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Versions: (draft-melnikov-acme-email-tls) 00 01 02 03 04 05

Network Working Group                                        A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft                                                 Isode Ltd
Intended status: Informational                             July 25, 2018
Expires: January 26, 2019


Extensions to Automatic Certificate Management Environment for email TLS
                      draft-ietf-acme-email-tls-05

Abstract

   This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable
   the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue
   certificates for use by TLS email services.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Use of ACME for use by TLS-protected SMTP, IMAP and POP3
       services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     3.1.  "service" field in JSON payload . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  "port" field in JSON payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  DNS challenge for email services  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  CAPABILITY challenge for email services . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.4.1.  Registration of the ACME SMTP extension . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate
   management on the Internet.  It enables administrative entities to
   prove effective control over resources like domain names, and
   automates the process of generating and issuing certificates.

   This document describes extensions to ACME for use by email services.
   Section 3 defines extensions for how email services (such as SMTP,
   IMAP and POP3) can get certificates for use with TLS.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Use of ACME for use by TLS-protected SMTP, IMAP and POP3 services

   SMTP [RFC5321] (including SMTP Submission [RFC6409]), IMAP [RFC3501]
   and POP3 [RFC2449] servers use TLS [RFC5246] to provide server
   identity authentication, data confidentiality and integrity services.
   Such TLS protected email services either use STARTTLS command or run
   on a separate TLS-protected port [RFC8314].

   [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] defines several challenge types that can be
   extended for use by email services.  This document also defines some
   new challenge types specific to SMTP, IMAP and POP3.

   In order to use these challenges JWS [RFC7515] object used by
   [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is extended.  The following extra requirements



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   are in addition to requirements on JWS objects sent in ACME defined
   in Section 6.2 of [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]:

   1.  "service" JWS header parameter MUST be included.  See Section 3.1
       for more details.

   2.  "port" JWS header parameter SHOULD be included.  See Section 3.2
       for more details.  If this JWS header parameter is not included,
       the default assigned IANA port for the corresponding "service" is
       assumed.

   For example, if the ACME client were to respond to the "dns-email-00"
   challenge, it would send the following request:

      POST /acme/authz/asdf/0 HTTP/1.1
      Host: example.com
      Content-Type: application/jose+json

      {
        "protected": base64url({
          "alg": "ES256",
          "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
          "nonce": "Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",
          "url": "https://example.com/acme/authz/asdf/0"
        }),
        "payload": base64url({
          "type": "dns-email-00",
          "service": "smtp",
          "port": 25,
          "keyAuthorization": "IlirfxKKXA...vb29HhjjLPSggQiE"
        }),
        "signature": "7cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjF...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYU"
      }

                                 Figure 1

3.1.  "service" field in JSON payload

   The "service" field in JSON payload specifies the service for which
   TLS server certificate should be issued.  Valid values come from
   "Service Names and Transport Protocol Port Numbers" IANA registry
   <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
   names-port-numbers.xhtml>.

   ACME servers compliant with this specification MUST support [RFC7817]
   (in particular see Section 4 of that document).

   [[This parameter might have applicability beyond email services.]]



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3.2.  "port" field in JSON payload

   The "port" field in JSON payload specifies the TCP port number where
   the corresponding service is running.  ACME server MAY check that the
   TCP port corresponds to the requested "service", for example that the
   port is the assigned default IANA port for the service.

   [[This parameter might have applicability beyond email services.]]

3.3.  DNS challenge for email services

   "dns-email-00" is very similar to "dns-01" defined in Section 8.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-acme-acme].

   The difference between processing of "dns-email-00" and "dns-01" are
   listed below:

   1.  The TXT record used to validate this challenge is
       _<port>._<service>._acme-challenge.<domain>.  For example, for
       domain "example.com" and IMAPS service running on port 993, the
       TXT record name is _993._imaps._acme-challenge.example.com.  For
       domain "example.net" and IMAP service running on port 143, the
       TXT record name is _143._imap._acme-challenge.example.next.

3.4.  CAPABILITY challenge for email services

   For "capability-smtp-00" challenge, ACME client (== SMTP server)
   constructs a key authorization from the "token" value provided in the
   challenge and the client's account key.  The client then computes the
   SHA-256 digest [FIPS180-4] of the key authorization.  SMTP server
   than returns the base64url encoding of this digest as a value of the
   "ACME" EHLO capability.  For example:



















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   250-smtp.example.com
   250-SIZE
   250-8BITMIME
   250-BINARYMIME
   250-PIPELINING
   250-HELP
   250-DSN
   250-CHUNKING
   250-AUTH SCRAM-SHA-1
   250-AUTH=SCRAM-SHA-1
   250-STARTTLS
   250-ACME gfj9Xq...Rg85nM
   250-MT-PRIORITY
   250 ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES

   Note that in the above example only presence of the ACME is relevant
   as far as this document is concerned.

