[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 RFC 7672

DANE                                                         V. Dukhovni
Internet-Draft                                              Unaffiliated
Intended status: Experimental                                W. Hardaker
Expires: April 24, 2014                                          Parsons
                                                        October 21, 2013


                SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS
                   draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-02

Abstract

   This memo describes a protocol for opportunistic TLS security based
   on the DANE TLSA DNS record.  The protocol is downgrade resistant
   when the SMTP client supports DANE TLSA and the server domain
   publishes TLSA records for its MX hosts.  This enables an incremental
   transition of the Internet email backbone (MTA to MTA SMTP traffic)
   to TLS encrypted and authenticated delivery.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  SMTP Channel Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Hardening Opportunistic TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  TLS discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Non-MX destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  MX resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.3.  TLSA record lookup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.2.  DANE authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.2.1.  TLSA certificate usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.2.2.  Certificate matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   3.  Opportunistic TLS for Submission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  Mandatory TLS Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   Lacking verified DNS and "Server Name Indication" (SNI), there has
   historically been no scalable way for SMTP server operators to deploy
   certificates with a client-trusted subject name.  It's only with the
   deployment of DNSSEC and DANE that authenticated TLS for SMTP to MX
   becomes possible between parties that have not already established an
   identity convention out-of-band.

1.1.  Background

   The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin
   authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  DNSSEC
   is defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034] and [RFC4035].

   As described in the introduction of [RFC6698], TLS authentication via
   the existing public Certificate Authority (CA) Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) suffers from an over-abundance of trusted
   certificate authorities capable of issuing certificates for any
   domain of their choice.  DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
   (DANE) leverages the DNSSEC infrastructure to publish trusted keys
   and certificates for use with TLS via a new TLSA record type.  With
   DANE, the public CA PKI can be augmented or replaced by DNSSEC
   validated TLSA records.



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   The Transport Layer Security (TLS [RFC5246]) protocol enables secure
   TCP communication.  In the context of this memo, channel security is
   assumed to be provided by TLS.  Used without authentication, TLS
   protects only against eavesdropping.  With authentication, TLS also
   protects against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

1.2.  SMTP Channel Security

   The Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) ([RFC5321]) is multi-hop
   store & forward, while TLS security is hop-by-hop.  The number of
   hops from the sender's Mail User Agent to the recipient mailbox is
   rarely less than 2 and is often higher.  Some hops may be TLS
   protected, some may not.  The same SMTP TCP endpoint can serve both
   TLS and non-TLS clients, with TLS negotiated via the SMTP STARTTLS
   command ([RFC3207]).  DNS MX records abstract the next-hop transport
   end-point.  SMTP addresses are not transport addresses and are
   security agnostic.  Unlike HTTP, there is no URI scheme for email
   addresses to designate whether the SMTP server should be contacted
   with or without security.

   A Mail Transport Agent (MTA) may need to forward a message to a
   particular email recipient <user@example.com>.  To deliver the
   message, the MTA needs to retrieve the MX hosts of example.com from
   DNS, and then deliver the message to one of them.  Absent DNSSEC, the
   MX lookup is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle and cache poisoning
   attacks.  An active attacker can forge DNS replies with fake MX
   records, and can direct traffic to a server of his choice.
   Therefore, secure verification of MX host certificates is not
   possible without DNSSEC.  A man in the middle can also suppress the
   MX host's STARTTLS EHLO response, convincing the client that
   communication over TLS is unavailable.

   One might try to harden STARTTLS with SMTP against DNS attacks by
   requiring each MX host to posess an X.509 certificate for the
   recipient domain that is obtained from the message envelope and is
   not subject to DNS reply forgery.  Unfortunately, this is
   impractical, as email for many domains is handled by third parties,
   which are not in a position to obtain certificates for all the
   domains they serve.  Deployment of SNI (see [RFC6066] Section 3.1) is
   no panacea, since SNI key management is operationally challenging
   except when the email service provider is also the domain's registrar
   and its certificate issuer; this is rarely the case for email.

   Since the recipient domain name cannot be used as the SMTP server
   authentication identity, and neither can the MX hostname without
   DNSSEC, large scale deployment of authenticated TLS for SMTP requires
   secure DNS.  At this time, DNSSEC is not yet widely deployed and MTA
   to MTA traffic between Internet connected organizations rarely uses



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   TLS at all, or simply uses TLS opportunistically without
   authentication and protects against only passive eavesdropping
   attacks.

