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Versions: (draft-ietf-avt-srtp-aes-gcm) 00 01 02 03 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 RFC 7714

Network Working Group                                          D. McGrew
Internet Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended Status: Informational                                   K. Igoe
Expires: March 22, 2013                         National Security Agency
                                                      September 18, 2012


    AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption in Secure RTP (SRTP)
                   draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-03


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   described in the Simplified BSD License.












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Abstract

   This document defines how AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated
   Encryption with Associated Data algorithms can be used to provide
   confidentiality and data authentication in the SRTP protocol.


Table of Contents

   1. Introduction.....................................................3
   2. Conventions Used In This Document................................3
   3. Overview of the SRTP/SRTCP Security Architecture.................4
   4. Terminology......................................................4
   5. Generic AEAD Processing..........................................5
      5.1. Types of Input Data.........................................5
      5.2. AEAD Invocation Inputs and Outputs..........................5
         5.2.1. Encrypt Mode...........................................5
         5.2.2. Decrypt Mode...........................................6
      5.3. Handling of AEAD Authentication.............................6
   6. Counter Mode Encryption..........................................6
   7. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12......................8
   8. Unneeded SRTP/SRTCP Fields.......................................8
      8.1. SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Field.............................8
      8.2. RTP Padding.................................................8
   9. AES-GCM/CCM processing for SRTP..................................9
      9.1. SRTP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM...................9
      9.2. Data Types in SRTP Packets..................................9
      9.3. Prevention of SRTP IV Reuse................................10
   10. AES-GCM/CCM Processing of SRTCP Compound Packets...............11
      10.1. SRTCP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM................11
      10.2. Data Types in Encrypted SRTCP Compound Packets............12
      10.3. Data Types in Unencrypted SRTCP Compound Packets..........13
      10.4. Prevention of SRTCP IV Reuse..............................14
   11. Constraints on AEAD for SRTP and SRTCP.........................14
      11.1. Generic AEAD Parameter Constraints........................15
      11.2. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP....................................15
      11.3. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP....................................16
   12. Key Derivation Functions.......................................16
   13. Security Considerations........................................17
      13.1. Handling of Security Critical Parameters..................17
      13.2. Size of the Authentication Tag............................17
   14. IANA Considerations............................................18
      14.1. SDES......................................................18
      14.2. DTLS......................................................19
      14.3. MIKEY.....................................................20
      14.4. AEAD registry.............................................21
   15. Parameters for use with MIKEY..................................21
   16. Acknowledgements...............................................22
   17. References.....................................................23
      17.1. Normative References......................................23
      17.2. Informative References....................................25



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1. Introduction

   The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is a profile of the
   Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide
   confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the
   RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time
   Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).  It is important to note that the
   outgoing SRTP packets from a single endpoint may be originating from
   several independent data sources.

   Authenticated encryption [BN00] is a form of encryption that, in
   addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is
   encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity.
   Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, or AEAD [R02], adds
   the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some
   Associated Data (AD), also called "additional authenticated data",
   that is not encrypted.  This specification makes use of the interface
   to a generic AEAD algorithm as defined in [RFC5116].

   The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher that
   provides a high level of security, and can accept different key
   sizes.  Two families of AEAD algorithm families, AES Galois/Counter
   Mode (AES-GCM) and AES Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message
   Authentication Code (AES-CCM), are based upon AES.  This
   specification makes use of the AES versions that use 128-bit and
   256-bit keys, which we call AES-128 and AES-256, respectively.

   The Galois/Counter Mode of operation (GCM) and the Counter with
   Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code mode of operation
   (CCM) are both AEAD modes of operation for block ciphers.  Both use
   counter mode to encrypt the data, an operation that can be
   efficiently pipelined.  Further, GCM authentication uses operations
   that are particularly well suited to efficient implementation in
   hardware, making it especially appealing for high-speed
   implementations, or for implementations in an efficient and compact
   circuit.  CCM is well suited for use in compact software
   implementations.  This specification uses GCM and CCM with both
   AES-128 and AES-256.

   In summary, this document defines how to use AEAD algorithms,
   particularly AES-GCM and AES-CCM, to provide confidentiality and
   message authentication within SRTP and SRTCP packets.


2. Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].




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3. Overview of the SRTP/SRTCP Security Architecture

   SRTP/SRTCP security is based upon the following principles:

       a)  Both privacy and authentication are based upon the use of
           symmetric algorithms.  An AEAD algorithm such as AES-CCM or
           AES-GCM combines privacy and authentication into a single
           process.

       b)  A secret master key is shared by all participating endpoints,
           both those originating SRTP/SRTCP packets and those receiving
           these packets.  Any given master key MAY be used
           simultaneously by several endpoints to originate SRTP/SRTCP
           packets (as well one or more endpoints using this master key
           to process inbound data).

       c)  A Key Derivation Function is applied to the shared master key
           value to form separate encryption keys, authentication keys
           and salting keys for SRTP and for SRTCP (a total of six
           keys).  This process is described in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3
           of [RFC3711].  Since AEAD algorithms such as AES-CCM and
           AES-GCM combine encryption and authentication into a single
           process, AEAD algorithms do not make use of the
           authentication keys.  The master key MUST be at least as
           large as the encryption key derived from it.


