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Versions: (draft-schaad-cose-msg) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

COSE Working Group                                             J. Schaad
Internet-Draft                                            August Cellars
Intended status: Informational                             July 20, 2015
Expires: January 21, 2016


                      CBOR Encoded Message Syntax
                         draft-ietf-cose-msg-02

Abstract

   Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is data format designed
   for small code size and small message size.  There is a need for the
   ability to have the basic security services defined for this data
   format.  This document specifies how to do signatures, message
   authentication codes and encryption using this data format.

Contributing to this document

   The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub.  Suggested
   changes should be submitted as pull requests at [1].  Instructions
   are on that page as well.  Editorial changes can be managed in
   GitHub, but any substantial issues need to be discussed on the COSE
   mailing list.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Design changes from JOSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.3.  CBOR Grammar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.5.  Document Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  The COSE_MSG structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Header Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  COSE Headers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Signing Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Encryption object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Key Management Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms  . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms  . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  MAC objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Key Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  COSE Key Map Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.1.  ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       8.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     8.2.  RSASSA-PSS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       8.2.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)  . . . . .  29
       9.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.2.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC) . . . . . . . .  30
   10. Content Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.1.  AES GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     10.2.  AES CCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       10.2.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   11. Key Derivation Functions (KDF)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
            (HKDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     11.2.  Context Information Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   12. Key Management Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38



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     12.1.  Direct Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       12.1.1.  Direct Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     12.2.  Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     12.3.  Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       12.3.1.  RSA OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     12.4.  Direct Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       12.4.1.  ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     12.5.  Key Agreement with KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       12.5.1.  ECDH ES + HKDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     12.6.  Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       12.6.1.  PBES2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
   13. Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       13.1.1.  Single Coordinate Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       13.1.2.  Double Coordinate Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     13.2.  RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     13.3.  Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   14. CBOR Encoder Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     15.1.  CBOR Tag assignment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     15.2.  COSE Object Labels Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     15.3.  COSE Header Label Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     15.4.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table  . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     15.5.  COSE Algorithm Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     15.6.  COSE Key Map Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     15.7.  COSE Key Parameter Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     15.8.  Media Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       15.8.1.  COSE Security Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
       15.8.2.  COSE Key media type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   16. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   17. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     17.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     17.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   Appendix A.  AEAD and AE algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   Appendix B.  Three Levels of Recipient Information  . . . . . . .  64
   Appendix C.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     C.1.  Examples of MAC messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       C.1.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       C.1.2.  ECDH Direct MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       C.1.3.  Wrapped MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
       C.1.4.  Multi-recipient MAC message . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
     C.2.  Examples of Encrypted Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       C.2.1.  Direct ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       C.2.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
     C.3.  Examples of Signed Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       C.3.1.  Single Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       C.3.2.  Multiple Signers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72



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   Appendix D.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table  . . . . . . . . .  72
   Appendix E.  Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     E.1.  Version -01 to -02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     E.2.  Version -00 to -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76

1.  Introduction

   There has been an increased focus on the small, constrained devices
   that make up the Internet of Things (IOT).  One of the standards that
   has come of of this process is the Concise Binary Object
   Representation (CBOR).  CBOR extended the data model of the
   JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) by allowing for binary data among
   other changes.  CBOR is being adopted by several of the IETF working
   groups dealing with the IOT world as their encoding of data
   structures.  CBOR was designed specifically to be both small in terms
   of messages transport and implementation size as well having a schema
   free decoder.  A need exists to provide basic message security
   services for IOT and using CBOR as the message encoding format makes
   sense.

   The JOSE working group produced a set of documents
   [RFC7515][RFC7516][RFC7517][RFC7518] that defined how to perform
   encryption, signatures and message authentication (MAC) operations
   for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) documents and then to encode
   the results using the JSON format [RFC7159].  This document does the
   same work for use with the Concise Binary Object Representation
   (CBOR) [RFC7049] document format.  While there is a strong attempt to
   keep the flavor of the original JOSE documents, two considerations
   are taken into account:

   o  CBOR has capabilities that are not present in JSON and should be
      used.  One example of this is the fact that CBOR has a method of
      encoding binary directly without first converting it into a base64
      encoded string.

   o  The author did not always agree with some of the decisions made by
      the JOSE working group.  Many of these decisions have been re-
      examined, and where it seems to the author to be superior or
      simpler, replaced.

1.1.  Design changes from JOSE

   o  Define a top level message structure so that encrypted, signed and
      MACed messages can easily identified and still have a consistent
      view.





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   o  Signed messages separate the concept of protected and unprotected
      attributes that are for the content and the signature.

   o  Key management has been made to be more uniform.  All key
      management techniques are represented as a recipient rather than
      only have some of them be so.

   o  MAC messages are separated from signed messages.

   o  MAC messages have the ability to do key management on the MAC
      authentication key.

   o  Use binary encodings for binary data rather than base64url
      encodings.

   o  Combine the authentication tag for encryption algorithms with the
      ciphertext.

   o  Remove the flattened mode of encoding.  Forcing the use of an
      array of recipients at all times forces the message size to be two
      bytes larger, but one gets a corresponding decrease in the
      implementation size that should compensate for this.  [CREF1]

1.2.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning
   is used.

1.3.  CBOR Grammar

   There currently is no standard CBOR grammar available for use by
   specifications.  While we describe the CBOR structures in prose, they
   are agumented in the text by the use of the CBOR Data Definition
   Language (CDDL) [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].  The use of
   CDDL is intended to be explanitory.  In the event of a conflict
   between the text and the CDDL grammar, the text is authorative.
   (Problems may be introduced at a later point because the CDDL grammar
   is not yet fixed.)

   CDDL productions that together define the grammar are interspersed in
   the document like this:





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   start = COSE_MSG

   The collected CDDL can be extracted from the XML version of this
   document via the following XPath expression below.  (Depending on the
   XPath evaluator one is using, it may be necessary to deal with >
   as an entity.)


   //artwork[@type='CDDL']/text()

1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology

   In JSON, maps are called objects and only have one kind of map key: a
   string.  In COSE, we use both strings and integers (both negative and
   non-negative integers) as map keys, as well as data items to identify
   specific choices.  The integers (both positive and negative) are used
   for compactness of encoding and easy comparison.  (Generally, in this
   document the value zero is going to be reserved and not used.)  Since
   the work "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, as a
   cryptographic key, we use the term "label" for this usage of either
   an integer or a string to identify map keys and choice data items.

   The CDLL grammar that defines a type that represents a label is given
   below:


   label = int / tstr

1.5.  Document Terminology

   In this document we use the following terminology: [CREF2]

   Byte is a synonym for octet.

   Key management is used as a term to describe how a key at level n is
   obtained from level n+1 in encrypted and MACed messages.  The term is
   also used to discuss key life cycle management, this document does
   not discuss key life cycle operations.

1.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms

   One of the issues that needs to be addressed is a requirement that a
   standard specify a set of algorithms that are required to be
   implemented.  [CREF3] This is done to promote interoperability as it
   provides a minimal set of algorithms that all devices can be sure
   will exist at both ends.  However, we have elected not to specify a
   set of mandatory algorithms in this document.




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   It is expected that COSE is going to be used in a wide variety of
   applications and on a wide variety of devices.  Many of the
   constrained devices are going to be setup to used a small fixed set
   of algorithms, and this set of algorithms may not match those
   available on a device.  We therefore have deferred to the application
   protocols the decision of what to specify for mandatory algorithms.

   Since the set of algorithms in an environment of constrained devices
   may depend on what the set of devices are and how long they have been
   in operation, we want to highlight that application protocols will
   need to specify some type of discovery method of algorithm
   capabilities.  The discovery method may be as simple as requiring
   preconfiguration of the set of algorithms to providing a discovery
   method built into the protocol.  S/MIME provided a number of
   different ways to approach the problem:

   o  Advertising in the message (S/MIME capabilities) [RFC5751].

   o  Advertising in the certificate (capabilities extension) [RFC4262]

   o  Minimum requirements for the S/MIME which have been updated over
      time [RFC2633][RFC5751]

2.  The COSE_MSG structure

   The COSE_MSG structure is a top level CBOR object that corresponds to
   the DataContent type in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652].  This structure allows for a top level message to be sent
   that could be any of the different security services.  The security
   service is identified within the message.

   The COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR type takes the COSE_MSG and prepends a CBOR
   tag of TBD1 to the encoding of COSE_MSG.  By having both a tagged and
   untagged version of the COSE_MSG structure, it becomes easy to either
   use COSE_MSG as a top level object or embedded in another object.
   The tagged version allows for a method of placing the COSE_MSG
   structure into a choice, using a consistent tag value to determine
   that this is a COSE object.

   The existence of the COSE_MSG and COSE_Tagged_MSG CBOR data types are
   not intended to prevent protocols from using the individual security
   primitives directly.  Where only a single service is required, that
   structure can be used directly.

   Each of the top-level security objects use a CBOR map as the base
   structure.  Items in the map at the top level are identified by a
   label.  The type of the value associated with the label is determined
   by the definition of the label.



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   The set of labels present in a security object is not restricted to
   those defined in this document.  However, it is not recommended that
   additional fields be added to a structure unless this is going to be
   done in a closed environment.  When new fields need to be added, it
   is recommended that a new message type be created so that processing
   of the field can be ensured.  Using an older structure with a new
   field means that any security properties of the new field will not be
   enforced.  Before a new field is added at the outer level, strong
   consideration needs to be given to defining a new header field and
   placing it into the protected headers.  Applications should make a
   determination if non-standardized fields are going to be permitted.
   It is suggested that libraries allow for an option to fail parsing if
   non-standardized fields exist, this is especially true if they do not
   allow for access to the fields in other ways.

   A label 'msg_type' is defined to distinguish between the different
   structures when they appear as part of a COSE_MSG object.  [CREF4]
   [CREF5]

      0 - Reserved.

      1 - Signed Message.

      2 - Encrypted Message

      3 - Authenticated Message (MACed message)

   Implementations MUST be prepared to find an integer under this label
   that does not correspond to the values 1 to 3.  If this is found then
   the client MUST stop attempting to parse the structure and fail.  The
   value of 0 is reserved and not to be used.  If the value of 0 is
   found, then clients MUST fail processing the structure.
   Implementations need to recognize that the set of values might be
   extended at a later date, but they should not provide a security
   service based on guesses of what is there.

   NOTE: Is there any reason to allow for a marker of a COSE_Key
   structure and allow it to be a COSE_MSG?  Doing so does allow for a
   security risk, but may simplify the code.  [CREF6]

   The CDDL grammar that corresponds to the above is:










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   COSE_MSG = COSE_Sign /
       COSE_encrypt /
       COSE_mac

   COSE_Tagged_MSG = #6.999(COSE_MSG)   ; Replace 999 with TBD1

   ; msg_type values
   msg_type_reserved=0
   msg_type_signed=1
   msg_type_encrypted=2
   msg_type_mac=3


   The top level of each of the COSE message structures are encoded as
   maps.  We use an integer to distinguish between the different
   security message types.  By searching for the integer under the label
   identified by msg_type (which is in turn an integer), one can
   determine which security message is being used and thus what syntax
   is for the rest of the elements in the map.

   +-------------+--------+--------------------------------------------+
   | name        | number | comments                                   |
   +-------------+--------+--------------------------------------------+
   | msg_type    | 1      | Occurs only in top level messages          |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | protected   | 2      | Occurs in all structures                   |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | unprotected | 3      | Occurs in all structures                   |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | payload     | 4      | Contains the content of the structure      |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | signatures  | 5      | For COSE_Sign - array of signatures        |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | signature   | 6      | For COSE_signature only                    |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | ciphertext  | 4      | TODO: Should we reuse the same as payload  |
   |             |        | or not?                                    |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | recipients  | 9      | For COSE_encrypt and COSE_mac              |
   |             |        |                                            |
   | tag         | 10     | For COSE_mac only                          |
   +-------------+--------+--------------------------------------------+

                         Table 1: COSE Map Labels

   The CDDL grammar that provides the label values is:





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   ; message_labels
   msg_type=1
   protected=2
   unprotected=3
   payload=4
   signatures=5
   signature=6
   ciphertext=4
   recipients=9
   tag=10


3.  Header Parameters

   The structure of COSE has been designed to have two buckets of
   information that are not considered to be part of the payload itself,
   but are used for holding information about algorithms, keys, or
   evaluation hints for the processing of the layer.  These two buckets
   are available for use in all of the structures in this document
   except for keys.  While these buckets can be present, they may not
   all be usable in all instances.  For example, while the protected
   bucket is present for recipient structures, most of the algorithms
   that are used for recipients do not provide the necessary
   functionality to provide the needed protection and thus the element
   is not used.

