[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: (draft-ssh-ext-info) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

Internet-Draft                                                  D. Bider
Updates: 4252, 4253, 4254 (if approved)                  Bitvise Limited
Intended status: Standards Track                           June 12, 2017
Expires: December 12, 2017


               Extension Negotiation in Secure Shell (SSH)
                  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-09.txt


Abstract

  This memo updates RFC 4252, RFC 4253, and RFC 4254 to define a
  mechanism for SSH clients and servers to exchange information about
  supported protocol extensions confidentially after SSH key exchange.

Status

  This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
  provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

  Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
  Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that other
  groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

  Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
  and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
  time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
  or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

  The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

  The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

Copyright

  Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.




Bider                                                           [Page 1]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


1.  Overview and Rationale

  Secure Shell (SSH) is a common protocol for secure communication on
  the Internet. The original design of the SSH transport layer [RFC4253]
  lacks proper extension negotiation. Meanwhile, diverse implementations
  take steps to ensure that known message types contain no unrecognized
  information. This makes it difficult for implementations to signal
  capabilities and negotiate extensions without risking disconnection.
  This obstacle has been recognized in relationship with [SSH-RSA-SHA2],
  where the need arises for a client to discover public key algorithms a
  server accepts, to avoid authentication penalties and trial-and-error.

  This memo updates RFC 4252, RFC 4253, and RFC 4254.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Wire Encoding Terminology

  The wire encoding types in this document - "byte", "uint32", "string",
  "boolean", "name-list" - have meanings as described in [RFC4251].


2.  Extension Negotiation Mechanism

2.1.  Signaling of Extension Negotiation in KEXINIT

  Applications implementing this mechanism MUST add to the field
  "kex_algorithms", in their KEXINIT packet sent for the first key
  exchange, one of the following indicator names:

  - When acting as server: "ext-info-s"
  - When acting as client: "ext-info-c"

  The indicator name is added without quotes, and MAY be added at any
  position in the name-list, subject to proper separation from other
  names as per name-list conventions.

  The names are added to the "kex_algorithms" field because this is one
  of two name-list fields in KEXINIT that do not have a separate copy
  for each data direction.

  The indicator names inserted by the client and server are different to
  ensure that these names will not produce a match, and will be neutral
  with respect to key exchange algorithm negotiation.

  The inclusion of textual indicator names is intended to provide a clue
  for implementers to discover this mechanism.


Bider                                                           [Page 2]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


2.2.  Enabling Criteria

  If a client or server offers "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s"
  respectively, it MUST be prepared to accept an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO
  message from the peer.

  Thus a server only needs to send "ext-info-s" if it intends to process
  SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO from the client.

  If a server receives an "ext-info-c", it MAY send an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO
  message, but is not required to do so.

  If an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message is sent, then it MUST be the first
  message after the initial SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.

  Implementations MUST NOT send an incorrect indicator name for their
  role. Implementations MAY disconnect if the counter-party sends an
  incorrect indicator. If "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s" ends up being
  negotiated as a key exchange method, the parties MUST disconnect.

2.3.  SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO Message

 A party that received the "ext-info-c" or "ext-info-s" indicator
 MAY send the following message:

    byte       SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO (value 7)
    uint32     nr-extensions
    repeat the following 2 fields "nr-extensions" times:
      string   extension-name
      string   extension-value (binary)

  This message is sent immediately after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, without delay.
  This allows a client to pipeline an authentication request after its
  SSH_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, even when this needs extension information.

  Receivers MUST tolerate any sequence of bytes; including null bytes
  at any position; in an unknown extension's extension-value.

2.4.  Server's Secondary SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO

  If the client sent "ext-info-c", the server MAY send zero, one, or two
  EXT_INFO messages. The first opportunity for the server's EXT_INFO is
  after the server's NEWKEYS, as above. The second opportunity is just
  before (*) SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, as defined in [RFC4252]. The
  server MAY send EXT_INFO at the second opportunity, whether or not it
  sent it at the first. A client that sent "ext-info-c" MUST accept a
  server's EXT_INFO at both opportunities, but MUST NOT require it.






Bider                                                           [Page 3]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


  This allows a server to reveal support for additional extensions that
  it was unwilling to reveal to an unauthenticated client. If a server
  sends a subsequent SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, this replaces any initial one,
  and both the client and the server re-evaluate extensions in effect.
  The server's last EXT_INFO is matched against the client's original.

  (*) The message MUST be sent at this point for the following reasons:
  if it was sent earlier, it would not allow the server to withhold
  information until the client has authenticated; if it was sent later,
  a client that needs information from the second EXT_INFO immediately
  after successful authentication would have no way of reliably knowing
  whether there will be a second EXT_INFO or not.

2.5.  Interpretation of Extension Names and Values

  Each extension is identified by its extension-name, and defines the
  conditions under which the extension is considered to be in effect.
  Applications MUST ignore unrecognized extension-names.