4. Terminology

   The following terms have very specific meanings in the context of
   this RFC:

      Crypto Context  For the purposes of this document, a crypto
                      context is the outcome of any process which
                      results in authentication of each endpoint in the
                      SRTP session and possession by each endpoint of a
                      shared secret master key.  Various encryption
                      keys, authentication keys and salts are derived
                      from the master key.  Aside from making
                      modifications to IANA registries to allow AES-GCM
                      and AES-CCM to work with SDES, DTLS and MIKEY, the
                      details of how the master key is established are
                      outside the scope of this document.  Similarly any
                      mechanism for rekeying an existing Cipher Context
                      is outside the scope of the document.

      Instantiation   In AEAD, an instantiation is an (Encryption_key,
                      salt) pair together with all of the data
                      structures (for example, counters) needed for it
                      to function properly.  In SRTP/SRTCP, each
                      endpoint will need two instantiations of the AEAD
                      algorithm for each master key in its possession,


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                      one for SRTP and one for SRTCP.

      Invocation      SRTP/SRTCP data streams are broken into packets.
                      Each packet is processed by a single invocation of
                      the appropriate instantiation of the AEAD
                      algorithm.

   In many applications, each endpoint will have one master key for
   processing outbound data but may have one or more separate master
   keys for processing inbound data.


5. Generic AEAD Processing


5.1. Types of Input Data

     Associated Data        This is data that is to be authenticated but
                            not encrypted.

     Plaintext              Data that is to be both encrypted and
                            authenticated.

     Raw Data               Data that is to be neither encrypted nor
                            authenticated.

   Which portions of SRTP/SRTCP packets that are to be treated as
   associated data, which are to be treated as plaintext, and which are
   to be treated as raw data are covered in sections 9.2, 10.2 and
   10.3.


5.2. AEAD Invocation Inputs and Outputs


5.2.1. Encrypt Mode


      Inputs:
        Encryption_key              Octet string, either 16 or 32
                                    octets long
        Initialization_Vector       Octet string, 12 octets long
        Associated_Data             Bit string of variable length
        Plaintext                   Bit string of variable length
        Tag_Size_Flag (CCM only*)   One Octet

      Outputs
        Ciphertext                  Bit string, length =
                                     length(Plaintext)+tag_length

     (*) For GCM, the algorithm choice determines the tag size.



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   AES-CCM uses a Tag_Size_Flag that has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet
   authentication tag is used, 6A if a 12-octet authentication tag is
   used, and 7A if a 16-octet authentication tag is used.


5.2.2. Decrypt Mode


      Inputs:
        Encryption_key              Octet string, either 16 or 32
                                    Octets long
        Initialization_Vector       Octet string, 12 octets long
        Associated_Data             Octet string of variable length
        Ciphertext                  Octet string of variable length
        Tag_Size_Flag (CCM only*)   One octet

      Outputs
        Plaintext                   Bit string, length =
                                      length(Ciphertext)-tag_length
        Validity_Flag               Boolean, TRUE if valid,
                                    FALSE otherwise

      (*) For GCM, the algorithm choice determines the tag size.

   The Tag_Size_Flag, used in AES-CCM authentication, has the hex value
   5A if an 8-octet authentication tag is used, 6A if a 12-octet
   authentication tag is used, and 7A if a 16-octet authentication tag
   is used.


5.3. Handling of AEAD Authentication

   AEAD requires that all incoming packets MUST pass AEAD authentication
   before any other action takes place.  Plaintext and associated data
   MUST NOT be released until the AEAD authentication tag has been
   validated.  Further, when GCM is being used, the ciphertext MUST NOT
   be decrypted until the AEAD tag has been validated.

   Should the AEAD tag prove to be invalid, the packet in question is to
   be discarded and a Validation Error flag raised.  Local policy
   determines how this flag is to be handled and is outside the scope of
   this document.


6. Counter Mode Encryption

   In both GCM and CCM, each outbound packet uses a 12-octet IV and an
   encryption key to form two outputs, a 16-octet first_key_block which
   is used informing the authentication tag and keystream of octets
   which is XORed to the plaintext to form cipher.

