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DANE                                                         V. Dukhovni
Internet-Draft                                              Unaffiliated
Intended status: Experimental                                W. Hardaker
Expires: April 11, 2014                                          Parsons
                                                        October 08, 2013


                SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS
                   draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-00

Abstract

   This memo describes a protocol for opportunistic TLS security based
   on the DANE TLSA DNS record.  The protocol is downgrade resistant
   when the SMTP client supports DANE TLSA and the server domain
   publishes TLSA records for its MX hosts.  This enables an incremental
   transition of the Internet email backbone (MTA to MTA SMTP traffic)
   to TLS encrypted and authenticated delivery.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  SMTP Channel Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Hardening Opportunistic TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  TLS discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  MX resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  TLSA record lookup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  DANE authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.1.  TLSA certificate usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.2.  Certificate matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  Opportunistic TLS for Submission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Mandatory TLS Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   Lacking verified DNS and "Server Name Indication" (SNI), there has
   historically been no scalable way for SMTP server operators to
   provide certificates which match a trustable identifier.  It's only
   with the deployment of DNSSEC and DANE that authenticated TLS for
   SMTP to MX becomes possible between parties that have not already
   established an identity convention out-of-band.

1.1.  Background

   The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin
   authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  DNSSEC
   is defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and [RFC4035].

   As described in the introduction of [RFC6698], TLS authentication via
   the existing public Certificate Authority (CA) Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) suffers from an over-abundance of trusted
   certificate authorities capable of issuing certificates for any
   domain of their choice.  DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
   (DANE) leverages the DNSSEC infrastructure to publish trusted keys
   and certificates for use with TLS via a new TLSA record type.  With
   DANE, the public CA PKI can be augmented or replaced by DNSSEC
   validated TLSA records.




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   The Transport Layer Security (TLS [RFC5246]) protocol enables secure
   TCP communication.  In the context of this memo, channel security is
   assumed to be provided by TLS.  Used without authentication, TLS
   protects only against eavesdropping.  With authentication, TLS also
   protects against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

1.2.  SMTP Channel Security

   The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) ([RFC5321]) is multi-hop
   store & forward, while TLS security is hop-by-hop.  The number of
   hops from the sender's Mail User Agent to the recipient mailbox is
   rarely less than 2 and is often higher.  Some hops may be TLS
   protected, some may not.  The same SMTP TCP endpoint can serve both
   TLS and non-TLS clients, with TLS negotiated via the SMTP STARTTLS
   command ([RFC3207]).  DNS MX records abstract the next hop transport
   end-point.  SMTP addresses are not transport addresses and are
   security agnostic.  Unlike HTTP, there is no URI scheme for email
   addresses to designate whether the SMTP server should be contacted
   with or without security.

   A Mail Transport Agent (MTA) may need to forward a message to a
   particular email recipient <user@example.com>.  To deliver the
   message, the MTA needs to retrieve the MX hosts of example.com from
   DNS, and then deliver the message to one of them.  Absent DNSSEC, the
   MX lookup is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle and cache poisoning
   attacks.  As a result, secure verification of MX host certificates is
   not possible without DNSSEC, as an active attacker can forge DNS
   replies with fake MX records, and can direct traffic to a server of
   their choice.  A man-in-the-middle can also suppress the MX host's
   STARTTLS EHLO response, convincing the client that communication over
   TLS is unavailable.

   One might try to harden STARTTLS with SMTP against DNS attacks by
   requiring each MX host to posess an X.509 certificate for the
   recipient domain that is obtained from the message envelope and is
   not subject to DNS reply forgery.  Unfortunately, this is
   impractical, as email for many domains is handled by third parties,
   which are not in a position to obtain certificates for all the
   domains they serve.  Deployment of SNI (see [RFC6066] Section 3.1) is
   no panacea, since the key management is operationally challenging at
   large scale unless the email service provider is also the domain's
   registrar and its certificate issuer; this is rarely the case for
   email.

