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Versions: (draft-selander-ace-object-security) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

CoRE Working Group                                           G. Selander
Internet-Draft                                               J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track                            F. Palombini
Expires: January 27, 2019                                    Ericsson AB
                                                                L. Seitz
                                                               RISE SICS
                                                           July 26, 2018


     Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
                   draft-ietf-core-object-security-14

Abstract

   This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful
   Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of
   the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object
   Signing and Encryption (COSE).  OSCORE provides end-to-end protection
   between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP.
   OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a
   range of proxy operations, including translation between different
   transport protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 27, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  The OSCORE Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  The Security Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Security Context Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Establishment of Security Context Parameters  . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Requirements on the Security Context Parameters . . . . .  12
   4.  Protected Message Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  CoAP Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  CoAP Header Fields and Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.3.  Signaling Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   5.  The COSE Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     5.1.  Kid Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.2.  Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.3.  Plaintext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     5.4.  Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   6.  OSCORE Header Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.1.  Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.2.  Encoding of the OSCORE Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     6.3.  Examples of Compressed COSE Objects . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   7.  Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay
       Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.1.  Message Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.2.  Sequence Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     7.3.  Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     7.4.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     7.5.  Losing Part of the Context State  . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   8.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     8.1.  Protecting the Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     8.2.  Verifying the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     8.3.  Protecting the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     8.4.  Verifying the Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   9.  Web Linking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   10. CoAP-to-CoAP Forwarding Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   11. HTTP Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     11.1.  The HTTP OSCORE Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     11.2.  CoAP-to-HTTP Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     11.3.  HTTP-to-CoAP Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     11.4.  HTTP Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44



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     11.5.  Example: HTTP Client and CoAP Server . . . . . . . . . .  44
     11.6.  Example: CoAP Client and HTTP Server . . . . . . . . . .  46
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     12.1.  End-to-end Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     12.2.  Security Context Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     12.3.  Master Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     12.4.  Replay Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     12.5.  Client Aliveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     12.6.  Cryptographic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     12.7.  Message Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     12.8.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     13.1.  COSE Header Parameters Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     13.2.  CoAP Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     13.3.  CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . .  51
     13.4.  Header Field Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     13.5.  Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     13.6.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     13.7.  OSCORE Octet Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     13.8.  Expert Review Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   Appendix A.  Scenario Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.1.  Secure Access to Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.2.  Secure Subscribe to Sensor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   Appendix B.  Deployment Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     B.1.  Master Secret Used Once . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     B.2.  Master Secret Used Multiple Times . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   Appendix C.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     C.1.  Test Vector 1: Key Derivation with Master Salt  . . . . .  63
     C.2.  Test Vector 2: Key Derivation without Master Salt . . . .  65
     C.3.  Test Vector 3: Key Derivation with ID Context . . . . . .  66
     C.4.  Test Vector 4: OSCORE Request, Client . . . . . . . . . .  68
     C.5.  Test Vector 5: OSCORE Request, Client . . . . . . . . . .  69
     C.6.  Test Vector 6: OSCORE Request, Client . . . . . . . . . .  70
     C.7.  Test Vector 7: OSCORE Response, Server  . . . . . . . . .  71
     C.8.  Test Vector 8: OSCORE Response with Partial IV, Server  .  72
   Appendix D.  Overview of Security Properties  . . . . . . . . . .  74
     D.1.  Supporting Proxy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     D.2.  Protected Message Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     D.3.  Uniqueness of (key, nonce)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
     D.4.  Unprotected Message Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   Appendix E.  CDDL Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80





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1.  Introduction

   The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web
   transfer protocol, designed for constrained nodes and networks
   [RFC7228], and may be mapped from HTTP [RFC8075].  CoAP specifies the
   use of proxies for scalability and efficiency and references DTLS
   [RFC6347] for security.  CoAP-to-CoAP, HTTP-to-CoAP, and CoAP-to-HTTP
   proxies require DTLS or TLS [RFC5246] to be terminated at the proxy.
   The proxy therefore not only has access to the data required for
   performing the intended proxy functionality, but is also able to
   eavesdrop on, or manipulate any part of, the message payload and
   metadata in transit between the endpoints.  The proxy can also
   inject, delete, or reorder packets since they are no longer protected
   by (D)TLS.

   This document defines the Object Security for Constrained RESTful
   Environments (OSCORE) security protocol, protecting CoAP and CoAP-
   mappable HTTP requests and responses end-to-end across intermediary
   nodes such as CoAP forward proxies and cross-protocol translators
   including HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075].  In addition to the core
   CoAP features defined in [RFC7252], OSCORE supports Observe
   [RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959], No-Response [RFC7967], and PATCH and
   FETCH [RFC8132].  An analysis of end-to-end security for CoAP
   messages through some types of intermediary nodes is performed in
   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].  OSCORE essentially protects the
   RESTful interactions; the request method, the requested resource, the
   message payload, etc. (see Section 4).  OSCORE protects neither the
   CoAP Messaging Layer nor the CoAP Token which may change between the
   endpoints, and those are therefore processed as defined in [RFC7252].
   Additionally, since the message formats for CoAP over unreliable
   transport [RFC7252] and for CoAP over reliable transport [RFC8323]
   differ only in terms of CoAP Messaging Layer, OSCORE can be applied
   to both unreliable and reliable transports (see Figure 1).


















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               +-----------------------------------+
               |            Application            |
               +-----------------------------------+
               +-----------------------------------+  \
               |  Requests / Responses / Signaling |  |
               |-----------------------------------|  |
               |               OSCORE              |  | CoAP
               |-----------------------------------|  |
               | Messaging Layer / Message Framing |  |
               +-----------------------------------+  /
               +-----------------------------------+
               |          UDP / TCP / ...          |
               +-----------------------------------+

              Figure 1: Abstract Layering of CoAP with OSCORE

   OSCORE works in very constrained nodes and networks, thanks to its
   small message size and the restricted code and memory requirements in
   addition to what is required by CoAP.  Examples of the use of OSCORE
   are given in Appendix A.  OSCORE does not depend on underlying
   layers, and can be used with non-IP transports (e.g.,
   [I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie]).  OSCORE may also be used in
   different ways with HTTP.  OSCORE messages may be transported in
   HTTP, and OSCORE may also be used to protect CoAP-mappable HTTP
   messages, as described below.

   OSCORE is designed to protect as much information as possible while
   still allowing CoAP proxy operations (Section 10).  It works with
   existing CoAP-to-CoAP forward proxies [RFC7252], but an OSCORE-aware
   proxy will be more efficient.  HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075] and
   CoAP-to-HTTP proxies can also be used with OSCORE, as specified in
   Section 11.  OSCORE may be used together with TLS or DTLS over one or
   more hops in the end-to-end path, e.g. transported with HTTPS in one
   hop and with plain CoAP in another hop.  The use of OSCORE does not
   affect the URI scheme and OSCORE can therefore be used with any URI
   scheme defined for CoAP or HTTP.  The application decides the
   conditions for which OSCORE is required.

   OSCORE uses pre-shared keys which may have been established out-of-
   band or with a key establishment protocol (see Section 3.2).  The
   technical solution builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
   (COSE) [RFC8152], providing end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay
   protection, and binding of response to request.  A compressed version
   of COSE is used, as specified in Section 6.  The use of OSCORE is
   signaled in CoAP with a new option (Section 2), and in HTTP with a
   new header field (Section 11.1) and content type (Section 13.5).  The
   solution transforms a CoAP/HTTP message into an "OSCORE message"
   before sending, and vice versa after receiving.  The OSCORE message



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   is a CoAP/HTTP message related to the original message in the
   following way: the original CoAP/HTTP message is translated to CoAP
   (if not already in CoAP) and protected in a COSE object.  The
   encrypted message fields of this COSE object are transported in the
   CoAP payload/HTTP body of the OSCORE message, and the OSCORE option/
   header field is included in the message.  A sketch of an exchange of
   OSCORE messages, in the case of the original message being CoAP, is
   provided in Figure 2.

          Client                                          Server
             |      OSCORE request - POST example.com:      |
             |        Header, Token,                        |
             |        Options: {OSCORE, ...},               |
             |        Payload: COSE ciphertext              |
             +--------------------------------------------->|
             |                                              |
             |<---------------------------------------------+
             |      OSCORE response - 2.04 (Changed):       |
             |        Header, Token,                        |
             |        Options: {OSCORE, ...},               |
             |        Payload: COSE ciphertext              |
             |                                              |

                   Figure 2: Sketch of CoAP with OSCORE

   An implementation supporting this specification MAY implement only
   the client part, MAY implement only the server part, or MAY implement
   only one of the proxy parts.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in CoAP [RFC7252], Observe [RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959],
   COSE [RFC8152], CBOR [RFC7049], CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] as
   summarized in Appendix E, and constrained environments [RFC7228].

   The term "hop" is used to denote a particular leg in the end-to-end
   path.  The concept "hop-by-hop" (as in "hop-by-hop encryption" or
   "hop-by-hop fragmentation") opposed to "end-to-end", is used in this
   document to indicate that the messages are processed accordingly in
   the intermediaries, rather than just forwarded to the next node.




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   The term "stop processing" is used throughout the document to denote
   that the message is not passed up to the CoAP Request/Response layer
   (see Figure 1).

   The terms Common/Sender/Recipient Context, Master Secret/Salt, Sender
   ID/Key, Recipient ID/Key, ID Context, and Common IV are defined in
   Section 3.1.

2.  The OSCORE Option

   The OSCORE option (see Figure 3, which extends Table 4 of [RFC7252])
   indicates that the CoAP message is an OSCORE message and that it
   contains a compressed COSE object (see Sections 5 and 6).  The OSCORE
   option is critical, safe to forward, part of the cache key, and not
   repeatable.

   +------+---+---+---+---+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
   | No.  | C | U | N | R | Name           | Format | Length | Default |
   +------+---+---+---+---+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
   | TBD1 | x |   |   |   | OSCORE         |  (*)   | 0-255  | (none)  |
   +------+---+---+---+---+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
       C = Critical,   U = Unsafe,   N = NoCacheKey,   R = Repeatable
       (*) See below.

                        Figure 3: The OSCORE Option

   The OSCORE option includes the OSCORE flag bits (Section 6), the
   Sender Sequence Number, the Sender ID, and the ID Context when these
   fields are present (Section 3).  The detailed format and length is
   specified in Section 6.  If the OSCORE flag bits are all zero (0x00)
   the Option value SHALL be empty (Option Length = 0).  An endpoint
   receiving a CoAP message without payload, that also contains an
   OSCORE option SHALL treat it as malformed and reject it.

   A successful response to a request with the OSCORE option SHALL
   contain the OSCORE option.  Whether error responses contain the
   OSCORE option depends on the error type (see Section 8).

   For CoAP proxy operations, see Section 10.

3.  The Security Context

   OSCORE requires that client and server establish a shared security
   context used to process the COSE objects.  OSCORE uses COSE with an
   Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD, [RFC5116])
   algorithm for protecting message data between a client and a server.
   In this section, we define the security context and how it is derived




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   in client and server based on a shared secret and a key derivation
   function (KDF).

3.1.  Security Context Definition

   The security context is the set of information elements necessary to
   carry out the cryptographic operations in OSCORE.  For each endpoint,
   the security context is composed of a "Common Context", a "Sender
   Context", and a "Recipient Context".

   The endpoints protect messages to send using the Sender Context and
   verify messages received using the Recipient Context, both contexts
   being derived from the Common Context and other data.  Clients and
   servers need to be able to retrieve the correct security context to
   use.

   An endpoint uses its Sender ID (SID) to derive its Sender Context,
   and the other endpoint uses the same ID, now called Recipient ID
   (RID), to derive its Recipient Context.  In communication between two
   endpoints, the Sender Context of one endpoint matches the Recipient
   Context of the other endpoint, and vice versa.  Thus, the two
   security contexts identified by the same IDs in the two endpoints are
   not the same, but they are partly mirrored.  Retrieval and use of the
   security context are shown in Figure 4.

                 .-------------.           .-------------.
                 |  Common,    |           |  Common,    |
                 |  Sender,    |           |  Recipient, |
                 |  Recipient  |           |  Sender     |
                 '-------------'           '-------------'
                      Client                   Server
                         |                       |
   Retrieve context for  | OSCORE request:       |
    target resource      |   Token = Token1,     |
   Protect request with  |   kid = SID, ...      |
     Sender Context      +---------------------->| Retrieve context with
                         |                       |  RID = kid
                         |                       | Verify request with
                         |                       |  Recipient Context
                         | OSCORE response:      | Protect response with
                         |   Token = Token1, ... |  Sender Context
   Retrieve context with |<----------------------+
    Token = Token1       |                       |
   Verify request with   |                       |
    Recipient Context    |                       |

            Figure 4: Retrieval and Use of the Security Context




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   The Common Context contains the following parameters:

   o  AEAD Algorithm.  The COSE AEAD algorithm to use for encryption.

   o  Key Derivation Function.  The HMAC based HKDF [RFC5869] used to
      derive Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV.

   o  Master Secret.  Variable length, random byte string (see
      Section 12.3) used to derive traffic keys and IVs.

   o  Master Salt.  Optional variable length byte string containing the
      salt used to derive traffic keys and IVs.

   o  ID Context.  Optional variable length byte string providing
      additional information to identify the Common Context and to
      derive traffic keys and IVs.

   o  Common IV.  Byte string derived from Master Secret, Master Salt,
      and ID Context.  Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

   The Sender Context contains the following parameters:

   o  Sender ID.  Byte string used to identify the Sender Context, to
      derive traffic keys and IVs, and to assure unique nonces.  Maximum
      length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

   o  Sender Key. Byte string containing the symmetric key to protect
      messages to send.  Derived from Common Context and Sender ID.
      Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

   o  Sender Sequence Number.  Non-negative integer used by the sender
      to protect requests and certain responses, e.g.  Observe
      notifications.  Used as 'Partial IV' [RFC8152] to generate unique
      nonces for the AEAD.  Maximum value is determined by the AEAD
      Algorithm.

   The Recipient Context contains the following parameters:

   o  Recipient ID.  Byte string used to identify the Recipient Context,
      to derive traffic keys and IVs, and to assure unique nonces.
      Maximum length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

   o  Recipient Key. Byte string containing the symmetric key to verify
      messages received.  Derived from Common Context and Recipient ID.
      Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.

   o  Replay Window (Server only).  The replay window to verify requests
      received.



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   All parameters except Sender Sequence Number and Replay Window are
   immutable once the security context is established.  An endpoint may
   free up memory by not storing the Common IV, Sender Key, and
   Recipient Key, deriving them when needed.  Alternatively, an endpoint
   may free up memory by not storing the Master Secret and Master Salt
   after the other parameters have been derived.

