [[this |
   |  parameter: JRC |       |               |            | document]] |
   |         address |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 8     |          None | nil        |     [[this |



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   |      parameter: |       |               |            | document]] |
   |  network prefix |       |               |            |            |
   |                 |       |               |            |            |
   |         Invalid | 9     |          Next | bstr       |     [[this |
   |      parameter: |       |    acceptable |            | document]] |
   |  OSCORE partial |       |        OSCORE |            |            |
   |              IV |       |    partial IV |            |            |
   +-----------------+-------+---------------+------------+------------+

                        Table 4: CoJP error codes.

9.5.  Parameters

   CoJP uses the following parameters:

                +-----------------------+----------------+
                | Name                  | Default Value  |
                +-----------------------+----------------+
                | TIMEOUT_BASE          | 10 s           |
                +-----------------------+----------------+
                | TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR | 1.5            |
                +-----------------------+----------------+
                | MAX_RETRANSMIT        | 4              |
                +----------------------------------------+

   The values of TIMEOUT_BASE, TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR, MAX_RETRANSMIT may
   be configured to values specific to the deployment.  The default
   values have been chosen to accommodate a wide range of deployments,
   taking into account dense networks.

9.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms

   The mandatory to implement AEAD algorithm for use with OSCORE is AES-
   CCM-16-64-128 from [RFC8152].  This is the algorithm used for
   securing IEEE Std 802.15.4 frames, and hardware acceleration for it
   is present in virtually all compliant radio chips.  With this choice,
   CoAP messages are protected with an 8-byte CCM authentication tag,
   and the algorithm uses 13-byte long nonces.

   The mandatory to implement hash algorithm is SHA-256 [RFC4231].

   The mandatory to implement key derivation function is HKDF [RFC5869],
   instantiated with a SHA-256 hash.








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10.  Security Considerations

   Since this document uses the pledge identifier to set the ID Context
   parameter of OSCORE, an important security requirement is that the
   pledge identifier is unique in the set of all pledge identifiers
   managed by a JRC.  The uniqueness of the pledge identifier ensures
   unique (key, nonce) pairs for AEAD algorithm used by OSCORE.  It also
   allows the JRC to retrieve the correct security context, upon the
   reception of a Join Request message.  The management of pledge
   identifiers is simplified if the globally unique EUI-64 is used, but
   this comes with privacy risks, as discussed in Section 11.

   This document further mandates that the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC are
   provisioned with unique PSKs.  The PSK is used to set the OSCORE
   Master Secret during security context derivation and is important for
   mutual authentication of the (6LBR) pledge and the JRC.  Should an
   attacker come to know the PSK, then a man-in-the-middle attack is
   possible.

   Many vendors are known to use unsafe practices when generating and
   provisioning PSKs.  The use of a single PSK shared among a group of
   devices is a common pitfall that results in poor security.  In this
   case, the compromise of a single device is likely to lead to a
   compromise of the whole batch, with the attacker having the ability
   to impersonate a legitimate device and join the network, generate
   bogus data and disturb the network operation.  As a reminder, recall
   the well-known problem with Bluetooth headsets with a "0000" pin.
   Additionally, some vendors use methods such as scrambling or hashing
   of device serial numbers or their EUI-64 to generate "unique" PSKs.
   Without any secret information involved, the effort that the attacker
   needs to invest into breaking these unsafe derivation methods is
   quite low, resulting in the possible impersonation of any device from
   the batch, without even needing to compromise a single device.  The
   use of cryptographically secure random number generators to generate
   the PSK is RECOMMENDED, see [NIST800-90A] for different mechanisms
   using deterministic methods.

   The JP forwards the unauthenticated join traffic into the network.  A
   simple bandwidth cap on the JP prevents it from forwarding more
   traffic than the network can handle.  This forces attackers to use
   more than one Join Proxy if they wish to overwhelm the network.
   Marking the join traffic packets with a non-zero DSCP allows the
   network to carry the traffic if it has capacity, but encourages the
   network to drop the extra traffic rather than add bandwidth due to
   that traffic.