   Since the recipient domain name cannot be used as the SMTP server
   authentication identity, nor can the MX hostname without DNSSEC,
   large scale deployment of authenticated TLS for SMTP requires secure
   DNS.  At this time, DNSSEC is not yet widely deployed and MTA to MTA



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   traffic between Internet connected organizations rarely uses TLS at
   all, or simply uses TLS opportunistically without authentication and
   protects against only passive eavesdropping attacks.

   The only exceptions are cases in which the sending MTA is statically
   configured to use TLS for mail sent to specific selected peer domains
   and is configured with appropriate names (or content digests) to
   expect in the presented MX host certificates of those domains.  Such
   statically configured SMTP secure channels are also used rarely, and
   only between domains that make bilateral arrangements with their
   business partners.  Internet email, on the other hand, requires
   contacting many new domains for which security configurations can not
   be established in advance.

   Note, the above does not apply to mail submission [RFC6409], where a
   mail user agent is pre-configured to send all email to a fixed Mail
   Submission Agent (MSA).  Submission servers usually offer TLS and the
   Mail User Agent (MUA) can be statically configured to require TLS
   with its chosen MSA.  The situation changes when submission servers
   are configured dynamically via SRV records (see [RFC6186] Section 6,
   although this is not yet widely deployed).  Applications to
   submission via SRV records will be discussed later in this memo.

   With little opportunity to use TLS authentication, MX hosts that
   support STARTTLS often use self-signed or private-CA issued X.509
   certificates.  Sending systems are rarely configured with a
   comprehensive list of trusted CAs and do not check CRLs or implement
   OCSP.  In essence, they don't and can't reply on the existing public
   CA PKI.  This is not simply a result of complacency on the part SMTP
   server administrators and MTA developers.  Nor is it just a result of
   the relative maturity of the SMTP infrastructure when TLS was
   introduced.  Rather, the abstraction of the SMTP transport endpoint
   via DNS MX records, often across organization boundaries, limits the
   use of public CA PKI with SMTP to a small set of sender-configured
   peer domains.

   This does not mean, however, that the Internet email backbone cannot
   benefit from TLS.  The fact that transport security is not explicitly
   specified in either the recipient address or the MX record means that
   new protocols can furnish out-of-band information to SMTP, making it
   possible to simultaneously discover both which peer domains support
   secure delivery via TLS and how to verify the authenticity of the
   associated MX hosts.  The first such mechanism that can work an
   Internet scale is DANE TLSA, but use of DANE TLSA with MTA to MTA
   SMTP must be cognizant of the lack of any realistic role for the
   existing public CA PKI.





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1.3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Hardening Opportunistic TLS

   This section describes opportunistic SMTP over TLS security, where
   traffic from DANE TLSA aware SMTP clients to domains that implement
   DANE TLSA records in accordance with this memo is secure.  Traffic to
   other domains continues to be sent in the same manner as before
   (either manually configured for security or unencrypted and
   unauthenticated).  It is hoped that, over time, more domains will
   implement DNSSEC and publish DANE TLSA records for their MX hosts.
   This will enable an incremental transition of the email backbone to
   authenticated TLS delivery.

   Since email addresses and MX hostnames (or submission SRV records)
   neither signal nor deny support for TLS by the receiving domain, it
   is possible to use DANE TLSA records to securely signal TLS support
   and simultaneously to provide the means by which SMTP clients can
   successfully authenticate legitimate SMTP servers.

2.1.  TLS discovery

   As noted previously (Section 1.2), opportunistic TLS with SMTP
   servers that advertise TLS support via STARTTLS is subject to a man
   in the middle downgrade attack.  Some SMTP servers erroneously
   advertise STARTTLS in default configurations that are not in fact TLS
   capable, and clients need to be prepared to retry plaintext delivery
   after STARTTLS fails.  A downgrade resistant mechanism for a server
   to advertise TLS support based on DANE TLSA records is specified
   below.  DNSSEC validated TLSA records are unlikely to be accidentally
   published for servers that do not in fact support TLS, and thus
   clients can safely interpret their presence as a commitment by the
   server operator to implement STARTTLS.