   Both buckets are implemented as CBOR maps.  The map key is a 'label'
   (Section 1.4).  The value portion is dependent on the definition for
   the label.  Both maps use the same set of label/value pairs.  The
   integer range for labels has been divided into several sections with
   a standard range, a private range, and a range that is dependent on
   the algorithm selected.  The defined labels can be found in the 'COSE
   Header Labels' IANA registry (Section 15.3.

   Two buckets are provided for each layer: [CREF7]

   protected  contains attributes about the layer that are to be
      cryptographically protected.  This bucket MUST NOT be used if it
      is not going to be included in a cryptographic computation.  This
      bucket is encoded in the message as a binary object.  This value
      is obtained by CBOR encoding the protected map and wrapping it in
      a bstr object.  This wrapping allows for the encoding of the
      protected map to be transported with a greater chance that it will
      not be altered in transit.  (Badly behaved intermediates could
      decode and re-encode, but this will result in a failure to verify
      unless the re-encoded byte string is identical to the decoded byte
      string.)  This finesses the problem of all parties needing to be
      able to do a common connical encoding.



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   unprotected  contains attributes about the layer that are not
      cryptographically protected.

   Both of the buckets are optional and are omitted if there are no
   items contained in the map.  The CDDL fragment that describes the two
   buckets is:

   header_map = {+ label => any }

   Headers = (
       ? protected => bstr,
       ? unprotected => header_map
   )

3.1.  COSE Headers

   The set of header fields defined in this document are:

   alg  This field is used to indicate the algorithm used for the
      security processing.  This field MUST be present at each level of
      a signed, encrypted or authenticated message.  This field using
      the integer '1' for the label.  The value is taken from the 'COSE
      Algorithm Registry' (see Section 15.4).

   crit  This field is used to ensure that applications will take
      appropriate action based on the values found.  The field is used
      to indicate which protected header labels an application that is
      processing a message is required to understand.  This field uses
      the integer '2' for the label.  The value is an array of COSE
      Header Labels.  When present, this MUST be placed in the protected
      header bucket.

      *  Integer labels in the range of 0 to 10 SHOULD be omitted.

      *  Integer labels in the range -1 to -255 can be omitted as they
         are algorithm dependent.  If an application can correctly
         process an algorithm, it can be assumed that it will correctly
         process all of the parameters associated with that algorithm.
         (The algorithm range is -1 to -65536, it is assumed that the
         higher end will deal with more optional algorithm specific
         items.)

      The header values indicated by 'crit' can be processed by either
      the security library code or by an application using a security
      library, the only requirement is that the field is processed.

   cty  This field is used to indicate the content type of the data in
      the payload or ciphertext fields.  The field uses the integer of



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      '3' for the label.  The value can be either an integer or a
      string.  [CREF8] Integers are from the XXXXX[CREF9] IANA registry
      table.  Strings are from the IANA 'mime-content types' registry.
      Applications SHOULD provide this field if the content structure is
      potentially ambiguous.

   kid  This field one of the ways that can be used to find the key to
      be used.  This value can be matched against the 'kid' field in a
      COSE_Key structure.  Applications MUST NOT assume that 'kid'
      values are unique.  There may be more than one key with the same
      'kid' value, it may be required that all of the keys need to be
      checked to find the correct one.  This field uses the integer
      value of '4' for the label.  The value of field is the CBOR 'bstr'
      type.  The internal structure of 'kid' is not defined and
      generally cannot be relied on by applications.  Key identifier
      values are hints about which key to use, they are not directly a
      security critical field, for this reason they can normally be
      placed in the unprotected headers bucket.

   nonce  This field holds either a nonce or Initialization Vector
      value.  This value can be used either as a counter value for a
      protocol or as an IV for an algorithm.  TODO: Talk about zero
      extending the value in some cases.  [CREF10]

   This table contains a list of all of the generic header parameters
   defined in document.  In the table is the data value type to be used
   for CBOR as well as the integer value that can be used as a
   replacement for the name in order to further decrease the size of the
   sent item.






















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   +----------+-------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | name     | label | value    | registry    | description           |
   +----------+-------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | alg      | 1     | int /    | COSE        | Integers are taken    |
   |          |       | tstr     | Algorithm   | from table --POINT TO |
   |          |       |          | Registry    | REGISTRY--            |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | crit     | 2     | [+       | COSE Header | integer values are    |
   |          |       | label]   | Label       | from  -- POINT TO     |
   |          |       |          | Registry    | REGISTRY --           |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | cty      | 3     | tstr /   | media-types | Value is either a     |
   |          |       | int      | registry    | media-type or an      |
   |          |       |          |             | integer from the      |
   |          |       |          |             | media-type registry   |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | jku      | *     | tstr     |             | URL to COSE key       |
   |          |       |          |             | object                |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | jwk      | *     | COSE_Key |             | contains a COSE key   |
   |          |       |          |             | not a JWK key         |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | kid      | 4     | bstr     |             | key identifier        |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | nonce    | 5     | bstr     |             | Nonce or              |
   |          |       |          |             | Initialization Vector |
   |          |       |          |             | (IV)                  |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | x5c      | *     | bstr*    |             | X.509 Certificate     |
   |          |       |          |             | Chain                 |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | x5t      | *     | bstr     |             | SHA-1 thumbprint of   |
   |          |       |          |             | key                   |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | x5t#S256 | *     | bstr     |             | SHA-256 thumbprint of |
   |          |       |          |             | key                   |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | x5u      | *     | tstr     |             | URL for X.509         |
   |          |       |          |             | certificate           |
   |          |       |          |             |                       |
   | zip      | *     | int /    |             | Integers are taken    |
   |          |       | tstr     |             | from the table        |
   |          |       |          |             | --POINT TO REGISTRY-- |
   +----------+-------+----------+-------------+-----------------------+

                          Table 2: Header Labels

   OPEN ISSUES:



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   1.  Which of the following items do we want to have standardized in
       this document: jku, jwk, x5c, x5t, x5t#S256, x5u, zip

   2.  I am currently torn on the question "Should epk and iv/nonce be
       algorithm specific or generic headers?"  They are really specific
       to an algorithm and can potentially be defined in different ways
       for different algorithms.  As an example, it would make sense to
       defined nonce for CCM and GCM modes that can have the leading
       zero bytes stripped, while for other algorithms this might be
       undesirable.

   3.  We might want to define some additional items.  What are they?  A
       possible example would be a sequence number as this might be
       common.  On the other hand, this is the type of things that is
       frequently used as the nonce in some places and thus should not
       be used in the same way.  Other items might be challenge/response
       fields for freshness as these are likely to be common.

4.  Signing Structure

   The signature structure allows for one or more signatures to be
   applied to a message payload.  There are provisions for attributes
   about the content and attributes about the signature to be carried
   along with the signature itself.  These attributes may be
   authenticated by the signature, or just present.  Examples of
   attributes about the content would be the type of content, when the
   content was created, and who created the content.  Examples of
   attributes about the signature would be the algorithm and key used to
   create the signature, when the signature was created, and counter-
   signatures.

   When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of
   one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a
   successful signature by that signer.  However, there are some
   application environments where other rules are needed.  An
   application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for
   each signer must specify those rules.  Also, where simple matching of
   the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the
   signatures were generated by the same signer, the application
   specification must describe how to determine which signatures were
   generated by the same signer.  Support of different communities of
   recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more
   than one signature.  For example, the COSE_Sign structure might
   include signatures generated with the RSA signature algorithm and
   with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature
   algorithm.  This allows recipients to verify the signature associated
   with one algorithm or the other.  (The original source of this text




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   is [RFC5652].)  More detailed information on multiple signature
   evaluation can be found in [RFC5752].

   The CDDL grammar for a signature message is:

   COSE_Sign = {
       msg_type => msg_type_signed,
       Headers,
       ? payload => bstr,
       signatures => [+ COSE_signature]
   }

   The fields is the structure have the following semantics:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the signed security service.
      The value MUST be msg_type_signed (1).

   protected  contains attributes about the payload that are to be
      protected by the signature.  An example of such an attribute would
      be the content type ('cty') attribute.  The content is a CBOR map
      of attributes that is encoded to a byte stream.  This field MUST
      NOT contain attributes about the signature, even if those
      attributes are common across multiple signatures.  The labels in
      this map are typically taken from Table 2.  [CREF11]

   unprotected  contains attributes about the payload that are not
      protected by the signature.  An example of such an attribute would
      be the content type ('cty') attribute.  This field MUST NOT
      contain attributes about a signature, even if the attributes are
      common across multiple signatures.  The labels in this map are
      typically taken from Table 2.  [CREF12]

   payload  contains the serialized content to be signed.  If the
      payload is not present in the message, the application is required
      to supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a
      bstr to ensure that it is transported without changes.  If the
      payload is transported separately, it is the responsibility of the
      application to ensure that it will be transported without changes.

   signatures  is an array of signature items.  Each of these items uses
      the COSE_signature structure for its representation.

   We use the values in Table 1 as the labels in the COSE_Sign map.
   While other labels can be present in the map, it is not generally a
   recommended practice.  The other labels can be either of integer or
   string type, use of other types SHOULD be treated as an error.

   The CDDL grammar structure for a signature is:



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   COSE_signature =  {
       Headers,
       signature => bstr
   }

   The fields in the structure have the following semantics:

   protected  contains additional information to be authenticated by the
      signature.  The field holds data about the signature operation.
      The field MUST NOT hold attributes about the payload being signed.
      The content is a CBOR map of attributes that is encoded to a byte
      stream.  At least one of protected and unprotected MUST be
      present.

   unprotected  contains attributes about the signature that are not
      protected by the signature.  This field MUST NOT contain
      attributes about the payload being signed.  At least one of
      protected and unprotected MUST be present.

   signature  contains the computed signature value.

   The COSE structure used to create the byte stream to be signed uses
   the following CDDL grammar structure:

   Sig_structure = [
       body_protected: bstr,
       sign_protected: bstr,
       payload: bstr
   ]

   How to compute a signature:

   1.  Create a Sig_structure object and populate it with the
       appropriate fields.  For body_protected and sign_protected, if
       the fields are not present in their corresponding maps, an bstr
       of length zero is used.

   2.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string.

   3.  Call the signature creation algorithm passing in K (the key to
       sign with), alg (the algorithm to sign with) and ToBeSigned (the
       value to sign).

   4.  Place the resulting signature value in the 'signature' field of
       the map.

   How to verify a signature:



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   1.  Create a Sig_structure object and populate it with the
       appropriate fields.  For body_protected and sign_protected, if
       the fields are not present in their corresponding maps, an bstr
       of length zero is used.

   2.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string.

   3.  Call the signature verification algorithm passing in K (the key
       to verify with), alg (the algorithm to sign with), ToBeSigned
       (the value to sign), and sig (the signature to be verified).

   In addition to performing the signature verification, one must also
   perform the appropriate checks to ensure that the key is correctly
   paired with the signing identity and that the appropriate
   authorization is done.

5.  Encryption object

   In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when
   doing an encryption in COSE.  In COSE, we use the same techniques and
   structures for encrypting both the plain text and the keys used to
   protect the text.  This is different from the approach used by both
   [RFC5652] and [RFC7516] where different structures are used for the
   plain text and for the different key management techniques.