   The exceptions are cases in which the sending MTA is statically
   configured to use TLS for mail sent to specific selected peer domains
   and is configured with appropriate subject names (or content digests)
   to expect in the presented MX host certificates of those domains.
   Such statically configured SMTP secure channels are used rarely,
   generally between domains that make bilateral arrangements with their
   business partners.  Internet email, on the other hand, requires
   contacting many new domains for which security configurations can not
   be established in advance.

   Note, the above does not apply to mail submission [RFC6409], where a
   mail user agent is pre-configured to send all email to a fixed Mail
   Submission Agent (MSA).  Submission servers usually offer TLS and the
   Mail User Agent (MUA) can be statically configured to require TLS
   with its chosen MSA.  The situation changes when submission servers
   are configured dynamically via SRV records (see [RFC6186] Section 6).
   Applications to submission via SRV records will be discussed later in
   this memo.

   With little opportunity to use TLS authentication, MX hosts that
   support STARTTLS often use self-signed or private CA issued X.509
   certificates.  Sending systems are rarely configured with a
   comprehensive list of trusted CAs and do not check CRLs or implement
   OCSP.  In essence, they don't and can't rely on the existing public
   CA PKI.  This is not a result of complacency on the part SMTP server
   administrators and MTA developers.  Nor is it just a consequence of
   the relative maturity of the SMTP infrastructure at the time that TLS
   was introduced.  Rather, the abstraction of the SMTP transport
   endpoint via DNS MX records, often across organization boundaries,
   limits the use of public CA PKI with SMTP to a small set of sender-
   configured peer domains.

   This does not mean, however, that the Internet email backbone cannot
   benefit from TLS.  The fact that transport security is not explicitly
   specified in either the recipient address or the MX record means that
   new protocols can furnish out-of-band information to SMTP, making it
   possible to simultaneously discover both which peer domains support
   secure delivery via TLS and how to verify the authenticity of the
   associated MX hosts.  The first such mechanism that can work an
   Internet scale is DANE TLSA, but use of DANE TLSA with MTA to MTA
   SMTP must be cognizant of the lack of any realistic role for the
   existing public CA PKI.





Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


1.3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Hardening Opportunistic TLS

   This memo describes opportunistic SMTP over TLS security, where
   traffic from DANE TLSA aware SMTP clients to domains that implement
   DANE TLSA records in accordance with this memo is secure.  Traffic to
   other domains continues to be sent in the same manner as before
   (either manually configured for security or unauthenticated and often
   unencrypted).  It is hoped that, over time, more domains will
   implement DNSSEC and publish DANE TLSA records for their MX hosts.
   This will enable an incremental transition of the email backbone to
   authenticated TLS delivery.

   Since email addresses and MX hostnames (or submission SRV records)
   neither signal nor deny support for TLS by the receiving domain, it
   is possible to use DANE TLSA records to securely signal TLS support
   and simultaneously to provide the means by which SMTP clients can
   successfully authenticate legitimate SMTP servers.

2.1.  TLS discovery

   As noted previously (Section 1.2), opportunistic TLS with SMTP
   servers that advertise TLS support via STARTTLS is subject to a man
   in the middle downgrade attack.  Some SMTP servers erroneously
   advertise STARTTLS in default configurations that are not, in fact,
   TLS capable, and clients need to be prepared to retry plaintext
   delivery after STARTTLS fails.  This memo specifies a downgrade
   resistant mechanism that allows a server to advertise TLS support
   based on DANE TLSA records.  DNSSEC validated TLSA records are
   unlikely to be accidentally published for servers that do not in fact
   support TLS, and thus clients can safely interpret their presence as
   a commitment by the server operator to implement STARTTLS.

   SMTP is a store & forward protocol.  An MTA that is not the final
   destination for a message recipient forwards the message one hop
   closer to the recipient's mailbox.  To do so, it must determine the
   appropriate next-hop destination, and locate one or more associated
   SMTP servers.  When DNSSEC validated TLSA records are available for a
   given next-hop SMTP server, the TLS connection to that server will be
   downgrade resistant.  If the records in question are "usable"
   ([RFC6698], Section 4.1) to authenticate the server, the connection
   will also be authenticated and thus immune to eavesdropping or
   tampering (unless DNSSEC itself is compromised).