   SMTP is a store & forward protocol.  An MTA that is not the final
   destination for a message recipient forwards the message one hop
   closer to the recipient's mailbox.  To do so, it must determine the
   appropriate next-hop destination.

   Typically, the next-hop destination defaults to the domain part of
   the recipient address, which is then subject to MX resolution.  The
   next-hop destination may also be configured by the MTA administrator
   to be a next-hop destination host (explicitly exempt from MX
   resolution), or a next-hop destination domain (subject to MX



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   resolution) which takes the place of the domain part of the recipient
   address.  In the language of [RFC5321] Section 5.1, we'll refer to
   this next-hop destination host or domain as "the initial name".

2.1.1.  MX resolution

   If the initial name is a next-hop domain subject to MX resolution, a
   DNSSEC validated "MX" lookup is performed, to obtain the list of
   associated MX hosts.  If no MX records are found, or if the initial
   name is a next-hop host not subject to MX resolution, it is resolved
   to one or more network addresses, by performing DNSSEC validated "A"
   and/or "AAAA" lookups.

   Following [RFC5321] Section 5.1, if the "A", "AAAA" or "MX" lookup of
   the initial name yields a CNAME, we replace it with the resulting
   name as if it were the initial name and try the same lookup again
   with the new name.  MTAs typically support limited recursion in CNAME
   expansion so this replacement is performed recursively.  If
   initially, or at any stage of recursion, the response is "bogus", MX
   resolution fails with a temporary error.  Mail delivery SHOULD either
   be deferred or attempted via any alternative delivery channel
   configured by the MTA administrator (which may also employ
   opportunistic DANE TLS).

   With a next-hop destination domain subject to MX resolution which has
   MX records, if at least one lookup in the (possibly empty) chain of
   CNAMEs leading to the MX RRset is "insecure", opportunistic DANE TLS
   is not applicable, and mail delivery may proceed with pre-DANE
   opportunistic TLS (subject to its various MITM attacks).

   With a next-hop destination host not subject to MX resolution or a
   domain with no MX records, if at least one lookup in the (possibly
   empty) chain of CNAMEs leading to the A or AAAA RRset is "insecure",
   the TLSA base domain is the initial next-hop name, and opportunistic
   DANE TLS is applicable only when a "secure" TLSA RRset is found at
   that base domain.

   Otherwise, if at each and every stage of CNAME expansion the DNS
   response is "secure", and either the initial name is a next-hop host
   name not subject to MX resolution or no MX records are found, the
   resulting final name becomes the next-hop destination and is the base
   domain for TLSA record lookup.  In summary, the TLSA base domain is
   the fully CNAME expanded name that is "secure" or else is the initial
   name.

   Finally, if at each and every stage the DNS response is "secure", and
   and one or more MX records are found, the MX records MUST be sorted
   by preference.  A better (numerically lower) MX preference for a host



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   that does not support TLS MUST NOT be preempted by a worse
   (numerically higher) MX preference for a host that does support TLS.
   In other words, avoiding delivery loops trumps any preference for
   channel security.  In each delivery attempt via a candidate MX host,
   the MX host MUST be treated as though it were the initial next-hop
   destination host (which is, of course, not subject to further MX
   resolution).  The associated TLSA base domain is equal to the CNAME
   resolved MX exchange name if CNAME expansion of MX exchange names is
   supported and all CNAMEs encountered are "secure".  Otherwise, the
   unexpanded name of the MX exchange is the TLSA base domain.

   CNAMEs are not legal in the exchange field of MX records, thus MTAs
   MAY skip over MX records in which the MX exchange is a CNAME.  There
   is some additional risk, in this case, that the MTA may fail to
   notice that it is one of the MX hosts for the destination and that it
   must skip MX records with equal or worse (numerically higher
   precedence).  If an MTA does allow CNAMEs to be used in MX records it
   SHOULD process them recursively as described above to determine
   whether opportunistic DANE TLS is applicable and if so the associated
   TLSA RRset base domain.

