[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits] [IPR]
Versions: (draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra)
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
ANIMA WG M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson
Expires: September 27, 2018 Sandelman
M. Behringer
S. Bjarnason
Arbor Networks
K. Watsen
Juniper Networks
March 26, 2018
Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-13
Abstract
This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure
key infrastructure (BRSKI) using manufacturer installed X.509
certificate, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing
service, both online and offline. Bootstrapping a new device can
occur using a routable address and a cloud service, or using only
link-local connectivity, or on limited/disconnected networks.
Support for lower security models, including devices with minimal
identity, is described for legacy reasons but not encouraged.
Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new
key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device but the
established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued
certificate to the device as well.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 27, 2018.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1. Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2. Constrained environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3. Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps . . . 11
1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1. Behavior of a Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.1. Identification of the Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2. MASA URI extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5. Architectural Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1. Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.2. Circuit Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.3. Domain Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.4. Manufacturer Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6. Certificate Time Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7. Cloud Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.8. Determining the MASA to contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3. Voucher-Request artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar) . . . . . . . . 30
4.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1.1. Proxy GRASP announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2. CoAP connection to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3. Proxy discovery of Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA) . . . . . . . . 35
5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar . . . . . . . 37
5.3. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4.1. Renew for expired voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.4.2. Voucher signature consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.4.3. Registrar revocation consistency . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.4.4. Pledge proximity assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.4.5. Registar (certificate) authentication . . . . . . . . 42
5.4.6. Registrar Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.5. Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.5.1. Completing authentication of Provisional TLS
connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.6. Voucher Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.7. MASA authorization log Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.7.1. MASA authorization log Response . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.8. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.8.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 48
5.8.2. EST CSR Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.8.3. EST Client Certificate Request . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.8.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.8.5. Multiple certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.8.6. EST over CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6. Reduced security operational modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.1. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2. Pledge security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3. Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.4. MASA security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.1. Well-known EST registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.2. PKIX Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.3. Voucher Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.1. MASA authorization log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.1. Freshness in Voucher-Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.2. Trusting manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Appendix A. IPv4 and non-ANI operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.1. IPv4 Link Local addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2. Use of DHCPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix B. mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix C. IPIP Join Proxy mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
C.1. Multiple Join networks on the Join Proxy side . . . . . . 66
C.2. Automatic configuration of tunnels on Registrar . . . . . 67
C.3. Proxy Neighbor Discovery by Join Proxy . . . . . . . . . 67
C.4. Use of connected sockets; or IP_PKTINFO for CoAP on
Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C.5. Use of socket extension rather than virtual interface . . 68
Appendix D. MUD Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix E. Example Vouchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
E.1. Keys involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
E.1.1. MASA key pair for voucher signatures . . . . . . . . 70
E.1.2. Manufacturer key pair for IDevID signatures . . . . . 70
E.1.3. Registrar key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
E.1.4. Pledge key pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
E.2. Example process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
E.2.1. Pledge to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
E.2.2. Registrar to MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
E.2.3. MASA to Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
1. Introduction
BRSKI provides a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap
of virgin (untouched) devices that are called Pledges in this
document. These Pledges need to discover (or be discovered by) an
element of the network domain to which the Pledge belongs to perform
the bootstrap. This element (device) is called the Registrar.
Before any other operation, Pledge and Registrar need to establish
mutual trust:
1. Registrar authenticating the Pledge: "Who is this device? What
is its identity?"
2. Registrar authorizing the Pledge: "Is it mine? Do I want it?
What are the chances it has been compromised?"
3. Pledge authenticating the Registrar/Domain: "What is this
domain's identity?"
4. Pledge authorizing the Registrar: "Should I join it?"
This document details protocols and messages to answer the above
questions. It uses a TLS connection and an PKIX (X.509v3)
certificate (an IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID] LDevID) of the Pledge to answer
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
points 1 and 2. It uses a new artifact called a "voucher" that the
registrar receives from a "Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority"
and passes to the Pledge to answer points 3 and 2.
A proxy provides very limited connectivity between the pledge and the
Registrar.
The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]. This document details automated protocol
mechanisms to obtain vouchers, including the definition of a
'voucher-request' message that is a minor extension to the voucher
format (see Section 3) defined by [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].
BRSKI results in the Pledge storing an X.509 root certificate
sufficient for verifying the Registrar identity. In the process a
TLS connection is established that can be directly used for
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST). In effect BRSKI provides an
automated mechanism for the "Bootstrap Distribution of CA
Certificates" described in [RFC7030] Section 4.1.1 wherein the Pledge
"MUST [...] engage a human user to authorize the CA certificate using
out-of-band" information". With BRSKI the Pledge now can automate
this process using the voucher. Integration with a complete EST
enrollment is optional but trivial.
BRSKI is agile enough to support bootstrapping alternative key
infrastructures, such as a symmetric key solutions, but no such
system is described in this document.
1.1. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches
To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible
action. Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure
without external help is also an impossibility. Today it is commonly
accepted that the initial connections between nodes are insecure,
until key distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying
material (often pre-shared keys, including mechanisms like SIM cards)
is pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-scalable
manner. Existing automated mechanisms are known as non-secured
'Trust on First Use' (TOFU) [RFC7435], 'resurrecting duckling'
[Stajano99theresurrecting] or 'pre-staging'.
Another prior approach has been to try and minimize user actions
during bootstrapping, but not eliminate all user-actions. The
original EST protocol [RFC7030] does reduce user actions during
bootstrap but does not provide solutions for how the following
protocol steps can be made autonomic (not involving user actions):
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
o using the Implicit Trust Anchor database to authenticate an owner
specific service (not an autonomic solution because the URL must
be securely distributed),
o engaging a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-
of-band data (not an autonomic solution because the human user is
involved),
o using a configured Explicit TA database (not an autonomic solution
because the distribution of an explicit TA database is not
autonomic),
o and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not
an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key
material is not autonomic).
These "touch" methods do not meet the requirements for zero-touch.
There are "call home" technologies where the Pledge first establishes
a connection to a well known manufacturer service using a common
client-server authentication model. After mutual authentication,
appropriate credentials to authenticate the target domain are
transfered to the Pledge. This creates serveral problems and
limitations:
o the Pledge requires realtime connectivity to the manufacturer
service,
o the domain identity is exposed to the manufacturer service (this
is a privacy concern),
o the manufacturer is responsible for making the authorization
decisions (this is a liability concern),
BRSKI addresses these issues by defining extensions to the EST
protocol for the automated distribution of vouchers.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
The following terms are defined for clarity:
domainID: The domain IDentity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT
STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the root certificate for the
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Registrars in the domain. This is consistent with the subject key
identifier (Section 4.2.1.2 [RFC5280]).
drop ship: The physical distribution of equipment containing the
"factory default" configuration to a final destination. In zero-
touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during
drop-ship.
imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key
material to identify and trust future interactions with a network.
This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new
ducklings: during a critical period, the duckling would assume
that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their
mother. An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint
of the network's root certification authority certificate. A
device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a
duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Securely imprinting is a
primary focus of this document [imprinting]. The analogy to
Lorenz's work was first noted in [Stajano99theresurrecting].
enrollment: The process where a device presents key material to a
network and acquires a network specific identity. For example
when a certificate signing request is presented to a certification
authority and a certificate is obtained in response.
Pledge: The prospective device, which has an identity installed at
the factory.
Voucher: A signed artifact from the MASA that indicates to a Pledge
the cryptographic identity of the Registrar it should trust.
There are different types of vouchers depending on how that trust
is asserted. Multiple voucher types are defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]
Domain: The set of entities that share a common local trust anchor.
This includes the Proxy, Registrar, Domain Certificate Authority,
Management components and any existing entity that is already a
member of the domain.
Domain CA: The domain Certification Authority (CA) provides
certification functionalities to the domain. At a minimum it
provides certification functionalities to a Registrar and manages
the private key that defines the domain. Optionally, it certifies
all elements.
Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain
that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new
device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
domain interfaces with a Join Registrar (and Coordinator) to
control this process. Typically a Join Registrar is "inside" its
domain. For simplicity this document often refers to this as just
"Registrar". Within [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] this is
refered to as the Join Registrar Autonomic Service Agent.
(Public) Key Infrastructure: The collection of systems and processes
that sustain the activities of a public key system. The Join
Registrar (and Coordinator) acts as an [RFC5280] and [RFC5272]
(see section 7) "Registration Authority".
Join Proxy: A domain entity that helps the Pledge join the domain.
A Proxy facilitates communication for devices that find themselves
in an environment where they are not provided connectivity until
after they are validated as members of the domain. The Pledge is
unaware that they are communicating with a Proxy rather than
directly with a Registrar.
MASA Service: A third-party Manufacturer Authorized Signing
Authority (MASA) service on the global Internet. The MASA signs
vouchers. It also provides a repository for audit log information
of privacy protected bootstrapping events. It does not track
ownership.
Ownership Tracker: An Ownership Tracker service on the global
internet. The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to
accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains
that have purchased them. Although optional, this component
allows vendors to provide additional value in cases where their
sales and distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of
such ownership. Ownership tracking information is indicated in
vouchers as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]
IDevID: An Initial Device Identity X.509 certificate installed by
the vendor on new equipment.
TOFU: Trust on First Use. Used similarly to [RFC7435]. This is
where a Pledge device makes no security decisions but rather
simply trusts the first Registrar it is contacted by. This is
also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model.
nonced: a voucher (or request) that contains a nonce (the normal
case).
nonceless: a voucher (or request) that does not contain a nonce,
relying upon accurate clocks for expiration, or which does not
expire.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
manufacturer: the term manufacturer is used throughout this document
to be the entity that created the device. This is typically the
"original equipment manufacturer" or OEM, but in more complex
situations it could be a "value added retailer" (VAR), or possibly
even a systems integrator. In general, it a goal of BRSKI to
eliminate small distinctions between different sales channels.
The reason for this is that it permits a single device, with a
uniform firmware load, to be shipped directly to all customers.
This eliminates costs for the manufacturer. This also reduces the
number of products supported in the field increasing the chance
that firmware will be more up to date.
ANI: The Autonomic Network Infrastructure as defined by
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]. This document details
specific requirements for pledges, proxies and registrars when
they are part of an ANI.
1.3. Scope of solution
1.3.1. Support environment
This solution (BRSKI) can support large router platforms with multi-
gigabit inter-connections, mounted in controlled access data centers.
But this solution is not exclusive to large equipment: it is intended
to scale to thousands of devices located in hostile environments,
such as ISP provided CPE devices which are drop-shipped to the end
user. The situation where an order is fulfilled from distributed
warehouse from a common stock and shipped directly to the target
location at the request of a domain owner is explicitly supported.
That stock ("SKU") could be provided to a number of potential domain
owners, and the eventual domain owner will not know a-priori which
device will go to which location.
The bootstrapping process can take minutes to complete depending on
the network infrastructure and device processing speed. The network
communication itself is not optimized for speed; for privacy reasons,
the discovery process allows for the Pledge to avoid announcing its
presence through broadcasting.
Nomadic or mobile devices often need to aquire credentials to access
the network at the new location. An example of this is mobile phone
roaming among network operators, or even between cell towers. This
is usually called handoff. BRSKI does not provide a low-latency
handoff which is usually a requirement in such situations. For these
solutions BRSKI can be used to create a relationship (an LDevID) with
the "home" domain owner. The resulting credentials are then used to
provide credentials more appropriate for a low-latency handoff.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
1.3.2. Constrained environments
Questions have been posed as to whether this solution is suitable in
general for Internet of Things (IoT) networks. This depends on the
capabilities of the devices in question. The terminology of
[RFC7228] is best used to describe the boundaries.
The solution described in this document is aimed in general at non-
constrained (i.e., class 2+) devices operating on a non-Challenged
network. The entire solution as described here is not intended to be
useable as-is by constrained devices operating on challenged networks
(such as 802.15.4 LLNs).
Specifically, there are protocol aspects described here that might
result in congestion collapse or energy-exhaustion of intermediate
battery powered routers in an LLN. Those types of networks SHOULD
NOT use this solution. These limitations are predominately related
to the large credential and key sizes required for device
authentication. Defining symmetric key techniques that meet the
operational requirements is out-of-scope but the underlying protocol
operations (TLS handshake and signing structures) have sufficient
algorithm agility to support such techniques when defined.
The imprint protocol described here could, however, be used by non-
energy constrained devices joining a non-constrained network (for
instance, smart light bulbs are usually mains powered, and speak
802.11). It could also be used by non-constrained devices across a
non-energy constrained, but challenged network (such as 802.15.4).
The certificate contents, and the process by which the four questions
above are resolved do apply to constrained devices. It is simply the
actual on-the-wire imprint protocol that could be inappropriate.
1.3.3. Network Access Controls
This document presumes that network access control has either already
occurred, is not required, or is integrated by the Proxy and
Registrar in such a way that the device itself does not need to be
aware of the details. Although the use of an X.509 Initial Device
Identity is consistant with IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID], and allows for
alignment with 802.1X network access control methods, its use here is
for Pledge authentication rather than network access control.
Integrating this protocol with network access control, perhaps as an
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method (see [RFC3748]), is
out-of-scope.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
1.4. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps
As a result of the protocol described herein, the bootstrapped
devices have the Domain CA trust anchor in common. An end entity
certificate has optionally been issued from the Domain CA. This
makes it possible to automatically deploy services across the domain
in a secure manner.
Services that benefit from this:
o Device management.
o Routing authentication.
o Service discovery.
The major beneficiary is that it possible to use the credentials
deployed by this protocol to secure the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)
([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]).
1.5. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices
The BRSKI protocol can be used in a number of environments. Some of
the flexibility in this document is the result of users out of the
ANI scope. This section defines the base requirements for ANI
devices.
For devices that intend to become part of an Autonomic Network
Infrastructure (ANI) ([I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]) that includes
an Autonomic Control Plane
([I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]), the following actions are
required and MUST be performed by the Pledge:
o BRSKI: Request Voucher
o EST: CA Certificates Request
o EST: CSR Attributes
o EST: Client Certificate Request
o BRSKI: Enrollment status Telemetry
The ANI Join Registrar ASA MUST support all the BRSKI and above
listed EST operations.
All ANI devices SHOULD support the BRSKI proxy function, using
circuit proxies. Other proxy methods are optional, and MUST NOT
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
enabled unless the Join Registrar ASA indicates support for them in
it's announcement. (See Section 4.3)
2. Architectural Overview
The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in
this section. Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the
components.