   Endpoints MAY operate as both client and server and use the same
   security context for those roles.  Independent of being client or
   server, the endpoint protects messages to send using its Sender
   Context, and verifies messages received using its Recipient Context.
   The endpoints MUST NOT change the Sender/Recipient ID when changing
   roles.  In other words, changing the roles does not change the set of
   keys to be used.

3.2.  Establishment of Security Context Parameters

   The parameters in the security context are derived from a small set
   of input parameters.  The following input parameters SHALL be pre-
   established:

   o  Master Secret

   o  Sender ID

   o  Recipient ID

   The following input parameters MAY be pre-established.  In case any
   of these parameters is not pre-established, the default value
   indicated below is used:

   o  AEAD Algorithm

      *  Default is AES-CCM-16-64-128 (COSE algorithm encoding: 10)

   o  Master Salt

      *  Default is the empty byte string

   o  Key Derivation Function (KDF)

      *  Default is HKDF SHA-256

   o  Replay Window Type and Size

      *  Default is DTLS-type replay protection with a window size of 32
         [RFC6347]




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   All input parameters need to be known to and agreed on by both
   endpoints, but the replay window may be different in the two
   endpoints.  The way the input parameters are pre-established, is
   application specific.  Considerations of security context
   establishment are given in Section 12.2 and examples of deploying
   OSCORE in Appendix B.

3.2.1.  Derivation of Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV

   The KDF MUST be one of the HMAC based HKDF [RFC5869] algorithms
   defined for COSE [RFC8152].  HKDF SHA-256 is mandatory to implement.
   The security context parameters Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common
   IV SHALL be derived from the input parameters using the HKDF, which
   consists of the composition of the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps
   [RFC5869]:

      output parameter = HKDF(salt, IKM, info, L)

   where:

   o  salt is the Master Salt as defined above

   o  IKM is the Master Secret as defined above

   o  info is the serialization of a CBOR array consisting of:

      info = [
          id : bstr,
          id_context : bstr / nil,
          alg_aead : int / tstr,
          type : tstr,
          L : uint
      ]

   where:

   o  id is the Sender ID or Recipient ID when deriving keys and the
      empty byte string when deriving the Common IV.  The encoding is
      described in Section 5.

   o  id_context is the ID Context, or nil if ID Context is not
      provided.

   o  alg_aead is the AEAD Algorithm, encoded as defined in [RFC8152].

   o  type is "Key" or "IV".  The label is an ASCII string, and does not
      include a trailing NUL byte.




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   o  L is the size of the key/IV for the AEAD algorithm used, in bytes.

   For example, if the algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 (see Section 10.2 in
   [RFC8152]) is used, the integer value for alg_aead is 10, the value
   for L is 16 for keys and 13 for the Common IV.

   Note that [RFC5869] specifies that if the salt is not provided, it is
   set to a string of zeros.  For implementation purposes, not providing
   the salt is the same as setting the salt to the empty byte string.
   OSCORE sets the salt default value to empty byte string, which in
   [RFC5869] is converted to a string of zeroes (see Section 2.2 of
   [RFC5869]).

3.2.2.  Initial Sequence Numbers and Replay Window

   The Sender Sequence Number is initialized to 0.  The supported types
   of replay protection and replay window length is application specific
   and depends on how OSCORE is transported, see Section 7.4.  The
   default is DTLS-type replay protection with a window size of 32
   initiated as described in Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC6347].

3.3.  Requirements on the Security Context Parameters

   To ensure unique Sender Keys, the quartet (Master Secret, Master
   Salt, ID Context, Sender ID) MUST be unique, i.e. the pair (ID
   Context, Sender ID) SHALL be unique in the set of all security
   contexts using the same Master Secret and Master Salt.  This means
   that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts
   using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context; such a
   requirement guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce
   reuse.

   Different methods can be used to assign Sender IDs: a protocol that
   allows the parties to negotiate locally unique identifiers, a trusted
   third party (e.g., [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), or the identifiers
   can be assigned out-of-band.  The Sender IDs can be very short (note
   that the empty string is a legitimate value).  The maximum length of
   Sender ID in bytes equals the length of AEAD nonce minus 6.  For AES-
   CCM-16-64-128 the maximum length of Sender ID is 7 bytes.

   To simplify retrieval of the right Recipient Context, the Recipient
   ID SHOULD be unique in the sets of all Recipient Contexts used by an
   endpoint.  If an endpoint has the same Recipient ID with different
   Recipient Contexts, i.e. the Recipient Contexts are derived from
   different Common Contexts, then the endpoint may need to try multiple
   times before verifying the right security context associated to the
   Recipient ID.




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   The ID Context is used to distinguish between security contexts.  The
   methods used for assigning Sender ID can also be used for assigning
   the ID Context.  Additionally, the ID Context can be generated by the
   client (see Appendix B.2).  ID Context can be arbitrarily long.

4.  Protected Message Fields

   OSCORE transforms a CoAP message (which may have been generated from
   an HTTP message) into an OSCORE message, and vice versa.  OSCORE
   protects as much of the original message as possible while still
   allowing certain proxy operations (see Sections 10 and 11).  This
   section defines how OSCORE protects the message fields and transfers
   them end-to-end between client and server (in any direction).

   The remainder of this section and later sections focus on the
   behavior in terms of CoAP messages.  If HTTP is used for a particular
   hop in the end-to-end path, then this section applies to the
   conceptual CoAP message that is mappable to/from the original HTTP
   message as discussed in Section 11.  That is, an HTTP message is
   conceptually transformed to a CoAP message and then to an OSCORE
   message, and similarly in the reverse direction.  An actual
   implementation might translate directly from HTTP to OSCORE without
   the intervening CoAP representation.

   Protection of Signaling messages (Section 5 of [RFC8323]) is
   specified in Section 4.3.  The other parts of this section target
   Request/Response messages.

   Message fields of the CoAP message may be protected end-to-end
   between CoAP client and CoAP server in different ways:

   o  Class E: encrypted and integrity protected,

   o  Class I: integrity protected only, or

   o  Class U: unprotected.

   The sending endpoint SHALL transfer Class E message fields in the
   ciphertext of the COSE object in the OSCORE message.  The sending
   endpoint SHALL include Class I message fields in the Additional
   Authenticated Data (AAD) of the AEAD algorithm, allowing the
   receiving endpoint to detect if the value has changed in transfer.
   Class U message fields SHALL NOT be protected in transfer.  Class I
   and Class U message field values are transferred in the header or
   options part of the OSCORE message, which is visible to proxies.

   Message fields not visible to proxies, i.e., transported in the
   ciphertext of the COSE object, are called "Inner" (Class E).  Message



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   fields transferred in the header or options part of the OSCORE
   message, which is visible to proxies, are called "Outer" (Class I or
   U).  There are currently no Class I options defined.

   An OSCORE message may contain both an Inner and an Outer instance of
   a certain CoAP message field.  Inner message fields are intended for
   the receiving endpoint, whereas Outer message fields are used to
   enable proxy operations.

4.1.  CoAP Options

   A summary of how options are protected is shown in Figure 5.  Note
   that some options may have both Inner and Outer message fields which
   are protected accordingly.  Certain options require special
   processing as is described in Section 4.1.3.

                   +------+-----------------+---+---+
                   | No.  | Name            | E | U |
                   +------+-----------------+---+---+
                   |   1  | If-Match        | x |   |
                   |   3  | Uri-Host        |   | x |
                   |   4  | ETag            | x |   |
                   |   5  | If-None-Match   | x |   |
                   |   6  | Observe         | x | x |
                   |   7  | Uri-Port        |   | x |
                   |   8  | Location-Path   | x |   |
                   | TBD1 | OSCORE          |   | x |
                   |  11  | Uri-Path        | x |   |
                   |  12  | Content-Format  | x |   |
                   |  14  | Max-Age         | x | x |
                   |  15  | Uri-Query       | x |   |
                   |  17  | Accept          | x |   |
                   |  20  | Location-Query  | x |   |
                   |  23  | Block2          | x | x |
                   |  27  | Block1          | x | x |
                   |  28  | Size2           | x | x |
                   |  35  | Proxy-Uri       |   | x |
                   |  39  | Proxy-Scheme    |   | x |
                   |  60  | Size1           | x | x |
                   | 258  | No-Response     | x | x |
                   +------+-----------------+---+---+

                 E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
                 U = Unprotected (Outer)

                   Figure 5: Protection of CoAP Options





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   Options that are unknown or for which OSCORE processing is not
   defined SHALL be processed as class E (and no special processing).
   Specifications of new CoAP options SHOULD define how they are
   processed with OSCORE.  A new COAP option SHOULD be of class E unless
   it requires proxy processing.  If a new CoAP option is of class U,
   the potential issues with the option being unprotected SHOULD be
   documented (see Appendix D.4).

4.1.1.  Inner Options

   Inner option message fields (class E) are used to communicate
   directly with the other endpoint.

   The sending endpoint SHALL write the Inner option message fields
   present in the original CoAP message into the plaintext of the COSE
   object (Section 5.3), and then remove the Inner option message fields
   from the OSCORE message.

   The processing of Inner option message fields by the receiving
   endpoint is specified in Sections 8.2 and 8.4.

4.1.2.  Outer Options

   Outer option message fields (Class U or I) are used to support proxy
   operations, see Appendix D.1.

   The sending endpoint SHALL include the Outer option message field
   present in the original message in the options part of the OSCORE
   message.  All Outer option message fields, including the OSCORE
   option, SHALL be encoded as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252],
   where the delta is the difference to the previously included instance
   of Outer option message field.

   The processing of Outer options by the receiving endpoint is
   specified in Sections 8.2 and 8.4.

   A procedure for integrity-protection-only of Class I option message
   fields is specified in Section 5.4.  Specifications that introduce
   repeatable Class I options MUST specify that proxies MUST NOT change
   the order of the instances of such an option in the CoAP message.

   Note: There are currently no Class I option message fields defined.

4.1.3.  Special Options

   Some options require special processing as specified in this section.





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4.1.3.1.  Max-Age

   An Inner Max-Age message field is used to indicate the maximum time a
   response may be cached by the client (as defined in [RFC7252]), end-
   to-end from the server to the client, taking into account that the
   option is not accessible to proxies.  The Inner Max-Age SHALL be
   processed by OSCORE as a normal Inner option, specified in
   Section 4.1.1.

   An Outer Max-Age message field is used to avoid unnecessary caching
   of error responses caused by OSCORE processing at OSCORE-unaware
   intermediary nodes.  A server MAY set a Class U Max-Age message field
   with value zero to such error responses, described in Sections 7.4,
   8.2, and 8.4, since these error responses are cacheable, but
   subsequent OSCORE requests would never create a hit in the
   intermediary caching it.  Setting the Outer Max-Age to zero relieves
   the intermediary from uselessly caching responses.  Successful OSCORE
   responses do not need to include an Outer Max-Age option since the
   responses appear to the OSCORE-unaware intermediary as 2.04 Changed
   responses, which are non-cacheable (see Section 4.2).

   The Outer Max-Age message field is processed according to
   Section 4.1.2.

4.1.3.2.  Uri-Host and Uri-Port

   When the Uri-Host and Uri-Port are set to their default values (see
   Section 5.10.1 [RFC7252]), they are omitted from the message
   (Section 5.4.4 of [RFC7252]), which is favorable both for overhead
   and privacy.

   In order to support forward proxy operations, Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host,
   and Uri-Port need to be Class U.  For the use of Proxy-Uri, see
   Section 4.1.3.3.

   Manipulation of unprotected message fields (including Uri-Host, Uri-
   Port, destination IP/port or request scheme) MUST NOT lead to an
   OSCORE message becoming verified by an unintended server.  Different
   servers SHOULD have different security contexts.

4.1.3.3.  Proxy-Uri

   When Proxy-Uri is present, the client SHALL first decompose the
   Proxy-Uri value of the original CoAP message into the Proxy-Scheme,
   Uri-Host, Uri-Port, Uri-Path, and Uri-Query options according to
   Section 6.4 of [RFC7252].





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   Uri-Path and Uri-Query are class E options and SHALL be protected and
   processed as Inner options (Section 4.1.1).

   The Proxy-Uri option of the OSCORE message SHALL be set to the
   composition of Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port options as
   specified in Section 6.5 of [RFC7252], and processed as an Outer
   option of Class U (Section 4.1.2).

   Note that replacing the Proxy-Uri value with the Proxy-Scheme and
   Uri-* options works by design for all CoAP URIs (see Section 6 of
   [RFC7252]).  OSCORE-aware HTTP servers should not use the userinfo
   component of the HTTP URI (as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC3986]),
   so that this type of replacement is possible in the presence of CoAP-
   to-HTTP proxies (see Section 11.2).  In future specifications of
   cross-protocol proxying behavior using different URI structures, it
   is expected that the authors will create Uri-* options that allow
   decomposing the Proxy-Uri, and specifying the OSCORE processing.

   An example of how Proxy-Uri is processed is given here.  Assume that
   the original CoAP message contains:

   o  Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com/resource?q=1"

   During OSCORE processing, Proxy-Uri is split into:

   o  Proxy-Scheme = "coap"

   o  Uri-Host = "example.com"

   o  Uri-Port = "5683"

   o  Uri-Path = "resource"

   o  Uri-Query = "q=1"

   Uri-Path and Uri-Query follow the processing defined in
   Section 4.1.1, and are thus encrypted and transported in the COSE
   object:

   o  Uri-Path = "resource"

   o  Uri-Query = "q=1"

   The remaining options are composed into the Proxy-Uri included in the
   options part of the OSCORE message, which has value:

   o  Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com"




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   See Sections 6.1 and 12.6 of [RFC7252] for more details.

4.1.3.4.  The Block Options

   Block-wise [RFC7959] is an optional feature.  An implementation MAY
   support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting block-wise
   transfers.  The Block options (Block1, Block2, Size1, Size2), when
   Inner message fields, provide secure message segmentation such that
   each segment can be verified.  The Block options, when Outer message
   fields, enables hop-by-hop fragmentation of the OSCORE message.
   Inner and Outer block processing may have different performance
   properties depending on the underlying transport.  The end-to-end
   integrity of the message can be verified both in case of Inner and
   Outer Block-wise transfers provided all blocks are received.

4.1.3.4.1.  Inner Block Options

   The sending CoAP endpoint MAY fragment a CoAP message as defined in
   [RFC7959] before the message is processed by OSCORE.  In this case
   the Block options SHALL be processed by OSCORE as normal Inner
   options (Section 4.1.1).  The receiving CoAP endpoint SHALL process
   the OSCORE message before processing Block-wise as defined in
   [RFC7959].