2.1.2.  TLSA record lookup

   When all the DNSSEC lookups, "CNAME", "MX", "A" or "AAAA", used to
   obtain a given TLSA base domain (one for each candidate MX host if
   multiple DNSSEC validated MX hosts were found) are "secure", and the
   SMTP client is configured for opportunistic DANE TLS, it SHOULD
   locate the TLSA RRset corresponding to this base domain.  If, for
   example, the base domain is "mail.example.com", the TLSA RRset is
   obtained via a DNSSEC query of the form:

   _25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA ?

   Typically, the destination TCP port is 25, but this may be different
   with custom routes specified by the MTA administrator or when an MUA
   connects to a submission server on port 587.  The SMTP client MUST
   use the appropriate "_<port>" prefix in place of "_25" when the port
   number is not equal to 25.  The query response may be a CNAME (or a
   DNAME + CNAME combination), or the TLSA RRset.  DNAME processing with
   DNSSEC can be done using standard DNAME resolution techniques and
   will not be discussed in detail here.  The SMTP client MUST check the
   security status of the response.

   If the response is "bogus", delivery via the host in question SHOULD
   NOT proceed, otherwise the SMTP client is vulnerable to man in the
   middle STARTTLS downgrade attacks.  If the response is "insecure",
   opportunistic DANE TLS is not applicable for the host in question,
   and the SMTP client SHOULD proceed with ordinary opportunistic TLS.



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   If the response is "secure" and the record is a CNAME or DNAME, the
   SMTP client restarts the TLSA query at the target domain, following
   CNAMEs as appropriate (such CNAME expansion does not change the SMTP
   client's notion of the TLSA base domain).

   If, after possible CNAME indirection, the response is "secure" and at
   least one TLSA record is found (even if not usable because it is
   unsupported by the implementation or administratively disabled) the
   next-hop host has committed to TLS support.  The SMTP client SHOULD
   NOT deliver mail via such a next-hop host unless a TLS session is
   negotiated via STARTTLS.  This avoids man in the middle STARTTLS
   downgrade attacks.

   When no TLSA records are found at a CNAME-expanded initial name
   (insecure response or no records), the unexpanded initial name MUST
   be tried instead.  This supports clients of hosting providers where
   the provider zone is not DNSSEC validated, but the client has shared
   appropriate key material with the hosting provider to enable TLS via
   SNI.

   When usable TLSA records are available, a client SHOULD NOT deliver
   mail via a server that fails to match at least one TLSA record.  This
   is not a "must" because clients may incrementally deploy
   opportunistic DANE TLS only for selected peer domains.  At times,
   clients may need to disable opportunistic DANE TLS for peers that
   fail to interoperate due to misconfiguration or software defects on
   either end.  For opportunistic DANE TLS to be robust (resistant to
   failures), servers MUST live up to the promises stated by the
   existence of the TLSA record, but it is not always possible to compel
   clients to use a security policy chosen by the server.  Given a
   robust security protocol, clients will hopefully, over time,
   willingly choose to adopt it.

   SMTP clients employing opportunistic DANE TLS and TLSA record
   publishers for SMTP servers need to follow the guidance outlined in
   [I-D.dukhovni-dane-ops]'s "Certificate Name Check Conventions",
   "Service Provider and TLSA Publisher Synchronization" and "TLSA Base
   Domain and CNAMEs" sections.

2.2.  DANE authentication

2.2.1.  TLSA certificate usages

   As noted in the introduction, the existing public CA PKI is not
   viable for the Internet email backbone.  TLSA records for MX hosts or
   submission servers that are to be found via SRV records SHOULD NOT
   include certificate usage "0" or "1", as in both cases SMTP clients
   cannot be expected to perform [RFC5280] PKIX validation or [RFC6125]



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   identity verification.  Clients MAY treat such TLSA records as
   unusable.

