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Versions: (draft-krishnan-conex-destopt) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 7837

ConEx Working Group                                          S. Krishnan
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Kuehlewind
Expires: August 18, 2014                     IKR University of Stuttgart
                                                               C. Ucendo
                                                              Telefonica
                                                       February 14, 2014


                   IPv6 Destination Option for ConEx
                      draft-ietf-conex-destopt-06

Abstract

   ConEx is a mechanism by which senders inform the network about the
   congestion encountered by packets earlier in the same flow.  This
   document specifies an IPv6 destination option that is capable of
   carrying ConEx markings in IPv6 datagrams.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Requirements for the coding of ConEx in IPv6  . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  ConEx Destination Option (CDO)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Implementation in the fast path of ConEx-aware routers  . . .   5
   6.  Compatibility with use of IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  DDoS mitigation by using preferential drop  . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   ConEx [CAM] is a mechanism by which senders inform the network about
   the congestion encountered by packets earlier in the same flow.  This
   document specifies an IPv6 destination option [RFC2460] that can be
   used for performing ConEx markings in IPv6 datagrams.

   The ConEx information can be used by any network element on the path
   to e.g. do traffic management or egress policing.  Additionally this
   information will potentially be used by an audit function that checks
   the integrity of the sender's signaling.

2.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL","SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Requirements for the coding of ConEx in IPv6

   R-1: The marking mechanism needs to be visible to all ConEx-capable
   nodes on the path.

   R-2: The mechanism needs to be able to traverse nodes that do not
   understand the markings.  This is required to ensure that ConEx can
   be incrementally deployed over the Internet.

   R-3: The presence of the marking mechanism should not significantly
   alter the processing of the packet.  This is required to ensure that




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   ConEx marked packets do not face any undue delays or drops due to a
   badly chosen mechanism.

   R-4: The markings should be immutable once set by the sender.  At the
   very least, any tampering should be detectable.

   Based on these requirements four solutions to implement the ConEx
   information in the IPv6 header have been investigated: hop-by-hop
   options, destination options, using IPv6 header bits (from the flow
   label), and new extension headers.  After evaluating the different
   solutions, the wg concluded that only the use of a destination option
   would fulfil the requirements.

4.  ConEx Destination Option (CDO)

   The ConEx Destination Option (CDO) is a destination option that can
   be included in IPv6 datagrams that are sent by ConEx-aware senders in
   order to inform ConEx-aware nodes on the path about the congestion
   encountered by packets earlier in the same flow.  The CDO has an
   alignment requirement of (none).

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
                                   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                   |  Option Type  | Option Length |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |X|L|E|C|                       Reserved                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                 Figure 1: ConEx Destination Option Layout





















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   Option Type

      8-bit identifier of the type of option. The option identifier
      for the ConEx destination option will be allocated by the IANA.

   Option Length

      8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option (excluding
      the Option Type and Option Length fields). This field MUST be
      set to the value 4.

   X Bit

      When this bit is set, the transport sender is using ConEx with
      this packet. If it is not set, the sender is not using ConEx with
      this packet.

   L Bit

      When this bit is set, the transport sender has experienced a loss.

   E Bit

      When this bit is set, the transport sender has experienced
      ECN-signaled congestion.

   C Bit

      When this bit is set, the transport sender is building up
      congestion credit in the audit.

   Reserved

      These bits are not used in the current specification. They
      are set to zero on the sender and are ignored on the receiver.

   All packets sent over a ConEx-capable connection MUST carry the CDO.
   The CDO is immutable.  Network devices SHOULD only read the flags.
   IPSeC Authentication Header (AH) may be used to verify that the CDO
   has not been modified.

   If the X bit is zero all other three bits are undefined and thus
   should be ignored.  The X bit set to zero means that the connection
   is ConEx-capable but this packet SHOULD NOT be accounted to determine
   ConEx information in an audit function.  This can be the case for
   e.g. pure control packets not carrying any user data.  As an example
   in TCP pure ACKs are usually not ECN-capable and TCP does not have an




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   mechanism to announce the lost of a pure ACK to the sender.  Thus
   congestion information about ACKs are not available at the sender.

   If the X bit is set, all three other bit (L, E, C) MAY be set.
   Whenever one of these bits is set, the number of bytes carried by
   this IP packet (including the IP header) SHOULD be accounted for
   determining congestion or credit information.  In IPv6 the number of
   bytes can easily be calculated by adding the number 40 (length of the
   IPv6 header in bytes) to the value present in the Payload Length
   field in the IPv6 header.

   Credits are sent previous to the occurence of congestion (loss or
   ECN-CE marks) and the amount of credits should cover the congestion
   risk.  Note, the maximum congestion risk is that all packets in
   flight get lost or ECN marked.

   If the L or E bit is set, a congestion signal in form of loss or,
   respectively, an ECN mark was previously expirienced by the same
   connection.

   In principle all of these three bits (L, E, C) MAY be set in the same
   packet.  In this case the packet size MUST be accounted more than
   once for each respective ConEx information counter.

