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Versions: (draft-schaad-cose-msg) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

COSE Working Group                                             J. Schaad
Internet-Draft                                            August Cellars
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 16, 2016
Expires: April 19, 2017


               CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
                         draft-ietf-cose-msg-22

Abstract

   Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is data format designed
   for small code size and small message size.  There is a need for the
   ability to have basic security services defined for this data format.
   This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
   specification.  This specification describes how to create and
   process signature, message authentication codes and encryption using
   CBOR for serialization.  This specification additionally specifies
   how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.

Contributing to this document

   The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub.  Suggested
   changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/
   cose-wg/cose-spec>.  Instructions are on that page as well.
   Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial
   issues need to be discussed on the COSE mailing list.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 19, 2017.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Design changes from JOSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  CBOR Grammar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.5.  Document Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Basic COSE Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Header Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Common COSE Headers Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Signing Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.1.  Signing with One or More Signers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Signing with One Signer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.3.  Externally Supplied Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.4.  Signing and Verification Process  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.5.  Computing Counter Signatures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Encryption Objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.1.  Enveloped COSE Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1.1.  Content Key Distribution Methods  . . . . . . . . . .  24
     5.2.  Single Recipient Encrypted  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.3.  How to encrypt and decrypt for AEAD Algorithms  . . . . .  25
     5.4.  How to encrypt and decrypt for AE Algorithms  . . . . . .  28
   6.  MAC Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     6.1.  MACed Message with Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     6.2.  MACed Messages with Implicit Key  . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     6.3.  How to compute and verify a MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   7.  Key Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     7.1.  COSE Key Common Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   8.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     8.1.  ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       8.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     8.2.  Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithms (EdDSA)  . . .  40



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       8.2.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)  . . . . .  41
       9.1.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     9.2.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-CBC-MAC) . . . . . .  43
       9.2.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
   10. Content Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     10.1.  AES GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       10.1.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     10.2.  AES CCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       10.2.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     10.3.  ChaCha20 and Poly1305  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       10.3.1.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   11. Key Derivation Functions (KDF)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
            (HKDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     11.2.  Context Information Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   12. Content Key Distribution Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     12.1.  Direct Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
       12.1.1.  Direct Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       12.1.2.  Direct Key with KDF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     12.2.  Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     12.3.  Key Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     12.4.  Direct Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
       12.4.1.  ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       12.4.2.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     12.5.  Key Agreement with Key Wrap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
       12.5.1.  ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   13. Key Object Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
     13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
       13.1.1.  Double Coordinate Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
     13.2.  Octet Key Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     13.3.  Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   14. CBOR Encoder Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   15. Application Profiling Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     16.1.  CBOR Tag assignment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     16.2.  COSE Header Parameters Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     16.3.  COSE Header Algorithm Parameters Registry  . . . . . . .  78
     16.4.  COSE Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
     16.5.  COSE Key Common Parameters Registry  . . . . . . . . . .  79
     16.6.  COSE Key Type Parameters Registry  . . . . . . . . . . .  80
     16.7.  COSE Key Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     16.8.  COSE Elliptic Curve Parameters Registry  . . . . . . . .  81
     16.9.  Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       16.9.1.  COSE Security Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
       16.9.2.  COSE Key media type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83



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     16.10. CoAP Content-Format Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     16.11. Expert Review Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   17. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     17.1.  Author's Versions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
     17.2.  COSE Testing Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   18. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
   19. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
     19.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
     19.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
   Appendix A.  Making Mandatory Algorithm Header Optional . . . . .  95
     A.1.  Algorithm Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
     A.2.  Counter Signature Without Headers . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
   Appendix B.  Two Layers of Recipient Information  . . . . . . . .  99
   Appendix C.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
     C.1.  Examples of Signed Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
       C.1.1.  Single Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
       C.1.2.  Multiple Signers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
       C.1.3.  Counter Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
       C.1.4.  Signature w/ Criticality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
     C.2.  Single Signer Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
       C.2.1.  Single ECDSA signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
     C.3.  Examples of Enveloped Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
       C.3.1.  Direct ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
       C.3.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
       C.3.3.  Counter Signature on Encrypted Content  . . . . . . . 109
       C.3.4.  Encrypted Content with External Data  . . . . . . . . 111
     C.4.  Examples of Encrypted Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
       C.4.1.  Simple Encrypted Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
       C.4.2.  Encrypted Message w/ a Partial IV . . . . . . . . . . 112
     C.5.  Examples of MACed messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
       C.5.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
       C.5.2.  ECDH Direct MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
       C.5.3.  Wrapped MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
       C.5.4.  Multi-recipient MACed message . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
     C.6.  Examples of MAC0 messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
       C.6.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
     C.7.  COSE Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
       C.7.1.  Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
       C.7.2.  Private Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

1.  Introduction

   There has been an increased focus on small, constrained devices that
   make up the Internet of Things (IoT).  One of the standards that has
   come out of this process is the Concise Binary Object Representation
   (CBOR) [RFC7049].  CBOR extended the data model of the JavaScript



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   Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] by allowing for binary data, among
   other changes.  CBOR is being adopted by several of the IETF working
   groups dealing with the IoT world as their encoding of data
   structures.  CBOR was designed specifically to be both small in terms
   of messages transport and implementation size, as well having a
   schema free decoder.  A need exists to provide message security
   services for IoT, and using CBOR as the message encoding format makes
   sense.

   The JOSE working group produced a set of documents
   [RFC7515][RFC7516][RFC7517][RFC7518] using JSON that specified how to
   process encryption, signatures and Message Authentication Code (MAC)
   operations, and how to encode keys using JSON.  This document defines
   the CBOR Object Encryption and Signing (COSE) standard which does the
   same thing for the CBOR encoding format.  While there is a strong
   attempt to keep the flavor of the original JOSE documents, two
   considerations are taken into account:

   o  CBOR has capabilities that are not present in JSON and are
      appropriate to use.  One example of this is the fact that CBOR has
      a method of encoding binary directly without first converting it
      into a base64 encoded string.

   o  COSE is not a direct copy of the JOSE specification.  In the
      process of creating COSE, decisions that were made for JOSE were
      re-examined.  In many cases different results were decided on as
      the criteria was not always the same.

1.1.  Design changes from JOSE

   o  Define a single top message structure so that encrypted, signed
      and MACed messages can easily be identified and still have a
      consistent view.

   o  Signed messages distinguish between the protected and unprotected
      parameters that relate to the content from those that relate to
      the signature.

   o  MACed messages are separated from signed messages.

   o  MACed messages have the ability to use the same set of recipient
      algorithms as enveloped messages for obtaining the MAC
      authentication key.

   o  Use binary encodings for binary data rather than base64url
      encodings.





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   o  Combine the authentication tag for encryption algorithms with the
      cipher text.

   o  The set of cryptographic algorithms has been expanded in some
      directions, and trimmed in others.

1.2.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   When the words appear in lower case, their natural language meaning
   is used.

1.3.  CBOR Grammar

   There is currently no standard CBOR grammar available for use by
   specifications.  The CBOR structures are therefore described in
   prose.

   The document was developed by first working on the grammar and then
   developing the prose to go with it.  An artifact of this is that the
   prose was written using the primitive type strings defined by CBOR
   Data Definition Language (CDDL) [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl].
   In this specification, the following primitive types are used:

      any - non-specific value that permits all CBOR values to be placed
      here.

      bool - a boolean value (true: major type 7, value 21; false: major
      type 7, value 20).

      bstr - byte string (major type 2).

      int - an unsigned integer or a negative integer.

      nil - a null value (major type 7, value 22).

      nint - a negative integer (major type 1).

      tstr - a UTF-8 text string (major type 3).

      uint - an unsigned integer (major type 0).

   Two syntaxes from CDDL appear in this document as shorthand.  These
   are:



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      FOO / BAR - indicates that either FOO or BAR can appear here

      [+ FOO] - indicates that the type FOO appears one or more times in
      an array

   As well as the prose description, a version of a CBOR grammar is
   presented in CDDL.  Since CDDL has not been published as an RFC, this
   grammar may not work with the final version of CDDL.  The CDDL
   grammar is informational, the prose description is normative.

   The collected CDDL can be extracted from the XML version of this
   document via the following XPath expression below.  (Depending on the
   XPath evaluator one is using, it may be necessary to deal with &gt;
   as an entity.)

   //artwork[@type='CDDL']/text()

   CDDL expects the initial non-terminal symbol to be the first symbol
   in the file.  For this reason the first fragment of CDDL is presented
   here.

   start = COSE_Messages / COSE_Key / COSE_KeySet / Internal_Types

   ; This is defined to make the tool quieter:
   Internal_Types = Sig_structure / Enc_structure / MAC_structure /
           COSE_KDF_Context

   The non-terminal Internal_Types is defined for dealing with the
   automated validation tools used during the writing of this document.
   It references those non-terminals that are used for security
   computations, but are not emitted for transport.

1.4.  CBOR Related Terminology

   In JSON, maps are called objects and only have one kind of map key: a
   string.  In COSE, we use strings, negative integers and unsigned
   integers as map keys.  The integers are used for compactness of
   encoding and easy comparison.  The inclusion of strings allows for an
   additional range of short encoded values to be used as well.  Since
   the word "key" is mainly used in its other meaning, as a
   cryptographic key, we use the term "label" for this usage as a map
   key.

   The presence of a label in a COSE map which is not a string or an
   integer is an error.  Applications can either fail processing or
   process messages with incorrect labels, however they MUST NOT create
   messages with incorrect labels.




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   A CDDL grammar fragment is defined that defines the non-terminals
   'label', as in the previous paragraph and 'values', which permits any
   value to be used.

   label = int / tstr
   values = any

1.5.  Document Terminology

   In this document, we use the following terminology:

   Byte is a synonym for octet.

   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer
   protocol for use in constrained systems.  It is defined in [RFC7252].

   Authenticated Encryption (AE) [RFC5116] algorithms are those
   encryption algorithms which provide an authentication check of the
   contents algorithm with the encryption service.

   Authenticated Encryption with Authenticated Data (AEAD) [RFC5116]
   algorithms provide the same content authentication service as AE
   algorithms, but additionally provide for authentication of non-
   encrypted data as well.

2.  Basic COSE Structure

   The COSE object structure is designed so that there can be a large
   amount of common code when parsing and processing the different types
   of security messages.  All of the message structures are built on the
   CBOR array type.  The first three elements of the array always
   contain the same information:

   1.  The set of protected header parameters wrapped in a bstr.

   2.  The set of unprotected header parameters as a map.

   3.  The content of the message.  The content is either the plain text
       or the cipher text as appropriate.  The content may be detached,
       but the location is still used.  The content is wrapped in a bstr
       when present and is a nil value when detached.

   Elements after this point are dependent on the specific message type.

   COSE messages are also built using the concept of layers to separate
   different types of cryptographic concepts.  As an example of how this
   works, consider the COSE_Encrypt message (Section 5.1).  This message
   type is broken into two layers: the content layer and the recipient



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   layer.  In the content layer, the plain text is encrypted and
   information about the encrypted message are placed.  In the recipient
   layer, the content encryption key (CEK) is encrypted and information
   about how it is encrypted for each recipient is placed.  A single
   layer version of the encryption message COSE_Encrypt0 (Section 5.2)
   is provided for cases where the CEK is pre-shared.

   Identification of which type of message has been presented is done by
   the following methods:

   1.  The specific message type is known from the context.  This may be
       defined by a marker in the containing structure or by
       restrictions specified by the application protocol.

   2.  The message type is identified by a CBOR tag.  Messages with a
       CBOR tag are known in this specification as tagged messages,
       while those without the CBOR tag are known as untagged messages.
       This document defines a CBOR tag for each of the message
       structures.  These tags can be found in Table 1.

   3.  When a COSE object is carried in a media type of application/
       cose, the optional parameter 'cose-type' can be used to identify
       the embedded object.  The parameter is OPTIONAL if the tagged
       version of the structure is used.  The parameter is REQUIRED if
       the untagged version of the structure is used.  The value to use
       with the parameter for each of the structures can be found in
       Table 1.

   4.  When a COSE object is carried as a CoAP payload, the CoAP
       Content-Format Option can be used to identify the message
       content.  The CoAP Content-Format values can be found in
       Table 26.  The CBOR tag for the message structure is not required
       as each security message is uniquely identified.


















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   +-------+---------------+---------------+---------------------------+
   | CBOR  | cose-type     | Data Item     | Semantics                 |
   | Tag   |               |               |                           |
   +-------+---------------+---------------+---------------------------+
   | TBD1  | cose-sign     | COSE_Sign     | COSE Signed Data Object   |
   |       |               |               |                           |
   | TBD7  | cose-sign1    | COSE_Sign1    | COSE Single Signer Data   |
   |       |               |               | Object                    |
   |       |               |               |                           |
   | TBD2  | cose-encrypt  | COSE_Encrypt  | COSE Encrypted Data       |
   |       |               |               | Object                    |
   |       |               |               |                           |
   | TBD3  | cose-encrypt0 | COSE_Encrypt0 | COSE Single Recipient     |
   |       |               |               | Encrypted Data Object     |
   |       |               |               |                           |
   | TBD4  | cose-mac      | COSE_Mac      | COSE Mac-ed Data Object   |
   |       |               |               |                           |
   | TBD6  | cose-mac0     | COSE_Mac0     | COSE Mac w/o Recipients   |
   |       |               |               | Object                    |
   +-------+---------------+---------------+---------------------------+

                   Table 1: COSE Message Identification

   The following CDDL fragment identifies all of the top messages
   defined in this document.  Separate non-terminals are defined for the
   tagged and the untagged versions of the messages.

   COSE_Messages = COSE_Untagged_Message / COSE_Tagged_Message

   COSE_Untagged_Message = COSE_Sign / COSE_Sign1 /
       COSE_Encrypt / COSE_Encrypt0 /
       COSE_Mac / COSE_Mac0

   COSE_Tagged_Message = COSE_Sign_Tagged / COSE_Sign1_Tagged /
       COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged /
       COSE_Mac_Tagged / COSE_Mac0_Tagged

3.  Header Parameters

   The structure of COSE has been designed to have two buckets of
   information that are not considered to be part of the payload itself,
   but are used for holding information about content, algorithms, keys,
   or evaluation hints for the processing of the layer.  These two
   buckets are available for use in all of the structures except for
   keys.  While these buckets are present, they may not all be usable in
   all instances.  For example, while the protected bucket is defined as
   part of the recipient structure, some of the algorithms used for




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   recipient structures do not provide for authenticated data.  If this
   is the case, the protected bucket is left empty.

   Both buckets are implemented as CBOR maps.  The map key is a 'label'
   (Section 1.4).  The value portion is dependent on the definition for
   the label.  Both maps use the same set of label/value pairs.  The
   integer and string values for labels have been divided into several
   sections with a standard range, a private range, and a range that is
   dependent on the algorithm selected.  The defined labels can be found
   in the "COSE Header Parameters" IANA registry (Section 16.2).

   Two buckets are provided for each layer:

   protected:  Contains parameters about the current layer that are to
      be cryptographically protected.  This bucket MUST be empty if it
      is not going to be included in a cryptographic computation.  This
      bucket is encoded in the message as a binary object.  This value
      is obtained by CBOR encoding the protected map and wrapping it in
      a bstr object.  Senders SHOULD encode a zero length map as a zero
      length string rather than as a zero length map (encoded as h'a0').
      The zero length binary encoding is preferred because it is both
      shorter and the version used in the serialization structures for
      cryptographic computation.  After encoding the map, the value is
      wrapped in the binary object.  Recipients MUST accept both a zero
      length binary value and a zero length map encoded in the binary
      value.  The wrapping allows for the encoding of the protected map
      to be transported with a greater chance that it will not be
      altered in transit.  (Badly behaved intermediates could decode and
      re-encode, but this will result in a failure to verify unless the
      re-encoded byte string is identical to the decoded byte string.)
      This avoids the problem of all parties needing to be able to do a
      common canonical encoding.

   unprotected:  Contains parameters about the current layer that are
      not cryptographically protected.

   Only parameters that deal with the current layer are to be placed at
   that layer.  As an example of this, the parameter 'content type'
   describes the content of the message being carried in the message.
   As such, this parameter is placed only in the content layer and is
   not placed in the recipient or signature layers.  In principle, one
   should be able to process any given layer without reference to any
   other layer.  With the exception of the COSE_Sign structure, the only
   data that needs to cross layers is the cryptographic key.

   The buckets are present in all of the security objects defined in
   this document.  The fields in order are the 'protected' bucket (as a
   CBOR 'bstr' type) and then the 'unprotected' bucket (as a CBOR 'map'



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   type).  The presence of both buckets is required.  The parameters
   that go into the buckets come from the IANA "COSE Header Parameters"
   registry (Section 16.2).  Some common parameters are defined in the
   next section, but a number of parameters are defined throughout this
   document.

   Labels in each of the maps MUST be unique.  When processing messages,
   if a label appears multiple times, the message MUST be rejected as
   malformed.  Applications SHOULD verify that the same label does not
   occur in both the protected and unprotected headers.  If the message
   is not rejected as malformed, attributes MUST be obtained from the
   protected bucket before they are obtained from the unprotected
   bucket.

   The following CDDL fragment represents the two header buckets.  A
   group Headers is defined in CDDL that represents the two buckets in
   which attributes are placed.  This group is used to provide these two
   fields consistently in all locations.  A type is also defined which
   represents the map of common headers.

   Headers = (
       protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
       unprotected : header_map
   )

   header_map = {
       Generic_Headers,
       * label => values
   }

   empty_or_serialized_map = bstr .cbor header_map / bstr .size 0


3.1.  Common COSE Headers Parameters

   This section defines a set of common header parameters.  A summary of
   these parameters can be found in Table 2.  This table should be
   consulted to determine the value of label, and the type of the value.

   The set of header parameters defined in this section are:

   alg:  This parameter is used to indicate the algorithm used for the
      security processing.  This parameter MUST be present in the
      COSE_Signature, COSE_Sign1, COSE_Encrypt, COSE_Encrypt0, COSE_Mac,
      and COSE_Mac0 structures.  When the algorithm supports
      authenticating associated data, this parameter MUST be in the
      protected header bucket.  The value is taken from the "COSE
      Algorithms" Registry (see Section 16.4).



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   crit:  The parameter is used to indicate which protected header
      labels an application that is processing a message is required to
      understand.  Parameters defined in this document do not need to be
      included as they should be understood by all implementations.
      When present, this parameter MUST be placed in the protected
      header bucket.  The array MUST have at least one value in it.
      Not all labels need to be included in the 'crit' parameter.  The
      rules for deciding which header labels are placed in the array
      are:

      *  Integer labels in the range of 0 to 8 SHOULD be omitted.

      *  Integer labels in the range -1 to -128 can be omitted as they
         are algorithm dependent.  If an application can correctly
         process an algorithm, it can be assumed that it will correctly
         process all of the common parameters associated with that
         algorithm.  Integer labels in the range -129 to -65536 SHOULD
         be included as these would be less common parameters that might
         not be generally supported.

      *  Labels for parameters required for an application MAY be
         omitted.  Applications should have a statement if the label can
         be omitted.

      The header parameter values indicated by 'crit' can be processed
      by either the security library code or by an application using a
      security library; the only requirement is that the parameter is
      processed.  If the 'crit' value list includes a value for which
      the parameter is not in the protected bucket, this is a fatal
      error in processing the message.

   content type:  This parameter is used to indicate the content type of
      the data in the payload or cipher text fields.  Integers are from
      the "CoAP Content-Formats" IANA registry table [COAP.Formats].
      Text values following the syntax of Content-Type defined in
      Section 4.2 of [RFC6838] omitting the prefix string "Content-
      Type:".  Leading and trailing whitespace is also omitted.  Textual
      content values along with parameters and subparameters can be
      located using the IANA "Media Types" registry.  Applications
      SHOULD provide this parameter if the content structure is
      potentially ambiguous.

   kid:  This parameter identifies one piece of data that can be used as
      input to find the needed cryptographic key.  The value of this
      parameter can be matched against the 'kid' member in a COSE_Key
      structure.  Other methods of key distribution can define an
      equivalent field to be matched.  Applications MUST NOT assume that
      'kid' values are unique.  There may be more than one key with the



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      same 'kid' value, so all of the keys associated with this 'kid'
      may need to be checked.  The internal structure of 'kid' values is
      not defined and cannot be relied on by applications.  Key
      identifier values are hints about which key to use.  This is not a
      security critical field.  For this reason, it can be placed in the
      unprotected headers bucket.