   SMTP clients may also to the extent possible map these usages to the
   corresponding non-PKIX certificate usages (0 to 2 and 1 to 3).
   Servers publishing these certificate usages hoping to be protected by
   both the public CA PKI and by DNSSEC will typically be protected by
   neither.

   TLSA Publishers should follow the TLSA publication size guidance
   found in [I-D.dukhovni-dane-ops] about "DANE DNS Record Size
   Guidelines".

2.2.1.1.  Certificate usage 3

   Since opportunistic DANE TLS will be used by non-interactive MTAs,
   with no user to "press OK" when authentication fails, reliability of
   peer authentication is paramount.  TLSA records published for SMTP
   servers SHOULD be "3 1 1" records to support opportunistic SMTP over
   TLS with DANE.  This record specifies the SHA-256 digest of the
   server's public key.

   Authentication via certificate usage "3" TLSA records involves no
   certificate authority signature checks.  It also involves no server
   name checks, and thus does not impose any new requirements on the
   names contained in the server certificate (SNI is not required when
   the TLSA record matches the public key of the server's default
   certificate).  It uses the SHA-256 digest which all clients are
   obligated to support, and works across certificate renewals with the
   same key.

   Two TLSA records will need to be published before updating a server's
   public key, one matching the currently deployed key and the other
   matching the new key scheduled to replace it.  Once sufficient time
   has elapsed for all DNS caches to time out the previous TLSA RRset,
   which contains only the old key, the server may be reconfigured to
   use the new private key and associated public key certificate.  The
   amount of time a server should wait before using a new key that is
   referenced by new TLSA records should be at least twice the TTL of
   the previously published TLSA records.  Once the server is using a
   new key, the obsolete TLSA RR can be removed from DNS, leaving only
   the RR that matches the new key.









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2.2.1.2.  Certificate usage 2

   Some domains may prefer to reduce the operational complexity of
   publishing unique TLSA RRs for each TLS service.  If the domain
   employs a common issuing certificate authority to create certificates
   for multiple TLS services, it may be simpler to publish the issuing
   authority's public key as a trust-anchor for the certificate chains
   of all relevant services.  The TLSA RRs for each service issued by
   the same TA may then be CNAMEs to a common TLSA RRset that matches
   the TA.  In this case, the certificate chain presented in the TLS
   handshake of each service SHOULD include the TA certificate, as SMTP
   clients cannot generally be expected to have domain-issued trust-
   anchor certificates in their trusted certificate store.  TLSA
   Publishers should publish either "2 1 1" or "2 0 1" TLSA parameters,
   which specify the SHA-256 digest of the trust-anchor public key or
   certificate respectively.  As with regular certificate rollover
   discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, two such TLSA RRs need to be published
   to facilitate TA certificate rollover.

   The usability of "2 1 1" or "2 0 1" TLSA RRs with SMTP is not
   assured.  If server operators employing these RRs universally ensure
   that the corresponding TA certificate is included in the SMTP
   server's TLS handshake trust chain, clients can safely enable support
   for these RRs.  If sufficiently many server administrators are
   negligent in deploying these RRs, SMTP clients will be hesitant to
   support them, since mail delivery will not work to many destination
   domains if they do.  Server operators are encouraged to implement
   these RRs, if they are operationally a better fit for their
   organization, provided they do so with care.  It is critical to never
   forget to include trust-anchor certificates in server trust chains.
   SMTP client implementations SHOULD support these TLSA RRs, unless
   server operators fail publish certificate chains that include the
   required TA certificate.

2.2.1.3.  Certificate usage 1

   SMTP servers SHOULD NOT publish TLSA RRs with certificate usage "1".
   Clients MAY treat such TLSA records as unusable.  Alternatively, SMTP
   clients that implement this specification MAY ignore the PKIX
   validation requirement when they encounter certificate usage "1", and
   authenticate the server per the content of the TLSA record alone.
   That is, SMTP clients may treat certificate usage "1" as certificate
   usage "3".