+------------------------+
+--------------Drop Ship--------------->| Vendor Service |
| +------------------------+
| | M anufacturer| |
| | A uthorized |Ownership|
| | S igning |Tracker |
| | A uthority | |
| +--------------+---------+
| ^
| | BRSKI-
V | MASA
+-------+ ............................................|...
| | . | .
| | . +------------+ +-----------+ | .
| | . | | | | | .
|Pledge | . | Circuit | | Domain <-------+ .
| | . | Proxy | | Registrar | .
| <-------->............<-------> (PKI RA) | .
| | | BRSKI-EST | | .
| | . | | +-----+-----+ .
|IDevID | . +------------+ | EST RFC7030 .
| | . +-----------------+----------+ .
| | . | Key Infrastructure | .
| | . | (e.g., PKI Certificate | .
+-------+ . | Authority) | .
. +----------------------------+ .
. .
................................................
"Domain" components
Figure 1
We assume a multi-vendor network. In such an environment there could
be a Manufacturer Service for each manufacturer that supports devices
following this document's specification, or an integrator could
provide a generic service authorized by multiple manufacturers. It
is unlikely that an integrator could provide Ownership Tracking
services for multiple manufacturers due to the required sales channel
integrations necessary to track ownership.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
The domain is the managed network infrastructure with a Key
Infrastructure the Pledge is joining. The domain provides initial
device connectivity sufficient for bootstrapping with a Circuit
Proxy. The Domain Registrar authenticates the Pledge, makes
authorization decisions, and distributes vouchers obtained from the
Manufacturer Service. Optionally the Registrar also acts as a PKI
Registration Authority.
2.1. Behavior of a Pledge
The Pledge goes through a series of steps, which are outlined here at
a high level.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
+--------------+
| Factory |
| default |
+------+-------+
|
+------v-------+
| Discover |
+------------> |
| +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Identity |
^------------+ |
| rejected +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Request |
| | Join |
| +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Imprint | Optional
^------------+ <--+Manual input (Appendix C)
| Bad MASA +------+-------+
| response | send Voucher Status Telemetry
| +------v-------+
| | Enroll |
^------------+ |
| Enroll +------+-------+
| Failure |
| +------v-------+
| | Enrolled |
^------------+ |
Factory +--------------+
reset
Figure 2
State descriptions for the Pledge are as follows:
1. Discover a communication channel to a Registrar.
2. Identify itself. This is done by presenting an X.509 IDevID
credential to the discovered Registrar (via the Proxy) in a TLS
handshake. (The Registrar credentials are only provisionally
accepted at this time).
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
3. Request to Join the discovered Registrar. A unique nonce can be
included ensuring that any responses can be associated with this
particular bootstrapping attempt.
4. Imprint on the Registrar. This requires verification of the
manufacturer service provided voucher. A voucher contains
sufficient information for the Pledge to complete authentication
of a Registrar. (It enables the Pledge to finish authentication
of the Registrar TLS server certificate).
5. Enroll. By accepting the domain specific information from a
Registrar, and by obtaining a domain certificate from a Registrar
using a standard enrollment protocol, e.g. Enrollment over
Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030].
6. The Pledge is now a member of, and can be managed by, the domain
and will only repeat the discovery aspects of bootstrapping if it
is returned to factory default settings.
After step 4, the pledge has received and authenticated an explicit
trust anchor (the pinned-domain-cert in the Voucher response). A
secure transport exists between pledge and registrar, and it may be
used for things other than enrollment into a PKI.
2.2. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers
A voucher is a cryptographically protected artifact (a digital
signature) to the Pledge device authorizing a zero-touch imprint on
the Registrar domain.
The format and cryptographic mechanism of vouchers is described in
detail in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].
Vouchers provide a flexible mechanism to secure imprinting: the
Pledge device only imprints when a voucher can be validated. At the
lowest security levels the MASA server can indiscriminately issue
vouchers and log claims of ownership by domains. At the highest
security levels issuance of vouchers can be integrated with complex
sales channel integrations that are beyond the scope of this
document. The sales channel integration would verify actual (legal)
ownership of the pledge by the domain. This provides the flexibility
for a number of use cases via a single common protocol mechanism on
the Pledge and Registrar devices that are to be widely deployed in
the field. The MASA services have the flexibility to leverage either
the currently defined claim mechanisms or to experiment with higher
or lower security levels.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Vouchers provide a signed but non-encrypted communication channel
among the Pledge, the MASA, and the Registrar. The Registrar
maintains control over the transport and policy decisions allowing
the local security policy of the domain network to be enforced.
2.3. Initial Device Identifier
Pledge authentication and Pledge voucher-request signing is via a
PKIX certificate installed during the manufacturing process. This is
the 802.1AR Initial Device Identifier (IDevID), and it provides a
basis for authenticating the Pledge during the protocol exchanges
described here. There is no requirement for a common root PKI
hierarchy. Each device manufacturer can generate its own root
certificate. Specifically, the IDevID:
1. Uniquely identifying the pledge by the Distinguished Name (DN)
and subjectAltName (SAN) parameters in the IDevID. The unique
identification of a pledge in the voucher objects are derived
from those parameters as described below.
2. Securely authentating the pledges identity via TLS connection to
registrar. This provides protection against cloned/fake pledged.
3. Secure auto-discovery of the pledges MASA by the registrar via
the MASA URI in IDevID as explained below.
4. (Optionally) communicating the MUD URL (see Appendix D.
5. (Optional) Signing of voucher-request by the pledges IDevID to
enable MASA to generate voucher only to a registrar that has a
connection to the pledge.
6. Authorizing pledge (via registrar) to receive certificate from
domain CA, by signing the Certificate Signing Request (CSR).
2.3.1. Identification of the Pledge
In the context of BRSKI, pledges are uniquely identified by a
"serial-number". This serial-number is used both in the "serial-
number" field of Voucher or Voucher requests (see Section 3) and in
local policies on Registrar or MASA (see Section 5).
The following fields are defined in [IDevID] and [RFC5280]:
o The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber"
attribute with the device's unique serial number. (from [IDevID]
section 7.2.8, and [RFC5280] section 4.1.2.4's list of standard
attributes)
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
o The subject-alt field's encoding MAY include a non-critical
version of the RFC4108 defined HardwareModuleName. (from [IDevID]
section 7.2.9) If the IDevID is stored in a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), then this field MAY contain the TPM identification
rather than the device's serial number. If both fields are
present, then the subject field takes precedence.
and they are used as follows to build pledge "serial-number". In
order to build it, the fields need to be converted into a serial-
number of "type string". The following methods are used depending on
the first available IDevID certificate field (attempted in this
order):
1. [RFC4519] section 2.31 provides an example ("WI-3005") of the
Distinguished Name "serialNumber" attribute, formatted according
to RFC4514 rules.
2. The HardwareModuleName hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, base64 encoded.
2.3.2. MASA URI extension
The following newly defined field SHOULD be in the PKIX IDevID
certificate: A PKIX non-critical certificate extension that contains
a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an on-line
Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority. The URI is represented as
described in Section 7.4 of [RFC5280].
Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
in the certificate extension. The URI provides the authority
information. The BRSKI "/.well-known" tree ([RFC5785]) is described
in Section 5.
The new extension is identified as follows:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
<CODE BEGINS>
MASAURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;
MASACertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-MASAURL, ... }
ext-MASAURL EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX MASAURLSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-masa-url }
id-pe-masa-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe TBD }
MASAURLSyntax ::= IA5String
END
<CODE ENDS>
The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of
[RFC5280], "These extensions may be used to direct applications to
on-line information about the issuer or the subject". The MASA URL
is precisely that: online information about the particular subject.
2.4. Protocol Flow
A representative flow is shown in Figure 3:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
+--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+
| Pledge | | Circuit | | Domain | | Vendor |
| | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Service |
| | | | | (JRC) | | (MASA) |
+--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+
| | | Internet |
|<-RFC4862 IPv6 addr | | |
|<-RFC3927 IPv4 addr | Appendix A | Legend |
|-------------------->| | C - circuit |
| optional: mDNS query| Appendix B | proxy |
| RFC6763/RFC6762 | | P - provisional |
|<--------------------| | TLS connection |
| GRASP M_FLOOD | | |
| periodic broadcast| | |
|<------------------->C<----------------->| |
| TLS via the Circuit Proxy | |
|<--Registrar TLS server authentication---| |
[PROVISIONAL accept of server cert] | |
P---X.509 client authentication---------->| |
P | | |
P---Voucher Request (include nonce)------>| |
P | /---> | |
P | | [accept device?] |
P | | [contact Vendor] |
P | | |--Pledge ID-------->|
P | | |--Domain ID-------->|
P | | |--optional:nonce--->|
P | | | [extract DomainID]
P | optional: | [update audit log]
P | |can | |
P | |occur | |
P | |in | |
P | |advance | |
P | |if | |
P | |nonceless | |
P | | |<- voucher ---------|
P | \----> | |
P<------voucher---------------------------| |
[verify voucher , [verify provisional cert| | |
|---------------------------------------->| |
| [voucher status telemetry] |<-device audit log--|
| | [verify audit log and voucher] |
|<--------------------------------------->| |
| Continue with RFC7030 enrollment | |
| using now bidirectionally authenticated | |
| TLS session. | | |
Figure 3
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
2.5. Architectural Components
2.5.1. Pledge
The Pledge is the device that is attempting to join. Until the
Pledge completes the enrollment process, it has link-local network
connectivity only to the Proxy.
2.5.2. Circuit Proxy
The (Circuit) Proxy provides HTTPS connectivity between the Pledge
and the Registrar. The circuit proxy mechanism is described in
Section 4, with an optional stateless proxy mechanism described in
Appendix C.
2.5.3. Domain Registrar
The domain's Registrar operates as the BRSKI-MASA client when
requesting vouchers from the MASA (see Section 5.3). The Registrar
operates as the BRSKI-EST server when Pledges request vouchers (see
Section 5.1). The Registrar operates as the BRSKI-EST server
"Registration Authority" if the Pledge requests an end entity
certificate over the BRSKI-EST connection (see Section 5.8).
The Registar uses an Implicit Trust Anchor database for
authenticating the BRSKI-MASA TLS connection MASA server certificate.
The Registrar uses a different Implicit Trust Anchor database for
authenticating the BRSKI-EST TLS connection Pledge client
certificate. Configuration or distribution of these trust anchor
databases is out-of-scope of this specification.
2.5.4. Manufacturer Service
The Manufacturer Service provides two logically seperate functions:
the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) described in
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5, and an ownership tracking/auditing
function described in Section 5.6 and Section 5.7.
2.5.5. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The Key Infrastructure (PKI) administers certificates for the domain
of concerns, providing the trust anchor(s) for it and allowing
enrollment of Pledges with domain certificates.
The domain's Registrar uses the "pinned-domain-cert" voucher field to
distribute a trust anchor for authenticating itself to the Pledge.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
The domain's Registrar acts as an [RFC5272] Registration Authority,
requesting certificates for Pledges from the Key Infrastructure.
The above requirements and expectations against the Key
Infrastructure are unchanged from RFC7030. This document does not
place any additional architectural requirements on the Public Key
Infrastructure.
2.6. Certificate Time Validation
2.6.1. Lack of realtime clock
Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current
time. Mechanisms such as Network Time Protocols cannot be secured
until bootstrapping is complete. Therefore bootstrapping is defined
in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time.
Unfortunately there are moments during bootstrapping when
certificates are verified, such as during the TLS handshake, where
validity periods are confirmed. This paradoxical "catch-22" is
resolved by the Pledge maintaining a concept of the current "window"
of presumed time validity that is continually refined throughout the
bootstrapping process as follows:
o Initially the Pledge does not know the current time.
o Bootstrapping Pledges that have a Realtime Clock (RTC), SHOULD use
it to verify certificate validity. However, they MUST be prepared
for the recognize that the RTC might be completely wrong when a
RTC battery fails and resets to an origin time (e.g., Jan. 1,
1970)
o If the Pledge has any stable storage (such as from where firmware
is loaded) then it SHOULD assume that the clock CAN NOT be before
the date at which the firmware or the the storage was last time
stamped. The Pledge SHOULD NOT update the timestamps in any file
systems until it has a secure time source. This provides an
earliest date which is reasonable. Call this the current
reasonable date (CRD). This value SHOULD NOT be stored in any
way, and applies to the current Registration attempt only.
Subsequent attempts MUST follow this proceedure again from
scratch. The current reasonable date may only increase.
o The Pledge is exposed to dates in the following five places
(Registrar certificate, notBefore and notAfter. Voucher created-
on, and expires-on. Additionally, CMS signatures contain a
signingTime)
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
o During the initial connection with the Registrar, the Pledge sees
the Registrar Certificate. It has an inception date (notBefore)
and an expiry date (notAfter). It is reasonable that the
notBefore date be after the Pledge's current working reasonable
date. It is however, suspicious for the notAfter date to be
before the Pledge's current reasonable date. No action is
recommended, other than an internal audit entry for this.
o If the notBefore date of the Registrar's certificate is newer than
the Pledge's reasonable date, then it MAY update it's current
reasonable date to the notBefore value.
o After the voucher request process, the pledge will have a voucher.
It can validate the signature on the voucher, as it has been (by
literal construction) provided with the MASA's key as a trust
anchor. The time values (created-on, expires-on) in the voucher
can not in general be validated as the Pledge has no certain real
time clock. There are some reasonable assumptions that can be
made: the voucher's expires-on time can not be prior to the the
Pledge's current reasonable date. For nonceless vouchers, the
voucher's created-on time COULD be earlier if the as well if a
long-lived voucher was obtained some time in the past, and the
Pledge has since gone through a firmware update and factory reset.
o If the voucher contains a nonce then the Pledge MUST confirm the
nonce matches the original Pledge voucher-request. This ensures
the voucher is fresh. See / (Section 5.2). In that case, the
voucher's created-on date MUST NOT be prior to the Pledge's
current reasonable date. In addition, when there is a valid
nonce, the current reasonable date MAY be incremented to that of
the CMS signingTime.
o Once the voucher is accepted the validity period of the pinned-
domain-cert in the voucher now serves as a valid time window. As
explained in Section 5.4.3, the MASA has checked the Registrar's
certificate against real clocks , the endorsement of the MASA
allows the Pledge to treat the notBefore and notAfter dates as
being constrained on any subsequent certificate validity periods
that may need to be checked: for instance, validating peer
certificates during ANIMA ACP setup.
o When accepting an enrollment certificate the validity period
within the new certificate is assumed to be valid by the Pledge.
The Pledge is now willing to use this credential for client
authentication.
o
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID
[RFC5280] explains that long lived Pledge certificates "SHOULD be
assigned the GeneralizedTime value of 99991231235959Z". Registrars
MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring Pledge
lifetimes if they did not follow the RFC5280 recommendations.
For example, IDevID may have incorrect lifetime of N <= 3 years,
rendering replacement Pledges from storage useless after N years
unless registrars support ignoring such a lifetime.