   IV:  This parameter holds the Initialization Vector (IV) value.  For
      some symmetric encryption algorithms this may be referred to as a
      nonce.  The IV can be placed in the unprotected header as
      modifying the IV will cause the decryption to yield plaintext that
      is readily detectable as garbled.

   Partial IV  This parameter holds a part of the IV value.  When using
      the COSE_Encrypt0 structure, a portion of the IV can be part of
      the context associated with the key.  This field is used to carry
      a value that causes the IV to be changed for each message.  The IV
      can be placed in the unprotected header as modifying the IV will
      cause the decryption to yield plaintext that is readily detectable
      as garbled.  The 'Initialization Vector' and 'Partial
      Initialization Vector' parameters MUST NOT both be present in the
      same security layer.
      The message IV is generated by the following steps:

      1.  Left pad the partial IV with zeros to the length of IV.

      2.  XOR the padded partial IV with the context IV.

   counter signature:  This parameter holds one or more counter
      signature values.  Counter signatures provide a method of having a
      second party sign some data.  The counter signature parameter can
      occur as an unprotected attribute in any of the following
      structures: COSE_Sign1, COSE_Signature, COSE_Encrypt,
      COSE_recipient, COSE_Encrypt0, COSE_Mac and COSE_Mac0.  These
      structures all have the same beginning elements so that a
      consistent calculation of the counter signature can be computed.
      Details on computing counter signatures are found in Section 4.5.














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   +-----------+-------+----------------+-------------+----------------+
   | name      | label | value type     | value       | description    |
   |           |       |                | registry    |                |
   +-----------+-------+----------------+-------------+----------------+
   | alg       | 1     | int / tstr     | COSE        | Cryptographic  |
   |           |       |                | Algorithms  | algorithm to   |
   |           |       |                | registry    | use            |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | crit      | 2     | [+ label]      | COSE Header | Critical       |
   |           |       |                | Labels      | headers to be  |
   |           |       |                | registry    | understood     |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | content   | 3     | tstr / uint    | CoAP        | Content type   |
   | type      |       |                | Content-    | of the payload |
   |           |       |                | Formats or  |                |
   |           |       |                | Media Types |                |
   |           |       |                | registry    |                |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | kid       | 4     | bstr           |             | Key identifier |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | IV        | 5     | bstr           |             | Full           |
   |           |       |                |             | Initialization |
   |           |       |                |             | Vector         |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | Partial   | 6     | bstr           |             | Partial        |
   | IV        |       |                |             | Initialization |
   |           |       |                |             | Vector         |
   |           |       |                |             |                |
   | counter   | 7     | COSE_Signature |             | CBOR encoded   |
   | signature |       | / [+           |             | signature      |
   |           |       | COSE_Signature |             | structure      |
   |           |       | ]              |             |                |
   +-----------+-------+----------------+-------------+----------------+

                     Table 2: Common Header Parameters

   The CDDL fragment that represents the set of headers defined in this
   section is given below.  Each of the headers is tagged as optional
   because they do not need to be in every map; headers required in
   specific maps are discussed above.











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   Generic_Headers = (
       ? 1 => int / tstr,  ; algorithm identifier
       ? 2 => [+label],    ; criticality
       ? 3 => tstr / int,  ; content type
       ? 4 => bstr,        ; key identifier
       ? 5 => bstr,        ; IV
       ? 6 => bstr,        ; Partial IV
       ? 7 => COSE_Signature / [+COSE_Signature] ; Counter signature
   )

4.  Signing Objects

   COSE supports two different signature structures.  COSE_Sign allows
   for one or more signatures to be applied to the same content.
   COSE_Sign1 is restricted to a single signer.  The structures cannot
   be converted between each other; as the signature computation
   includes a parameter identifying which structure is being used, the
   converted structure will fail signature validation.

4.1.  Signing with One or More Signers

   The COSE_Sign structure allows for one or more signatures to be
   applied to a message payload.  Parameters relating to the content and
   parameters relating to the signature are carried along with the
   signature itself.  These parameters may be authenticated by the
   signature, or just present.  An example of a parameter about the
   content is the content type.  Examples of parameters about the
   signature would be the algorithm and key used to create the signature
   and counter signatures.

   When more than one signature is present, the successful validation of
   one signature associated with a given signer is usually treated as a
   successful signature by that signer.  However, there are some
   application environments where other rules are needed.  An
   application that employs a rule other than one valid signature for
   each signer must specify those rules.  Also, where simple matching of
   the signer identifier is not sufficient to determine whether the
   signatures were generated by the same signer, the application
   specification must describe how to determine which signatures were
   generated by the same signer.  Support for different communities of
   recipients is the primary reason that signers choose to include more
   than one signature.  For example, the COSE_Sign structure might
   include signatures generated with the Edwards Digital Signature
   Algorithm (EdDSA) [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] signature algorithm and with
   the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS]
   signature algorithm.  This allows recipients to verify the signature
   associated with one algorithm or the other.  (The original source of




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   this text is [RFC5652].)  More detailed information on multiple
   signature evaluation can be found in [RFC5752].

   The signature structure can be encoded either as tagged or untagged
   depending on the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Sign
   structure is identified by the CBOR tag TBD1.  The CDDL fragment that
   represents this is:

   COSE_Sign_Tagged = #6.991(COSE_Sign) ; Replace 991 with TBD1

   A COSE Signed Message is defined in two parts.  The CBOR object that
   carries the body and information about the body is called the
   COSE_Sign structure.  The CBOR object that carries the signature and
   information about the signature is called the COSE_Signature
   structure.  Examples of COSE Signed Messages can be found in
   Appendix C.1.

   The COSE_Sign structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   payload  contains the serialized content to be signed.  If the
      payload is not present in the message, the application is required
      to supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a
      bstr to ensure that it is transported without changes.  If the
      payload is transported separately ("detached content"), then a nil
      CBOR object is placed in this location and it is the
      responsibility of the application to ensure that it will be
      transported without changes.

      Note: When a signature with message recovery algorithm is used
      (Section 8), the maximum number of bytes that can be recovered is
      the length of the payload.  The size of the payload is reduced by
      the number of bytes that will be recovered.  If all of the bytes
      of the payload are consumed, then the payload is encoded as a zero
      length binary string rather than as being absent.

   signatures  is an array of signatures.  Each signature is represented
      as a COSE_Signature structure.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the above text for COSE_Sign
   follows.






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   COSE_Sign = [
       Headers,
       payload : bstr / nil,
       signatures : [+ COSE_Signature]
   ]

   The COSE_Signature structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   array in order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   signature  contains the computed signature value.  The type of the
      field is a bstr.  Algorithms MUST specify padding if the signature
      value is not a multiple of 8 bits.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the above text for COSE_Signature
   follows.

   COSE_Signature =  [
       Headers,
       signature : bstr
   ]

4.2.  Signing with One Signer

   The COSE_Sign1 signature structure is used when only one signature is
   going to be placed on a message.  The parameters dealing with the
   content and the signature are placed in the same pair of buckets
   rather than having the separation of COSE_Sign.

   The structure can be encoded either tagged or untagged depending on
   the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Sign1 structure is
   identified by the CBOR tag TBD7.  The CDDL fragment that represents
   this is:

   COSE_Sign1_Tagged = #6.997(COSE_Sign1) ; Replace 997 with TBD7

   The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the
   information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1
   structure.  Examples of COSE_Sign1 messages can be found in
   Appendix C.2.

   The COSE_Sign1 structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.



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   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   payload  as described in Section 4.1.

   signature  contains the computed signature value.  The type of the
      field is a bstr.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the above text for COSE_Sign1
   follows.

   COSE_Sign1 = [
       Headers,
       payload : bstr / nil,
       signature : bstr
   ]

4.3.  Externally Supplied Data

   One of the features offered in the COSE document is the ability for
   applications to provide additional data to be authenticated, but that
   is not carried as part of the COSE object.  The primary reason for
   supporting this can be seen by looking at the CoAP message structure
   [RFC7252], where the facility exists for options to be carried before
   the payload.  Examples of data that can be placed in this location
   would be the CoAP code or CoAP options.  If the data is in the header
   section, then it is available for proxies to help in performing its
   operations.  For example, the Accept Option can be used by a proxy to
   determine if an appropriate value is in the Proxy's cache.  But the
   sender can prevent a proxy from changing the set of values that it
   will accept by including that value in the resulting authentication
   tag.  However, it may also be desired to protect these values so that
   if they are modified in transit, it can be detected.

   This document describes the process for using a byte array of
   externally supplied authenticated data; however, the method of
   constructing the byte array is a function of the application.
   Applications that use this feature need to define how the externally
   supplied authenticated data is to be constructed.  Such a
   construction needs to take into account the following issues:

   o  If multiple items are included, applications need to ensure that
      the same byte string is not produced if there are different
      inputs.  This could occur by appending the strings 'AB' and 'CDE'
      or by appending the strings 'ABC' and 'DE'.  This is usually
      addressed by making fields a fixed width and/or encoding the
      length of the field as part of the output.  Using options from
      CoAP [RFC7252] as an example, these fields use a TLV structure so
      they can be concatenated without any problems.



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   o  If multiple items are included, an order for the items needs to be
      defined.  Using options from CoAP as an example, an application
      could state that the fields are to be ordered by the option
      number.

   o  Applications need to ensure that the byte stream is going to be
      the same on both sides.  Using options from CoAP might give a
      problem if the same relative numbering is kept.  An intermediate
      node could insert or remove an option, changing how the relative
      number is done.  An application would need to specify that the
      relative number must be re-encoded to be relative only to the
      options that are in the external data.

4.4.  Signing and Verification Process

   In order to create a signature, a well-defined byte stream is needed.
   The Sig_struture is used to create the canonical form.  This signing
   and verification process takes in the body information (COSE_Sign or
   COSE_Sign1), the signer information (COSE_Signature), and the
   application data (external source).  A Sig_structure is a CBOR array.
   The fields of the Sig_struture in order are:

   1.  A text string identifying the context of the signature.  The
       context string is:

       "Signature"  for signatures using the COSE_Signature structure.

       "Signature1"  for signatures using the COSE_Sign1 structure.

       "CounterSignature"  for signatures used as counter signature
          attributes.

   2.  The protected attributes from the body structure encoded in a
       bstr type.  If there are no protected attributes, a bstr of
       length zero is used.

   3.  The protected attributes from the signer structure encoded in a
       bstr type.  If there are no protected attributes, a bstr of
       length zero is used.  This field is omitted for the COSE_Sign1
       signature structure.

   4.  The protected attributes from the application encoded in a bstr
       type.  If this field is not supplied, it defaults to a zero
       length binary string.  (See Section 4.3 for application guidance
       on constructing this field.)

   5.  The payload to be signed encoded in a bstr type.  The payload is
       placed here independent of how it is transported.



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   The CDDL fragment that describes the above text is.

   Sig_structure = [
       context : "Signature" / "Signature1" / "CounterSignature",
       body_protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
       ? sign_protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
       external_aad : bstr,
       payload : bstr
   ]

   How to compute a signature:

   1.  Create a Sig_structure and populate it with the appropriate
       fields.

   2.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string, using the encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Call the signature creation algorithm passing in K (the key to
       sign with), alg (the algorithm to sign with), and ToBeSigned (the
       value to sign).

   4.  Place the resulting signature value in the 'signature' field of
       the array.

   The steps for verifying a signature are:

   1.  Create a Sig_structure object and populate it with the
       appropriate fields.

   2.  Create the value ToBeSigned by encoding the Sig_structure to a
       byte string, using the encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Call the signature verification algorithm passing in K (the key
       to verify with), alg (the algorithm used sign with), ToBeSigned
       (the value to sign), and sig (the signature to be verified).

   In addition to performing the signature verification, the application
   may also perform the appropriate checks to ensure that the key is
   correctly paired with the signing identity and that the signing
   identity is authorized before performing actions.

4.5.  Computing Counter Signatures

   Counter signatures provide a method of associating different
   signature generated by different signers with some piece of content.
   This is normally used to provide a signature on a signature allowing
   for a proof that a signature existed at a given time (i.e., a



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   Timestamp).  In this document, we allow for counter signatures to
   exist in a greater number of environments.  As an example, it is
   possible to place a counter signature in the unprotected attributes
   of a COSE_Encrypt object.  This would allow for an intermediary to
   either verify that the encrypted byte stream has not been modified,
   without being able to decrypt it, or for the intermediary to assert
   that an encrypted byte stream either existed at a given time or
   passed through it in terms of routing (i.e., a proxy signature).

   An example of a counter signature on a signature can be found in
   Appendix C.1.3.  An example of a counter signature in an encryption
   object can be found in Appendix C.3.3.

   The creation and validation of counter signatures over the different
   items relies on the fact that the structure of the objects have the
   same structure.  The elements are a set of protected attributes, a
   set of unprotected attributes, and a body, in that order.  This means
   that the Sig_structure can be used in a uniform manner to get the
   byte stream for processing a signature.  If the counter signature is
   going to be computed over a COSE_Encrypt structure, the
   body_protected and payload items can be mapped into the Sig_structure
   in the same manner as from the COSE_Sign structure.

   It should be noted that only a signature algorithm with appendix (see
   Section 8) can be used for counter signatures.  This is because the
   body should be able to be processed without having to evaluate the
   counter signature, and this is not possible for signature schemes
   with message recovery.

5.  Encryption Objects

   COSE supports two different encryption structures.  COSE_Encrypt0 is
   used when a recipient structure is not needed because the key to be
   used is known implicitly.  COSE_Encrypt is used the rest of the time.
   This includes cases where there are multiple recipients or a
   recipient algorithm other than direct is used.

5.1.  Enveloped COSE Structure

   The enveloped structure allows for one or more recipients of a
   message.  There are provisions for parameters about the content and
   parameters about the recipient information to be carried in the
   message.  The protected parameters associated with the content are
   authenticated by the content encryption algorithm.  The protected
   parameters associated with the recipient are authenticated by the
   recipient algorithm (when the algorithm supports it).  Examples of
   parameters about the content are the type of the content and the
   content encryption algorithm.  Examples of parameters about the



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   recipient are the recipient's key identifier and the recipient's
   encryption algorithm.

   The same techniques and structures are used for encrypting both the
   plain text and the keys.  This is different from the approach used by
   both CMS [RFC5652] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516] where
   different structures are used for the content layer and for the
   recipient layer.  Two structures are defined: COSE_Encrypt to hold
   the encrypted content and COSE_recipient to hold the encrypted keys
   for recipients.  Examples of encrypted messages can be found in
   Appendix C.3.

   The COSE_Encrypt structure can be encoded either tagged or untagged
   depending on the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Encrypt
   structure is identified by the CBOR tag TBD2.  The CDDL fragment that
   represents this is:

   COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = #6.992(COSE_Encrypt) ; Replace 992 with TBD2

   The COSE_Encrypt structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array
   in order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.  '

   ciphertext  contains the cipher text encoded as a bstr.  If the
      cipher text is to be transported independently of the control
      information about the encryption process (i.e., detached content)
      then the field is encoded as a nil value.

   recipients  contains an array of recipient information structures.
      The type for the recipient information structure is a
      COSE_recipient.

   The CDDL fragment that corresponds to the above text is:

   COSE_Encrypt = [
       Headers,
       ciphertext : bstr / nil,
       recipients : [+COSE_recipient]
   ]

   The COSE_recipient structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   array in order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.




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   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   ciphertext  contains the encrypted key encoded as a bstr.  All
      encoded keys are symetric keys, the binary value of the key is the
      content.  If there is not an encrypted key, then this field is
      encoded as a nil value.

   recipients  contains an array of recipient information structures.
      The type for the recipient information structure is a
      COSE_recipient.  (An example of this can be found in Appendix B.)
      If there are no recipient information structures, this element is
      absent.

   The CDDL fragment that corresponds to the above text for
   COSE_recipient is:

   COSE_recipient = [
       Headers,
       ciphertext : bstr / nil,
       ? recipients : [+COSE_recipient]
   ]

5.1.1.  Content Key Distribution Methods

   An encrypted message consists of an encrypted content and an
   encrypted CEK for one or more recipients.  The CEK is encrypted for
   each recipient, using a key specific to that recipient.  The details
   of this encryption depend on which class the recipient algorithm
   falls into.  Specific details on each of the classes can be found in
   Section 12.  A short summary of the five content key distribution
   methods is:

   direct:  The CEK is the same as the identified previously distributed
      symmetric key or derived from a previously distributed secret.  No
      CEK is transported in the message.

   symmetric key-encryption keys:  The CEK is encrypted using a
      previously distributed symmetric KEK.

   key agreement:  The recipient's public key and a sender's private key
      are used to generate a pairwise secret, a KDF is applied to derive
      a key, and then the CEK is either the derived key or encrypted by
      the derived key.

   key transport:  The CEK is encrypted with the recipient's public key.
      No key transport algorithms are defined in this document.





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   passwords:  The CEK is encrypted in a KEK that is derived from a
      password.  No password algorithms are defined in this document.

5.2.  Single Recipient Encrypted

   The COSE_Encrypt0 encrypted structure does not have the ability to
   specify recipients of the message.  The structure assumes that the
   recipient of the object will already know the identity of the key to
   be used in order to decrypt the message.  If a key needs to be
   identified to the recipient, the enveloped structure ought to be
   used.

   Examples of encrypted messages can be found in Appendix C.3.

   The COSE_Encrypt0 structure can be encoded either tagged or untagged
   depending on the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Encrypt0
   structure is identified by the CBOR tag TBD3.  The CDDL fragment that
   represents this is:

   COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged = #6.993(COSE_Encrypt0) ; Replace 993 with TBD3

   The COSE_Encrypt0 structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array
   in order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   ciphertext  as described in Section 5.1.

   The CDDL fragment for COSE_Encrypt0 that corresponds to the above
   text is:

   COSE_Encrypt0 = [
       Headers,
       ciphertext : bstr / nil,
   ]

5.3.  How to encrypt and decrypt for AEAD Algorithms

   The encryption algorithm for AEAD algorithms is fairly simple.  The
   first step is to create a consistent byte stream for the
   authenticated data structure.  For this purpose, we use an
   Enc_structure.  The Enc_structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the
   Enc_structure in order are:

   1.  A text string identifying the context of the authenticated data
       structure.  The context string is:



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       "Encrypt0"  for the content encryption of a COSE_Encrypt0 data
          structure.

       "Encrypt"  for the first layer of a COSE_Encrypt data structure
          (i.e., for content encryption).

       "Enc_Recipient"  for a recipient encoding to be placed in an
          COSE_Encrypt data structure.

       "Mac_Recipient"  for a recipient encoding to be placed in a MACed
          message structure.

       "Rec_Recipient"  for a recipient encoding to be placed in a
          recipient structure.

   2.  The protected attributes from the body structure encoded in a
       bstr type.  If there are no protected attributes, a bstr of
       length zero is used.

   3.  The protected attributes from the application encoded in a bstr
       type.  If this field is not supplied, it defaults to a zero
       length bstr.  (See Section 4.3 for application guidance on
       constructing this field.)

   The CDDL fragment that describes the above text is:

   Enc_structure = [
       context : "Encrypt" / "Encrypt0" / "Enc_Recipient" /
           "Mac_Recipient" / "Rec_Recipient",
       protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
       external_aad : bstr
   ]

   How to encrypt a message:

   1.  Create an Enc_structure and populate it with the appropriate
       fields.

   2.  Encode the Enc_structure to a byte stream (AAD), using the
       encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Determine the encryption key (K).  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current layer.  Examples are key transport keys
          Section 12.3, key wrap keys Section 12.2.1 or pre-shared
          secrets.



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       Direct Encryption and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is
          determined by the key and algorithm in the recipient
          structure.  The encryption algorithm and size of the key to be
          used are inputs into the KDF used for the recipient.  (For
          direct, the KDF can be thought of as the identity operation.)
          Examples of these algorithms are found in Section 12.1.2 and
          Section 12.4.1.

       Other:  The key is randomly or pseudo-randomly generated.