2.2.1.4.  Certificate usage 0

   SMTP servers SHOULD NOT publish TLSA RRs with certificate usage "0".
   Clients MAY treat such TLSA records as unusable.  Alternatively,



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   since PKIX validation is not possible with opportunistic DANE TLS,
   SMTP clients MAY treat certificate usage "0" RRs as though they were
   certificate usage "2" RRs.  But, with certificate usage "0" the
   usability of the TLSA record depends more strongly on its matching
   type.

   If the matching type is "0" (the server should also avoid this
   matching type and should publish usage "3" or "2" public key or
   certificate digests), the TLSA record contains the full certificate
   or full public key of the trusted certificate authority.  In this
   case the client has all the information it needs to match the server
   trust-chain to the TLSA record.  The client SHOULD ignore the PKIX
   validation requirement, and verify the server's trust chain via its
   DANE TLSA records only (name checks still apply as with usage "2").

   If the matching type is not "0", the TLSA record contains only a
   digest of the trust certificate authority certificate or public key.
   The server operator publishing usage 0 TLSA records may expect that
   clients already have the issuing authority certificate on hand, and
   may omit it from the server's certificate chain.  As a result, the
   client may not be able to match the server trust chain against the
   TLSA record if it, in fact, does not have a copy of the certificate
   authority certificate or public key.

   SMTP clients that implement this specification SHOULD treat TLSA
   records with certificate usage "0" and a digest matching type as
   unusable, but MAY be explicitly configured to support them when it is
   believed that clients posses a sufficiently complete set of trusted
   public CA certificates.  This is most plausible with an MUA which
   only needs enough CA certificates to authenticate its preferred
   submission service.

2.2.2.  Certificate matching

   When at least one usable "secure" TLSA record is found, the SMTP
   client SHOULD use TLSA records to authenticate the next-hop host,
   mail SHOULD not be delivered via this next-hop host if authentication
   fails, otherwise the SMTP client is vulnerable to TLS man in the
   middle attacks.

   To match a server via a TLSA record with certificate usage "2", the
   client MUST perform name checks to ensure that it has reached the
   correct server.  The SMTP client MUST accept the TLSA base domain as
   a valid DNS name in the server certificate.  Clients should also
   accept securely looked up TLSA base domain obtained indirectly via an
   MX lookup, or a CNAME resolved expansion.





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   Accepting certificates with the next-hop domain in addition to the
   next-hop MX host allows a domain with multiple MX hosts to field a
   single certificate bearing the email domain name across all the MX
   hosts, this is also compatible with pre-DANE SMTP clients that are
   configured to look for the email domain name in server certificates.

   The client MUST NOT perform certificate usage name checks with
   certificate usage "3", since with usage "3" the server is
   authenticated directly by matching the TLSA RRset to its certificate
   or public key without resort to any issuing authority.  The
   certificate content is ignored except in so far as it is used to
   match the certificate or public key digest with the TLSA RRset.

   To ensure that the server sends the right certificate chain, the SMTP
   client MUST send the TLS SNI extension containing the TLSA base
   domain.  Since DANE-aware clients are obligated to send SNI
   information, which requires at least TLS 1.0, SMTP servers for which
   DANE TLSA records are published MUST support TLS 1.0 or later with
   any client authorized to use the service.

   Each SMTP server MUST present a certificate trust chain (see
   [RFC2246] Section 7.4.2) that matches at least one of the TLSA
   records.  The server MAY rely on SNI to determine which certificate
   chain to present to the client.  Clients that don't send SNI
   information may not see the expected certificate chain.

   If the server's TLSA RRset includes records with a matching type
   indication a digest record (i.e., a value other than "0"), the
   SHA-256 digest of any object SHOULD be provided along with any other
   digest published, since clients may support only SHA-256.  Unless
   SHA-256 proves vulnerable to a "second preimage" attack, it should be
   the only digest algorithm used in TLSA records.