2.7. Cloud Registrar
There exist operationally open network wherein device gains
unauthenticated access to the internet at large. In these use cases
the management domain for the device needs to be discovered within
the larger internet. These are less likely within the anima scope
but may be more important in the future.
There are additionally some greenfield situations involving an
entirely new installation where a device may have some kind of
management uplink that it can use (such as via 3G network for
instance). In such a future situation, the device might use this
management interface to learn that it should configure itself by to-
be-determined mechanism (such as an Intent) to become the local
Registrar.
In order to support these scenarios, the Pledge MAY contact a well
known URI of a cloud Registrar if a local Registrar cannot be
discovered or if the Pledge's target use cases do not include a local
Registrar.
If the Pledge uses a well known URI for contacting a cloud Registrar
an Implicit Trust Anchor database (see [RFC7030]) MUST be used to
authenticate service as described in [RFC6125]. This is consistent
with the human user configuration of an EST server URI in [RFC7030]
which also depends on RFC6125.
2.8. Determining the MASA to contact
The Registrar needs to be able to contact a MASA that is trusted by
the Pledge in order to obtain vouchers. There are three mechanisms
described:
The device's Initial Device Identifier will normally contain the MASA
URL as detailed in Section 2.3. This is the RECOMMENDED mechanism.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
If the Registrar is integrated with [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud] and the
Pledge IDevID contains the id-pe-mud-url then the Registrar MAY
attempt to obtain the MASA URL from the MUD file. The MUD file
extension for the MASA URL is defined in Appendix D.
It can be operationally difficult to ensure the necessary X.509
extensions are in the Pledge's IDevID due to the difficulty of
aligning current Pledge manufacturing with software releases and
development. As a final fallback the Registrar MAY be manually
configured or distributed with a MASA URL for each manufacturer.
Note that the Registrar can only select the configured MASA URL based
on the trust anchor -- so manufacturers can only leverage this
approach if they ensure a single MASA URL works for all Pledge's
associated with each trust anchor.
3. Voucher-Request artifact
Voucher-requests are how vouchers are requested. The semantics of
the vouchers are described below, in the YANG model.
A Pledge forms the "Pledge voucher-request" and submits it to the
Registrar.
The Registrar in turn forms the "Registrar voucher-request", and
submits it to the MASA server.
The "proximity-registrar-cert" leaf is used in the Pledge voucher-
requests. This provides a method for the Pledge to assert the
Registrar's proximity.
The "prior-signed-voucher-request" leaf is used in Registrar voucher-
requests. If present, it is the encoded (signed form) of the Pledge
voucher-request. This provides a method for the Registrar to forward
the Pledge's signed request to the MASA. This completes transmission
of the signed "proximity-registrar-cert" leaf.
A Registar MAY also retrieve nonceless vouchers by sending nonceless
voucher-requests to the MASA in order to obtain vouchers for later
offline use. No "prior-signed-voucher-request" leaf would be
included. The Registrar will also need to know the serial number of
the pledge. This document does not provide a mechanism for the
Registrar to learn that in an automated fashion. Typically this will
be done via scanning of bar-code or QR-code on packaging, or via some
sales channel integration.
Unless otherwise signaled (outside the voucher-request artifact), the
signing structure is as defined for vouchers, see
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
3.1. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a
voucher-request document. The notation used in this diagram is
described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]. Each node in the diagram is
fully described by the YANG module in Section 3.3. Please review the
YANG module for a detailed description of the voucher-request format.
module: ietf-voucher-request
grouping voucher-request-grouping
+---- voucher
+---- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- assertion enumeration
+---- serial-number string
+---- idevid-issuer? binary
+---- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+---- nonce? binary
+---- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+---- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary
+---- proximity-registrar-cert? binary
3.2. Examples
This section provides voucher-request examples for illustration
purposes. These examples conform to the encoding rules defined in
[RFC7951].
Example (1) The following example illustrates a Pledge voucher-
request. The assertion leaf is indicated as 'proximity'
and the Registrar's TLS server certificate is included
in the 'proximity-registrar-cert' leaf. See
Section 5.2.
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
"assertion": "proximity",
"proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
Example (2) The following example illustrates a Registrar voucher-
request. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is
populated with the Pledge's voucher-request (such as the
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
prior example). The Pledge's voucher-request, if a
signed artifact with a CMS format signature is a binary
object. In the JSON encoding used here it must be
base64 encoded. The nonce, created-on and assertion is
carried forward. serial-number is extracted from the
Pledge's Client Certificate from the TLS connection.
See Section 5.4.
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
"assertion": "proximity",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
"serial-number": "JADA123456789"
"prior-signed-voucher": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
Example (3) The following example illustrates a Registrar voucher-
request. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is not
populated with the Pledge's voucher-request nor is the
nonce leaf. This form might be used by a Registrar
requesting a voucher when the Pledge is offline or when
the Registrar expects to be offline during deployment.
See Section 5.4.
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
"assertion": "TBD",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
"serial-number": "JADA123456789"
}
}
Example (4) The following example illustrates a Registrar voucher-
request. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is not
populated with the Pledge voucher-request because the
Pledge did not sign its own request. This form might be
used when more constrained Pledges are being deployed.
The nonce is populated from the Pledge's request. See
Section 5.4.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
"assertion": "proximity",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
"serial-number": "JADA123456789"
}
}
3.3. YANG Module
Following is a YANG [RFC7950] module formally extending the
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] voucher into a voucher-request.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher-request@2018-02-14.yang"
module ietf-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request";
prefix "vch";
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description "This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-voucher {
prefix v;
description "This module defines the format for a voucher,
which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or
delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to
an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure
conn ection to the owner's network infrastructure";
reference "RFC YYYY: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>
Author: Max Pritikin
<mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Toerless Eckert
<mailto:tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>";
description
"This module module defines the format for a voucher request.
It is a superset of the voucher itself.
This artifact may be optionally signed.
It provides content to the MASA for consideration
during a voucher request.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in
the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2018-02-14" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
// Top-level statement
rc:yang-data voucher-request-artifact {
uses voucher-request-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
refine "voucher/created-on" {
mandatory false;
}
refine "voucher/pinned-domain-cert" {
mandatory false;
}
augment "voucher" {
description
"Adds leaf nodes appropriate for requesting vouchers.";
leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD be
included in this field.
For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher, which
an intermediate registrar then re-signs to make its own
proximity assertion. This is a simple mechanism for a
chain of trusted parties to change a voucher, while
maintaining the prior signature information.
The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information when
accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other parties MAY
examine the prior signed voucher information for the
purposes of policy decisions. For example this information
could be useful to a MASA to determine that both pledge and
registrar agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD
remove all prior-signed-voucher information when signing
a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the final
voucher size.";
}
leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280,
Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by
the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is
populated.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar)
The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communications. The Proxy
forwards packets between the Pledge and a Registrar that has been
provisioned to the Proxy via GRASP discovery.
This section defines a stateful proxy mechanism which is refered to
as a "circuit" proxy.
The Proxy does not terminate the TLS handshake: it passes streams of
bytes onward without examination.
A Proxy MAY assume TLS framing for auditing purposes, but MUST NOT
assume any TLS version.
Registrars are assumed to have logically a locally integrated Proxy
to support directly (subnet) connected Pledges - because Registrars
themself does not define any functions for Pledges to discover them.
Such a logical local proxy does not need to provide actual TCP
proxying (just discovery) as long as the Registrar can operate with
subnet (link) local addresses on the interfaces where Pledges may
connect to.
As a result of the Proxy Discovery process in Section 4.1.1, the port
number exposed by the Proxy does not need to be well known, or
require an IANA allocation.
In the ANI, the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) secured instance of
GRASP ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]) MUST be used for discovery of ANI
Registrar ACP addresses and ports by ANI Proxies. The TCP leg of the
proxy connection between ANI Proxy and ANI Registrar therefore also
runs across the ACP.
If GRASP is used by proxies for discovery of Registrars (ACP or not),
the proxy can also learn the proxy mechanism (Circuit Proxy vs. IPIP
encapsulation or other)
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
For the IPIP encapsulation methods (described in Appendix C), the
port announced by the Proxy SHOULD be the same as on the Registrar in
order for the Proxy to remain stateless.
In order to permit the Proxy functionality to be implemented on the
maximum variety of devices the chosen mechanism SHOULD use the
minimum amount of state on the Proxy device. While many devices in
the ANIMA target space will be rather large routers, the Proxy
function is likely to be implemented in the control plane CPU of such
a device, with available capabilities for the Proxy function similar
to many class 2 IoT devices.
The document [I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] provides a
more extensive analysis and background of the alternative Proxy
methods.
4.1. Pledge discovery of Proxy
The result of discovery is a logical communication with a Registrar,
through a Proxy. The Proxy is transparent to the Pledge but is
always assumed to exist.
To discover the Proxy the Pledge performs the following actions:
1. MUST: Obtains a local address using IPv6 methods as described in
[RFC4862] IPv6 Stateless Address AutoConfiguration. Use of
[RFC4941] temporary addresses is encouraged. A new temporary
address SHOULD be allocated whenever the discovery process is
forced to restart due to failures. Pledges will generally prefer
use of IPv6 Link-Local addresses, and discovery of Proxy will be
by Link-Local mechanisms. IPv4 methods are described in
Appendix A
2. MUST: Listen for GRASP M_FLOOD ([I-D.ietf-anima-grasp])
announcements of the objective: "AN_Proxy". See section
Section 4.1.1 for the details of the objective. The Pledge MAY
listen concurrently for other sources of information, see
Appendix B.
Once a Proxy is discovered the Pledge communicates with a Registrar
through the Proxy using the bootstrapping protocol defined in
Section 5.
While the GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism is passive for the Pledge, the
optional other methods (mDNS, and IPv4 methods) are active. The
Pledge SHOULD run those methods in parallel with listening to for the
M_FLOOD. The active methods SHOULD exponentially back-off to a
maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network with discovery
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
attempts. Detection of change of physical link status (ethernet
carrier for instance) SHOULD reset the exponential back off.
The Pledge may discover more than one proxy on a given physical
interface. The Pledge may have a multitude of physical interfaces as
well: a layer-2/3 ethernet switch may have hundreds of physical
ports.
Each possible proxy offer SHOULD be attempted up to the point where a
voucher is received: while there are many ways in which the attempt
may fail, it does not succeed until the voucher has been validated.
The connection attempts via a single proxy SHOULD exponentially back-
off to a maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network
infrastructure. The back-off timer for each MUST be independent of
other connection attempts.
Connection attempts SHOULD be run in parallel to avoid head of queue
problems wherein an attacker running a fake Proxy or Registrar could
perform protocol actions intentionally slowly. The Pledge SHOULD
continue to listen to for additional GRASP M_FLOOD messages during
the connection attempts.
Once a connection to a Registrar is established (e.g. establishment
of a TLS session key) there are expectations of more timely
responses, see Section 5.2.
Once all discovered services are attempted (assuming that none
succeeded) the device MUST return to listening for GRASP M_FLOOD. It
SHOULD periodically retry the manufacturer specific mechanisms. The
Pledge MAY prioritize selection order as appropriate for the
anticipated environment.
4.1.1. Proxy GRASP announcements
A Proxy uses the DULL GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism to announce itself.
This announcement can be within the same message as the ACP
announcement detailed in [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane].
The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows:
[M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
["AN_Proxy", 4, 1, ""],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 'TCP', 4443]]
Figure 6b: Proxy Discovery
The formal CDDL definition is:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl,
+[objective, (locator-option / [])]]
objective = ["AN_Proxy", objective-flags, loop-count,
objective-value]
ttl = 180000 ; 180,000 ms (3 minutes)
initiator = ACP address to contact Registrar
objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec
sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization
loop-count = 1 ; one hop only
objective-value = any ; none
locator = [ O_IPv6_LOCATOR, ipv6-address,
transport-proto, port-number ]
ipv6-address = the v6 LL of the Proxy
transport-proto = IPPROTO_TCP / IPPROTO_UDP / IPPROTO_IPV6
port-number = selected by Proxy
Figure 6c: AN_Proxy CDDL
4.2. CoAP connection to Registrar
The use of CoAP to connect from Pledge to Registrar is out of scope
for this document, and may be described in future work.
4.3. Proxy discovery of Registrar
The Registrar SHOULD announce itself so that proxies can find it and
determine what kind of connections can be terminated.
The Registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using
M_FLOOD messages. They MUST support ANI TLS circuit Proxy and
therefore BRSKI across HTTPS/TLS native across the ACP. ANI
Registrars MAY support the IPIP proxy method by implementing IPIP
tunneling for their HTTPS/TLS traffic across the ACP. ANI Proxies
MUST support GRASP discovery of Registrars.
The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows:
[M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', 180000,
["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "EST-TLS"],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', TCP, 80]]
Figure 7a: Registrar Discovery
The formal CDDL definition is:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl,
+[objective, (locator-option / [])]]
objective = ["AN_join_registrar", objective-flags, loop-count,
objective-value]
initiator = ACP address to contact Registrar
objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec
sync-only = 4 ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization
loop-count = 255 ; mandatory maximum
objective-value = text ; name of the (list of) of supported
; protocols: "EST-TLS" for RFC7030.
Figure 7: AN_join_registrar CDDL
The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The period is subject
to network administrator policy (EST server configuration). It must
be sufficiently low that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs
from all EST servers causes negligible traffic across the ACP.
The locators are to be interpreted as follows:
locator1 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 6, 443]
locator2 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 17, 5683]
locator3 = [O_IPv6_LOCATOR, fe80::1234, 41, nil]
A protocol of 6 indicates that TCP proxying on the indicated port is
desired. A protocol of 17 indicates that UDP proxying on the
indicated port is desired. In each case, the traffic SHOULD be
proxied to the same port at the ULA address provided.
A protocol of 41 indicates that packets may be IPIP proxy'ed. In the
case of that IPIP proxying is used, then the provided link-local
address MUST be advertised on the local link using proxy neighbour
discovery. The Join Proxy MAY limit forwarded traffic to the
protocol (6 and 17) and port numbers indicated by locator1 and
locator2. The address to which the IPIP traffic should be sent is
the initiator address (an ACP address of the Registrar), not the
address given in the locator.
Registrars MUST accept TCP / UDP traffic on the ports given at the
ACP address of the Registrar. If the Registrar supports IPIP
tunnelling, it MUST also accept traffic encapsulated with IPIP.
Registrars MUST accept HTTPS/EST traffic on the TCP ports indicated.
Registrars MAY accept DTLS/CoAP/EST traffic on the UDP ports, in
addition to TCP traffic.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
5. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA)
The Pledge MUST initiate BRSKI after boot if it is unconfigured. The
Pledge MUST NOT automatically initiate BRSKI if it has been
configured or is in the process of being configured.