4.1.3.4.2.  Outer Block Options

   Proxies MAY fragment an OSCORE message using [RFC7959], by
   introducing Block option message fields that are Outer
   (Section 4.1.2).  Note that the Outer Block options are neither
   encrypted nor integrity protected.  As a consequence, a proxy can
   maliciously inject block fragments indefinitely, since the receiving
   endpoint needs to receive the last block (see [RFC7959]) to be able
   to compose the OSCORE message and verify its integrity.  Therefore,
   applications supporting OSCORE and [RFC7959] MUST specify a security
   policy defining a maximum unfragmented message size
   (MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE) considering the maximum size of message which
   can be handled by the endpoints.  Messages exceeding this size SHOULD
   be fragmented by the sending endpoint using Inner Block options
   (Section 4.1.3.4.1).

   An endpoint receiving an OSCORE message with an Outer Block option
   SHALL first process this option according to [RFC7959], until all
   blocks of the OSCORE message have been received, or the cumulated
   message size of the blocks exceeds MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE.  In the
   former case, the processing of the OSCORE message continues as
   defined in this document.  In the latter case the message SHALL be
   discarded.




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   Because of encryption of Uri-Path and Uri-Query, messages to the same
   server may, from the point of view of a proxy, look like they also
   target the same resource.  A proxy SHOULD mitigate a potential mix-up
   of blocks from concurrent requests to the same server, for example
   using the Request-Tag processing specified in Section 3.3.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].

4.1.3.5.  Observe

   Observe [RFC7641] is an optional feature.  An implementation MAY
   support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting [RFC7641],
   in which case the Observe related processing can be omitted.

   The support for Observe [RFC7641] with OSCORE targets the
   requirements on forwarding of Section 2.2.1 of
   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs], i.e. that observations go
   through intermediary nodes, as illustrated in Figure 8 of [RFC7641].

   Inner Observe SHALL be used to protect the value of the Observe
   option between the endpoints.  Outer Observe SHALL be used to support
   forwarding by intermediary nodes.

   The server SHALL include a new Partial IV in responses (with or
   without the Observe option) to Observe registrations, except for the
   first response where Partial IV MAY be omitted.

   [RFC7252] does not specify how the server should act upon receiving
   the same Token in different requests.  When using OSCORE, the server
   SHOULD NOT remove an active observation just because it receives a
   request with the same Token.

   Since POST with Observe is not defined, for messages with Observe,
   the Outer Code MUST be set to 0.05 (FETCH) for requests and to 2.05
   (Content) for responses (see Section 4.2).

4.1.3.5.1.  Registrations and Cancellations

   The Inner and Outer Observe in the request MUST contain the Observe
   value of the original CoAP request; 0 (registration) or 1
   (cancellation).

   Every time a client issues a new Observe request, a new Partial IV
   MUST be used (see Section 5), and so the payload and OSCORE option
   are changed.  The server uses the Partial IV of the new request as
   the 'request_piv' of all associated notifications (see Section 5.4).

   Intermediaries are not assumed to have access to the OSCORE security
   context used by the endpoints, and thus cannot make requests or



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   transform responses with the OSCORE option which verify at the
   receiving endpoint as coming from the other endpoint.  This has the
   following consequences and limitations for Observe operations.

   o  An intermediary node removing the Outer Observe 0 does not change
      the registration request to a request without Observe (see
      Section 2 of [RFC7641]).  Instead other means for cancellation may
      be used as described in Section 3.6 of [RFC7641].

   o  An intermediary node is not able to transform a normal response
      into an OSCORE protected Observe notification (see figure 7 of
      [RFC7641]) which verifies as coming from the server.

   o  An intermediary node is not able to initiate an OSCORE protected
      Observe registration (Observe with value 0) which verifies as
      coming from the client.  An OSCORE-aware intermediary SHALL NOT
      initiate registrations of observations (see Section 10).  If an
      OSCORE-unaware proxy re-sends an old registration message from a
      client this will trigger the replay protection mechanism in the
      server.  To prevent this from resulting in the OSCORE-unaware
      proxy to cancel of the registration, a server MAY respond to a
      replayed registration request with a replay of a cached
      notification.  Alternatively, the server MAY send a new
      notification.

   o  An intermediary node is not able to initiate an OSCORE protected
      Observe cancellation (Observe with value 1) which verifies as
      coming from the client.  An application MAY decide to allow
      intermediaries to cancel Observe registrations, e.g. to send
      Observe with value 1 (see Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]), but that can
      also be done with other methods, e.g. reusing the Token in a
      different request or sending a RST message.  This is out of scope
      for this specification.

4.1.3.5.2.  Notifications

   If the server accepts an Observe registration, a Partial IV MUST be
   included in all notifications (both successful and error), except for
   the first one where Partial IV MAY be omitted.  To protect against
   replay, the client SHALL maintain a Notification Number for each
   Observation it registers.  The Notification Number is a non-negative
   integer containing the largest Partial IV of the received
   notifications for the associated Observe registration.  Further
   details of replay protection of notifications are specified in
   Section 7.4.1.

   For notifications, the Inner Observe value MUST be empty (see
   Section 3.2 of [RFC7252]).  The Outer Observe in a notification is



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   needed for intermediary nodes to allow multiple responses to one
   request, and may be set to the value of Observe in the original CoAP
   message.  The client performs ordering of notifications and replay
   protection by comparing their Partial IVs and SHALL ignore the outer
   Observe value.

   If the client receives a response to an Observe request without an
   Inner Observe option, then it verifies the response as a non-Observe
   response, as specified in Section 8.4.  If the client receives a
   response to a non-Observe request with an Inner Observe option, then
   it stops processing the message, as specified in Section 8.4.

   A client MUST consider the notification with the highest Partial IV
   as the freshest, regardless of the order of arrival.  In order to
   support existing Observe implementations the OSCORE client
   implementation MAY set the Observe value to the three least
   significant bytes of the Partial IV; such an implementation needs to
   make sure that the Observe value for an observe notification without
   Partial IV is smaller than a notification with Partial IV.

4.1.3.6.  No-Response

   No-Response [RFC7967] is an optional feature used by the client to
   communicate its disinterest in certain classes of responses to a
   particular request.  An implementation MAY support [RFC7252] and the
   OSCORE option without supporting [RFC7967].

   If used, No-Response MUST be Inner.  The Inner No-Response SHALL be
   processed by OSCORE as specified in Section 4.1.1.  The Outer option
   SHOULD NOT be present.  The server SHALL ignore the Outer No-Response
   option.  The client MAY set the Outer No-Response value to 26
   ('suppress all known codes') if the Inner value is set to 26.  The
   client MUST be prepared to receive and discard 5.04 Gateway Timeout
   error messages from intermediaries potentially resulting from
   destination time out due to no response.

4.1.3.7.  OSCORE

   The OSCORE option is only defined to be present in OSCORE messages,
   as an indication that OSCORE processing have been performed.  The
   content in the OSCORE option is neither encrypted nor integrity
   protected as a whole but some part of the content of this option is
   protected (see Section 5.4).  Nested use of OSCORE is not supported:
   If OSCORE processing detects an OSCORE option in the original CoAP
   message, then processing SHALL be stopped.






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4.2.  CoAP Header Fields and Payload

   A summary of how the CoAP header fields and payload are protected is
   shown in Figure 6, including fields specific to CoAP over UDP and
   CoAP over TCP (marked accordingly in the table).

                       +------------------+---+---+
                       | Field            | E | U |
                       +------------------+---+---+
                       | Version (UDP)    |   | x |
                       | Type (UDP)       |   | x |
                       | Length (TCP)     |   | x |
                       | Token Length     |   | x |
                       | Code             | x |   |
                       | Message ID (UDP) |   | x |
                       | Token            |   | x |
                       | Payload          | x |   |
                       +------------------+---+---+

                 E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
                 U = Unprotected (Outer)

          Figure 6: Protection of CoAP Header Fields and Payload

   Most CoAP Header fields (i.e. the message fields in the fixed 4-byte
   header) are required to be read and/or changed by CoAP proxies and
   thus cannot in general be protected end-to-end between the endpoints.
   As mentioned in Section 1, OSCORE protects the CoAP Request/Response
   layer only, and not the Messaging Layer (Section 2 of [RFC7252]), so
   fields such as Type and Message ID are not protected with OSCORE.

   The CoAP Header field Code is protected by OSCORE.  Code SHALL be
   encrypted and integrity protected (Class E) to prevent an
   intermediary from eavesdropping on or manipulating the Code (e.g.,
   changing from GET to DELETE).

   The sending endpoint SHALL write the Code of the original CoAP
   message into the plaintext of the COSE object (see Section 5.3).
   After that, the sending endpoint writes an Outer Code to the OSCORE
   message.  With one exception (see Section 4.1.3.5) the Outer Code
   SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST) for requests and to 2.04 (Changed) for
   responses.  The receiving endpoint SHALL discard the Outer Code in
   the OSCORE message and write the Code of the COSE object plaintext
   (Section 5.3) into the decrypted CoAP message.

   The other currently defined CoAP Header fields are Unprotected (Class
   U).  The sending endpoint SHALL write all other header fields of the
   original message into the header of the OSCORE message.  The



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   receiving endpoint SHALL write the header fields from the received
   OSCORE message into the header of the decrypted CoAP message.

   The CoAP Payload, if present in the original CoAP message, SHALL be
   encrypted and integrity protected and is thus an Inner message field.
   The sending endpoint writes the payload of the original CoAP message
   into the plaintext (Section 5.3) input to the COSE object.  The
   receiving endpoint verifies and decrypts the COSE object, and
   recreates the payload of the original CoAP message.

4.3.  Signaling Messages

   Signaling messages (CoAP Code 7.00-7.31) were introduced to exchange
   information related to an underlying transport connection in the
   specific case of CoAP over reliable transports [RFC8323].

   OSCORE MAY be used to protect Signaling if the endpoints for OSCORE
   coincide with the endpoints for the signaling message.  If OSCORE is
   used to protect Signaling then:

   o  To comply with [RFC8323], an initial empty CSM message SHALL be
      sent.  The subsequent signaling message SHALL be protected.

   o  Signaling messages SHALL be protected as CoAP Request messages,
      except in the case the Signaling message is a response to a
      previous Signaling message, in which case it SHALL be protected as
      a CoAP Response message.  For example, 7.02 (Ping) is protected as
      a CoAP Request and 7.03 (Pong) as a CoAP response.

   o  The Outer Code for Signaling messages SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST),
      unless it is a response to a previous Signaling message, in which
      case it SHALL be set to 2.04 (Changed).

   o  All Signaling options, except the OSCORE option, SHALL be Inner
      (Class E).

   NOTE: Option numbers for Signaling messages are specific to the CoAP
   Code (see Section 5.2 of [RFC8323]).

   If OSCORE is not used to protect Signaling, Signaling messages SHALL
   be unaltered by OSCORE.

5.  The COSE Object

   This section defines how to use COSE [RFC8152] to wrap and protect
   data in the original message.  OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0
   structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data




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   (AEAD) algorithm.  The key lengths, IV length, nonce length, and
   maximum Sender Sequence Number are algorithm dependent.

   The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 10.2 of
   [RFC8152] is mandatory to implement.  For AES-CCM-16-64-128 the
   length of Sender Key and Recipient Key is 128 bits, the length of
   nonce and Common IV is 13 bytes.  The maximum Sender Sequence Number
   is specified in Section 12.

   As specified in [RFC5116], plaintext denotes the data that is to be
   encrypted and integrity protected, and Additional Authenticated Data
   (AAD) denotes the data that is to be integrity protected only.

   The COSE Object SHALL be a COSE_Encrypt0 object with fields defined
   as follows

   o  The 'protected' field is empty.

   o  The 'unprotected' field includes:

      *  The 'Partial IV' parameter.  The value is set to the Sender
         Sequence Number.  All leading bytes of value zero SHALL be
         removed when encoding the Partial IV, except in the case of
         Partial IV of value 0 which is encoded to the byte string 0x00.
         This parameter SHALL be present in requests.  The Partial IV
         SHALL be present in responses to Observe registrations (see
         Section 4.1.3.5.1), otherwise the Partial IV will not typically
         be present in responses.

      *  The 'kid' parameter.  The value is set to the Sender ID.  This
         parameter SHALL be present in requests and will not typically
         be present in responses.  An example where the Sender ID is
         included in a response is the extension of OSCORE to group
         communication [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].

      *  Optionally, a 'kid context' parameter (see Section 5.1)
         containing an ID Context (see Section 3.1).  This parameter MAY
         be present in requests and MUST NOT be present in responses.
         If 'kid context' is present in the request, then the server
         SHALL use a security context with that ID Context when
         verifying the request.

   o  The 'ciphertext' field is computed from the secret key (Sender Key
      or Recipient Key), AEAD nonce (see Section 5.2), plaintext (see
      Section 5.3), and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) (see
      Section 5.4) following Section 5.2 of [RFC8152].

   The encryption process is described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152].



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5.1.  Kid Context

   For certain use cases, e.g. deployments where the same Sender ID is
   used with multiple contexts, it is possible (and sometimes necessary,
   see Section 3.3) for the client to use an ID Context to distinguish
   the security contexts (see Section 3.1).  For example:

   o  If the client has a unique identifier in some namespace, then that
      identifier can be used as ID Context.

   o  In case of group communication [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], a
      group identifier can be used as ID Context to enable different
      security contexts for a server belonging to multiple groups.

   The Sender ID and Context ID are used to establish the necessary
   input parameters and in the derivation of the security context (see
   Section 3.2).  Whereas the 'kid' parameter is used to transport the
   Sender ID, the new COSE header parameter 'kid context' is used to
   transport the ID Context, see Figure 7.

   +----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+
   |   name   |  label | value type | value registry |   description   |
   +----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+
   |   kid    |  TBD2  | bstr       |                | Identifies the  |
   | context  |        |            |                | context for kid |
   +----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+

     Figure 7: Common Header Parameter kid context for the COSE object

5.2.  Nonce

   The AEAD nonce is constructed in the following way (see Figure 8):

   1.  left-padding the Partial IV (PIV) in network byte order with
       zeroes to exactly 5 bytes,

   2.  left-padding the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated the
       Partial IV (ID_PIV) in network byte order with zeroes to exactly
       nonce length minus 6 bytes,

   3.  concatenating the size of the ID_PIV (a single byte S) with the
       padded ID_PIV and the padded PIV,

   4.  and then XORing with the Common IV.

   Note that in this specification only algorithms that use nonces equal
   or greater than 7 bytes are supported.  The nonce construction with
   S, ID_PIV, and PIV together with endpoint unique IDs and encryption



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   keys makes it easy to verify that the nonces used with a specific key
   will be unique, see Appendix D.3.

