[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 6494

Network Working Group                                        R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft                                                    LACNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                             S. Krishnan
Expires: August 20, 2010                                        Ericsson
                                                                A. Kukec
                                                    University of Zagreb
                                                       February 16, 2010


        Certificate profile and certificate management for SEND
                      draft-ietf-csi-send-cert-02

Abstract

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Utilizes X.509v3 certificates for
   performing router authorization.  This document specifies a
   certificate profile for SEND based on Resource Certificates along
   with extended key usage values required for SEND.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 20, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  SEND Certificate profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Deployment Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Trust Anchor Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Extended Key Usage Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  CRL profile and revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  OCSP Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix A.  Appendix A: Router Authorization Certificate
                certificate example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


2.  Introduction

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971] (SEND) utilizes X.509v3
   certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses
   to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the Neighbor
   Discovery (ND) Protocol.  SEND specification defines neither the
   certificate profile nor any certificate management routines.  It
   specifies only the certificate path validation and the IP address
   extension verification procedures.  This document defines the
   certificate profile, as well as certificate issuance and revocation
   routines for SEND.

   The SIDR WG in the IETF is working on a Certificate Profile for the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The RPKI represents the
   centralized model referred in Section 6.2 of [RFC3971].
   Consequently, SEND will use the SIDR certificate profile and
   certificate validation detailed in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].

   Since the RFC 3779 IPv6 addresses extension does not mention what
   functions the node can perform for the certified IPv6 space, it
   becomes impossible to know the reason for which the certificate was
   issued.  In order to facilitate issuance of certificates for specific
   functions, it is necessary to utilize the ExtKeyUsageSyntax field
   (optional in RPKI Certificates) of the X.509 certificate to mention
   the purpose why the certificate was issued.  This document specifies
   three extended key usage values, one for routers, one for proxies,
   and one for address owners, for use with SEND.

   In RFC 3971 two deployment models were described: centralized and
   decentralized.  With the advance of RPKI standardization we introduce
   two different deployment models: local and public deployment models.




















Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


3.  Terminology

   Certified IPv6 address space  IPv6 address space included in an
                             X.509v3 certificate using RFC 3779
                             extension for IPv6 addresses.

   End Entity (EE)           user of PKI certificates and/or end user
                             system that is the subject of a
                             certificate;

   ISP                       Internet Service Provider.

   NIR                       National Internet Registry.

   RIR                       Regional Internet Registry.

   RPKI                      Resource PKI established in accordance with
                             [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].

   RPKI certificates         Certificates defined in
                             [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].

   SEND certificates         Certificates described in [RFC3971] and
                             extended in this document.  They are end-
                             entity certificates that belong either to
                             SEND routers or Secure Proxy ND nodes:

                             *  Router Authorization Certificates.

                             *  Secure Proxy ND certificates for ND
                                Proxy, Mobile IPv6 Home Agent or Proxy
                                Mobile Access Gateway
                                [I-D.ietf-csi-proxy-send].


















Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


4.  SEND Certificate profile

   SEND certificates MUST comply with the RPKI resource profile
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].  A Router Authorization Certificate
   example is included in the Appendix A.

   In sections 2, 3.9.10 and 3.9.11 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] it is
   stated that RFC 3779 resource extensions MUST be critical and MUST be
   present in all Resource Certificates.  SEND certificates MUST include
   the IP Resources extension for IPv6 Address Family (AFI=0002)
   described in section 3.9.10 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] and MUST be
   the only resource extension present.  The IPv6 resource extension
   MUST NOT specify the "inherit" element.  Certified IPv6 address space
   SHOULD be expressed using either addressPrefix or addressesOrRange
   elements.




































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


5.  Deployment Models

   RFC 3971 describes two deployment models:centralized and
   decentralized.  These models were differentiated by having one or
   many trust anchor.  In this document we introduced two new deployment
   models, not based on the number of trust anchors but on the
   localization of the SEND deployment.

   The local SEND deployment model represent those cases where SEND
   deployment is confined to an administrative domain.  In this
   scenario, the deployment of SEND MAY be done independently of the
   existence of deployment in the upper RPKI hierarchy (i.e. an end user
   could local SEND deployment without the need of RPKI deployment in
   its ISP).  This model requires the use of local trust anchors and
   configuring islands of trust.  This model MAY include ULA addresses.

   The public SEND deployment models represent those cases where SEND
   deployment is linked to RPKI deployment as described in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].  Trust anchor material MAY be part of a
   different administrative domain (i.e.  RIR, NIR or ISPs).  It is a
   global model suitable for mobile users.






























Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


6.  Trust Anchor Material

   Relying parties (e.g., user devices that implement SEND and process
   these router certificates) MUST be configured with one or more trust
   anchors to enable validation of the routers' certificates.  The trust
   anchor material MAY be either a CA certificate (which MAY be self-
   signed) containing an RFC 3779 address extension or it MAY be trust
   anchor material as defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta].