   4.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key), P (the
       plain text) and AAD.  Place the returned cipher text into the
       'ciphertext' field of the structure.

   5.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient, using K (the encryption key) as the
       plain text.

   How to decrypt a message:

   1.  Create a Enc_structure and populate it with the appropriate
       fields.

   2.  Encode the Enc_structure to a byte stream (AAD), using the
       encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Determine the decryption key.  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current layer.  Examples are key transport keys
          Section 12.3, key wrap keys Section 12.2.1 or pre-shared
          secrets.

       Direct Encryption and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is
          determined by the key and algorithm in the recipient
          structure.  The encryption algorithm and size of the key to be
          used are inputs into the KDF used for the recipient.  (For
          direct, the KDF can be thought of as the identity operation.)
          Examples of these algorithms are found in Section 12.1.2 and
          Section 12.4.1.

       Other:  The key is determined by decoding and decrypting one of
          the recipient structures.

   4.  Call the decryption algorithm with K (the decryption key to use),
       C (the cipher text) and AAD.




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5.4.  How to encrypt and decrypt for AE Algorithms

   How to encrypt a message:

   1.  Verify that the 'protected' field is empty.

   2.  Verify that there was no external additional authenticated data
       supplied for this operation.

   3.  Determine the encryption key.  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current layer.  Examples are key transport keys
          Section 12.3, key wrap keys Section 12.2.1 or pre-shared
          secrets.

       Direct Encryption and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is
          determined by the key and algorithm in the recipient
          structure.  The encryption algorithm and size of the key to be
          used are inputs into the KDF used for the recipient.  (For
          direct, the KDF can be thought of as the identity operation.)
          Examples of these algorithms are found in Section 12.1.2 and
          Section 12.4.1.

       Other:  The key is randomly generated.

   4.  Call the encryption algorithm with K (the encryption key to use)
       and the P (the plain text).  Place the returned cipher text into
       the 'ciphertext' field of the structure.

   5.  For recipients of the message, recursively perform the encryption
       algorithm for that recipient, using K (the encryption key) as the
       plain text.

   How to decrypt a message:

   1.  Verify that the 'protected' field is empty.

   2.  Verify that there was no external additional authenticated data
       supplied for this operation.

   3.  Determine the decryption key.  This step is dependent on the
       class of recipient algorithm being used.  For:

       No Recipients:  The key to be used is determined by the algorithm
          and key at the current layer.  Examples are key transport keys




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          Section 12.3, key wrap keys Section 12.2.1 or pre-shared
          secrets.

       Direct Encryption and Direct Key Agreement:  The key is
          determined by the key and algorithm in the recipient
          structure.  The encryption algorithm and size of the key to be
          used are inputs into the KDF used for the recipient.  (For
          direct, the KDF can be thought of as the identity operation.)
          Examples of these algorithms are found in Section 12.1.2 and
          Section 12.4.1.

       Other:  The key is determined by decoding and decrypting one of
          the recipient structures.

   4.  Call the decryption algorithm with K (the decryption key to use),
       and C (the cipher text).

6.  MAC Objects

   COSE supports two different MAC structures.  COSE_MAC0 is used when a
   recipient structure is not needed because the key to be used is
   implicitly known.  COSE_MAC is used for all other cases.  These
   include a requirement for multiple recipients, the key being unknown,
   and a recipient algorithm of other than direct.

   In this section, we describe the structure and methods to be used
   when doing MAC authentication in COSE.  This document allows for the
   use of all of the same classes of recipient algorithms as are allowed
   for encryption.

   When using MAC operations, there are two modes in which they can be
   used.  The first is just a check that the content has not been
   changed since the MAC was computed.  Any class of recipient algorithm
   can be used for this purpose.  The second mode is to both check that
   the content has not been changed since the MAC was computed, and to
   use the recipient algorithm to verify who sent it.  The classes of
   recipient algorithms that support this are those that use a pre-
   shared secret or do static-static key agreement (without the key wrap
   step).  In both of these cases, the entity that created and sent the
   message MAC can be validated.  (This knowledge of sender assumes that
   there are only two parties involved and you did not send the message
   to yourself.)  The origination property can be obtained with both of
   the MAC message structures.








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6.1.  MACed Message with Recipients

   The multiple recipient MACed message uses two structures, the
   COSE_Mac structure defined in this section for carrying the body and
   the COSE_recipient structure (Section 5.1) to hold the key used for
   the MAC computation.  Examples of MACed messages can be found in
   Appendix C.5.

   The MAC structure can be encoded either tagged or untagged depending
   on the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Mac structure is
   identified by the CBOR tag TBD4.  The CDDL fragment that represents
   this is:

   COSE_Mac_Tagged = #6.994(COSE_Mac)         ; Replace 994 with TBD4

   The COSE_Mac structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   payload  contains the serialized content to be MACed.  If the payload
      is not present in the message, the application is required to
      supply the payload separately.  The payload is wrapped in a bstr
      to ensure that it is transported without changes.  If the payload
      is transported separately (i.e., detached content), then a nil
      CBOR value is placed in this location and it is the responsibility
      of the application to ensure that it will be transported without
      changes.

   tag  contains the MAC value.

   recipients  as described in Section 5.1.

   The CDDL fragment that represents the above text for COSE_Mac
   follows.

   COSE_Mac = [
      Headers,
      payload : bstr / nil,
      tag : bstr,
      recipients :[+COSE_recipient]
   ]







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6.2.  MACed Messages with Implicit Key

   In this section, we describe the structure and methods to be used
   when doing MAC authentication for those cases where the recipient is
   implicitly known.

   The MACed message uses the COSE_Mac0 structure defined in this
   section for carrying the body.  Examples of MACed messages with an
   implicit key can be found in Appendix C.6.

   The MAC structure can be encoded either tagged or untagged depending
   on the context it will be used in.  A tagged COSE_Mac0 structure is
   identified by the CBOR tag TBD6.  The CDDL fragment that represents
   this is:

   COSE_Mac0_Tagged = #6.996(COSE_Mac0)    ; Replace 996 with TBD6

   The COSE_Mac0 structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the array in
   order are:

   protected  as described in Section 3.

   unprotected  as described in Section 3.

   payload  as described in Section 6.1.

   tag  contains the MAC value.

   The CDDL fragment that corresponds to the above text is:

   COSE_Mac0 = [
      Headers,
      payload : bstr / nil,
      tag : bstr,
   ]

6.3.  How to compute and verify a MAC

   In order to get a consistent encoding of the data to be
   authenticated, the MAC_structure is used to have a canonical form.
   The MAC_structure is a CBOR array.  The fields of the MAC_structure
   in order are:

   1.  A text string that identifies the structure that is being
       encoded.  This string is "MAC" for the COSE_Mac structure.  This
       string is "MAC0" for the COSE_Mac0 structure.





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   2.  The protected attributes from the COSE_MAC structure.  If there
       are no protected attributes, a zero length bstr is used.

   3.  The protected attributes from the application encoded as a bstr
       type.  If this field is not supplied, it defaults to a zero
       length binary string.  (See Section 4.3 for application guidance
       on constructing this field.)

   4.  The payload to be MAC-ed encoded in a bstr type.  The payload is
       placed here independent of how it is transported.

   The CDDL fragment that corresponds to the above text is:

   MAC_structure = [
        context : "MAC" / "MAC0",
        protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
        external_aad : bstr,
        payload : bstr
   ]

   The steps to compute a MAC are:

   1.  Create a MAC_structure and populate it with the appropriate
       fields.

   2.  Create the value ToBeMaced by encoding the MAC_structure to a
       byte stream, using the encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Call the MAC creation algorithm passing in K (the key to use),
       alg (the algorithm to MAC with) and ToBeMaced (the value to
       compute the MAC on).

   4.  Place the resulting MAC in the 'tag' field of the COSE_Mac or
       COSE_Mac0 structure.

   5.  Encrypt and encode the MAC key for each recipient of the message.

   The steps to verify a MAC are:

   1.  Create a MAC_structure object and populate it with the
       appropriate fields.

   2.  Create the value ToBeMaced by encoding the MAC_structure to a
       byte stream, using the encoding described in Section 14.

   3.  Obtain the cryptographic key from one of the recipients of the
       message.




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   4.  Call the MAC creation algorithm passing in K (the key to use),
       alg (the algorithm to MAC with) and ToBeMaced (the value to
       compute the MAC on).

   5.  Compare the MAC value to the 'tag' field of the COSE_Mac or
       COSE_Mac0 structure.

7.  Key Objects

   A COSE Key structure is built on a CBOR map object.  The set of
   common parameters that can appear in a COSE Key can be found in the
   IANA "COSE Key Common Parameters" registry (Section 16.5).
   Additional parameters defined for specific key types can be found in
   the IANA "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry (Section 16.6).

   A COSE Key Set uses a CBOR array object as its underlying type.  The
   values of the array elements are COSE Keys.  A Key Set MUST have at
   least one element in the array.  Examples of Key Sets can be found in
   Appendix C.7.

   Each element in a key set MUST be processed independently.  If one
   element in a key set is either malformed or uses a key that is not
   understood by an application, that key is ignored and the other keys
   are processed normally.

   The element "kty" is a required element in a COSE_Key map.

   The CDDL grammar describing COSE_Key and COSE_KeySet is:

   COSE_Key = {
       1 => tstr / int,          ; kty
       ? 2 => bstr,              ; kid
       ? 3 => tstr / int,        ; alg
       ? 4 => [+ (tstr / int) ], ; key_ops
       ? 5 => bstr,              ; Base IV
       * label => values
   }

   COSE_KeySet = [+COSE_Key]

7.1.  COSE Key Common Parameters

   This document defines a set of common parameters for a COSE Key
   object.  Table 3 provides a summary of the parameters defined in this
   section.  There are also parameters that are defined for specific key
   types.  Key type specific parameters can be found in Section 13.





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   +---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+
   | name    | label | CBOR type      | registry   | description       |
   +---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+
   | kty     | 1     | tstr / int     | COSE Key   | Identification of |
   |         |       |                | Common     | the key type      |
   |         |       |                | Parameters |                   |
   |         |       |                |            |                   |
   | alg     | 3     | tstr / int     | COSE       | Key usage         |
   |         |       |                | Algorithm  | restriction to    |
   |         |       |                | Values     | this algorithm    |
   |         |       |                |            |                   |
   | kid     | 2     | bstr           |            | Key               |
   |         |       |                |            | Identification    |
   |         |       |                |            | value - match to  |
   |         |       |                |            | kid in message    |
   |         |       |                |            |                   |
   | key_ops | 4     | [+ (tstr/int)] |            | Restrict set of   |
   |         |       |                |            | permissible       |
   |         |       |                |            | operations        |
   |         |       |                |            |                   |
   | Base IV | 5     | bstr           |            | Base IV to be     |
   |         |       |                |            | xor-ed with       |
   |         |       |                |            | Partial IVs       |
   +---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+

                          Table 3: Key Map Labels

   kty:  This parameter is used to identify the family of keys for this
      structure, and thus the set of key type specific parameters to be
      found.  The set of values defined in this document can be found in
      Table 21.  This parameter MUST be present in a key object.
      Implementations MUST verify that the key type is appropriate for
      the algorithm being processed.  The key type MUST be included as
      part of the trust decision process.

   alg:  This parameter is used to restrict the algorithm that is used
      with the key.  If this parameter is present in the key structure,
      the application MUST verify that this algorithm matches the
      algorithm for which the key is being used.  If the algorithms do
      not match, then this key object MUST NOT be used to perform the
      cryptographic operation.  Note that the same key can be in a
      different key structure with a different or no algorithm
      specified, however this is considered to be a poor security
      practice.

   kid:  This parameter is used to give an identifier for a key.  The
      identifier is not structured and can be anything from a user
      provided string to a value computed on the public portion of the



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      key.  This field is intended for matching against a 'kid'
      parameter in a message in order to filter down the set of keys
      that need to be checked.

   key_ops:  This parameter is defined to restrict the set of operations
      that a key is to be used for.  The value of the field is an array
      of values from Table 4.  Algorithms define the values of key ops
      that are permitted to appear and are required for specific
      operations.  The set of values matches that in [RFC7517] and
      [W3C.WebCrypto].

   Base IV:  This parameter is defined to carry the base portion of an
      IV.  It is designed to be used with the partial IV header
      parameter defined in Section 3.1.  This field provides the ability
      to associate a partial IV with a key that is then modified on a
      per message basis with the partial IV.

      Extreme care needs to be taken when using a Base IV in an
      application.  Many encryption algorithms lose security if the same
      IV is used twice.

      If different keys are derived for each sender, using the same base
      IV with partial IVs starting at zero is likely to ensure that the
      IV would not be used twice for a single key.  If different keys
      are derived for each sender, starting at the same base IV is
      likely to satisfy this condition.  If the same key is used for
      multiple senders, then the application needs to provide for a
      method of dividing the IV space up between the senders.  This
      could be done by providing a different base point to start from or
      a different partial IV to start with and restricting the number of
      messages to be sent before re-keying.




















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   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | name    | value | description                                     |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | sign    | 1     | The key is used to create signatures.  Requires |
   |         |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | verify  | 2     | The key is used for verification of signatures. |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | encrypt | 3     | The key is used for key transport encryption.   |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | decrypt | 4     | The key is used for key transport decryption.   |
   |         |       | Requires private key fields.                    |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | wrap    | 5     | The key is used for key wrapping.               |
   | key     |       |                                                 |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | unwrap  | 6     | The key is used for key unwrapping.  Requires   |
   | key     |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | derive  | 7     | The key is used for deriving keys.  Requires    |
   | key     |       | private key fields.                             |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | derive  | 8     | The key is used for deriving bits not to be     |
   | bits    |       | used as a key.  Requires private key fields.    |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | MAC     | 9     | The key is used for creating MACs.              |
   | create  |       |                                                 |
   |         |       |                                                 |
   | MAC     | 10    | The key is used for validating MACs.            |
   | verify  |       |                                                 |
   +---------+-------+-------------------------------------------------+

                       Table 4: Key Operation Values

8.  Signature Algorithms

   There are two signature algorithm schemes.  The first is signature
   with appendix.  In this scheme, the message content is processed and
   a signature is produced, the signature is called the appendix.  This
   is the scheme used by algorithms such as ECDSA and RSASSA-PSS.  (In
   fact the SSA in RSASSA-PSS stands for Signature Scheme with
   Appendix.)

   The signature functions for this scheme are:

   signature = Sign(message content, key)

   valid = Verification(message content, key, signature)



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   The second scheme is signature with message recovery.  (An example of
   such an algorithm is [PVSig].)  In this scheme, the message content
   is processed, but part of it is included in the signature.  Moving
   bytes of the message content into the signature allows for smaller
   signatures, the signature size is still potentially large, but the
   message content has shrunk.  This has implications for systems
   implementing these algorithms and for applications that use them.
   The first is that the message content is not fully available until
   after a signature has been validated.  Until that point the part of
   the message contained inside of the signature is unrecoverable.  The
   second is that the security analysis of the strength of the signature
   is very much based on the structure of the message content.  Messages
   that are highly predictable require additional randomness to be
   supplied as part of the signature process.  In the worst case, it
   becomes the same as doing a signature with appendix.  Finally, in the
   event that multiple signatures are applied to a message, all of the
   signature algorithms are going to be required to consume the same
   number of bytes of message content.  This means that mixing of the
   different schemes in a single message is not supported, and if a
   recovery signature scheme is used, then the same amount of content
   needs to be consumed by all of the signatures.

   The signature functions for this scheme are:

   signature, message sent = Sign(message content, key)

   valid, message content = Verification(message sent, key, signature)

   Signature algorithms are used with the COSE_Signature and COSE_Sign1
   structures.  At this time, only signatures with appendixes are
   defined for use with COSE, however considerable interest has been
   expressed in using a signature with message recovery algorithm due to
   the effective size reduction that is possible.  Implementations will
   need to keep this in mind for later possible integration.

8.1.  ECDSA

   ECDSA [DSS] defines a signature algorithm using ECC.  Implementations
   SHOULD use a deterministic version of ECDSA such as the one defined
   in [RFC6979].  The use of a deterministic signature algorithms allows
   for systems to avoid relying on random number generators in order to
   avoid generating the same value of 'k' (the per-message random
   value).  Biased generation of the value be attacked and collisions
   will lead to leaked keys.  It additionally allows for doing
   deterministic tests for the signature algorithm.  The use of
   deterministic ECDSA does not lessen the need to to have good random
   number generation when creating the private key.




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   The ECDSA signature algorithm is parameterized with a hash function
   (h).  In the event that the length of the hash function output is
   greater than the group of the key, the left-most bytes of the hash
   output are used.

   The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 5.

              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | name  | value | hash    | description      |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+
              | ES256 | -7    | SHA-256 | ECDSA w/ SHA-256 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES384 | -35   | SHA-384 | ECDSA w/ SHA-384 |
              |       |       |         |                  |
              | ES512 | -36   | SHA-512 | ECDSA w/ SHA-512 |
              +-------+-------+---------+------------------+

                      Table 5: ECDSA Algorithm Values

   This document defines ECDSA to work only with the curves P-256, P-384
   and P-521.  This document requires that the curves be encoded using
   the 'EC2' (2 coordinate Elliptic Curve) key type.  Implementations
   need to check that the key type and curve are correct when creating
   and verifying a signature.  Other documents can define it to work
   with other curves and points in the future.

   In order to promote interoperability, it is suggested that SHA-256 be
   used only with curve P-256, SHA-384 be used only with curve P-384 and
   SHA-512 be used with curve P-521.  This is aligned with the
   recommendation in Section 4 of [RFC5480].

   The signature algorithm results in a pair of integers (R, S).  These
   integers will the same length as length of the key used for the
   signature process.  The signature is encoded by converting the
   integers into byte strings of the same length as the key size.  The
   length is rounded up to the nearest byte and is left padded with zero
   bits to get to the correct length.  The two integers are then
   concatenated together to form a byte string that is the resulting
   signature.

   Using the function defined in [I-D.moriarty-pkcs1] the signature is:
   Signature = I2OSP(R, n) | I2OSP(S, n)
   where n = ceiling(key_length / 8)

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'EC2'.



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   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the ECDSA signature
      algorithm being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'sign' when
      creating an ECDSA signature.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'verify' when
      verifying an ECDSA signature.

8.1.1.  Security Considerations

   The security strength of the signature is no greater than the minimum
   of the security strength associated with the bit length of the key
   and the security strength of the hash function.

   Note: Use of this technique is a good idea even when good random
   number generation exists.  Doing so both reduces the possibility of
   having the same value of 'k' in two signature operations and allows
   for reproducible signature values, which helps testing.

   There are two substitution attacks that can theoretically be mounted
   against the ECDSA signature algorithm.

   o  Changing the curve used to validate the signature: If one changes
      the curve used to validate the signature, then potentially one
      could have a two messages with the same signature each computed
      under a different curve.  The only requirement on the new curve is
      that its order be the same as the old one and it be acceptable to
      the client.  An example would be to change from using the curve
      secp256r1 (aka P-256) to using secp256k1.  (Both are 256 bit
      curves.)  We current do not have any way to deal with this version
      of the attack except to restrict the overall set of curves that
      can be used.

   o  Change the hash function used to validate the signature: If one
      has either two different hash functions of the same length, or one
      can truncate a hash function down, then one could potentially find
      collisions between the hash functions rather than within a single
      hash function.  (For example, truncating SHA-512 to 256 bits might
      collide with a SHA-256 bit hash value.)  As the hash algorithm is
      part of the signature algorithm identifier, this attack is
      mitigated by including signature algorithm identifier in the
      protected header.








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8.2.  Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithms (EdDSA)

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] describes the elliptic curve signature scheme
   Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).  In that document,
   the signature algorithm is instantiated using parameters for
   edwards25519 and edwards448 curves.  The document additionally
   describes two variants of the EdDSA algorithm: Pure EdDSA, where no
   hash function is applied to the content before signing and, HashEdDSA
   where a hash function is applied to the content before signing and
   the result of that hash function is signed.  For the EdDSA, the
   content to be signed (either the message or the pre-hash value) is
   processed twice inside of the signature algorithm.  For use with
   COSE, only the pure EdDSA version is used.  This is because it is not
   expected that extremely large contents are going to be needed and,
   based on the arrangement of the message structure, the entire message
   is going to need to be held in memory in order to create or verify a
   signature.  This means that there does not appear to be a need to be
   able to do block updates of the hash, followed by eliminating the
   message from memory.  Applications can provide the same features by
   defining the content of the message as a hash value and transporting
   the COSE object (with the hash value) and the content as separate
   items.