   If the Partial IV is not present in a response, the nonce from the
   request is used.  For responses that are not notifications (i.e. when
   there is a single response to a request), the request and the
   response should typically use the same nonce to reduce message
   overhead.  Both alternatives provide all the required security
   properties, see Section 7.4 and Appendix D.3.  The only non-Observe
   scenario where a Partial IV must be included in a response is when
   the server is unable to perform replay protection, see Section 7.5.2.
   For processing instructions see Section 8.

              <- nonce length minus 6 B -> <-- 5 bytes -->
         +---+-------------------+--------+---------+-----+
         | S |      padding      | ID_PIV | padding | PIV |----+
         +---+-------------------+--------+---------+-----+    |
                                                               |
          <---------------- nonce length ---------------->     |
         +------------------------------------------------+    |
         |                   Common IV                    |->(XOR)
         +------------------------------------------------+    |
                                                               |
          <---------------- nonce length ---------------->     |
         +------------------------------------------------+    |
         |                     Nonce                      |<---+
         +------------------------------------------------+

                      Figure 8: AEAD Nonce Formation

5.3.  Plaintext

   The plaintext is formatted as a CoAP message without Header (see
   Figure 9) consisting of:

   o  the Code of the original CoAP message as defined in Section 3 of
      [RFC7252]; and

   o  all Inner option message fields (see Section 4.1.1) present in the
      original CoAP message (see Section 4.1).  The options are encoded
      as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252], where the delta is the
      difference to the previously included instance of Class E option;
      and

   o  the Payload of original CoAP message, if present, and in that case
      prefixed by the one-byte Payload Marker (0xFF).





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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Code      |    Class E options (if any) ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1|    Payload (if any) ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      (only if there
        is payload)

                            Figure 9: Plaintext

   NOTE: The plaintext contains all CoAP data that needs to be encrypted
   end-to-end between the endpoints.

5.4.  Additional Authenticated Data

   The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array as defined below:

   external_aad = [
      oscore_version : uint,
      algorithms : [ alg_aead : int / tstr ],
      request_kid : bstr,
      request_piv : bstr,
      options : bstr
   ]

   where:

   o  oscore_version: contains the OSCORE version number.
      Implementations of this specification MUST set this field to 1.
      Other values are reserved for future versions.

   o  algorithms: contains (for extensibility) an array of algorithms,
      according to this specification only containing alg_aead.

   o  alg_aead: contains the AEAD Algorithm from the security context
      used for the exchange (see Section 3.1).

   o  request_kid: contains the value of the 'kid' in the COSE object of
      the request (see Section 5).

   o  request_piv: contains the value of the 'Partial IV' in the COSE
      object of the request (see Section 5).

   o  options: contains the Class I options (see Section 4.1.2) present
      in the original CoAP message encoded as described in Section 3.1




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      of [RFC7252], where the delta is the difference to the previously
      included instance of class I option.

   The oscore_version and algorithms parameters are established out-of-
   band and are thus never transported in OSCORE, but the external_aad
   allows to verify that they are the same in both endpoints.

   NOTE: The format of the external_aad is for simplicity the same for
   requests and responses, although some parameters, e.g. request_kid,
   need not be integrity protected in all requests.

   The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is composed from the
   external_add as described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152].

6.  OSCORE Header Compression

   The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] combines
   very small message sizes with extensibility.  The CBOR Object Signing
   and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] uses CBOR to create compact encoding
   of signed and encrypted data.  COSE is however constructed to support
   a large number of different stateless use cases, and is not fully
   optimized for use as a stateful security protocol, leading to a
   larger than necessary message expansion.  In this section, we define
   a stateless header compression mechanism, simply removing redundant
   information from the COSE objects, which significantly reduces the
   per-packet overhead.  The result of applying this mechanism to a COSE
   object is called the "compressed COSE object".

   The COSE_Encrypt0 object used in OSCORE is transported in the OSCORE
   option and in the Payload.  The Payload contains the Ciphertext of
   the COSE object.  The headers of the COSE object are compactly
   encoded as described in the next section.

6.1.  Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value

   The value of the OSCORE option SHALL contain the OSCORE flag bits,
   the Partial IV parameter, the kid context parameter (length and
   value), and the kid parameter as follows:













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          0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <------------- n bytes -------------->
         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--------------------------------------
         |0 0 0|h|k|  n  |       Partial IV (if any) ...
         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--------------------------------------

          <- 1 byte -> <----- s bytes ------>
         +------------+----------------------+------------------+
         | s (if any) | kid context (if any) | kid (if any) ... |
         +------------+----------------------+------------------+

                    Figure 10: The OSCORE Option Value

   o  The first byte, called OSCORE Octet, encodes the following set of
      flag bits and the length of the Partial IV parameter:

      *  The three least significant bits encode the Partial IV length
         n.  If n = 0 then the Partial IV is not present in the
         compressed COSE object.  The values n = 6 and n = 7 are
         reserved.

      *  The fourth least significant bit is the kid flag, k: it is set
         to 1 if the kid is present in the compressed COSE object.

      *  The fifth least significant bit is the kid context flag, h: it
         is set to 1 if the compressed COSE object contains a kid
         context (see Section 5.1).

      *  The sixth to eighth least significant bits are reserved for
         future use.  These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use.
         According to this specification, if any of these bits are set
         to 1 the message is considered to be malformed and
         decompression fails as specified in item 3 of Section 8.2.

   The flag bits are registered in the OSCORE Octet registry specified
   in Section 13.7.

   o  The following n bytes encode the value of the Partial IV, if the
      Partial IV is present (n > 0).

   o  The following 1 byte encode the length of the kid context
      (Section 5.1) s, if the kid context flag is set (h = 1).

   o  The following s bytes encode the kid context, if the kid context
      flag is set (h = 1).

   o  The remaining bytes encode the value of the kid, if the kid is
      present (k = 1).




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   Note that the kid MUST be the last field of the OSCORE option value,
   even in case reserved bits are used and additional fields are added
   to it.

   The length of the OSCORE option thus depends on the presence and
   length of Partial IV, kid context, kid, as specified in this section,
   and on the presence and length of the other parameters, as defined in
   the separate documents.

6.2.  Encoding of the OSCORE Payload

   The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of the
   COSE object.

6.3.  Examples of Compressed COSE Objects

   This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples for
   requests and responses.  The examples assume the COSE_Encrypt0 object
   is set (which means the CoAP message and cryptographic material is
   known).  Note that the full CoAP unprotected message, as well as the
   full security context, is not reported in the examples, but only the
   input necessary to the compression mechanism, i.e. the COSE_Encrypt0
   object.  The output is the compressed COSE object as defined in
   Section 6, divided into two parts, since the object is transported in
   two CoAP fields: OSCORE option and payload.

   1.  Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
       0x25, and Partial IV = 0x05

       Before compression (24 bytes):

         [
         h'',
         { 4:h'25', 6:h'05' },
         h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
         ]

       After compression (17 bytes):

         Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09

         Option Value: 09 05 25 (3 bytes)

         Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

   2.  Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
       empty string, and Partial IV = 0x00




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       Before compression (23 bytes):

         [
         h'',
         { 4:h'', 6:h'00' },
         h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
         ]

       After compression (16 bytes):

         Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09

         Option Value: 09 00 (2 bytes)

         Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

   3.  Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
       empty string, Partial IV = 0x05, and kid context = 0x44616c656b

       Before compression (30 bytes):

         [
         h'',
         { 4:h'', 6:h'05', 8:h'44616c656b' },
         h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
         ]

       After compression (22  bytes):

         Flag byte: 0b00011001 = 0x19

         Option Value: 19 05 05 44 61 6c 65 6b (8 bytes)

         Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

   4.  Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and no
       Partial IV

       Before compression (18 bytes):

         [
         h'',
         {},
         h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
         ]






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       After compression (14 bytes):

         Flag byte: 0b00000000 = 0x00

         Option Value: (0 bytes)

         Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

   5.  Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and
       Partial IV = 0x07

       Before compression (21 bytes):

         [
         h'',
         { 6:h'07' },
         h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
         ]

       After compression (16 bytes):

         Flag byte: 0b00000001 = 0x01

         Option Value: 01 07 (2 bytes)

         Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)

7.  Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection

7.1.  Message Binding

   In order to prevent response delay and mismatch attacks
   [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators] from on-path attackers and
   compromised intermediaries, OSCORE binds responses to the requests by
   including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the AAD of the
   response.  The server therefore needs to store the kid and Partial IV
   of the request until all responses have been sent.

7.2.  Sequence Numbers

   An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key.  The
   uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in
   particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs (which encode
   the Sender Sequence Numbers, see Section 5).  If messages are
   processed concurrently, the operation of reading and increasing the
   Sender Sequence Number MUST be atomic.





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7.2.1.  Maximum Sequence Number

   The maximum Sender Sequence Number is algorithm dependent (see
   Section 12), and SHALL be less than 2^40.  If the Sender Sequence
   Number exceeds the maximum, the endpoint MUST NOT process any more
   messages with the given Sender Context.  If necessary, the endpoint
   SHOULD acquire a new security context before this happens.  The
   latter is out of scope of this document.

7.3.  Freshness

   For requests, OSCORE provides only the guarantee that the request is
   not older than the security context.  For applications having
   stronger demands on request freshness (e.g., control of actuators),
   OSCORE needs to be augmented with mechanisms providing freshness, for
   example as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].

   Assuming an honest server (see Appendix D), the message binding
   guarantees that a response is not older than its request.  For
   responses that are not notifications (i.e. when there is a single
   response to a request), this gives absolute freshness.  For
   notifications, the absolute freshness gets weaker with time, and it
   is RECOMMENDED that the client regularly re-register the observation.
   Note that the message binding does not guarantee that misbehaving
   server created the response before receiving the request, i.e. it
   does not verify server aliveness.

   For requests and notifications, OSCORE also provides relative
   freshness in the sense that the received Partial IV allows a
   recipient to determine the relative order of requests or responses.

7.4.  Replay Protection

   In order to protect from replay of requests, the server's Recipient
   Context includes a Replay Window.  A server SHALL verify that a
   Partial IV received in the COSE object has not been received before.
   If this verification fails the server SHALL stop processing the
   message, and MAY optionally respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error
   message.  Also, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value
   zero, to inform any intermediary that the response is not to be
   cached.  The diagnostic payload MAY contain the "Replay detected"
   string.  The size and type of the Replay Window depends on the use
   case and the protocol with which the OSCORE message is transported.
   In case of reliable and ordered transport from endpoint to endpoint,
   e.g.  TCP, the server MAY just store the last received Partial IV and
   require that newly received Partial IVs equals the last received
   Partial IV + 1.  However, in case of mixed reliable and unreliable
   transports and where messages may be lost, such a replay mechanism



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   may be too restrictive and the default replay window be more suitable
   (see Section 3.2.2).

   Responses (with or without Partial IV) are protected against replay
   as they are bound to the request and the fact that only a single
   response is accepted.  Note that the Partial IV is not used for
   replay protection in this case.

   The operation of validating the Partial IV and updating the replay
   protection MUST be atomic.

7.4.1.  Replay Protection of Notifications

   The following applies additionally when Observe is supported.

   The Notification Number is initialized to the Partial IV of the first
   successfully verified notification in response to the registration
   request.  A client MUST only accept at most one Observe notifications
   without Partial IV, and treat it as the oldest notification received.
   A client receiving a notification containing a Partial IV SHALL
   compare the Partial IV with the Notification Number associated to
   that Observe registration.  The client MUST stop processing
   notifications with a Partial IV which has been previously received.
   Applications MAY decide that a client only processes notifications
   which have greater Partial IV than the Notification Number.

   If the verification of the response succeeds, and the received
   Partial IV was greater than the Notification Number then the client
   SHALL overwrite the corresponding Notification Number with the
   received Partial IV.

7.5.  Losing Part of the Context State

   To prevent reuse of an AEAD nonce with the same key, or from
   accepting replayed messages, an endpoint needs to handle the
   situation of losing rapidly changing parts of the context, such as
   the request Token, Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window, and
   Notification Numbers.  These are typically stored in RAM and
   therefore lost in the case of an unplanned reboot.

   After boot, an endpoint can either use a persistently stored complete
   or partial security context, or establish a new security context with
   each endpoint it communicates with.  However, establishing a fresh
   security context may have a non-negligible cost in terms of, e.g.,
   power consumption.

   If the endpoint uses a persistently stored partial security context,
   it MUST NOT reuse a previous Sender Sequence Number and MUST NOT



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   accept previously received messages.  Some ways to achieve this are
   described in the following sections.

7.5.1.  Sequence Number

   To prevent reuse of Sender Sequence Numbers, an endpoint may perform
   the following procedure during normal operations:

   o  Before using a Sender Sequence Number that is evenly divisible by
      K, where K is a positive integer, store the Sender Sequence Number
      in persistent memory.  After boot, the endpoint initiates the
      Sender Sequence Number to the value stored in persistent memory +
      K.  Storing to persistent memory can be costly.  The value K gives
      a trade-off between the number of storage operations and efficient
      use of Sender Sequence Numbers.

7.5.2.  Replay Window

   To prevent accepting replay of previously received requests, the
   server may perform the following procedure after boot:

   o  For each stored security context, the first time after boot the
      server receives an OSCORE request, the server responds with the
      Echo option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] to get a request with
      verifiable freshness.  The server MUST use its Partial IV when
      generating the AEAD nonce and MUST include the Partial IV in the
      response.

   If the server using the Echo option can verify a second request as
   fresh, then the Partial IV of the second request is set as the lower
   limit of the replay window.

7.5.3.  Replay of Notifications

   To prevent accepting replay of previously received notifications, the
   client may perform the following procedure after boot:

   o  The client forgets about earlier registrations, removes all
      Notification Numbers and registers using Observe.

8.  Processing

   This section describes the OSCORE message processing.  Additional
   processing for Observe or Block-wise are described in subsections.

   Note that, analogously to [RFC7252] where the Token and source/
   destination pair are used to match a response with a request, both
   endpoints MUST keep the association (Token, {Security Context,



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   Partial IV of the request}), in order to be able to find the Security
   Context and compute the AAD to protect or verify the response.  The
   association MAY be forgotten after it has been used to successfully
   protect or verify the response, with the exception of Observe
   processing, where the association MUST be kept as long as the
   Observation is active.

8.1.  Protecting the Request

   Given a CoAP request, the client SHALL perform the following steps to
   create an OSCORE request:

   1.  Retrieve the Sender Context associated with the target resource.

   2.  Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as
       described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

   3.  Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte
       order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one.  Compute
       the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV as
       described in Section 5.2.

