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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 6494

Network Working Group                                        S. Krishnan
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                                A. Kukec
Expires: April 29, 2010                             University of Zagreb
                                                             R. Gagliano
                                                                  LACNIC
                                                        October 26, 2009


        Certificate profile and certificate management for SEND
                      draft-ietf-csi-send-cert-01

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   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the



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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Abstract

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Utilizes X.509v3 certificates for
   performing router authorization.  This document specifies a
   certificate profile for SEND based on Resource Certificates along
   with extended key usage values required for SEND.


Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Deployment Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Certificate profile and issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.1.  Trust Anchor Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     5.2.  Extended Key Usage Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  CRL profile and revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.1.  Certificate Revocation Solicitation message  . . . . . . . 11
     6.2.  Certificate Revocation Advertisement message . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14




























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1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































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2.  Introduction

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971] (SEND) utilizes X.509v3
   certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses
   to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the Neighbor
   Discovery (ND) Protocol.  SEND specification defines neither the
   certificate profile nor any certificate management routines.  It
   specifies only the certificate path validation and the IP address
   extension verification procedures.  This document defines the
   certificate profile, as well as certificate issuance and revocation
   routines for SEND.

   The SIDR WG in the IETF is working on a Certificate Profile for the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The RPKI represents the
   centralized model referred in Section 6.2 of [RFC3971].
   Consequently, the SIDR certificate profile and certificate validation
   detailed in [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17] MUST be used for SEND.

   The RFC 3779 extension for IPv6 addresses can be expressed as either
   an addressPrefix or an addressRange.  For SEND it does not matter how
   the IPv6 address space is expressed (either an addressPrefix or an
   addressRange) in the certificate as long as the IPv6 address space
   that the entity is allowed to route is included.  We will use the
   term "certified IPv6 space" to refer to the IPv6 address space
   included in an X.509v3 certificate using RFC 3779 extension for IPv6
   addresses.

   Since the IPv6 addresses extension does not mention what functions
   the node can perform for the certified IPv6 space, it becomes
   impossible to know the reason for which the certificate was issued.
   In order to facilitate issuance of certificates for specific
   functions, it is necessary to utilize the ExtKeyUsageSyntax field
   (optional in RPKI Certificates) of the X.509 certificate to mention
   the purpose why the certificate was issued.  This document specifies
   three extended key usage values, one for routers, one for proxies,
   and one for address owners, for use with SEND.

   In RFC 3971 two deployment models were described: centralized and
   decentralized.  With the advance of RPKI standardization we introduce
   two different deployment models: local and public deployment models.











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3.  Terminology

   Certified IPv6 Addresses  IPv6 address space included in an X.509v3
                             certificate using RFC 3779 extension for
                             IPv6 addresses.

   ISP                       Internet Service Provider.

   NIR                       National Internet Registry.

   RIR                       Regional Internet Registry.

   RPKI                      Resource PKI established in accordance with
                             [draft-ietf-sidr-arch-06].

   RPKI certificates         Certificates defined in
                             [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17].

   SEND certificates         Certificates described in [RFC3971] and
                             extended in this document.  They belong
                             either to SEND routers or Secure Proxy ND
                             nodes:

                             *  Router Authorization Certificate and
                                parent certificates in the Authorization
                                Delegation chain.  There is no
                                difference in the profile of the Router
                                Authorization Certificate and other
                                (parent) certificates in the
                                Authorization Delegation process.

                             *  Secure Proxy ND certificates for ND
                                Proxy, Mobile IPv6 Home Agent or Proxy
                                Mobile Access Gateway
                                [draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-00].

   CA and end entity certificates issued in support of SEND MUST comply
   with the RPKI resource profile [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17].













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4.  Deployment Models

   RFC 3971 describes two deployment models:centralized and
   decentralized.  These models were differentiated by having one or
   many trust anchor.  In this document we introduced two new deployment
   models, not based on the number of trust anchors but on the
   localization of the SEND deployment

   The local SEND deployment model represent those cases where SEND
   deployment is confined to an administrative domain.  In this
   scenario, the deployment of SEND MAY be done independently of the
   existance of deployment in the upper RPKI hierarchy (i.e. and end
   user could deploy SEND without the need of RPKI deployment in its
   ISP) by the use of local trust anchors and configuring islands of
   trust.  This model MAY include ULA addresses.

   The public SEND deployment models represent those cases where SEND
   deployment is linked to RPKI deployment as described in
   [draft-ietf-sidr-arch-06].  Trust anchor material MAY be part of a
   different administrative domain (i.e.  RIR, NIR or ISPs).  It is a
   global model suitable for mobile users.






























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5.  Certificate profile and issuance

   End entity certificates issued in support of SEND MUST comply with
   the RPKI resource profile [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17].  CA
   certificates used to verify these router (EE) certificates also MUST
   comply with this profile.  This implies that these CA certificates
   MUST contain an RFC 3779 address extension representing the address
   space allocations held by the service provider represented by the CA.