BRSKI is described as extensions to EST [RFC7030]. The goal of these
extensions is to reduce the number of TLS connections and crypto
operations required on the Pledge. The Registrar implements the
BRSKI REST interface within the same "/.well-known" URI tree as the
existing EST URIs as described in EST [RFC7030] section 3.2.2. The
communication channel between the Pledge and the Registrar is
referred to as "BRSKI-EST" (see Figure 1).
The communication channel between the Registrar and MASA is similarly
described as extensions to EST within the same "/.well-known" tree.
For clarity this channel is referred to as "BRSKI-MASA". (See
Figure 1).
MASA URI is "https://" authority "/.well-known/est".
BRSKI uses existing CMS message formats for existing EST operations.
BRSKI uses JSON [RFC7159] for all new operations defined here, and
voucher formats.
While EST section 3.2 does not insist upon use of HTTP 1.1 persistent
connections, BRSKI-EST connections SHOULD use persistent connections.
The intention of this guidance is to ensure the provisional TLS state
occurs only once, and that the subsequent resolution of the provision
state is not subject to a MITM attack during a critical phase.
Summarized automation extensions for the BRSKI-EST flow are:
o The Pledge provisionally accepts the Registrar certificate during
the TLS handshake as detailed in Section 5.1.
o In order to avoid infinite redirect loops, which a malicious
Registrar might do in order to keep the Pledge from discovering
the correct Registrar, the Pledge MUST NOT follow more than one
redirection to another other web origins.
o (EST supports redirection but does not allow redirections to other
web origins without user input.)
o The Registar MAY respond with an HTTP 202 ("the request has been
accepted for processing, but the processing has not been
completed") as described in EST [RFC7030] section 4.2.3 wherein
the client "MUST wait at least the specified 'retry-after' time
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
before repeating the same request". The Pledge is RECOMMENDED to
provide local feedback (blinked LED etc) during this wait cycle if
mechanisms for this are available. To prevent an attacker
Registrar from significantly delaying bootstrapping the Pledge
MUST limit the 'retry-after' time to 60 seconds.
o To avoid blocking on a single erroneous Registrar the Pledge MUST
drop the connection after 5 seconds in which there has been no
progress on the TCP connection. It should proceed to connect to
any other Registrar's via any other discovered Proxies if there
are any. If there were no other Proxies discovered, the Pledge
MAY continue to wait, as long as it is concurrently listening for
new Proxy announcements.
o Ideally the Pledge could keep track of the appropriate retry-after
value for any number of outstanding Registrars but this would
involve a large state table on the Pledge. Instead the Pledge MAY
ignore the exact retry-after value in favor of a single hard coded
value that takes effect between discovery attempts. A Registrar
that is unable to complete the transaction the first time due to
timing reasons will have future chances.
o The Pledge requests and validates a voucher using the new REST
calls described below.
o If necessary the Pledge calls the EST defined /cacerts method to
obtain the domain owners' CA certificate. The pinned-domain-
certificate element from the voucher should validate this
certificate, or be identical to it.
o The Pledge completes authentication of the server certificate as
detailed in Section 5.5.1. This moves the BRSKI-EST TLS
connection out of the provisional state.
o Mandatory boostrap steps conclude with Voucher Status Telemetry
(see Section 5.6).
The BRSKI-EST TLS connection can now be used for EST enrollment.
The extensions for a Registrar (equivalent to EST server) are:
o Client authentication is automated using Initial Device Identity
(IDevID) as per the EST certificate based client authentication.
The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber"
attribute with the device's unique serial number.
o In the language of [RFC6125] this provides for a SERIALNUM-ID
category of identifier that can be included in a certificate and
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
therefore that can also be used for matching purposes. The
SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is collated according to manufacturer trust
anchor since serial numbers are not globally unique.
o The Registrar requests and validates the Voucher from the MASA.
o The Registrar forwards the Voucher to the Pledge when requested.
o The Registar performs log verifications in addition to local
authorization checks before accepting optional Pledge device
enrollment requests.
5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details
The Pledge establishes the TLS connection with the Registrar through
the circuit proxy (see Section 4) but the TLS handshake is with the
Registar. The BRSKI-EST Pledge is the TLS client and the BRSKI-EST
Registrar is the TLS server. All security associations established
are between the Pledge and the Registrar regardless of proxy
operations.
Establishment of the BRSKI-EST TLS connection is as specified in EST
[RFC7030] section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates"
[RFC7030] wherein the client is authenticated with the IDevID
certificate, and the EST server (the Registrar) is provisionally
authenticated with an unverified server certificate.
The Pledge maintains a security paranoia concerning the provisional
state, and all data received, until a voucher is received and
verified as specified in Section 5.5.1
5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar
When the Pledge bootstraps it makes a request for a Voucher from a
Registrar.
This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of
"/.well-known/est/requestvoucher".
The request media types are:
application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON
document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described
in Section 3 using the JSON encoding described in [RFC7951]. The
Pledge SHOULD sign the request using the Section 2.3 credential.
application/json The request is the "YANG-defined JSON document" as
described in Section 3 with the exception that it is not within a
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
PKCS#7 structure. It is protected only by the TLS client
authentication. This reduces the cryptographic requirements on
the Pledge.
For simplicity the term 'voucher-request' is used to refer to either
of these media types. Registrar impementations SHOULD anticipate
future media types but of course will simply fail the request if
those types are not yet known.
The Pledge populates the voucher-request fields as follows:
created-on: Pledges that have a realtime clock are RECOMMENDED to
populate this field. This provides additional information to the
MASA.
nonce: The Pledge voucher-request MUST contain a cryptographically
strong random or pseudo-random number nonce. Doing so ensures
Section 2.6.1 functionality. The nonce MUST NOT be reused for
multiple bootstrapping attempts.
assertion: The Pledge voucher-request MAY contain an assertion of
"proximity".
proximity-registrar-cert: In a Pledge voucher-request this is the
first certificate in the TLS server 'certificate_list' sequence
(see [RFC5246]) presented by the Registrar to the Pledge. This
MUST be populated in a Pledge voucher-request if the "proximity"
assertion is populated.
All other fields MAY be omitted in the Pledge voucher-request.
An example JSON payload of a Pledge voucher-request is in Section 3.2
Example 1.
The Registrar validates the client identity as described in EST
[RFC7030] section 3.3.2. If the request is signed the Registrar
confirms that the 'proximity' asserion and associated 'proximity-
registrar-cert' are correct. The Registrar performs authorization as
detailed in [[EDNOTE: UNRESOLVED. See Appendix D "Pledge
Authorization"]]. If these validations fail the Registrar SHOULD
respond with an appropriate HTTP error code.
If authorization is successful the Registrar obtains a voucher from
the MASA service (see Section 5.4) and returns that MASA signed
voucher to the Pledge as described in Section 5.5.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
5.3. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details
The BRSKI-MASA TLS connection is a 'normal' TLS connection
appropriate for HTTPS REST interfaces. The Registrar initiates the
connection and uses the MASA URL obtained as described in Section 2.8
for [RFC6125] authentication of the MASA server.
The primary method of Registrar "authentication" by the MASA is
detailed in Section 5.4. As detailed in Section 9 the MASA might
find it necessary to request additional Registrar authentication.
Registrars MUST be prepared to support TLS client certificate
authentication and HTTP Basic or Digest authentication as described
in RFC7030 for EST clients. Implementors are advised that contacting
the MASA is to establish a secured REST connection with a web service
and that there are a number of authentication models being explored
within the industry. Registrars are RECOMMENDED to fail gracefully
and generate useful administrative notifications or logs in the
advent of unexpected HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) responses from the MASA.
5.4. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA
When a Registrar receives a Pledge voucher-request it in turn submits
a Registrar voucher-request to the MASA service. For simplicity this
is defined as an optional EST message between a Registrar and an EST
server running on the MASA service although the Registrar is not
required to make use of any other EST functionality when
communicating with the MASA service. (The MASA service MUST properly
reject any EST functionality requests it does not wish to service; a
requirement that holds for any REST interface).
This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of
"/.well-known/est/requestvoucher".
The request media type is defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] and is
application/voucher-cms+json. It is a JSON document that has been
signed using a CMS structure. The Registrar MUST sign the Registrar
voucher-request. The entire Registrar certificate chain, up to and
including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the PKCS#7 structure.
MASA impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of
course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.
The Registrar populates the voucher-request fields as follows:
created-on: Registrars are RECOMMENDED to populate this field. This
provides additional information to the MASA.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
nonce: The optional nonce value from the Pledge request if desired
(see below).
serial-number: The serial number of the Pledge the Registrar would
like a voucher for. The Registrar determines this value by
parsing the authenticated Pledge IDevID certificate. See
Section 2.3. The Registrar SHOULD verify that the serial number
field it parsed matches the serial number field the Pledge
provided in its voucher-request. This provides a sanity check
useful for detecting error conditions and logging. The Registrar
MUST NOT simply copy the serial number field from a Pledge voucher
request as that field is claimed but not certified.
idevid-issuer: The idevid-issuer value from the Pledge certificate
is included to ensure a statistically unique identity.
prior-signed-voucher: If a signed Pledge voucher-request was
received then it SHOULD be included in the Registrar voucher-
request. (NOTE: what is included is the complete Pledge voucher-
request, inclusive of the 'assertion', 'proximity-registrar-cert',
etc wrapped by the Pledge's original signature). If a signed
voucher-request was not recieved from the Pledge then this leaf is
omitted from the Registrar voucher request.
A nonceless Registrar voucher-request MAY be submitted to the MASA.
Doing so allows the Registrar to request a Voucher when the Pledge is
offline, or when the Registrar is expected to be offline when the
Pledge is being deployed. These use cases require the Registrar to
learn the appropriate IDevID SerialNumber field from the physical
device labeling or from the sales channel (out-of-scope for this
document). If a nonceless voucher-reqeust is submitted the MASA
server MUST authenticate the Registrar as described in either EST
[RFC7030] section 3.2, section 3.3, or by validating the Registrar's
certificate used to sign the Registrar voucher-request. Any of these
methods reduce the risk of DDoS attacks and provide an authenticated
identity as an input to sales channel integration and authorizations
(the actual sale-channel integration is also out-of-scope of this
document).
All other fields MAY be omitted in the Registrar voucher-request.
Example JSON payloads of Registrar voucher-requests are in
Section 3.2 Examples 2 through 4.
The MASA verifies that the Registrar voucher-request is internally
consistent but does not necessarily authenticate the Registrar
certificate since the Registrar is not known to the MASA server in
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
advance. The MASA performs the following actions and validation
checks before issuing a voucher:
5.4.1. Renew for expired voucher
As described in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] vouchers are normally short
lived to avoid revocation issues. If the request is for a previous
(expired) voucher using the same Registrar (as determined by the
Registrar pinned-domain-cert) and the MASA has not been informed that
the claim is invalid then the request for a renewed voucher SHOULD be
automatically authorized.
5.4.2. Voucher signature consistency
The MASA MUST verify that the Registrar voucher-request is signed by
a Registrar. This is confirmed by verifying that the id-kp-cmcRA
extended key usage extension field (as detailed in EST RFC7030
section 3.6.1) exists in the certificate of the entity that signed
the Registrar voucher-request. This verification is only a
consistency check that the unauthenticated domain CA intended this to
be a Registrar. Performing this check provides value to domain PKI
by assuring the domain administrator that the MASA service will only
respect claims from authorized Registration Authorities of the
domain. (The requirement for the Registrar to include the Domain CA
certificate in the signature structure was stated above.)
5.4.3. Registrar revocation consistency
If the Registrar uses a CA known to the MASA, and it makes
certificate revocation information available to the MASA, then the
MASA SHOULD check for the maximum validity of the Registrar's
certificate.
There are three times to consider: a) a configured voucher lifetime
in the MASA, b) the expiry time for the Registrar's Certificate, c)
any certificate revocation information (CRL) lifetime.
The resulting voucher should have a lifetime (expires-on field) which
is the earliest of these three values. Typically (b) will be some
significant time in the future, but (c) will typically be short (on
the order of a week or less). The RECOMMENDED period for (a) is on
the order of 20 minutes, so it will typically determine the lifespan
of the resulting voucher.
By limiting the voucher lifetime in this way, the MASA is effectively
doing CRL and lifetime checks on behalf of the Pledge. While the
pledge may be without a real time clock to tell it absolute time, it
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
SHOULD be able to calculate relative time. See section
Section 2.6.1.
If CRL information is unavailable to the MASA, then the MASA SHOULD
rely on the validity information Because the Registar certificate
authority is unknown to the MASA in advance this is only an extended
consistency check and is not required. The maximum lifetime of the
voucher issued SHOULD NOT exceed the lifetime of the Registrar's
revocation validation (for example if the Registrar revocation status
is indicated in a CRL that is valid for two weeks then that is an
appropriate lifetime for the voucher.)
5.4.4. Pledge proximity assertion
The MASA server MAY verify that the Registrar voucher-request
includes the 'prior-signed-voucher' field populated with a Pledge
voucher-request that includes a 'proximity-registrar-cert' that is
consistent with the certificate used to sign the Registrar voucher-
request. The MASA server is aware of which Pledges support signing
of their voucher requests and can use this information to confirm
proximity of the Pledge with the Registrar.
5.4.5. Registar (certificate) authentication
The pledge proximity assertion only occurs if the Registrar voucher-
request is nonceless. As noted above the details concerning
necessary sales-channel integration for the MASA to authenticate a
Registrar certificate is out-of-scope.
5.4.6. Registrar Anchor
The Registrar's certificate chain is extracted from the signature
method and the root certificate is used to populate the "pinned-
domain-cert" of the Voucher being issued. The domainID (e.g., hash
of the root public key) is determined from the pinned-domain-cert and
is used to update the audit log.
5.5. Voucher Response
The voucher response to requests from the Pledge and requests from a
Registrar are in the same format. A Registrar either caches prior
MASA responses or dynamically requests a new Voucher based on local
policy.
If the join operation is successful, the server (MASA responding to
Registrar, and Registrar responding to Pledge) response MUST contain
an HTTP 200 response code. The server MUST answer with a suitable
4xx or 5xx HTTP [RFC2616] error code when a problem occurs. In this
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
case, the response data from the MASA server MUST be a plaintext
human-readable (ASCII, English) error message containing explanatory
information describing why the request was rejected.
A 403 (Forbidden) response is appropriate if the voucher-request is
not signed correctly, stale, or if the Pledge has another outstanding
voucher that cannot be overridden.
A 404 (Not Found) response is appropriate when the request is for a
device that is not known to the MASA.
A 406 (Not Acceptable) response is appropriate if a voucher of the
desired type, or using the desired algorithms (as indicated by the
Accept: headers, and algorithms used in the signature) cannot be
issued, such as because the MASA knows the Pledge cannot process that
type.