   If the server's TLSA records match the server's default certificate
   chain, the server need not support SNI.  The server need not include
   the extension in its TLS HELLO, simply returning a matching
   certificate chain is sufficient.  Servers MUST NOT enforce the use of
   SNI by clients, if the client sends no SNI extension, or sends an SNI
   extension for an unsupported domain the server MUST simply use its
   default certificate chain.  The client may be using unauthenticated
   opportunistic TLS and may not expect any particular certificate from
   the server.

   The client may even offer to use anonymous TLS ciphersuites and
   servers SHOULD support these, no security is gained by forcing the
   use of a certificate the client will ignore.  Indeed support for
   anonymous ciphersuites in the server makes audit trails more useful
   if the chosen ciphersuite is logged, as this will in many cases



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   record which clients did not care to authenticate the server.  (The
   Postfix SMTP server supports anonymous TLS ciphersuites by default,
   and the Postfix SMTP client offers these at its highest preference
   when server authentication is not applicable).

   With opportunistic DANE TLS, both the TLS support implied by the
   presence of DANE TLSA records and the verification parameters
   necessary to authenticate the TLS peer are obtained together,
   therefore authentication via this protocol is expected to be less
   prone to connection failure caused by incompatible configuration of
   the client and server.

3.  Opportunistic TLS for Submission

   Prior to [RFC6409], the SMTP submission protocol was a poster child
   for PKIX TLS.  The MUA typically connects to one or more submission
   servers explicitly configured by the user.  There is no indirection
   via insecure MX records, and unlike web browsers, there is no need to
   authenticate a large set of TLS servers.  Once TLS is enabled for the
   desired submission server or servers, provided the server certificate
   is correctly maintained, the MUA is able to reliably use TLS to
   authenticate the submission server.

   [RFC6186] aims to simplify the configuration of the MUA submission
   service by dynamically deriving the submission service from the
   user's email address.  This is done via SRV records, but at the cost
   of introducing the same TLS security problems faced by MTA to MTA
   SMTP.  Prompting the user when the SRV record domain is different
   from the email domain is not a robust solution.

   The protocol defined in this memo can also be used to
   opportunistically secure the submission service association.  If the
   email domain is DNSSEC signed, the SRV records are "secure" and the
   SRV host publishes secure TLSA records for submission, then the MUA
   can safely auto-configure to authenticate the submission server via
   DANE.  When DANE TLSA records are not available, the client SHOULD
   fall back to legacy behavior.

   Specifically, MUAs that dynamically determine the submission server
   via SRV records SHOULD support DNSSEC and DANE TLSA records.  They
   SHOULD use TLSA records to authenticate the server.  The processing
   of usage 2 and 3 TLSA associations by an MUA is the same as by an MTA
   with SRV records replaced by corresponding MX records.

   Just as with port 25, SMTP submission servers SHOULD NOT publish
   usage 0 or 1 TLSA associations, and MUAs that support DANE TLSA are
   not expected to trust a full list of public CAs.  Server certificate
   subjectAltNames should include at least the server name.  When the



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   server administrator is also authorized to obtain certificates for
   the email domain, the server certificate should also include the
   email domain name.  MUAs that are not able to support DNSSEC may then
   be able to authenticate the server domain.  If it is practical to
   field additional certificates for hosted domains, SNI may be used by
   the server to select the appropriate domain's certificate.

4.  Mandatory TLS Security

   An MTA implementing this protocol may require a stronger security
   assurance when sending email to selected destinations to which the
   sending organization sends sensitive email and may have regulatory
   obligations to protect its content.  This protocol is not in conflict
   with such a requirement, and in fact it can often simplify
   authenticated delivery to such destinations.