   When GCM is used, the concatenation of a 12-octet IV, with a 4-octet


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   block counter forms the input to AES.  This is used to build a
   key_stream as follows:



    def GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ):
        assert len(plaintext)  <= (2**36) - 32
        key_stream = ""
        block_counter = 1
        first_key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter,
                                   key=Encryption_key        )
        while len(key_stream) < len(Plaintext):
            block_counter = block_counter + 1
            key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter,
                                 key=Encryption_key        )
            key_stream  = key_stream || key_block
         key_stream = truncate( key_stream, len(Plaintext) )
        return (first_key_block, key_stream )


   In AES-CCM counter mode encryption, the AES data input consists of
   the concatenaton of a 1-octet flag,, a 12-octet IV, and a 3-octet
   block counter.  Note that in this apllication the flag octet will
   always have the value 0x02 (see section 2.3 of [RFC3610]).  A
   (first_key_block, keystream) pair is formed as follows:


    def CCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ):
        assert len(Plaintext) <= (2**28)-16
        key_stream = ""
        block_counter = 0
        first_key_block = AES_ENC( data=0x02||IV||block_counter,
                                   key=Encryption_key            )
        while len(key_stream)<len(Plaintext):
            block_counter = block_counter + 1
            key_block = AES_ENC( data=0x02||IV||block_counter,
                                 key=Encryption_key            )
            key_stream  = key_stream || key_block
        key_stream = truncate( key_stream, len(Plaintext) )
        return (first_key_block, key_stream )


   These keystream generation processes allows for a keystream of length
   of up to (2^24)-16 octets for AES-CCM and up to (2^36)-32 octets for
   AES-GCM.

   With any counter mode, if the same (IV, Encryption_key) pair is used
   twice, precisely the same keystream is formed.  As explained in
   section 9.1 of RFC 3711, this is a cryptographic disaster.  For
   AES-GCM, the consequences of such a reuse are even worse than
   explained in RFC 3711 because it would completely compromise the
   AES-GCM authentication mechanism.


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7. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12

   AEAD_AEC_128_CCM and AEAD_AEC_256_CCM are defined in [RFC5116] with
   an authentication tag length of 16-octets.  AEAD_AEC_128_CCM_8 and
   AEAD_AEC_256_CCM_8 are defined in [RFC6655] with an authentication
   tag length of 8-octets.  We require two new variants,
   AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, with 12-octet
   authentication tags.  In each case the authentication tag is formed
   by taking the 12 most significant octets (in network order) of the
   AEAD_AES_128/256_CCM authentication tag:

         +=====================+===========+==============+
         |        Name         | Key Size  | tag size (t) |
         +=====================+===========+==============+
         | AEAD_AEC_256_CCM_12 | 256 bits  | 12 octets    |
         | AEAD_AEC_128_CCM_12 | 128 bits  | 12 octets    |
         +=====================+===========+==============+

8. Unneeded SRTP/SRTCP Fields

   AEAD counter mode encryption removes the need for certain existing
   SRTP/SRTCP mechanisms.


8.1. SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Field

   The AEAD message authentication mechanism MUST be the primary message
   authentication mechanism for AEAD SRTP/SRTCP.  Additional SRTP/SRTCP
   authentication mechanisms SHOULD NOT be used with any AEAD algorithm
   and the optional SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Tags are NOT RECOMMENDED
   and SHOULD NOT be present.  Note that this contradicts section 3.4 of
   [RFC3711] which makes the use of the SRTCP Authentication field
   mandatory, but the presence of the AEAD authentication renders the
   older authentication methods redundant.

      Rationale.  Some applications use the SRTP/SRTCP Authentication
      Tag as a means of conveying additional information, notably
      [RFC4771].  This document retains the Authentication Tag field
      primarily to preserve compatibility with these applications.


8.2. RTP Padding

   Neither AES-GCM not AES-CCM requires that the data be padded out to a
   specific block size, reducing the need to use the padding mechanism
   provided by RTP.  It is RECOMENDED that the RTP padding mechanism not
   be used unless it is necessary to disguise the length of the
   underlying plaintext.




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9. AES-GCM/CCM processing for SRTP


9.1. SRTP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM

   The 12 octet initialization vector used by both AES-GCM and AES-CCM
   SRTP is formed by first concatenating 2-octets of zeroes, the 4-octet
   SSRC, the 4-octer Rollover Counter (ROC) and the two octet sequence
   number SEQ.  The resulting 12-octet value is then XORed to the
   12-octet salt to form the 12-octet IV.

               0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1
               0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
             |00|00|    SSRC   |     ROC   | SEQ |---+
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                                                     |
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
             |         Encryption Salt           |->(+)
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                                                     |
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
             |       Initialization Vector       |<--+
             +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

           Figure 1: AES-GCM and AES-CCM SRTP
                     Initialization Vector formation.

   Using the terminology of section 8.2.1.  of [GCM], the first six
   octets of the IV are the fixed field and the last six octets are the
   invocation field.