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   Typically, the next-hop destination will be the domain part of the
   recipient address, which is then subject to MX resolution.  The next-
   hop destination may also be configured by the MTA administrator to be
   a next-hop destination host (explicitly exempt from MX resolution),
   or a next-hop destination domain (subject to MX resolution) which
   takes the place of the domain part of the recipient address.

   The protocol in this memo is "opportunistic"; it should be used
   whenever possible but communication should continue when it is not
   available.  Absent "secure" (DNSSEC validated) TLSA records, mail
   delivery should fall back to pre-DANE opportunistic TLS.  The SMTP
   client MAY be configured to require DANE verified delivery for some
   or all destinations, in which case mail delivery will be deferred
   when "secure" TLSA records are absent.

   Below we explain how to determine for a given next-hop destination
   the associated SMTP servers, the TLSA base domain and TLSA records.

2.1.1.  Non-MX destinations

   As mentioned above, the next-hop destination domain may in some cases
   be exempt from MX lookups.  In addition, MX lookups for the next-hop
   domain may yield no results.  In either case, the destination server
   for such a domain is determined by looking up the corresponding A or
   AAAA records.

   When "bogus" records are encountered either during CNAME expansion,
   or when retrieving the associated TLSA RRset, the SMTP client MUST
   proceed as if the next-hop domain were unreachable.  Delivery should
   either be deferred or may be attempted via any fallback next-hop
   configured by the SMTP client administrator.  Fallback next-hop
   destinations may also employ opportunistic DANE TLS.  Proceeding with
   the original next-hop despite "bogus" DNS responses would destroy
   protection against downgrade attacks.

   Following [RFC5321] Section 5.1, if the A or AAAA lookup of the
   initial name yields a CNAME, we replace it with the resulting name as
   if it were the initial name and perform a lookup again using the new
   name.  This replacement is performed recursively, although MTAs
   typically support only limited recursion in CNAME expansion.  We
   consider the following cases:

   Non-CNAME:   The next-hop destination domain is not a CNAME alias.
      The lookup key for the DNSSEC validated TLSA records is obtained
      by prepending service labels ("_<port-number>._tcp") to the
      initial next-hop destination domain.  If associated "secure" TLSA
      records are found (see Section 2.1.3) the TLSA base domain is the
      next-hop domain.  If no secure TLSA records are found,



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


      opportunistic DANE TLS is not applicable and mail delivery
      proceeds with pre-DANE opportunistic TLS.

   Insecure CNAME:   The next-hop destination domain is a CNAME alias,
      but at least one of the CNAME RRs leading to the ultimate target
      of this alias (during recursive CNAME expansion) is "insecure".
      We treat this case just like the non-CNAME case above.

   Secure CNAME, no TLSA:   The next-hop destination domain is a CNAME
      alias, and all the CNAME RRs leading to the ultimate target of
      this alias (during recursive CNAME expansion) are "secure" (DNSSEC
      validated), but no "secure" TLSA RRs are found after prefixing the
      service labels to the CNAME-expanded next-hop domain.  This case
      is also treated just like the non-CNAME case.

   Secure CNAME, TLSA:   The next-hop destination domain is a CNAME
      alias, all the CNAME RRs leading to the ultimate target of this
      alias (during recursive CNAME expansion) are "secure", and in
      addition "secure" TLSA RRs are found after prefixing the service
      labels to the CNAME-expanded next-hop domain.  In this case the
      CNAME-expanded next-hop domain is taken as the TLSA base domain.
      The original next-hop domain is (see Section 2.2.2) used only as
      an alternative name in certificate peername verification if
      applicable.

   In summary, if it is possible to securely obtain the full, CNAME-
   expanded, DNSSEC-validated address records for the non-MX next-hop
   domain then that name is the preferred TLSA base domain.  If that is
   not possible, then the original next-hop domain is used as the TLSA
   base domain.  When no "secure" TLSA records are found at either the
   CNAME expanded or original next-hop domain, then opportunistic DANE
   TLS does not apply for mail delivery to the non-MX destination in
   question.