   4.  Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE
       Object as specified in Section 6.

   5.  Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4.  The OSCORE
       option is added (see Section 4.1.2).

8.2.  Verifying the Request

   A server receiving a request containing the OSCORE option SHALL
   perform the following steps:

   1.  Discard Code and all class E options (marked in Figure 5 with 'x'
       in column E) present in the received message.  For example, an
       If-Match Outer option is discarded, but an Uri-Host Outer option
       is not discarded.

   2.  Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6) and retrieve the Recipient
       Context associated with the Recipient ID in the 'kid' parameter,
       additionally using the 'kid context', if present.  If either the
       decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, or the server
       fails to retrieve a Recipient Context with Recipient ID
       corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received, then the server
       SHALL stop processing the request.

       *  If either the decompression or the COSE message fails to
          decode, the server MAY respond with a 4.02 Bad Option error



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          message.  The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with
          value zero.  The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string
          "Failed to decode COSE".

       *  If the server fails to retrieve a Recipient Context with
          Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received,
          the server MAY respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error message.
          The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero.
          The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string "Security
          context not found".

   3.  Verify the 'Partial IV' parameter using the Replay Window, as
       described in Section 7.4.

   4.  Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in
       Section 5.4.

   5.  Compute the AEAD nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the
       'Partial IV' parameter, received in the COSE Object.

   6.  Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per [RFC8152]
       Section 5.3.  (The decrypt operation includes the verification of
       the integrity.)

       *  If decryption fails, the server MUST stop processing the
          request and MAY respond with a 4.00 Bad Request error message.
          The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero.
          The diagnostic payload MAY contain the "Decryption failed"
          string.

       *  If decryption succeeds, update the Replay Window, as described
          in Section 7.

   7.  Add decrypted Code, options, and payload to the decrypted
       request.  The OSCORE option is removed.

   8.  The decrypted CoAP request is processed according to [RFC7252].

8.2.1.  Supporting Block-wise

   If Block-wise is supported, insert the following step before any
   other:

   A.  If Block-wise is present in the request then process the Outer
   Block options according to [RFC7959], until all blocks of the request
   have been received (see Section 4.1.3.4).





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8.3.  Protecting the Response

   If a CoAP response is generated in response to an OSCORE request, the
   server SHALL perform the following steps to create an OSCORE
   response.  Note that CoAP error responses derived from CoAP
   processing (step 8 in Section 8.2) are protected, as well as
   successful CoAP responses, while the OSCORE errors (steps 2, 3, and 6
   in Section 8.2) do not follow the processing below, but are sent as
   simple CoAP responses, without OSCORE processing.

   1.  Retrieve the Sender Context in the Security Context associated
       with the Token.

   2.  Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as
       described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

   3.  Compute the AEAD nonce as described in Section 5.2:

       *  Either use the nonce from the request, or

       *  Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte
          order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one.
          Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and
          Partial IV.

   4.  Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE
       Object as specified in Section 6.  If the AEAD nonce was
       constructed from a new Partial IV, this Partial IV MUST be
       included in the message.  If the AEAD nonce from the request was
       used, the Partial IV MUST NOT be included in the message.

   5.  Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4.  The OSCORE
       option is added (see Section 4.1.2).

8.3.1.  Supporting Observe

   If Observe is supported, insert the following step between step 2 and
   3 of Section 8.3:

   A.  If the response is an observe notification:

   o  If the response is the first notification:

      *  compute the AEAD nonce as described in Section 5.2:

         +  Either use the nonce from the request, or





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         +  Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network
            byte order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one.
            Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and
            Partial IV.

         Then go to 4.

   o  If the response is not the first notification:

      *  encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte
         order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one.
         Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and
         Partial IV, then go to 4.

8.4.  Verifying the Response

   A client receiving a response containing the OSCORE option SHALL
   perform the following steps:

   1.  Discard Code and all class E options (marked in Figure 5 with 'x'
       in column E) present in the received message.  For example, ETag
       Outer option is discarded, as well as Max-Age Outer option.

   2.  Retrieve the Recipient Context in the Security Context associated
       with the Token.  Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6).  If
       either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode,
       then go to 8.

   3.  Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in
       Section 5.4.

   4.  Compute the AEAD nonce

       *  If the Partial IV is not present in the response, the nonce
          from the request is used.

       *  If the Partial IV is present in the response, compute the
          nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the 'Partial IV'
          parameter, received in the COSE Object.

   5.  Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per [RFC8152]
       Section 5.3.  (The decrypt operation includes the verification of
       the integrity.)  If decryption fails, then go to 8.

   6.  Add decrypted Code, options and payload to the decrypted request.
       The OSCORE option is removed.

   7.  The decrypted CoAP response is processed according to [RFC7252].



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   8.  In case any of the previous erroneous conditions apply: the
       client SHALL stop processing the response.

8.4.1.  Supporting Block-wise

   If Block-wise is supported, insert the following step before any
   other:

   A.  If Block-wise is present in the request then process the Outer
   Block options according to [RFC7959], until all blocks of the request
   have been received (see Section 4.1.3.4).

8.4.2.  Supporting Observe

   If Observe is supported:

   Insert the following step between step 5 and step 6:

   A.  If the request was an Observe registration, then:

   o  If the Partial IV is not present in the response, and Inner
      Observe is present, and the nonce from the request was already
      used once, then go to 8.

   o  If the Partial IV is present in the response and Inner Observe is
      present, then follow the processing described in Section 4.1.3.5.2
      and Section 7.4.1, then:

      *  initialize the Notification Number (if first successfully
         verified notification), or

      *  overwrite the Notification Number (if the received Partial IV
         was greater than the Notification Number).

   Replace step 8 of Section 8.4 with:

   B.  In case any of the previous erroneous conditions apply: the
   client SHALL stop processing the response.  An error condition
   occurring while processing a response to an observation request does
   not cancel the observation.  A client MUST NOT react to failure by
   re-registering the observation immediately.

9.  Web Linking

   The use of OSCORE MAY be indicated by a target attribute "osc" in a
   web link [RFC8288] to a resource, e.g. using a link-format document
   [RFC6690] if the resource is accessible over CoAP.




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   The "osc" attribute is a hint indicating that the destination of that
   link is only accessible using OSCORE, and unprotected access to it is
   not supported.  Note that this is simply a hint, it does not include
   any security context material or any other information required to
   run OSCORE.

   A value MUST NOT be given for the "osc" attribute; any present value
   MUST be ignored by parsers.  The "osc" attribute MUST NOT appear more
   than once in a given link-value; occurrences after the first MUST be
   ignored by parsers.

   The example in Figure 11 shows a use of the "osc" attribute: the
   client does resource discovery on a server, and gets back a list of
   resources, one of which includes the "osc" attribute indicating that
   the resource is protected with OSCORE.  The link-format notation (see
   Section 5 of [RFC6690]) is used.

                      REQ: GET /.well-known/core

                      RES: 2.05 Content
                         </sensors/temp>;osc,
                         </sensors/light>;if="sensor"

                          Figure 11: The web link

10.  CoAP-to-CoAP Forwarding Proxy

   CoAP is designed for proxy operations (see Section 5.7 of [RFC7252]).

   OSCORE is designed to work with OSCORE-unaware CoAP proxies.
   Security requirements for forwarding are listed in Section 2.2.1 of
   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].  Proxy processing of the (Outer)
   Proxy-Uri option works as defined in [RFC7252].  Proxy processing of
   the (Outer) Block options works as defined in [RFC7959].

   However, not all CoAP proxy operations are useful:

   o  Since a CoAP response is only applicable to the original CoAP
      request, caching is in general not useful.  In support of existing
      proxies, OSCORE uses the outer Max-Age option, see
      Section 4.1.3.1.

   o  Proxy processing of the (Outer) Observe option as defined in
      [RFC7641] is specified in Section 4.1.3.5.

   Optionally, a CoAP proxy MAY detect OSCORE and act accordingly.  An
   OSCORE-aware CoAP proxy:




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   o  SHALL bypass caching for the request if the OSCORE option is
      present

   o  SHOULD avoid caching responses to requests with an OSCORE option

   In the case of Observe (see Section 4.1.3.5) the OSCORE-aware CoAP
   proxy:

   o  SHALL NOT initiate an Observe registration

   o  MAY verify the order of notifications using Partial IV rather than
      the Observe option

11.  HTTP Operations

   The CoAP request/response model may be mapped to HTTP and vice versa
   as described in Section 10 of [RFC7252].  The HTTP-CoAP mapping is
   further detailed in [RFC8075].  This section defines the components
   needed to map and transport OSCORE messages over HTTP hops.  By
   mapping between HTTP and CoAP and by using cross-protocol proxies
   OSCORE may be used end-to-end between e.g. an HTTP client and a CoAP
   server.  Examples are provided at the end of the section.

11.1.  The HTTP OSCORE Header Field

   The HTTP OSCORE Header Field (see Section 13.4) is used for carrying
   the content of the CoAP OSCORE option when transporting OSCORE
   messages over HTTP hops.

   The HTTP OSCORE header field is only used in POST requests and 200
   (OK) responses.  When used, the HTTP header field Content-Type is set
   to 'application/oscore' (see Section 13.5) indicating that the HTTP
   body of this message contains the OSCORE payload (see Section 6.2).
   No additional semantics is provided by other message fields.

   Using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234],
   including the following core ABNF syntax rules defined by that
   specification: ALPHA (letters) and DIGIT (decimal digits), the HTTP
   OSCORE header field value is as follows.

   base64url-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_"

   OSCORE = 2*base64url-char

   The HTTP OSCORE header field is not appropriate to list in the
   Connection header field (see Section 6.1 of [RFC7230]) since it is
   not hop-by-hop.  OSCORE messages are generally not useful when served
   from cache (i.e., they will generally be marked Cache-Control: no-



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   cache) and so interaction with Vary is not relevant (Section 7.1.4 of
   [RFC7231]).  Since the HTTP OSCORE header field is critical for
   message processing, moving it from headers to trailers renders the
   message unusable in case trailers are ignored (see Section 4.1 of
   [RFC7230]).

   Intermediaries are in general not allowed to insert, delete, or
   modify the OSCORE header.  Changes to the HTTP OSCORE header field
   will in general violate the integrity of the OSCORE message resulting
   in an error.  For the same reason the HTTP OSCORE header field is in
   general not preserved across redirects.

   Since redirects are not defined in the mappings between HTTP and CoAP
   [RFC8075][RFC7252], a number of conditions need to be fulfilled for
   redirects to work.  For CoAP client to HTTP server, such conditions
   include:

   o  the CoAP-to-HTTP proxy follows the redirect, instead of the CoAP
      client as in the HTTP case

   o  the CoAP-to-HTTP proxy copies the HTTP OSCORE header field and
      body to the new request

   o  the target of the redirect has the necessary OSCORE security
      context required to decrypt and verify the message

   Since OSCORE requires HTTP body to be preserved across redirects, the
   HTTP server is recommended to reply with 307 or 308 instead of 301 or
   302.

   For the case of HTTP client to CoAP server, although redirect is not
   defined for CoAP servers [RFC7252], an HTTP client receiving a
   redirect should generate a new OSCORE request for the server it was
   redirected to.

11.2.  CoAP-to-HTTP Mapping

   Section 10.1 of [RFC7252] describes the fundamentals of the CoAP-to-
   HTTP cross-protocol mapping process.  The additional rules for OSCORE
   messages are:

   o  The HTTP OSCORE header field value is set to

      *  AA if the CoAP OSCORE option is empty, otherwise

      *  the value of the CoAP OSCORE option (Section 6.1) in base64url
         (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) encoding without padding.




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         Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C
         of [RFC7515].

   o  The HTTP Content-Type is set to 'application/oscore' (see
      Section 13.5), independent of CoAP Content-Format.

11.3.  HTTP-to-CoAP Mapping

   Section 10.2 of [RFC7252] and [RFC8075] specify the behavior of an
   HTTP-to-CoAP proxy.  The additional rules for HTTP messages with the
   OSCORE header field are:

   o  The CoAP OSCORE option is set as follows:

      *  empty if the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field is a single
         zero byte (0x00) represented by AA, otherwise

      *  the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field decoded from
         base64url (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding.
         Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C
         of [RFC7515].

   o  The CoAP Content-Format option is omitted, the content format for
      OSCORE (Section 13.6) MUST NOT be used.

11.4.  HTTP Endpoints

   Restricted to subsets of HTTP and CoAP supporting a bijective
   mapping, OSCORE can be originated or terminated in HTTP endpoints.

   The sending HTTP endpoint uses [RFC8075] to translate the HTTP
   message into a CoAP message.  The CoAP message is then processed with
   OSCORE as defined in this document.  The OSCORE message is then
   mapped to HTTP as described in Section 11.2 and sent in compliance
   with the rules in Section 11.1.

   The receiving HTTP endpoint maps the HTTP message to a CoAP message
   using [RFC8075] and Section 11.3.  The resulting OSCORE message is
   processed as defined in this document.  If successful, the plaintext
   CoAP message is translated to HTTP for normal processing in the
   endpoint.

11.5.  Example: HTTP Client and CoAP Server

   This section is giving an example of how a request and a response
   between an HTTP client and a CoAP server could look like.  The
   example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how
   the message fields are translated in the different steps.



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   Mapping and notation here is based on "Simple Form" (Section 5.4.1 of
   [RFC8075]).

   [HTTP request -- Before client object security processing]

     GET http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/orders
      HTTP/1.1

   [HTTP request -- HTTP Client to Proxy]

     POST http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
     Content-Type: application/oscore
     OSCORE: CSU
     Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

   [CoAP request -- Proxy to CoAP Server]

     POST coap://server.url/
     OSCORE: 09 25
     Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

   [CoAP request -- After server object security processing]

     GET coap://server.url/orders

   [CoAP response -- Before server object security processing]

     2.05 Content
     Content-Format: 0
     Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!

   [CoAP response -- CoAP Server to Proxy]

     2.04 Changed
     OSCORE: [empty]
     Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

   [HTTP response -- Proxy to HTTP Client]

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: application/oscore
     OSCORE: AA
     Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]








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   [HTTP response -- After client object security processing]

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: text/plain
     Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!

   Note that the HTTP Status Code 200 in the next-to-last message is the
   mapping of CoAP Code 2.04 (Changed), whereas the HTTP Status Code 200
   in the last message is the mapping of the CoAP Code 2.05 (Content),
   which was encrypted within the compressed COSE object carried in the
   Body of the HTTP response.