   One of the byproducts of using the same technique for encrypting and
   encoding both the content and the keys using the various key
   management techniques, is a requirement that all of the key
   management techniques use an Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithm.
   (For the purpose of this document we use a slightly loose definition
   of AE algorithms.)  When encrypting the plain text, it is normal to
   use an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD)
   algorithm.  For key management, either AE or AEAD algorithms can be
   used.  See Appendix A for more details about the different types of
   algorithms.  [CREF13]

   The CDDL grammar structure for encryption is:













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   COSE_encrypt = {
       msg_type=>msg_type_encrypted,
       COSE_encrypt_fields
   }

   COSE_encrypt_fields = (
       Headers,
       ? ciphertext => bstr,
       ? recipients => [+{COSE_encrypt_fields}]
   )

   Description of the fields:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the encrypted security
      service.  The value MUST be msg_type_encrypted (2).

   protected  contains the information about the plain text or
      encryption process that is to be integrity protected.  The field
      is encoded in CBOR as a 'bstr'.  The contents of the protected
      field is a CBOR map of the protected data names and values.  The
      map is CBOR encoded before placing it into the bstr.  Only values
      associated with the current cipher text are to be placed in this
      location even if the value would apply to multiple recipient
      structures.

   unprotected  contains information about the plain text that is not
      integrity protected.  Only values associated with the current
      cipher text are to be placed in this location even if the value
      would apply to multiple recipient structures.

   ciphertext  contains the encrypted plain text.  If the ciphertext is
      to be transported independently of the control information about
      the encryption process (i.e. detached content) then the field is
      omitted.

   recipients  contains the recipient information.  It is required that
      at least one recipient MUST be present for the content encryption
      layer.

5.1.  Key Management Methods

   A typical encrypted message consists of an encrypted content and an
   encrypted CEK for one or more recipients.  The content-encryption key
   is encrypted for each recipient.  The details of this encryption
   depends on the key management technique used, but the six generally
   techniques are:





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   none:  The CEK is the same as as the identified previously
      distributed symmetric key.

   symmetric key-encryption keys:  The CEK is encrypted using a
      previously distributed symmetric key-encryption key.

   key agreement:  the recipient's public key and a sender's private key
      are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then the CEK is
      either the derived key or encrypted by the derived key.

   key transport:  the CEK is encrypted in the recipient's public key

   passwords:  the CEK is encrypted in a key-encryption key that is
      derived from a password or other shared secret value.

   Section 12 provides details on a number of different key management
   algorithms and discusses which elements need to be present for each
   of the key management techniques.

5.2.  Encryption Algorithm for AEAD algorithms

   The encryption algorithm for AEAD algorithms is fairly simple.  In
   order to get a consistent encoding of the data to be authenticated,
   the Enc_structure is used to have canonical form of the AAD.

   Enc_structure = [
       protected: bstr,
       external_aad: bstr
   ]


   1.  Copy the protected header field from the message to be sent.

   2.  If the application has supplied external additional authenticated
       data to be included in the computation, then it is placed in the
       'external_aad' field.  If no data was supplied, then a zero
       length binary value is used.

   3.  Encode the Enc_structure using a CBOR Canonical encoding
       Section 14 to get the AAD value.

   4.  Determine the encryption key.  This step is dependent on the key
       management method being used: For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current level.





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       Direct and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is determined by the
          key and algorithm in the recipient structure.  The encryption
          algorithm and size of the key to be used are inputs into the
          KDF used for the recipient.  (For direct, the KDF can be
          thought of as the identity operation.)

       Other:  The key is randomly generated.

   5.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key to use),
       P (the plain text) and AAD (the additional authenticated data).
       Place the returned cipher text into the 'ciphertext' field of the
       structure.

   6.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient using the encryption key as the
       plain text.

5.3.  Encryption algorithm for AE algorithms

   1.  Verify that the 'protected' field is absent.

   2.  Verify that there was no external additional authenticated data
       supplied for this operation.

   3.  Determine the encryption key.  This step is dependent on the key
       management method being used: For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current level.

       Direct and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is determined by the
          key and algorithm in the recipient structure.  The encryption
          algorithm and size of the key to be used are inputs into the
          KDF used for the recipient.  (For direct, the KDF can be
          thought of as the identity operation.)

       Other:  The key is randomly generated.

   4.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key to use)
       and the P (the plain text).  Place the returned cipher text into
       the 'ciphertext' field of the structure.

   5.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient using the encryption key as the
       plain text.






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6.  MAC objects

   In this section we describe the structure and methods to be used when
   doing MAC authentication in COSE.  JOSE used a variant of the
   signature structure for doing MAC operations and it is restricted to
   using a single pre-shared secret to do the authentication.  [CREF14]
   This document allows for the use of all of the same methods of key
   management as are allowed for encryption.

   When using MAC operations, there are two modes in which it can be
   used.  The first is just a check that the content has not been
   changed since the MAC was computed.  Any of the key management
   methods can be used for this purpose.  The second mode is to both
   check that the content has not been changed since the MAC was
   computed, and to use key management to verify who sent it.  The key
   management modes that support this are ones that either use a pre-
   shared secret, or do static-static key agreement.  In both of these
   cases the entity MACing the message can be validated by a key
   binding.  (The binding of identity assumes that there are only two
   parties involved and you did not send the message yourself.)

   COSE_mac = {
      msg_type=>msg_type_mac,
      Headers,
      ? payload => bstr,
      tag => bstr,
      recipients => [+{COSE_encrypt_fields}]
   }


   Field descriptions:

   msg_type  identifies this as providing the encrypted security
      service.  The value MUST be msg_type_mac (3).

   protected  contains attributes about the payload that are to be
      protected by the MAC.  An example of such an attribute would be
      the content type ('cty') attribute.  The content is a CBOR map of
      attributes that is encoded to a byte stream.  This field MUST NOT
      contain attributes about the recipient, even if those attributes
      are common across multiple recipients.  At least one of protected
      and unprotected MUST be present.

   unprotected  contains attributes about the payload that are not
      protected by the MAC.  An example of such an attribute would be
      the content type ('cty') attribute.  This field MUST NOT contain
      attributes about a recipient, even if the attributes are common




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      across multiple recipients.  At least one of protected and
      unprotected MUST be present.

   payload  contains the serialized content to be MACed.  If the payload
      is not present in the message, the application is required to
      supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a bstr
      to ensure that it is transported without changes, if the payload
      is transported separately it is the responsibility of the
      application to ensure that it will be transported without changes.

   tag  contains the MAC value.

   recipients  contains the recipient information.  See the description
      under COSE_Encryption for more info.

    MAC_structure = [
        protected: bstr,
        external_aad: bstr,
        payload: bstr
   ]

   How to compute a MAC:

   1.  Create a MAC_structure and copy the protected and payload
       elements from the COSE_mac structure.

   2.  If the application has supplied external authenticated data,
       encode it as a binary value and place in the MAC_structure.  If
       there is no external authenticated data, then use a zero length
       'bstr'.

   3.  Encode the MAC_structure using a canonical CBOR encoder.  The
       resulting bytes is the value to compute the MAC on.

   4.  Compute the MAC and place the result in the 'tag' field of the
       COSE_mac structure.

   5.  Encrypt and encode the MAC key for each recipient of the message.

7.  Key Structure

   There are only a few changes between JOSE and COSE for how keys are
   formatted.  As with JOSE, COSE uses a map to contain the elements of
   a key.  Those values, which in JOSE are base64url encoded because
   they are binary values, are encoded as bstr values in COSE.

   For COSE we use the same set of fields that were defined in
   [RFC7517].  [CREF15] [CREF16]



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   COSE_Key = {
       kty => tstr / int,
       ? key_ops => [+ tstr / int ],
       ? alg => tstr / int,
       ? kid => bstr,
       * label => values
   }

   COSE_KeySet = [+COSE_Key]

   The element "kty" is a required element in a COSE_Key map.  All other
   elements are optional and not all of the elements listed in [RFC7517]
   or [RFC7518] have been listed here even though they can all appear in
   a COSE_Key map.

7.1.  COSE Key Map Labels

   This document defines a set of common map elements for a COSE Key
   object.  Table 3 provides a summary of the elements defined in this
   section.  There are also a set of map elements that are defined for a
   specific key type.  Key specific elements can be found in Section 13.






























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   +----------+-------+-------------+------------+---------------------+
   | name     | label | CBOR type   | registry   | description         |
   +----------+-------+-------------+------------+---------------------+
   | kty      | 1     | tstr / int  | COSE       | Identification of   |
   |          |       |             | General    | the key type        |
   |          |       |             | Values     |                     |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | key_ops  | 4     | [*          |            | Restrict set of     |
   |          |       | (tstr/int)] |            | permissible         |
   |          |       |             |            | operations          |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | alg      | 3     | tstr / int  | COSE       | Key usage           |
   |          |       |             | Algorithm  | restriction to this |
   |          |       |             | Values     | algorithm           |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | kid      | 2     | bstr        |            | Key Identification  |
   |          |       |             |            | value - match to    |
   |          |       |             |            | kid in message      |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | x5u      | *     | tstr        |            |                     |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | x5c      | *     | bstr*       |            |                     |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | x5t      | *     | bstr        |            |                     |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | x5t#S256 | *     | bstr        |            |                     |
   |          |       |             |            |                     |
   | use      | *     | tstr        |            | deprecated - don't  |
   |          |       |             |            | use                 |
   +----------+-------+-------------+------------+---------------------+

                          Table 3: Key Map Labels

   kty:  This field is used to identify the family of keys for this
      structure, and thus the set of fields to be found.  The set of
      values can be found in Table 19.

   alg:  This field is used to restrict the algorithms that are to be
      used with this key.  If this field is present in the key
      structure, the application MUST verify that this algorithm matches
      the algorithm for which the key is being used.  If the algorthms
      do not match, then this key object MUST NOT be used to perform the
      cryptographic operation.  Note that the same key can be in a
      different key structure with a different or no algorithm
      specified, however this is considered to be a poor security
      practice.





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   kid:  This field is used to give an identifier for a key.  The
      identifier is not structured and can be anything from a user
      provided string to a value computed on the public portion of the
      key.  This field is intended for matching against a 'kid' field in
      a message in order to filter down the set of keys that need to be
      checked.

   key_ops:  This field is defined to restrict the set of operations
      that a key is to be used for.  The value of the field is an array
      of values from Table 4.

   Only the 'kty' field MUST be present in a key object.  All other
   members may be omitted if their behavior is not needed.

   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | name    | value | description                                     |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | sign    | 1     | The key is used to create signatures.  Requires |
   |         |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | verify  | 2     | The key is used for verification of signatures. |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | encrypt | 3     | The key is used for key transport encryption.   |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | decrypt | 4     | The key is used for key transport decryption.   |
   |         |       | Requires private key fields.                    |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | wrap    | 5     | The key is used for key wrapping.               |
   | key     |       |                                                 |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | unwrap  | 6     | The key is used for key unwrapping.  Requires   |
   | key     |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | key     | 7     | The key is used for key agreement.              |
   | agree   |       |                                                 |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+

                       Table 4: Key Operation Values

   The following provides a CDDL fragment which duplicates the
   assignment labels from Table 3 and Table 4.










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   ;key_labels
   key_kty=1
   key_kid=2
   key_alg=3
   key_ops=4

   ;key_ops values
   key_ops_sign=1
   key_ops_verify=2
   key_ops_encrypt=3
   key_ops_decrypt=4
   key_ops_wrap=5
   key_ops_unwrap=6
   key_ops_agree=7

8.  Signature Algorithms

   There are two basic signature algorithm structures that can be used.
   The first is the common signature with appendix.  In this structure,
   the message content is processed and a signature is produced, the
   signature is called the appendix.  This is the message structure used
   by our common algorithms such as ECDSA and RSASSA-PSS.  (In fact two
   of the letters in RSASSA-PSS are signature appendix.)  The basic
   structure becomes:


                    signature = Sign(message content, key)

   valid = Verification(message content, key, signature)


   The second is a signature with message recovery.  (An example of such
   an algorithm is [TBD].)  In this structure, the message content is
   processed, but part of is included in the siguature.  Moving bytes of
   the message content into the signature allows for an effectively
   smaller signature, the signature size is still potentially large, but
   the message content is shrunk.  This has implications for systems
   implementing these algoritms and for applications that use them.  The
   first is that the message content is not fully available until after
   a signature has been validated.  Until that point the part of the
   message contained inside of the signature is unrecoverable.  The
   second is that the security analysis of the strength of the signature
   is very much based on the structure of the message content.  Messages
   which are highly predictable require additional randomness to be
   supplied as part of the signature process, in the worst case it
   because the same as doing a singature with appendix.  Thirdly, in the
   event that multple signatures are applied to a message, all of the




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   signature algorithms are going to be required to consume the same
   number of bytes of message content.


   signature, message sent = Sign(message content, key)

   valid, message content = Verification(message sent, key, signature)


   At this time, only signatures with appendixes are defined for use
   with COSE, however considerable interest has been expressed in using
   a signature with message recovery algorithm due to the effective size
   reduction that is possible.  Implementations will need to keep this
   in mind for later possible integration.