2.1.2.  MX resolution

   In this section we consider next-hop domains that are subject to MX
   resolution and have MX records.  When DANE TLS is applicable, the
   TLSA base domain will be associated with the MX host selected for
   message delivery.  Therefore, the MX host names must be determined
   securely by performing a DNSSEC validated MX lookup to obtain the
   list of associated MX hosts.  If the MX RRset is "insecure", DANE
   TLSA does not apply and mail delivery proceeds with pre-DANE
   opportunistic TLS (subject to its various MITM attacks and unecrypted
   transmission when STARTTLS is not supported by the destination).

   When "bogus" DNSSEC records are encountered during CNAME expansion of
   the next-hop domain or when processing the actual MX RRset, delivery



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   MUST either be deferred, or MAY be attempted via any fallback next-
   hop (which may also employ opportunistic DANE TLS) configured by the
   SMTP client administrator.  Proceeding with the original next-hop
   despite "bogus" DNS responses would destroy protection against
   downgrade attacks.  When "bogus" DNSSEC records are encountered with
   CNAME expansion or TLSA RRset lookup for a particular MX host,
   delivery MUST proceed as if MX host in question were unreachable.

   MX records MUST be sorted by preference; an MX host with a better
   preference and no TLSA records MUST NOT be preempted by a host with a
   worse MX preference but with TLSA records.  In other words, avoiding
   delivery loops by following MX preferences must take place even if it
   means insecure delivery.

   In accordance with Section 5.1 of [RFC5321], if the MX lookup of the
   initial name yields a CNAME, we replace the initial name with the
   resulting name and perform a new lookup with the new name.  MTAs
   typically support recursion in CNAME expansion, so this replacement
   is performed repeatedly until the ultimate non-CNAME domain is found
   (or the limit on the number of CNAMEs to examine is reached).  If at
   any stage of CNAME expansion the DNS result is "bogus", MX resolution
   fails with a temporary error.  In that case, mail delivery MUST
   either be deferred, or attempted via any alternative delivery channel
   configured by the MTA administrator.  We consider the following
   cases:

   Non-CNAME:   The next-hop destination domain is not a CNAME alias,
      that is, it resolves directly to a set of DNSSEC validated
      ("secure") MX hosts.  With each MX host, if MX host CNAME
      expansion is supported by the MTA, and the full CNAME expansion of
      the MX host name is "secure", then the CNAME expanded MX host name
      is the TLSA base domain provided secure TLSA records are found
      there after prefixing service labels ("_<port-number>._tcp").
      Otherwise, the initial MX host name is the TLSA base domain
      provided secure TLSA records are found there after prefixing
      service labels.  With the MX hostname (or its CNAME expansion) as
      the TLSA base domain, the original next-hop domain SHOULD be used
      only in certificate name checks.  If no "secure" TLSA RRs are
      found, and no "bogus" records encountered, DANE TLSA is not
      applicable with the MX host in question and delivery proceeds as
      with pre-DANE opportunistic TLS.

   CNAME:  The next-hop destination domain is a CNAME alias, and
      resolves via a chain of "secure" CNAME records to a final domain
      with "secure" MX records.  The TLSA base domain for each MX host
      in this case is the same as in the "Non-CNAME" case above, but now
      both the initial domain and its CNAME-expansion are candidate
      names in certificate name checks.  If the CNAME chain contains



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


      "insecure" elements, DANE TLSA does not apply to the next-hop
      domain, and delivery proceeds via pre-DANE opportunistic TLS.

   Note: CNAMEs are not legal in the exchange field of MX records, thus
   MTAs are not obligated to perform MX exchange CNAME expansion.  If an
   MTA does not perform CNAME expansion, there is potential risk, that
   the MTA may fail to notice that it is one of the MX hosts for the
   destination and that it must skip MX records with equal or worse
   (numerically higher precedence).  If an MTA does allow CNAMEs to be
   used in MX records, it SHOULD process them recursively as described
   above to determine the most appropriate TLSA RRset base domain.

2.1.3.  TLSA record lookup

   Each TLSA base domain obtained above (for a non-MX destination, or
   for a particular MX host of an MX destination), when prefixed with
   appropriate service labels leads to associated "secure" TLSA RRs
   (possibly via a chain of "secure" CNAME RRs).  If, for example, the
   base domain is "mail.example.com", the TLSA RRset is obtained via a
   DNSSEC query of the form:

   _25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA ?