9.2. Data Types in SRTP Packets

   All SRTP packets MUST be both authenticated and encrypted.  The data
   fields within the SRTP packets are broken into Associated Data,
   Plaintext and Raw Data as follows (see figure 2):

     Associated Data  The version (2 bits), padding flag (1 bit),
                      extension flag (1 bit), CSRC count (4 bits),
                      sequence number (16 bits), timestamp (32 bits),
                      SSRC (32 bits), optional contributing source
                      identifiers (CSRCs, 32 bits each), and optional
                      RTP extension (variable length).

     Plaintext        The RTP payload (variable length), RTP padding (if
                      used, variable length), and RTP pad count ( if
                      used, 1 octet).

     Raw Data         The optional 32-bit SRTP MKI and the 32-bit SRTP
                      authentication tag (whose use is NOT


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                      RECOMMENDED).

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |V=2|P|X|  CC   |M| Packet Type |       sequence number         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                           timestamp                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |           synchronization source (SSRC) identifier            |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    A  |      contributing source (CSRC) identifiers (optional)        |
    A  |                               ....                            |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                   RTP extension (OPTIONAL)                    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                          payload  ...                         |
    P  |                               +-------------------------------+
    P  |                               | RTP padding   | RTP pad count |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  :                     SRTP MKI (optional)                       :
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  :              authentication tag (NOT RECOMMENDED)             :
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                P = Plaintext (to be encrypted and authenticated)
                A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)
                R = neither encrypted nor authenticated

        Note: The RTP padding and RTP padding count fields are optional
              and are not recommended

      Figure 2: AEAD inputs from an SRTP packet


   Since the AEAD cipher is larger than the plaintext by exactly the
   length of the AEAD authentication tag, the corresponding SRTP
   encrypted packet replaces the plaintext field by a slightly larger
   field containing the cipher.  Even if the plaintext field is empty,
   AEAD encryption must still be performed, with the resulting cipher
   consisting solely of the authentication tag.  This tag is to be
   placed immediately before the optional SRTP MKI and SRTP
   authentication tag fields.


9.3. Prevention of SRTP IV Reuse

   In order to prevent IV reuse, we must ensure that the (ROC,SEQ,SSRC)
   triple is never used twice with the same master key.  There are two
   phases to this issue.

     Counter Management A rekey MUST be performed to establish a new


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                        master key before the (ROC,SEQ) pair cycles back
                        to its original value.

     SSRC Management    The set of all SSRC values must be partitioned
                        into disjoint pools, one pool for each endpoint
                        using the master key to originate outbound
                        data.  Each such endpoint MUST only issue SSRC
                        values from the pool it has been assigned.
                        Further, each endpoint MUST maintain a history
                        of outbound SSRC identifiers that it has issued
                        within the lifetime of the current master key,
                        and when a new synchronization source requests
                        an SSRC identifier it MUST NOT be given an
                        identifier that has been previously issued.  A
                        rekey MUST be performed before its pool of SSRC
                        values is exhausted.


10. AES-GCM/CCM Processing of SRTCP Compound Packets

   All SRTCP compound packets MUST be authenticated, but unlike SRTP,
   SRTCP packet encryption is optional.  A sender can select which
   packets to encrypt, and indicates this choice with a 1-bit encryption
   flag (located just before the 31-bit SRTCP index)


10.1. SRTCP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM

   The 12 octet initialization vector used by both AES-GCM and AES-CCM
   SRTCP is formed by first concatenating 2-octets of zeroes, the
   4-octet Synchronization Source identifier (SSRC), 2-octets of zeroes,
   a single zero bit, and the 31-bit SRTCP Index.  The resulting
   12-octet value is then XORed to the 12-octet salt to form the
   12-octet IV.

                  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
                |00|00|    SSRC   |00|00|0+SRTCP Idx|---+
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                                                        |
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                |         Encryption Salt           |->(+)
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                                                        |
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |
                |       Initialization Vector       |<--+
                +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+

              Figure 3: SRTCP Initialization Vector formation


   Using the terminology of section 8.2.1.  of [GCM], the first eight


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   octets of the IV are the fixed field and the last four octets are the
   invocation field.


10.2. Data Types in Encrypted SRTCP Compound Packets

   When the encryption flag is set to 1, the SRTCP packet is broken into
   plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as listed below
   (see figure 4):

     Associated Data  The packet version (2 bits), padding flag (1 bit),
                      reception report count (5 bits), packet type (8
                      bits), length (2 octets), SSRC (4 octets),
                      encryption flag (1 bit) and SRTCP index (31
                      bits).

     Raw Data         The 32-bit optional SRTCP MKI index and 32-bit
                      SRTCP authentication tag (whose use is NOT
                      RECOMMENDED).