  If an extension requires both the client and the server to include it
  in order for the extension to take effect, the relative position of
  the extension-name in each EXT_INFO message is irrelevant.

  Extension-value fields are interpreted as defined by their respective
  extension. An extension-value field MAY be empty if so permitted by
  the extension. Applications that do not implement or recognize a
  particular extension MUST ignore the associated extension-value field,
  regardless of its size or content. In particular, applications MUST
  tolerate any sequence of bytes; including null bytes at any position;
  in an unknown extension's extension-value.

  The cumulative size of an SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message is limited only by
  the maximum packet length that an implementation may apply in
  accordance with [RFC4253]. Implementations MUST accept well-formed
  SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO messages up to the maximum packet length they accept.


3. Initially Defined Extensions

3.1. "server-sig-algs"

  This extension is sent with the following extension name and value:

    string      "server-sig-algs"
    name-list   public-key-algorithms-accepted

  The name-list type is a strict subset of the string type, and is thus
  permissible as an extension-value. See [RFC4251] for more information.





Bider                                                           [Page 4]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


  This extension is sent by the server, and contains a list of public
  key algorithms that the server is able to process as part of a
  "publickey" authentication request. If a client sends this extension,
  the server MAY ignore it, and MAY disconnect.

  In this extension, a server MUST enumerate all public key algorithms
  it might accept during user authentication. However, there exist early
  server implementations which do not enumerate all accepted algorithms.
  For this reason, a client MAY send a user authentication request using
  a public key algorithm not included in "server-sig-algs".

  A client that wishes to proceed with public key authentication MAY
  wait for the server's SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so it can send a "publickey"
  authentication request with an appropriate public key algorithm,
  rather than resorting to trial and error.

  Servers that implement public key authentication SHOULD implement this
  extension.

  If a server does not send this extension, a client MUST NOT make any
  assumptions about the server's public key algorithm support, and MAY
  proceed with authentication requests using trial and error. Note that
  implementations are known to exist that apply authentication penalties
  if the client attempts to use an unexpected public key algorithm.


3.2.  "delay-compression"

  This extension MAY be sent by both parties as follows:

    string         "delay-compression"
    string:
      name-list    compression_algorithms_client_to_server
      name-list    compression_algorithms_server_to_client

  This extension allows the server and client to renegotiate compression
  algorithm support without having to conduct a key re-exchange, putting
  new algorithms into effect immediately upon successful authentication.

  This extension takes effect only if both parties send it. Name-lists
  MAY include any compression algorithm that could have been negotiated
  in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, except algorithms that define their own delayed
  compression semantics. This means "zlib,none" is a valid algorithm
  list in this context; but "zlib@openssh.com" is not.

  If both parties send this extension, but the name-lists do not contain
  a common algorithm in either direction, the parties MUST disconnect in
  the same way as if negotiation failed as part of SSH_MSG_KEXINIT.





Bider                                                           [Page 5]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


  If this extension takes effect, the renegotiated compression algorithm
  is activated for the very next SSH message after the trigger message:

  - Sent by the server, the trigger message is SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS.
  - Sent by the client, the trigger message is SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS.

  If this extension takes effect, the client MUST send the following
  message shortly after receiving SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS:

    byte       SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS (value 8)

  The purpose of NEWCOMPRESS is to avoid a race condition where the
  server cannot reliably know whether a message sent by the client was
  sent before or after receiving the server's USERAUTH_SUCCESS.

  As with all extensions, the server MAY delay including this extension
  until its secondary SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO, sent before USERAUTH_SUCCESS.
  This allows the server to avoid advertising compression support until
  the client has been authenticated.

  If the parties re-negotiate compression using this extension in a
  session where compression is already enabled; and the re-negotiated
  algorithm is the same in one or both directions; then the internal
  compression state MUST be reset for each direction at the time the
  re-negotiated algorithm takes effect.

3.2.1.  Awkwardly Timed Key Re-Exchange

  A party that has signaled, or intends to signal, support for this
  extension in an SSH session, MUST NOT initiate key re-exchange in that
  session until either of the following occurs:

  - This extension was negotiated, and the party that's about to start
    key re-exchange already sent its trigger message for compression.

  - The party has sent (if server) or received (if client) the message
    SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and this extension was not negotiated.

  If a party violates this rule, the other party MAY disconnect.

  In general, parties SHOULD NOT start key re-exchange before successful
  user authentication, but MAY tolerate it if not using this extension.

3.2.2.  Subsequent Re-Exchange

  In subsequent key re-exchanges that unambiguously begin after the
  compression trigger messages, the compression algorithms negotiated in
  re-exchange override the algorithms negotiated with this extension.