   Typically, the destination TCP port is 25, but this may be different
   with custom routes specified by the MTA administrator or when an MUA
   connects to a submission server on port 587.  The SMTP client MUST
   use the appropriate "_<port-number>" prefix in place of "_25" when
   the port number is not equal to 25.  The query response may be a
   CNAME (or a DNAME + CNAME combination), or the TLSA RRset.  If the
   record is a CNAME or DNAME, the SMTP client restarts the TLSA query
   at the target domain, following CNAMEs as appropriate.

   CNAMEs encountered during TLSA record lookups can be used to share a
   single TLSA RRset specifying a common certificate authority or a
   common leaf certificate for multiple TLS services.  Such CNAME
   expansion does not change the SMTP client's notion of the TLSA base
   domain, thus when _25._tcp.mail.example.com is a CNAME the base
   domain remains mail.example.com and is still used in peer certificate
   name checks.  For example:

   example.com.                IN MX 0 mail.example.com.
   example.com.                IN MX 0 mail2.example.com.
   _25._tcp.mail.example.com.  IN CNAME 2.1.1._dane.example.com.
   _25._tcp.mail2.example.com. IN CNAME 2.1.1._dane.example.com.
   2.1.1._dane.example.com.    IN  TLSA 2 1 1 e3b0c44298fc1c14
                                              9afbf4c8996fb924
                          27ae41e4649b934c
                          a495991b7852b855



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                 [Page 9]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   Here, mail.example.com and mail2.example.com have certificates issued
   under a common trust-anchor, but each MX host's TLSA base domain
   remains its hostname and MUST match the subject name (or subject
   alternative name) in its certificate.

   If, after possible CNAME indirection, at least one "secure" TLSA
   record is found (even if not usable because it is unsupported by the
   implementation or administratively disabled) the next-hop host has
   committed to TLS support.  The SMTP client SHOULD NOT deliver mail
   via such a next-hop host unless a TLS session is negotiated via
   STARTTLS.  This avoids man in the middle STARTTLS downgrade attacks.

   As noted previously (Section 2.1.1, Section 2.1.2), when no TLSA
   records are found at a CNAME-expanded name (due to an insecure
   response or a lack of TLSA records verified by DNSSEC's proof-of-non-
   existence), the unexpanded name MUST be tried instead.  This supports
   clients of hosting providers where the provider's zone is not DNSSEC
   validated, but the client has shared appropriate key material with
   the hosting provider to enable TLS via SNI.

   SMTP clients may deploy opportunistic DANE TLS incrementally by
   enabling it only for selected sites, or may occasionally need to
   disable opportunistic DANE TLS for peers that fail to interoperate
   due to misconfiguration or software defects on either end.  Unless
   local policy specifies that opportunistic DANE TLS is not to be used
   for a particular destination, client MUST NOT deliver mail via a
   server whose certificate chain fails to match at least one TLSA
   record when usable TLSA records are available.

   SMTP clients employing opportunistic DANE TLS and TLSA record
   publishers for SMTP servers need to follow the guidance outlined in
   [I-D.ietf-dane-ops]'s "Certificate Name Check Conventions", "Service
   Provider and TLSA Publisher Synchronization" and "TLSA Base Domain
   and CNAMEs" sections.

2.2.  DANE authentication

2.2.1.  TLSA certificate usages

   TLSA Publishers should follow the TLSA publication size guidance
   found in [I-D.ietf-dane-ops] about "DANE DNS Record Size Guidelines".

2.2.1.1.  Certificate usage 3

   Since opportunistic DANE TLS will be used by non-interactive MTAs,
   with no user to "press OK" when authentication fails, reliability of
   peer authentication is paramount.  TLSA records published for SMTP
   servers SHOULD be "3 1 1" records to support opportunistic SMTP over



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 10]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   TLS with DANE.  This record specifies the SHA-256 digest of the
   server's public key.  Since all DANE implementations are required to
   support SHA-256, this record works for all clients and need not
   change across certificate renewals with the same key.

   Authentication via certificate usage "3" TLSA records involves simply
   checking that the server's leaf certificate matches the TLSA record.
   Other than extracting the relevant certificate elements for
   comparison, no other use is made of the certificate content.
   Authentication via certificate usage "3" TLSA records involves no
   certificate authority signature checks.  It also involves no server
   name checks, and thus does not impose any new requirements on the
   names contained in the server certificate (SNI is not required when
   the TLSA record matches server's default certificate).