   The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 6.  A
   single signature algorithm is defined, which can be used for multiple
   curves.

                      +-------+-------+-------------+
                      | name  | value | description |
                      +-------+-------+-------------+
                      | EdDSA | -8    | EdDSA       |
                      +-------+-------+-------------+

                      Table 6: EdDSA Algorithm Values

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] describes the method of encoding the signature
   value.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'OKP' (Octet Key
      Pair).

   o  The 'crv' field MUST be present, and it MUST be a curve defined
      for this signature algorithm.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match 'EdDSA'.



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   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'sign' when
      creating an EdDSA signature.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'verify' when
      verifying an EdDSA signature.

8.2.1.  Security Considerations

   How public values are computed is not the same when looking at EdDSA
   and ECDH, for this reason they should not be used with the other
   algorithm.

   If batch signature verification is performed, a well-seeded
   cryptographic random number generator is REQUIRED.  Signing and non-
   batch signature verification are deterministic operations and do not
   need random numbers of any kind.

9.  Message Authentication (MAC) Algorithms

   Message Authentication Codes (MACs) provide data authentication and
   integrity protection.  They provide either no or very limited data
   origination.  A MAC, for example, be used to prove the identity of
   the sender to a third party.

   MACs use the same scheme as signature with appendix algorithms.  The
   message content is processed and an authentication code is produced.
   The authentication code is frequently called a tag.

   The MAC functions are:

   tag = MAC_Create(message content, key)

   valid = MAC_Verify(message content, key, tag)

   MAC algorithms can be based on either a block cipher algorithm (i.e.,
   AES-MAC) or a hash algorithm (i.e., HMAC).  This document defines a
   MAC algorithm using each of these constructions.

   MAC algorithms are used in the COSE_Mac and COSE_Mac0 structures.

9.1.  Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC)

   The Hash-based Message Authentication Code algorithm (HMAC)
   [RFC2104][RFC4231] was designed to deal with length extension
   attacks.  The algorithm was also designed to allow for new hash
   algorithms to be directly plugged in without changes to the hash
   function.  The HMAC design process has been shown as solid since,
   while the security of hash algorithms such as MD5 has decreased over



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   time, the security of HMAC combined with MD5 has not yet been shown
   to be compromised [RFC6151].

   The HMAC algorithm is parameterized by an inner and outer padding, a
   hash function (h), and an authentication tag value length.  For this
   specification, the inner and outer padding are fixed to the values
   set in [RFC2104].  The length of the authentication tag corresponds
   to the difficulty of producing a forgery.  For use in constrained
   environments, we define a set of HMAC algorithms that are truncated.
   There are currently no known issues with truncation, however the
   security strength of the message tag is correspondingly reduced in
   strength.  When truncating, the left-most tag length bits are kept
   and transmitted.

   The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 7.

   +-----------+-------+---------+----------+--------------------------+
   | name      | value | Hash    | Tag      | description              |
   |           |       |         | Length   |                          |
   +-----------+-------+---------+----------+--------------------------+
   | HMAC      | 4     | SHA-256 | 64       | HMAC w/ SHA-256          |
   | 256/64    |       |         |          | truncated to 64 bits     |
   |           |       |         |          |                          |
   | HMAC      | 5     | SHA-256 | 256      | HMAC w/ SHA-256          |
   | 256/256   |       |         |          |                          |
   |           |       |         |          |                          |
   | HMAC      | 6     | SHA-384 | 384      | HMAC w/ SHA-384          |
   | 384/384   |       |         |          |                          |
   |           |       |         |          |                          |
   | HMAC      | 7     | SHA-512 | 512      | HMAC w/ SHA-512          |
   | 512/512   |       |         |          |                          |
   +-----------+-------+---------+----------+--------------------------+

                      Table 7: HMAC Algorithm Values

   Some recipient algorithms carry the key while others derive a key
   from secret data.  For those algorithms that carry the key (such as
   AES-KeyWrap), the size of the HMAC key SHOULD be the same size as the
   underlying hash function.  For those algorithms that derive the key
   (such as ECDH), the derived key MUST be the same size as the
   underlying hash function.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.





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   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the HMAC algorithm
      being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC create'
      when creating an HMAC authentication tag.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC verify'
      when verifying an HMAC authentication tag.

   Implementations creating and validating MAC values MUST validate that
   the key type, key length, and algorithm are correct and appropriate
   for the entities involved.

9.1.1.  Security Considerations

   HMAC has proved to be resistant to attack even when used with
   weakened hash algorithms.  The current best known attack appears is
   to brute force the key.  This means that key size is going to be
   directly related to the security of an HMAC operation.

9.2.  AES Message Authentication Code (AES-CBC-MAC)

   AES-CBC-MAC is defined in [MAC].  (Note this is not the same
   algorithm as AES-CMAC [RFC4493]).

   AES-CBC-MAC is parameterized by the key length, the authentication
   tag length and the IV used.  For all of these algorithms, the IV is
   fixed to all zeros.  We provide an array of algorithms for various
   key lengths and tag lengths.  The algorithms defined in this document
   are found in Table 8.





















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   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
   | name        | value | key      | tag      | description           |
   |             |       | length   | length   |                       |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+
   | AES-MAC     | 14    | 128      | 64       | AES-MAC 128 bit key,  |
   | 128/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | 15    | 256      | 64       | AES-MAC 256 bit key,  |
   | 256/64      |       |          |          | 64-bit tag            |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | 25    | 128      | 128      | AES-MAC 128 bit key,  |
   | 128/128     |       |          |          | 128-bit tag           |
   |             |       |          |          |                       |
   | AES-MAC     | 26    | 256      | 128      | AES-MAC 256 bit key,  |
   | 256/128     |       |          |          | 128-bit tag           |
   +-------------+-------+----------+----------+-----------------------+

                     Table 8: AES-MAC Algorithm Values

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  Implementations creating and validating MAC values MUST
   validate that the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the entities involved.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the AES-MAC algorithm
      being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC create'
      when creating an AES-MAC authentication tag.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC verify'
      when verifying an AES-MAC authentication tag.

9.2.1.  Security Considerations

   A number of attacks exist against CBC-MAC that need to be considered.
   -

   o  A single key must only be used for messages of a fixed and known
      length.  If this is not the case, an attacker will be able to
      generate a message with a valid tag given two message and tag
      pairs.  This can be addressed by using different keys for
      different length messages.  The current structure mitigates this



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      problem, as a specific encoding structure that includes lengths is
      built and signed.  (CMAC also addresses this issue.)

   o  When using CBC mode, if the same key is used for both encryption
      and authentication operations, an attacker can produce messages
      with a valid authentication code.

   o  If the IV can be modified, then messages can be forged.  This is
      addressed by fixing the IV to all zeros.

10.  Content Encryption Algorithms

   Content Encryption Algorithms provide data confidentiality for
   potentially large blocks of data using a symmetric key.  They provide
   integrity on the data that was encrypted, however they provide either
   no or very limited data origination.  (One cannot, for example, be
   used to prove the identity of the sender to a third party.)  The
   ability to provide data origination is linked to how the CEK is
   obtained.

   COSE restricts the set of legal content encryption algorithms to
   those that support authentication both of the content and additional
   data.  The encryption process will generate some type of
   authentication value, but that value may be either explicit or
   implicit in terms of the algorithm definition.  For simplicity sake,
   the authentication code will normally be defined as being appended to
   the cipher text stream.  The encryption functions are:

   ciphertext = Encrypt(message content, key, additional data)

   valid, message content = Decrypt(cipher text, key, additional data)

   Most AEAD algorithms are logically defined as returning the message
   content only if the decryption is valid.  Many but not all
   implementations will follow this convention.  The message content
   MUST NOT be used if the decryption does not validate.

   These algorithms are used in COSE_Encrypt and COSE_Encrypt0.

10.1.  AES GCM

   The GCM mode is a generic authenticated encryption block cipher mode
   defined in [AES-GCM].  The GCM mode is combined with the AES block
   encryption algorithm to define an AEAD cipher.

   The GCM mode is parameterized by the size of the authentication tag
   and the size of the nonce.  This document fixes the size of the nonce
   at 96 bits.  The size of the authentication tag is limited to a small



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   set of values.  For this document however, the size of the
   authentication tag is fixed at 128 bits.

   The set of algorithms defined in this document are in Table 9.

      +---------+-------+------------------------------------------+
      | name    | value | description                              |
      +---------+-------+------------------------------------------+
      | A128GCM | 1     | AES-GCM mode w/ 128-bit key, 128-bit tag |
      |         |       |                                          |
      | A192GCM | 2     | AES-GCM mode w/ 192-bit key, 128-bit tag |
      |         |       |                                          |
      | A256GCM | 3     | AES-GCM mode w/ 256-bit key, 128-bit tag |
      +---------+-------+------------------------------------------+

                   Table 9: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  Implementations encrypting and decrypting MUST validate
   that the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the entities involved.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the AES-GCM algorithm
      being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'encrypt' or
      'wrap key' when encrypting.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'decrypt' or
      'unwrap key' when decrypting.

10.1.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-GCM, the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.

   o  The total amount of data encrypted for a single key MUST NOT
      exceed 2^39 - 256 bits.  An explicit check is required only in
      environments where it is expected that it might be exceeded.

   Consideration was given to supporting smaller tag values; the
   constrained community would desire tag sizes in the 64-bit range.



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   Doing so drastically changes both the maximum messages size
   (generally not an issue) and the number of times that a key can be
   used.  Given that CCM is the usual mode for constrained environments,
   restricted modes are not supported.

10.2.  AES CCM

   Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) is a generic authentication encryption
   block cipher mode defined in [RFC3610].  The CCM mode is combined
   with the AES block encryption algorithm to define a commonly used
   content encryption algorithm used in constrained devices.

   The CCM mode has two parameter choices.  The first choice is M, the
   size of the authentication field.  The choice of the value for M
   involves a trade-off between message growth (from the tag) and the
   probably that an attacker can undetectably modify a message.  The
   second choice is L, the size of the length field.  This value
   requires a trade-off between the maximum message size and the size of
   the Nonce.

   It is unfortunate that the specification for CCM specified L and M as
   a count of bytes rather than a count of bits.  This leads to possible
   misunderstandings where AES-CCM-8 is frequently used to refer to a
   version of CCM mode where the size of the authentication is 64 bits
   and not 8 bits.  These values have traditionally been specified as
   bit counts rather than byte counts.  This document will follow the
   convention of using bit counts so that it is easier to compare the
   different algorithms presented in this document.

   We define a matrix of algorithms in this document over the values of
   L and M.  Constrained devices are usually operating in situations
   where they use short messages and want to avoid doing recipient
   specific cryptographic operations.  This favors smaller values of
   both L and M.  Less constrained devices will want to be able to use
   larger messages and are more willing to generate new keys for every
   operation.  This favors larger values of L and M.

   The following values are used for L:

   16 bits (2)  limits messages to 2^16 bytes (64 KiB) in length.  This
      is sufficiently long for messages in the constrained world.  The
      nonce length is 13 bytes allowing for 2^(13*8) possible values of
      the nonce without repeating.

   64 bits (8)  limits messages to 2^64 bytes in length.  The nonce
      length is 7 bytes allowing for 2^56 possible values of the nonce
      without repeating.




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   The following values are used for M:

   64 bits (8)  produces a 64-bit authentication tag.  This implies that
      there is a 1 in 2^64 chance that a modified message will
      authenticate.

   128 bits (16)  produces a 128-bit authentication tag.  This implies
      that there is a 1 in 2^128 chance that a modified message will
      authenticate.










































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   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | name               | value | L  | M   | k   | description         |
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+
   | AES-CCM-16-64-128  | 10    | 16 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 13-byte nonce  |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-64-256  | 11    | 16 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 13-byte nonce  |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-128  | 12    | 64 | 64  | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-64-256  | 13    | 64 | 64  | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key, 64-bit |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | tag, 7-byte nonce   |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-128 | 30    | 16 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-16-128-256 | 31    | 16 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 13-byte nonce       |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-128 | 32    | 64 | 128 | 128 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   |                    |       |    |     |     |                     |
   | AES-CCM-64-128-256 | 33    | 64 | 128 | 256 | AES-CCM mode        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 256-bit key,        |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | 128-bit tag, 7-byte |
   |                    |       |    |     |     | nonce               |
   +--------------------+-------+----+-----+-----+---------------------+

                  Table 10: Algorithm Values for AES-CCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  Implementations encrypting and decrypting MUST validate
   that the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the entities involved.





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   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the AES-CCM algorithm
      being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'encrypt' or
      'wrap key' when encrypting.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'decrypt' or
      'unwrap key' when decrypting.

10.2.1.  Security Considerations

   When using AES-CCM, the following restrictions MUST be enforced:

   o  The key and nonce pair MUST be unique for every message encrypted.
      Note that the value of L influences the number of unique nonces.

   o  The total number of times the AES block cipher is used MUST NOT
      exceed 2^61 operations.  This limitation is the sum of times the
      block cipher is used in computing the MAC value and in performing
      stream encryption operations.  An explicit check is required only
      in environments where it is expected that it might be exceeded.

   [RFC3610] additionally calls out one other consideration of note.  It
   is possible to do a pre-computation attack against the algorithm in
   cases where portions of the plaintext are highly predictable.  This
   reduces the security of the key size by half.  Ways to deal with this
   attack include adding a random portion to the nonce value and/or
   increasing the key size used.  Using a portion of the nonce for a
   random value will decrease the number of messages that a single key
   can be used for.  Increasing the key size may require more resources
   in the constrained device.  See sections 5 and 10 of [RFC3610] for
   more information.

10.3.  ChaCha20 and Poly1305

   ChaCha20 and Poly1305 combined together is an AEAD mode that is
   defined in [RFC7539].  This is an algorithm defined to be a cipher
   that is not AES and thus would not suffer from any future weaknesses
   found in AES.  These cryptographic functions are designed to be fast
   in software-only implementations.

   The ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD construction defined in [RFC7539] has no
   parameterization.  It takes a 256-bit key and a 96-bit nonce, as well



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   as the plain text and additional data as inputs and produces the
   cipher text as an option.  We define one algorithm identifier for
   this algorithm in Table 11.

   +-------------------+-------+---------------------------------------+
   | name              | value | description                           |
   +-------------------+-------+---------------------------------------+
   | ChaCha20/Poly1305 | 24    | ChaCha20/Poly1305 w/ 256-bit key,     |
   |                   |       | 128-bit tag                           |
   +-------------------+-------+---------------------------------------+

                   Table 11: Algorithm Value for AES-GCM

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  Implementations encrypting and decrypting MUST validate
   that the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the entities involved.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the ChaCha20/Poly1305
      algorithm being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'encrypt' or
      'wrap key' when encrypting.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'decrypt' or
      'unwrap key' when decrypting.

10.3.1.  Security Considerations

   The pair of key, nonce MUST be unique for every invocation of the
   algorithm.  Nonce counters are considered to be an acceptable way of
   ensuring that they are unique.

11.  Key Derivation Functions (KDF)

   Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) are used to take some secret value
   and generate a different one.  The secret value comes in three
   flavors:

   o  Secrets that are uniformly random: This is the type of secret that
      is created by a good random number generator.





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   o  Secrets that are not uniformly random: This is type of secret that
      is created by operations like key agreement.

   o  Secrets that are not random: This is the type of secret that
      people generate for things like passwords.

   General KDF functions work well with the first type of secret, can do
   reasonably well with the second type of secret, and generally do
   poorly with the last type of secret.  None of the KDF functions in
   this section are designed to deal with the type of secrets that are
   used for passwords.  Functions like PBES2 [I-D.moriarty-pkcs5-v2dot1]
   need to be used for that type of secret.

   The same KDF function can be setup to deal with the first two types
   of secrets in a different way.  The KDF function defined in
   Section 11.1 is such a function.  This is reflected in the set of
   algorithms defined for HKDF.

   When using KDF functions, one component that is included is context
   information.  Context information is used to allow for different
   keying information to be derived from the same secret.  The use of
   context based keying material is considered to be a good security
   practice.

   This document defines a single context structure and a single KDF
   function.  These elements are used for all of the recipient
   algorithms defined in this document that require a KDF process.
   These algorithms are defined in Section 12.1.2, Section 12.4.1, and
   Section 12.5.1.

11.1.  HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)

   The HKDF key derivation algorithm is defined in [RFC5869].

   The HKDF algorithm takes these inputs:

      secret - a shared value that is secret.  Secrets may be either
      previously shared or derived from operations like a DH key
      agreement.

      salt - an optional value that is used to change the generation
      process.  The salt value can be either public or private.  If the
      salt is public and carried in the message, then the 'salt'
      algorithm header parameter defined in Table 13 is used.  While
      [RFC5869] suggests that the length of the salt be the same as the
      length of the underlying hash value, any amount of salt will
      improve the security as different key values will be generated.
      This parameter is protected by being included in the key



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      computation and does not need to be separately authenticated.  The
      salt value does not need to be unique for every message sent.

      length - the number of bytes of output that need to be generated.

      context information - Information that describes the context in
      which the resulting value will be used.  Making this information
      specific to the context in which the material is going to be used
      ensures that the resulting material will always be tied to that
      usage.  The context structure defined in Section 11.2 is used by
      the KDF functions in this document.

      PRF - The underlying pseudo-random function to be used in the HKDF
      algorithm.  The PRF is encoded into the HKDF algorithm selection.

   HKDF is defined to use HMAC as the underlying PRF.  However, it is
   possible to use other functions in the same construct to provide a
   different KDF function that is more appropriate in the constrained
   world.  Specifically, one can use AES-CBC-MAC as the PRF for the
   expand step, but not for the extract step.  When using a good random
   shared secret of the correct length, the extract step can be skipped.
   For the AES algorithm versions, the extract step is always skipped.

   The extract step cannot be skipped if the secret is not uniformly
   random, for example, if it is the result of an ECDH key agreement
   step.  (This implies that the AES HKDF version cannot be used with
   ECDH.)  If the extract step is skipped, the 'salt' value is not used
   as part of the HKDF functionality.

   The algorithms defined in this document are found in Table 12.

   +---------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+
   | name          | PRF             | description                     |
   +---------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+
   | HKDF SHA-256  | HMAC with       | HKDF using HMAC SHA-256 as the  |
   |               | SHA-256         | PRF                             |
   |               |                 |                                 |
   | HKDF SHA-512  | HMAC with       | HKDF using HMAC SHA-512 as the  |
   |               | SHA-512         | PRF                             |
   |               |                 |                                 |
   | HKDF AES-     | AES-CBC-MAC-128 | HKDF using AES-MAC as the PRF   |
   | MAC-128       |                 | w/ 128-bit key                  |
   |               |                 |                                 |
   | HKDF AES-     | AES-CBC-MAC-256 | HKDF using AES-MAC as the PRF   |
   | MAC-256       |                 | w/ 256-bit key                  |
   +---------------+-----------------+---------------------------------+

                         Table 12: HKDF algorithms



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   +------+-------+------+-------------------------------+-------------+
   | name | label | type | algorithm                     | description |
   +------+-------+------+-------------------------------+-------------+
   | salt | -20   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256, direct   | Random salt |
   |      |       |      | +HKDF-SHA-512, direct+HKDF-   |             |
   |      |       |      | AES-128, direct+HKDF-AES-256, |             |
   |      |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-       |             |
   |      |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-            |             |
   |      |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-            |             |
   |      |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-ES+A128KW,  |             |
   |      |       |      | ECDH-ES+A192KW, ECDH-         |             |
   |      |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-SS+A128KW,    |             |
   |      |       |      | ECDH-SS+A192KW, ECDH-         |             |
   |      |       |      | SS+A256KW                     |             |
   +------+-------+------+-------------------------------+-------------+

                    Table 13: HKDF Algorithm Parameters

11.2.  Context Information Structure

   The context information structure is used to ensure that the derived
   keying material is "bound" to the context of the transaction.  The
   context information structure used here is based on that defined in
   [SP800-56A].  By using CBOR for the encoding of the context
   information structure, we automatically get the same type and length
   separation of fields that is obtained by the use of ASN.1.  This
   means that there is no need to encode the lengths for the base
   elements as it is done by the encoding used in JOSE (Section 4.6.2 of
   [RFC7518]).

