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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 7929

Network Working Group                                         P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Intended status: Experimental                           October 20, 2015
Expires: April 22, 2016


    Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
                     draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-06

Abstract

   OpenPGP is a message format for email (and file) encryption that
   lacks a standardized lookup mechanism to securely obtain OpenPGP
   public keys.  This document specifies a method for publishing and
   locating OpenPGP public keys in DNS for a specific email address
   using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS Resource Record.  Security is provided via
   Secure DNS, however the OPENPGPKEY record is not a replacement for
   verification of authenticity via the "Web of Trust" or manual
   verification.  The OPENPGPKEY record can be used to encrypt an email
   that would otherwise have to be send unencrypted.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Experiment goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  The OPENPGPKEY Resource Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA component  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA content  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Reducing the Transferable Public Key size . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA wire format  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA presentation format  . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Location of the OPENPGPKEY record . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Email address variants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Application use of OPENPGPKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Obtaining an OpenPGP key for a specific email address . .   8
     5.2.  Confirming the validity of an OpenPGP key . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Public Key UIDs and query names . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  OpenPGP Key size and DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  MTA behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  MUA behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.3.  Email client behaviour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.4.  Response size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.5.  Email address information leak  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.6.  Storage of OPENPGPKEY data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.7.  Security of OpenPGP versus DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  The GNU Privacy Guard (GNUpg) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  hash-slinger  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.3.  openpgpkey-milter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.1.  OPENPGPKEY RRtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Generating OPENPGPKEY records  . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   OpenPGP [RFC4880] public keys are used to encrypt or sign email
   messages and files.  To encrypt an email message, or verify a



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   sender's OpenPGP signature, the email client or MTA needs to locate
   the recipient's OpenPGP public key.

   OpenPGP clients have relied on centralized "well-known" key servers
   that are accessed using either the HTTP Keyserver Protocol [HKP]
   Alternatively, users need to manually browse a variety of different
   front-end websites.  These key servers do not validate the email
   address in the User ID of the uploaded OpenPGP public key.  Attackers
   can - and have - uploaded rogue public keys with other people's email
   addresses to these key servers.

   Once uploaded, public keys cannot be deleted.  People who did not
   pre-sign a key revocation can never remove their OpenPGP public key
   from these key servers once they have lost access to their private
   key.  This results in receiving encrypted email that cannot be
   decrypted.

   Therefor, these keyservers are not well suited to support email
   clients and MTA's to automatically encrypt email - especially in the
   absence of an interactive user.

   This document describes a mechanism to associate a user's OpenPGP
   public key with their email address, using the OPENPGPKEY DNS RRtype.
   These records are published in the DNS zone of the user's email
   address.  If the user loses their private key, the OPENPGPKEY DNS
   record can simply be updated or removed from the zone.

   The OPENPGPKEY data is secured using Secure DNS.

   The main goal of the OPENPGPKEY resource record is to stop passive
   attacks against plaintext emails.  While it can also twart some
   active attacks (such as people uploading rogue keys to keyservers in
   the hopes that others will encrypt to these rogue keys), this
   resource record is not a replacement for verifying OpenPGP public
   keys via the web of trust signatures, or manually via a fingerprint
   verification.

1.1.  Experiment goal

   This document defines an Experimental RRtype.  The goal of the
   experiment is to see whether encrypted email usage will increase if
   an automated discovery method is available to MTA's and MUA's to help
   the enduser with email encryption key management.








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   It is unclear if this RRtype will scale to some of the larger email
   service deployments.  Concerns have been raised about the size of the
   OPENPGPKEY record and the size of the resulting DNS zone files.  This
   experiment hopefully will give the working group some insight into
   whether this is a problem or not.

   If the experiment is successful, it is expected that the findings of
   the experiment will result in an updated document for standards track
   approval.

   The OPENPGPKEY RRtype somewhat resembles the generic CERT record
   defined in [RFC4398].  However, the CERT record uses sub-typing with
   many different types of keys and certificates.  It is suspected that
   its generality of very different protocols (PKIX versus OpenPGP) has
   been the cause for lack of implementation and deployment.
   Furthermore, the CERT record uses sub-typing, which is now considered
   to be a bad idea for DNS.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   This document also makes use of standard DNSSEC and DANE terminology.
   See DNSSEC [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035], and DANE [RFC6698] for
   these terms.