11.6.  Example: CoAP Client and HTTP Server

   This section is giving an example of how a request and a response
   between a CoAP client and an HTTP server could look like.  The
   example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how
   the message fields are translated in the different steps

   [CoAP request -- Before client object security processing]

     GET coap://proxy.url/
     Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/orders

   [CoAP request -- CoAP Client to Proxy]

     POST coap://proxy.url/
     Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/
     OSCORE: 09 25
     Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

   [HTTP request -- Proxy to HTTP Server]

     POST http://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
     Content-Type: application/oscore
     OSCORE: CSU
     Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]

   [HTTP request -- After server object security processing]

     GET http://server.url/orders HTTP/1.1

   [HTTP response -- Before server object security processing]

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: text/plain
     Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!




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   [HTTP response -- HTTP Server to Proxy]

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: application/oscore
     OSCORE: AA
     Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

   [CoAP response -- Proxy to CoAP Client]

     2.04 Changed
     OSCORE: [empty]
     Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]

   [CoAP response -- After client object security processing]

     2.05 Content
     Content-Format: 0
     Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!

   Note that the HTTP Code 2.04 (Changed) in the next-to-last message is
   the mapping of HTTP Status Code 200, whereas the CoAP Code 2.05
   (Content) in the last message is the value that was encrypted within
   the compressed COSE object carried in the Body of the HTTP response.

12.  Security Considerations

   An overview of the security properties is given in Appendix D.

12.1.  End-to-end Protection

   In scenarios with intermediary nodes such as proxies or gateways,
   transport layer security such as (D)TLS only protects data hop-by-
   hop.  As a consequence, the intermediary nodes can read and modify
   any information.  The trust model where all intermediary nodes are
   considered trustworthy is problematic, not only from a privacy
   perspective, but also from a security perspective, as the
   intermediaries are free to delete resources on sensors and falsify
   commands to actuators (such as "unlock door", "start fire alarm",
   "raise bridge").  Even in the rare cases where all the owners of the
   intermediary nodes are fully trusted, attacks and data breaches make
   such an architecture brittle.

   (D)TLS protects hop-by-hop the entire message.  OSCORE protects end-
   to-end all information that is not required for proxy operations (see
   Section 4).  (D)TLS and OSCORE can be combined, thereby enabling end-
   to-end security of the message payload, in combination with hop-by-
   hop protection of the entire message, during transport between end-
   point and intermediary node.  In particular when OSCORE is used with



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   HTTP, the additional TLS protection of HTTP hops is recommended, e.g.
   between an HTTP endpoint and a proxy translating between HTTP and
   CoAP.

   Applications need to consider that certain message fields and
   messages types are not protected end-to-end and may be spoofed or
   manipulated.  The consequences of unprotected message fields are
   analyzed in Appendix D.4.

12.2.  Security Context Establishment

   The use of COSE_Encrypt0 and AEAD to protect messages as specified in
   this document requires an established security context.  The method
   to establish the security context described in Section 3.2 is based
   on a common Master Secret and unique Sender IDs.  The necessary input
   parameters may be pre-established or obtained using a key
   establishment protocol augmented with establishment of Sender/
   Recipient ID such as the OSCORE profile of the ACE framework
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile].  Such a procedure must ensure that the
   requirements of the security context parameters for the intended use
   are complied with (see Section 3.3) and also in error situations.  It
   is recommended to use a key establishment protocol which provides
   forward secrecy whenever possible.  Considerations for deploying
   OSCORE with a fixed Master Secret are given in Appendix B.

12.3.  Master Secret

   OSCORE uses HKDF [RFC5869] and the established input parameters to
   derive the security context.  The required properties of the security
   context parameters are discussed in Section 3.3, in this section we
   focus on the Master Secret.  HKDF denotes in this specification the
   composition of the expand and extract functions as defined in
   [RFC5869] and the Master Secret is used as Input Key Material (IKM).

   Informally, HKDF takes as source an IKM containing some good amount
   of randomness but not necessarily distributed uniformly (or for which
   an attacker has some partial knowledge) and derive from it one or
   more cryptographically strong secret keys [RFC5869].

   Therefore, the main requirement for the OSCORE Master Secret, in
   addition to being secret, is that it is has a good amount of
   randomness.  The selected key establishment schemes must ensure that
   the necessary properties for the Master Secret are fulfilled.  For
   pre-shared key deployments and key transport solutions such as
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], the Master Secret can be generated
   offline using a good random number generator.





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12.4.  Replay Protection

   Replay attacks need to be considered in different parts of the
   implementation.  Most AEAD algorithms require a unique nonce for each
   message, for which the sender sequence numbers in the COSE message
   field 'Partial IV' is used.  If the recipient accepts any sequence
   number larger than the one previously received, then the problem of
   sequence number synchronization is avoided.  With reliable transport,
   it may be defined that only messages with sequence number which are
   equal to previous sequence number + 1 are accepted.  An adversary may
   try to induce a device reboot for the purpose of replaying a message
   (see Section 7.5).

   Note that sharing a security context between servers may open up for
   replay attacks, for example if the replay windows are not
   synchronized.

12.5.  Client Aliveness

   A verified OSCORE request enables the server to verify the identity
   of the entity who generated the message.  However, it does not verify
   that the client is currently involved in the communication, since the
   message may be a delayed delivery of a previously generated request
   which now reaches the server.  To verify the aliveness of the client
   the server may use the Echo option in the response to a request from
   the client (see [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]).

12.6.  Cryptographic Considerations

   The maximum sender sequence number is dependent on the AEAD
   algorithm.  The maximum sender sequence number is 2^40 - 1, or any
   algorithm specific lower limit, after which a new security context
   must be generated.  The mechanism to build the nonce (Section 5.2)
   assumes that the nonce is at least 56 bits, and the Partial IV is at
   most 40 bits.  The mandatory-to-implement AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-
   16-64-128 is selected for compatibility with CCM*.

   In order to prevent cryptanalysis when the same plaintext is
   repeatedly encrypted by many different users with distinct keys, the
   nonce is formed by mixing the sequence number with a secret per-
   context initialization vector (Common IV) derived along with the keys
   (see Section 3.1 of [RFC8152]), and by using a Master Salt in the key
   derivation (see [MF00] for an overview).  The Master Secret, Sender
   Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV must be secret, the rest of the
   parameters may be public.  The Master Secret must have a good amount
   of randomness (see Section 12.3).





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12.7.  Message Segmentation

   The Inner Block options enable the sender to split large messages
   into OSCORE-protected blocks such that the receiving endpoint can
   verify blocks before having received the complete message.  The Outer
   Block options allow for arbitrary proxy fragmentation operations that
   cannot be verified by the endpoints, but can by policy be restricted
   in size since the Inner Block options allow for secure fragmentation
   of very large messages.  A maximum message size (above which the
   sending endpoint fragments the message and the receiving endpoint
   discards the message, if complying to the policy) may be obtained as
   part of normal resource discovery.

12.8.  Privacy Considerations

   Privacy threats executed through intermediary nodes are considerably
   reduced by means of OSCORE.  End-to-end integrity protection and
   encryption of the message payload and all options that are not used
   for proxy operations, provide mitigation against attacks on sensor
   and actuator communication, which may have a direct impact on the
   personal sphere.

   The unprotected options (Figure 5) may reveal privacy sensitive
   information, see Appendix D.4.  CoAP headers sent in plaintext allow,
   for example, matching of CON and ACK (CoAP Message Identifier),
   matching of request and responses (Token) and traffic analysis.
   OSCORE does not provide protection for HTTP header fields which are
   not both CoAP-mappable and class E.  The HTTP message fields which
   are visible to on-path entity are only used for the purpose of
   transporting the OSCORE message, whereas the application layer
   message is encoded in CoAP and encrypted.

   COSE message fields, i.e. the OSCORE option, may reveal information
   about the communicating endpoints.  E.g. 'kid' and 'kid context',
   which are intended to help the server find the right context, may
   reveal information about the client.  Tracking 'kid' and 'kid
   context' to one server may be used for correlating requests from one
   client.

   Unprotected error messages reveal information about the security
   state in the communication between the endpoints.  Unprotected
   signaling messages reveal information about the reliable transport
   used on a leg of the path.  Using the mechanisms described in
   Section 7.5 may reveal when a device goes through a reboot.  This can
   be mitigated by the device storing the precise state of sender
   sequence number and replay window on a clean shutdown.





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   The length of message fields can reveal information about the
   message.  Applications may use a padding scheme to protect against
   traffic analysis.

13.  IANA Considerations

   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this
   document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

   Note to IANA: Please note all occurrences of "TBDx" in this
   specification should be assigned the same number.

13.1.  COSE Header Parameters Registry

   The 'kid context' parameter is added to the "COSE Header Parameters
   Registry":

   o  Name: kid context

   o  Label: TBD2

   o  Value Type: bstr

   o  Value Registry:

   o  Description: Identifies the context for kid

   o  Reference: Section 5.1 of this document

   Note to IANA: Label assignment in (Integer value between 1 and 255)
   is requested.  (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)

13.2.  CoAP Option Numbers Registry

   The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Option Numbers registry:

             +--------+-----------------+-------------------+
             | Number | Name            | Reference         |
             +--------+-----------------+-------------------+
             |  TBD1  | OSCORE          | [[this document]] |
             +--------+-----------------+-------------------+

13.3.  CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry

   The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Signaling Option Numbers
   registry:





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     +------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+
     | Applies to | Number | Name                | Reference         |
     +------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+
     | 7.xx (any) |  TBD1  | OSCORE              | [[this document]] |
     +------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+

13.4.  Header Field Registrations

   The HTTP OSCORE header field is added to the Message Headers
   registry:

    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
    | Header Field Name    | Protocol | Status   | Reference         |
    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
    | OSCORE               | http     | standard | [[this document]] |
    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+

13.5.  Media Type Registrations

   This section registers the 'application/oscore' media type in the
   "Media Types" registry.  These media types are used to indicate that
   the content is an OSCORE message.  The OSCORE body cannot be
   understood without the OSCORE header field value and the security
   context.



























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     Type name: application

     Subtype name: oscore

     Required parameters: N/A

     Optional parameters: N/A

     Encoding considerations: binary

     Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
     of [[This document]].

     Interoperability considerations: N/A

     Published specification: [[This document]]

     Applications that use this media type: IoT applications sending
     security content over HTTP(S) transports.

     Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

     Additional information:

     *  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

     *  Magic number(s): N/A

     *  File extension(s): N/A

     *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

     Person & email address to contact for further information:
     iesg@ietf.org

     Intended usage: COMMON

     Restrictions on usage: N/A

     Author: Goeran Selander, goran.selander@ericsson.com

     Change Controller: IESG

     Provisional registration?  No







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13.6.  CoAP Content-Formats Registry

   Note to IANA: ID assignment in the 10000-64999 range is requested.
   (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)

   This section registers the media type 'application/oscore' media type
   in the "CoAP Content-Format" registry.  This Content-Format for the
   OSCORE payload is defined for potential future use cases and SHALL
   NOT be used in the OSCORE message.  The OSCORE payload cannot be
   understood without the OSCORE option value and the security context.

    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
    | Media Type           | Encoding |   ID     |     Reference     |
    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
    | application/oscore   |          |   TBD3   | [[this document]] |
    +----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+

13.7.  OSCORE Octet Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "OSCORE
   Octet".  The registry should be created with the Expert Review
   policy.  Guidelines for the experts are provided in Section 13.8.

   The columns of the registry are:

   o  bit position: This indicates the position of the bit in the OSCORE
      Octet, starting at 0 for the most significant bit.  The bit
      position must be an integer or a range of integers, in the range 0
      to 63.

   o  name: The name is present to make it easier to refer to and
      discuss the registration entry.  The value is not used in the
      protocol.  Names are to be unique in the table.

   o  description: This contains a brief description of the use of the
      bit.

   o  specification: This contains a pointer to the specification
      defining the entry.

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Figure 12.  The
   specification column for all rows in that table should be this
   document.  Additionally, the entry with Bit Position of 0 is to be
   marked as 'Reserved'.  This entry is going to be specified in a
   future document, and will be used to expand the OSCORE Octet in
   Section 6.1, so that entries 8-63 of the registry are defined.





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+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+
| Bit Position |     Name    |     Description     |   Specification   |
+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+
|       0      | Reserved    |                     |                   |
+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+
|       3      | Kid Context | Set to 1 if kid     | [[this document]] |
|              | Flag        | context is present  |                   |
|              |             | in the compressed   |                   |
|              |             | COSE object         |                   |
+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+
|       4      | Kid Flag    | Set to 1 if kid is  | [[this document]] |
|              |             | present in the com- |                   |
|              |             | pressed COSE object |                   |
+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+
|     5-7      | Partial IV  | Encodes the Partial | [[this document]] |
|              | Length      | IV length; can have |                   |
|              |             | value 0 to 5        |                   |
+--------------+-------------+---------------------+-------------------+

                                 Figure 12

13.8.  Expert Review Instructions

   The expert reviewers for the registry defined in this document are
   expected to ensure that the usage solves a valid use case that could
   hardly be solved in a different way, that it is not going to
   duplicate one that is already registered, and that the registered
   point is likely to be used in deployments.  They are furthermore
   expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested
   code points.  Experts should take into account the expected usage of
   entries when approving point assignment, and the length of the
   encoded value should be weighed against the number of code points
   left that encode to that size and the size of device it will be used
   on.  Experts should block registration for entries 8-63 until these
   points are defined (i.e. until the mechanism for the OSCORE Octet
   expansion via bit 0 is specified).

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.






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   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7641]  Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.

   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.





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   [RFC8075]  Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
              E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.

   [RFC8132]  van der Stok, P., Bormann, C., and A. Sehgal, "PATCH and
              FETCH Methods for the Constrained Application Protocol
              (CoAP)", RFC 8132, DOI 10.17487/RFC8132, April 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8132>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8288]  Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 8288,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8288, October 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8288>.

   [RFC8323]  Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
              Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
              Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
              RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie]
              Bormann, C., "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over
              IEEE 802.15.4 Information Element for IETF", draft-
              bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie-00 (work in progress), April
              2016.

   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]
              Selander, G., Palombini, F., and K. Hartke, "Requirements
              for CoAP End-To-End Security", draft-hartke-core-e2e-
              security-reqs-03 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
              Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
              H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
              Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-13
              (work in progress), July 2018.



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   [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
              Seitz, L., Palombini, F., Gunnarsson, M., and G. Selander,
              "OSCORE profile of the Authentication and Authorization
              for Constrained Environments Framework", draft-ietf-ace-
              oscore-profile-02 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
              Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
              definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
              express CBOR data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-cddl-03
              (work in progress), July 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]
              Amsuess, C., Mattsson, J., and G. Selander, "Echo and
              Request-Tag", draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-02 (work in
              progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]
              Tiloca, M., Selander, G., Palombini, F., and J. Park,
              "Secure group communication for CoAP", draft-ietf-core-
              oscore-groupcomm-02 (work in progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]
              Mattsson, J., Fornehed, J., Selander, G., Palombini, F.,
              and C. Amsuess, "Controlling Actuators with CoAP", draft-
              mattsson-core-coap-actuators-05 (work in progress), March
              2018.