   Two TLSA records will need to be published before updating a server's
   public key, one matching the currently deployed key and the other
   matching the new key scheduled to replace it.  Once sufficient time
   has elapsed for all DNS caches to time out the previous TLSA RRset,
   which contains only the old key, the server may be reconfigured to
   use the new private key and associated public key certificate.  The
   amount of time a server should wait before using a new key that is
   referenced by new TLSA records should be at least twice the TTL of
   the previously published TLSA records.  Once the server is using a
   new key, the obsolete TLSA RR can be removed from DNS, leaving only
   the RR that matches the new key.

2.2.1.2.  Certificate usage 2

   Some domains may prefer to reduce the operational complexity of
   publishing unique TLSA RRs for each TLS service.  If the domain
   employs a common issuing certificate authority to create certificates
   for multiple TLS services, it may be simpler to publish the issuing
   authority's public key as a trust-anchor for the certificate chains
   of all relevant services.  The TLSA RRs for each service issued by
   the same TA may then be CNAMEs to a common TLSA RRset that matches
   the TA.  In this case, the certificate chain presented in the TLS
   handshake of each service SHOULD include the TA certificate, as SMTP
   clients cannot generally be expected to have domain-issued trust-
   anchor certificates in their trusted certificate store.  TLSA
   Publishers should publish either "2 1 1" or "2 0 1" TLSA parameters,
   which specify the SHA-256 digest of the trust-anchor public key or
   certificate respectively.  As with leaf certificate rollover
   discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, two such TLSA RRs need to be published
   to facilitate TA certificate rollover.

   The usability of "2 1 1" or "2 0 1" TLSA RRs with SMTP is not
   assured.  If server operators employing these RRs universally ensure



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 11]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   that the corresponding TA certificate is included in the SMTP
   server's TLS handshake certificate chain, clients can safely enable
   support for these RRs.  If sufficiently many server administrators
   negligently omit the TA certificate from the server's TLS certificate
   chain, SMTP clients will be hesitant to support usage "2" TLSA RRs,
   since mail delivery will not work to many destination domains if they
   do.  Server operators are encouraged to implement these RRs, if they
   are operationally a better fit for their organization, provided they
   do so with care.  It is critical to not forget to include trust-
   anchor certificates in server trust chains.  SMTP client
   implementations SHOULD support these TLSA RRs, unless, despite the
   above warning, a non-trivial fraction of server operators fail to
   publish certificate chains that include the required TA certificate.

2.2.1.3.  Certificate usages 0 and 1

   SMTP servers SHOULD NOT publish TLSA RRs with certificate usage "0"
   or "1".  SMTP clients cannot be expected to be configured with a
   suitably complete set of trusted public CAs.  Even with a full set of
   public CAs, SMTP clients cannot (without relying on DNSSEC for secure
   MX records) perform [RFC6125] server identity verification.

   SMTP client treatment of TLSA RRs with certificate usages "0" or "1"
   is undefined.  For example, clients MAY (will likely) treat such TLSA
   records as unusable.

2.2.2.  Certificate matching

   When at least one usable "secure" TLSA record is found, the SMTP
   client SHOULD use TLSA records to authenticate the next-hop host,
   mail SHOULD not be delivered via this next-hop host if authentication
   fails, otherwise the SMTP client is vulnerable to TLS man in the
   middle attacks.

   To match a server via a TLSA record with certificate usage "2", the
   client MUST perform name checks to ensure that it has reached the
   correct server.  In all cases the SMTP client MUST accept the TLSA
   base domain as a valid DNS name in the server certificate.

   MX:  If the TLSA base domain was obtained indirectly via an MX lookup
      (it is the name of an MX exchange that may be securely CNAME
      expanded), then the initial query name used in the MX lookup
      SHOULD be accepted in the peer certificate.  The CNAME-expanded
      initial query name SHOULD also be accepted if different from the
      initial query name.






Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 12]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   Non-MX:  If no MX records were found and the TLSA base domain is the
      CNAME-expanded initial query name, then the initial query name
      SHOULD also be accepted.

   Accepting certificates with the next-hop domain in addition to the
   next-hop MX host allows a domain with multiple MX hosts to field a
   single certificate bearing the email domain name across all the MX
   hosts, this is also compatible with pre-DANE SMTP clients that are
   configured to look for the email domain name in server certificates.