5.1.  Trust Anchor Material

   Relying parties (e.g., user devices that implement SEND and process
   these router certificates) MUST be configured with one or more trust
   anchors, to enable validation of the routers' certificates.  The
   trust anchor material MAY be either a CA certificate (which MAY be
   self-signed) containing an RFC 3779 address extension or MAY be trust
   anchor material as defined in [draft-ietf-sidr-ta-02].

   In a local SEND deployment model, it is possible to use as a trust
   anchor material a certificate that includes in its RFC 3779 address
   extension the prefix ::/0.  In this case no new trust anchor material
   would be needed when renumbering.  However, if trying to move from
   the local deployment model to the public deployment model, new trust
   anchor material will have to be distributed to relying parties.

   By using the trust anchor model described in [draft-ietf-sidr-ta-02],
   no address space is part of the trust anchor material.  This allows
   network renumbering without the need for issuing trust anchor
   material in bith the local and the public model.  In this case the
   Relying party MUST obtain a certificate that includes an RFC 3779
   address extension.  This certificate will be obtained from the
   publication point of certificate defined as trust anchor.

   The identification for the Trust Anchor Material will be included in
   the Name Type Field of the ICMP Trust Anchor Option as decribed in
   RFC 3971 and MUST always to refer to a certificate that includes as
   RFC 3779 address extension.

5.2.  Extended Key Usage Values

   The Internet PKI document [RFC5280] specifies the extended key usage
   X.509 certificate extension.  The extension indicates one or more
   purposes for which the certified public key may be used.  The
   extended key usage extension can be used in conjunction with key
   usage extension, which indicates the intended purpose of the
   certified public key.  The Extended Key Usage extension is defined as
   optional in [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17] for end entity
   certificates but MUST be present when issuing end entity certificates



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   for SEND.

   The extended key usage extension syntax is repeated here for
   convenience:

     ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId

     KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   This specification defines three KeyPurposeId values: one for
   authorizing routers, one for authorizing proxies, and one for address
   owners.

   The inclusion of the router authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the router to advertise
   prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP
   addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

   The inclusion of the proxy authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the proxy to perform
   proxying of neighbor discovery messages for the prefix(es) that are
   mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP addresses and AS
   identifiers [RFC3779]

   The inclusion of the owner authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the node to use the
   address(es) or prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509
   extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

   Inclusion of multiple values indicates that the certified public key
   is appropriate for use by a node performing more than one of these
   functions.

     send-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) TBA1 }

     id-kp-sendRouter OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 1 }

     id-kp-sendProxy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 2 }

     id-kp-sendOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 3 }

   The extended key usage extension MAY, at the option of the
   certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical.

   Certificate-using applications MAY require the extended key usage
   extension to be present in a certificate, and they MAY require a



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   particular KeyPurposeId value to be present (such as id-kp-sendRouter
   or id-kp-sendProxy) within the extended key usage extension.  If
   multiple KeyPurposeId values are included, the certificate-using
   application need not recognize all of them, as long as the required
   KeyPurposeId value is present.














































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6.  CRL profile and revocation

   RPKI requires the use of CRLs [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17].  CRLs
   require an in-band exchange of the revocation material, and the
   specification of new SEND messages - Certificate Revocation
   Solicitation (CRS) message and the Certificate Revocation
   Advertisement (CRA) message.  While receiving a CPA message, SEND
   host does not have an access to Internet, and therefore MUST accept
   certificates within the CPA message, and consider them as
   provisional.  Once when the SEND host gains Internet access, it MUST
   send the Certificate Revocation Solicitation (CRS) message to request
   the CRL, and then perform the revocation after the receipt of the CRL
   within the Certificate Revocation Advertisement (CRA) message.

6.1.  Certificate Revocation Solicitation message

   TBD.

6.2.  Certificate Revocation Advertisement message

   TBD.






























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7.  Security Considerations

   The certification authority needs to ensure that the correct values
   for the extended key usage are inserted in each certificate that is
   issued.  Relying parties may accept or reject a particular
   certificate for an intended use based on the information provided in
   these extensions.  Incorrect representation of the information in the
   extended key usage field can cause the relying party to reject an
   otherwise appropriate certificate or accept a certificate that ought
   to be rejected.









































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8.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
              Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
              draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17 (work in progress),
              September 2009.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.






























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Authors' Addresses

   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson
   8400 Decarie Blvd.
   Town of Mount Royal, QC
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
   Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com


   Ana Kukec
   University of Zagreb
   Unska 3
   Zagreb
   Croatia

   Email: ana.kukec@fer.hr


   Roque Gagliano
   LACNIC
   Rambla Rep Mexico 6125
   Montevideo,   11400
   UY

   Email: roque@lacnic.net























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