   The shared nature of the "minimal" cell used for the join traffic
   makes the network prone to DoS attacks by congesting the JP with



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   bogus traffic.  Such an attacker is limited by its maximum transmit
   power.  The redundancy in the number of deployed JPs alleviates the
   issue and also gives the pledge a possibility to use the best
   available link for joining.  How a network node decides to become a
   JP is out of scope of this specification.

   At the beginning of the join process, the pledge has no means of
   verifying the content in the EB, and has to accept it at "face
   value".  In case the pledge tries to join an attacker's network, the
   Join Response message will either fail the security check or time
   out.  The pledge may implement a temporary blacklist in order to
   filter out undesired EBs and try to join using the next seemingly
   valid EB.  This blacklist alleviates the issue, but is effectively
   limited by the node's available memory.  Bogus beacons prolong the
   join time of the pledge, and so the time spent in "minimal" [RFC8180]
   duty cycle mode.

11.  Privacy Considerations

   The join solution specified in this document relies on the uniqueness
   of the pledge identifier in the set of all pledge identifiers managed
   by a JRC.  This identifier is transferred in clear as an OSCORE kid
   context.  The use of the globally unique EUI-64 as pledge identifier
   simplifies the management but comes with certain privacy risks.  The
   implications are thoroughly discussed in [RFC7721] and comprise
   correlation of activities over time, location tracking, address
   scanning and device-specific vulnerability exploitation.  Since the
   join process occurs rarely compared to the network lifetime, long-
   term threats that arise from using EUI-64 as the pledge identifier
   are minimal.  In addition, the Join Response message contains a short
   address which is assigned by the JRC to the (6LBR) pledge.  The
   assigned short address SHOULD be uncorrelated with the long-term
   pledge identifier.  The short address is encrypted in the response.
   Once the join process completes, the new node uses the short
   addresses for all further layer 2 (and layer-3) operations.  This
   reduces the aforementioned privacy risks as the short layer-2 address
   (visible even when the network is encrypted) is not traceable between
   locations and does not disclose the manufacturer, as is the case of
   EUI-64.  However, an eavesdropper with access to the radio medium
   during the join process may be able to correlate the assigned short
   address with the extended address based on timing information with a
   non-negligible probability.  This probability decreases with an
   increasing number of pledges joining concurrently.








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12.  IANA Considerations

   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this
   document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

   This document allocates a well-known name under the .arpa name space
   according to the rules given in [RFC3172].  The name "6tisch.arpa" is
   requested.  No subdomains are expected.  No A, AAAA or PTR record is
   requested.

12.1.  CoJP Parameters Registry

   This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH
   mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name
   "Constrained Join Protocol Parameters Registry".

   The columns of the registry are:

   Name: This is a descriptive name that enables an easier reference to
   the item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   Label: The value to be used to identify this parameter.  The label is
   an unsigned integer.

   CBOR type: This field contains the CBOR type for the field.

   Description: This field contains a brief description for the field.

   Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification
   for the field, if one exists.

   This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 2.

   The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of
   values use different registration policies [RFC8126].  Integer values
   from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action.  Integer values
   from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as
   Specification Required.  Integer values greater than 65535 are
   designated as Expert Review.  Integer values less than -65536 are
   marked as Private Use.

12.2.  CoJP Key Usage Registry

   This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH
   mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name
   "Constrained Join Protocol Key Usage Registry".

   The columns of this registry are:



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   Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
   item.  The name MUST be unique.  It is not used in the encoding.

   Value: This is the value used to identify the key usage setting.
   These values MUST be unique.  The value is an integer.

   Algorithm: This is a descriptive name of the link-layer algorithm in
   use and uniquely determines the key length.  The name is not used in
   the encoding.

   Description: This field contains a description of the key usage
   setting.  The field should describe in enough detail how the key is
   to be used with different frame types, specific for the link-layer
   technology in question.

   Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for
   the field, if one exists.

   This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 3.

   The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of
   values use different registration policies [RFC8126].  Integer values
   from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action.  Integer values
   from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as
   Specification Required.  Integer values greater than 65535 are
   designated as Expert Review.  Integer values less than -65536 are
   marked as Private Use.