2.  The OPENPGPKEY Resource Record

   The OPENPGPKEY DNS resource record (RR) is used to associate an end
   entity OpenPGP Transferable Public Key (see Section 11.1 of [RFC4880]
   with an email address, thus forming a "OpenPGP public key
   association".  A user that wishes to specify more than one OpenPGP
   key, for example because they are transitioning to a newer stronger
   key, can do so by adding multiple OPENPGPKEY records.  A single
   OPENPGPKEY DNS record MUST only contain one OpenPGP key.

   The type value allocated for the OPENPGPKEY RR type is 61.  The
   OPENPGPKEY RR is class independent.  The OPENPGPKEY RR has no special
   TTL requirements.

2.1.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA component

   The RDATA portion of an OPENPGPKEY Resource Record contains a single
   value consisting of a [RFC4880] formatted Transferable Public Key.





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2.1.1.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA content

   An OpenPGP Transferable Public Key can be arbitrarily large.  DNS
   records are limited in size.  When creating OPENPGPKEY DNS records,
   the OpenPGP Transferable Public Key should be filtered to only
   contain appropriate and useful data.  At a minimum, an OPENPGPKEY
   Transferable Public Key for the user hugh@example.com should contain:

        o The primary key X
          o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
            o self-signature from X, binding X to Y


   If the primary key is not encryption-capable, a relevant subkey
   should be included resulting in an OPENPGPKEY Transferable Public Key
   containing:

        o The primary key X
          o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
            o self-signature from X, binding X to Y
          o encryption-capable subkey Z
            o self-signature from X, binding Z to X
          o [ other subkeys if relevant ... ]


   The user can also elect to add a few third-party certifications which
   they believe would be helpful for validation in the traditional Web
   Of Trust.  The resulting OPENPGPKEY Transferable Public Key would
   then look like:

        o The primary key X
          o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
            o self-signature from X, binding X to Y
            o third-party certification from V, binding Y to X
            o [ other third-party certifications if relevant ... ]
          o encryption-capable subkey Z
            o self-signature from X, binding Z to X
          o [ other subkeys if relevant ... ]


2.1.2.  Reducing the Transferable Public Key size

   When preparing a Transferable Public Key for a specific OPENPGPKEY
   RDATA format with the goal of minimizing certificate size, a user
   would typically want to:






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   o  Where one User ID from the certifications matches the looked-up
      address, strip away non-matching User IDs and any associated
      certifications (self-signatures or third-party certifications)

   o  Strip away all User Attribute packets and associated
      certifications.

   o  Strip away all expired subkeys.  The user may want to keep revoked
      subkeys if these were revoked prior to their preferred expiration
      time to ensure that correspondents know about these earlier then
      expected revocations.

   o  Strip away all but the most recent self-sig for the remaining user
      IDs and subkeys

   o  Optionally strip away any uninteresting or unimportant third-party
      User ID certifications.  This is a value judgment by the user that
      is difficult to automate.  At the very least, expired and
      superseded third-party certifcations should be stripped out.  The
      user should attempt to keep the most recent and most well
      connected certifications in the Web Of Trust in their Transferable
      Public Key.

2.2.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA wire format

   The RDATA Wire Format consists of a single OpenPGP Transferable
   Public Key as defined in Section 11.1 of [RFC4880].  Note that this
   format is without ASCII armor or base64 encoding.

2.3.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA presentation format

   The RDATA Presentation Format, as visible in textual zone files,
   consists of a single OpenPGP Transferable Public Key as defined in
   Section 11.1 of [RFC4880] encoded in base64 as defined in Section 4
   of [RFC4648].

3.  Location of the OPENPGPKEY record

   The DNS does not allow the use of all characters that are supported
   in the "local-part" of email addresses as defined in [RFC5322] and
   [RFC6530].  Therefore, email addresses are mapped into DNS using the
   following method:

   o  The user name (the "left-hand side" of the email address, called
      the "local-part" in the mail message format definition [RFC5322]
      and the local-part in the specification for internationalized
      email [RFC6530]) should already be encoded in UTF-8 (or its subset
      ASCII).  If it is written in another encoding it should be



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      converted to UTF-8 and then hashed using the SHA2-256 [RFC5754]
      algorithm, with the hash truncated to 28 octets and represented in
      its hexadecimal representation, to become the left-most label in
      the prepared domain name.  Truncation comes from the right-most
      octets.  This does not include the at symbol ("@") that separates
      the left and right sides of the email address.

   o  The string "_openpgpkey" becomes the second left-most label in the
      prepared domain name.

   o  The domain name (the "right-hand side" of the email address,
      called the "domain" in RFC 5322) is appended to the result of step
      2 to complete the prepared domain name.