8.1.  ECDSA

   ECDSA [DSS] defines a signature algorithm using ECC.

   The security strength of the signature is no greater than the minimum
   of the security strength associated with the bit length of the key
   and the security strength of the hash function.  When a hash function
   is used that has greater security than is provided by the length of
   the key, the signature algorithm uses the leftmost keyLength bits of
   the hash function output.

              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | name  | value | hash    | description      |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | ES256 | -7    | SHA-256 | ECDSA w/ SHA-256 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES384 | -8    | SHA-384 | ECDSA w/ SHA-384 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES512 | -9    | SHA-512 | ECDSA w/ SHA-512 |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+

                      Table 5: ECDSA Algorithm Values

   In order to promote interoperability, it is suggested that SHA-256 be
   used only with keys of length 256, SHA-384 be used only with keys of
   length 384 and SHA-512 be used only with keys of length 521.  This is
   aligned with the recommendation in Section 4 of [RFC5480].

   The signature algorithm results in a pair of integers (R, S).  These
   integers will be of the same order as length of the key used for the
   signature process.  The signature is encoded by converting the
   integers into byte strings of the same length as the key size.  The
   length is rounded up to the nearest byte and is left padded with zero



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   bits to get to the correct length.  The two integers are then
   concatenated together to form a byte string that is the resulting
   signature.

   Using the function defined in [RFC3447] the signature is:
   Signature = I2OSP(R, n) | I2OSP(S, n)
   where n = ceiling(key_length / 8)

8.1.1.  Security Considerations

   On of the issues that needs to be discussed is substitution attacks.
   There are two different things that can potentially be substituted in
   this algorithm.  Both of these attacks are current theoretical only.

   The first substitution attack is changing the curve used to validate
   the signature, the only requirement is that the order of the key
   match the length of R and S.  It is theoretically possible to use a
   different curve and get a different result.  We current do not have
   any way to deal with this version of the attack except to restrict
   the overall set of curves that can be used.

   The second substitution attack is to change the hash function that is
   used to verify the signature.  This attack can be mitigated by
   including the signature algorithm identifier in the data to be
   signed.

8.2.  RSASSA-PSS

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in [RFC3447].

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is parametized with a hash
   function, a mask generation function and a salt length (sLen).  For
   this specification, the mask generation function is fixed to be MGF1
   as defined in [RFC3447].  It has been recommended that the same hash
   function be used for hashing the data as well as in the mask
   generation function, for this specification we following this
   recommendation.  The salt length is the same length as the hash
   function output.

   Three algorithms are defined in this document.  These algorithms are:

   PS256:  This uses the hash algorithm SHA-256 for signature
      processing.  The value used for this algorithm is -10.  The key
      type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'.

   PS384:  This uses the hash algorithm SHA-384 for signature
      processing.  The value used for this algorithm is "PS384".  The
      key type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'.



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   PS512:  This uses the hash algorithm SHA-512 for signature
      processing.  The value used for this algorithm is -11.  The key
      type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'.

   There are no algorithm parameters defined for these signature
   algorithms.  A summary of the algorithm definitions can be found in
   Table 6.

     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
     | name  | value | hash    | salt length | description           |
     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+
     | PS256 | -10   | SHA-256 | 32          | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-256 |
     |       |       |         |             |                       |
     | PS384 | *     | SHA-384 | 48          | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-384 |
     |       |       |         |             |                       |
     | PS512 | -11   | SHA-512 | 64          | RSASSA-PSS w/ SHA-512 |
     +-------+-------+---------+-------------+-----------------------+

                       Table 6: RSA Algorithm Values

8.2.1.  Security Considerations

   Key size.  is there a MUST for 2048? or do we need to specify a
   minimum here?

9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms

   Message Authentication Codes (MACs) provide data authentication and
   integrity protection.  They provide either no or very limited data
   origination.  (One cannot, for example, be used to prove the identity
   of the sender to a third party.)

   MAC algorithms can be based on either a block cipher algorithm (i.e.
   AES-MAC) or a hash algorithm (i.e.  HMAC).  This document defines a
   MAC algorithm for each of these two constructions.

9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)

   The Hash-base Message Authentication Code algorithm (HMAC)
   [RFC2104][RFC4231] was designed, in part, to deal with the birthday
   attacks on straight hash functions.  The algorithm was also designed
   to all for new hash algorithms to be directly plugged in without
   changes to the hash function.  The HMAC design process has been
   vindicated as, while the security of hash algorithms such as MD5 has
   decreased over time, the security of HMAC combined with MD5 has not
   yet been shown to be compromised [RFC6151].





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   For use in constrained environments, we define a set of HMAC
   algorithms that are truncated.  There are currently no known issues
   when truncating, however the security strength of the message tag is
   correspondingly reduced in strength.  When truncating, the left most
   tag length bits are kept and transmitted.

   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | name      | value | Hash    | Length | description                |
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+
   | HMAC      | *     | SHA-256 | 64     | HMAC w/ SHA-256 truncated  |
   | 256/64    |       |         |        | to 8 bytes                 |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 4     | SHA-256 | 256    | HMAC w/ SHA-256            |
   | 256/256   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 5     | SHA-384 | 384    | HMAC w/ SHA-384            |
   | 384/384   |       |         |        |                            |
   |           |       |         |        |                            |
   | HMAC      | 6     | SHA-512 | 512    | HMAC w/ SHA-512            |
   | 512/512   |       |         |        |                            |
   +-----------+-------+---------+--------+----------------------------+

                      Table 7: HMAC Algorithm Values

9.1.1.  Security Considerations

   TBD.

9.2.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-MAC)

   There are a set of different algorithms that we can specify here.
   Which should it be?

      AES-MAC - Use standard CBC mode

      AES-CMAC - RFC 4493 - has improved security over AES-CBC.  The
      padding is different from CBC mode and requires one extra AES
      block encryption step plus and xor operation.

10.  Content Encryption Algorithms

10.1.  AES GCM









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             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+
             | name    | value | description                 |
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+
             | A128GCM | 1     | AES-GCM mode w/ 128-bit key |
             |         |       |                             |
             | A192GCM | 2     | AES-GCM mode w/ 192-bit key |
             |         |       |                             |
             | A256GCM | 3     | AES-GCM mode w/ 256-bit key |
             +---------+-------+-----------------------------+

                   Table 8: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

10.2.  AES CCM

   Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) is a generic authentication encryption
   block cipher mode defined in [RFC3610].  The CCM mode is combined
   with the AES block encryption algorithm to define a commonly used
   content encryption algorithm used in constrainted devices.

   The CCM mode has two parameter choices.  The first choice is M, the
   size of the authentication field.  The choice of the value for M
   involves a trade-off between message expansion and the probably that
   an attacker can undetecably modify a message.  The second choice is
   L, the size of the length field.  This value requires a trade-off
   between the maximum message size and the size of the Nonce.

   It is unfortunate that the specification for CCM specified L and M as
   a count of bytes rather than a count of bits.  This leads to possible
   misunderstandings where AES-CCM-8 is frequently used to refer to a
   version of CCM mode where the size of the authentication is 64-bits
   and not 8-bits.  These values have traditionally been specified as
   bit counts rather than byte counts.  This document will follow the
   tradition of using bit counts so that it is easier to compare the
   different algorithms presented in this document.

   We define a matrix of algorithms in this document over the values of
   L and M.  Constrained devices are usually operating in situations
   where they use short messages and want to avoid doing key management
   operations.  This favors smaller values of M and larger values of L.
   Less constrained devices do will want to be able to user larger
   messages and are more willing to generate new keys for every
   operation.  This favors larger values of M and smaller values of L.
   (The use of a large nonce means that random generation of both the
   key and the nonce will decrease the chances of repeating the pair on
   two different messages.)

   The following values are used for L:




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   16-bits (2)  limits messages to 2^16 bytes in length.  The nonce
      length is 13 bytes allowing for 2^(13*8) possible values of the
      nonce without repeating.

   64-bits (8)  limits messages to 2^64 byes in length.  The nonce
      length is 7 bytes allowing for 2^56 possible values of the nonce
      without repeating.

   The following values are used for M:

   64-bits (8)  produces a 64-bit authentication tag.  This implies that
      there is a 1 in 2^64 chance that an modified message will
      authenticate.

   128-bits (16)  produces a 128-bit authentication tag.  This implies
      that there is a 1 in 2^128 chance that an modified message will
      authenticate.

   +--------------------+--------+----+-----+-----+--------------------+
   | name               | value  | L  | M   | k   | description        |
   +--------------------+--------+----+-----+-----+--------------------+
   | AES-CCM-16-64-128  | A281C  | 16 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag,        |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-16-64-192  | A282C  | 16 | 64  | 192 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 192-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag,        |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-16-64-256  | A283C  | 16 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 256-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag,        |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-128  | A881C  | 64 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | nonce              |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-192  | A882C  | 64 | 64  | 192 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 192-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | nonce              |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-256  | A883C  | 64 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 256-bit key,       |



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   |                    |        |    |     |     | 64-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | nonce              |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-128 | A2161C | 16 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-192 | A2162C | 16 | 128 | 192 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 192-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-256 | A2163C | 16 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 256-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce      |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-128 | A8161C | 64 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 7-byte nonce       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-192 | A8162C | 64 | 128 | 192 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 192-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 7-byte nonce       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     |                    |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-256 | A8163C | 64 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 256-bit key,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,       |
   |                    |        |    |     |     | 7-byte nonce       |
   +--------------------+--------+----+-----+-----+--------------------+

                   Table 9: Algorithm Values for AES-CCM

   M00TODO: Make a determination of which ones get 1-, 2- or 3-byte
   identifiers.  I.e. which ones are going to be popular.

10.2.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-CCM the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.

   o  The total number of times the AES block cipher is used MUST NOT
      exceed 2^61 operations.  This limitation is the sum of times the
      block cipher is used in computing the MAC value and in performing



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      stream encryption operations.  An explicit check is required only
      in environments where it is expected that it might be exceeded.

   [RFC3610] additionally calls out one other consideration of note.  It
   is possible to do a pre-computation attack against the algorithm in
   cases where the portions encryption content is highly predictable.
   This reduces the security of the key size by half.  Ways to deal with
   this attack include adding a random portion to the nonce value and/or
   increasing the key size used.  Using a portion of the nonce for a
   random value will decrease the number of messages that a single key
   can be used for.  Increasing the key size may require more resources
   in the constrained device.  See sections 5 and 10 of [RFC3610] for
   more information.

11.  Key Derivation Functions (KDF)

11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)

   See [RFC5869].

   Inputs:

      secret - a shared value that is secret.  Secrets may be either
      previously shared or derived from operations like a DH key
      agreement.

      salt - an optional public value that is used to change the
      generation process.  If specified, the salt is carried using the
      'salt' algorithm parameter.  While [RFC5869] suggests that the
      length of the salt be the same as the length of the underlying
      hash value, any amount of salt will improve the security as
      different key values will be generated.  The 'salt' parameter is
      encoded as a binary string.  This parameter is protected by being
      included in the key computation and does not need to be separately
      authenticated.

      length - the number of bytes of output that need to be generated.

      context information

      hash function - The underlying hash function to be used in the
      HKDF algorithm.  The hash function is encoded into the HKDF
      algorithm selection.








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                     +----------+---------+---------+
                     | name     | hash    | context |
                     +----------+---------+---------+
                     | HKDF-256 | SHA-256 | XXX     |
                     |          |         |         |
                     | HKDF-512 | SHA-512 | XXX     |
                     +----------+---------+---------+

                         Table 10: HKDF algorithms

                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | name | label | type | description |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+
                   | salt | -20   | bstr | Random salt |
                   +------+-------+------+-------------+

                         Table 11: HKDF parameters

11.2.  Context Information Structure

   The context information structure is used to ensure that the derived
   keying material is "bound" to the context of the transaction.  The
   context information structure used here is based on that defined in
   [SP800-56A].  By using CBOR for the encoding of the context
   information structure, we automatically get the same type of type and
   length separation of fields that is obtained by the use of ASN.1.
   This means that there is no need to encode the lengths for the base
   elements as it is done by the CBOR encoding.