Bider                                                           [Page 6]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


3.3.  "no-flow-control"

  This extension is sent with the following extension name and value:

    string      "no-flow-control"
    string      choice of: "p" for preferred | "s" for supported

  A party SHOULD send "s" if it supports "no-flow-control", but does not
  prefer to enable it. A party SHOULD send "p" if it prefers to enable
  the extension if the other party supports it. Parties MAY disconnect
  if they receive a different extension value.

  To take effect, this extension MUST be:

  - Sent by both parties.
  - At least one party MUST have sent the value "p" (preferred).

  If this extension takes effect, the "initial window size" fields in
  SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, as defined
  in [RFC4254], become meaningless. The values of these fields MUST be
  ignored, and a channel behaves as if all window sizes are infinite.
  Neither side is required to send any SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST
  messages, and if received, such messages MUST be ignored.

  This extension is intended, but not limited to, use by file transfer
  applications that are only going to use one channel, and for which the
  flow control provided by SSH is an impediment, rather than a feature.

  Implementations MUST refuse to open more than one simultaneous channel
  when this extension is in effect. Nevertheless, server implementations
  SHOULD support clients opening more than one non-simultaneous channel.

3.3.1.  Implementation Note: Prior "No Flow Control" Practice

  Before this extension, some applications would simply not implement
  SSH flow control, sending an initial channel window size of 2^32 - 1.
  Applications SHOULD NOT do this for the following reasons:

  - It is entirely within the realm of possibility to transfer more than
    2^32 bytes over a channel. The channel will then hang if the other
    party implements SSH flow control according to [RFC4254].

  - There exist implementations which cannot handle such large channel
    window sizes, and will exhibit non-graceful behaviors, including
    disconnection.








Bider                                                           [Page 7]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


3.4.  "elevation"

  This extension MAY be sent by the client as follows:

    string      "elevation"
    string      choice of: "y" | "n" | "d"

  A client sends "y" to indicate its preference that the session should
  be elevated (as used by Windows); "n" to not be elevated; and "d" for
  the server to use its default behavior. The server MAY disconnect if
  it receives a different extension value. If a client does not send the
  "elevation" extension, the server SHOULD act as if "d" was sent.

  If a client has included this extension, then after authentication, a
  server that supports this extension SHOULD indicate to the client
  whether elevation was done by sending the following global request:


    byte        SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
    string      "elevation"
    boolean     want reply = false
    boolean     elevation performed


4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  Additions to existing tables

  IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
  Message Numbers [IANA-M] under Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters
  [RFC4250]:

    Value    Message ID             Reference
    7        SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO       [this document]
    8        SSH_MSG_NEWCOMPRESS    [this document]

  IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table Key
  Exchange Method Names [IANA-KE]:

    Method Name     Reference          Note
    ext-info-s      [this document]    Section 2.2
    ext-info-c      [this document]    Section 2.2











Bider                                                           [Page 8]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


4.2.  New table: Extension Names

  Also under Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters, IANA is requested
  to create a new table, Extension Names, with initial content:

    Extension Name       Reference          Note
    server-sig-algs      [this document]    Section 3.1
    delay-compression    [this document]    Section 3.2
    no-flow-control      [this document]    Section 3.3
    elevation            [this document]    Section 3.4

4.2.1.  Future Assignments to Extension Names

  Names in the Extension Names table MUST follow the Conventions for
  Names defined in [RFC4250], Section 4.6.1.

  Requests for assignments of new non-local names in the Extension Names
  table (i.e. names not including the '@' character) MUST be done
  through the IETF CONSENSUS method, as described in [RFC5226].


5.  Security Considerations

  Security considerations are discussed throughout this document. This
  document updates the SSH protocol as defined in [RFC4251] and related
  documents. The security considerations of [RFC4251] apply.



























Bider                                                           [Page 9]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC4250]   Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.

  [RFC4251]   Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

  [RFC4252]   Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.

  [RFC4253]   Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006.

  [RFC4254]   Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, January 2006.

  [RFC5226]   Narten, T. and Alvestrand, H., "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

6.2.  Informative References

  [SSH-RSA-SHA2]
              Bider, D., "Use of RSA Keys with SHA-2 256 and 512 in
              Secure Shell (SSH)", draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-08.txt,
              May 2017, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-08>.

  [IANA-M]    "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
              ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-1>.

  [IANA-KE]   "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
              ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16>.












Bider                                                          [Page 10]


Internet-Draft        Extension Negotiation in SSH             June 2017


Author's Address

  Denis Bider
  Bitvise Limited
  Suites 41/42, Victoria House
  26 Main Street
  GI

  Phone: +506 8315 6519
  EMail: ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com
  URI:   https://www.bitvise.com/


Acknowledgments

  Thanks to Markus Friedl and Damien Miller for comments and initial
  implementation. Thanks to Peter Gutmann, Roumen Petrov, and Daniel
  Migault for review and feedback.



































Bider                                                          [Page 11]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.124, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/