12.3.  CoJP Error Registry

   This section defines a sub-registries within the "IPv6 over the TSCH
   mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) parameters" registry with the name
   "Constrained Join Protocol Error Registry".

   The columns of this registry are:

   Description: This is a descriptive human-readble name.  The
   description MUST be unique.  It is not used in the encoding.

   Value: This is the value used to identify the error.  These values
   MUST be unique.  The value is an integer.

   Additional information: This is a descriptive name of additional
   information that is meaningful for the error.  The name is not used
   in the encoding.

   Additional information type: A CBOR type of the additional
   information field.



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   Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for
   the field, if one exists.

   This registry is to be populated with the values in Table 4.

   The amending formula for this sub-registry is: Different ranges of
   values use different registration policies [RFC8126].  Integer values
   from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards Action.  Integer values
   from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as
   Specification Required.  Integer values greater than 65535 are
   designated as Expert Review.  Integer values less than -65536 are
   marked as Private Use.

13.  Acknowledgments

   The work on this document has been partially supported by the
   European Union's H2020 Programme for research, technological
   development and demonstration under grant agreement No 644852,
   project ARMOUR.

   The following individuals provided input to this document (in
   alphabetic order): Tengfei Chang, Klaus Hartke, Tero Kivinen, Jim
   Schaad, Goeran Selander, Yasuyuki Tanaka, Pascal Thubert, William
   Vignat, Xavier Vilajosana, Thomas Watteyne.

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-15 (work in
              progress), August 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2597]  Heinanen, J., Baker, F., Weiss, W., and J. Wroclawski,
              "Assured Forwarding PHB Group", RFC 2597,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2597, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2597>.







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   [RFC3172]  Huston, G., Ed., "Management Guidelines & Operational
              Requirements for the Address and Routing Parameter Area
              Domain ("arpa")", BCP 52, RFC 3172, DOI 10.17487/RFC3172,
              September 2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3172>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.hartke-core-stateless]
              Hartke, K., "Extended Tokens and Stateless Clients in the
              Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-hartke-
              core-stateless-02 (work in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol]
              Wang, Q., Vilajosana, X., and T. Watteyne, "6TiSCH
              Operation Sublayer Protocol (6P)", draft-ietf-6tisch-6top-
              protocol-12 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture]
              Thubert, P., "An Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode
              of IEEE 802.15.4", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-15 (work
              in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]
              Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang,
              "Terms Used in IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e",
              draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-10 (work in progress), March
              2018.






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   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
              Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
              definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
              express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
              cddl-05 (work in progress), August 2018.

   [IEEE802.15.4]
              IEEE standard for Information Technology, ., "IEEE Std
              802.15.4 Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks", n.d..

   [NIST800-90A]
              NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, ., Barker,
              E., and J. Kelsey, "Recommendation for Random Number
              Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators",
              2015.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
              RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6550]  Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
              Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
              JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
              Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.

   [RFC6775]  Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
              Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
              Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
              RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.








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   [RFC7554]  Watteyne, T., Ed., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using
              IEEE 802.15.4e Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) in the
              Internet of Things (IoT): Problem Statement", RFC 7554,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7554, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7554>.

   [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

   [RFC8180]  Vilajosana, X., Ed., Pister, K., and T. Watteyne, "Minimal
              IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH)
              Configuration", BCP 210, RFC 8180, DOI 10.17487/RFC8180,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8180>.

Appendix A.  Example

   Figure 3 illustrates a successful join protocol exchange.  The pledge
   instantiates the OSCORE context and derives the AEAD keys and nonces
   from the PSK.  It uses the instantiated context to protect the Join
   Request addressed with a Proxy-Scheme option, the well-known host
   name of the JRC in the Uri-Host option, and its EUI-64 as pledge
   identifier and OSCORE kid context.  Triggered by the presence of a
   Proxy-Scheme option, the JP forwards the request to the JRC and sets
   the CoAP token to the internally needed state.  The JP has learned
   the IPv6 address of the JRC when it acted as a pledge and joined the
   network.  Once the JRC receives the request, it looks up the correct
   context based on the kid context parameter.  OSCORE data authenticity
   verification ensures that the request has not been modified in
   transit.  In addition, replay protection is ensured through
   persistent handling of mutable context parameters.