A 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response is approriate for a request
that has a voucher encoding that is not understood.
The response media type is:
application/voucher-cms+json The response is a "YANG-defined JSON
document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described
in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] using the JSON encoded described in
[RFC7951]. The MASA MUST sign the request.
The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]. For example, the voucher consists of:
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
"assertion": "logging"
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
"serial-number": "JADA123456789"
}
}
The Pledge verifies the signed voucher using the manufacturer
installed trust anchor associated with the manufacturer's selected
Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority.
The Pledge verifies the serial-number field of the signed voucher
matches the Pledge's serial-number.
The 'pinned-domain-cert' element of the voucher contains the domain
CA's public key. The Pledge MUST use the 'pinned-domain-cert' trust
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
anchor to immediately complete authentication of the provisional TLS
connection.
The Pledge MUST be prepared to parse and fail gracefully from a
Voucher response that does not contain a 'pinned-domain-cert' field.
The Pledge MUST be prepared to ignore additional fields that it does
not recognize.
5.5.1. Completing authentication of Provisional TLS connection
If a Registrar's credentials cannot be verified using the pinned-
domain-cert trust anchor from the voucher then the TLS connection is
immediately discarded and the Pledge abandons attempts to bootstrap
with this discovered Registrar. The Pledge SHOULD send voucher
status telemetry (described below) before closing the TLS connection.
The Pledge MUST attempt to enroll using any other proxies it has
found. It SHOULD return to the same proxy again after attempting
with other proxies. Attempts should be attempted in the exponential
backoff described earlier. Attempts SHOULD be repeated as failure
may be the result of a temporary inconsistently (an inconsistently
rolled Registrar key, or some other mis-configuration.) The
inconsistently could also be the result an active MITM attack on the
EST connection.
The Registrar MUST use a certificate that chains to the pinned-
domain-cert as its TLS server certificate.
The Pledge's PKIX path validation of a Registrar certificate's
validity period information is as described in Section 2.6.1. Once
the PKIX path validation is successful the TLS connection is no
longer provisional.
The pinned-domain-cert is installed as an Explicit Trust Anchor for
future operations. It can therefore can be used to authenticate any
dynamically discovered EST server that contain the id-kp-cmcRA
extended key usage extension as detailed in EST RFC7030 section
3.6.1; but to reduce system complexity the Pledge SHOULD avoid
additional discovery operations. Instead the Pledge SHOULD
communicate directly with the Registrar as the EST server. The
'pinned-domain-cert' is not a complete distribution of the [RFC7030]
section 4.1.3 CA Certificate Response, which is an additional
justification for the recommendation to proceed with EST key
management operations. Once a full CA Certificate Response is
obtained it is more authoritative for the domain than the limited
'pinned-domain-cert' response.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
5.6. Voucher Status Telemetry
The domain is expected to provide indications to the system
administrators concerning device lifecycle status. To facilitate
this it needs telemetry information concerning the device's status.
To indicate Pledge status regarding the Voucher, the Pledge MUST post
a status message.
The posted data media type: application/json
The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the EST well
known URI "/voucher_status". The Status field indicates if the
Voucher was acceptable. If it was not acceptable the Reason string
indicates why. In the failure case this message may be sent to an
unauthenticated, potentially malicious Registrar and therefore the
Reason string SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an
attacker. The operational benefit of this telemetry information is
balanced against the operational costs of not recording that an
Voucher was ignored by a client the registar expected to continue
joining the domain.
{
"version":"1",
"Status":FALSE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
"Reason":"Informative human readable message"
"reason-context": { additional JSON }
}
The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
an HTTP 404 error. The client ignores any response. Within the
server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.
The reason-context attribute is an arbitrary JSON object (literal
value or hash of values) which provides additional information
specific to this Pledge. The contents of this field are not subject
to standardization.
Additional standard responses MAY be added via Specification
Required.
5.7. MASA authorization log Request
After receiving the voucher status telemetry Section 5.6, the
Registrar SHOULD request the MASA authorization log from the MASA
service using this EST extension. If a device had previously
registered with another domain, a Registrar of that domain would show
in the log.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of
"/.well-known/est/requestauditlog".
The Registrar MUST HTTP POST the same Registrar voucher-request as it
did when requesting a Voucher. It is posted to the /requestauditlog
URI instead. The "idevid-issuer" and "serial-number" informs the
MASA server which log is requested so the appropriate log can be
prepared for the response. Using the same media type and message
minimizes cryptographic and message operations although it results in
additional network traffic. The relying MASA server implementation
MAY leverage internal state to associate this request with the
original, and by now already validated, Registrar voucher-request so
as to avoid an extra crypto validation.
A MASA that receives a request for a device that does not exist, or
for which the requesting owner was never an owner returns an HTTP 404
("Not found") code.
Rather than returning the audit log as a response to the POST (with a
return code 200), the MASA MAY instead return a 201 ("Created")
RESTful response ([RFC7231] section 7.1) containing a URL to the
prepared (and easily cachable) audit response.
In order to avoid enumeration of device audit logs, MASA servers that
return URLs SHOULD take care to make the returned URL unguessable.
For instance, rather than returning URLs containing a database number
such as https://example.com/auditlog/1234 or the EUI of the device
such https://example.com/auditlog/10-00-00-11-22-33, the MASA SHOULD
return a randomly generated value (a "slug" in web parlance). The
value is used to find the relevant database entry.
A MASA that returns a code 200 MAY also include a Location: header
for future reference by the Registrar.
The request media type is:
application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON
document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described
in Section 3 using the JSON encoded described in [RFC7951]. The
Registrar MUST sign the request. The entire Registrar certificate
chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the
CMS structure.
5.7.1. MASA authorization log Response
A log data file is returned consisting of all log entries. For
example:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
{
"version":"1",
"events":[
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
},
{
"date":"<date/time of the entry>",
"domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
}
],
"truncation": {
"nonced duplicates": <number of entries truncated>,
"nonceless duplicates": <number of entries truncated>,
"arbitrary": <number of entries trucated>
}
}
A Registrar SHOULD use this log information to make an informed
decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the Pledge. For
example if the log includes an unexpected domainID then the Pledge
could have imprinted on an unexpected domain. If the log includes
nonceless entries then any Registrar in the same domain could
theoretically trigger a reset of the device and take over management
of the Pledge. Equipment that is purchased pre-owned can be expected
to have an extensive history. A Registrar MAY request logs at future
times. A Registrar MAY be configured to ignore the history of the
device but it is RECOMMENDED that this only be configured if hardware
assisted NEA [RFC5209] is supported.
Log entries can be compared against local history logs in search of
discrepancies.
Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can
be optimized as follows: Nonced or Nonceless entries for the same
domainID MAY be truncated from the log leaving only the single most
recent nonced or nonceless entry. The log SHOULD NOT be further
reduced but there could exist operational situation where maintaining
the full log is not possible. In such situations the log MAY be
arbitrarily truncated for length. The trunctation method(s) used
MUST be indicated in the JSON truncation dictionary using "nonced
duplicates", "nonceless duplicates", and "arbitrary" where the number
of entries that have been truncation is indicated. If the truncation
count exceeds 1024 then the MASA MAY use this value without further
incrementing it.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
A log where duplicate entries for the same domain have been truncated
("nonced duplicates" and/or "nonceless duplicates) could still be
acceptable for informed decisions. A log that has had "arbitrary"
truncations is less acceptable but manufacturer transparency is
better than hidden truncations.
This document specifies a simple log format as provided by the MASA
service to the registar. This format could be improved by
distributed consensus technologies that integrate vouchers with
technologies such as block-chain or hash trees or optimized logging
approaches. Doing so is out of the scope of this document but is an
anticipated improvement for future work. As such, the Registrar
client SHOULD anticipate new kinds of responses, and SHOULD provide
operator controls to indicate how to process unknown responses.
5.8. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping
The Pledge SHOULD follow the BRSKI operations with EST enrollment
operations including "CA Certificates Request", "CSR Attributes" and
"Client Certificate Request" or "Server-Side Key Generation", etc.
This is a relatively seamless integration since BRSKI REST calls
provide an automated alternative to the manual bootstrapping method
described in [RFC7030]. As noted above, use of HTTP 1.1 persistent
connections simplifies the Pledge state machine.
An ANIMA ANI Pledge MUST implement the EST automation extensions
described below. They supplement the [RFC7030] EST to better support
automated devices that do not have an end user.
Although EST allows clients to obtain multiple certificates by
sending multiple CSR requests BRSKI mandates use of the CSR
Attributes request and mandates that the Registrar validate the CSR
against the expected attributes. This implies that client requests
will "look the same" and therefore result in a single logical
certificate being issued even if the client were to make multiple
requests. Registrars MAY contain more complex logic but doing so is
out-of-scope of this specification. BRSKI does not signal any
enhancement or restriction to this capability.
5.8.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates
The Pledge MUST request the full EST Distribution of CA Certificates
message. See RFC7030, section 4.1.
This ensures that the Pledge has the complete set of current CA
certificates beyond the pinned-domain-cert (see Section 5.5.1 for a
discussion of the limitations inherent in having a single certificate
instead of a full CA Certificates response.) Although these
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
limitations are acceptable during initial bootstrapping, they are not
appropriate for ongoing PKIX end entity certificate validation.
5.8.2. EST CSR Attributes
Automated bootstrapping occurs without local administrative
configuration of the Pledge. In some deployments it is plausible
that the Pledge generates a certificate request containing only
identity information known to the Pledge (essentially the X.509
IDevID information) and ultimately receives a certificate containing
domain specific identity information. Conceptually the CA has
complete control over all fields issued in the end entity
certificate. Realistically this is operationally difficult with the
current status of PKI certificate authority deployments, where the
CSR is submitted to the CA via a number of non-standard protocols.
Even with all standardized protocols used, it could operationally be
problematic to expect that service specific certificate fields can be
created by a CA that is likely operated by a group that has no
insight into different network services/protocols used. For example,
the CA could even be outsourced.
To alleviate these operational difficulties, the Pledge MUST request
the EST "CSR Attributes" from the EST server and the EST server needs
to be able to reply with the attributes necessary for use of the
certificate in its intended protocols/services. This approach allows
for minimal CA integrations and instead the local infrastructure (EST
server) informs the Pledge of the proper fields to include in the
generated CSR. This approach is beneficial to automated boostrapping
in the widest number of environments.
If the hardwareModuleName in the X.509 IDevID is populated then it
SHOULD by default be propagated to the LDevID along with the
hwSerialNum. The EST server SHOULD support local policy concerning
this functionality.
In networks using the BRSKI enrolled certificate to authenticate the
ACP (Autonomic Control Plane), the EST attributes MUST include the
"ACP information" field. See
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] for more details.
The Registar MUST also confirm that the resulting CSR is formatted as
indicated before forwarding the request to a CA. If the Registar is
communicating with the CA using a protocol such as full CMC, which
provides mechanisms to override the CSR attributes, then these
mechanisms MAY be used even if the client ignores CSR Attribute
guidance.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
5.8.3. EST Client Certificate Request
The Pledge MUST request a new client certificate. See RFC7030,
section 4.2.
5.8.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry
For automated bootstrapping of devices, the adminstrative elements
providing bootstrapping also provide indications to the system
administrators concerning device lifecycle status. This might
include information concerning attempted bootstrapping messages seen
by the client, MASA provides logs and status of credential
enrollment. [RFC7030] assumes an end user and therefore does not
include a final success indication back to the server. This is
insufficient for automated use cases.
To indicate successful enrollment the client SHOULD re-negotiate the
EST TLS session using the newly obtained credentials. This occurs by
the client initiating a new TLS ClientHello message on the existing
TLS connection. The client MAY simply close the old TLS session and
start a new one. The server MUST support either model.
In the case of a FAIL, the Reason string indicates why the most
recent enrollment failed. The SubjectKeyIdentifier field MUST be
included if the enrollment attempt was for a keypair that is locally
known to the client. If EST /serverkeygen was used and failed then
the field is omitted from the status telemetry.
In the case of a SUCCESS the Reason string is omitted. The
SubjectKeyIdentifier is included so that the server can record the
successful certificate distribution.
Status media type: application/json
The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the new EST well
known URI /enrollstatus.
{
"version":"1",
"Status":TRUE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
"Reason":"Informative human readable message"
"reason-context": "Additional information"
}
The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with
an HTTP 404 error.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Within the server logs the server MUST capture if this message was
received over an TLS session with a matching client certificate.
This allows for clients that wish to minimize their crypto operations
to simply POST this response without renegotiating the TLS session -
at the cost of the server not being able to accurately verify that
enrollment was truly successful.
5.8.5. Multiple certificates
Pledges that require multiple certificates could establish direct EST
connections to the Registrar.
5.8.6. EST over CoAP
This document describes extensions to EST for the purposes of
bootstrapping of remote key infrastructures. Bootstrapping is
relevant for CoAP enrollment discussions as well. The defintion of
EST and BRSKI over CoAP is not discussed within this document beyond
ensuring proxy support for CoAP operations. Instead it is
anticipated that a definition of CoAP mappings will occur in
subsequent documents such as [I-D.vanderstok-ace-coap-est] and that
CoAP mappings for BRSKI will be discussed either there or in future
work.
6. Reduced security operational modes
A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure
operational modes for support specific use cases. The following
sections detail specific ways that the Pledge, Registrar and MASA can
be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated reasons.
This section is considered non-normative: use suggested methods MUST
be detailed in specific profiles of BRSKI. This is the subject for
future work.
6.1. Trust Model
+--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+
| Pledge | | Circuit | | Domain | |Manufacturer|
| | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Service |
| | | | | | | (Internet) |
+--------+ +---------+ +------------+ +------------+
Figure 10
Pledge: The Pledge could be compromised and providing an attack
vector for malware. The entity is trusted to only imprint using
secure methods described in this document. Additional endpoint
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
assessment techniques are RECOMMENDED but are out-of-scope of this
document.
Proxy: Provides proxy functionalities but is not involved in
security considerations.
Registrar: When interacting with a MASA server a Registrar makes all
decisions. When Ownership Vouchers are involved a Registrar is
only a conduit and all security decisions are made on the
manufacturer service.
Vendor Service, MASA: This form of manufacturer service is trusted
to accurately log all claim attempts and to provide authoritative
log information to Registrars. The MASA does not know which
devices are associated with which domains. These claims could be
strengthened by using cryptographic log techniques to provide
append only, cryptographic assured, publicly auditable logs.
Current text provides only for a trusted manufacturer.
Vendor Service, Ownership Validation: This form of manufacturer
service is trusted to accurately know which device is owned by
which domain.
6.2. Pledge security reductions
The Pledge can choose to accept vouchers using less secure methods.