   If a network node extracts the ConEx information from a connection,
   this node is usually supposed to hold this information byte-wise,
   e.g. comparing the total number of bytes sent with the number of
   bytes sent with ConEx congestion mark (L, E) to determine the current
   whole path congestion level.  For ConEx-aware node processing, the
   CDO MUST use the Payload length field of the preceding IPv6 header
   for byte-based accounting.  When equally sized packets can be
   assumed, the accounting of the number of packets (instead the number
   of bytes) should deliver the same result.  But a network node must be
   aware that this estimation can be quite wrong, if e.g. different
   sized packed are send, and thus is not reliable.

   A ConEx sender SHOULD set the reserved bits in the CDO to zero.
   Other nodes SHOULD not interpret these bits.

5.  Implementation in the fast path of ConEx-aware routers

   The ConEx information is being encoded into a destination option so
   that it does not impact forwarding performance in the non-ConEx-aware
   nodes on the path.  Since destination options are not usually
   processed by routers, the existence of the CDO does not affect the
   fast path processing of the datagram on non-ConEx-aware routers. i.e.
   They are not pushed into the slow path towards the control plane for
   exception processing.



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   The ConEx-aware nodes still need to process the CDO without severely
   affecting forwarding.  For this to be possible, the ConEx-aware
   routers need to quickly ascertain the presence of the CDO and process
   the option if it is present.  To efficiently perform this, the CDO
   needs to be placed in a fairly deterministic location.  In order to
   facilitate forwarding on ConEx-aware routers, ConEx-aware senders who
   send IPv6 datagrams with the CDO MUST place the CDO as the first
   destination option in the destination options header.

6.  Compatibility with use of IPsec

   In IPsec transport mode no action needs to be taken as the CDO is
   visible to the network.  When accounting ConEx information the size
   of the Authentication Header (AH) SHOULD NOT be accounted as this
   information has been added later.  In the IPsec Tunnel model the CDO
   SHOULD be copied to the outer IP header as this information is end-
   to-end.  Only the payload of the outer IP header minus the AH SHOULD
   be accounted.

   If the transport network can not be trusted authentication SHOULD be
   used to ensure integrity of the ConEx information.  If an attacker
   would be able to remove the ConEx marks, this could cause an audit
   device to penalize the respective connection, while the sender cannot
   easily detect that ConEx information is missing.

7.  DDoS mitigation by using preferential drop

   If a router queue experiences very high load so that it has to drop
   arriving packets, it MAY preferentially drop packets within the same
   Diffserv PHB using the preference order given in Table 1 (1 means
   drop first).  Additionally, if a router implements preferential drop
   it SHOULD also support ECN-marking.  Preferential dropping can be
   difficult to implement on some hardware, but if feasible it would
   discriminate against attack traffic if done as part of the overall
   policing framework as described in [RFC6789].  If nowhere else,
   routers at the egress of a network SHOULD implement preferential drop
   (stronger than the MAY above).

                 +----------------------+----------------+
                 |                      |   Preference   |
                 +----------------------+----------------+
                 | Not-ConEx or no CDO  | 1 (drop first) |
                 | X (but not L,E or C) |       2        |
                 | X and L,E or C       |       3        |
                 +----------------------+----------------+

                Table 1: Drop preference for ConEx packets




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   A flooding attack is inherently about congestion of a resource.  As
   load focuses on a victim, upstream queues grow, requiring honest
   sources to pre-load packets with a higher fraction of ConEx-marks.

   If ECN marking is supported by the downstream queues preferential
   dropping provides the most benefits because if the queue is so
   congested that it drops traffic, it will be CE-marking 100% of the
   forwarded traffic.  Honest sources will therefore be sending 100%
   ConEx E-marked packets (and therefore being rate-limited at an
   ingress policer).  Senders under malicious control can either do the
   same as honest sources, and be rate-limited at ingress, or they can
   understate congestion.  If the preferential drop ranking is
   implemented on queues, these queues will preserve E/L-marked traffic
   until last.  So, the traffic from malicious sources will all be
   automatically dropped first.  Either way, the malicious sources
   cannot send more than honest sources.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Marcelo Bagnulo, Bob Briscoe, Ingemar
   Johansson, Joel Halpern and John Leslie for the discussions that led
   to this document.

   Special thanks to Bob Briscoe who contributed text and analysis work
   on preferential dropping.

9.  Security Considerations

   This document does not bring up any new security issues.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new IPv6 destination option for carrying
   ConEx markings.  IANA is requested to assign a new destination option
   type in the Destination Options registry maintained at http://
   www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters <TBA1> ConEx Destination
   Option [RFCXXXX] The act bits for this option need to be 10 and the
   chg bit needs to be 0.

11.  Normative References

   [CAM]      Mathis, M. and B. Briscoe, "Congestion Exposure (ConEx)
              Concepts and Abstract Mechanism", draft-ietf-ConEx-
              abstract-mech-05 (work in progress), July 2011.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.




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   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC6789]  Briscoe, B., Woundy, R., and A. Cooper, "Congestion
              Exposure (ConEx) Concepts and Use Cases", RFC 6789,
              December 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson
   8400 Blvd Decarie
   Town of Mount Royal, Quebec
   Canada

   Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com


   Mirja Kuehlewind
   IKR University of Stuttgart

   Email: mirja.kuehlewind@ikr.uni-stuttgart.de


   Carlos Ralli Ucendo
   Telefonica

   Email: ralli@tid.es























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