   [MF00]     McGrew, D. and S. Fluhrer, "Attacks on Encryption of
              Redundant Plaintext and Implications on Internet
              Security", the Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop
              on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2000), Springer-
              Verlag. , 2000.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.




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   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7967]  Bhattacharyya, A., Bandyopadhyay, S., Pal, A., and T.
              Bose, "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Option for
              No Server Response", RFC 7967, DOI 10.17487/RFC7967,
              August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7967>.

Appendix A.  Scenario Examples

   This section gives examples of OSCORE, targeting scenarios in
   Section 2.2.1.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].  The message
   exchanges are made, based on the assumption that there is a security
   context established between client and server.  For simplicity, these
   examples only indicate the content of the messages without going into
   detail of the (compressed) COSE message format.

A.1.  Secure Access to Sensor

   This example illustrates a client requesting the alarm status from a
   server.




















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      Client  Proxy  Server
        |       |       |
        +------>|       |            Code: 0.02 (POST)
        | POST  |       |           Token: 0x8c
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [kid:5f,Partial IV:42]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:0.01,
        |       |       |                   Uri-Path:"alarm_status"}
        |       |       |
        |       +------>|            Code: 0.02 (POST)
        |       | POST  |           Token: 0x7b
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [kid:5f,Partial IV:42]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:0.01,
        |       |       |                   Uri-Path:"alarm_status"}
        |       |       |
        |       |<------+            Code: 2.04 (Changed)
        |       |  2.04 |           Token: 0x7b
        |       |       |          OSCORE: -
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05, "0"}
        |       |       |
        |<------+       |            Code: 2.04 (Changed)
        |  2.04 |       |           Token: 0x8c
        |       |       |          OSCORE: -
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05, "0"}
        |       |       |

   Figure 13: Secure Access to Sensor.  Square brackets [ ... ] indicate
    content of compressed COSE object.  Curly brackets { ... } indicate
                              encrypted data.

   The request/response Codes are encrypted by OSCORE and only dummy
   Codes (POST/Changed) are visible in the header of the OSCORE message.
   The option Uri-Path ("alarm_status") and payload ("0") are encrypted.

   The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (5f),
   indicating which security context was used to protect the message and
   a Partial IV (42).

   The server verifies the request as specified in Section 8.2.  The
   client verifies the response as specified in Section 8.4.

A.2.  Secure Subscribe to Sensor

   This example illustrates a client requesting subscription to a blood
   sugar measurement resource (GET /glucose), first receiving the value
   220 mg/dl and then a second value 180 mg/dl.

      Client  Proxy  Server
        |       |       |



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        +------>|       |            Code: 0.05 (FETCH)
        | FETCH |       |           Token: 0x83
        |       |       |         Observe: 0
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [kid:ca,Partial IV:15]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:0.01,
        |       |       |                   Uri-Path:"glucose"}
        |       |       |
        |       +------>|            Code: 0.05 (FETCH)
        |       | FETCH |           Token: 0xbe
        |       |       |         Observe: 0
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [kid:ca,Partial IV:15]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:0.01,
        |       |       |                   Uri-Path:"glucose"}
        |       |       |
        |       |<------+            Code: 2.05 (Content)
        |       |  2.05 |           Token: 0xbe
        |       |       |         Observe: 7
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [Partial IV:32]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05,
        |       |       |                   Content-Format:0, "220"}
        |       |       |
        |<------+       |            Code: 2.05 (Content)
        |  2.05 |       |           Token: 0x83
        |       |       |         Observe: 7
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [Partial IV:32]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05,
        |       |       |                   Content-Format:0, "220"}
       ...     ...     ...
        |       |       |
        |       |<------+            Code: 2.05 (Content)
        |       |  2.05 |           Token: 0xbe
        |       |       |         Observe: 8
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [Partial IV:36]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05,
        |       |       |                   Content-Format:0, "180"}
        |       |       |
        |<------+       |            Code: 2.05 (Content)
        |  2.05 |       |           Token: 0x83
        |       |       |         Observe: 8
        |       |       |          OSCORE: [Partial IV:36]
        |       |       |         Payload: {Code:2.05,
        |       |       |                   Content-Format:0, "180"}
        |       |       |

      Figure 14: Secure Subscribe to Sensor.  Square brackets [ ... ]
   indicate content of compressed COSE object header.  Curly brackets {
                      ... } indicate encrypted data.




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   The dummy Codes (FETCH/Content) are used to allow forwarding of
   Observe messages.  The options Content-Format (0) and the payload
   ("220" and "180"), are encrypted.

   The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (ca),
   indicating the security context used to protect the message and a
   Partial IV (15).  The COSE headers of the responses contains Partial
   IVs (32 and 36).

   The server verifies that the Partial IV has not been received before.
   The client verifies that the responses are bound to the request and
   that the Partial IVs are greater than any Partial IV previously
   received in a response bound to the request.

Appendix B.  Deployment Examples

   Two examples complying with the requirements on the security context
   parameters (Section 3.3) are given in this section.

B.1.  Master Secret Used Once

   An application may derive a security context once and use it for the
   lifetime of a device.  For many IoT deployments, a 128 bit uniformly
   random Master Key is sufficient for encrypting all data exchanged
   with the IoT device.  This specification describes techniques for
   persistent storage of the security context and synchronization of
   sequence numbers (see Section 7.5) to ensure that security is
   maintained with the existing security context.

B.2.  Master Secret Used Multiple Times

   Section 12.2 recommends the use of a key establishment protocol
   providing forward secrecy of the Master Secret.

   An application which does not require forward secrecy may allow
   multiple security contexts to be derived from one Master Secret.  The
   requirements on the security context parameters must be fulfilled
   (Section 3.3) even if the client or server is rebooted,
   recommissioned or in error cases.

   This section gives an example of an application allowing new security
   contexts to be derived from input parameters pre-established between
   client and server for this purpose: in particular Master Secret,
   Master Salt and Sender/Recipient ID (see Section 3.2):

   o  The client generates an ID Context which has previously not been
      used with the pre-established input parameters and derives a new
      security context.  ID context may be pseudo-random and large for



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      stochastic uniqueness, but care must be taken e.g. to avoid re-use
      of the same seed for random number generation.  Using this new
      security context, the client generates an OSCORE request with (kid
      context, kid) = (ID Context, Sender ID) in the OSCORE option.

   o  The server receiving such an OSCORE request with kid matching the
      Recipient ID of pre-established input parameters, but with a new
      kid context, derives the security context using ID Context = kid
      context.  If the message verifies then a new security context with
      this ID Context is stored in the server, and used in the response.
      Further requests with the same (kid context, kid) are verified
      with this security context.

   As an alternative procedure to reduce the subsequent overhead in
   requests due to kid context, the verification of a message with a new
   ID Context may trigger the server to generate a new kid to replace
   the Client Sender ID in future requests.  A client may e.g. indicate
   support for such a procedure by requesting a special well-known URI
   and receive the new kid in the response, which together with the
   input parameters and the ID context is used to derive the new
   security context which may be identified only by its kid.  The
   details are out of scope for this specification.

   The procedures may be complemented with the use of the Echo option
   for verifying the aliveness of the client requesting a new security
   context.

Appendix C.  Test Vectors

   This appendix includes the test vectors for different examples of
   CoAP messages using OSCORE.  Given a set of inputs, OSCORE defines
   how to set up the Security Context in both the client and the server.

C.1.  Test Vector 1: Key Derivation with Master Salt

   In this test vector, a Master Salt of 8 bytes is used.  The default
   values are used for AEAD Algorithm and KDF.

C.1.1.  Client

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)




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   o  Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x8540f60a634b657910 (9 bytes)

   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)

   o  Recipient Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c

   o  recipient nonce: 0x4722d4dd6d944169eefb54987c

C.1.2.  Server

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  Recipient ID: 0x (0 byte)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x8540f60a634b657910 (9 bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)



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   o  Recipient Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0x4722d4dd6d944169eefb54987c

   o  recipient nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c

C.2.  Test Vector 2: Key Derivation without Master Salt

   In this test vector, the default values are used for AEAD Algorithm,
   KDF, and Master Salt.

C.2.1.  Client

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x00 (1 byte)

   o  Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x854100f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)

   o  Recipient Key: 0xe57b5635815177cd679ab4bcec9d7dda (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9

   o  recipient nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace810c52e99f9



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C.2.2.  Server

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  Recipient ID: 0x00 (1 byte)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x854101f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x854100f60a634b657910 (10 bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x8540f60a6249560d (8 bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0xe57b5635815177cd679ab4bcec9d7dda (16 bytes)

   o  Recipient Key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace810c52e99f9

   o  recipient nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9

C.3.  Test Vector 3: Key Derivation with ID Context

   In this test vector, a Master Salt of 8 bytes and a ID Context of 8
   bytes are used.  The default values are used for AEAD Algorithm and
   KDF.

C.3.1.  Client

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)



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   o  Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (17
      bytes)

   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x8541014837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910
      (18 bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a6249560d (16
      bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)

   o  Recipient Key: 0xe39a0c7c77b43f03b4b39ab9a268699f (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e

   o  recipient nonce: 0x2da58fb85ff1b81d0b7181b85e

C.3.2.  Server

   Inputs:

   o  Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)

   o  Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)

   o  Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  Recipient ID: 0x (0 byte)

   o  ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

   From the previous parameters,

   o  info (for Sender Key): 0x8541014837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (18
      bytes)



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   o  info (for Recipient Key): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a634b657910 (17
      bytes)

   o  info (for Common IV): 0x85404837cbf3210017a2d30a6249560d (16
      bytes)

   Outputs:

   o  Sender Key: 0xe39a0c7c77b43f03b4b39ab9a268699f (16 bytes)

   o  Recipient Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)

   o  Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameters and a Partial IV equal to 0 (both for
   sender and recipient):

   o  sender nonce: 0x2da58fb85ff1b81d0b7181b85e

   o  recipient nonce: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e

C.4.  Test Vector 4: OSCORE Request, Client

   This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET
   request using the security context derived in Appendix C.1.  The
   unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.

   Unprotected CoAP request:
   0x44015d1f00003974396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)

   Common Context:

   o  AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)

   o  Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256

   o  Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   Sender Context:

   o  Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)

   o  Sender Key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)

   o  Sender Sequence Number: 20

   The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:




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   o  Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)

   o  kid: 0x (0 byte)

   o  external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)

   o  AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)

   o  plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)

   o  encryption key: 0xf0910ed7295e6ad4b54fc793154302ff (16 bytes)

   o  nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb549868 (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

   o  OSCORE option value: 0x0914 (2 bytes)

   o  ciphertext: 0x612f1092f1776f1c1668b3825e (13 bytes)

   From there:

   o  Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x44025d1f00003974396c6f6
      3616c686f7374620914ff612f1092f1776f1c1668b3825e (35 bytes)

C.5.  Test Vector 5: OSCORE Request, Client

   This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET
   request using the security context derived in Appendix C.2.  The
   unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.

   Unprotected CoAP request:
   0x440171c30000b932396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)

   Common Context:

   o  AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)

   o  Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256

   o  Common IV: 0xbe35ae297d2dace910c52e99f9 (13 bytes)

   Sender Context:

   o  Sender ID: 0x00 (1 bytes)

   o  Sender Key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)




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   o  Sender Sequence Number: 20

   The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:

   o  Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)

   o  kid: 0x00 (1 byte)

   o  external_aad: 0x8501810a4100411440 (9 bytes)

   o  AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040498501810a4100411440 (21 bytes)

   o  plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)

   o  encryption key: 0x321b26943253c7ffb6003b0b64d74041 (16 bytes)

   o  nonce: 0xbf35ae297d2dace910c52e99ed (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

   o  OSCORE option value: 0x091400 (3 bytes)

   o  ciphertext: 0x4ed339a5a379b0b8bc731fffb0 (13 bytes)

   From there:

   o  Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x440271c30000b932396c6f6
      3616c686f737463091400ff4ed339a5a379b0b8bc731fffb0 (36 bytes)

C.6.  Test Vector 6: OSCORE Request, Client

   This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET
   request carrying the ID Context in the message, using the security
   context derived in Appendix C.3.  The unprotected request only
   contains the Uri-Path and Uri-Host options.

   Unprotected CoAP request:
   0x44012f8eef9bbf7a396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)

   Common Context:

   o  AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)

   o  Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256

   o  Common IV: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b85e (13 bytes)

   o  ID Context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)



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   Sender Context:

   o  Sender ID: 0x (0 bytes)

   o  Sender Key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)

   o  Sender Sequence Number: 20

   The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:

   o  Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)

   o  kid: 0x (0 byte)

   o  kid context: 0x37cbf3210017a2d3 (8 bytes)

   o  external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)

   o  AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)

   o  plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)

   o  encryption key: 0xaf2a1300a5e95788b356336eeecd2b92 (16 bytes)

   o  nonce: 0x2ca58fb85ff1b81c0b7181b84a (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

   o  OSCORE option value: 0x19140837cbf3210017a2d3 (11 bytes)

   o  ciphertext: 0x72cd7273fd331ac45cffbe55c3 (13 bytes)

   From there:

   o  Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x44022f8eef9bbf7a396c6f6
      3616c686f73746b19140837cbf3210017a2d3ff4ed339a5a379b0b8bc731fffb0
      (44 bytes)

C.7.  Test Vector 7: OSCORE Response, Server

   This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05
   Content response to the request in Appendix C.4.  The unprotected
   response has payload "Hello World!" and no options.  The protected
   response does not contain a kid nor a Partial IV.  Note that some
   parameters are derived from the request.

   Unprotected CoAP response:
   0x64455d1f00003974ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (21 bytes)



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   Common Context:

   o  AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)

   o  Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256

   o  Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   Sender Context:

   o  Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  Sender Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)

   o  Sender Sequence Number: 0

   The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:

   o  external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)

   o  AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)

   o  plaintext: 0x45ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (14 bytes)

   o  encryption key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)

   o  nonce: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb549868 (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

   o  OSCORE option value: 0x (0 bytes)

   o  ciphertext: 0xdbaad1e9a7e7b2a813d3c31524378303cdafae119106 (22
      bytes)

   From there:

   o  Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message):
      0x64445d1f0000397490ffdbaad1e9a7e7b2a813d3c31524378303cdafae119106
      (32 bytes)

C.8.  Test Vector 8: OSCORE Response with Partial IV, Server

   This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05
   Content response to the request in Appendix C.4.  The unprotected
   response has payload "Hello World!" and no options.  The protected
   response does not contain a kid, but contains a Partial IV.  Note
   that some parameters are derived from the request.