   For example, to request an OPENPGPKEY resource record for a user
   whose email address is "hugh@example.com", an OPENPGPKEY query would
   be placed for the following QNAME: "c93f1e400f26708f98cb19d936620da35
   eec8f72e57f9eec01c1afd6._openpgpkey.example.com".  The corresponding
   RR in the example.com zone might look like (key shortened for
   formatting):

   c9[..]d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN OPENPGPKEY <base64 public key>


4.  Email address variants

   Mail systems usually handle variant forms of local-parts.  The most
   common variants are upper and lower case, often automatically
   corrected when a name is recognized as such.  Other variants include
   systems that ignore "noise" characters such as dots, so that local
   parts johnsmith and John.Smith would be equivalent.  Many systems
   allow "extensions" such as john-ext or mary+ext where john or mary is
   treated as the effective local-part, and the ext is passed to the
   recipient for further handling.  This can complicate finding the
   OPENPGPKEY record associated with the dynamically created email
   address.

   [RFC5321] and its predecessors have always made it clear that only
   the recipient MTA is allowed to interpret the local-part of an
   address.  A client supporting OPENPGPKEY therefor MUST NOT perform
   any kind of mapping rules based on the email address.

5.  Application use of OPENPGPKEY

   The OPENPGPKEY record allows an application or service to obtain or
   verify an OpenPGP public key.  The lookup result MUST pass DNSSEC
   validation; if validation reaches any state other than "Secure", the
   verification MUST be treated as a failure.



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5.1.  Obtaining an OpenPGP key for a specific email address

   If no OpenPGP public keys are known for an email address, an
   OPENPGPKEY lookup MAY be performed to discover the OpenPGP public key
   that belongs to a specific email address.  This public key can then
   be used to verify a received signed message or can be used to send
   out an encrypted email message.  An application that confirms the
   lack of an OPENPGPKEY record SHOULD remember this for some time to
   avoid sending out a DNS request for each email message that is sent
   out as this constitutes a privacy leak.

5.2.  Confirming the validity of an OpenPGP key

   Locally stored OpenPGP public keys are not automatically refreshed.
   If the owner of that key creates a new OpenPGP public key, that owner
   is unable to securely notify all users and applications that have its
   old OpenPGP public key.  Applications and users can perform an
   OPENPGPKEY lookup to confirm the locally stored OpenPGP public key is
   still the correct key to use.  If verifying a locally stored OpenPGP
   public key and the OpenPGP public key found through DNS is different
   from the locally stored OpenPGP public key, the verification MUST be
   treated as a failure.  An application that can interact with the user
   MAY ask the user for guidance.  For privacy reasons, an application
   MUST NOT attempt to validate a locally stored OpenPGP key using an
   OPENPGPKEY lookup at every use of that key.

5.3.  Public Key UIDs and query names

   An OpenPGP public key can be associated with multiple email addresses
   by specifying multiple key uids.  The OpenPGP public key obtained
   from a OPENPGPKEY RR can be used as long as the query and resulting
   data form a proper email to uid identity association.

   CNAME's (see [RFC2181]) and DNAME's (see [RFC6672]) can be followed
   to obtain an OPENPGPKEY RR, as long as the original recipient's email
   address appears as one of the OpenPGP public key uids.  For example,
   if the OPENPGPKEY RR query for hugh@example.com
   (8d57[...]b7._openpgpkey.example.com) yields a CNAME to
   8d57[...]b7._openpgpkey.example.net, and an OPENPGPKEY RR for
   8d57[...]b7._openpgpkey.example.net exists, then this OpenPGP public
   key can be used, provided one of the key uids contains
   "hugh@example.com".  This public key cannot be used if it would only
   contain the key uid "hugh@example.net".

   If one of the OpenPGP key uids contains only a single wildcard as the
   LHS of the email address, such as "*@example.com", the OpenPGP public
   key may be used for any email address within that domain.  Wildcards
   at other locations (eg hugh@*.com) or regular expressions in key uids



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   are not allowed, and any OPENPGPKEY RR containing these should be
   ignored.