   In a local SEND deployment model, it is possible to use as trust
   anchor material a certificate that includes in its RFC 3779 address
   extension the prefix ::/0.  In this case no new trust anchor material
   would be needed when renumbering.  However, if trying to move from
   the local deployment model to the public deployment model, new trust
   anchor material will have to be distributed to relying parties.

   By using the trust anchor model described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta],
   relying parties will use as trust anchor material the ETA (External
   Trust Anchor) certificate, which does not list any address space.
   This configuration allows network renumbering without the need for
   issuing trust anchor material in both the local and the public model.
   In this case the Relying party MUST obtain an RTA (RPKI Trust Anchor)
   certificate from the publication point of the ETA certificate as
   defined at [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta].

   The identification for the Trust Anchor Material will be included in
   the Name Type Field of the ICMP Trust Anchor Option as described in
   RFC 3971 and MUST always to refer to a certificate that includes a
   RFC 3779 address extension.






















Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


7.  Extended Key Usage Values

   The Internet PKI document [RFC5280] specifies the extended key usage
   X.509 certificate extension.  The extension indicates one or more
   purposes for which the certified public key may be used.  The
   extended key usage extension can be used in conjunction with key
   usage extension, which indicates the intended purpose of the
   certified public key.  The Extended Key Usage extension is defined as
   optional in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] for end entity certificates but
   MUST be present when issuing end entity certificates for SEND.

   The extended key usage extension syntax is repeated here for
   convenience:

     ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId

     KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   This specification defines three KeyPurposeId values: one for
   authorizing routers, one for authorizing proxies, and one for address
   owners.

   The inclusion of the router authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the router to advertise
   prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP
   addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

   The inclusion of the proxy authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the proxy to perform
   proxying of neighbor discovery messages for the prefix(es) that are
   mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP addresses and AS
   identifiers [RFC3779]

   The inclusion of the owner authorization value indicates that the
   certificate has been issued for allowing the node to use the
   address(es) or prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509
   extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]

   Inclusion of multiple values indicates that the certified public key
   is appropriate for use by a node performing more than one of these
   functions.

     send-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) TBA }

     id-kp-sendRouter OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 1 }




Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


     id-kp-sendProxy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 2 }

     id-kp-sendOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 3 }

   As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], the extended key usage
   extension, if present, MUST be non-critical.

   Certificate-using applications MAY require the extended key usage
   extension to be present in a certificate, and they MAY require a
   particular KeyPurposeId value to be present (such as id-kp-sendRouter
   or id-kp-sendProxy) within the extended key usage extension.  If
   multiple KeyPurposeId values are included, the certificate-using
   application need not recognize all of them, as long as the required
   KeyPurposeId value is present.





































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


8.  CRL profile and revocation

   RPKI requires the use of CRLs [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].  The host
   will obtain the necessary CRLs and perform the certificate validation
   method described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].

8.1.  OCSP Considerations

   By addopting the [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] as the certificate profile
   for SEND, the use of the OCSP protocol is not allowed by the RPKI
   Certicate Policies [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp].  As CRLs are expected to be
   small, the fetching of the required CRLs are not expected to demand
   important bandwith.






































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


9.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.
















































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


10.  Security Considerations

   The certification authority needs to ensure that the correct values
   for the extended key usage are inserted in each certificate that is
   issued.  Relying parties may accept or reject a particular
   certificate for an intended use based on the information provided in
   these extensions.  Incorrect representation of the information in the
   extended key usage field can cause the relying party to reject an
   otherwise appropriate certificate or accept a certificate that ought
   to be rejected.









































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


11.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank the contributions from Stephen Kent.
















































Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


12.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-csi-proxy-send]
              Krishnan, S., Laganier, J., and M. Bonola, "Secure Proxy
              ND Support for SEND", draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-01 (work
              in progress), July 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09 (work in
              progress), October 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]
              Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
              Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)",
              draft-ietf-sidr-cp-08 (work in progress), January 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
              Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
              draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17 (work in progress),
              September 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta]
              Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and G. Huston, "A Profile for
              Trust Anchor Material for the Resource Certificate PKI",
              draft-ietf-sidr-ta-02 (work in progress), September 2009.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.







Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


Appendix A.  Appendix A: Router Authorization Certificate certificate
             example

     Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 29 (0x1d)
           Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
           Issuer: CN=EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346
           Validity
               Not Before: Feb  15 23:06:53 2010 GMT
               Not After : Feb  15 23:06:53 2011 GMT
           Subject: CN=SEND-EXAMPLE-123432
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
               RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
                   Modulus (2048 bit):
                       00:bf:64:da:82:fb:b6:fd:a6:2d:c4:3a:10:d7:2c:
                       7b:8c:22:0a:30:b7:45:b1:7d:ae:c0:fd:f1:06:04:
                       5b:4a:6c:21:e7:de:15:cb:9a:07:c8:c4:80:6f:55:
                       cd:71:33:01:04:9f:87:57:db:d5:b3:c7:91:c5:81:
                       28:7f:a8:eb:b1:53:80:3a:01:8a:7c:97:d2:d3:41:
                       92:f4:68:db:3b:86:64:12:24:1e:e1:84:f8:33:5c:
                       0f:fa:ae:8a:a0:1f:e7:b7:4e:5a:ad:0a:a0:a1:2d:
                       42:5a:54:10:37:e2:13:84:88:ed:70:e4:76:6c:d6:
                       75:ab:8a:5c:c9:42:39:60:55:49:c2:66:ee:e7:64:
                       a1:67:fa:69:27:de:f6:2f:55:4d:09:89:29:75:c0:
                       61:02:41:7e:99:4f:81:1d:78:5a:45:8b:1c:9c:85:
                       87:76:51:a3:24:3b:0e:63:72:e8:b9:c5:81:32:91:
                       46:bb:87:81:82:5d:14:48:60:4a:ae:79:4f:f4:7e:
                       bd:ce:cf:01:de:19:e0:34:1a:12:fe:10:9d:1e:a6:
                       91:8b:28:ca:d6:83:71:8a:f3:39:fa:7a:49:c6:36:
                       b5:66:39:3a:a3:f8:02:70:a1:7a:8c:92:55:bd:b6:
                       84:cf:18:02:78:82:4f:2f:8e:f1:08:db:54:02:e0:
                       c5:e9
                   Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Certificate Policies: critical
                   Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2

               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
               keyid:F7:EB:16:AB:D2:43:E3:72:16:41:
               E0:B7:99:CA:1F:A4:37:C3:74:FB

               Authority Information Access:
                   CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.lacnic.net/
                   EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346/EXAMPLE-CA.cer




Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


               X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
                   URI:rsync://rsync.example.exampledomain/
                   EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346/EXAMPLE-CA.crl

               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
               5F:AB:EC:98:8A:E1:47:41:55:4F:67:57:98:
               22:CE:99:85:8F:2A:85
               X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                   Digital Signature
               X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
                   1.3.6.1.5.5.TBA.1
               sbgp-ipAddrBlock: critical
                   IPv6:
                     2001:db8:CAFE:BEBE::/64

       Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
           6f:ec:08:b2:5f:2c:84:6b:99:4c:fe:7d:00:db:fa:c1:90:a2:
           de:34:0a:31:b0:f6:f1:95:d9:4a:ef:09:79:90:51:84:a9:5a:
           a1:5a:a2:cd:09:69:e2:cb:ff:da:f1:34:32:bd:cc:b5:c8:7e:
           b1:fa:46:78:93:a5:cc:d5:1b:03:30:42:c4:ab:55:d7:e5:0d:
           74:de:e8:f3:00:6b:68:df:0d:64:ba:58:49:d0:0b:5d:a5:7c:
           82:ec:5c:95:18:fe:67:f5:25:21:9c:07:8e:ba:81:80:c8:c2:
           95:e6:0a:ea:bd:4b:a2:fc:10:53:cf:c9:16:83:83:88:7c:06:
           39:04:dd:49:4e:75:b5:4b:6b:8d:4c:9f:d7:59:33:c3:95:c4:
           7f:48:f5:83:da:37:e0:c1:a5:5d:09:7d:65:78:b6:77:a7:f9:
           49:59:f8:83:3e:14:dd:e0:86:e1:5e:fa:6d:42:ee:dd:eb:c0:
           f6:4b:0a:31:f1:37:1b:77:12:79:99:1b:2f:d5:e7:7f:2f:a2:
           6e:54:71:17:17:0d:a4:7b:7d:5a:6e:40:02:1d:5c:6a:06:ab:
           5d:33:ea:b6:8a:1b:f6:85:16:ef:d4:00:db:54:e8:ac:53:b8:
           0f:39:d8:a4:3e:9b:87:41:f3:f5:05:d6:a0:44:cc:82:bc:b9:
           fd:72:40:ff




















Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft   SEND certificate profile and management   February 2010


Authors' Addresses

   Roque Gagliano
   LACNIC
   Rambla Rep Mexico 6125
   Montevideo,   11400
   Uruguay

   Phone: +598 2 4005633
   Email: roque@lacnic.net


   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson
   8400 Decarie Blvd.
   Town of Mount Royal, QC
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
   Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com


   Ana Kukec
   University of Zagreb
   Unska 3
   Zagreb
   Croatia

   Email: ana.kukec@fer.hr






















Gagliano, et al.         Expires August 20, 2010               [Page 19]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/