                                 Figure 2

   The ACME SMTP extension is formerly defined in Section 3.4.1.

   Similarly, "capability-imap-00" challenge, ACME client (== IMAP
   server) constructs a key authorization from the "token" value
   provided in the challenge and the client's account key.  The client
   then computes the SHA-256 digest [FIPS180-4] of the key
   authorization.  IMAP server than returns the base64url encoding of
   this digest as a value of the "ACME" capability:

* OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 LOGINDISABLED LITERAL+ ENABLE STARTTLS ACME=gfj9Xq...Rg85nM] Example IMAP4rev1 server ready

 or

* CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 LOGINDISABLED LITERAL+ ENABLE STARTTLS ACME=gfj9Xq...Rg85nM

   Note that in the above example only presence of the ACME capability
   token is relevant as far as this document is concerned.

                                 Figure 3

   Similarly, "capability-pop-00" challenge, ACME client (== POP3
   server) constructs a key authorization from the "token" value
   provided in the challenge and the client's account key.  The client
   then computes the SHA-256 digest [FIPS180-4] of the key
   authorization.  POP3 server than returns the base64url encoding of
   this digest as a value of the "ACME" capability in response to CAPA
   command [RFC2449]:




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   C: CAPA
   S: +OK Capability list follows
   S: TOP
   S: SASL CRAM-MD5 KERBEROS_V4
   S: UIDL
   S: ACME gfj9Xq...Rg85nM
   S: IMPLEMENTATION Shlemazle-Plotz-v915
   S: .

   Note that in the above example only presence of the ACME capability
   token is relevant as far as this document is concerned.

                                 Figure 3

3.4.1.  Registration of the ACME SMTP extension

   The ACME SMTP service extension is defined as follows:

   1.  The textual name of this extension is "ACME for SMTP".

   2.  The EHLO keyword value associated with this extension is "ACME".

   3.  The EHLO keyword has a single required parameter which is a
       base64url encoded SHA-256 hash, which is 44 octets in length.

   4.  This extension doesn't define any new SMTP verbs.

   5.  This extension doesn't add any new parameters to MAIL FROM or
       RCPT TO commands.

   6.  The ACME extension is valid for the submission service [RFC6409]
       (default port number 587) or its version running directly over
       TLS [RFC8314] ("submissions" service, default port number 465) .

4.  Open Issues

   [[This section should be empty before publication]]

   1.  Should the same certificate be allowed to be used on both IMAP
       (143) and IMAPS (993) ports?  (These ports have different service
       names associated with them.  Is 1 service/port per ACME
       certificate a restriction imposed by this document?)  Maybe if
       the ACME server sees a request for port 143 (or 993), it can
       include SRV-ID for the other port, if it can verify that both are
       running?  (How can this be done reliably?)  Many email servers
       don't allow different certificates to be configured for different
       ports they are listening on.  The cleanest way is to change




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       "service" to "services", change "port" to "ports" and make both
       of them arrays.

   2.  Add support for LMTP (RFC 2033)?

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to register the following ACME challenge types that
   are used with Identifier Type "dns": "dns-email", "capability-smtp",
   "capability-imap" and "capability-pop".  The reference for all of
   them is this document.

6.  Security Considerations

   Security Considerations from [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] relevant to the DNS
   challenge type are also relevant to "dns-email".

7.  Normative References

   [FIPS180-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, August 2015,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/
              final>.

   [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
              Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-12 (work in progress), April
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2449]  Gellens, R., Newman, C., and L. Lundblade, "POP3 Extension
              Mechanism", RFC 2449, DOI 10.17487/RFC2449, November 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2449>.

   [RFC3501]  Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
              4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.



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   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6409]  Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
              STD 72, RFC 6409, DOI 10.17487/RFC6409, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6409>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7817]  Melnikov, A., "Updated Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Server Identity Check Procedure for Email-Related
              Protocols", RFC 7817, DOI 10.17487/RFC7817, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7817>.

   [RFC8314]  Moore, K. and C. Newman, "Cleartext Considered Obsolete:
              Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission
              and Access", RFC 8314, DOI 10.17487/RFC8314, January 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314>.

Author's Address

   Alexey Melnikov
   Isode Ltd
   14 Castle Mews
   Hampton, Middlesex  TW12 2NP
   UK

   EMail: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com













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