6.  OpenPGP Key size and DNS

   Due to the expected size of the OPENPGPKEY record, applications
   SHOULD use TCP - not UDP - to perform queries for the OPENPGPKEY
   Resource Record.

   Although the reliability of the transport of large DNS Resource
   Records has improved in the last years, it is still recommended to
   keep the DNS records as small as possible without sacrificing the
   security properties of the public key.  The algorithm type and key
   size of OpenPGP keys should not be modified to accommodate this
   section.

   OpenPGP supports various attributes that do not contribute to the
   security of a key, such as an embedded image file.  It is recommended
   that these properties are not exported to OpenPGP public keyrings
   that are used to create OPENPGPKEY Resource Records.  Some OpenPGP
   software, for example GnuPG, have support for a "minimal key export"
   that is well suited to use as OPENPGPKEY RDATA.  See Appendix A.

7.  Security Considerations

   DNSSEC is not an alternative for the "web of trust" or for manual
   fingerprint verification by humans.  It is a solution aimed to ease
   obtaining someone's public key, and without manual verification
   should be treated as "better then plaintext" only.  While this twarts
   all passive attacks that simply capture and log all plaintext email
   content, it is not a security measure against active attacks.  A user
   who publishes an OPENPGPKEY record in DNS still expects senders to
   perform their due diligence by additional verification of their
   public key via other out-of-band methods before sending any
   confidential or sensitive information.

   In other words, the OPENPGPKEY record MUST NOT be used to send
   sensitive information without additional verification or confirmation
   that the OpenPGP key actually belongs to the target recipient.












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   Various components could be responsible for encrypting an email
   message to a target recipient.  It could be done by the sender's
   email client or software plugin, the sender's Mail User Agent (MUA)
   or the sender's Mail Transfer Agent (MTA).  Each of these have their
   own characteristics.  An email client can direct the human to make a
   decision before continuing.  The MUA can either accept or refuse a
   message.  The MTA must deliver the message as-is, or encrypt the
   message before delivering.  Each of these programs should attempt to
   encrypt an unencrypted received message whenever possible.

   Organisations that are required to be able to read everyone's
   encrypted email should publish the escrow key as the OPENPGPKEY
   record.  Upon receipt, such mail servers MAY optionally re-encrypt
   the message to the individual's OpenPGP key.

7.1.  MTA behaviour

   An MTA could be operating in a stand-alone mode, without access to
   the sender's OpenPGP public keyring, or in a way where it can access
   the user's OpenPGP public keyring.  Regardless, the MTA MUST NOT
   modify the user's OpenPGP keyring.

   An MTA sending an email MUST NOT add the public key obtained from an
   OPENPGPKEY resource record to a permanent public keyring for future
   use beyond the TTL.

   If the obtained public key is revoked, the MTA MUST NOT use the key
   for encryption, even if that would result in sending the message in
   plaintext.

   If a message is already encrypted, the MTA SHOULD NOT re-encrypt the
   message, even if different encryption schemes or different encryption
   keys would be used.

   If the DNS request for an OPENPGPKEY record returned an
   "indeterminate" or "bogus" answer, the MTA MUST NOT sent the message
   and queue the plaintext message for encrypted delivery at a later
   time.  If the problem persists, the email should be returned via the
   regular bounce methods.

   If multiple non-revoked OPENPGPKEY resource records are found, the
   MTA SHOULD pick the most secure RR based on its local policy.









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7.2.  MUA behaviour

   If the public key for a recipient obtained from the locally stored
   sender's public keyring differs from the recipient's OPENPGPKEY RR,
   the MUA MUST NOT accept the message for delivery.

   If the public key for a recipient obtained from the locally stored
   sender's public keyring contains contradicting properties for the
   same key obtained from an OPENPGPKEY RR, the MUA SHOULD NOT accept
   the message for delivery.

   If multiple non-revoked OPENPGPKEY resource records are found, the
   MUA SHOULD pick the most secure OpenPGP public key based on its local
   policy.

7.3.  Email client behaviour

   Email clients should adhere to the above listed MUA behaviour.
   Additionally, an email client MAY interact with the user to resolve
   any conflicts between locally stored keyrings and OPENPGPKEY RRdata.

   An email client that is encrypting a message SHOULD clearly indicate
   to the user the difference between encrypting to a locally stored and
   humanly verified public key and encrypting to an unverified (by the
   human sender) public key obtained via an OPENPGPKEY resource record.