     Plaintext        All other data.

   Note that the plaintext comes in one contiguous field.  Since the
   AEAD cipher is larger than the plaintext by exactly the length of the
   AEAD authentication tag, the corresponding SRTCP encrypted packet
   replaces the plaintext field with a slightly larger field containing
   the cipher.  Even if the plaintext field is empty, AEAD encryption
   must still be performed, with the resulting cipher consisting solely
   of the authentication tag.  This tag is to be placed immediately
   before the encryption flag and SRTCP index.
























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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |V=2|P|   RC    |  Packet Type  |            length             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |           synchronization source (SSRC) of Sender             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                         sender info                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                        report block 1                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                        report block 2                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                              ...                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |V=2|P|   SC    |  Packet Type  |              length           |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    P  |                          SSRC/CSRC_1                          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    P  |                           SDES items                          |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    P  |                              ...                              |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    A  |1|                         SRTCP index                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  |                  SRTCP MKI (optional) index                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  :              authentication tag (NOT RECOMMENDED)             :
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                P = Plaintext (to be encrypted and authenticated)
                A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)
                R = neither encrypted nor authenticated

    Figure 4: AEAD SRTCP inputs when encryption flag = 1.

10.3. Data Types in Unencrypted SRTCP Compound Packets

   When the encryption flag is set to 0, the SRTCP compound packet is
   broken into plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as
   follows (see figure 5):

     Plaintext        None.

     Raw Data         The 32-bit optional SRTCP MKI index and 32-bit
                      SRTCP authentication tag (whose use is NOT
                      RECOMMENDED).

     Associated Data  All other data.

   Even though there is no plaintext in this RTCP packet, AEAD
   encryption returns a cipher field which is precisely the length of


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   the AEAD authentication tag.  This cipher is to be placed before the
   Encryption flag and the SRTCP index in the authenticated SRTCP
   packet.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |V=2|P|   RC    |  Packet Type  |            length             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |           synchronization source (SSRC) of Sender             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                         sender info                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                        report block 1                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                        report block 2                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                              ...                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |V=2|P|   SC    |  Packet Type  |              length           |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    A  |                          SSRC/CSRC_1                          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    A  |                           SDES items                          |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    A  |                              ...                              |
       +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
    A  |0|                         SRTCP index                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  |                   SRTCP MKI (optional)index                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    R  :              authentication tag (NOT RECOMMENDED)             :
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)
                R = neither encrypted nor authenticated

    Figure 5: AEAD SRTCP inputs when encryption flag = 0

10.4. Prevention of SRTCP IV Reuse

   A new master key MUST be established before the 31-bit SRTCP index
   cycles back to its original value.  Ideally, a rekey performed should
   be performed and a new master key put in place well before the SRTCP
   index overflows.

   The comments on SSRC management in section 9.3 also apply.


11. Constraints on AEAD for SRTP and SRTCP

   In general, any AEAD algorithm can accept inputs with varying


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   lengths, but each algorithm can accept only a limited range of
   lengths for a specific parameter.  In this section, we describe the
   constraints on the parameter lengths that any AEAD algorithm must
   support to be used in AEAD-SRTP.  Additionally, we specify a complete
   parameter set for two specific AEAD algorithms, namely AES-GCM and
   AES-CCM.


11.1. Generic AEAD Parameter Constraints

   All AEAD algorithms used with SRTP/SRTCP MUST satisfy the three
   constraints listed below:

   PARAMETER  Meaning                  Value

   A_MAX      maximum additional       MUST be at least 12 octets
              authenticated data
              length
   N_MIN      minimum nonce (IV)       MUST be no more than 12 octets
              length
   N_MAX      maximum nonce (IV)       MUST be at least 12 octets
              length
   C_MAX      maximum ciphertext       GCM: MUST be at most 2^36-16 octets
              length per invocation    CCM: MUST be at most 2^24+16 octets
                                            C_MAX values less than 2232
                                       are discouraged

   The upper bound on C_MAX are based on purely cryptographic
   considerations.  The lower bound on C_MAX is obtained by subtracting
   away a 20-octet IP header, 8-octet UDP header, and 12-octet RTP
   header from the maximum transmission unit (MTU) of 2272.

   For sake of clarity we specify two additional parameters:

      Authentication Tag Length         MUST be either 8, 12, or 16
                                             octets
      Maximum number of invocations     MUST be at most 2^48 for SRTP
         for a given instantiation      MUST be at most 2^31 for SRTCP
      Block Counter size                MUST be 24 bits for CCM,
                                        MUST be 32 bits for GCM

   The reader is reminded that the ciphertext is longer than the
   plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag.


