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Versions: (draft-richardson-btns-abstract-api) 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                      M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                                       SSW
Expires: December 27, 2007                                 June 25, 2007


          An interface between applications and keying systems
                  draft-ietf-btns-abstract-api-00.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).















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Abstract

   The "BTNS" (Better Than Nothing Security) protocols specifies how to
   use IKEv1 and IKEv2 to do unauthenticated IPsec.  This document
   explains in the abstract (no language bindings are provided) how an
   application may learn that BTNS IPsec has been applied to a
   conversation, such that the application can plan to do it's own
   authentication using a channel binding.  In addition, applications
   can use this API (Application Programming Interface) to request BTNS
   treatment of the applications' connections.


Table of Contents

   1.    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.    Objects involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.1.  Scope of Protection Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.2.  Scope of Identity Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.3.  Validity period of Protection Token  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.4.  Validity period of Identity Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.    Namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.    pToken discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.    Properties of pToken objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.    Properties of iToken objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.    Accessor Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10.   IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   11.   Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   12.   TRACKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   13.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   13.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   13.2. Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
         Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
         Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 19
















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1.  Overview

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].














































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2.  Introduction

   Purpose of this API.
















































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3.  Objects involved

   There are two major kinds of objects that are defined by this
   document.  These are the Protection Token (pToken) and the Identity
   Token (iToken).  Both objects are abstracted into unique opaque
   tokens which may be manipulated only indirectly by applications.

   Each object has a series of attributes associated with it.  The API
   provides a mechanism to query the value of attributes of the token.
   The attributes are where all of the content of the objects are.

   Each token has a scope - the place and time in which it can be
   considered valid.  There are many conflicting qualities that one
   would wish for the token, and the result is a different compromise
   among these qualities for each token type.  The tokens should be:

      small

      easy to allocate and deallocate

      automatically cleaned up when an application terminates (both
      properly and inproperly)

      easily compared

      easily passed back in a recvmsg(2) call as auxiliary data (for
      pToken)

3.1.  Scope of Protection Token

   The protection token has a per-process (i.e. per-address space)
   scope.  The scope of the token is not related to the underlying
   protection provided by IPsec.  The token is a handle.

3.2.  Scope of Identity Token

   The identity token has a per-system scope, although two applications
   running on the same system may not be able to compare it literally.

3.3.  Validity period of Protection Token

   The pToken is valid only within the scope of a single process.  The
   token may not be saved in any long term storage.

   It is permitted for one protection token to be replaced with another
   (equivalent) protection token due to a node moving, suspending and
   resuming, or due to extended network outages, however the underlying
   identity token would be guaranteed to be the same.  This would most



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   likely occur with unconnected sockets, where due to the outage/
   downtime, the keying system was unable to maintain a keying channel,
   and had to re-create the keys from scratch.

3.4.  Validity period of Identity Token

   The iToken may be valid across the entire system, although it may
   need to be turned into an external representation.  Some forms of
   identity token may be valid across systems, but in general an
   identity token is only valid in reference to a local set of trust
   anchors.  (See [RFC2692]).








































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4.  Namespace

   All functions and macros defined by this API are prefixed with
   "ipsec_" for functions and variables, and with "IPSEC_" if they are
   macros or enumerated types. (cf. to appropriate POSIX section?)

   Whenever sensible, the enumerated values defined in [RFC2367] are
   used if appropriate.











































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5.  pToken discovery

   An application that receives a connection using accept(2), or with
   recvmsg(2) needs to get a protection token that is associated with
   the socket.

   For connected sockets (such as TCP and some SCTP modes), the
   protection token should not change during the lifetime of the socket,
   so a simple process is appropriate.

   For unconnected sockets (such as UDP and some SCTP modes), each
   datagram received may be received may arrive from a different source,
   and therefore may have different protections applied.  A protection
   token needs to be returned with each datagram, so it must be returned
   as ancilliary data with recvmsg(2).

   For connected sockets, the pToken will not change during the
   connection. (see notes about rekeying).  A simple function is
   provided to return a pToken from a file descriptor.  Many
   implementions are likely to implement this using getsockopt(2), but
   an interface in those terms is not specified in order to keep it more
   abstract, and therefore more portable.





