These methods enable offline and emergency (touch based) deployment
use cases:
1. The Pledge MUST accept nonceless vouchers. This allows for
offline use cases. Logging and validity periods address the
inherent security considerations of supporting these use cases.
2. The Pledge MAY support "trust on first use" for physical
interfaces such as a local console port or physical user
interface but MUST NOT support "trust on first use" on network
interfaces. This is because "trust on first use" permanently
degrades the security for all use cases.
3. The Pledge MAY have an operational mode where it skips Voucher
validation one time. For example if a physical button is
depressed during the bootstrapping operation. This can be useful
if the manufacturer service is unavailable. This behavior SHOULD
be available via local configuration or physical presence methods
(such as use of a serial/craft console) to ensure new entities
can always be deployed even when autonomic methods fail. This
allows for unsecured imprint.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
It is RECOMMENDED that "trust on first use" or skipping voucher
validation only be available if hardware assisted Network Endpoint
Assessment [RFC5209] is supported. This recommendation ensures that
domain network monitoring can detect innappropriate use of offline or
emergency deployment procedures.
6.3. Registrar security reductions
A Registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods.
These methods are acceptable when low security models are needed, as
the security decisions are being made by the local administrator, but
they MUST NOT be the default behavior:
1. A Registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of a
particular type, at the administrator's discretion. This could
occur when informing all Registrars of unique identifiers of new
entities might be operationally difficult.
2. A Registrar MAY choose to accept devices that claim a unique
identity without the benefit of authenticating that claimed
identity. This could occur when the Pledge does not include an
X.509 IDevID factory installed credential. New Entities without
an X.509 IDevID credential MAY form the Section 5.2 request using
the Section 5.4 format to ensure the Pledge's serial number
information is provided to the Registar (this includes the IDevID
AuthorityKeyIdentifier value, which would be statically
configured on the Pledge.) The Pledge MAY refuse to provide a
TLS client certificate (as one is not available.) The Pledge
SHOULD support HTTP-based or certificate-less TLS authentication
as described in EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2. A Registrar MUST NOT
accept unauthenticated New Entities unless it has been configured
to do so by an administrator that has verified that only expected
new entities can communicate with a Registrar (presumably via a
physically secured perimeter.)
3. A Registrar MAY submit a nonceless voucher-requests to the MASA
service (by not including a nonce in the voucher-request.) The
resulting Vouchers can then be stored by the Registrar until they
are needed during bootstrapping operations. This is for use
cases where the target network is protected by an air gap and
therefore cannot contact the MASA service during Pledge
deployment.
4. A Registrar MAY ignore unrecognized nonceless log entries. This
could occur when used equipment is purchased with a valid history
being deployed in air gap networks that required permanent
Vouchers.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
6.4. MASA security reductions
Lower security modes chosen by the MASA service affect all device
deployments unless bound to the specific device identities. In which
case these modes can be provided as additional features for specific
customers. The MASA service can choose to run in less secure modes
by:
1. Not enforcing that a nonce is in the Voucher. This results in
distribution of a Voucher that never expires and in effect makes
the Domain an always trusted entity to the Pledge during any
subsequent bootstrapping attempts. That this occurred is
captured in the log information so that the Registrar can make
appropriate security decisions when a Pledge joins the Domain.
This is useful to support use cases where Registrars might not be
online during actual device deployment. Because this results in
a long lived Voucher and does not require the proof that the
device is online, this is only accepted when the Registrar is
authenticated by the MASA server and authorized to provide this
functionality. The MASA server is RECOMMENDED to use this
functionality only in concert with an enhanced level of ownership
tracking (out-of-scope.) If the Pledge device is known to have a
real-time-clock that is set from the factory, use of a voucher
validity period is RECOMMENDED.
2. Not verifying ownership before responding with a Voucher. This
is expected to be a common operational model because doing so
relieves the manufacturer providing MASA services from having to
track ownership during shipping and supply chain and allows for a
very low overhead MASA service. A Registrar uses the audit log
information as a defense in depth strategy to ensure that this
does not occur unexpectedly (for example when purchasing new
equipment the Registrar would throw an error if any audit log
information is reported.) The MASA should verify the 'prior-
signed-voucher' information for Pledges that support that
functionality. This provides a proof-of-proximity check that
reduces the need for ownership verification.
7. IANA Considerations
This document requires the following IANA actions:
7.1. Well-known EST registration
This document extends the definitions of "est" (so far defined via
RFC7030) in the "https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/
well-known-uris.xhtml" registry as follows:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
o add /.well-known/est/requestvoucher (see Section 5.4 )
o add /.well-known/est/requestauditlog (see Section 5.6)
7.2. PKIX Registry
IANA is requested to register the following:
This document requests a number for id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) from
the pkix(7) id-mod(0) Registry. [[EDNOTE: fix names]]
This document requests a number from the id-pe registry for id-pe-
masa-url. XXX
7.3. Voucher Status Telemetry
IANA is requested to create a registry entitled: _Voucher Status
Telemetry Attributes_. New items can be added using the
Specification Required. The following items are to be in the initial
registration, with this document as the reference:
o version
o Status
o Reason
o reason-context
8. Privacy Considerations
8.1. MASA authorization log
The MASA authorization log includes a hash of the domainID for each
Registrar a voucher has been issued to. This information is closely
related to the actual domain identity, especially when paired with
the anti-DDoS authentication information the MASA might collect.
This could provide sufficient information for the MASA service to
build a detailed understanding the devices that have been provisioned
within a domain.
There are a number of design choices that mitigate this risk. The
domain can maintain some privacy since it has not necessarily been
authenticated and is not authoritatively bound to the supply chain.
Additionally the domainID captures only the unauthenticated subject
key identifier of the domain. A privacy sensitive domain could
theoretically generate a new domainID for each device being deployed.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Similarly a privacy sensitive domain would likely purchase devices
that support proximity assertions from a manufacturer that does not
require sales channel integrations. This would result in a
significant level of privacy while maintaining the security
characteristics provided by Registrar based audit log inspection.
9. Security Considerations
There are uses cases where the MASA could be unavailable or
uncooperative to the Registrar. They include planned and unplanned
network partitions, changes to MASA policy, or other instances where
MASA policy rejects a claim. These introduce an operational risk to
the Registrar owner that MASA behavior might limit the ability to re-
boostrap a Pledge device. For example this might be an issue during
disaster recovery. This risk can be mitigated by Registrars that
request and maintain long term copies of "nonceless" Vouchers. In
that way they are guaranteed to be able to repeat bootstrapping for
their devices.
The issuance of nonceless vouchers themselves creates a security
concern. If the Registrar of a previous domain can intercept
protocol communications then it can use a previously issued nonceless
voucher to establish management control of a Pledge device even after
having sold it. This risk is mitigated by recording the issuance of
such vouchers in the MASA audit log that is verified by the
subsequent Registrar. This reduces the resale value of the equipment
because future owners will detect the lowered security inherent in
the existence of a nonceless voucher that would be trusted by their
Pledge. This reflects a balance between partition resistant recovery
and security of future bootstrapping. Registrars take the Pledge's
audit history into account when applying policy to new devices.
The MASA server is exposed to DoS attacks wherein attackers claim an
unbounded number of devices. Ensuring a Registrar is representative
of a valid manufacturer customer, even without validating ownership
of specific Pledge devices, helps to mitigate this. Pledge
signatures on the Pledge voucher-request, as forwarded by the
Registrar in the prior-signed-voucher field of the Registrar voucher-
request, significantly reduce this risk by ensuring the MASA can
confirm proximity between the Pledge and the Registrar making the
request. This mechanism is optional to allow for constrained
devices.
To facilitate logging and administrative oversight in addition to
triggering Registration verification of MASA logs the Pledge reports
on Voucher parsing status to the Registrar. In the case of a
failure, this information is informative to a potentially malicious
Registar but this is mandated anyway because of the operational
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
benefits of an informed administrator in cases where the failure is
indicative of a problem. The Registrar is RECOMMENDED to verify MASA
logs if voucher status telemetry is not received.
To facilitate truely limited clients EST RFC7030 section 3.3.2
requirements that the client MUST support a client authentication
model have been reduced in Section 6 to a statement that the
Registrar "MAY" choose to accept devices that fail cryptographic
authentication. This reflects current (poor) practices in shipping
devices without a cryptographic identity that are NOT RECOMMENDED.
During the provisional period of the connection the Pledge MUST treat
all HTTP header and content data as untrusted data. HTTP libraries
are regularly exposed to non-secured HTTP traffic: mature libraries
should not have any problems.
Pledges might chose to engage in protocol operations with multiple
discovered Registrars in parallel. As noted above they will only do
so with distinct nonce values, but the end result could be multiple
vouchers issued from the MASA if all Registrars attempt to claim the
device. This is not a failure and the Pledge choses whichever
voucher to accept based on internal logic. The Registrar's verifying
log information will see multiple entries and take this into account
for their analytics purposes.
9.1. Freshness in Voucher-Requests
A concern has been raised that the Pledge voucher-request should
contain some content (a nonce) provided by the Registrar and/or MASA
in order for those actors to verify that the Pledge voucher-request
is fresh.
There are a number of operational problems with getting a nonce from
the MASA to the Pledge. It is somewhat easier to collect a random
value from the Registrar, but as the Registrar is not yet vouched
for, such a Registrar nonce has little value. There are privacy and
logistical challenges to addressing these operational issues, so if
such a thing were to be considered, it would have to provide some
clear value. This section examines the impacts of not having a fresh
Pledge voucher-request.
Because the Registrar authenticates the Pledge, a full Man-in-the-
Middle attack is not possible, despite the provisional TLS
authentication by the Pledge (see Section 5.) Instead we examine the
case of a fake Registrar (Rm) that communicates with the Pledge in
parallel or in close time proximity with the intended Registrar.
(This scenario is intentionally supported as described in
Section 4.1.)
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
The fake Registrar (Rm) can obtain a voucher signed by the MASA
either directly or through arbitrary intermediaries. Assuming that
the MASA accepts the Registar voucher-request (either because Rm is
collaborating with a legitimate Registrar according to supply chain
information, or because the MASA is in audit-log only mode), then a
voucher linking the Pledge to the Registrar Rm is issued.
Such a voucher, when passed back to the Pledge, would link the Pledge
to Registrar Rm, and would permit the Pledge to end the provisional
state. It now trusts Rm and, if it has any security vulnerabilities
leveragable by an Rm with full administrative control, can be assumed
to be a threat against the intended Registrar.
This flow is mitigated by the intended Registar verifying the audit
logs available from the MASA as described in Section 5.7. Rm might
chose to wait until after the intended Registrar completes the
authorization process before submitting the now-stale Pledge voucher-
request. The Rm would need to remove the Pledge's nonce.
In order to successfully use the resulting "stale voucher" Rm would
have to attack the Pledge and return it to a bootstrapping enabled
state. This would require wiping the Pledge of current configuration
and triggering a re-bootstrapping of the Pledge. This is no more
likely than simply taking control of the Pledge directly but if this
is a consideration the target network is RECOMMENDED to take the
following steps:
o Ongoing network monitoring for unexpected bootstrapping attempts
by Pledges.
o Retreival and examination of MASA log information upon the
occurance of any such unexpected events. Rm will be listed in the
logs.
9.2. Trusting manufacturers
The BRSKI extensions to EST permit a new pledge to be completely
configured with domain specific trust anchors. The link from built-
in manufacturer-provided trust anchors to domain-specific trust
anchors is mediated by the signed voucher artifact.
If the manufacturer's IDevID signing key is not properly validated,
then there is a risk that the network will accept a pledge that
should not be a member of the network. As the address of the
manufacturer's MASA is provided in the IDevID using the extension
from Section 2.3, the malicious pledge will have no problem
collaborating with it's MASA to produce a completely valid voucher.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
BRSKI does not, however, fundamentally change the trust model from
domain owner to manufacturer. Assuming that the pledge used its
IDevID with RFC7030 EST and BRSKI, the domain (registrar) still needs
to trust the manufacturer.
Establishing this trust between domain and manufacturer is outside
the scope of BRSKI. There are a number of mechanisms that can
adopted including:
o Manually configuring each manufacturer's trust anchor.
o A Trust-On-First-Use (TOFU) mechanism. A human would be queried
upon seeing a manufacturer's trust anchor for the first time, and
then the trust anchor would be installed to the trusted store.
There are risks with this; even if the key to name is validated
using something like the WebPKI, there remains the possibility
that the name is a look alike: e.g, c1sco.com, ..
o scanning the trust anchor from a QR code that came with the
packaging (this is really a manual TOFU mechanism)
o some sales integration process where trust anchors are provided as
part of the sales process, probably included in a digital packing
"slip", or a sales invoice.
o consortium membership, where all manufacturers of a particular
device category (e.g, a light bulb, or a cable-modem) are signed
by an certificate authority specifically for this. This is done
by CableLabs today. It is used for authentication and
authorization as part of TR-79: [docsisroot] and [TR069].
The existing WebPKI provides a reasonable anchor between manufacturer
name and public key. It authenticates the key. It does not provide
a reasonable authorization for the manufacturer, so it is not
directly useable on it's own.
10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in
particular William Atwood, Brian Carpenter, Toerless Eckert, Fuyu
Eleven, Eliot Lear, Sergey Kasatkin, Anoop Kumar, Markus Stenberg,
and Peter van der Stok
11. References
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane-13 (work in progress), December 2017.
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
grasp-15 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-anima-voucher]
Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-ietf-
anima-voucher-07 (work in progress), January 2018.
[IDevID] IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3542] Stevens, W., Thomas, M., Nordmark, E., and T. Jinmei,
"Advanced Sockets Application Program Interface (API) for
IPv6", RFC 3542, DOI 10.17487/RFC3542, May 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3542>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3927, May 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3927>.
[RFC4519] Sciberras, A., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Schema for User Applications", RFC 4519,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4519, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4519>.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing
Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5386, November 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5386>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5660] Williams, N., "IPsec Channels: Connection Latching",
RFC 5660, DOI 10.17487/RFC5660, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5660>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
11.2. Informative References
[docsisroot]
CableLabs, "CableLabs Digital Certificate Issuance
Service", February 2018,
<https://www.cablelabs.com/resources/
digital-certificate-issuance-service/>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
and J. Nobre, "A Reference Model for Autonomic
Networking", draft-ietf-anima-reference-model-06 (work in
progress), February 2018.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
Watsen, K., Abrahamsson, M., and I. Farrer, "Zero Touch
Provisioning for Networking Devices", draft-ietf-netconf-
zerotouch-21 (work in progress), March 2018.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud]
Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-18 (work
in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter]
Richardson, M., "Considerations for stateful vs stateless
join router in ANIMA bootstrap", draft-richardson-anima-
state-for-joinrouter-02 (work in progress), January 2018.