7.4.  Response size

   To prevent amplification attacks, an Authoritative DNS server MAY
   wish to prevent returning OPENPGPKEY records over UDP unless the
   source IP address has been verified with [EDNS-COOKIE].  Such servers
   MUST NOT return REFUSED, but answer the query with an empty Answer
   Section and the truncation flag set ("TC=1").

7.5.  Email address information leak

   The hashing of the user name in this document is not a security
   feature.  Publishing OPENPGPKEY records however, will create a list
   of hashes of valid email addresses, which could simplify obtaining a
   list of valid email addresses for a particular domain.  It is
   desirable to not ease the harvesting of email addresses where
   possible.









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   The domain name part of the email address is not used as part of the
   hash so that hashes can be used in multiple zones deployed using
   DNAME [RFC6672].  This does makes it slightly easier and cheaper to
   brute-force the SHA2-256 hashes into common and short user names, as
   single rainbow tables can be re-used across domains.  This can be
   somewhat countered by using NSEC3.

   DNS zones that are signed with DNSSEC using NSEC for denial of
   existence are susceptible to zone-walking, a mechanism that allows
   someone to enumerate all the OPENPGPKEY hashes in a zone.  This can
   be used in combination with previously hashed common or short user
   names (in rainbow tables) to deduce valid email addresses.  DNSSEC-
   signed zones using NSEC3 for denial of existence instead of NSEC are
   significantly harder to brute-force after performing a zone-walk.

7.6.  Storage of OPENPGPKEY data

   Users may have a local key store with OpenPGP public keys.  An
   application supporting the use of OPENPGPKEY DNS records MUST NOT
   modify the local key store without explicit confirmation of the user,
   as the application is unaware of the user's personal policy for
   adding, removing or updating their local key store.  An application
   MAY warn the user if an OPENPGPKEY record does not match the OpenPGP
   public key in the local key store.

   Applications that cannot interact with users, such as daemon
   processes, SHOULD store OpenPGP public keys obtained via OPENPGPKEY
   up to their DNS TTL value.  This avoids repeated DNS lookups that
   third parties could monitor to determine when an email is being sent
   to a particular user.

7.7.  Security of OpenPGP versus DNSSEC

   Anyone who can obtain a DNSSEC private key of a domain name via
   coercion, theft or brute force calculations, can replace any
   OPENPGPKEY record in that zone and all of the delegated child zones.
   Any future messages encrypted with the malicious OpenPGP key could
   then be read.

   Therefore, an OpenPGP key obtained via an OPENPGPKEY record can only
   be trusted as much as the DNS domain can be trusted, and is no
   substitute for in-person key verification or verification via the
   "Web of Trust".

8.  Implementation Status

   [RFC Editor Note: Please remove this entire seciton prior to
   publication as an RFC.]



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   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC6982].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.  According to RFC 6982, "this will allow reviewers and working
   groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit
   of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
   experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
   more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups to use this
   information as they see fit."

8.1.  The GNU Privacy Guard (GNUpg)

   Implementation Name and Details:  The GNUpg software, more commonly
      known as "gpg", is is available at https://gnupg.org/

   Brief Description:  Support has been added to gnupg in their git
      repository.  This code is expected to be part of the next official
      release.

   Level of Maturity:  The implementation has just been added and has
      not seen widespread deployment.

   Coverage:  The implementation follows the latest draft with the
      exception that it first performs a lowercase of the local-part
      before hashing.  This is done because other parts in the code that
      perform a lookup of uid already performed a localcasing to ensure
      case insensitivity.  The implementors are tracking the development
      of this draft in particular with respect to the lowercase issue.

   Licensing:  All code is covered under the GNU Public License version
      3 or later.

   Implementation Experience:  Currrent experience limited to small test
      networks only

   Contact Information:  https://gnupg.org/

   Interoperability:  No report.





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8.2.  hash-slinger

   Implementation Name and Details:  The hash-slinger software is a
      collection of tools to generate and verify application DNS records
      written by the author of this document.  It is available at http:/
      /people.redhat.com/pwouters/

   Brief Description:  Support has been added in the form of an
      "openpgpkey" command that can generate, fetch and verify
      OPENPGPKEY records.

   Level of Maturity:  The implementation has been around for a few
      months but has not seen widespread deployment.

   Coverage:  The implementation follows the latest draft with the
      exception that it first performs a lowercase of the local-part
      before hashing.