11.2. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP

   AES-GCM is a family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES block
   cipher algorithm.  AES-GCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and
   Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for authentication.  A
   detailed description of the AES-GCM family can be found in
   [RFC5116].  The following members of the AES-GCM family may be used


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   with SRTP/SRTCP:

             Table 1: AES-GCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP
      Name                 Key Size      Auth. Tag Size     Reference
      ================================================================
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM     16 octets     16 octets          [RFC5116]
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM     32 octets     16 octets          [RFC5116]
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8   16 octets      8 octets          [RFC5282]
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8   32 octets      8 octets          [RFC5282]
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12  16 octets     12 octets          [RFC5282]
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12  32 octets     12 octets          [RFC5282]

   Any implementation of AES-GCM SRTP SHOULD support both
   AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8, and it MAY support the
   four other variants shown in table 1.


11.3. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP

   AES-CCM is another family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES
   block cipher algorithm.  AES-CCM uses AES counter mode for encryption
   and AES Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC MAC)
   for authentication.  A detailed description of the AES-CCM family can
   be found in [RFC5116].  Four of the six CCM algorithms used in this
   document are defined in previous RFCs, while two, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12
   and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, are defined in section 7 of this document.

             Table 2: AES-CCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP
      Name                 Key Size    Auth. Tag Size   Reference
      ================================================================
      AEAD_AES_128_CCM     128 bits    16 octets        [RFC5116]
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM     256 bits    16 octets        [RFC5116]
      AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12  128 bits    12 octets        see section 7
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12  256 bits    12 octets        see section 7
      AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8   128 bits     8 octets        [RFC6655]
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8   256 bits     8 octets        [RFC6655]

   Any implementation of AES-CCM SRTP/SRTCP SHOULD support both
   AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM.

   In addition to the flag octet used in counter node encryptionn,
   AES-CCM authentications also useus a flag octet that conveys
   information about the length of the authentication tag, length of the
   block counter, and presence of additional authenticated data (see
   section 2.2 of [RFC 3610]).  For AES-CCM in SRTP/SRTCP, the flag
   octet has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet authentication tag is used,
   6A if a 12-octet authentication tag is used, and 7A if a 16-octet
   authentication tag is used.  The flag octet is one of the inputs to
   AES during the counter mode encryption of the plaintext.


12. Key Derivation Functions


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   A Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to derive all of the required
   encryption and authentication keys from a secret value shared by the
   endpoints.  Both the AEAD_AES_128_GCM algorithms and the
   AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithms MUST use the (128-bit) AES_CM_PRF Key
   Derivation Function described in [RFC3711].  Both the
   AEAD_AES_256_GCM algorithms and the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithms MUST
   use the AES_256_CM_PRF Key Derivation Function described in [RFC
   6188].


13. Security Considerations


13.1. Handling of Security Critical Parameters

   As with any security process, the implementer must take care to
   ensure cryptographically sensitive parameters are properly handled.
   Many of these recommendations hold for all SRTP cryptographic
   algorithms, but we include them here to emphasize their importance.

      - If the master salt is to be kept secret, it MUST be properly
        erased when no longer needed.
      - The secret master key and all keys derived from it MUST be kept
        secret.  All keys MUST be properly erased when no longer
        needed.
      - At the start of each packet, the block counter MUST be reset (to
        0 for CCM, to 1 for GCM).  The block counter is incremented
        after each block key has been produced, but it MUST NOT be
        allowed to exceed 2^32 for GCM and 2^24 for CCM.
      - Each time a rekey occurs, the initial values of the SRTCP index
        and the values of all the SEQ counters MUST be saved.
      - Processing MUST cease if the 48-bit Packet Counter or the 31-bit
        SRTCP index cycles back to its initial value.  Processing MUST
        NOT resume until a new SRTP/SRTCP session has been established
        using a new SRTP master key.  Ideally, a rekey should be done
        well before either of these counters cycle.


13.2. Size of the Authentication Tag

   We require that the AEAD authentication tag must be at least 8
   octets, significantly reducing the probability of an adversary
   successfully introducing fraudulent data.  The goal of an
   authentication tag is to minimize the probability of a successful
   forgery occurring anywhere in the network we are attempting to
   defend.  There are three relevant factors: how low we wish the
   probability of successful forgery to be (prob_success), how many
   attempts the adversary can make (N_tries) and the size of the
   authentication tag in bits (N_tag_bits).  Then

           prob_success < expected number of successes


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                        = N_tries * 2^-N_tag_bits.
   Suppose an adversary wishes to introduce a forged or altered packet
   into a target network by randomly selecting an authentication value
   until by chance they hit a valid authentication tag.  The table below
   summarizes the relationship between the number of forged packets the
   adversary has tried, the size of the authentication tag, and the
   probability of a compromise occurring (i.e.  at least one of the
   attempted forgeries having a valid authentication tag).  The reader
   is reminded that the forgery attempts can be made over the entire
   network, not just a single link, and that frequently changing the key
   does not decrease the probability of a compromise occurring.