[I-D.vanderstok-ace-coap-est]
Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Kumar, S., Richardson, M.,
Furuhed, M., and S. Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-
coaps)", draft-vanderstok-ace-coap-est-04 (work in
progress), January 2018.
[imprinting]
Wikipedia, "Wikipedia article: Imprinting", July 2015,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imprinting_(psychology)>.
[RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473,
December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2473>.
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations",
RFC 2663, DOI 10.17487/RFC2663, August 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2663>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 63]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
[RFC7575] Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.
[Stajano99theresurrecting]
Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The resurrecting duckling:
security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks", 1999,
<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/
papers/1999-StajanoAnd-duckling.pdf>.
[TR069] Broadband Forum, "TR-69: CPE WAN Management Protocol",
February 2018, <https://www.broadband-forum.org/
standards-and-software/technical-specifications/
tr-069-files-tools>.
Appendix A. IPv4 and non-ANI operations
The secification of BRSKI in Section 4 intentionally only covers the
mechanisms for an IPv6 Pledge using Link-Local addresses. This
section describes non-normative extensions that can be used in other
environments.
A.1. IPv4 Link Local addresses
Instead of an IPv6 link-local address, an IPv4 address may be
generated using [RFC3927] Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local
Addresses.
In the case that an IPv4 Link-Local address is formed, then the
bootstrap process would continue as in the IPv6 case by looking for a
(circuit) proxy.
A.2. Use of DHCPv4
The Plege MAY obtain an IP address via DHCP [RFC2131]. The DHCP
provided parameters for the Domain Name System can be used to perform
DNS operations if all local discovery attempts fail.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Appendix B. mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options
The Pledge MAY perform DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over
Multicast DNS [RFC6762] searching for the service
"_bootstrapks._tcp.local.".
A non-ANI Proxy MAY perform DNS-based Service Discovery using unicast
DNS to discover Registrars searching for searching for the service
"_brski-registrar._tcp.local.".
To prevent unaccceptable levels of network traffic, when using mDNS,
the congestion avoidance mechanisms specified in [RFC6762] section 7
MUST be followed. The Pledge SHOULD listen for an unsolicited
broadcast response as described in [RFC6762]. This allows devices to
avoid announcing their presence via mDNS broadcasts and instead
silently join a network by watching for periodic unsolicited
broadcast responses.
The service searched for is "_bootstrapks._tcp.example.com". In this
case the domain "example.com" is discovered as described in [RFC6763]
section 11. This method is only available if the host has received a
useable IPv4 address via DHCPv4 as suggested in Appendix A.2.
If no local bootstrapks service is located using the GRASP
mechanisms, or the above mentioned DNS-based Service Discovery
methods, the Pledge MAY contact a well known manufacturer provided
bootstrapping server by performing a DNS lookup using a well known
URI such as "bootstrapks.manufacturer-example.com". The details of
the URI are manufacturer specific. Manufacturers that leverage this
method on the Pledge are responsible for providing the bootstrapks
service. Also see Section 2.7.
The current DNS services returned during each query are maintained
until bootstrapping is completed. If bootstrapping fails and the
Pledge returns to the Discovery state, it picks up where it left off
and continues attempting bootstrapping. For example, if the first
Multicast DNS _bootstrapks._tcp.local response doesn't work then the
second and third responses are tried. If these fail the Pledge moves
on to normal DNS-based Service Discovery.
Appendix C. IPIP Join Proxy mechanism
The Circuit Proxy mechanism suffers from requiring a state on the
Join Proxy for each connection that is relayed. The Circuit Proxy
can be considered a kind of Algorithm Gateway (see [RFC2663], section
2.9).
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
An alternative to proxying at the TCP layer is to selectively forward
at the IP layer. This moves all per-connection to the Join
Registrar. The IPIP tunnel statelessly forwards packets. This
section provides some explanation of some of the details of the
Registrar discovery procotol, which are not important to Circuit
Proxy, and some implementation advice.
The IPIP tunnel is described in [RFC2473]. Each such tunnel is
considered a unidirectional construct, but two tunnels may be
associated to form a bidirectional mechanism. An IPIP tunnel is
setup as follows. The outer addresses are an ACP address of the Join
Proxy, and the ACP address of the Join Registrar. The inner
addresses seen in the tunnel are the link-local addresses of the
network on which the join activity is occuring.
One way to look at this construct is to consider that the Registrar
is extending attaching an interface to the network on which the Join
Proxy is physically present. The Registrar then interacts as if it
were present on that network using link-local (fe80::) addresses.
The Join node is unaware that the traffic is being proxied through a
tunnel, and does not need any special routing.
There are a number of considerations with this mechanism which cause
some minor amounts of complexity. Note that due to the tunnels, the
Registrar sees multiple connections to a fe80::/10 network on not
just physical interfaces, but on each of the virtual interfaces
representing the tunnels.
C.1. Multiple Join networks on the Join Proxy side
The Join Proxy will in the general case be a routing device with
multiple interfaces. Even a device as simple as a wifi access point
may have wired, and multiple frequencies of wireless interfaces,
potentially with multiple ESSIDs.
Each of these interfaces on the Join Proxy may be separate L3 routing
domains, and therefore will have a unique set of link-local
addresses. An IPIP packet being returned by the Registrar needs to
be forwarded to the correct interface, so the Join Proxy needs an
additional key to distinguish which network the packet should be
returned to.
The simplest way to get this additional key is to allocate an
additional ACP address; one address for each network on which join
traffic is occuring.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
C.2. Automatic configuration of tunnels on Registrar
The Join Proxy is expected to do a GRASP negotiation with the Proxy
for each Join Interface that it needs to relay traffic from. This is
to permit Registrars to configure the appropriate virtual interfaces
before join traffic arrives.
A Registrar serving a large number of interfaces may not wish to
allocate resources to every interface at all times, but can instead
dynamically allocate interfaces. It can do this by monitoring IPIP
traffic that arrives on its ACP interface, and when packets arrive
from new Join Proxys, it can dynamically configure virtual
interfaces.
A more sophisticated Registrar willing to modify the behaviour of its
TCP and UDP stack could note the IPIP traffic origination in the
socket control block and make information available to the TCP layer
(for HTTPS connections), or to the application (for CoAP connections)
via a proprietary extension to the socket API.
C.3. Proxy Neighbor Discovery by Join Proxy
The Join Proxy MUST answer neighbor discovery messages for the
address given by the Registrar as being its link-local address. The
Join Proxy must also advertise this address as the address to which
to connect when advertising its existence.
This Proxy neighbor discovery means that the Pledge will create TCP
and UDP connections to the correct Registrar address. This matters
as the TCP and UDP pseudo-header checksum includes the destination
address, and for the Proxy to remain completely stateless, it must
not be necessary for the checksum to be updated.
C.4. Use of connected sockets; or IP_PKTINFO for CoAP on Registrar
TCP connections on the Registrar SHOULD properly capture the ifindex
of the incoming connection into the socket structure. This is normal
IPv6 socket API processing. The outgoing responses will go out on
the same (virtual) interface by ifindex.
When using UDP sockets with CoAP, the application will have to pay
attention to the incoming ifindex on the socket. Access to this
information is available using the IP_PKTINFO auxiliary extension,
which is a standard part of the IPv6 sockets API [RFC3542].
A Registrar application could, after receipt of an initial CoAP
message from the Pledge, create a connected UDP socket (including the
ifindex information.) The kernel would then take care of accurate
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
demultiplexing upon receive, and subsequent transmission to the
correct interface.
C.5. Use of socket extension rather than virtual interface
Some operating systems on which a Registrar needs to be implemented
may find need for a virtual interface per Join Proxy to be
problematic. There are other mechanisms which can be implemented.
If the IPIP decapsulator can mark the (SYN) packet inside the kernel
with the address of the Join Proxy sending the traffic, then an
interface per Join Proxy may not be needed. The outgoing path need
just pay attention to this extra information and add an appropriate
IPIP header on outgoing. A CoAP over UDP mechanism may need to
expose this extra information to the application as the UDP sockets
are often not connected, and the application will need to specify the
outgoing path on each packet sent.
Such an additional socket mechanism has not been standardized.
Terminating L2TP connections over IPsec transport mode suffers from
the same challenges.
Appendix D. MUD Extension
The following extension augments the MUD model to include a single
node, as described in [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud] section 3.6, using the
following sample module that has the following tree structure:
module: ietf-mud-brski-masa
augment /ietf-mud:mud:
+--rw masa-server? inet:uri
The model is defined as follows:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 68]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-mud-extension@2018-02-14.yang"
module ietf-mud-brski-masa {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-brski-masa";
prefix ietf-mud-brski-masa;
import ietf-mud {
prefix ietf-mud;
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA (Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and
Approach) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/
WG List: anima@ietf.org
";
description
"BRSKI extension to a MUD file to indicate the
MASA URL.";
revision 2018-02-14 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
Specification";
}
augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
description
"BRSKI extension to a MUD file to indicate the
MASA URL.";
leaf masa-server {
type inet:uri;
description
"This value is the URI of the MASA server";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 69]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Appendix E. Example Vouchers
Three entities are involved in a voucher: the MASA issues (signs) it,
the Registrar's public key is mentioned in the voucher, and the
Pledge validates it. In order to provide reproduceable examples the
public and private keys for an example MASA and Registrar are first
listed.
E.1. Keys involved
The Manufacturer has a Certificate Authority that signs the Pledge's
IDevID. In addition the Manufacturer's signing authority (the MASA)
signs the vouchers, and that certificate must distributed to the
devices at manufacturing time so that vouchers can be validated.
E.1.1. MASA key pair for voucher signatures
This private key signs vouchers:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGkAgEBBDAgiRoYqKoEcfOfvRvmZ5P5Azn58tuI7nSnIy7OgFnCeiNo+BmbgMho
r6lcU60gwVagBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATZAH3Rb2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjA
zOi2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCfw5ICgJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KUlOkejz
Tvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxI=
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
This public key validates vouchers:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
E.1.2. Manufacturer key pair for IDevID signatures
This private key signs IDevID certificates:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 70]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGkAgEBBDAgiRoYqKoEcfOfvRvmZ5P5Azn58tuI7nSnIy7OgFnCeiNo+BmbgMho
r6lcU60gwVagBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATZAH3Rb2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjA
zOi2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCfw5ICgJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KUlOkejz
Tvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxI=
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
This public key validates IDevID certificates:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
E.1.3. Registrar key pair
The Registrar key (or chain) is the representative of the domain
owner. This key signs Registrar voucher-requests:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIF+obiToYYYeMifPsZvrjWJ0yFsCJwIFhpokmT/TULmXoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAENWQOzcNMUjP0NrtfeBc0DJLWfeMGgCFdIv6FUz4DifM1ujMBec/g
6W/P6boTmyTGdFOh/8HwKUerL5bpneK8sg==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
The public key is indicated in a Pledge voucher-request to show
proximity.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 71]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
The Registrar public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509
utility. Note that the Registrar certificate is marked with the
cmcRA extension.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 3 (0x3)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
Issuer: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = Unstrung Fount
ain CA
Validity
Not Before: Sep 5 01:12:45 2017 GMT
Not After : Sep 5 01:12:45 2019 GMT
Subject: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = localhost
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:35:64:0e:cd:c3:4c:52:33:f4:36:bb:5f:7
8:17:
34:0c:92:d6:7d:e3:06:80:21:5d:22:fe:85:5
3:3e:
03:89:f3:35:ba:33:01:79:cf:e0:e9:6f:cf:e
9:ba:
13:9b:24:c6:74:53:a1:ff:c1:f0:29:47:ab:2
f:96:
e9:9d:e2:bc:b2
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
30:66:02:31:00:b7:fe:24:d0:27:77:af:61:87:20:6d:78:
5b:
9b:3a:e9:eb:8b:77:40:2e:aa:8c:87:98:da:39:03:c7:4e:
b6:
9e:e3:62:7d:52:ad:c9:a6:ab:6b:71:77:d0:02:24:29:21:
02:
31:00:e2:db:d7:9f:6d:32:db:76:d0:e4:de:d7:9c:63:fa:
c3:
ed:5e:fb:5d:a2:7a:9d:80:a6:74:30:91:e7:84:eb:48:53:
4b:
83:1b:ed:d6:5c:85:33:ed:1f:62:96:11:73:7a
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 72]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
E.1.4. Pledge key pair
The Pledge has an IDevID key pair built in at manufacturing time:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIL+ue8PQcN+M7LFBGPsompYwobI/rsoHnTb2a+0hO+8joAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEumBVaDlX87WyME8CJToyt9NWy6sYw0DTbjjJIn79pgr7ALa//Y8p
r70WpK1SIaiUeeFw7e+lCzTp1Z+wJu14Bg==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
The public key is used by the Registrar to find the MASA. The MASA
URL is in an extension described in Section 2.3. RFC-EDITOR: Note
that these certificates are using a Private Enterprise Number for the
not-yet-assigned by IANA MASA URL, and need to be replaced before
AUTH48.
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
The Pledge public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509 utility so
that the extensions can be seen. A second custom Extension is
included to provided to contain the EUI48/EUI64 that the Pledge will
configure.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 12 (0xc)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = Unstrung Highw
ay CA
Validity
Not Before: Oct 12 13:52:52 2017 GMT
Not After : Dec 31 00:00:00 2999 GMT
Subject: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = 00-D0-E5-F2-0
0-02
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 73]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:49:a7:98:b4:75:4d:5a:52:74:76:bb:cc:0
c:47:
08:24:36:ea:4d:6c:d3:3b:9b:59:f4:9a:3f:b
4:28:
96:63:70:f2:2a:20:3f:ad:ac:f8:d3:4a:86:e
d:b8:
87:69:44:f7:c6:67:c8:54:fe:72:14:bd:ea:b
0:ca:
86:08:f0:13:db
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
1D:31:16:61:B6:11:50:9B:3C:FA:13:B6:15:5F:39
:0B:ED:76:43:2A
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
othername:<unsupported>
1.3.6.1.4.1.46930.2:
..https://highway.sandelman.ca
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:66:02:31:00:e1:27:53:7e:79:a9:d6:d5:4f:de:e6:aa:
0c:
48:6b:d4:bd:61:d1:ee:e8:9c:f1:c2:5b:87:bb:d7:cb:9f:
34:
9c:1b:3c:6e:93:67:eb:49:3f:f8:8c:ef:11:47:ad:33:32:
02:
31:00:ab:d6:ec:6f:75:87:8a:ab:b9:9b:45:70:91:e1:90:
89:
b3:0e:bb:7c:9e:e3:c9:76:5b:09:44:a2:af:ed:f0:05:3d:
be:
95:68:20:cc:f0:d1:81:80:79:00:16:fb:b0:0c
E.2. Example process
RFC-EDITOR: these examples will need to be replaced with CMS versions
once IANA has assigned the eContentType in [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher].