   The context information structure refers to PartyU and PartyV as the
   two parties which are doing the key derivation.  Unless the
   application protocol defines differently, we assign PartyU to the
   entity that is creating the message and PartyV to the entity that is
   receiving the message.  This is because we are assuming a set of
   stand alone store and forward messaging processes.

   Application protocols are free to define the roles differently.  For
   example, they could assign the PartyU role to the entity that
   initiates the connection and allow directly sending multiple messages
   over the line without changing the role information.

   We encode the context specific information using a CBOR array type.
   The fields in the array are:

   AlgorithmID  This field indicates the algorithm for which the key
      material will be used.  This field is required to be present and
      is a copy of the algorithm identifier in the message.  The field
      exists in the context information so that if the same environment



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      is used for different algorithms, then completely different keys
      will be generated each of those algorithms.  (This practice means
      if algorithm A uses a shorter key than algorithm B and thus can be
      found easier, the key derived for algorithm B will not contain the
      key for algorithm A as a prefix.)  [CREF17]

   PartyUInfo  This field holds information about party U.  The
      ParytUInfo structure is divided into three pieces:

      identity  This contains the identity information for party U.  The
         identities can be assigned in one of two manners.  Firstly, a
         protocol can assign identities based on roles.  For example,
         the roles of "client" and "server" may be assigned to different
         entities in the protocol.  Each entity would then use the
         correct label for the data they they send or receive.  The
         second way is for a protocol to assign identities is to use a
         name based on a naming system (i.e.  DNS, X.509 names).
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU identity' that can be
         used to carry identity information in the message.  However,
         identity information is often known as part of the protocol and
         can thus be inferred rather than made explicit.  If identity
         information is carried in the message, applications SHOULD have
         a way of validating the supplied identity information.  The
         identity information does not need to be specified and can be
         left as absent.
         The identity value supplied will be validated as part of the
         key derivation process.  If the identity string is wrong, then
         the wrong key will be created.

      nonce  This contains a one time nonce value.  The nonce can either
         be implicit from the protocol or carried as a value in the
         unprotected headers.  [CREF18]
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU nonce' that can be
         used to carry this value in the message However, the nonce
         value could be determined by the application and the value
         determined from elsewhere.
         This item is optional and can be absent.

      other  This contains other information that is defined by the
         protocol.
         This item is optional and can be absent.

   PartyVInfo  M00TODO: Copy down from PartyUInfo when that text is
      ready.

   SuppPubInfo  This field contains public information that is mutually
      known to both parties.




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      keyDataLength  This is set to the number of bits of the desired
         output value.

      other  The field other is for free form data defined by the
         application.  An example is that an application could defined
         two different strings to be placed here to generate different
         keys for a data stream vs a control stream.  This field is
         optional and will only be present if the application defines a
         structure for this information.  Applications that define this
         SHOULD use CBOR to encode the data so that types and lengths
         are correctly include.

   SuppPrivInfo  This field contains private information that is
      mutually known information.  An example of this information would
      be a pre-existing shared secret.  The field is optional and will
      only be present if the application defines a structure for this
      information.  Applications that define this SHOULD use CBOR to
      encode the data so that types and lengths are correctly include.


   COSE_KDF_Context = [
       AlgorithmID : int / tstr,
       PartyUInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr / int,
           ? identity : bstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       PartyVInfo : [
           ? nonce : bstr,
           ? identity : bstr / tstr,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       SuppPubInfo : [
           keyDataLength : uint,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       ? SuppPrivInfo : bstr
   ]













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   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
   | name          | label | type      | description                   |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+
   | PartyU        | -21   | bstr      | Party U identity Information  |
   | identity      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU nonce  | -22   | bstr /    | Party U provided nonce        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyU other  | -23   | bstr      | Party U other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information                   |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV        | -24   | bstr      | Party V identity Information  |
   | identity      |       |           |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV nonce  | -25   | bstr /    | Party V provided nonce        |
   |               |       | int       |                               |
   |               |       |           |                               |
   | PartyV other  | -26   | bstr      | Party V other provided        |
   |               |       |           | information                   |
   +---------------+-------+-----------+-------------------------------+

                  Table 12: Context Algorithm Parameters

12.  Key Management Algorithms

   There are a number of different key management methods that can be
   used in the COSE encryption system.  In this section we will discuss
   each of the key management methods, what fields need to be specified,
   and which algorithms are defined in this document to deal with each
   of them.

   The names of the key management methods used here are the same as are
   defined in [RFC7517].  Other specifications use different terms for
   the key management methods or do not support some of the key
   management methods.

   At the moment we do not have any key management methods that allow
   for the use of protected headers.  This may be changed in the future
   if, for example, the AES-GCM Key wrap method defined in [RFC7518]
   were extended to allow for authenticated data.  In that event, the
   use of the 'protected' field, which is current forbidden below, would
   be permitted.








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12.1.  Direct Encryption

   In direct encryption mode, a shared secret between the sender and the
   recipient is used as the key.  [CREF19] When direct encryption mode
   is used, it MUST be the only mode used on the message.  It is a
   massive security leak to have both direct encryption and a different
   key management mode on the same message.

   For JOSE, direct encryption key management is the only key management
   method allowed for doing MACed messages.  In COSE, all of the key
   management methods can be used for MACed messages.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected', 'ciphertext' and 'recipients' fields MUST be
      absent.

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the shared
      secret.

12.1.1.  Direct Key

   We define two key agreement algorithms that function as direct key
   algorithms.  These algorithms are:

   Direct:  This key management technique is the simplest method, the
      supplied key is directly used as the key for the next layer down
      in the message.  There are no algorithm parameters defined for
      this key management methods.

   Direct KDF:  This key managment takes a common shared secret between
      the two parties and applies the HKDF function (Section 11.1) using
      the context structure defined in Section 11.2 to transform the
      shared secret into the necessary key.  Either the 'salt' parameter
      of HKDF or the partyU 'nonce' parameter of the context structure
      MUST be present.  This parameter can be generated either randomly
      or deterministically, the requirement is that it be a unique value
      for the key pair in question.
      If the salt/nonce value is generated randomly, then it is
      suggested that the length of the random value be the same length
      as the hash function underlying HKDF, i.e 256-bits.  While there
      is no way to guarantee that it will be unique, there is a high
      probability that it will be unique.  If the salt/nonce value is
      generated deterministically, it can be guaranteed to be unique and
      thus there is no length requirement.





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       +------------+-------+--------------+----------------------+
       | name       | value | KDF          | description          |
       +------------+-------+--------------+----------------------+
       | direct     | -6    | N/A          | Direct use of CEK    |
       |            |       |              |                      |
       | direct+KDF | *     | HKDF SHA-256 | Shared secret w/ KDF |
       +------------+-------+--------------+----------------------+

                           Table 13: Direct Key

12.1.1.1.  Security Considerations

   Lifetime, Length, Compromise

12.2.  Key Wrapping

   In key wrapping mode, the CEK is randomly generated and that key is
   then encrypted by a shared secret between the sender and the
   recipient.  All of the currently defined key wrapping algorithms for
   JOSE (and thus for COSE) are AE algorithms.  Key wrapping mode is
   considered to be superior to direct encryption if the system has any
   capability for doing random key generation.  This is because the
   shared key is used to wrap random data rather than data has some
   degree of organization and may in fact be repeating the same content.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent if the key wrap algorithm is
      an AE algorithm.

   o  The 'recipients' field is normally absent, but can be used.
      Applications MUST deal with a recipients field present, not being
      able to decrypt that recipient is an acceptable way of dealing
      with it.  Failing to process the message is not an acceptable way
      of dealing with it.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the shared
      secret.

12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping

   The AES Key Wrapping algorithm is defined in [RFC3394].  This
   algorithm uses an AES key to wrap a value that is a multiple of
   64-bits, as such it can be used to wrap a key for any of the content



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   encryption algorithms defined in this document.  [CREF20] The
   algorithm requires a single fixed parameter, the initial value.  This
   is fixed to the value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of [RFC3394].
   There are no public parameters that vary on a per invocation basis.

        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | name   | value | key size | description                 |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | A128KW | -3    | 128      | AES Key Wrap w/ 128-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A192KW | -4    | 192      | AES Key Wrap w/ 192-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A256KW | -5    | 256      | AES Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+

                  Table 14: AES Key Wrap Algorithm Values

12.2.1.1.  Security Considerations for AES-KW

   There are no specific security considerations for this algorithm.

12.3.  Key Encryption

   Key Encryption mode is also called key transport mode in some
   standards.  Key Encryption mode differs from Key Wrap mode in that it
   uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm rather than a symmetric
   encryption algorithm to protect the key.  The only current Key
   Encryption mode algorithm supported is RSAES-OAEP.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the
      asymmetric key.

12.3.1.  RSA OAEP










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               +----------+-------+-----------------------+
               | name     | value | description           |
               +----------+-------+-----------------------+
               | RSA-OAEP | -2    | RSAES OAEP w/ SHA-256 |
               +----------+-------+-----------------------+

                    Table 15: RSA OAEP Algorithm Values

12.3.1.1.  Security Considerations for RSA OAEP

   A key size of 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
   This key size corresponds roughly to the same strength as provided by
   a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm.

   It is highly recommended that checks on the key length be done before
   starting a decryption operation.  One potential denial of service
   operation is to provide encrypted objects using either abnormally
   long or oddly sized RSA modulus values.  Implementations SHOULD be
   able to encrypt and decrypt with modulus between 2048 and 16K bits in
   length.[CREF21] Applications can impose additional restrictions on
   the length of the modulus.

12.4.  Direct Key Agreement

   When using the 'Direct Key Agreement' key managment method, the two
   parties use a key agreement method to create a shared secret.  A KDF
   is then applied to the shared secret to derive a key to be used in
   protecting the data.  This key is normally used as a CEK or MAC key,
   but could be used for other purposes if more than two layers are in
   use (see Appendix B).

   The most commonly used key agreement algorithm used is Diffie-
   Hellman, but other variants exist.  Since COSE is designed for a
   store and forward environment rather than an on-line environment,
   many of the DH variants cannot be used as the receiver of the message
   cannot provide any key material.  One side-effect of this is that
   perfect forward security is not achievable, a static key will always
   be used for the receiver of the COSE message.

   Two variants of DH that are easily supported are:

      Ephemeral-Static DH: where the sender of the message creates a one
      time DH key and uses a static key for the recipient.  The use of
      the ephemeral sender key means that no additional random input is
      needed as this is randomly generated for each message.

      Static-Static DH: where a static key is used for both the sender
      and the recipient.  The use of static keys allows for recipient to



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      get a weak version of data origination for the message.  When
      static-static key agreement is used, then some piece of unique
      data is require to ensure that a different key is created for each
      message

   In this specification, both variants are specified.  This has been
   done to provide the weak data origination option for use with MAC
   operations.

   When direct key agreement mode is used, it MUST be the only key
   management mode used on the message and there MUST be only one
   recipient.  This method creates the key directly and that makes it
   difficult to mix with additional recipients.  If multiple recipients
   are needed, then the version with key wrap (Section 12.5.1) needs to
   be used.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent.

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the
      recipient's asymmetric key.

   o  The 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'epk' parameter.

12.4.1.  ECDH

   NOTE: Curves 25519 and Goldilocks are elements at risk.

   We define one set of key agreement algorithms structured around
   Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman problem.  [CREF22] We define both an
   ephemeral-static and a static-static version of these algorithms.  We
   allow for multiple curves to be used, it needs to be noted that the
   math required for the curves as well as the point representation is
   going to be different.  [CREF23]

   We setup to use two different curve structures for the ECDH
   algorithms.

      Weierstrass Curves: These are the ones one is used to seeing from
      NIST.  We define three NIST curves for use with this document.
      These curves are P-256, P-384 and P-512.  (The mathematics can be
      found in [RFC6090].)  For these curves, the key type 'EC2' is used
      (Section 13.1.2).






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      Montgomery Curves: These curves are Curve25519 and Goldilocks.
      (The mathematics can be found in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves].)  For
      these curves, the key type 'EC1' is used (Section 13.1.1).