   The SMTP client MUST NOT perform certificate usage name checks with
   certificate usage "3", since with usage "3" the server is
   authenticated directly by matching the TLSA RRset to its certificate
   or public key without resort to any issuing authority.  The
   certificate content is ignored except in so far as it is used to
   match the certificate or public key (ASN.1 object or its digest) with
   the TLSA RRset.

   To ensure that the server sends the right certificate chain, the SMTP
   client MUST send the TLS SNI extension containing the TLSA base
   domain.  Since DANE-aware clients are obligated to send SNI
   information, which requires at least TLS 1.0, SMTP servers for which
   DANE TLSA records are published MUST support TLS 1.0 or later with
   any client authorized to use the service.

   Each SMTP server MUST present a certificate chain (see [RFC2246]
   Section 7.4.2) that matches at least one of the TLSA records.  The
   server MAY rely on SNI to determine which certificate chain to
   present to the client.  Clients that don't send SNI information may
   not see the expected certificate chain.

   If the server's TLSA RRset includes records with a matching type
   indicating a digest record (i.e., a value other than "0"), the
   SHA-256 digest of any object SHOULD be provided along with any other
   digest published, since clients may support only SHA-256.  Unless
   SHA-256 proves vulnerable to a "second preimage" attack, it should be
   the only digest algorithm used in TLSA records.

   If the server's TLSA records match the server's default certificate
   chain, the server need not support SNI.  The server need not include
   the extension in its TLS HELLO, simply returning a matching
   certificate chain is sufficient.  Servers MUST NOT enforce the use of
   SNI by clients, if the client sends no SNI extension, or sends an SNI
   extension for an unsupported domain the server MUST simply use its
   default certificate chain.  The client may be using unauthenticated
   opportunistic TLS and may not expect any particular certificate from
   the server.




Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 13]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   The client may even offer to use anonymous TLS ciphersuites and
   servers SHOULD support these.  No security is gained by sending a
   certificate the client is willing to ignore.  Indeed support for
   anonymous ciphersuites in the server makes audit trails more useful
   when the chosen ciphersuite is logged, as this will in many cases
   record which clients did not care to authenticate the server.  (The
   Postfix SMTP server supports anonymous TLS ciphersuites by default,
   and the Postfix SMTP client offers these at its highest preference
   when server authentication is not applicable).

   With opportunistic DANE TLS, both the TLS support implied by the
   presence of DANE TLSA records and the verification parameters
   necessary to authenticate the TLS peer are obtained together,
   therefore authentication via this protocol is expected to be less
   prone to connection failure caused by incompatible configuration of
   the client and server.

3.  Opportunistic TLS for Submission

   Prior to [RFC6409], the SMTP submission protocol was a poster-child
   for PKIX TLS.  The MUA typically connects to one or more submission
   servers explicitly configured by the user.  There is no indirection
   via insecure MX records, and unlike web browsers, there is no need to
   authenticate a large set of TLS servers.  Once TLS is enabled for the
   desired submission server or servers, provided the server certificate
   is correctly maintained, the MUA is able to reliably use TLS to
   authenticate the submission server.

   [RFC6186] aims to simplify the configuration of the MUA submission
   service by dynamically deriving the submission service from the
   user's email address.  This is done via SRV records, but at the cost
   of introducing the same TLS security problems faced by MTA to MTA
   SMTP.  Prompting the user when the SRV record domain is different
   from the email domain is not a robust solution.

   The protocol defined in this memo can also be used to secure
   submission service discovery.  If the email domain is DNSSEC signed,
   the SRV records are "secure" and the SRV host publishes secure TLSA
   records for submission, then the MUA can safely auto-configure to
   authenticate the submission server via DANE.  When DANE TLSA records
   are not available, the client SHOULD fall back to legacy behavior
   (this may involve prompting the user to accept the resulting server
   and perhaps "pin" its certificate).








Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 14]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   Specifically, MUAs that dynamically determine the submission server
   via SRV records SHOULD support DNSSEC and DANE TLSA records.  They
   SHOULD use TLSA records to authenticate the server.  The processing
   of usage 2 and 3 TLSA associations by an MUA is the same as by an MTA
   with SRV records replaced by corresponding MX records.