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6.  Properties of pToken objects

      privacyProtected - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
      initiator. set to false if the connection has either no privacy
      configured (AH, ESP-null), or if the privacy configured is known
      to be untrustworthy by the administrator.  Returns true otherwise.
      (XXX: False does not mean that there will be no IPsec, but that it
      should not be considered useful)

      integrityProtected - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
      initiator. set to false if there is no data integrity protection
      other than the UDP/TCP checksum.

      compressionAvailable - boolean. readonly on responder, get/set on
      initiator.  Set to true if data count sent/received from socket
      may not map linearly to data sent/received on wire.

      iToken - object. readonly on responder. get/set on initiator.  Set
      to iToken object which represents identity of remote system.

      auditString - string. readonly on responder and readonly on
      initiator after connection establishment.  Contains a string which
      can be used in system auditing and logging functions which
      describes the details of the IPsec SA that was negotiated.  No
      structure of this string may be assumed.  No session keys are
      disclosed by this string.

























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7.  Properties of iToken objects

      auditString - string. readonly on responder and readonly on
      initiator after connection establishment.  Contains a string which
      can be used in system auditing and logging functions which
      describes the remote identity, and the method by which it was
      authenticated (i.e. it may list the CA or origin of a public key)

      authenticationMethod - enumerated type.  Indicates which method
      was used to authenticate the peer, possible values are:

         NONE - the peer was not authenticated in anyway

         BTNS - the peer was authenticated using an inline key which was
         not verified in anyway

         LEAFOFFAITH - the peer was authenticated using a key which was
         previously cached, but was previously received inline, and was
         not verified in anyway.

         PRESHAREDKEY - the peer was authenticated using a unique pre-
         shared key

         GROUPKEY - the peer was authenticated using a non-unique pre-
         shared key

         XAUTH - the type of phase1/PARENT-SA is not relevant, as the
         peer was authenticated using a username/password.

         EAP - the type of phase1/PARENT-SA is not relevant, as the peer
         was authenticated using an EAP method.  (Additional properties
         may provide more information)

         PKIX_TRUSTED - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
         certificate that was found in the trusted store.

         PKIX_INLINE - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
         certificate that was transmitted inline, and was verified by
         using a Certificate Authority that was found in the trusted
         store.

         PKIX_OFFLINE - the peer was authenticated using a PKIX/X.509
         certificate that was retrieved out-of-band (such as by LDAP or
         HTTP), and was verified by using a Certificate Authority that
         was found in the trusted store.






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      certificateAuthorityDN - string. readonly. the Distinguished Name
      (DN) of certificate authority that was used to verify the key (for
      methods that involved PKIX)

      certificateDN - string. readonly. the DN of the peer that was
      authenticated

      pubKeyID - string. readonly. a somewhat unique identifier for the
      public key.  A suggestion is to use the first 9 base64 digits of
      the RFC3110 public key modulus, but this is a local matter.

      channelBinding - binary blog. readonly. provides the concatenated
      set of public keys






































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8.  Accessor Functions

   Methods to access the properties of the two objects are specific to
   the language in which the bindings are done.  See YYYY for
   C-bindings.














































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9.  Security Considerations

   Probably lots to say here.  Please help.
















































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10.  IANA Considerations

   There are no registries created by this document.  The names (and
   language specific enum, if applicable) of the pToken and iToken
   proprties are internal to a single system, and therefore do not need
   standization.













































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11.  Acknowledgments

   stuff
















































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12.  TRACKING

   Document RCS tracking info


   $Revision: 1.1 $
   $Log: ietf-btns-abstract-api-00.txt,v $
   Revision 1.1  2007/06/25 15:37:06  mcr
     added ietf-btns-abstract-api

   Revision 1.1  2007/06/25 15:34:08  mcr
      renamed drafts in Makefile

   Revision 1.3  2007/05/14 19:56:37  mcr
     added abstract

   Revision 1.2  2007/05/12 20:38:56  mcr
     fixed id string

   Revision 1.1  2007/05/12 01:31:00  mcr
     updates to abstract api document

   Revision 1.4 2007/02/16 03:24:09 mcr
         updated to make XML happy, and dates corrected
   Revision 1.3 2007/02/16 03:04:44 mcr
         C API document.
   Revision 1.2 2006/03/21 22:02:47 mcr
         added API requirements and skeleton of original API spec
   Revision 1.1 2006/03/21 21:04:43 mcr
         added documents from ipsp WG
   Revision 1.1 2003/06/03 20:45:06 mcr
         initial template

                        Figure 1: document tracking




















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13.  References

13.1.  Normative references

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2367]  McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key
              Management API, Version 2", RFC 2367, July 1998.

   [RFC2692]  Ellison, C., "SPKI Requirements", RFC 2692,
              September 1999.

13.2.  Non-normative references

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.


































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Author's Address

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   Email: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/









































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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

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Acknowledgment

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   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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