   The context information structure refers to PartyU and PartyV as the
   two parties that are doing the key derivation.  Unless the
   application protocol defines differently, we assign PartyU to the
   entity that is creating the message and PartyV to the entity that is
   receiving the message.  By doing this association, different keys
   will be derived for each direction as the context information is
   different in each direction.

   The context structure is built from information that is known to both
   entities.  This information can be obtained from a variety of
   sources:

   o  Fields can be defined by the application.  This is commonly used
      to assign fixed names to parties, but can be used for other items
      such as nonces.

   o  Fields can be defined by usage of the output.  Examples of this
      are the algorithm and key size that are being generated.



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   o  Fields can be defined by parameters from the message.  We define a
      set of parameters in Table 14 that can be used to carry the values
      associated with the context structure.  Examples of this are
      identities and nonce values.  These parameters are designed to be
      placed in the unprotected bucket of the recipient structure.
      (They do not need to be in the protected bucket since they already
      are included in the cryptographic computation by virtue of being
      included in the context structure.)

   +----------+-------+------+---------------------------+-------------+
   | name     | label | type | algorithm                 | description |
   +----------+-------+------+---------------------------+-------------+
   | PartyU   | -21   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party U     |
   | identity |       |      | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | identity    |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | Information |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      |             |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   |          |       |      |                           |             |
   | PartyU   | -22   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party U     |
   | nonce    |       | /    | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | provided    |
   |          |       | int  | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | nonce       |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      |             |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   |          |       |      |                           |             |
   | PartyU   | -23   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party U     |
   | other    |       |      | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | other       |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | provided    |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      | information |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |



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   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   |          |       |      |                           |             |
   | PartyV   | -24   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party V     |
   | identity |       |      | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | identity    |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | Information |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      |             |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   |          |       |      |                           |             |
   | PartyV   | -25   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party V     |
   | nonce    |       | /    | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | provided    |
   |          |       | int  | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | nonce       |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      |             |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   |          |       |      |                           |             |
   | PartyV   | -26   | bstr | direct+HKDF-SHA-256,      | Party V     |
   | other    |       |      | direct+HKDF-SHA-512,      | other       |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-128,      | provided    |
   |          |       |      | direct+HKDF-AES-256,      | information |
   |          |       |      | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256, ECDH-   |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-256, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+HKDF-512, ECDH-        |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A192KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | ES+A256KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A128KW, ECDH-          |             |
   |          |       |      | SS+A192KW, ECDH-SS+A256KW |             |
   +----------+-------+------+---------------------------+-------------+



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                  Table 14: Context Algorithm Parameters

   We define a CBOR object to hold the context information.  This object
   is referred to as COSE_KDF_Context.  The object is based on a CBOR
   array type.  The fields in the array are:

   AlgorithmID  This field indicates the algorithm for which the key
      material will be used.  This normally is either a Key Wrap
      algorithm identifier or a Content Encryption algorithm identifier.
      The values are from the "COSE Algorithm Value" registry.  This
      field is required to be present.  The field exists in the context
      information so that if the same environment is used for different
      algorithms, then completely different keys will be generated for
      each of those algorithms.  (This practice means if algorithm A is
      broken and thus is easier to find, the key derived for algorithm B
      will not be the same as the key derived for algorithm A.)

   PartyUInfo  This field holds information about party U.  The
      PartyUInfo is encoded as a CBOR array.  The elements of PartyUInfo
      are encoded in the order presented, however if the element does
      not exist no element is placed in the array.  The elements of the
      PartyUInfo array are:

      identity  This contains the identity information for party U.  The
         identities can be assigned in one of two manners.  Firstly, a
         protocol can assign identities based on roles.  For example,
         the roles of "client" and "server" may be assigned to different
         entities in the protocol.  Each entity would then use the
         correct label for the data they send or receive.  The second
         way for a protocol to assign identities is to use a name based
         on a naming system (i.e., DNS, X.509 names).
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU identity' that can be
         used to carry identity information in the message.  However,
         identity information is often known as part of the protocol and
         can thus be inferred rather than made explicit.  If identity
         information is carried in the message, applications SHOULD have
         a way of validating the supplied identity information.  The
         identity information does not need to be specified and is set
         to nil in that case.

      nonce  This contains a nonce value.  The nonce can either be
         implicit from the protocol or carried as a value in the
         unprotected headers.
         We define an algorithm parameter 'PartyU nonce' that can be
         used to carry this value in the message However, the nonce
         value could be determined by the application and the value
         determined from elsewhere.




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         This option does not need to be specified and is set to nil in
         that case

      other  This contains other information that is defined by the
         protocol.
         This option does not need to be specified and is set to nil in
         that case

   PartyVInfo  This field holds information about party V.  The content
      of the structure are the same as for the PartyUInfo but for party
      V.

   SuppPubInfo  This field contains public information that is mutually
      known to both parties.

      keyDataLength  This is set to the number of bits of the desired
         output value.  (This practice means if algorithm A can use two
         different key lengths, the key derived for longer key size will
         not contain the key for shorter key size as a prefix.)

      protected  This field contains the protected parameter field.  If
         there are no elements in the protected field, then use a zero
         length bstr.

      other  This field is for free form data defined by the
         application.  An example is that an application could define
         two different strings to be placed here to generate different
         keys for a data stream vs a control stream.  This field is
         optional and will only be present if the application defines a
         structure for this information.  Applications that define this
         SHOULD use CBOR to encode the data so that types and lengths
         are correctly included.

   SuppPrivInfo  This field contains private information that is
      mutually known private information.  An example of this
      information would be a pre-existing shared secret.  (This could,
      for example, be used in combination with an ECDH key agreement to
      provide a secondary proof of identity.)  The field is optional and
      will only be present if the application defines a structure for
      this information.  Applications that define this SHOULD use CBOR
      to encode the data so that types and lengths are correctly
      included.

   The following CDDL fragment corresponds to the text above.







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   PartyInfo = (
       identity : bstr / nil,
       nonce : bstr / int / nil,
       other : bstr / nil,
   )

   COSE_KDF_Context = [
       AlgorithmID : int / tstr,
       PartyUInfo : [ PartyInfo ],
       PartyVInfo : [ PartyInfo ],
       SuppPubInfo : [
           keyDataLength : uint,
           protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
           ? other : bstr
       ],
       ? SuppPrivInfo : bstr
   ]

12.  Content Key Distribution Methods

   Content key distribution methods (recipient algorithms) can be
   defined into a number of different classes.  COSE has the ability to
   support many classes of recipient algorithms.  In this section, a
   number of classes are listed and then a set of algorithms are
   specified for each of the classes.  The names of the recipient
   algorithm classes used here are the same as are defined in [RFC7516].
   Other specifications use different terms for the recipient algorithm
   classes or do not support some of the recipient algorithm classes.

12.1.  Direct Encryption

   The direct encryption class algorithms share a secret between the
   sender and the recipient that is used either directly or after
   manipulation as the CEK.  When direct encryption mode is used, it
   MUST be the only mode used on the message.

   The COSE_Encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be a zero length item unless it is used
      in the computation of the content key.

   o  The 'alg' parameter MUST be present.

   o  A parameter identifying the shared secret SHOULD be present.

   o  The 'ciphertext' field MUST be a zero length item.

   o  The 'recipients' field MUST be absent.



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12.1.1.  Direct Key

   This recipient algorithm is the simplest; the identified key is
   directly used as the key for the next layer down in the message.
   There are no algorithm parameters defined for this algorithm.  The
   algorithm identifier value is assigned in Table 15.

   When this algorithm is used, the protected field MUST be zero length.
   The key type MUST be 'Symmetric'.

                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | name   | value | description       |
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+
                  | direct | -6    | Direct use of CEK |
                  +--------+-------+-------------------+

                           Table 15: Direct Key

12.1.1.1.  Security Considerations

   This recipient algorithm has several potential problems that need to
   be considered:

   o  These keys need to have some method to be regularly updated over
      time.  All of the content encryption algorithms specified in this
      document have limits on how many times a key can be used without
      significant loss of security.

   o  These keys need to be dedicated to a single algorithm.  There have
      been a number of attacks developed over time when a single key is
      used for multiple different algorithms.  One example of this is
      the use of a single key both for CBC encryption mode and CBC-MAC
      authentication mode.

   o  Breaking one message means all messages are broken.  If an
      adversary succeeds in determining the key for a single message,
      then the key for all messages is also determined.

12.1.2.  Direct Key with KDF

   These recipient algorithms take a common shared secret between the
   two parties and applies the HKDF function (Section 11.1), using the
   context structure defined in Section 11.2 to transform the shared
   secret into the CEK.  The 'protected' field can be of non-zero
   length.  Either the 'salt' parameter of HKDF or the partyU 'nonce'
   parameter of the context structure MUST be present.  The salt/nonce
   parameter can be generated either randomly or deterministically.  The




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   requirement is that it be a unique value for the shared secret in
   question.

   If the salt/nonce value is generated randomly, then it is suggested
   that the length of the random value be the same length as the hash
   function underlying HKDF.  While there is no way to guarantee that it
   will be unique, there is a high probability that it will be unique.
   If the salt/nonce value is generated deterministically, it can be
   guaranteed to be unique and thus there is no length requirement.

   A new IV must be used for each message if the same key is used.  The
   IV can be modified in a predictable manner, a random manner or an
   unpredictable manner (i.e., encrypting a counter).

   The IV used for a key can also be generated from the same HKDF
   functionality as the key is generated.  If HKDF is used for
   generating the IV, the algorithm identifier is set to "IV-
   GENERATION".

   When these algorithms are used, the key type MUST be 'symmetric'.

   The set of algorithms defined in this document can be found in
   Table 16.

   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | name                | value | KDF         | description           |
   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+
   | direct+HKDF-SHA-256 | -10   | HKDF        | Shared secret w/ HKDF |
   |                     |       | SHA-256     | and SHA-256           |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-SHA-512 | -11   | HKDF        | Shared secret w/ HKDF |
   |                     |       | SHA-512     | and SHA-512           |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-AES-128 | -12   | HKDF AES-   | Shared secret w/ AES- |
   |                     |       | MAC-128     | MAC 128-bit key       |
   |                     |       |             |                       |
   | direct+HKDF-AES-256 | -13   | HKDF AES-   | Shared secret w/ AES- |
   |                     |       | MAC-256     | MAC 256-bit key       |
   +---------------------+-------+-------------+-----------------------+

                       Table 16: Direct Key with KDF

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.





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   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the algorithm being
      used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'deriveKey' or
      'deriveBits'.

12.1.2.1.  Security Considerations

   The shared secret needs to have some method to be regularly updated
   over time.  The shared secret forms the basis of trust.  Although not
   used directly, it should still be subject to scheduled rotation.

   While these methods do not provide for perfect forward secrecy, as
   the same shared secret is used for all of the keys generated, if the
   key for any single message is discovered only the message (or series
   of messages) using that derived key are compromised.  A new key
   derivation step will generate a new key which requires the same
   amount of work to get the key.

12.2.  Key Wrapping

   In key wrapping mode, the CEK is randomly generated and that key is
   then encrypted by a shared secret between the sender and the
   recipient.  All of the currently defined key wrapping algorithms for
   COSE are AE algorithms.  Key wrapping mode is considered to be
   superior to direct encryption if the system has any capability for
   doing random key generation.  This is because the shared key is used
   to wrap random data rather than data that has some degree of
   organization and may in fact be repeating the same content.  The use
   of Key Wrapping loses the weak data origination that is provided by
   the direct encryption algorithms.

   The COSE_Encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent if the key wrap algorithm is
      an AE algorithm.

   o  The 'recipients' field is normally absent, but can be used.
      Applications MUST deal with a recipient field being present, not
      being able to decrypt that recipient is an acceptable way of
      dealing with it.  Failing to process the message is not an
      acceptable way of dealing with it.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).






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   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the shared
      secret.

12.2.1.  AES Key Wrapping

   The AES Key Wrapping algorithm is defined in [RFC3394].  This
   algorithm uses an AES key to wrap a value that is a multiple of 64
   bits.  As such, it can be used to wrap a key for any of the content
   encryption algorithms defined in this document.  The algorithm
   requires a single fixed parameter, the initial value.  This is fixed
   to the value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of [RFC3394].  There are no
   public parameters that vary on a per invocation basis.  The protected
   header field MUST be empty.

   Keys may be obtained either from a key structure or from a recipient
   structure.  Implementations encrypting and decrypting MUST validate
   that the key type, key length and algorithm are correct and
   appropriate for the entities involved.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'Symmetric'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the AES Key Wrap
      algorithm being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'encrypt' or
      'wrap key' when encrypting.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'decrypt' or
      'unwrap key' when decrypting.

        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | name   | value | key size | description                 |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+
        | A128KW | -3    | 128      | AES Key Wrap w/ 128-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A192KW | -4    | 192      | AES Key Wrap w/ 192-bit key |
        |        |       |          |                             |
        | A256KW | -5    | 256      | AES Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key |
        +--------+-------+----------+-----------------------------+

                  Table 17: AES Key Wrap Algorithm Values






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12.2.1.1.  Security Considerations for AES-KW

   The shared secret needs to have some method to be regularly updated
   over time.  The shared secret is the basis of trust.

12.3.  Key Transport

   Key transport mode is also called key encryption mode in some
   standards.  Key transport mode differs from key wrap mode in that it
   uses an asymmetric encryption algorithm rather than a symmetric
   encryption algorithm to protect the key.  This document does not
   define any key transport mode algorithms.

   When using a key transport algorithm, the COSE_Encrypt structure for
   the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field MUST be absent.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'alg'
      parameter and SHOULD contain a parameter identifying the
      asymmetric key.

12.4.  Direct Key Agreement

   The 'direct key agreement' class of recipient algorithms uses a key
   agreement method to create a shared secret.  A KDF is then applied to
   the shared secret to derive a key to be used in protecting the data.
   This key is normally used as a CEK or MAC key, but could be used for
   other purposes if more than two layers are in use (see Appendix B).

   The most commonly used key agreement algorithm is Diffie-Hellman, but
   other variants exist.  Since COSE is designed for a store and forward
   environment rather than an on-line environment, many of the DH
   variants cannot be used as the receiver of the message cannot provide
   any dynamic key material.  One side-effect of this is that perfect
   forward secrecy (see [RFC4949]) is not achievable.  A static key will
   always be used for the receiver of the COSE object.

   Two variants of DH that are supported are:

      Ephemeral-Static DH: where the sender of the message creates a
      one-time DH key and uses a static key for the recipient.  The use
      of the ephemeral sender key means that no additional random input
      is needed as this is randomly generated for each message.




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      Static-Static DH: where a static key is used for both the sender
      and the recipient.  The use of static keys allows for recipient to
      get a weak version of data origination for the message.  When
      static-static key agreement is used, then some piece of unique
      data for the KDF is required to ensure that a different key is
      created for each message.

   When direct key agreement mode is used, there MUST be only one
   recipient in the message.  This method creates the key directly and
   that makes it difficult to mix with additional recipients.  If
   multiple recipients are needed, then the version with key wrap needs
   to be used.

   The COSE_Encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  At a minimum, headers MUST contain the 'alg' parameter and SHOULD
      contain a parameter identifying the recipient's asymmetric key.

   o  The headers SHOULD identify the sender's key for the static-static
      versions and MUST contain the sender's ephemeral key for the
      ephemeral-static versions.

12.4.1.  ECDH

   The mathematics for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman can be found in
   [RFC6090].  In this document, the algorithm is extended to be used
   with the two curves defined in [RFC7748].

   ECDH is parameterized by the following:

   o  Curve Type/Curve: The curve selected controls not only the size of
      the shared secret, but the mathematics for computing the shared
      secret.  The curve selected also controls how a point in the curve
      is represented and what happens for the identity points on the
      curve.  In this specification, we allow for a number of different
      curves to be used.  A set of curves are defined in Table 22.
      The math used to obtain the computed secret is based on the curve
      selected and not on the ECDH algorithm.  For this reason, a new
      algorithm does not need to be defined for each of the curves.

   o  Computed Secret to Shared Secret: Once the computed secret is
      known, the resulting value needs to be converted to a byte string
      to run the KDF function.  The X coordinate is used for all of the
      curves defined in this document.  For curves X25519 and X448, the
      resulting value is used directly as it is a byte string of a known
      length.  For the P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves, the X coordinate
      is run through the I2OSP function defined in [I-D.moriarty-pkcs1],
      using the same computation for n as is defined in Section 8.1.



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   o  Ephemeral-static or static-static: The key agreement process may
      be done using either a static or an ephemeral key for the sender's
      side.  When using ephemeral keys, the sender MUST generate a new
      ephemeral key for every key agreement operation.  The ephemeral
      key is placed in the 'ephemeral key' parameter and MUST be present
      for all algorithm identifiers that use ephemeral keys.  When using
      static keys, the sender MUST either generate a new random value or
      otherwise create a unique value.  For the KDF functions used, this
      means either in the 'salt' parameter for HKDF (Table 13) or in the
      'PartyU nonce' parameter for the context structure (Table 14) MUST
      be present.  (Both may be present if desired.)  The value in the
      parameter MUST be unique for the pair of keys being used.  It is
      acceptable to use a global counter that is incremented for every
      static-static operation and use the resulting value.  When using
      static keys, the static key should be identified to the recipient.
      The static key can be identified either by providing the key
      ('static key') or by providing a key identifier for the static key
      ('static key id').  Both of these parameters are defined in
      Table 19.

   o  Key derivation algorithm: The result of an ECDH key agreement
      process does not provide a uniformly random secret.  As such, it
      needs to be run through a KDF in order to produce a usable key.
      Processing the secret through a KDF also allows for the
      introduction of context material: how the key is going to be used,
      and one-time material for static-static key agreement.  All of the
      algorithms defined in this document use one of the HKDF algorithms
      defined in Section 11.1 with the context structure defined in
      Section 11.2.

   o  Key Wrap algorithm: No key wrap algorithm is used.  This is
      represented in Table 18 as 'none'.  The key size for the context
      structure is the content layer encryption algorithm size.

   The set of direct ECDH algorithms defined in this document are found
   in Table 18.















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   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+
   | name      | value | KDF     | Ephemeral- | Key    | description   |
   |           |       |         | Static     | Wrap   |               |
   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+
   | ECDH-ES + | -25   | HKDF -  | yes        | none   | ECDH ES w/    |
   | HKDF-256  |       | SHA-256 |            |        | HKDF -        |
   |           |       |         |            |        | generate key  |
   |           |       |         |            |        | directly      |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-ES + | -26   | HKDF -  | yes        | none   | ECDH ES w/    |
   | HKDF-512  |       | SHA-512 |            |        | HKDF -        |
   |           |       |         |            |        | generate key  |
   |           |       |         |            |        | directly      |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-SS + | -27   | HKDF -  | no         | none   | ECDH SS w/    |
   | HKDF-256  |       | SHA-256 |            |        | HKDF -        |
   |           |       |         |            |        | generate key  |
   |           |       |         |            |        | directly      |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-SS + | -28   | HKDF -  | no         | none   | ECDH SS w/    |
   | HKDF-512  |       | SHA-512 |            |        | HKDF -        |
   |           |       |         |            |        | generate key  |
   |           |       |         |            |        | directly      |
   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+

                      Table 18: ECDH Algorithm Values

























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   +-----------+-------+----------+---------------------+--------------+
   | name      | label | type     | algorithm           | description  |
   +-----------+-------+----------+---------------------+--------------+
   | ephemeral | -1    | COSE_Key | ECDH-ES+HKDF-256,   | Ephemeral    |
   | key       |       |          | ECDH-ES+HKDF-512,   | Public key   |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-ES+A128KW,     | for the      |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-ES+A192KW,     | sender       |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-ES+A256KW      |              |
   |           |       |          |                     |              |
   | static    | -2    | COSE_Key | ECDH-SS+HKDF-256,   | Static       |
   | key       |       |          | ECDH-SS+HKDF-512,   | Public key   |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A128KW,     | for the      |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A192KW,     | sender       |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A256KW      |              |
   |           |       |          |                     |              |
   | static    | -3    | bstr     | ECDH-SS+HKDF-256,   | Static       |
   | key id    |       |          | ECDH-SS+HKDF-512,   | Public key   |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A128KW,     | identifier   |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A192KW,     | for the      |
   |           |       |          | ECDH-SS+A256KW      | sender       |
   +-----------+-------+----------+---------------------+--------------+

                    Table 19: ECDH Algorithm Parameters

   This document defines these algorithms to be used with the curves
   P-256, P-384, P-521, X25519, and X448.  Implementations MUST verify
   that the key type and curve are correct.  Different curves are
   restricted to different key types.  Implementations MUST verify that
   the curve and algorithm are appropriate for the entities involved.