   As shown in Table 16 we define two ECDH algorithm identifiers for EC
   direct key agreement.  These identifiers are:

   ECDH-ES:  This algorithm does a key agreement operation using a
      static key for the recipient and an ephemeral key for the sender.
      The ephemeral key MUST be generated fresh for every message.  The
      HKDF function (Section 11.1) is used with the context structure in
      Section 11.2 to transform the key agreement secret into the
      necessary key.  Since the ephemeral key is generated freshly, the
      'salt' parameter of HKDF is not needed and can be absent.
      One new algorithm parameter is defined for use with this
      algorithm.  This parameter is:

      ephemeral key:  This parameter is used to hold and transport the
         ephemeral key generated by the sender of the message.  This
         parameter has a label of -1 and a type of COSE_Key.  This
         parameter can be placed in the unprotected bucket, if it is
         changed then the correct key will not be able to be generated.

      The parameter is summarized in Table 17.

   ECDH-SS:  This algorithm does a key agreement operation using two
      static keys, one for the recipient and one for the sender.  The
      HKDF function (Section 11.1) is used with the context structure in
      Section 11.2 to transform the key agreement secret into the
      necessary key.  Either the 'salt' parameter of HKDF or the partyU
      'nonce' parameter of the context structure MUST be present.  This
      parameter can be generated either randomly or deterministically,
      the requirement is that it be a unique value for the key pair in
      question.
      If the salt/nonce value is generated randomly, then it is
      suggested that the length of the random value be the same length
      as the hash function underlying HKDF, i.e 256-bits.  While there
      is no way to guarantee that it will be unique, there is a high
      probability that it will be unique.  If the salt/nonce value is
      generated deterministically, it can be guaranteed to be unique and
      thus there is no length requirement.
      Two new algorithm parameters are defined for use with this
      algorithm.  These parameters are:

      static key:  This parameter is used to hold and transport the
         static key used by the sender of the message.  This parameter
         has the label of -2 and a type of COSE_Key.  The parameter can
         be placed in the unprotected bucket, if it is changed then the



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         correct key will not be able to be generated.  If the data
         origination service is desired, then the message recipient
         needs to validate that the key in this field is associated with
         the sender.

      static key identifier:  This parameter is used to hold a reference
         to the static key used by the sender of the message.  The value
         is expected to match the 'kid' member of a COSE_Key structure
         published by the sender.  The value in this field cannot be
         assumed to uniquely identify a single key, multiple keys may
         need to be found and tested.  Not all of the keys identified by
         a kid value may be associated with the sender of the message.
         If the data origination service is desired, then the message
         recipient needs to validate that the key in this field is
         associated with the sender.

      These parameters are summarized in Table 17.

   +---------+---------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | name    | value   | KDF          | description                    |
   +---------+---------+--------------+--------------------------------+
   | ECDH-ES | ECDH-ES | HKDF -       | ECDH ES w/ HKDF - generate key |
   |         |         | SHA-256      | directly                       |
   |         |         |              |                                |
   | ECDH-SS | ECDH-SS | HKDF -       | ECDH SS w/ HKDF - generate key |
   |         |         | SHA-256      | directly                       |
   +---------+---------+--------------+--------------------------------+

                      Table 16: ECDH Algorithm Values

   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | name      | label | type     | algorithm | description            |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+
   | ephemeral | -1    | COSE_Key | ECDH-ES   | Ephemeral Public key   |
   | key       |       |          |           | for the sender         |
   |           |       |          |           |                        |
   | static    | -2    | COSE_Key | ECDH-ES   | Static Public key for  |
   | key       |       |          |           | the sender             |
   |           |       |          |           |                        |
   | static    | -3    | bstr     | ECDH-SS   | Static Public key      |
   | key id    |       |          |           | identifier for the     |
   |           |       |          |           | sender                 |
   +-----------+-------+----------+-----------+------------------------+

                    Table 17: ECDH Algorithm Parameters

   M00TODO: Talk about curves and point formats.




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     +------------+----------+-------+-------------------------------+
     | name       | key type | value | description                   |
     +------------+----------+-------+-------------------------------+
     | P-256      | EC2      | 1     | NIST P-256 also known as .... |
     |            |          |       |                               |
     | P-384      | EC2      | 2     | NIST P-384 also known as .... |
     |            |          |       |                               |
     | P-521      | EC2      | 3     | NIST P-512 also known as .... |
     |            |          |       |                               |
     | Curve25519 | EC1      | 1     | Provide reference             |
     |            |          |       |                               |
     | Goldilocks | EC1      | 2     | Provide reference             |
     +------------+----------+-------+-------------------------------+

                            Table 18: EC Curves

12.5.  Key Agreement with KDF

   Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK.  The
   CEK is then encrypted using a Key Wrapping algorithm and a key
   derived from the shared secret computed by the key agreement
   algorithm.

   The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent if the key wrap algorithm is
      an AE algorithm.  [CREF24]

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter, a parameter identifying the recipient asymmetric key,
      and a parameter with the sender's asymmetric public key.

12.5.1.  ECDH ES + HKDF















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   +----------------+-------+----------+-------------------------------+
   | name           | value | KDF      | description                   |
   +----------------+-------+----------+-------------------------------+
   | ECDH-ES+A128KW | *     | HKDF -   | ECDH ES w/ Concat KDF and AES |
   |                |       | SHA-256  | Key wrap w/ 128 bit key       |
   |                |       |          |                               |
   | ECDH-ES+A192KW | *     | HKDF -   | ECDH ES w/ Concat KDF and AES |
   |                |       | SHA-256  | Key wrap w/ 192 bit key       |
   |                |       |          |                               |
   | ECDH-ES+A256KW | *     | HKDF -   | ECDH ES w/ Concat KDF and AES |
   |                |       | SHA-256  | Key wrap w/ 256 bit key       |
   +----------------+-------+----------+-------------------------------+

12.6.  Password

   [CREF25]

12.6.1.  PBES2

   +--------------------+-------+--------------------------------------+
   | name               | value | description                          |
   +--------------------+-------+--------------------------------------+
   | PBES2-HS256+A128KW | *     | PBES2 w/ HMAC SHA-256 and AES Key    |
   |                    |       | wrap w/ 128 bit key                  |
   |                    |       |                                      |
   | PBES2-HS384+A192KW | *     | PBES2 w/ HMAC SHA-384 and AES Key    |
   |                    |       | wrap w/ 192 bit key                  |
   |                    |       |                                      |
   | PBES2-HS512+A256KW | *     | PBES2 w/ HMAC SHA-512 and AES Key    |
   |                    |       | wrap w/ 256 bit key                  |
   +--------------------+-------+--------------------------------------+

13.  Keys

   The COSE_Key object defines a way to hold a single key object, it is
   still required that the members of individual key types be defined.
   This section of the document is where we define an initial set of
   members for specific key types.

   For each of the key types, we define both public and private members.
   The public members are what is transmitted to others for their usage.
   We define private members mainly for the purpose of archival of keys
   by individuals.  However, there are some circumstances where private
   keys may be distributed by various entities in a protocol.  Examples
   include: Entities which have poor random number generation.
   Centralized key creation for multi-cast type operations.  Protocols
   where a shared secret is used as a bearer token for authorization
   purposes.



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   Keys are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object.  In
   this document we define four values for the member.

    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | name      | value | description                                |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | EC1       | 1     | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X Coordinate only   |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | EC2       | 2     | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X,Y Coordinate pair |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | RSA       | 3     | RSA Keys                                   |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | Symmetric | 4     | Symmetric Keys                             |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+

                         Table 19: Key Type Values

13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys

   Two different key structures are being defined for Elliptic Curve
   keys.  One version uses both an x and a y coordinate, potentially
   with point compression.  This is the traditional EC point
   representation that is used in [RFC5480].  The other version uses
   only the x coordinate as the y coordinate is either to be recomputed
   or not needed for the key agreement operation.  An example of this is
   Curve25519 [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves].

13.1.1.  Single Coordinate Curves

   NOTE: This section represents at risk work depending on the ability
   to get good references for Curve25519 and Goldilocks.

   New versions of ECC have been targeted at variants where only a
   single value of the EC Point need to be transmitted.  This work is
   currently going on in the IRTF CFRG group.

   For EC keys with both coordinates, the 'kty' member is set to 1
   (EC1).  The members that are defined for this key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      [CREF26] The curves defined in this document for this key type can
      be found in Table 18.  Other curves may be registered in the
      future and private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point.  The integer is
      converted to an octet string use ???.  Note that the octet string
      represents a little-endian encoding of x.  [CREF27]




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   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'x' be present in the
   structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd' be
   present in the structure.  It is RECOMMENDED that 'x' also be
   present, but it can be recomputed from the required elements and
   omitting it saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+
   | name | key   | value | type   | description                       |
   |      | type  |       |        |                                   |
   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+
   | crv  | 1     | -1    | int /  | EC Curve identifier - Taken from  |
   |      |       |       | tstr   | the COSE General Registry         |
   |      |       |       |        |                                   |
   | x    | 1     | -2    | bstr   | X Coordinate                      |
   |      |       |       |        |                                   |
   | d    | 1     | -4    | bstr   | Private key                       |
   +------+-------+-------+--------+-----------------------------------+

                        Table 20: EC Key Parameters

13.1.2.  Double Coordinate Curves

   The traditional way of sending EC curves has been to send either both
   the x and y coordinates, or the x coordinate and a sign bit for the y
   coordinate.  The latter encoding has not been recommend in the IETF
   due to potential IPR issues with Certicom.  However, for operations
   in constrained environments, the ability to shrink a message by not
   sending the y coordinate is potentially useful.

   For EC keys with both coordinates, the 'kty' member is set to 2
   (EC2).  The members that are defined for this key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      The curves defined in this document for this key type can be found
      in Table 18.  Other curves may be registered in the future and
      private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point.  The integer is
      converted to an octet string as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets
      MUST NOT be removed from the front of the octet string.  [CREF28]

   y  contains either the sign bit or the value of y coordinate for the
      EC point.  For the value, the integer is converted to an octet
      string as defined in [SEC1].  Zero octets MUST NOT be removed from
      the front of the octet string.  For the sign bit, the value is
      true if the value of y is positive.



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   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv', 'x' and 'y' be present in
   the structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd'
   be present in the structure.  It is RECOMMENDED that 'x' and 'y' also
   be present, but they can be recomputed from the required elements and
   omitting them saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | name | key   | value | type    | description                      |
   |      | type  |       |         |                                  |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | crv  | 2     | -1    | int /   | EC Curve identifier - Taken from |
   |      |       |       | tstr    | the COSE General Registry        |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | x    | 2     | -2    | bstr    | X Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | y    | 2     | -3    | bstr /  | Y Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       | bool    |                                  |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | d    | 2     | -4    | bstr    | Private key                      |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+

                        Table 21: EC Key Parameters

13.2.  RSA Keys

























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     +-------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------------+
     | name  | key type | value | type  | description                |
     +-------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------------+
     | n     | 3        | -1    | bstr  | Modulus Parameter          |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | e     | 3        | -2    | int   | Exponent Parameter         |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | d     | 3        | -3    | bstr  | Private Exponent Parameter |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | p     | 3        | -4    | bstr  | First Prime Factor         |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | q     | 3        | -5    | bstr  | Second Prime Factor        |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | dp    | 3        | -6    | bstr  | First Factor CRT Exponent  |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | dq    | 3        | -7    | bstr  | Second Factor CRT Exponent |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | qi    | 3        | -8    | bstr  | First CRT Coefficient      |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | other | 3        | -9    | array | Other Primes Info          |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | r     | 3        | -10   | bstr  | Prime Factor               |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | d     | 3        | -11   | bstr  | Factor CRT Exponent        |
     |       |          |       |       |                            |
     | t     | 3        | -12   | bstr  | Factor CRT Coefficient     |
     +-------+----------+-------+-------+----------------------------+

                       Table 22: RSA Key Parameters

13.3.  Symmetric Keys

   Occasionally it is required that a symmetric key be transported
   between entities.  This key structure allows for that to happen.

   For symmetric keys, the 'kty' member is set to 3 (Symmetric).  The
   member that is defined for this key type is:

   k  contains the value of the key.