      +==================+========================================+
      |  Authentication  | Probability of a Compromise Occurring  |
      |      Tag         | for a given number of forgery attempts |
      |      Size        |------------+-------------+-------------|
      |    (octets)      | prob=2^-30 | prob=2^-20  | prob=2^-10  |
      |==================+=============+=============+============|
      |        4         |  2^2 tries |  2^12 tries |  2^22 tries |
      |==================+============+=============+=============|
      |        8         | 2^34 tries |  2^44 tries |  2^54 tries |
      |==================+============+=============+=============|
      |       12         | 2^66 tries |  2^76 tries |  2^86 tries |
      |==================+============+=============+=============|
      |       16         | 2^98 tries | 2^108 tries | 2^118 tries |
      +=================+============+=============+==============+

       Table 3: Probability of a compromise occurring for a given
                number of forgery attempts and tag size.

14. IANA Considerations


14.1. SDES

   Security description [RFC 4568] defines SRTP "crypto suites"; a
   crypto suite corresponds to a particular AEAD algorithm in SRTP.  In
   order to allow SDP to signal the use of the algorithms defined in
   this document, IANA will register the following crypto suites into
   the subregistry for SRTP crypto suites under the SRTP transport of
   the SDP Security Descriptions:

      srtp-crypto-suite-ext = "AEAD_AES_128_GCM"    /
                              "AEAD_AES_256_GCM"    /
                              "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8"  /
                              "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8"  /
                              "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12" /
                              "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12" /
                              "AEAD_AES_128_CCM"    /
                              "AEAD_AES_256_CCM"    /


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                              srtp-crypto-suite-ext


14.2. DTLS

   DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] defines a DTLS-SRTP "SRTP Protection Profile"; it
   also corresponds to the use of an AEAD algorithm in SRTP.  In order
   to allow the use of the algorithms defined in this document in
   DTLS-SRTP, we request IANA register the following SRTP Protection
   Profiles:

   AEAD_AES_128_CCM
        cipher:               AES_128_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_CCM
        cipher:               AES_256_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8
        cipher:               AES_128_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8
        cipher:               AES_256_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12
        cipher:               AES_128_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12
        cipher:               AES_256_CCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets


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   AEAD_AES_128_GCM
        cipher:               AES_128_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_GCM
        cipher:               AES_256_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8
        cipher:               AES_128_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8
        cipher:               AES_256_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12
        cipher:               AES_128_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    128 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets

   AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12
        cipher:               AES_256_GCM
        cipher_key_length:    256 bits
        cipher_salt_length:   96 bits
        maximum lifetime:     at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                              at most 2^48 SRTP packets


   Note that these SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an
   auth_function, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length because all of
   these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate
   auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag.


14.3. MIKEY



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   In accordance with "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing" [RFC3830],
   IANA maintains several Payload Name Spaces under Multimedia Internet
   KEYing (MIKEY).  This document requires additions to two of the lists
   maintained under MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters.

   On the SRTP policy Type/Value list (derived from Table 6.10.1.a of
   [RFC3830]) we request the following addition:

      Type | Meaning                         | Possible values
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
       TBD | AEAD authentication tag length  | 8, 12, or 16 (in octets)


   On the Encryption Algorithm List (derived from Table 6.10.1.b of
   [RFC3830]) we request the following additions:

       SRTP encr alg. | Value | Default Session Encr. Key Length
       -----------------------------------------------------------
         AES-CCM       |  TBD  |        16 octets
         AES-GCM       |  TBD  |        16 octets

   The SRTP encryption algorithm, session encryption key length, and
   AEAD authentication tag values received from MIKEY fully determine
   the AEAD algorithm (e.g., AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8).  The exact mapping is
   described in section 15.


14.4. AEAD registry

   We request that IANA make the following additions to the AEAD
   registry:

                AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12     = TBD
             AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12     = TBD

15. Parameters for use with MIKEY

   MIKEY specifies the algorithm family separately from the key length
   (which is specified by the Session Encryption key length ) and the
   authentication tag length (specified by AEAD Auth.  tag length).


