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Versions: (draft-hartke-core-stateless) 00 01

CoRE Working Group                                             K. Hartke
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Updates: 7252, 8323 (if approved)                         March 11, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: September 12, 2019


                 Extended Tokens and Stateless Clients
             in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
                      draft-ietf-core-stateless-01

Abstract

   This document provides considerations for alleviating CoAP clients
   and intermediaries of keeping per-request state.  To facilitate this,
   this document additionally introduces a new, optional CoAP protocol
   extension for extended token lengths.

   This document updates RFCs 7252 and 8323.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Extended Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Extended Token Length (TKL) Field . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Discovering Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.2.1.  Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option  . . . . . .   5
       2.2.2.  Trial and Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Intermediaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Stateless Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Intermediaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Extended Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Message Transmission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Extended Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Stateless Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  Recommended Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  CoAP Signaling Option Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Updated Message Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.1.  CoAP over UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.2.  CoAP over TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.3.  CoAP over WebSockets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a RESTful
   application-layer protocol for constrained environments [RFC7228].
   In CoAP, clients (or intermediaries in the client role) make requests
   to servers (or intermediaries in the server role), which serve the
   requests by returning responses.

   While a request is ongoing, a client typically needs to keep some
   state that it requires for processing the response when it arrives.
   Identification of this state is done by means of a _token_ in CoAP,
   an opaque sequence of bytes chosen by the client and included in the
   CoAP request.  The server returns the token verbatim in any resulting
   CoAP response (Figure 1).



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          +-----------------+     request with     +------------+
          |        |        |   state identifier   |            |
          |        |        |       as token       |            |
          |    .-<-+->------|--------------------->|------.     |
          |   _|_           |                      |      |     |
          |  /   \ stored   |                      |      |     |
          |  \___/ state    |                      |      |     |
          |    |            |                      |      |     |
          |    '->-+-<------|<---------------------|------'     |
          |        |        |     response with    |            |
          |        v        |   token echoed back  |            |
          +-----------------+                      +------------+
                Client                                 Server

            Figure 1: Token as an Identifier for Request State

   In some scenarios, it can be beneficial to reduce the amount of state
   that is stored at the client at the cost of increased message sizes.
   Clients can implement this by serializing (parts of) their state into
   the token itself and recovering the state from the token in the
   response (Figure 2).

          +-----------------+     request with     +------------+
          |        |        |   serialized state   |            |
          |        |        |       as token       |            |
          |        +--------|=====================>|------.     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |    look ma,     |                      |      |     |
          |    no state!    |                      |      |     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |        +--------|<=====================|------'     |
          |        |        |     response with    |            |
          |        v        |   token echoed back  |            |
          +-----------------+                      +------------+
                Client                                 Server

             Figure 2: Token as Serialization of Request State

   Section 3 of this document provides considerations for making clients
   "stateless" in this way, i.e., for avoiding per-request state in
   client implementations.  (They'll still need to maintain per-server
   state and other kinds of state, so they're not entirely stateless.)

   Serializing state into tokens is complicated by the fact that both
   CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] and CoAP over reliable transports [RFC8323]
   limit the maximum token length to 8 bytes.  To overcome this
   limitation, Section 2 of this document first introduces a CoAP
   protocol extension for extended token lengths.



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   While the use case (avoiding per-request state) and the mechanism
   (extended token lengths) presented in this document are closely
   related, both can be used independently of each other: Some
   implementations may be able to fit their state in just 8 bytes; some
   implementations may have other use cases for extended token lengths.

1.1.  Terminology

   Stateless
      In this document, "stateless" refers to an implementation strategy
      for a client (or intermediary in the client role) that doesn't
      require it to keep state for the individual requests it sends to a
      server (or intermediary in the server role).  The client still
      needs to keep state for each server it communicates with (such as
      state for generating tokens and congestion control), so it's not
      free of any state.

   Client
      In this document, "client" generally refers to any sender of a
      request and recipient of a response, including intermediaries.

   Server
      In this document, "server" generally refers to any recipient of a
      request and sender of a response, including intermediaries.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Extended Tokens

2.1.  Extended Token Length (TKL) Field

   This document updates the message formats defined for CoAP over UDP
   [RFC7252] and CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets [RFC8323] with the
   following new definition of the TKL field, increasing the maximum
   token length to 65804 bytes.

   Token Length (TKL):  4-bit unsigned integer.  A value between 0 and
      12 inclusive indicates the length of the variable-length Token
      field in bytes.  Three values are reserved for special constructs:

      13:  An 8-bit unsigned integer precedes the Token field and
         indicates the length of the Token field minus 13.





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      14:  A 16-bit unsigned integer in network byte order precedes the
         Token field and indicates the length of the Token field minus
         269.

      15:  Reserved.  This value MUST NOT be sent and MUST be processed
         as a message format error.