   Once the JP receives the Join Response, it authenticates the state
   within the CoAP token before deciding where to forward.  The JP sets
   its internal state to that found in the token, and forwards the Join
   Response to the correct pledge.  Note that the JP does not possess
   the key to decrypt the CBOR object (configuration) present in the
   payload.  The Join Response is matched to the Join Request and
   verified for replay protection at the pledge using OSCORE processing
   rules.  In this example, the Join Response does not contain the IPv6
   address of the JRC, the pledge hence understands the JRC is co-
   located with the 6LBR.








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   <---E2E OSCORE-->
 Client      Proxy     Server
 Pledge       JP        JRC
   |          |          |
   |  Join    |          |            Code: { 0.02 } (POST)
   | Request  |          |           Token: 0x8c
   +--------->|          |    Proxy-Scheme: [ coap ]
   |  POST    |          |        Uri-Host: [ 6tisch.arpa ]
   |          |          | Object-Security: [ kid: 0 ]
   |          |          |         Payload: kid_context: EUI-64
   |          |          |                  [ Partial IV: 1,
   |          |          |                    { Uri-Path:"j",
   |          |          |                      join_request },
   |          |          |                      <Tag> ]
   |          |          |
   |          |  Join    |            Code: { 0.01 } (GET)
   |          | Request  |           Token: opaque state
   |          +--------->|        Uri-Host: [ 6tisch.arpa ]
   |          | POST     | Object-Security: [ kid: 0 ]
   |          |          |         Payload: kid_context: EUI-64
   |          |          |                  [ Partial IV: 1,
   |          |          |                    { Uri-Path:"j",
   |          |          |                      join_request },
   |          |          |                      <Tag> ]
   |          |          |
   |          |  Join    |            Code: { 2.05 } (Content)
   |          | Response |           Token: 0x7b
   |          |<---------+ Object-Security: -
   |          | 2.04     |         Payload: [ { configuration }, <Tag> ]
   |          |          |
   |  Join    |          |            Code: { 2.05 } (Content)
   | Response |          |           Token: 0x8c
   |<---------+          | Object-Security: -
   | 2.04     |          |         Payload: [ { configuration }, <Tag> ]
   |          |          |

     Figure 3: Example of a successful join protocol exchange. { ... }
          denotes encryption and authentication, [ ... ] denotes
                              authentication.

   Where the join_request object is:

  join_request:
  {
      5 : h'cafe' / PAN ID of the network pledge is attempting to join /
  }





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   Since the role parameter is not present, the default role of "6TiSCH
   Node" is implied.

   The join_request object encodes to h'a10542cafe' with a size of 5
   bytes.

   And the configuration object is:

   configuration:
   {
       2 : [           / link-layer key set /
             1,        / key_id /
             h'e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffd33e6' / key_value /
           ],
       3 : [           / short identifier /
             h'af93'   / assigned short address /
           ]
   }

   Since the key_usage parameter is not present in the link-layer key
   set object, the default value of "6TiSCH-K1K2-ENC-MIC32" is implied.
   Since key_addinfo parameter is not present and key_id is different
   than 0, Key ID Mode 0x01 (Key Index) is implied.  Similarly, since
   the lease_time parameter is not present in the short identifier
   object, the default value of positive infinity is implied.

   The configuration object encodes to

   h'a202820150e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffd33e6038142af93' with a size
   of 26 bytes.

Authors' Addresses

   Malisa Vucinic (editor)
   University of Montenegro
   Dzordza Vasingtona bb
   Podgorica  81000
   Montenegro

   Email: malisav@ac.me











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   Jonathan Simon
   Analog Devices
   32990 Alvarado-Niles Road, Suite 910
   Union City, CA  94587
   USA

   Email: jonathan.simon@analog.com


   Kris Pister
   University of California Berkeley
   512 Cory Hall
   Berkeley, CA  94720
   USA

   Email: pister@eecs.berkeley.edu


   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z5V7
   Canada

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca


























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