   Licensing:  All code is covered under the GNU Public License version
      3 or later.

   Implementation Experience:  Currrent experience limited to small test
      networks only

   Contact Information:  pwouters@redhat.com

   Interoperability:  No report.

8.3.  openpgpkey-milter

   Implementation Name and Details:  The openpgpkey-milter is a Postfix
      and Sendmail Mail server plugin (milter) that automatically
      encrypts email before sending further to other SMTP servers.  It
      is written by the author of this document.  It is available at
      http://github.com/letoams/openpgpkey-milter/

   Brief Description:  Before forwarding an unencrypted email, the
      plugin looks for the presence of an OPENPGPKEY record.  When
      available, it will encrypt the email message and send out the
      encrypted email.

   Level of Maturity:  The implementation has been around for a few
      months but has not seen widespread deployment.

   Coverage:  The implementation follows the latest draft with the
      exception that it first performs a lowercase of the local-part
      before hashing.




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   Licensing:  All code is covered under the GNU Public License version
      3 or later.

   Implementation Experience:  Currrent experience limited to small test
      networks only

   Contact Information:  pwouters@redhat.com

   Interoperability:  No report.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  OPENPGPKEY RRtype

   This document uses a new DNS RR type, OPENPGPKEY, whose value 61 has
   been allocated by IANA from the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs
   subregistry of the Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters registry.

10.  Acknowledgments

   This document is based on RFC-4255 and draft-ietf-dane-smime whose
   authors are Paul Hoffman, Jacob Schlyter and W. Griffin.  Olafur
   Gudmundsson provided feedback and suggested various improvements.
   Willem Toorop contributed the gpg and hexdump command options.
   Daniel Kahn Gillmor provided the text describing the OpenPGP packet
   formats and filtering options.  Edwin Taylor contributed language
   improvements for various iterations of this document.  Text regarding
   email mappings was taken from draft-levine-dns-mailbox whose author
   is John Levine.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.




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   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC4880, November 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880>.

   [RFC5754]  Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
              Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
              2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [EDNS-COOKIE]
              Eastlake, Donald., "Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies",
              draft-ietf-dnsop-cookies (work in progress), August 2015.

   [HKP]      Shaw, D., "The OpenPGP HTTP Keyserver Protocol (HKP)",
              draft-shaw-openpgp-hkp (work in progress), March 2013.

   [RFC3597]  Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record
              (RR) Types", RFC 3597, DOI 10.17487/RFC3597, September
              2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3597>.

   [RFC4398]  Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
              System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322, DOI
              10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.




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   [RFC6530]  Klensin, J. and Y. Ko, "Overview and Framework for
              Internationalized Email", RFC 6530, DOI 10.17487/RFC6530,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6530>.

   [RFC6672]  Rose, S. and W. Wijngaards, "DNAME Redirection in the
              DNS", RFC 6672, DOI 10.17487/RFC6672, June 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6672>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC6982]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", RFC 6982, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6982, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6982>.

Appendix A.  Generating OPENPGPKEY records

   The commonly available GnuPG software can be used to generate a
   minimum Transferable Public Key for the RRdata portion of an
   OPENPGPKEY record:


   gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \
       hugh@example.com | base64



   The --armor or -a option of the gpg command should NOT be used, as it
   adds additional markers around the armored key.

   When DNS software reading or signing the zone file does not yet
   support the OPENPGPKEY RRtype, the Generic Record Syntax of [RFC3597]
   can be used to generate the RDATA.  One needs to calculate the number
   of octets and the actual data in hexadecimal:


   gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \
       hugh@example.com | wc -c

   gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \
       hugh@example.com | hexdump -e \
          '"\t" /1 "%.2x"' -e '/32 "\n"'






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   These values can then be used to generate a generic record (line
   break has been added for formatting):


   <SHA2-256-trunc(hugh)>._openpgpkey.example.com. IN TYPE61 \# \
       <numOctets> <keydata in hex>



   The openpgpkey command in the hash-slinger software can be used to
   generate complete OPENPGPKEY records


   ~> openpgpkey --output rfc hugh@example.com
   c9[..]d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN OPENPGPKEY mQCNAzIG[...]

   ~> openpgpkey --output generic hugh@example.com
   c9[..]d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN TYPE61 \# 2313 99008d03[...]



Author's Address

   Paul Wouters
   Red Hat

   Email: pwouters@redhat.com
























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