   All other fields retain their definition.

   The updated message formats are illustrated in Appendix A.

2.2.  Discovering Support

   Extended token lengths require support from the server or, if there
   are one or more intermediaries between the client and the server, the
   intermediary in the server role that the client is interacting with.

   Support can be discovered by a client (or intermediary in the client
   role) in one of two ways: In case Capabilities and Settings Messages
   (CSMs) are available, such as in CoAP over TCP, support can be
   discovered using the Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option defined
   in Section 2.2.1.  Otherwise, such as in CoAP over UDP, support can
   only be discovered by trial and error, as described in Section 2.2.2.

2.2.1.  Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option

   A sender can use the elective Extended-Token-Lengths Capability
   Option to indicate its support for the new TKL field definition
   specified in Section 2.1.

   +----+---+---+-------+--------------------+-------+--------+--------+
   |  # | C | R | Appli | Name               | Forma | Length | Base   |
   |    |   |   | es to |                    | t     |        | Value  |
   +----+---+---+-------+--------------------+-------+--------+--------+
   | TB |   |   | CSM   | Extended-Token-    | empty | 0      | (none) |
   |  D |   |   |       | Lengths            |       |        |        |
   +----+---+---+-------+--------------------+-------+--------+--------+

                         C=Critical, R=Repeatable

           Table 1: The Extended-Token-Lengths Capability Option

2.2.2.  Trial and Error

   A request with a TKL field value outside the range from 0 to 8 will
   be considered a message format error (Section 3 of RFC 7252) and be
   rejected by a recipient that does not support the updated TKL field
   definition.  A client thus can determine support by sending a request



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   with an extended token length and checking whether it's rejected by
   the recipient or not.

   In CoAP over UDP, a recipient rejects a malformed confirmable message
   by sending a Reset message (Section 4.2 of RFC 7252).  In case of a
   non-confirmable message, sending a Reset message is permitted but not
   required (Section 4.3 of RFC 7252).  It is therefore RECOMMENDED that
   clients use a confirmable message for determining support.

   As per RFC 7252, Reset messages are empty and don't contain a token;
   they only return the Message ID (Figure 3).  They also don't contain
   any indication of what caused a message format error.  It is
   therefore RECOMMENDED that clients use a request that contains no
   potential message format error other than the extended token length.

   In CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets, a recipient rejects a
   malformed message by sending an Abort message and shutting down the
   connection (Section 5.6 of RFC 8323).

          +-----------------+   request message    +------------+
          |        |        |    with extended     |            |
          |        |        |     token length     |            |
          |    .-<-+->------|--------------------->|------.     |
          |   _|_           |                      |      |     |
          |  /   \ stored   |                      |      |     |
          |  \___/ state    |                      |      |     |
          |    |            |                      |      |     |
          |    '->-+-<------|<---------------------|------'     |
          |        |        |     reset message    |            |
          |        v        |   with only message  |            |
          +-----------------+    ID echoed back    +------------+
                Client                                 Server

    Figure 3: A Confirmable Request With an Extended Token is Rejected
         With a Reset Message if the Next Hop Does Not Support It

   If a server supports extended token lengths but receives a request
   with a token of a length it is unwilling or unable to process, it
   MUST NOT reject the message.  Instead, it SHOULD return a 4.00 (Bad
   Request) response.  This implies that the server returns the entire
   token verbatim.

2.3.  Intermediaries

   Tokens are a hop-by-hop feature: When an intermediary receives a
   request, the only requirement is that it echoes the token back in any
   resulting response.  There is no requirement or expectation that an
   intermediary passes a client's token on to a server or that an



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   intermediary uses extended token lengths itself when receiving a
   request with an extended token length.

3.  Stateless Clients

   A client can be alleviated of keeping per-request state by
   serializing the state into a sequence of bytes and sending the bytes
   as the token of the request.  The server will return the token in the
   response to the client, so that the client can recover the state and
   process the response as if it had kept the state locally.

   The format of the serialized state is an implementation detail of the
   client and opaque to any server implementation.  However, using
   tokens to serialize state has significant and non-obvious security
   and privacy implications that need to be mitigated; see Section 4.

3.1.  Intermediaries

   Tokens are a hop-by-hop feature: If a client makes a request to an
   intermediary, that intermediary needs to store the client's token
   (along with the client's transport address) while it makes its own
   request to the next hop towards the origin server and waits for the
   response.  When the intermediary receives the response, it looks up
   the client's token and transport address for the ongoing request and
   sends an appropriate response to the client.

   Such an intermediary might want to be "stateless" as well, i.e., be
   alleviated of storing the client's token and transport address for
   ongoing requests.  This can be implemented by serializing this
   information along the request state into the token to the next hop.
   When the next hop returns the response, the intermediary can recover
   the information from the token and use it to satisfy the client's
   request.