   Specifically, with domains that publish DANE TLSA records for their
   MX hosts a sending MTA can be configured to use the receiving
   domains's DANE TLSA records to authenticate the corresponding MX
   hosts, thereby obviating the complex manual provisioning process.  In
   anticipation of, or in response to, a failure to obtain the expected
   TLSA records, the sending system's administrator may choose from a
   selection of fallback options, if supported by the sending MTA:

   o  Defer mail if no usable TLSA records are found.  This is useful
      when the destination is known to publish TLSA records, and lack of
      TLSA records is most likely a transient misconfiguration.

   o  Authenticate the peer via a manually configured certificate
      digest.  This may be obtained, for example, after a problem is
      detected and confirmed to be valid by some out-of-band mechanism.

   o  Authenticate the peer via the existing public CA PKI, if the peer
      server has usable CA issued certificates.  In many cases the
      sending MTA will need custom certificate name matching rules to
      match the destination's gateways.  And the sending server must
      explicitly configure policy for the destination to always require
      TLS to prevent MITM attacks.

   o  Send via unauthenticated mandatory TLS.  This is useful if the
      requirement is merely to always encrypt transmissions to protect
      against only eavesdropping, and the possibility of MITM attacks is
      less of a concern than timely email delivery.

   It should be noted that barring administrator intervention, email
   SHOULD be deferred when DNSSEC lookups fail, (as distinct from
   "secure" non-existence of TLSA records, or secure evidence that the
   domain is no longer signed).  In addition to configuring fallback



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   strategies when TLSA records are unexpectedly absent, administrators
   may, in hopefully rare cases, need to disable DNSSEC lookups for a
   destination to work around a DNSSEC outage.

5.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to extend great thanks to Tony Finch, who
   started the original version of a DANE SMTP document.  His work is
   greatly appreciated and has been incorporated into this document.
   The authors would like to additionally thank Phil Pennock for his
   comments and advice on this document.

   Acknowledgments from Viktor: Thanks to Tony Finch who finally prodded
   me into participating in DANE working group discussions.  Thanks to
   Paul Hoffman who motivated me to produce this memo and provided
   feedback on early drafts.  Thanks also to Wietse Venema who created
   Postfix, and patiently guided the Postfix DANE implementation to
   production quality.

6.  Security Considerations

   This protocol leverages DANE TLSA records to implement MITM resistant
   opportunistic channel security for SMTP.  For destination domains
   that sign their MX records and publish signed TLSA records for their
   MX hosts, this protocol allows sending MTAs (and perhaps dynamically
   configured MUAs) to securely discover both the availability of TLS
   and how to authenticate the destination.

   This protocol does not aim to secure all SMTP traffic, as that is not
   practical until DNSSEC and DANE adoption are universal.  The
   incremental deployment provided by following this specification is a
   best possible path for securing SMTP.  This protocol coexists and
   interoperates with the existing insecure Internet email backbone.

   The protocol does not preclude existing non-opportunistic SMTP TLS
   security arrangements, which can continue to be used as before via
   manual configuration and negotiated out-of-band key and TLS
   configuration exchanges.













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   Opportunistic SMTP TLS depends critically on DNSSEC for downgrade
   resistance and secure resolution of the destination name.  If DNSSEC
   is compromised, it is not possible to fall back on the public CA PKI
   to prevent MITM attacks.  A successful breach of DNSSEC enables the
   attacker to publish TLSA usage 3 certificate associations, and
   thereby bypass any security benefit the legitimate domain owner might
   hope to gain by publishing usage 0 or 1 TLSA RRs.  Given the lack of
   public CA PKI support in existing MTA deployments, deprecating
   certificate usages 0 and 1 in this specifications improves
   interoperability without degrading security.

7.  Normative References

   [I-D.dukhovni-dane-ops]
              Dukhovni, V., "DANE TLSA implementation and operational
              guidance", draft-dukhovni-dane-ops-00 (work in progress),
              May 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2246]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC3207]  Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
              Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, February 2002.

   [RFC3546]  Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
              and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4346]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.



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   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
              Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

   [RFC6186]  Daboo, C., "Use of SRV Records for Locating Email
              Submission/Access Services", RFC 6186, March 2011.

   [RFC6409]  Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
              STD 72, RFC 6409, November 2011.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Viktor Dukhovni
   Unaffiliated

   Email: ietf-dane@dukhovni.org


   Wes Hardaker
   Parsons
   P.O. Box 382
   Davis, CA  95617
   US

   Email: ietf@hardakers.net









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