   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'EC2' or 'OKP'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the Key Agreement
      algorithm being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'derive key' or
      'derive bits' for the private key.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST be empty for the public
      key.








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12.4.2.  Security Considerations

   Some method of checking that points provided from external entities
   are valid.  For the 'EC2' key format, this can be done by checking
   that the x and y values form a point on the curve.  For the 'OKP'
   format, there is no simple way to do point validation.

   Consideration was given to requiring that the public keys of both
   entities be provided as part of the key derivation process.  (As
   recommended in section 6.1 of [RFC7748].)  This was not done as COSE
   is used in a store and forward format rather than in on line key
   exchange.  In order for this to be a problem, either the receiver
   public key has to be chosen maliciously or the sender has to be
   malicious.  In either case, all security evaporates anyway.

   A proof of possession of the private key associated with the public
   key is recommended when a key is moved from untrusted to trusted.
   (Either by the end user or by the entity that is responsible for
   making trust statements on keys.)

12.5.  Key Agreement with Key Wrap

   Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK.  The
   CEK is then encrypted using a Key Wrapping algorithm and a key
   derived from the shared secret computed by the key agreement
   algorithm.  The function for this would be:

   encryptedKey = KeyWrap(KDF(DH-Shared, context), CEK)

   The COSE_Encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows:

   o  The 'protected' field is fed into the KDF context structure.

   o  The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down
      (usually the content layer).

   o  The 'alg' parameter MUST be present in the layer.

   o  A parameter identifying the recipient's key SHOULD be present.  A
      parameter identifying the sender's key SHOULD be present.

12.5.1.  ECDH

   These algorithms are defined in Table 20.

   ECDH with Key Agreement is parameterized by the same parameters as
   for ECDH Section 12.4.1 with the following modifications:




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   o  Key Wrap Algorithm: Any of the key wrap algorithms defined in
      Section 12.2.1 are supported.  The size of the key used for the
      key wrap algorithm is fed into the KDF function.  The set of
      identifiers are found in Table 20.

   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+
   | name      | value | KDF     | Ephemeral- | Key    | description   |
   |           |       |         | Static     | Wrap   |               |
   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+
   | ECDH-ES + | -29   | HKDF -  | yes        | A128KW | ECDH ES w/    |
   | A128KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 128   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-ES + | -30   | HKDF -  | yes        | A192KW | ECDH ES w/    |
   | A192KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 192   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-ES + | -31   | HKDF -  | yes        | A256KW | ECDH ES w/    |
   | A256KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 256   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-SS + | -32   | HKDF -  | no         | A128KW | ECDH SS w/    |
   | A128KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 128   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-SS + | -33   | HKDF -  | no         | A192KW | ECDH SS w/    |
   | A192KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 192   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   |           |       |         |            |        |               |
   | ECDH-SS + | -34   | HKDF -  | no         | A256KW | ECDH SS w/    |
   | A256KW    |       | SHA-256 |            |        | Concat KDF    |
   |           |       |         |            |        | and AES Key   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | wrap w/ 256   |
   |           |       |         |            |        | bit key       |
   +-----------+-------+---------+------------+--------+---------------+

               Table 20: ECDH Algorithm Values with Key Wrap




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   When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
   made:

   o  The 'kty' field MUST be present and it MUST be 'EC2' or 'OKP'.

   o  If the 'alg' field is present, it MUST match the Key Agreement
      algorithm being used.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'derive key' or
      'derive bits' for the private key.

   o  If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST be empty for the public
      key.

13.  Key Object Parameters

   The COSE_Key object defines a way to hold a single key object.  It is
   still required that the members of individual key types be defined.
   This section of the document is where we define an initial set of
   members for specific key types.

   For each of the key types, we define both public and private members.
   The public members are what is transmitted to others for their usage.
   Private members allow for the archival of keys by individuals.
   However, there are some circumstances in which private keys may be
   distributed to entities in a protocol.  Examples include: entities
   that have poor random number generation, centralized key creation for
   multi-cast type operations, and protocols in which a shared secret is
   used as a bearer token for authorization purposes.

   Key types are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object.
   In this document, we define four values for the member:

    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | name      | value | description                                |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+
    | OKP       | 1     | Octet Key Pair                             |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | EC2       | 2     | Elliptic Curve Keys w/ X,Y Coordinate pair |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | Symmetric | 4     | Symmetric Keys                             |
    |           |       |                                            |
    | Reserved  | 0     | This value is reserved                     |
    +-----------+-------+--------------------------------------------+

                         Table 21: Key Type Values





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13.1.  Elliptic Curve Keys

   Two different key structures could be defined for Elliptic Curve
   keys.  One version uses both an x and a y coordinate, potentially
   with point compression ('EC2').  This is the traditional EC point
   representation that is used in [RFC5480].  The other version uses
   only the x coordinate as the y coordinate is either to be recomputed
   or not needed for the key agreement operation ('OKP').

   Applications MUST check that the curve and the key type are
   consistent and reject a key if they are not.

    +---------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+
    | name    | key type | value | description                        |
    +---------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+
    | P-256   | EC2      | 1     | NIST P-256 also known as secp256r1 |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | P-384   | EC2      | 2     | NIST P-384 also known as secp384r1 |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | P-521   | EC2      | 3     | NIST P-521 also known as secp521r1 |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | X25519  | OKP      | 4     | X25519 for use w/ ECDH only        |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | X448    | OKP      | 5     | X448 for use w/ ECDH only          |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | Ed25519 | OKP      | 6     | Ed25519 for use w/ EdDSA only      |
    |         |          |       |                                    |
    | Ed448   | OKP      | 7     | Ed448 for use w/ EdDSA only        |
    +---------+----------+-------+------------------------------------+

                            Table 22: EC Curves

13.1.1.  Double Coordinate Curves

   The traditional way of sending EC curves has been to send either both
   the x and y coordinates, or the x coordinate and a sign bit for the y
   coordinate.  The latter encoding has not been recommended in the IETF
   due to potential IPR issues.  However, for operations in constrained
   environments, the ability to shrink a message by not sending the y
   coordinate is potentially useful.

   For EC keys with both coordinates, the 'kty' member is set to 2
   (EC2).  The key parameters defined in this section are summarized in
   Table 23.  The members that are defined for this key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      The curves defined in this document for this key type can be found




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      in Table 22.  Other curves may be registered in the future and
      private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point.  The integer is
      converted to an octet string as defined in [SEC1].  Leading zero
      octets MUST be preserved.

   y  contains either the sign bit or the value of y coordinate for the
      EC point.  When encoding the value y, the integer is converted to
      an octet string (as defined in [SEC1]) and encoded as a CBOR bstr.
      Leading zero octets MUST be preserved.  The compressed point
      encoding is also supported.  Compute the sign bit as laid out in
      the Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String Conversion function of
      [SEC1].  If the sign bit is zero, then encode y as a CBOR false
      value, otherwise encode y as a CBOR true value.  The encoding of
      the infinity point is not supported.

   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv', 'x' and 'y' be present in
   the structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd'
   be present in the structure.  For private keys, it is RECOMMENDED
   that 'x' and 'y' also be present, but they can be recomputed from the
   required elements and omitting them saves on space.

   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | name | key   | label | type    | description                      |
   |      | type  |       |         |                                  |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+
   | crv  | 2     | -1    | int /   | EC Curve identifier - Taken from |
   |      |       |       | tstr    | the COSE Curves registry         |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | x    | 2     | -2    | bstr    | X Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | y    | 2     | -3    | bstr /  | Y Coordinate                     |
   |      |       |       | bool    |                                  |
   |      |       |       |         |                                  |
   | d    | 2     | -4    | bstr    | Private key                      |
   +------+-------+-------+---------+----------------------------------+

                        Table 23: EC Key Parameters

13.2.  Octet Key Pair

   A new key type is defined for Octet Key Pairs (OKP).  Do not assume
   that keys using this type are elliptic curves.  This key type could
   be used for other curve types (for example, mathematics based on
   hyper-elliptic surfaces).



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   The key parameters defined in this section are summarized in
   Table 24.  The members that are defined for this key type are:

   crv  contains an identifier of the curve to be used with the key.
      The curves defined in this document for this key type can be found
      in Table 22.  Other curves may be registered in the future and
      private curves can be used as well.

   x  contains the x coordinate for the EC point.  The octet string
      represents a little-endian encoding of x.

   d  contains the private key.

   For public keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'x' be present in the
   structure.  For private keys, it is REQUIRED that 'crv' and 'd' be
   present in the structure.  For private keys, it is RECOMMENDED that
   'x' also be present, but it can be recomputed from the required
   elements and omitting it saves on space.

   +------+------+-------+-------+-------------------------------------+
   | name | key  | label | type  | description                         |
   |      | type |       |       |                                     |
   +------+------+-------+-------+-------------------------------------+
   | crv  | 1    | -1    | int / | EC Curve identifier - Taken from    |
   |      |      |       | tstr  | the COSE Key Common Parameters      |
   |      |      |       |       | registry                            |
   |      |      |       |       |                                     |
   | x    | 1    | -2    | bstr  | X Coordinate                        |
   |      |      |       |       |                                     |
   | d    | 1    | -4    | bstr  | Private key                         |
   +------+------+-------+-------+-------------------------------------+

                    Table 24: Octet Key Pair Parameters

13.3.  Symmetric Keys

   Occasionally it is required that a symmetric key be transported
   between entities.  This key structure allows for that to happen.

   For symmetric keys, the 'kty' member is set to 3 (Symmetric).  The
   member that is defined for this key type is:

   k  contains the value of the key.

   This key structure does not have a form that contains only public
   members.  As it is expected that this key structure is going to be
   transmitted, care must be taking that it is never transmitted




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   accidentally or insecurely.  For symmetric keys, it is REQUIRED that
   'k' be present in the structure.

             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | name | key type | label | type | description |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+
             | k    | 4        | -1    | bstr | Key Value   |
             +------+----------+-------+------+-------------+

                    Table 25: Symmetric Key Parameters

14.  CBOR Encoder Restrictions

   There has been an attempt to limit the number of places where the
   document needs to impose restrictions on how the CBOR Encoder needs
   to work.  We have managed to narrow it down to the following
   restrictions:

   o  The restriction applies to the encoding the Sig_structure, the
      Enc_structure, and the MAC_structure.

   o  The rules for Canonical CBOR (Section 3.9 of RFC 7049) MUST be
      used in these locations.  The main rule that needs to be enforced
      is that all lengths in these structures MUST be encoded such that
      they are encoded using definite lengths and the minimum length
      encoding is used.

   o  Applications MUST NOT generate messages with the same label used
      twice as a key in a single map.  Applications MUST NOT parse and
      process messages with the same label used twice as a key in a
      single map.  Applications can enforce the parse and process
      requirement by using parsers that will fail the parse step or by
      using parsers that will pass all keys to the application and the
      application can perform the check for duplicate keys.

15.  Application Profiling Considerations

   This document is designed to provide a set of security services, but
   not to provide implementation requirements for specific usage.  The
   interoperability requirements are provided for how each of the
   individual services are used and how the algorithms are to be used
   for interoperability.  The requirements about which algorithms and
   which services are needed are deferred to each application.

   An example of a profile can be found in
   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security] where two profiles are being
   developed.  One is for carrying content by itself, and the other is
   for carrying content in combination with CoAP headers.



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   It is intended that a profile of this document be created that
   defines the interoperability requirements for that specific
   application.  This section provides a set of guidelines and topics
   that need to be considered when profiling this document.

   o  Applications need to determine the set of messages defined in this
      document that they will be using.  The set of messages corresponds
      fairly directly to the set of security services that are needed
      and to the security levels needed.

   o  Applications may define new header parameters for a specific
      purpose.  Applications will often times select specific header
      parameters to use or not to use.  For example, an application
      would normally state a preference for using either the IV or the
      partial IV parameter.  If the partial IV parameter is specified,
      then the application would also need to define how the fixed
      portion of the IV would be determined.

   o  When applications use externally defined authenticated data, they
      need to define how that data is encoded.  This document assumes
      that the data will be provided as a byte stream.  More information
      can be found in Section 4.3.

   o  Applications need to determine the set of security algorithms that
      are to be used.  When selecting the algorithms to be used as the
      mandatory to implement set, consideration should be given to
      choosing different types of algorithms when two are chosen for a
      specific purpose.  An example of this would be choosing HMAC-
      SHA512 and AES-CMAC as different MAC algorithms; the construction
      is vastly different between these two algorithms.  This means that
      a weakening of one algorithm would be unlikely to lead to a
      weakening of the other algorithms.  Of course, these algorithms do
      not provide the same level of security and thus may not be
      comparable for the desired security functionality.

   o  Applications may need to provide some type of negotiation or
      discovery method if multiple algorithms or message structures are
      permitted.  The method can be as simple as requiring
      preconfiguration of the set of algorithms to providing a discovery
      method built into the protocol.  S/MIME provided a number of
      different ways to approach the problem that applications could
      follow:

      *  Advertising in the message (S/MIME capabilities) [RFC5751].

      *  Advertising in the certificate (capabilities extension)
         [RFC4262].




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      *  Minimum requirements for the S/MIME, which have been updated
         over time [RFC2633][RFC5751].

16.  IANA Considerations

16.1.  CBOR Tag assignment

   It is requested that IANA assign the following tags from the "CBOR
   Tags" registry.  It is requested that the tags for COSE_Sign1,
   COSE_Encrypt0, and COSE_Mac0 be assigned in the 1 to 23 value range
   (one byte long when encoded).  It is requested that the tags for
   COSE_Sign, COSE_Encrypt and COSE_MAC be assigned in the 24 to 255
   value range (two bytes long when encoded).

   The tags to be assigned are in Table 1.

16.2.  COSE Header Parameters Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Parameters".  The registry should be created as Expert Review
   Required.  Guidelines for the experts is provided Section 16.11.  It
   should be noted that in additional to the expert review, some
   portions of the registry require a specification, potentially on
   standards track, be supplied as well.

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.
      Names are to be unique in the table.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label can be either
      an integer or a string.  Registration in the table is based on the
      value of the label requested.  Integer values between 1 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as expert review.  Integer values in the range -1 to
      -65536 are delegated to the "COSE Header Algorithm Parameters"
      registry.  Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private
      use.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   value registry  This contains a pointer to the registry used to
      contain values where the set is limited.



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   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 2 and
   Table 27.  The specification column for all rows in that table should
   be this document.

   Additionally, the label of 0 is to be marked as 'Reserved'.

16.3.  COSE Header Algorithm Parameters Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Header
   Algorithm Parameters".  The registry is to be created as Expert
   Review Required.  Expert review guidelines are provided in
   Section 16.11.

   The columns of the registry are:

   name  The name is present to make it easier to refer to and discuss
      the registration entry.  The value is not used in the protocol.

   algorithm  The algorithm(s) that this registry entry is used for.
      This value is taken from the "COSE Algorithm Values" registry.
      Multiple algorithms can be specified in this entry.  For the
      table, the algorithm, label pair MUST be unique.

   label  This is the value used for the label.  The label is an integer
      in the range of -1 to -65536.

   value  This contains the CBOR type for the value portion of the
      label.

   description  This contains a brief description of the header field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the specification defining
      the header field (where public).

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 13,
   Table 14, and Table 19.  The specification column for all rows in
   that table should be this document.

16.4.  COSE Algorithms Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE
   Algorithms Registry".  The registry is to be created as Expert Review
   Required.  Guidelines for the experts is provided Section 16.11.  It



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   should be noted that in additional to the expert review, some
   portions of the registry require a specification, potentially on
   standards track, be supplied as well.

   The columns of the registry are:

   value:  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Algorithm
      values MUST be unique.  The value can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between -256 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from -65536 to 65535 and strings of
      length 2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values
      of greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as expert review.  Integer values less than -65536 are
      marked as private use.

   description:  A short description of the algorithm.

   specification:  A document where the algorithm is defined (if
      publicly available).

   recommended:  Does the IETF have a concensus recommendation to use
      the algorithm.  The legal values are 'yes', 'no' and 'deprecated'.

   The initial contents of the registry can be found in Table 10,
   Table 9, Table 11, Table 5, Table 7, Table 8, Table 15, Table 16,
   Table 17, Table 6, Table 20 and Table 18.  The specification column
   for all rows in the table should be this document.  The recommneded
   column for all rows in the table are set to 'yes'.

   Additionally, the label of 0 is to be marked as 'Reserved'.

   NOTE: The assignment of algorithm identifiers in this document was
   done so that positive numbers were used for the first layer objects
   (COSE_Sign, COSE_Sign1, COSE_Encrypt, COSE_Encrypt0, COSE_Mac, and
   COSE_Mac0).  Negative numbers were used for second layer objects
   (COSE_Signature and COSE_recipient).  Expert reviewers should
   consider this practice, but are not expected to be restricted by this
   precedent.

16.5.  COSE Key Common Parameters Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry entitled "COSE Key
   Common Parameters" registry.  The registry is to be created as Expert
   Review Required.  Guidelines for the experts is provided
   Section 16.11.  It should be noted that in additional to the expert
   review, some portions of the registry require a specification,
   potentially on standards track, be supplied as well.



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   The columns of the registry are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   label  The value to be used to identify this algorithm.  Key map
      labels MUST be unique.  The label can be a positive integer, a
      negative integer or a string.  Integer values between 0 and 255
      and strings of length 1 are designated as Standards Track Document
      required.  Integer values from 256 to 65535 and strings of length
      2 are designated as Specification Required.  Integer values of
      greater than 65535 and strings of length greater than 2 are
      designated as expert review.  Integer values in the range -1 to
      -65536 are used for key parameters specific to a single algorithm
      delegated to the "COSE Key Type Parameter Labels" registry.
      Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

   CBOR Type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field.

   registry  This field denotes the registry that values come from, if
      one exists.

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 3.
   The specification column for all of these entries will be this
   document.

16.6.  COSE Key Type Parameters Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Key Type
   Parameters".  The registry is to be created as Expert Review
   Required.  Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 16.11.

   The columns of the table are:

   key type  This field contains a descriptive string of a key type.
      This should be a value that is in the COSE Key Common Parameters
      table and is placed in the 'kty' field of a COSE Key structure.

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.






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   label  The label is to be unique for every value of key type.  The
      range of values is from -256 to -1.  Labels are expected to be
      reused for different keys.

   CBOR type  This field contains the CBOR type for the field.

   description  This field contains a brief description for the field.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the field if one exists.

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 23,
   Table 24, and Table 25.  The specification column for all of these
   entries will be this document.

16.7.  COSE Key Type Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Key Type
   Registry".  The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.
   Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 16.11.

   The columns of this table are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  The name MUST be unique.  It is not used in the encoding.

   value  This is the value used to identify the curve.  These values
      MUST be unique.  The value can be a positive integer, a negative
      integer or a string.

   description  This field contains a brief description of the curve.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the curve if one exists.

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 21.
   The specification column for all of these entries will be this
   document.

16.8.  COSE Elliptic Curve Parameters Registry

   It is requested that IANA create a new registry "COSE Elliptic Curve
   Parameters".  The registry is to be created as Expert Review
   Required.  Guidelines for the experts is provided Section 16.11.  It
   should be noted that in additional to the expert review, some
   portions of the registry require a specification, potentially on
   standards track, be supplied as well.