   The downside of this approach is that an intermediary, without
   keeping request state, is unable to aggregate multiple requests for
   the same target resource, which reduces efficiency.

   When multiple clients observe [RFC7641] the same resource,
   aggregating requests is REQUIRED (Section 3.1 of RFC 7641).  As this
   cannot be satisfied without keeping request state, an intermediary
   MUST NOT include an Observe Option in requests it sends without
   keeping request state.

   When using blockwise transfers [RFC7959], a server might not be able
   to distinguish blocks originating from different clients once they
   have been forwarded by an intermediary.  To ensure that this does not
   lead to inconsistent resource state, a stateless intermediary MUST



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   include the Request-Tag Option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] in
   blockwise transfers with a value that uniquely identifies the next
   hop towards the client in the intermediary's namespace.

3.2.  Extended Tokens

   A client (or intermediary in the role of a client) that depends on
   support for extended token lengths (Section 2) from the next hop to
   avoid keeping request state MUST perform a discovery of support
   (Section 2.2) before it can be stateless.  This discovery MUST be
   performed in a stateful way, i.e., keeping state for the request
   (Figure 4): If the client was stateless from the start and the next
   hop doesn't support extended tokens, then any error message couldn't
   be processed since the state would neither be present at the client
   nor returned in the Reset message (Figure 5).

          +-----------------+    dummy request     +------------+
          |        |        |    with extended     |            |
          |        |        |        token         |            |
          |    .-<-+->------|=====================>|------.     |
          |   _|_           |                      |      |     |
          |  /   \ stored   |                      |      |     |
          |  \___/ state    |                      |      |     |
          |    |            |                      |      |     |
          |    '->-+-<------|<=====================|------'     |
          |        |        |     response with    |            |
          |        |        |    extended token    |            |
          |        |        |      echoed back     |            |
          |        |        |                      |            |
          |        |        |                      |            |
          |        |        |     request with     |            |
          |        |        |   serialized state   |            |
          |        |        |       as token       |            |
          |        +--------|=====================>|------.     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |    look ma,     |                      |      |     |
          |    no state!    |                      |      |     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |        +--------|<=====================|------'     |
          |        |        |     response with    |            |
          |        v        |   token echoed back  |            |
          +-----------------+                      +------------+
                Client                                 Server

     Figure 4: Depending on Extended Tokens for Being Stateless First
            Requires a Successful Stateful Discovery of Support





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          +-----------------+    dummy request     +------------+
          |        |        |    with extended     |            |
          |        |        |        token         |            |
          |        +--------|=====================>|------.     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |                 |                      |      |     |
          |              ???|<---------------------|------'     |
          |                 |     reset message    |            |
          |                 |   with only message  |            |
          +-----------------+    ID echoed back    +------------+
                Client                                 Server

          Figure 5: Stateless Discovery of Support Does Not Work

3.3.  Message Transmission

   As a further step, in the case of CoAP over UDP [RFC7252], a client
   (or intermediary in the client role) might want to also avoid keeping
   message transmission state.

   Generally, a client can use confirmable or non-confirmable messages
   for requests.  When using confirmable messages, it needs to keep
   message exchange state for performing retransmissions and handling
   Acknowledgement and Reset messages.  When using non-confirmable
   messages, it can keep no message exchange state.  However, in either
   case the client needs to keep congestion control state.  That is, it
   needs to maintain state for each node it communicates with and, e.g.,
   enforce NSTART.

   As per RFC 7252, a client must be prepared to receive a response as a
   piggybacked response, a separate response or non-confirmable response
   (Section 5.2 of RFC 7252), regardless of the message type used for
   the request.  A stateless client needs to handle these response types
   as follows:

   o  If a piggybacked response contains a valid authentication tag and
      freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the
      message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST silently
      ignore the message.

   o  If a separate response contains a valid authentication tag and
      freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the
      message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST reject the
      message as specified in Section 4.2 of RFC 7252.





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   o  If a non-confirmable response contains a valid authentication tag
      and freshness indicator in the token, the client MUST process the
      message as specified in RFC 7252; otherwise, it MUST reject the
      message as specified in Section 4.3 of RFC 7252.

4.  Security Considerations

4.1.  Extended Tokens

   Tokens significantly larger than the 8 bytes specified in RFC 7252
   have implications for nodes in particular with constrained memory
   size that need to be mitigated.

   A node in the server role supporting extended token lengths may be
   vulnerable to a denial-of-service when an attacker (either on-path or
   a malicious client) sends large tokens to fill up the memory of the
   node.  Implementations MUST be prepared for this and mitigate it.

4.2.  Stateless Clients

   Transporting the state needed by a client to process a response as
   serialized state information in the token has several significant and
   non-obvious security and privacy implications that need to be
   mitigated.