   This key structure contains only private key information, care must
   be taken that it is never transmitted accidentally.  For public keys,
   there are no required fields.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that
   'k' be present in the structure.







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             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | name | key type | value | type | description |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | k    | 4        | -1    | bstr | Key Value   |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+

                    Table 23: Symmetric Key Parameters

14.  CBOR Encoder Restrictions

   There as been an attempt to limit the number of places where the
   document needs to impose restrictions on how the CBOR Encoder needs
   to work.  We have managed to narrow it down to the following
   restrictions:

   o  The restriction applies to the encoding the Sig_structure, the
      Enc_structure, and the MAC_structure.

   o  The rules for Canonical CBOR (Section 3.9 of RFC 7049) MUST be
      used in these locations.  The main rule that needs to be enforced
      is that all lengths in these structures MUST be encoded such that
      they are encoded using definite lengths and the minimum length
      encoding is used.

   o  All parsers used SHOULD fail on both parsing and generation if the
      same label is used twice as a key for the same map.

15.  IANA Considerations

15.1.  CBOR Tag assignment

   It is requested that IANA assign a new tag from the "Concise Binary
   Object Representation (CBOR) Tags" registry.  It is requested that
   the tag be assigned in the 0 to 23 value range.

   Tag Value: TBD1

   Data Item: COSE_Msg

   Semantics: COSE security message.

15.2.  COSE Object Labels Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Object
   Labels Registry".  [CREF29]

   This table is initially populated by the table in Table 1.




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15.3.  COSE Header Label Table

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Labels".

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.
      Names are to be unique in the table.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label can be either
      an integer or a string.  Registration in the table is based on the
      value of the label requested.  Integer values between 1 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are delegated to the "COSE Header Algorithm
      Label" registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as
      private use.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   value registry  This contains a pointer to the registry used to
      contain values where the set is limited.

   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 2.  The
   specification column for all rows in that table should be this
   document.

   Additionally, the label of 0 is to be marked as 'Reserved'.

15.4.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Algorithm Labels".

   The columns of the registry are:





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   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.

   algorithm  The algorithm(s) that this registry entry is used for.
      This value is taken from the "COSE Algorithm Value" registry.
      Multiple algorithms can be specified in this entry.  For the
      table, the algorithm, label pair MUST be unique.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label is an integer
      in the range of -1 to -65536.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   value registry  This contains a pointer to the registry used to
      contain values where the set is limited.

   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in: Table 11,
   Table 12, Table 17, and Appendix D.  The specification column for all
   rows in that table should be this document.

15.5.  COSE Algorithm Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE
   Algorithm Registry".

   The columns of the registry are:

   value  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Algorithm
      values MUST be unique.  The value can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between 0 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are delegated to the "COSE Header Algorithm
      Label" registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as
      private use.

   description  A short description of the algorithm.





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   specification  A document where the algorithm is defined (if publicly
      available).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in the following:
   Table 9, Table 8, Table 5, Table 7, Table 13, Table 14, Table 15.
   The specification column for all rows in that table should be this
   document.

15.6.  COSE Key Map Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Key
   Map Registry".

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   label  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Key map
      labels MUST be unique.  The label can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between 0 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as first come first server.  Integer values in the
      range -1 to -65536 are used for key parameters specific to a
      single algorithm delegated to the "COSE Key Parameter Label"
      registry.  Integer values beyond -65536 are marked as private use.

   CBOR Type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field

   registry  This field denotes the registry that values come from, if
      one exists.

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in
   Section 7.1.  The specification column for all of these entries will
   be this document.








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15.7.  COSE Key Parameter Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Key
   Parameters".

   The columns of the table are:

   key type  This field contains a descriptive string of a key type.
      This should be a value that is in the COSE General Values table
      and is placed in the 'kty' field of a COSE Key structure.

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   label  The label is to be unique for every value of key type.  The
      range of values is from -256 to -1.  Labels are expected to be
      reused for different keys.

   CBOR type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 20,
   Table 21, Table 22, and Table 23.  The specification column for all
   of these entries will be this document.

15.8.  Media Type Registration

15.8.1.  COSE Security Message

   This section registers the "application/cose" and "application/
   cose+cbor" media types in the "Media Types" registry.  [CREF30] These
   media types are used to indicate that the content is a COSE_MSG.

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary





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      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD



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      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

15.8.2.  COSE Key media type

   This section registers the "application/cose+json" and "application/
   cose-set+json" media types in the "Media Types" registry.  These
   media types are used to indicate, respectively, that content is a
   COSE_Key or COSE_KeySet object.

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD



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      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key-set+cbor

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: To be identified

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:




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      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

16.  Security Considerations

   There are security considerations:

   1.  Protect private keys

   2.  MAC messages with more than one recipient means one cannot figure
       out who sent the message

   3.  Use of direct key with other recipient structures hands the key
       to other recipients.

   4.  Use of direct ECDH direct encryption is easy for people to leak
       information on if there are other recipients in the message.

   5.  Considerations about protected vs unprotected header fields.

17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, October 2013.






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17.2.  Informative References

   [AES-GCM]  Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", Nov 2007.

   [DSS]      U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", July 2013.

   [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]
              Vigano, C., Birkholz, H., and R. Sun, "CBOR data
              definition language: a notational convention to express
              CBOR data structures.", draft-greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-
              cddl-05 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves]
              Langley, A. and R. Salz, "Elliptic Curves for Security",
              draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-02 (work in progress), March 2015.

   [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2]
              McGrew, D., Foley, J., and K. Paterson, "Authenticated
              Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA", draft-mcgrew-aead-
              aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-05 (work in progress), July 2014.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC2633]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
              RFC 2633, June 1999.

   [RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC3610]  Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
              CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512", RFC
              4231, December 2005.

   [RFC4262]  Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
              Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.



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   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

   [RFC5752]  Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752, January
              2010.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010.

   [RFC5990]  Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner,
              "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990, September
              2010.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, March 2011.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, May 2015.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, May
              2015.

   [SEC1]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
              Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009.





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   [SP800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., and M. Smid, "NIST
              Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise
              Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
              Cryptography", May 2013.

Appendix A.  AEAD and AE algorithms

   The set of encryption algorithms that can be used with this
   specification is restricted to authenticated encryption (AE) and
   authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) algorithms.
   This means that there is a strong check that the data decrypted by
   the recipient is the same as what was encrypted by the sender.
   Encryption modes such as counter have no check on this at all.  The
   CBC encryption mode had a weak check that the data is correct, given
   a random key and random data, the CBC padding check will pass one out
   of 256 times.  There have been several times that a normal encryption
   mode has been combined with an integrity check to provide a content
   encryption mode that does provide the necessary authentication.  AES-
   GCM [AES-GCM], AES-CCM [RFC3610], AES-CBC-HMAC
   [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] are examples of these composite
   modes.

   PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport does not qualify as an AE algorithm.
   There are only three bytes in the encoding that can be checked as
   having decrypted correctly, the rest of the content can only be
   probabilistically checked as having decrypted correctly.  For this
   reason, PKCS v1.5 RSA key transport MUST NOT be used with this
   specification.  RSA-OAEP was designed to have the necessary checks
   that that content correctly decrypted and does qualify as an AE
   algorithm.

   When dealing with authenticated encryption algorithms, there is
   always some type of value that needs to be checked to see if the
   authentication level has passed.  This authentication value may be:

   o  A separately generated tag computed by both the encrypter and
      decrypter and then compared by the decryptor.  This tag value may
      be either placed at the end of the cipher text (the decision we
      made) or kept separately (the decision made by the JOSE working
      group).  This is the approach followed by AES-GCM [AES-GCM] and
      AES-CCM [RFC3610].

   o  A fixed value that is part of the encoded plain text.  This is the
      approach followed by the AES key wrap algorithm [RFC3394].

   o  A computed value is included as part of the encoded plain text.
      The computed value is then checked by the decryptor using the same



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      computation path.  This is the approach followed by RSAES-OAEP
      [RFC3447].

Appendix B.  Three Levels of Recipient Information

   All of the currently defined Key Management methods only use two
   levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.  The first level is the message
   content and the second level is the content key encryption.  However,
   if one uses a key management technique such as RSA-KEM (see
   Appendix A of RSA-KEM [RFC5990], then it make sense to have three
   levels of the COSE_Encrypt structure.

   These levels would be:

   o  Level 0: The content encryption level.  This level contains the
      payload of the message.

   o  Level 1: The encryption of the CEK by a KEK.

   o  Level 2: The encryption of a long random secret using an RSA key
      and a key derivation function to convert that secret into the KEK.

   This is an example of what a triple layer message would look like.
   The message has the following layers:

   o  Level 0: Has a content encrypted with AES-GCM using a 128-bit key.

   o  Level 1: Uses the AES Key wrap algorithm with a 128-bit key.

   o  Level 3: Uses ECDH Ephemeral-Static direct to generate the level 1
      key.

   In effect this example is a decomposed version of using the ECDH-
   ES+A128KW algorithm.

















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   {
     1: 2,
     2: h'a10101',
     3: {
       -1: h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ce'
     },
     4: h'64f84d913ba60a76070a9a48f26e97e863e285295a44320878caceb076
   3a334806857c67',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: -3
         },
         4: h'5a15dbf5b282ecb31a6074ee3815c252405dd7583e078188',
         9: [
           {
             3: {
               1: "ECDH-ES",
               5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b
   6c616e642e6578616d706c65',
               4: {
                 1: 1,
                 -1: 4,
                 -2: h'b2add44368ea6d641f9ca9af308b4079aeb519f11e9b8
   a55a600b21233e86e68',
                 -3: h'1a2cf118b9ee6895c8f415b686d4ca1cef362d4a7630a
   31ef6019c0c56d33de0'
               }
             }
           }
         ]
       }
     ]
   }

Appendix C.  Examples

   The examples can be found at https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples.  I
   am currently still in the process of getting the examples up there
   along with some control information for people to be able to check
   and reproduce the examples.

   Examples may have some features that are in questions but not yet
   incorporated in the document.

   To make it easier to read, the examples are presented using the
   CBOR's diagnostic notation rather than a binary dump.  [CREF31] Using
   the Ruby based CBOR diagnostic tools at ????, the diagnostic notation



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   can be converted into binary files using the following command line:
   (install command is?...)


            diag2cbor < inputfile > outputfile


   The examples can be extracted from the XML version of this docuent
   via an XPath expression as all of the artwork is tagged with the
   attribute type='CBORdiag'.

C.1.  Examples of MAC messages

C.1.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC

   This example users the following:

   o  MAC: AES-CMAC, 256-bit key, trucated to 64 bits

   o  Key management: direct shared secret

   o  File name: Mac-04

   {
     1: 3,
     2: h'a1016f4145532d434d41432d3235362f3634',
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     10: h'd9afa663dd740848',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: -6,
           5: h'6f75722d736563726574'
         }
       }
     ]
   }

C.1.2.  ECDH Direct MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/SHA-256, 256-bit key [CREF32]

   o  Key management: ECDH key agreement, two static keys, HKDF w/
      context structure





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   {
     1: 3,
     2: h'a10104',
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     10: h'2ba937ca03d76c3dbad30cfcbaeef586f9c0f9ba616ad67e9205d3857
   6ad9930',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: "ECDH-SS",
           5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
   6e642e6578616d706c65',
           "spk": {
             "kid": "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"
           },
           "apu": h'4d8553e7e74f3c6a3a9dd3ef286a8195cbf8a23d19558ccf
   ec7d34b824f42d92bd06bd2c7f0271f0214e141fb779ae2856abf585a58368b01
   7e7f2a9e5ce4db5'
         }
       }
     ]
   }

C.1.3.  Wrapped MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: AES-MAC, 128-bit key, truncated to 64 bits

   o  Key management: AES keywrap w/ a pre-shared 256-bit key

   {
     1: 3,
     2: h'a1016e4145532d3132382d4d41432d3634',
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     10: h'6d1fa77b2dd9146a',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: -5,
           5: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
   66333134626337303337'
         },
         4: h'711ab0dc2fc4585dce27effa6781c8093eba906f227b6eb0'
       }
     ]
   }




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C.1.4.  Multi-recipient MAC message

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/ SHA-256, 128-bit key

   o  Key management: Uses three different methods

      1.  ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-521, AES-Key Wrap w/ 128-bit
          key