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   The columns of the table are:

   name  This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the
      item.  It is not used in the encoding.

   value  This is the value used to identify the curve.  These values
      MUST be unique.  The integer values from -256 to 255 are
      designated as Standards Track Document Required.  The integer
      values from 256 to 65535 and -65536 to -257 are designated as
      Specification Required.  Integer values over 65535 are designated
      as expert review.  Integer values less than -65536 are marked as
      private use.

   key type  This designates the key type(s) that can be used with this
      curve.

   description  This field contains a brief description of the curve.

   specification  This contains a pointer to the public specification
      for the curve if one exists.

   recommended:  Does the IETF have a concensus recommendation to use
      the algorithm.  The legal values are 'yes', 'no' and 'deprecated'.

   This registry will be initially populated by the values in Table 22.
   The specification column for all of these entries will be this
   document.  The recommended column for all of the inital entries will
   be 'yes'.

16.9.  Media Type Registrations

16.9.1.  COSE Security Message

   This section registers the "application/cose" media type in the
   "Media Types" registry.  These media types are used to indicate that
   the content is a COSE message.

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: cose-type

      Encoding considerations: binary





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      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: IoT applications sending
      security content over HTTP(S) transports.

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

16.9.2.  COSE Key media type

   This section registers the "application/cose-key" and "application/
   cose-key-set" media types in the "Media Types" registry.  These media
   types are used to indicate, respectively, that content is a COSE_Key
   or COSE_KeySet object.

   The template for registering "application/cose-key" is:

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key

      Required parameters: N/A




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      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary

      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: Distribution of COSE based
      keys for IoT applications.

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

   The template for registering "application/cose-key-set" is:

      Type name: application

      Subtype name: cose-key-set

      Required parameters: N/A

      Optional parameters: N/A

      Encoding considerations: binary



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      Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
      of RFC TBD.

      Interoperability considerations: N/A

      Published specification: RFC TBD

      Applications that use this media type: Distribution of COSE based
      keys for IoT applications.

      Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

      Additional information:

      *  Magic number(s): N/A

      *  File extension(s): cbor

      *  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

      Person & email address to contact for further information:
      iesg@ietf.org

      Intended usage: COMMON

      Restrictions on usage: N/A

      Author: Jim Schaad, ietf@augustcellars.com

      Change Controller: IESG

      Provisional registration?  No

16.10.  CoAP Content-Format Registrations

   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "CoAP Content-
   Format" registry.  ID assignment in the 24-255 range is requested.














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   +---------------------------------+----------+-------+--------------+
   | Media Type                      | Encoding | ID    | Reference    |
   +---------------------------------+----------+-------+--------------+
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD10 | [This        |
   | ="cose-sign"                    |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD11 | [This        |
   | ="cose-sign1"                   |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD12 | [This        |
   | ="cose-encrypt"                 |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD13 | [This        |
   | ="cose-encrypt0"                |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD14 | [This        |
   | ="cose-mac"                     |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose; cose-type     |          | TBD15 | [This        |
   | ="cose-mac0"                    |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose-key            |          | TBD16 | [This        |
   |                                 |          |       | Document]    |
   |                                 |          |       |              |
   | application/cose-key-set        |          | TBD17 | [This        |
   |                                 |          |       | Document     |
   +---------------------------------+----------+-------+--------------+

                                 Table 26

16.11.  Expert Review Instructions

   All of the IANA registries established in this document are defined
   as expert review.  This section gives some general guidelines for
   what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated
   as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.

   Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

   o  Point squatting should be discouraged.  Reviewers are encouraged
      to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure
      that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already
      registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments.
      The zones tagged as private use are intended for testing purposes
      and closed environments, code points in other ranges should not be
      assigned for testing.





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   o  Specifications are required for the standards track range of point
      assignment.  Specifications should exist for specification
      required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is
      available is considered to be permissible.  Specifications are
      needed for the first-come, first-serve range if they are expected
      to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way.
      When specifications are not provided, the description provided
      needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point is
      being used for.

   o  Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when
      approving point assignment.  The fact that there is a range for
      standards track documents does not mean that a standards track
      document cannot have points assigned outside of that range.  The
      length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many
      code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be
      used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that
      size.

   o  When algorithms are registered, vanity registrations should be
      discouraged.  One way to do this is to require registrations to
      provide additional documentation on security analysis of the
      algorithm.  Another thing that should be considered is to request
      for an opinion on the algorithm from the Crypto Forum Research
      Group (CFRG).  Algorithms that do not meet the security
      requirements of the community and the messages structures should
      not be registered.

17.  Implementation Status

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.




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   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

17.1.  Author's Versions

   There are three different implementations that have been created by
   the author of the document both to create the examples that are
   included in the document and to validate the structures and
   methodology used in the design of COSE.

      Implementation Location: https://github.com/cose-wg

      Primary Maintainer: Jim Schaad

      Languages: There are three different languages that are currently
      supported: Java, C# and C.

      Cryptography: The Java and C# libraries use Bouncy Castle to
      provide the required cryptography.  The C version uses OPENSSL
      Version 1.0 for the cryptography.

      Coverage: The libraries currently do not have full support for
      counter signatures of either variety.  They do have support to
      allow for implicit algorithm support as they allow for the
      application to set attributes that are not to be sent in the
      message.

      Testing: All of the examples in the example library are generated
      by the C# library and then validated using the Java and C
      libraries.  All three libraries have tests to allow for the
      creating of the same messages that are in the example library
      followed by validating them.  These are not compared against the
      example library.  The Java and C# libraries have unit testing
      included.  Not all of the MUST statements in the document have
      been implemented as part of the libraries.  One such statement is
      the requirement that unique labels be present.

      Licensing: Revised BSD License

17.2.  COSE Testing Library

      Implementation Location: https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples

      Primary Maintainer: Jim Schaad

      Description: A set of tests for the COSE library is provided as
      part of the implementation effort.  Both success and fail tests




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      have been provided.  All of the examples in this document are part
      of this example set.

      Coverage: An attempt has been made to have test cases for every
      message type and algorithm in the document.  Currently examples
      dealing with counter signatures, EdDSA, and ECDH with Curve24459
      and Goldilocks are missing.

      Licensing: Public Domain

18.  Security Considerations

   There are a number of security considerations that need to be taken
   into account by implementers of this specification.  The security
   considerations that are specific to an individual algorithm are
   placed next to the description of the algorithm.  While some
   considerations have been highlighted here, additional considerations
   may be found in the documents listed in the references.

   Implementations need to protect the private key material for any
   individuals.  There are some cases in this document that need to be
   highlighted on this issue.

   o  Using the same key for two different algorithms can leak
      information about the key.  It is therefore recommended that keys
      be restricted to a single algorithm.

   o  Use of 'direct' as a recipient algorithm combined with a second
      recipient algorithm, exposes the direct key to the second
      recipient.

   o  Several of the algorithms in this document have limits on the
      number of times that a key can be used without leaking information
      about the key.

   The use of ECDH and direct plus KDF (with no key wrap) will not
   directly lead to the private key being leaked; the one way function
   of the KDF will prevent that.  There is however, a different issue
   that needs to be addressed.  Having two recipients requires that the
   CEK be shared between two recipients.  The second recipient therefore
   has a CEK that was derived from material that can be used for the
   weak proof of origin.  The second recipient could create a message
   using the same CEK and send it to the first recipient, the first
   recipient would, for either static-static ECDH or direct plus KDF,
   make an assumption that the CEK could be used for proof of origin
   even though it is from the wrong entity.  If the key wrap step is
   added, then no proof of origin is implied and this is not an issue.




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   Although it has been mentioned before, the use of a single key for
   multiple algorithms has been demonstrated in some cases to leak
   information about a key, provide for attackers to forge integrity
   tags, or gain information about encrypted content.  Binding a key to
   a single algorithm prevents these problems.  Key creators and key
   consumers are strongly encouraged not only to create new keys for
   each different algorithm, but to include that selection of algorithm
   in any distribution of key material and strictly enforce the matching
   of algorithms in the key structure to algorithms in the message
   structure.  In addition to checking that algorithms are correct, the
   key form needs to be checked as well.  Do not use an 'EC2' key where
   an 'OKP' key is expected.

   Before using a key for transmission, or before acting on information
   received, a trust decision on a key needs to be made.  Is the data or
   action something that the entity associated with the key has a right
   to see or a right to request?  A number of factors are associated
   with this trust decision.  Some of the ones that are highlighted here
   are:

   o  What are the permissions associated with the key owner?

   o  Is the cryptographic algorithm acceptable in the current context?

   o  Have the restrictions associated with the key, such as algorithm
      or freshness, been checked and are correct?

   o  Is the request something that is reasonable, given the current
      state of the application?

   o  Have any security considerations that are part of the message been
      enforced (as specified by the application or 'crit' parameter)?

   There are a large number of algorithms presented in this document
   that use nonce values.  For all of the nonces defined in this
   document, there is some type of restriction on the nonce being a
   unique value either for a key or for some other conditions.  In all
   of these cases, there is no known requirement on the nonce being both
   unique and unpredictable, under these circumstances it reasonable to
   use a counter for creation of the nonce.  In cases where one wants
   the pattern of the nonce to be unpredictable as well as unique, one
   can use a key created for that purpose and encrypt the counter to
   produce the nonce value.

   One area that has been starting to get exposure is doing traffic
   analysis of encrypted messages based on the length of the message.
   This specification does not provide for a uniform method of providing
   padding as part of the message structure.  An observer can



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   distinguish between two different strings (for example, 'YES' and
   'NO') based on length for all of the content encryption algorithms
   that are defined in this document.  This means that it is up to
   applications to document how content padding is to be done in order
   to prevent or discourage such analysis.  (For example, the strings
   could be defined as 'YES' and 'NO '.)

19.  References

19.1.  Normative References

   [AES-GCM]  Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", Nov 2007.

   [COAP.Formats]
              IANA, , "CoAP Content-Formats".

   [DSS]      U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", July 2013.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
              Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-08
              (work in progress), August 2016.

   [MAC]      NiST, N., "FIPS PUB 113: Computer Data Authentication",
              May 1985.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3394]  Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
              (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
              September 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.

   [RFC3610]  Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
              CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, DOI 10.17487/RFC3610, September
              2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610>.





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   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

   [RFC6979]  Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
              Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
              2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7539]  Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
              Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.

   [SEC1]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
              Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009.

19.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]
              Vigano, C. and H. Birkholz, "CBOR data definition language
              (CDDL): a notational convention to express CBOR data
              structures", draft-greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl-09 (work
              in progress), September 2016.

   [I-D.moriarty-pkcs1]
              Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1 Version 2.2: RSA Cryptography Specifications",
              draft-moriarty-pkcs1-03 (work in progress), September
              2016.








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   [I-D.moriarty-pkcs5-v2dot1]
              Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
              Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
              draft-moriarty-pkcs5-v2dot1-04 (work in progress),
              September 2016.

   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-selander-ace-
              object-security-05 (work in progress), July 2016.

   [PVSig]    Brown, D. and D. Johnson, "Formal Security Proofs for a
              Signature Scheme with Partial Message Recover", February
              2000.

   [RFC2633]  Ramsdell, B., Ed., "S/MIME Version 3 Message
              Specification", RFC 2633, DOI 10.17487/RFC2633, June 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2633>.

   [RFC4231]  Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
              224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
              RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.

   [RFC4262]  Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
              Capabilities", RFC 4262, DOI 10.17487/RFC4262, December
              2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4262>.

   [RFC4493]  Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
              AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June
              2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.






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   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January
              2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751>.

   [RFC5752]  Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5752, January 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5752>.

   [RFC5990]  Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner,
              "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5990, September 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5990>.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.

   [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
              RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.





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   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

   [SP800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., and M. Smid, "NIST
              Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise
              Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
              Cryptography", May 2013.

   [W3C.WebCrypto]
              Watson, M., "Web Cryptography API", July 2016.

Appendix A.  Making Mandatory Algorithm Header Optional

   There has been a portion of the working group who have expressed a
   strong desire to relax the rule that the algorithm identifier be
   required to appear in each level of a COSE object.  There are two
   basic reasons that have been advanced to support this position.
   First, the resulting message will be smaller if the algorithm
   identifier is omitted from the most common messages in a CoAP
   environment.  Second, there is a potential bug that will arise if
   full checking is not done correctly between the different places that
   an algorithm identifier could be placed (the message itself, an
   application statement, the key structure that the sender possesses
   and the key structure the recipient possesses).

   This appendix lays out how such a change can be made and the details
   that an application needs to specify in order to use this option.
   Two different sets of details are specified: Those needed to omit an
   algorithm identifier and those needed to use a variant on the counter
   signature attribute that contains no attributes about itself.

A.1.  Algorithm Identification

   In this section are laid out three sets of recommendations.  The
   first set of recommendations apply to having an implicit algorithm
   identified for a single layer of a COSE object.  The second set of
   recommendations apply to having multiple implicit algorithms



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   identified for multiple layers of a COSE object.  The third set of
   recommendations apply to having implicit algorithms for multiple COSE
   object constructs.

   RFC 2119 language is deliberately not used here.  This specification
   can provide recommendations, but it cannot enforce them.

   This set of recommendations applies to the case where an application
   is distributing a fixed algorithm along with the key information for
   use in a single COSE object.  This normally applies to the smallest
   of the COSE objects, specifically COSE_Sign1, COSE_Mac0, and
   COSE_Encrypt0, but could apply to the other structures as well.

   The following items should be taken into account:

   o  Applications need to list the set of COSE structures that implicit
      algorithms are to be used in.  Applications need to require that
      the receipt of an explicit algorithm identifier in one of these
      structures will lead to the message being rejected.  This
      requirement is stated so that there will never be a case where
      there is any ambiguity about the question of which algorithm
      should be used, the implicit or the explicit one.  This applies
      even if the transported algorithm identifier is a protected
      attribute.  This applies even if the transported algorithm is the
      same as the implicit algorithm.

   o  Applications need to define the set of information that is to be
      considered to be part of a context when omitting algorithm
      identifiers.  At a minimum, this would be the key identifier (if
      needed), the key, the algorithm, and the COSE structure it is used
      with.  Applications should restrict the use of a single key to a
      single algorithm.  As noted for some of the algorithms in this
      document, the use of the same key in different related algorithms
      can lead to leakage of information about the key, leakage about
      the data or the ability to perform forgeries.

   o  In many cases, applications that make the algorithm identifier
      implicit will also want to make the context identifier implicit
      for the same reason.  That is, omitting the context identifier
      will decrease the message size (potentially significantly
      depending on the length of the identifier).  Applications that do
      this will need to describe the circumstances where the context
      identifier is to be omitted and how the context identifier is to
      be inferred in these cases.  (Exhaustive search over all of the
      keys would normally not be considered to be acceptable.)  An
      example of how this can be done is to tie the context to a
      transaction identifier.  Both would be sent on the original
      message, but only the transaction identifier would need to be sent



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      after that point as the context is tied into the transaction
      identifier.  Another way would be to associate a context with a
      network address.  All messages coming from a single network
      address can be assumed to be associated with a specific context.
      (In this case the address would normally be distributed as part of
      the context.)

   o  Applications cannot rely on key identifiers being unique unless
      they take significant efforts to ensure that they are computed in
      such a way as to create this guarantee.  Even when an application
      does this, the uniqueness might be violated if the application is
      run in different contexts (i.e., with a different context
      provider) or if the system combines the security contexts from
      different applications together into a single store.

   o  Applications should continue the practice of protecting the
      algorithm identifier.  Since this is not done by placing it in the
      protected attributes field, applications should define an
      application specific external data structure that includes this
      value.  This external data field can be used as such for content
      encryption, MAC, and signature algorithms.  It can be used in the
      SuppPrivInfo field for those algorithms which use a KDF function
      to derive a key value.  Applications may also want to protect
      other information that is part of the context structure as well.
      It should be noted that those fields, such as the key or a base
      IV, are protected by virtue of being used in the cryptographic
      computation and do not need to be included in the external data
      field.

   The second case is having multiple implicit algorithm identifiers
   specified for a multiple layer COSE object.  An example of how this
   would work is the encryption context that an application specifies
   contains a content encryption algorithm, a key wrap algorithm, a key
   identifier, and a shared secret.  The sender omits sending the
   algorithm identifier for both the content layer and the recipient
   layer leaving only the key identifier.  The receiver then uses the
   key identifier to get the implicit algorithm identifiers.

   The following additional items need to be taken into consideration:

   o  Applications that want to support this will need to define a
      structure that allows for, and clearly identifies, both the COSE
      structure to be used with a given key and the structure and
      algorithm to be used for the secondary layer.  The key for the
      secondary layer is computed per normal from the recipient layer.

   The third case is having multiple implicit algorithm identifiers, but
   targeted at potentially unrelated layers or different COSE objects.



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   There are a number of different scenarios where this might be
   applicable.  Some of these scenarios are:

   o  Two contexts are distributed as a pair.  Each of the contexts is
      for use with a COSE_Encrypt message.  Each context will consist of
      distinct secret keys and IVs and potentially even different
      algorithms.  One context is for sending messages from party A to
      party B, the second context is for sending messages from party B
      to party A.  This means that there is no chance for a reflection
      attack to occur as each party uses different secret keys to send
      its messages, a message that is reflected back to it would fail to
      decrypt.

   o  Two contexts are distributed as a pair.  The first context is used
      for encryption of the message; the second context is used to place
      a counter signature on the message.  The intention is that the
      second context can be distributed to other entities independently
      of the first context.  This allows these entities to validate that
      the message came from an individual without being able to decrypt
      the message and see the content.

   o  Two contexts are distributed as a pair.  The first context
      contains a key for dealing with MACed messages, the second context
      contains a key for dealing with encrypted messages.  This allows
      for a unified distribution of keys to participants for different
      types of messages that have different keys, but where the keys may
      be used in coordinated manner.

   For these cases, the following additional items need to be
   considered:

   o  Applications need to ensure that the multiple contexts stay
      associated.  If one of the contexts is invalidated for any reason,
      all of the contexts associated with it should also be invalidated.

A.2.  Counter Signature Without Headers

   There is a group of people who want to have a counter signature
   parameter that is directly tied to the value being signed and thus
   the authenticated and unauthenticated buckets can be removed from the
   message being sent.  The focus on this is an even smaller size, as
   all of the information on the process of creating the counter
   signature is implicit rather than being explicitly carried in the
   message.  This includes not only the algorithm identifier as
   presented above, but also items such as the key identification is
   always external to the signature structure.  This means that the
   entities that are doing the validation of the counter signature are
   required to infer which key is to be used from context rather than



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   being explicit.  One way of doing this would be to presume that all
   data coming from a specific port (or to a specific URL) is to be
   validated by a specific key.  (Note that this does not require that
   the key identifier be part of the value signed as it does not serve a
   cryptographic purpose.  If the key validates the counter signature,
   then it should be presumed that the entity associated with that key
   produced the signature.)

   When computing the signature for the bare counter signature header,
   the same Sig_structure defined in Section 4.4 is used.  The
   sign_protected field is omitted, as there is no protected header
   field in in this counter signature header.  The value of
   "CounterSignature0" is placed in the context field of the
   Sig_stucture.

   +-------------------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------+
   | name              | label | value | value | description           |
   |                   |       | type  |       |                       |
   +-------------------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------+
   | CounterSignature0 | 9     | bstr  |       | Counter signature     |
   |                   |       |       |       | with implied signer   |
   |                   |       |       |       | and headers           |
   +-------------------+-------+-------+-------+-----------------------+

                                 Table 27

Appendix B.  Two Layers of Recipient Information

   All of the currently defined recipient algorithms classes only use
   two layers of the COSE_Encrypt structure.  The first layer is the
   message content and the second layer is the content key encryption.
   However, if one uses a recipient algorithm such as RSA-KEM (see
   Appendix A of RSA-KEM [RFC5990]), then it makes sense to have three
   layers of the COSE_Encrypt structure.

   These layers would be:

   o  Layer 0: The content encryption layer.  This layer contains the
      payload of the message.

   o  Layer 1: The encryption of the CEK by a KEK.

   o  Layer 2: The encryption of a long random secret using an RSA key
      and a key derivation function to convert that secret into the KEK.

   This is an example of what a triple layer message would look like.
   The message has the following layers:




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   o  Layer 0: Has a content encrypted with AES-GCM using a 128-bit key.

   o  Layer 1: Uses the AES Key wrap algorithm with a 128-bit key.

   o  Layer 2: Uses ECDH Ephemeral-Static direct to generate the layer 1
      key.