                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
                           | Encryption | Encryption  |  AEAD Auth. |
                           | Algorithm  | Key Length  |  Tag Length |
                           +============+=============+=============+
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM     |  AES-GCM   | 16 octets   | 16 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_128_CCM     |  AES-CCM   | 16 octets   | 16 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12  |  AES-GCM   |  16 octets  | 12 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+


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      AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12  |  AES-CCM   | 16 octets   | 12 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8   |  AES-GCM   | 16 octets   |  8 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8   |  AES-CCM   | 16 octets   |  8 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM     |  AES-GCM   | 32 octets   | 16 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM     |  AES-CCM   | 32 octets   | 16 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12  |  AES-GCM   | 32 octets   | 12 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12  |  AES-CCM   | 32 octets   | 12 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8   |  AES-GCM   | 32 octets   |  8 octets   |
                           +------------+-------------+-------------+
      AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8   |  AES-CCM   | 32 octets   |  8 octets   |
                           +============+=============+=============+

             Table 4: Mapping MIKEY parameters to AEAD algorithm


   Section 12 in this document restricts the choice of Key Derivation
   Function for AEAD algorithms.  To enforce this restriction in MIKEY,
   we require that the SRTP PRF has value AES-CM whenever an AEAD
   algorithm is used.  Note that, according to Section 6.10.1 in
   [RFC3830], the key length of the Key Derivation Function (i.e.  the
   SRTP master key length) is always equal to the session encryption key
   length.  This means, for example, that AEAD_AES_256_GCM will use
   AES_256_CM_PRF as the Key Derivation Function.


16. Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Michael Peck, Michael Torla, Qin Wu,
   Magnus Westerland, Oscar Ohllson and many other reviewers who
   provided valuable comments on earlier drafts of this document.

















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17. References


17.1. Normative References


   [CCM]      Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38C: The CCM
              Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", U.S.
              National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C.pdf.

   [GCM]      Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", U.S. National
              Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP800-38D.pdf.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3610]  Whiting,D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
              CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, March 2004.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and
              K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
              (SRTP)", RFC 3711, September 2003.

   [RFC3830]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M.,and
              Norrman, K, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
              August 2004.

   [RFC4568]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D.Wing, "Session
              Description Protocol (SDP): Security Descriptions for
              Media Streams", RFC 4568, July 2006.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for
              Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data", RFC 5116,
              January 2008.

   [RFC5282]  McGrew, D. and D. Black, "Using Authenticated Encryption
              Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
              Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282, August 2008.

   [RFC5764]  McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
              Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, May 2010.

   [RFC6188]  McGrew,D.,"The Use of AES-192 and AES-256 in Secure RTP"
              RFC 6188, March 2011

   [RFC6655]  McGrew,D. and D. Bailey,"AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport


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              Layer Security (TLS)", July 2012





















































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17.2. Informative References

   [BN00]     Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated encryption:
              Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
              composition paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
              Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545 http://
              www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/oem.html.

   [BOYD]     Boyd, C. and A. Mathuria, "Protocols for Authentication
              and Key Establishment", Springer, 2003 .

   [CMAC]     "NIST Special Publication 800-38B",  http://csrc.nist.gov/
              CryptoToolkit/modes/800-38_Series_Publications/
              SP800-38B.pdf.

   [EEM04]    Bellare, M., Namprempre, C., and T. Kohno, "Breaking and
              provably repairing the SSH authenticated encryption
              scheme: A case study of the Encode-then-Encrypt-and-MAC
              paradigm", ACM Transactions on Information and System Secu
              rity, http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/
              TISSEC04/.

   [GR05]     Garfinkel, T. and M. Rosenblum, "When Virtual is Harder
              than Real: Security Challenges in Virtual Machine Based
              Computing Environments", Proceedings of the 10th Workshop
              on Hot Topics in Operating Systems http://
              www.stanford.edu/~talg/papers/HOTOS05/
              virtual-harder-hotos05.pdf.

   [J02]      Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC",
              Proceedings of the 9th Annual Workshop on Selected Areas
              on Cryptography, http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/
              proposedmodes/ccm/ccm-ad1.pdf, 2002.

   [MODES]    Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", U.S.
              National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.

   [MV04]     McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Security and Performance of
              the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)", Proceedings of INDOCRYPT
              '04, http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193, December 2004.

   [R02]      Rogaway, P., "Authenticated encryption with Associated-
              Data", ACM Conference on Computer and Communication
              Security (CCS'02), pp. 98-107, ACM Press,
              2002. http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ad.html.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.


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Internet Draft         AES-GCM and AES-CCM for SRTP         Sep 18, 2012



   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4106, June 2005.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4309]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
              Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4309, December 2005.

   [RFC4771]  Lehtovirta, V., Naslund, M., and K. Norrman, "Integrity
              Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-
              time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 4771, January 2007.

































Igoe and McGrew                 Informational                  [Page 26]


Internet Draft         AES-GCM and AES-CCM for SRTP         Sep 18, 2012


   Author's Address

      David A. McGrew
      Cisco Systems, Inc.
      510 McCarthy Blvd.
      Milpitas, CA  95035
      US
      Phone: (408) 525 8651
      Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
      URI:   http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm


      Kevin M. Igoe
      NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center
      National Security Agency
      EMail: kmigoe@nsa.gov


Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
































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