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   Unprotected CoAP response:
   0x64455d1f00003974ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (21 bytes)

   Common Context:

   o  AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)

   o  Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256

   o  Common IV: 0x4622d4dd6d944168eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   Sender Context:

   o  Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)

   o  Sender Key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)

   o  Sender Sequence Number: 0

   The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:

   o  Partial IV: 0x00 (1 byte)

   o  external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)

   o  AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)

   o  plaintext: 0x45ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (14 bytes)

   o  encryption key: 0xffb14e093c94c9cac9471648b4f98710 (16 bytes)

   o  nonce: 0x4722d4dd6d944169eefb54987c (13 bytes)

   From the previous parameter, the following is derived:

   o  OSCORE option value: 0x0100 (2 bytes)

   o  ciphertext: 0x4d4c13669384b67354b2b6175ff4b8658c666a6cf88e (22
      bytes)

   From there:

   o  Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message): 0x64445d1f00003974920100
      ff4d4c13669384b67354b2b6175ff4b8658c666a6cf88e (34 bytes)







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Appendix D.  Overview of Security Properties

D.1.  Supporting Proxy Operations

   CoAP is designed to work with intermediaries reading and/or changing
   CoAP message fields to perform supporting operations in constrained
   environments, e.g. forwarding and cross-protocol translations.

   Securing CoAP on transport layer protects the entire message between
   the endpoints in which case CoAP proxy operations are not possible.
   In order to enable proxy operations, security on transport layer
   needs to be terminated at the proxy in which case the CoAP message in
   its entirety is unprotected in the proxy.

   Requirements for CoAP end-to-end security are specified in
   [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].  The client and server are
   assumed to be honest, but proxies and gateways are only trusted to
   perform their intended operations.  Forwarding is specified in
   Section 2.2.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].  HTTP-CoAP
   translation is specified in [RFC8075].  Intermediaries translating
   between different transport layers are intended to perform just that.

   By working at the CoAP layer, OSCORE enables different CoAP message
   fields to be protected differently, which allows message fields
   required for proxy operations to be available to the proxy while
   message fields intended for the other endpoint remain protected.  In
   the remainder of this section we analyze how OSCORE protects the
   protected message fields and the consequences of message fields
   intended for proxy operation being unprotected.

D.2.  Protected Message Fields

   Protected message fields are included in the Plaintext (Section 5.3)
   and the Additional Authenticated Data (Section 5.4) of the
   COSE_Encrypt0 object and encrypted using an AEAD algorithm.

   OSCORE depends on a pre-established random Master Secret
   (Section 12.3) used to derive encryption keys, and a construction for
   making (key, nonce) pairs unique (Appendix D.3).  Assuming this is
   true, and the keys are used for no more data than indicated in
   Section 7.2.1, OSCORE should provide the following guarantees:

   o  Confidentiality: An attacker should not be able to determine the
      plaintext contents of a given OSCORE message or determine that
      different plaintexts are related (Section 5.3).






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   o  Integrity: An attacker should not be able to craft a new OSCORE
      message with protected message fields different from an existing
      OSCORE message which will be accepted by the receiver.

   o  Request-response binding: An attacker should not be able to make a
      client match a response to the wrong request.

   o  Non-replayability: An attacker should not be able to cause the
      receiver to accept a message which it has previously received and
      accepted.

   In the above, the attacker is anyone except the endpoints, e.g. a
   compromised intermediary.  Informally, OSCORE provides these
   properties by AEAD-protecting the plaintext with a strong key and
   uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs.  AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides
   confidentiality and integrity for the data.  Response-request binding
   is provided by including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the
   AAD of the response.  Non-replayability of requests and notifications
   is provided by using unique (key, nonce) pairs and a replay
   protection mechanism (application dependent, see Section 7.4).

   OSCORE is susceptible to a variety of traffic analysis attacks based
   on observing the length and timing of encrypted packets.  OSCORE does
   not provide any specific defenses against this form of attack but the
   application may use a padding mechanism to prevent an attacker from
   directly determine the length of the padding.  However, information
   about padding may still be revealed by side-channel attacks observing
   differences in timing.

D.3.  Uniqueness of (key, nonce)

   In this section we show that (key, nonce) pairs are unique as long as
   the requirements in Sections 3.3 and 7.2.1 are followed.

   Fix a Common Context (Section 3.1) and an endpoint, called the
   encrypting endpoint.  An endpoint may alternate between client and
   server roles, but each endpoint always encrypts with the Sender Key
   of its Sender Context.  Sender Keys are (stochastically) unique since
   they are derived with HKDF using unique Sender IDs, so messages
   encrypted by different endpoints use different keys.  It remains to
   prove that the nonces used by the fixed endpoint are unique.

   Since the Common IV is fixed, the nonces are determined by a Partial
   IV (PIV) and the Sender ID of the endpoint generating that Partial IV
   (ID_PIV).  The nonce construction (Section 5.2) with the size of the
   ID_PIV (S) creates unique nonces for different (ID_PIV, PIV) pairs.
   There are two cases:




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   A.  For requests, and responses with Partial IV (e.g.  Observe
   notifications):

   o  ID_PIV = Sender ID of the encrypting endpoint

   o  PIV = current Partial IV of the encrypting endpoint

   Since the encrypting endpoint steps the Partial IV for each use, the
   nonces used in case A are all unique as long as the number of
   encrypted messages is kept within the required range (Section 7.2.1).

   B.  For responses without Partial IV (e.g. single response to a
   request):

   o  ID_PIV = Sender ID of the endpoint generating the request

   o  PIV = Partial IV of the request

   Since the Sender IDs are unique, ID_PIV is different from the Sender
   ID of the encrypting endpoint.  Therefore, the nonces in case B are
   different compared to nonces in case A, where the encrypting endpoint
   generated the Partial IV.  Since the Partial IV of the request is
   verified for replay (Section 7.4) associated to this Recipient
   Context, PIV is unique for this ID_PIV, which makes all nonces in
   case B distinct.

D.4.  Unprotected Message Fields

   This section lists and discusses issues with unprotected message
   fields.

D.4.1.  CoAP Header Fields

   o  Version.  The CoAP version [RFC7252] is not expected to be
      sensitive to disclose.  Currently there is only one CoAP version
      defined.  A change of this parameter is potentially a denial-of-
      service attack.  Future versions of CoAP need to analyze attacks
      to OSCORE protected messages due to an adversary changing the CoAP
      version.

   o  Token/Token Length.  The Token field is a client-local identifier
      for differentiating between concurrent requests [RFC7252].  An
      eavesdropper reading the token can match requests to responses
      which can be used in traffic analysis.  In particular this is true
      for notifications, where multiple responses are matched with one
      request.  CoAP proxies are allowed to change Token and Token
      Length between UDP hops.  However, modifications of Token and
      Token Length during a UDP hop may become a denial-of-service



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      attack, since it may prevent the client to identify to which
      request the response belongs or to find the correct information to
      verify integrity of the response.

   o  Code.  The Outer CoAP Code of an OSCORE message is POST or FETCH
      for requests with corresponding response codes.  The use of FETCH
      reveals no more than what is revealed by the Outer Observe option.
      Changing the Outer Code may be a denial-of-service attack by
      causing errors in the proxy processing.

   o  Type/Message ID.  The Type/Message ID fields [RFC7252] reveal
      information about the UDP transport binding, e.g. an eavesdropper
      reading the Type or Message ID gain information about how UDP
      messages are related to each other.  CoAP proxies are allowed to
      change Type and Message ID.  These message fields are not present
      in CoAP over TCP [RFC8323], and does not impact the request/
      response message.  A change of these fields in a UDP hop is a
      denial-of-service attack.  By sending an ACK, an attacker can make
      the endpoint believe that the other endpoint received the previous
      message.  By sending a RST, an attacker may be able to cancel an
      observation, make one endpoint believe the other endpoint is
      alive, or make one endpoint endpoint believe that the other
      endpoint is missing some context.  By changing a NON to a CON, the
      attacker can cause the receiving endpoint to respond to messages
      for which no response was requested.

   o  Length.  This field contain the length of the message [RFC8323]
      which may be used for traffic analysis.  These message fields are
      not present in CoAP over UDP, and does not impact the request/
      response message.  A change of Length is a denial-of-service
      attack similar to changing TCP header fields.

D.4.2.  CoAP Options

   o  Max-Age. The Outer Max-Age is set to zero to avoid unnecessary
      caching of OSCORE error responses.  Changing this value thus may
      cause unnecessary caching.  No additional information is carried
      with this option.

   o  Proxy-Uri/Proxy-Scheme.  These options are used in forward proxy
      deployments.  With OSCORE, the Proxy-Uri option does not contain
      the Uri-Path/Uri-Query parts of the URI.  The other parts of
      Proxy-Uri cannot be protected since they are allowed to be changed
      by a forward proxy.  The server can verify what scheme is used in
      the last hop, but not what was requested by the client or what was
      used in previous hops.





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   o  Uri-Host/Uri-Port.  In forward proxy deployments, the Uri-Host/
      Uri-Port may be changed by an adversary, and the application needs
      to handle the consequences of that (see Section 4.1.3.2).  The
      Uri-Host may either be omitted, reveal information equivalent to
      that of the IP address or more privacy-sensitive information,
      which is discouraged.

   o  Observe.  The Outer Observe option is intended for a proxy to
      support forwarding of Observe messages, but is ignored by the
      endpoints since the Inner Observe determines the processing in the
      endpoints.  Since the Partial IV provides absolute ordering of
      notifications it is not possible for an intermediary to spoof
      reordering (see Section 4.1.3.5).  The absence of Partial IV,
      since only allowed for the first notification, does not prevent
      correct ordering of notifications.  The size and distributions of
      notifications over time may reveal information about the content
      or nature of the notifications.  Cancellations (Section 4.1.3.5.1)
      are not bound to the corresponding registrations in the same way
      responses are bound to requests in OSCORE (see Appendix D.2), but
      that does not open up for attacks based on mismatched
      cancellations, since [RFC7641] specifies that for cancellations to
      be accepted, all options except for ETags MUST be the same (see
      Section 3.6 of [RFC7641]).  For different target resources, the
      OSCORE option is different, and even if the Token is modified to
      match a different observation, such a cancellation would not be
      accepted.

   o  Block1/Block2/Size1/Size2.  The Outer Block options enables
      fragmentation of OSCORE messages in addition to segmentation
      performed by the Inner Block options.  The presence of these
      options indicates a large message being sent and the message size
      can be estimated and used for traffic analysis.  Manipulating
      these options is a potential denial-of-service attack, e.g.
      injection of alleged Block fragments.  The specification of a
      maximum size of message, MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE
      (Section 4.1.3.4.2), above which messages will be dropped, is
      intended as one measure to mitigate this kind of attack.

   o  No-Response.  The Outer No-Response option is used to support
      proxy functionality, specifically to avoid error transmissions
      from proxies to clients, and to avoid bandwidth reduction to
      servers by proxies applying congestion control when not receiving
      responses.  Modifying or introducing this option is a potential
      denial-of-service attack against the proxy operations, but since
      the option has an Inner value its use can be securely agreed
      between the endpoints.  The presence of this option is not
      expected to reveal any sensitive information about the message
      exchange.



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   o  OSCORE.  The OSCORE option contains information about the
      compressed COSE header.  Changing this field may cause OSCORE
      verification to fail.

D.4.3.  Error and Signaling Messages

   Error messages occurring during CoAP processing are protected end-to-
   end.  Error messages occurring during OSCORE processing are not
   always possible to protect, e.g. if the receiving endpoint cannot
   locate the right security context.  For this setting, unprotected
   error messages are allowed as specified to prevent extensive
   retransmissions.  Those error messages can be spoofed or manipulated,
   which is a potential denial-of-service attack.

   Signaling messages used in CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] are intended to be
   hop-by-hop; spoofing signaling messages can be used as a denial-of-
   service attack of a TCP connection.

D.4.4.  HTTP Message Fields

   In contrast to CoAP, where OSCORE does not protect header fields to
   enable CoAP-CoAP proxy operations, the use of OSCORE with HTTP is
   restricted to transporting a protected CoAP message over an HTTP hop.
   Any unprotected HTTP message fields may reveal information about the
   transport of the OSCORE message and enable various denial-of-service
   attacks.  It is recommended to additionally use TLS [RFC5246] for
   HTTP hops, which enables encryption and integrity protection of
   headers, but still leaves some information for traffic analysis.

Appendix E.  CDDL Summary

   Data structure definitions in the present specification employ the
   CDDL language for conciseness and precision.  CDDL is defined in
   [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl], which at the time of writing this appendix is
   in the process of completion.  As the document is not yet available
   for a normative reference, the present appendix defines the small
   subset of CDDL that is being used in the present specification.

   Within the subset being used here, a CDDL rule is of the form "name =
   type", where "name" is the name given to the "type".  A "type" can be
   one of:

   o  a reference to another named type, by giving its name.  The
      predefined named types used in the present specification are:
      "uint", an unsigned integer (as represented in CBOR by major type
      0); "int", an unsigned or negative integer (as represented in CBOR
      by major type 0 or 1); "bstr", a byte string (as represented in




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      CBOR by major type 2); "tstr", a text string (as represented in
      CBOR by major type 3);

   o  a choice between two types, by giving both types separated by a
      "/";

   o  an array type (as represented in CBOR by major type 4), where the
      sequence of elements of the array is described by giving a
      sequence of entries separated by commas ",", and this sequence is
      enclosed by square brackets "[" and "]".  Arrays described by an
      array description contain elements that correspond one-to-one to
      the sequence of entries given.  Each entry of an array description
      is of the form "name : type", where "name" is the name given to
      the entry and "type" is the type of the array element
      corresponding to this entry.

Acknowledgments

   The following individuals provided input to this document: Christian
   Amsuess, Tobias Andersson, Carsten Bormann, Joakim Brorsson, Esko
   Dijk, Thomas Fossati, Martin Gunnarsson, Klaus Hartke, Michael
   Richardson, Jim Schaad, Peter van der Stok, Dave Thaler, Marco
   Tiloca, William Vignat, and Malisa Vucinic.

   Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
   the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.

Authors' Addresses

   Goeran Selander
   Ericsson AB

   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com


   John Mattsson
   Ericsson AB

   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com


   Francesca Palombini
   Ericsson AB

   Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com






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   Ludwig Seitz
   RISE SICS

   Email: ludwig.seitz@ri.se















































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