   In effect, this example is a decomposed version of using the ECDH-
   ES+A128KW algorithm.

   Size of binary file is 184 bytes








































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   992(
     [
       / protected / h'a10101' / {
           \ alg \ 1:1 \ AES-GCM 128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ce'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'64f84d913ba60a76070a9a48f26e97e863e2852948658f0
   811139868826e89218a75715b',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'',
           / unprotected / {
             / alg / 1:-3 / A128KW /
           },
           / ciphertext / h'dbd43c4e9d719c27c6275c67d628d493f090593db82
   18f11',
           / recipients / [
             [
               / protected / h'a1013818' / {
                   \ alg \ 1:-25 \ ECDH-ES + HKDF-256 \
                 } / ,
               / unprotected / {
                 / ephemeral / -1:{
                   / kty / 1:2,
                   / crv / -1:1,
                   / x / -2:h'b2add44368ea6d641f9ca9af308b4079aeb519f11
   e9b8a55a600b21233e86e68',
                   / y / -3:false
                 },
                 / kid / 4:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example'
               },
               / ciphertext / h''
             ]
           ]
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

Appendix C.  Examples

   This appendix includes a set of examples that show the different
   features and message types that have been defined in this document.
   To make the examples easier to read, they are presented using the
   extended CBOR diagnostic notation (defined in
   [I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor-cddl]) rather than as a binary dump.



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   A GitHub project has been created at https://github.com/cose-wg/
   Examples that contains not only the examples presented in this
   document, but a more complete set of testing examples as well.  Each
   example is found in a JSON file that contains the inputs used to
   create the example, some of the intermediate values that can be used
   in debugging the example and the output of the example presented in
   both a hex and a CBOR diagnostic notation format.  Some of the
   examples at the site are designed failure testing cases; these are
   clearly marked as such in the JSON file.  If errors in the examples
   in this document are found, the examples on github will be updated
   and a note to that effect will be placed in the JSON file.

   As noted, the examples are presented using the CBOR's diagnostic
   notation.  A Ruby based tool exists that can convert between the
   diagnostic notation and binary.  This tool can be installed with the
   command line:

   gem install cbor-diag

   The diagnostic notation can be converted into binary files using the
   following command line:

   diag2cbor.rb < inputfile > outputfile

   The examples can be extracted from the XML version of this document
   via an XPath expression as all of the artwork is tagged with the
   attribute type='CBORdiag'.  (Depending on the XPath evaluator one is
   using, it may be necessary to deal with &gt; as an entity.)

   //artwork[@type='CDDL']/text()

C.1.  Examples of Signed Message

C.1.1.  Single Signature

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-256, Curve P-256

   Size of binary file is 104 bytes











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   991(
     [
       / protected / h'',
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / signatures / [
         [
           / protected / h'a10126' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'11'
           },
           / signature / h'eae868ecc176883766c5dc5ba5b8dca25dab3c2e56a5
   51ce5705b793914348e14eea4aee6e0c9f09db4ef3ddeca8f3506cd1a98a8fb64327
   be470355c9657ce0'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.1.2.  Multiple Signers

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-256, Curve P-256

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-512, Curve P-521

   Size of binary file is 278 bytes





















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   991(
     [
       / protected / h'',
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / signatures / [
         [
           / protected / h'a10126' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'11'
           },
           / signature / h'0dc1c5e62719d8f3cce1468b7c881eee6a8088b46bf8
   36ae956dd38fe93199199951a6a5e02a24aed5edde3509748366b1c539aaef7dea34
   f2cd618fe19fe55d'
         ],
         [
           / protected / h'a1013823' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-36
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example'
           },
           / signature / h'012ce5b1dfe8b5aa6eaa09a54c58a84ad0900e4fdf27
   59ec22d1c861cccd75c7e1c4025a2da35e512fc2874d6ac8fd862d09ad07ed2deac2
   97b897561e04a8d42476017c11a4a34e26c570c9eff22c1dc84d56cdf6e03ed34bc9
   e934c5fdf676c7948d79e97dfe161730217c57748aadb364a0207cee811e9dde65ae
   37942e8a8348cc91'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.1.3.  Counter Signature

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-256, Curve P-256

   o  The same parameters are used for both the signature and the
      counter signature.

   Size of binary file is 181 bytes







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   991(
     [
       / protected / h'',
       / unprotected / {
         / countersign / 7:[
           / protected / h'a10126' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'11'
           },
           / signature / h'c9d3402485aa585cee3efc69b14496c0b00714584b26
   0f8e05764b7dbc70ae2b23b89812f5895b805f07a792f7ce77ef6d63875dc37d6a78
   ef4d175da45c9a51'
         ]
       },
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / signatures / [
         [
           / protected / h'a10126' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'11'
           },
           / signature / h'eae868ecc176883766c5dc5ba5b8dca25dab3c2e56a5
   51ce5705b793914348e14eea4aee6e0c9f09db4ef3ddeca8f3506cd1a98a8fb64327
   be470355c9657ce0'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.1.4.  Signature w/ Criticality

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-256, Curve P-256

   o  There is a criticality marker on the "reserved" header parameter

   Size of binary file is 126 bytes









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   991(
     [
       / protected / h'a2687265736572766564f40281687265736572766564' /
   {
           "reserved":false,
           \ crit \ 2:[
             "reserved"
           ]
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / signatures / [
         [
           / protected / h'a10126' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'11'
           },
           / signature / h'eae868ecc176883766c5dc5ba5b8dca25dab3c2e56a5
   51ce5705b793914348e1ff259ead2c38d8a7d8a9c87c2ce534d762dab059773115a6
   176fa780e85b6b25'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.2.  Single Signer Examples

C.2.1.  Single ECDSA signature

   This example uses the following:

   o  Signature Algorithm: ECDSA w/ SHA-256, Curve P-256

   Size of binary file is 100 bytes















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   997(
     [
       / protected / h'a10126' / {
           \ alg \ 1:-7 \ ECDSA 256 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / kid / 4:'11'
       },
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / signature / h'eae868ecc176883766c5dc5ba5b8dca25dab3c2e56a551ce
   5705b793914348e19f43d6c6ba654472da301b645b293c9ba939295b97c4bdb84778
   2bff384c5794'
     ]
   )

C.3.  Examples of Enveloped Messages

C.3.1.  Direct ECDH

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-GCM w/ 128-bit key

   o  Recipient class: ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-256

   Size of binary file is 152 bytes

























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   992(
     [
       / protected / h'a10101' / {
           \ alg \ 1:1 \ AES-GCM 128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'c9cf4df2fe6c632bf7886413'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'7adbe2709ca818fb415f1e5df66f4e1a51053ba6d65a1a0
   c52a357da7a644b8070a151b0',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a1013818' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-25 \ ECDH-ES + HKDF-256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / ephemeral / -1:{
               / kty / 1:2,
               / crv / -1:1,
               / x / -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbf
   bf054e1c7b4d91d6280',
               / y / -3:true
             },
             / kid / 4:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example'
           },
           / ciphertext / h''
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.3.2.  Direct plus Key Derivation

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-CCM w/128-bit key, truncate the tag to 64 bits

   o  Recipient class: Use HKDF on a shared secret with the following
      implicit fields as part of the context.

      *  salt: "aabbccddeeffgghh"

      *  APU identity: "lighting-client"

      *  APV identity: "lighting-server"

      *  Supplementary Public Other: "Encryption Example 02"




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   Size of binary file is 92 bytes

   992(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010a' / {
           \ alg \ 1:10 \ AES-CCM-16-64-128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'89f52f65a1c580933b5261a76c'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'753548a19b1307084ca7b2056924ed95f2e3b17006dfe93
   1b687b847',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a10129' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-10
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / salt / -20:'aabbccddeeffgghh',
             / kid / 4:'our-secret'
           },
           / ciphertext / h''
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.3.3.  Counter Signature on Encrypted Content

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-GCM w/ 128-bit key

   o  Recipient class: ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-256

   Size of binary file is 327 bytes















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   992(
     [
       / protected / h'a10101' / {
           \ alg \ 1:1 \ AES-GCM 128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'c9cf4df2fe6c632bf7886413',
         / countersign / 7:[
           / protected / h'a1013823' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-36
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / kid / 4:'bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example'
           },
           / signature / h'00aa98cbfd382610a375d046a275f30266e8d0faacb9
   069fde06e37825ae7825419c474f416ded0c8e3e7b55bff68f2a704135bdf99186f6
   6659461c8cf929cc7fb300f5e2b33c3b433655042ff719804ff73b0be3e988ecebc0
   c70ef6616996809c6eb59a918dbe0a5edb0d15137ece0aba2a0b0f68ad2631cb62f2
   ea4d7099804218b0'
         ]
       },
       / ciphertext / h'7adbe2709ca818fb415f1e5df66f4e1a51053ba6d65a1a0
   c52a357da7a644b8070a151b0',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a1013818' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-25 \ ECDH-ES + HKDF-256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / ephemeral / -1:{
               / kty / 1:2,
               / crv / -1:1,
               / x / -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbf
   bf054e1c7b4d91d6280',
               / y / -3:true
             },
             / kid / 4:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example'
           },
           / ciphertext / h''
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )








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C.3.4.  Encrypted Content with External Data

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-GCM w/ 128-bit key

   o  Recipient class: ECDH static-Static, Curve P-256 with AES Key Wrap

   o  Externally Supplied AAD: h'0011bbcc22dd44ee55ff660077'

   Size of binary file is 174 bytes

   992(
     [
       / protected / h'a10101' / {
           \ alg \ 1:1 \ AES-GCM 128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ce'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'64f84d913ba60a76070a9a48f26e97e863e28529d8f5335
   e5f0165eee976b4a5f6c6f09d',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a101381f' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-32 \ ECHD-SS+A128KW \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / static kid / -3:'peregrin.took@tuckborough.example',
             / kid / 4:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example',
             / U nonce / -22:h'0101'
           },
           / ciphertext / h'41e0d76f579dbd0d936a662d54d8582037de2e366fd
   e1c62'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.4.  Examples of Encrypted Messages

C.4.1.  Simple Encrypted Message

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-CCM w/ 128-bit key and a 64-bit tag

   Size of binary file is 54 bytes



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   993(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010a' / {
           \ alg \ 1:10 \ AES-CCM-16-64-128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / iv / 5:h'89f52f65a1c580933b5261a78c'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'5974e1b99a3a4cc09a659aa2e9e7fff161d38ce7edd5617
   388e77baf'
     ]
   )

C.4.2.  Encrypted Message w/ a Partial IV

   This example uses the following:

   o  CEK: AES-CCM w/ 128-bit key and a 64-bit tag

   o  Prefix for IV is 89F52F65A1C580933B52

   Size of binary file is 43 bytes

   993(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010a' / {
           \ alg \ 1:10 \ AES-CCM-16-64-128 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {
         / partial iv / 6:h'61a7'
       },
       / ciphertext / h'252a8911d465c125b6764739700f0141ed09192da5c69e5
   33abf852b'
     ]
   )

C.5.  Examples of MACed messages

C.5.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: AES-CMAC, 256-bit key, truncated to 64 bits

   o  Recipient class: direct shared secret

   Size of binary file is 58 bytes




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   994(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010f' / {
           \ alg \ 1:15 \ AES-CBC-MAC-256//64 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / tag / h'9e1226ba1f81b848',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'',
           / unprotected / {
             / alg / 1:-6 / direct /,
             / kid / 4:'our-secret'
           },
           / ciphertext / h''
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.5.2.  ECDH Direct MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/SHA-256, 256-bit key

   o  Recipient class: ECDH key agreement, two static keys, HKDF w/
      context structure

   Size of binary file is 215 bytes




















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   994(
     [
       / protected / h'a10105' / {
           \ alg \ 1:5 \ HMAC 256//256 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / tag / h'81a03448acd3d305376eaa11fb3fe416a955be2cbe7ec96f012c99
   4bc3f16a41',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a101381a' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-27 \ ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / static kid / -3:'peregrin.took@tuckborough.example',
             / kid / 4:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example',
             / U nonce / -22:h'4d8553e7e74f3c6a3a9dd3ef286a8195cbf8a23d
   19558ccfec7d34b824f42d92bd06bd2c7f0271f0214e141fb779ae2856abf585a583
   68b017e7f2a9e5ce4db5'
           },
           / ciphertext / h''
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.5.3.  Wrapped MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: AES-MAC, 128-bit key, truncated to 64 bits

   o  Recipient class: AES keywrap w/ a pre-shared 256-bit key

   Size of binary file is 110 bytes















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   994(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010e' / {
           \ alg \ 1:14 \ AES-CBC-MAC-128//64 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / tag / h'36f5afaf0bab5d43',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'',
           / unprotected / {
             / alg / 1:-5 / A256KW /,
             / kid / 4:'018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037'
           },
           / ciphertext / h'711ab0dc2fc4585dce27effa6781c8093eba906f227
   b6eb0'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.5.4.  Multi-recipient MACed message

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: HMAC w/ SHA-256, 128-bit key

   o  Recipient class: Uses three different methods

      1.  ECDH Ephemeral-Static, Curve P-521, AES-Key Wrap w/ 128-bit
          key

      2.  AES-Key Wrap w/ 256-bit key

   Size of binary file is 310 bytes















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   994(
     [
       / protected / h'a10105' / {
           \ alg \ 1:5 \ HMAC 256//256 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / tag / h'bf48235e809b5c42e995f2b7d5fa13620e7ed834e337f6aa43df16
   1e49e9323e',
       / recipients / [
         [
           / protected / h'a101381c' / {
               \ alg \ 1:-29 \ ECHD-ES+A128KW \
             } / ,
           / unprotected / {
             / ephemeral / -1:{
               / kty / 1:2,
               / crv / -1:3,
               / x / -2:h'0043b12669acac3fd27898ffba0bcd2e6c366d53bc4db
   71f909a759304acfb5e18cdc7ba0b13ff8c7636271a6924b1ac63c02688075b55ef2
   d613574e7dc242f79c3',
               / y / -3:true
             },
             / kid / 4:'bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example'
           },
           / ciphertext / h'339bc4f79984cdc6b3e6ce5f315a4c7d2b0ac466fce
   a69e8c07dfbca5bb1f661bc5f8e0df9e3eff5'
         ],
         [
           / protected / h'',
           / unprotected / {
             / alg / 1:-5 / A256KW /,
             / kid / 4:'018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037'
           },
           / ciphertext / h'0b2c7cfce04e98276342d6476a7723c090dfdd15f9a
   518e7736549e998370695e6d6a83b4ae507bb'
         ]
       ]
     ]
   )

C.6.  Examples of MAC0 messages

C.6.1.  Shared Secret Direct MAC

   This example uses the following:

   o  MAC: AES-CMAC, 256-bit key, truncated to 64 bits



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   o  Recipient class: direct shared secret

   Size of binary file is 39 bytes

   996(
     [
       / protected / h'a1010f' / {
           \ alg \ 1:15 \ AES-CBC-MAC-256//64 \
         } / ,
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / 'This is the content.',
       / tag / h'726043745027214f'
     ]
   )

   Note that this example uses the same inputs as Appendix C.5.1.

C.7.  COSE Keys

C.7.1.  Public Keys

   This is an example of a COSE Key set.  This example includes the
   public keys for all of the previous examples.

   In order the keys are:

   o  An EC key with a kid of "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "11"

   Size of binary file is 481 bytes
















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   [
     {
       -1:1,
       -2:h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c0
   8551d',
       -3:h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd008
   4d19c',
       1:2,
       2:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example'
     },
     {
       -1:1,
       -2:h'bac5b11cad8f99f9c72b05cf4b9e26d244dc189f745228255a219a86d6a
   09eff',
       -3:h'20138bf82dc1b6d562be0fa54ab7804a3a64b6d72ccfed6b6fb6ed28bbf
   c117e',
       1:2,
       2:'11'
     },
     {
       -1:3,
       -2:h'0072992cb3ac08ecf3e5c63dedec0d51a8c1f79ef2f82f94f3c737bf5de
   7986671eac625fe8257bbd0394644caaa3aaf8f27a4585fbbcad0f2457620085e5c8
   f42ad',
       -3:h'01dca6947bce88bc5790485ac97427342bc35f887d86d65a089377e247e
   60baa55e4e8501e2ada5724ac51d6909008033ebc10ac999b9d7f5cc2519f3fe1ea1
   d9475',
       1:2,
       2:'bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example'
     },
     {
       -1:1,
       -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91
   d6280',
       -3:h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d924b7e03bf
   822bb',
       1:2,
       2:'peregrin.took@tuckborough.example'
     }
   ]

C.7.2.  Private Keys

   This is an example of a COSE Key set.  This example includes the
   private keys for all of the previous examples.

   In order the keys are:




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   o  An EC key with a kid of "meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example"

   o  A shared-secret key with a kid of "our-secret"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "peregrin.took@tuckborough.example"

   o  A shared-secret key with a kid of "018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-
      bfd6-eef314bc7037"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example"

   o  An EC key with a kid of "11"

   Size of binary file is 816 bytes

   [
     {
       1:2,
       2:'meriadoc.brandybuck@buckland.example',
       -1:1,
       -2:h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c0
   8551d',
       -3:h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd008
   4d19c',
       -4:h'aff907c99f9ad3aae6c4cdf21122bce2bd68b5283e6907154ad911840fa
   208cf'
     },
     {
       1:2,
       2:'11',
       -1:1,
       -2:h'bac5b11cad8f99f9c72b05cf4b9e26d244dc189f745228255a219a86d6a
   09eff',
       -3:h'20138bf82dc1b6d562be0fa54ab7804a3a64b6d72ccfed6b6fb6ed28bbf
   c117e',
       -4:h'57c92077664146e876760c9520d054aa93c3afb04e306705db609030850
   7b4d3'
     },
     {
       1:2,
       2:'bilbo.baggins@hobbiton.example',
       -1:3,
       -2:h'0072992cb3ac08ecf3e5c63dedec0d51a8c1f79ef2f82f94f3c737bf5de
   7986671eac625fe8257bbd0394644caaa3aaf8f27a4585fbbcad0f2457620085e5c8
   f42ad',
       -3:h'01dca6947bce88bc5790485ac97427342bc35f887d86d65a089377e247e
   60baa55e4e8501e2ada5724ac51d6909008033ebc10ac999b9d7f5cc2519f3fe1ea1
   d9475',



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       -4:h'00085138ddabf5ca975f5860f91a08e91d6d5f9a76ad4018766a476680b
   55cd339e8ab6c72b5facdb2a2a50ac25bd086647dd3e2e6e99e84ca2c3609fdf177f
   eb26d'
     },
     {
       1:4,
       2:'our-secret',
       -1:h'849b57219dae48de646d07dbb533566e976686457c1491be3a76dcea6c4
   27188'
     },
     {
       1:2,
       -1:1,
       2:'peregrin.took@tuckborough.example',
       -2:h'98f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b4d91
   d6280',
       -3:h'f01400b089867804b8e9fc96c3932161f1934f4223069170d924b7e03bf
   822bb',
       -4:h'02d1f7e6f26c43d4868d87ceb2353161740aacf1f7163647984b522a848
   df1c3'
     },
     {
       1:4,
       2:'our-secret2',
       -1:h'849b5786457c1491be3a76dcea6c4271'
     },
     {
       1:4,
       2:'018c0ae5-4d9b-471b-bfd6-eef314bc7037',
       -1:h'849b57219dae48de646d07dbb533566e976686457c1491be3a76dcea6c4
   27188'
     }
   ]

Acknowledgments

   This document is a product of the COSE working group of the IETF.

   The following individuals are to blame for getting me started on this
   project in the first place: Richard Barnes, Matt Miller, and Martin
   Thomson.

   The initial version of the draft was based to some degree on the
   outputs of the JOSE and S/MIME working groups.

   The following individuals provided input into the final form of the
   document: Carsten Bormann, John Bradley, Brain Campbell, Michael B.




Schaad                   Expires April 19, 2017               [Page 120]


Internet-Draft  CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)   October 2016


   Jones, Ilari Liusvaara, Francesca Palombini, Goran Selander, and
   Ludwig Seitz.

Author's Address

   Jim Schaad
   August Cellars

   Email: ietf@augustcellars.com










































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