      2.  RSA-OAEP w/ SHA-256

      3.  AES-Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key

   {
     1: 3,
     2: h'a10104',
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     10: h'7aaa6e74546873061f0a7de21ff0c0658d401a68da738dd8937486519
   83ce1d0',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
           5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65',
           4: {
             1: 1,
             -1: 5,
             -2: h'43b12669acac3fd27898ffba0bcd2e6c366d53bc4db71f909
   a759304acfb5e18cdc7ba0b13ff8c7636271a6924b1ac63c02688075b55ef2d61
   3574e7dc242f79c3',
             -3: h'812dd694f4ef32b11014d74010a954689c6b6e8785b333d1a
   b44f22b9d1091ae8fc8ae40b687e5cfbe7ee6f8b47918a07bb04e9f5b1a51a334
   a16bc09777434113'
           }
         },
         4: h'1b120c848c7f2f8943e402cbdbdb58efb281753af4169c70d0126c
   0d16436277160821790ef4fe3f'
       },
       {
         3: {
           1: -2,
           5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65'
         },
         4: h'46c4f88069b650909a891e84013614cd58a3668f88fa18f3852940



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   a20b35098591d3aacf91c125a2595cda7bee75a490579f0e2f20fd6bc956623bf
   de3029c318f82c426dac3463b261c981ab18b72fe9409412e5c7f2d8f2b5abaf7
   80df6a282db033b3a863fa957408b81741878f466dcc437006ca21407181a016c
   a608ca8208bd3c5a1ddc828531e30b89a67ec6bb97b0c3c3c92036c0cb84aa0f0
   ce8c3e4a215d173bfa668f116ca9f1177505afb7629a9b0b5e096e81d37900e06
   f561a32b6bc993fc6d0cb5d4bb81b74e6ffb0958dac7227c2eb8856303d989f93
   b4a051830706a4c44e8314ec846022eab727e16ada628f12ee7978855550249cc
   b58'
       },
       {
         3: {
           1: -5,
           5: h'30313863306165352d346439622d343731622d626664362d6565
   66333134626337303337'
         },
         4: h'0b2c7cfce04e98276342d6476a7723c090dfdd15f9a518e7736549
   e998370695e6d6a83b4ae507bb'
       }
     ]
   }

C.2.  Examples of Encrypted Messages

C.2.1.  Direct ECDH

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-GCM w/ 128-bit key

   o  Key managment: ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-256





















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   {
     1: 2,
     2: h'a10101',
     3: {
       -1: h'c9cf4df2fe6c632bf7886413'
     },
     4: h'45fce2814311024d3a479e7d3eed063850f3f0b9f3f948677e3ae9869b
   cf9ff4e1763812',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: "ECDH-ES",
           5: h'6d65726961646f632e6272616e64796275636b406275636b6c61
   6e642e6578616d706c65',
           4: {
             1: 1,
             -1: 4,
             -2: h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf05
   4e1c7b4d91d6280',
             -3: h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d
   924b7e03bf822bb'
           }
         }
       }
     ]
   }

C.2.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-CCM w/128-bit key, trucate the tag to 64-bits

   o  Key managment: Use HKDF on a shared secret with the following
      implicit fields as part of the context.

      *  APU identity: "lighting-client"

      *  APV identity: "lighting-server"

      *  Supplimentary Public Other: "Encryption Example 02"










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   {
     1: 2,
     2: h'a1016e4145532d43434d2d3132382f3634',
     3: {
       -1: h'8f2720f78dce2737ae61a4fa'
     },
     4: h'0159973c5d790041cf54be80412b3d12a7be30f6b64193d3bb51dfec',
     9: [
       {
         3: {
           1: "dir+kdf",
           5: h'6f75722d736563726574',
           -10: h'61616262636364646565666667676868'
         }
       }
     ]
   }

C.3.  Examples of Signed Message

C.3.1.  Single Signature

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: RSA-PSS w/ SHA-384, MGF-1

   {
     1: 1,
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     5: [
       {
         2: h'a20165505333383405581e62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f
   626269746f6e2e6578616d706c65',
         6: h'1b22515f96fd798a331c7b156e90bfea7f558ec6de840e05a8e5f4
   b7be44ea1451c48517da7fd216c6143898673c232a96937ebcfb88264a58f5995
   82d89cf8a4f20ef35fbfcfd2aad46ad8b99ea6425367afd898de1b712d558b0d2
   49d6d180d0b1fb7256140ec3553556f3b5b95a49931a75998dfc23ca905efc7d8
   e04deeb92d5936c0824e535aa344396f73913d8a65de0010600270ae5df7f5c8d
   52ae525a7642d4c4ff9e219acaa52fd933df003be36b9e3c77ced37129d66745e
   2a42baa3d0b3f2675cd51ae8a64fd024d126be5396c91b9236fb5f8548d09881b
   b5d40a61c0d342bed9fe8058f36b8722b9e8465dc3b8bfa4f2fd138ce186b73e4
   082'
       }
     ]
   }






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C.3.2.  Multiple Signers

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: RSA-PSS w/ SHA-256, MGF-1

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-512, Curve P-521

   {
     1: 1,
     4: h'546869732069732074686520636f6e74656e742e',
     5: [
       {
         2: h'a10129',
         3: {
           5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65'
         },
         6: h'028947ac3521f66f2506013007e2cd7b0cb09a209e76ab5b95f751
   eb63f5730f1672a282419c49b9653d742577fb6a6cea9ab2e1d4d5d9e786e2240
   4760663cc74a1c2c90160af92628e1ebbc3eeba552f757054b691ab17271396b7
   ff2d86c100b94a2fce0438c0b50ca70bcdd3074a0f8dc40c2e44e9b26e9093287
   b7245ee13171b28ea0f3e291c2cca64aa17f7094aee2be02b5fe5cd2cf343e18c
   eec0c763cb76a128df9a9cbfc37b835f6467d98d74505eee1dccc9e6ebf2405ea
   1329b41a33eeb13f1bbef3a272e42b3df96cdaea9016663e31ddff4603eb66a88
   5c583b53977c1fb9707550717d7387f84616a6670e27d4007b08879109aaf3720
   f33'
       },
       {
         3: {
           1: -9,
           5: h'62696c626f2e62616767696e7340686f626269746f6e2e657861
   6d706c65'
         },
         6: h'0195345953742c6725352a13cdc55402c895133525c9a3b16bb47d
   02ca5f57f8a34aebf47298c602a8feb1dd71d1936886f21029a4142abf38c3aa3
   94b3597c2f35c01987c801edc7022c8fddacbf25bc8794b9ffb7cb27f9f346ba4
   4db6f5c9b60406530f62b378c5da3e7e2259327f4e55f48271873496497724492
   d90ba67a4b65112'
       }
     ]
   }

Appendix D.  COSE Header Algorithm Label Table

   This section disappears when we make a decision on password based key
   management.




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          +------+-----------+-------+-----------+-------------+
          | name | algorithm | label | CBOR type | description |
          +------+-----------+-------+-----------+-------------+
          | p2c  | PBE       | -1    | int       |             |
          |      |           |       |           |             |
          | p2s  | PBE       | -2    | bstr      |             |
          +------+-----------+-------+-----------+-------------+

Appendix E.  Document Updates

E.1.  Version -01 to -02

   o  Add a set of straw man proposals for algorithms.  It is possible/
      expected that this text will be moved to a new document.

   o  Add a set of straw man proposals for key structures.  It is
      possible/expected that this text will be moved to a new document.

E.2.  Version -00 to -01

   o  Add note on where the document is being maintained and
      contributing notes.

   o  Put in proposal on MTI algorithms.

   o  Changed to use labels rather than keys when talking about what
      indexes a map.

   o  Moved nonce/IV to be a common header item.

   o  Expand section to discuss the common set of labels used in
      COSE_Key maps.

   o  Start marking element 0 in registries as reserved.

   o  Update examples.

Editorial Comments

[CREF1] JLS: Need to check this list for correctness before publishing.

[CREF2] JLS: I have not gone through the document to determine what
        needs to be here yet.  We mostly want to grab terms which are
        used in unusual ways or are not generally understood.

[CREF3] JLS: It would be possible to extend this section to talk about
        those decisions which an application needs to think about rather
        than just talking about MTI algoithms.



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[CREF4] JLS: I have moved msg_type into the individual structures.
        However, they would not be necessary in the cases where a) the
        security service is known and b) security libraries can setup to
        take individual structures.  Should they be moved back to just
        appearing if used in a COSE_MSG rather than on the individual
        structure?

[CREF5] JLS: Should we create an IANA registries for the values of
        msg_type?

[CREF6] JLS: OPEN ISSUE

[CREF7] JLS: A completest version of this grammar would list the options
        available in the protected and unprotected headers.  Do we want
        to head that direction?

[CREF8] JLS: After looking at this, I am wondering if the type for this
        should be: [int int]/[int tstr] so that we can keep the major/
        minor difference of media-types.  This does cost a couple of
        bytes in the message.

[CREF9] JLS: Need to figure out how we are going to go about creating
        this registry -or are we going to modify the current mime-
        content table?

[CREF10] JLS: Open to do.

[CREF11] JLS: Should be able to move much of this text into the headers
         section and just do a refer to that text from here.

[CREF12] JLS: Should be able to move much of this text into the headers
         section and just do a refer to that text from here.

[CREF13] Ilari: I don't follow/understand this text

[CREF14] JLS: Should this sentence be removed?

[CREF15] JLS: Do we remove this line and just define them ourselves?

[CREF16] JLS: We can really simplify the grammar for COSE_Key to be just
         the kty (the one required field) and the generic item.  The
         reason to do this is that it makes things simpler.  The reason
         not to do this says that we really need to add a lot more items
         so that a grammar check can be done that is more tightly
         enforced.

[CREF17] JLS: Unless key material is being derived for multiple items
         (i.e both a key and an IV) this will be the COSE algorithm



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         value.  Even then it might still be the COSE algorithm value,
         it is just a requirement for a new algorithm.  Do we want to
         have the ability to derive both the key and a partial IV for
         CCM?

[CREF18] JLS: I need to get a better justification for this item.  It
         has to do with generating new keys for each message in a series
         of messages that have the same salt value.

[CREF19] JLS: It would be reasonable to support a shared-secret + KDF
         that is not PBE for when one has good randomness in the shared-
         secret.

[CREF20] JLS: Do we also want to document the use of RFC 5649 as well?
         It allows for other sizes of keys that might be used for HMAC -
         i.e. a 200 bit key.  The algorithm exists, but I do not
         personally know of any standard uses of it.

[CREF21] JLS: Is this range we want to specify?

[CREF22] JLS: Does anybody need pure DH?

[CREF23] JLS: This could just as easily be done by specifying two
         different set of algorithm identifiers, one for each of the key
         formats.  I don't believe that we need to set things up by
         having two different sets of algorithm identifiers for the
         different keys as the structure of what is represented is going
         to be the same, just the math and point formats are going to be
         different.  The other "difference" is the question of how the
         octet string of the shared secret is defined.  However, since
         we don't need to specify either in this document we can defer
         both of them into their respective documents.

[CREF24] JLS: It would be possible to include the protected field in the
         KDF rather than the key wrap algorithm if we wanted to.  This
         would provide the same level of security, it would not be
         possible to get the same key if they are different.

[CREF25] JLS: Do we want/need to support this?  JOSE did it mainly to
         support the encryption of private keys.

[CREF26] JLS: Do we create a registry for curves?  Is is the same
         registry for both EC1 and EC2?

[CREF27] JLS: Should we use the integer encoding for x and d instead of
         bstr?





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[CREF28] JLS: Should we use the integer encoding for x, y and d instead
         of bstr?

[CREF29] JLS: Finish the registration process.

[CREF30] JLS: Should we register both or just the cose+cbor one?

[CREF31] JLS: Do we want to keep this as diagnostic notation or should
         we switch to having "binary" examples instead?

[CREF32] JLS: Need to examine how this is worked out.  In this case the
         length of the key to be used is implicit rather than explicit.
         This needs to be the case because a direct key could be any
         length, however it means that when the key is derived, there is
         currently nothing to state how long the derived key needs to
         be.

Author's Address

   Jim Schaad
   August Cellars

   Email: ietf@augustcellars.com




























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