   Serialized state information is an attractive target for both
   unwanted nodes (attackers between the node in client role and the
   next hop) and wanted nodes (the next hop itself) on the path.
   Therefore, a node in the client role MUST integrity protect the state
   information, unless processing a response does not modify state or
   cause other significant side effects.

   Even when the serialized state is integrity protected, an attacker
   may still replay a response, making the client believe it sent the
   same request twice.  Therefore, the node in client role MUST
   implement replay protection (e.g., by using sequence numbers and a
   replay window), unless processing a response does not modify state or
   cause other significant side effects.  Integrity protection is
   REQUIRED for replay protection.

   If processing a response without keeping request state is sensitive
   to the time elapsed to sending the request, then the serialized state
   MUST include freshness information (e.g., a timestamp).

   Information in the serialized state may be privacy sensitive.  A node
   in client role MUST encrypt the serialized state if it contains
   privacy sensitive information that an attacker would not get
   otherwise.  For example, an intermediary that serializes the client's



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   token and transport address into its token leaks that information to
   the next hop, which may be undesirable.  In wireless mesh networks,
   where all traffic is visible to a passive attacker, encryption may
   not be needed as the attacker can get the same information from
   analyzing the traffic flows.

4.2.1.  Recommended Algorithms

   The use of encryption, integrity protection, and replay protection of
   serialized state is recommended in general, unless a careful analysis
   of any potential attacks to security and privacy is performed.  AES-
   CCM with a 64 bit tag is recommended, combined with a sequence number
   and a replay window.  Where encryption is not needed, HMAC-SHA-256,
   combined with a sequence number and a replay window, may be used.

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  CoAP Signaling Option Number

   The following entries are added to the "CoAP Signaling Option
   Numbers" registry within the "CoRE Parameters" registry.

   +------------+--------+------------------------+-------------------+
   | Applies to | Number | Name                   | Reference         |
   +------------+--------+------------------------+-------------------+
   | 7.01       |    TBD | Extended-Token-Lengths | [[this document]] |
   +------------+--------+------------------------+-------------------+

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]
              Amsuess, C., Mattsson, J., and G. Selander, "Echo and
              Request-Tag", draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-03 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.





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   [RFC7641]  Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.

   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8323]  Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
              Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
              Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
              RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
              Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson,
              "Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-
              6tisch-minimal-security-09 (work in progress), November
              2018.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

Appendix A.  Updated Message Formats

   This appendix illustrates the CoAP message formats updated with the
   new definition of the TKL field (Section 2).














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A.1.  CoAP over UDP

                   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                 +-------+-------+---------------+
                 |       |       |               |
                 |  Ver  |   T   |      TKL      |   1 byte
                 |       |       |               |
                 +-------+-------+---------------+
                 |                               |
                 |             Code              |   1 byte
                 |                               |
                 +-------------------------------+
                 |                               |
                 |                               |
                 |                               |
                 +-         Message ID          -+   2 bytes
                 |                               |
                 |                               |
                 |                               |
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /              TKL              /   0-2 bytes
                 \          (extended)           \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /             Token             /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Options            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |               |               |
                 |      15       |       15      |   1 byte (if payload)
                 |               |               |
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Payload            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+



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A.2.  CoAP over TCP

                   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |               |               |
                 |      Len      |      TKL      |   1 byte
                 |               |               |
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 \                               \
                 /              Len              /   0-2 bytes
                 \          (extended)           \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 |                               |
                 |             Code              |   1 byte
                 |                               |
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /              TKL              /   0-2 bytes
                 \          (extended)           \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /             Token             /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Options            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |               |               |
                 |      15       |       15      |   1 byte (if payload)
                 |               |               |
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Payload            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+







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A.3.  CoAP over WebSockets

                   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |               |               |
                 |       0       |      TKL      |   1 byte
                 |               |               |
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |                               |
                 |             Code              |   1 byte
                 |                               |
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /              TKL              /   0-2 bytes
                 \          (extended)           \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /             Token             /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Options            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 |               |               |
                 |      15       |       15      |   1 byte (if payload)
                 |               |               |
                 +---------------+---------------+
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 /            Payload            /   0 or more bytes
                 \                               \
                 /                               /
                 \                               \
                 +-------------------------------+











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Acknowledgements

   This document is based on the requirements of and work on the Minimal
   Security Framework for 6TiSCH [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] by
   Malisa Vucinic, Jonathan Simon, Kris Pister, and Michael Richardson.

   Thanks to Carsten Bormann, Ari Keranen, John Mattsson, Jim Schaad,
   Goeran Selander, and Malisa Vucinic for helpful comments and
   discussions that have shaped the document.

Author's Address

   Klaus Hartke
   Ericsson
   Torshamnsgatan 23
   Stockholm  SE-16483
   Sweden

   Email: klaus.hartke@ericsson.com
































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