E.2.1. Pledge to Registrar
As described in Section 5.2, the Pledge will sign a Pledge voucher-
request containing the Registrar's public key in the proximity-
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 74]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
registrar-cert field. The base64 has been wrapped at 60 characters
for presentation reasons.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file: examples/vr_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs
The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 75]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
0:d=0 hl=4 l=1820 cons: SEQUENCE
4:d=1 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-signed
Data
15:d=1 hl=4 l=1805 cons: cont [ 0 ]
19:d=2 hl=4 l=1801 cons: SEQUENCE
23:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
26:d=3 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
28:d=4 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
30:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
41:d=5 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
43:d=3 hl=4 l= 782 cons: SEQUENCE
47:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
58:d=4 hl=4 l= 767 cons: cont [ 0 ]
62:d=5 hl=4 l= 763 prim: OCTET STRING :{"ietf-vouch
er-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","created-on":"2
017-09-01","serial-number":"00-D0-E5-F2-00-02","nonce":"Dss9
9sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w","proximity-registrar-cert":"MIIBrjCCATOg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"}}
829:d=3 hl=4 l= 566 cons: cont [ 0 ]
833:d=4 hl=4 l= 562 cons: SEQUENCE
837:d=5 hl=4 l= 439 cons: SEQUENCE
841:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
843:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02
846:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :0C
849:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
851:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
861:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
863:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
865:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
867:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
879:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
883:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
885:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
887:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
899:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
910:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 76]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
912:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
914:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
919:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
940:d=6 hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE
942:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :171012135252
Z
957:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 prim: GENERALIZEDTIME :299912310000
00Z
974:d=6 hl=2 l= 75 cons: SEQUENCE
976:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
978:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
980:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
992:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
996:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
998:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1000:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
1012:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
1023:d=7 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SET
1025:d=8 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
1027:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
1032:d=9 hl=2 l= 17 prim: UTF8STRING :00-D0-E5-F2-
00-02
1051:d=6 hl=2 l= 89 cons: SEQUENCE
1053:d=7 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
1055:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT :id-ecPublicK
ey
1064:d=8 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :prime256v1
1074:d=7 hl=2 l= 66 prim: BIT STRING
1142:d=6 hl=3 l= 135 cons: cont [ 3 ]
1145:d=7 hl=3 l= 132 cons: SEQUENCE
1148:d=8 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
1150:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Subje
ct Key Identifier
1155:d=9 hl=2 l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:04
141D311661B611509B3CFA13B6155F390BED76432A
1179:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
1181:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic
Constraints
1186:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
00
1190:d=8 hl=2 l= 43 cons: SEQUENCE
1192:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Subje
ct Alternative Name
1197:d=9 hl=2 l= 36 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
22A02006092B0601040182EE5201A0130C1130302D44302D45352D46322D
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 77]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
30302D3032
1235:d=8 hl=2 l= 43 cons: SEQUENCE
1237:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :1.3.6.1.4.1.
46930.2
1248:d=9 hl=2 l= 30 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:0C
1C68747470733A2F2F686967687761792E73616E64656C6D616E2E6361
1280:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1282:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1292:d=5 hl=2 l= 105 prim: BIT STRING
1399:d=3 hl=4 l= 421 cons: SET
1403:d=4 hl=4 l= 417 cons: SEQUENCE
1407:d=5 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
1410:d=5 hl=2 l= 82 cons: SEQUENCE
1412:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
1414:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
1416:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
1418:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
1430:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
1434:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
1436:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1438:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
1450:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
1461:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
1463:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
1465:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
1470:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
1491:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :0C
1494:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1496:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
1507:d=6 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
1509:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
1512:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
1514:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :contentType
1525:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
1527:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
1538:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
1540:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :signingTime
1551:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
1553:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :171012175430
Z
1568:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
1570:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :messageDiges
t
1581:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 78]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
1583:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:FE
7D72E29500F90A38E95021A215FD6D40B1629B99598177DC054AE0F9C8B6
9F
1617:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
1619:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :S/MIME Capab
ilities
1630:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
1632:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
1634:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1636:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-256-cbc
1647:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1649:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-192-cbc
1660:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1662:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-128-cbc
1673:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1675:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :des-ede3-cbc
1685:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
1687:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
1697:d=10 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :80
1701:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1703:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
1713:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :40
1716:d=9 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE
1718:d=10 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT :des-cbc
1725:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1727:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
1737:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :28
1740:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1742:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1752:d=5 hl=2 l= 70 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
440220614CB435374FFB14E49BF12DEBD788FBE4BFDB3DDD4303CA3B074B
D1C0C24AF0022008778C96F26CC9CA71FEC328A9EC9F61BF3B4E87781FFC
8A6308FA19C0EC27CD
The JSON contained in the voucher request:
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 79]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
{"ietf-voucher-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","cr
eated-on":"2017-09-01","serial-number":"00-D0-E5-F2-00-02","
nonce":"Dss99sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w","proximity-registrar-cert":"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"}}
E.2.2. Registrar to MASA
As described in Section 5.4 the Registrar will sign a Registrar
voucher-request, and will include Pledge's voucher request in the
prior-signed-voucher-request.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, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 80]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018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, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 81]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
AwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFAMAcGBSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEo
MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgDdp5uPUlMKp7GFQAD7ypAgqFv8q+KkJt6c3O
7iVpVI8CIQCD1u8BkxipvigwvIDmWfjlYdJxcvozNjffq5j3UHg7Rg==
file: examples/parboiled_vr_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs
The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:
0:d=0 hl=4 l=3546 cons: SEQUENCE
4:d=1 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-signed
Data
15:d=1 hl=4 l=3531 cons: cont [ 0 ]
19:d=2 hl=4 l=3527 cons: SEQUENCE
23:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
26:d=3 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
28:d=4 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
30:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
41:d=5 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
43:d=3 hl=4 l=2638 cons: SEQUENCE
47:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
58:d=4 hl=4 l=2623 cons: cont [ 0 ]
62:d=5 hl=4 l=2619 prim: OCTET STRING :{"ietf-vouch
er-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","created-on":"2
017-09-15T00:00:00.000Z","serial-number":"JADA123456789","no
nce":"abcd1234","prior-signed-voucher-request":"MIIHHQYJKoZI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, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 82]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018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"}}
2685:d=3 hl=4 l= 434 cons: cont [ 0 ]
2689:d=4 hl=4 l= 430 cons: SEQUENCE
2693:d=5 hl=4 l= 307 cons: SEQUENCE
2697:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
2699:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02
2702:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :03
2705:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
2707:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA384
2717:d=6 hl=2 l= 78 cons: SEQUENCE
2719:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
2721:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
2723:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
2735:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
2739:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
2741:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
2743:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
2755:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
2766:d=7 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SET
2768:d=8 hl=2 l= 27 cons: SEQUENCE
2770:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
2775:d=9 hl=2 l= 20 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Fou
ntain CA
2797:d=6 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE
2799:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :170905011245
Z
2814:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :190905011245
Z
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 83]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
2829:d=6 hl=2 l= 67 cons: SEQUENCE
2831:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
2833:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
2835:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
2847:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
2851:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
2853:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
2855:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
2867:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
2878:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
2880:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
2882:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
2887:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: UTF8STRING :localhost
2898:d=6 hl=2 l= 89 cons: SEQUENCE
2900:d=7 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
2902:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT :id-ecPublicK
ey
2911:d=8 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :prime256v1
2921:d=7 hl=2 l= 66 prim: BIT STRING
2989:d=6 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 3 ]
2991:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
2993:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
2995:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic
Constraints
3000:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
00
3004:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
3006:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA384
3016:d=5 hl=2 l= 105 prim: BIT STRING
3123:d=3 hl=4 l= 423 cons: SET
3127:d=4 hl=4 l= 419 cons: SEQUENCE
3131:d=5 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
3134:d=5 hl=2 l= 83 cons: SEQUENCE
3136:d=6 hl=2 l= 78 cons: SEQUENCE
3138:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
3140:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
3142:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
3154:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
3158:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
3160:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
3162:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
3174:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
3185:d=7 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SET
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 84]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
3187:d=8 hl=2 l= 27 cons: SEQUENCE
3189:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
3194:d=9 hl=2 l= 20 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Fou
ntain CA
3216:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :03
3219:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
3221:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
3232:d=6 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
3234:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
3237:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
3239:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :contentType
3250:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
3252:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
3263:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
3265:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :signingTime
3276:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
3278:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :171026013618
Z
3293:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
3295:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :messageDiges
t
3306:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
3308:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:44
0133BDCF6733E8EED13D323F2042F69A61E3103ACC65002696FC77A702A3
70
3342:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
3344:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :S/MIME Capab
ilities
3355:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
3357:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
3359:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
3361:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-256-cbc
3372:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
3374:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-192-cbc
3385:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
3387:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-128-cbc
3398:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
3400:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :des-ede3-cbc
3410:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
3412:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
3422:d=10 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :80
3426:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
3428:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
3438:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :40
3441:d=9 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE
3443:d=10 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT :des-cbc
3450:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
3452:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 85]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
3462:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :28
3465:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
3467:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
3477:d=5 hl=2 l= 71 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
4502200DDA79B8F52530AA7B1854000FBCA9020A85BFCABE2A426DE9CDCE
EE2569548F02210083D6EF019318A9BE2830BC80E659F8E561D27172FA33
3637DFAB98F750783B46
E.2.3. MASA to Registrar
The MASA will return a voucher to the Registrar, to be relayed to the
Pledge.
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 86]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018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file: examples/voucher_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs
The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:
0:d=0 hl=4 l=1756 cons: SEQUENCE
4:d=1 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-signed
Data
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 87]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
15:d=1 hl=4 l=1741 cons: cont [ 0 ]
19:d=2 hl=4 l=1737 cons: SEQUENCE
23:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
26:d=3 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
28:d=4 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
30:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
41:d=5 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
43:d=3 hl=4 l= 784 cons: SEQUENCE
47:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
58:d=4 hl=4 l= 769 cons: cont [ 0 ]
62:d=5 hl=4 l= 765 prim: OCTET STRING :{"ietf-vouch
er:voucher":{"assertion":"logged","created-on":"2017-10-12T1
3:54:31.439-04:00","serial-number":"00-D0-E5-F2-00-02","nonc
e":"Dss99sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w","pinned-domain-cert":"MIIBrjCCAT
OgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBOMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYCY2ExGT
AXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHTAbBgNVBAMMFFVuc3RydW5nIE
ZvdW50YWluIENBMB4XDTE3MDkwNTAxMTI0NVoXDTE5MDkwNTAxMTI0NVowQz
ESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbW
FuMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlsb2NhbGhvc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBw
NCAAQ1ZA7Nw0xSM/Q2u194FzQMktZ94waAIV0i/oVTPgOJ8zW6MwF5z+Dpb8
/puhObJMZ0U6H/wfApR6svlumd4ryyow0wCzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMAoGCCqGSM
49BAMDA2kAMGYCMQC3/iTQJ3evYYcgbXhbmzrp64t3QC6qjIeY2jkDx062nu
NifVKtyaara3F30AIkKSECMQDi29efbTLbdtDk3tecY/rD7V77XaJ6nYCmdD
CR54TrSFNLgxvt1lyFM+0fYpYRc3o="}}
831:d=3 hl=4 l= 467 cons: cont [ 0 ]
835:d=4 hl=4 l= 463 cons: SEQUENCE
839:d=5 hl=4 l= 342 cons: SEQUENCE
843:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
845:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02
848:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
851:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
853:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
863:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
865:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
867:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
869:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
881:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
885:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
887:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
889:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
901:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
912:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
914:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
916:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
921:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Hig
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 88]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
hway CA
942:d=6 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE
944:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :170326161940
Z
959:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :190326161940
Z
974:d=6 hl=2 l= 71 cons: SEQUENCE
976:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
978:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
980:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
992:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
996:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
998:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1000:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
1012:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
1023:d=7 hl=2 l= 22 cons: SET
1025:d=8 hl=2 l= 20 cons: SEQUENCE
1027:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
1032:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung MAS
A
1047:d=6 hl=2 l= 118 cons: SEQUENCE
1049:d=7 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
1051:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT :id-ecPublicK
ey
1060:d=8 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT :secp384r1
1067:d=7 hl=2 l= 98 prim: BIT STRING
1167:d=6 hl=2 l= 16 cons: cont [ 3 ]
1169:d=7 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
1171:d=8 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
1173:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :X509v3 Basic
Constraints
1178:d=9 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN :255
1181:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
00
1185:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1187:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1197:d=5 hl=2 l= 103 prim: BIT STRING
1302:d=3 hl=4 l= 454 cons: SET
1306:d=4 hl=4 l= 450 cons: SEQUENCE
1310:d=5 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
1313:d=5 hl=2 l= 82 cons: SEQUENCE
1315:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
1317:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
1319:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
1321:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 89]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
ent
1333:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca
1337:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
1339:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1341:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon
ent
1353:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman
1364:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
1366:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
1368:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName
1373:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
1394:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
1397:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1399:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha256
1410:d=6 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
1412:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
1415:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
1417:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :contentType
1428:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
1430:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :pkcs7-data
1441:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
1443:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :signingTime
1454:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
1456:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :171012175431
Z
1471:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
1473:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :messageDiges
t
1484:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
1486:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:41
79C6EB6F1C216F0CA187C1D658C30E52E5250971103DAD9E372F90B11F8B
1D
1520:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
1522:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :S/MIME Capab
ilities
1533:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
1535:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
1537:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1539:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-256-cbc
1550:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1552:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-192-cbc
1563:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1565:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :aes-128-cbc
1576:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1578:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :des-ede3-cbc
1588:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
1590:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 90]
Internet-Draft BRSKI March 2018
1600:d=10 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :80
1604:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1606:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
1616:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :40
1619:d=9 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE
1621:d=10 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT :des-cbc
1628:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1630:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :rc2-cbc
1640:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :28
1643:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1645:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1655:d=5 hl=2 l= 103 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30
6502310087389DFC090D8EDB6948FD6B7E5369A5D1EC8B7DB8676F935C9C
6E79EC2727CCFFD8D5DBF937F70EC4E1BFB76ED343B3023063C8E9E69244
8A1EC3D1D8996E03973AC28BEE3C49CD28FDF675A1867852861073244C89
DBAEA8A90BCF35FF92BD43E9
Authors' Addresses
Max Pritikin
Cisco
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Michael H. Behringer
Email: Michael.H.Behringer@gmail.com
Steinthor Bjarnason
Arbor Networks
Email: sbjarnason@arbor.net
Kent Watsen
Juniper Networks
Email: kwatsen@juniper.net
Pritikin, et al. Expires September 27, 2018 [Page 91]
Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/