   Just as with MX service on port 25, SMTP submission servers SHOULD
   NOT publish usage 0 or 1 TLSA associations, and MUAs that support
   DANE TLSA are not expected to trust a full list of public CAs.
   Server certificate subjectAltNames should include at least the server
   name.  When the server administrator is able to obtain a certificate
   for the email domain, the server certificate should also include the
   email domain name.  MUAs that are not able to support DNSSEC may then
   be able to authenticate the server domain.  If it is practical to
   field additional certificates for hosted domains, SNI may be used by
   the server to select the appropriate domain's certificate.

4.  Mandatory TLS Security

   An MTA implementing this protocol may require a stronger security
   assurance when sending email to selected destinations to which the
   sending organization sends sensitive email and may have regulatory
   obligations to protect its content.  This protocol is not in conflict
   with such a requirement, and in fact it can often simplify
   authenticated delivery to such destinations.

   Specifically, with domains that publish DANE TLSA records for their
   MX hosts a sending MTA can be configured to use the receiving
   domains's DANE TLSA records to authenticate the corresponding MX
   hosts, thereby obviating the complex manual provisioning process.  In
   anticipation of, or in response to, a failure to obtain the expected
   TLSA records, the sending system's administrator may choose from a
   selection of fallback options, if supported by the sending MTA:

   o  Defer mail if no usable TLSA records are found.  This is useful
      when the destination is known to publish TLSA records, and lack of
      TLSA records is most likely a transient misconfiguration.

   o  Authenticate the peer via a manually configured certificate
      digest.  This may be obtained, for example, after a problem is
      detected and confirmed to be valid by some out-of-band mechanism.

   o  Authenticate the peer via the existing public CA PKI, if the peer
      server has usable CA issued certificates.  In many cases the
      sending MTA will need custom certificate name matching rules to
      match the destination's gateways.  And the sending server must
      explicitly configure policy for the destination to always require
      TLS to prevent MITM attacks.



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 15]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   o  Send via unauthenticated mandatory TLS.  This is useful if the
      requirement is merely to always encrypt transmissions to protect
      against only eavesdropping, and the possibility of MITM attacks is
      less of a concern than timely email delivery.

   It should be noted that barring administrator intervention, email
   SHOULD be deferred when DNSSEC lookups fail, (as distinct from
   "secure" non-existence of TLSA records, or secure evidence that the
   domain is no longer signed).  In addition to configuring fallback
   strategies when TLSA records are unexpectedly absent, administrators
   may, in hopefully rare cases, need to disable DNSSEC lookups for a
   destination to work around a DNSSEC outage.

5.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to extend great thanks to Tony Finch, who
   started the original version of a DANE SMTP document.  His work is
   greatly appreciated and has been incorporated into this document.
   The authors would like to additionally thank Phil Pennock for his
   comments and advice on this document.

   Acknowledgments from Viktor: Thanks to Tony Finch who finally prodded
   me into participating in DANE working group discussions.  Thanks to
   Paul Hoffman who motivated me to produce this memo and provided
   feedback on early drafts.  Thanks also to Wietse Venema who created
   Postfix, and patiently guided the Postfix DANE implementation to
   production quality.

6.  Security Considerations

   This protocol leverages DANE TLSA records to implement MITM resistant
   opportunistic channel security for SMTP.  For destination domains
   that sign their MX records and publish signed TLSA records for their
   MX hosts, this protocol allows sending MTAs (and perhaps dynamically
   configured MUAs) to securely discover both the availability of TLS
   and how to authenticate the destination.

   This protocol does not aim to secure all SMTP traffic, as that is not
   practical until DNSSEC and DANE adoption are universal.  The
   incremental deployment provided by following this specification is a
   best possible path for securing SMTP.  This protocol coexists and
   interoperates with the existing insecure Internet email backbone.

   The protocol does not preclude existing non-opportunistic SMTP TLS
   security arrangements, which can continue to be used as before via
   manual configuration and negotiated out-of-band key and TLS
   configuration exchanges.




Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 16]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   Opportunistic SMTP TLS depends critically on DNSSEC for downgrade
   resistance and secure resolution of the destination name.  If DNSSEC
   is compromised, it is not possible to fall back on the public CA PKI
   to prevent MITM attacks.  A successful breach of DNSSEC enables the
   attacker to publish TLSA usage 3 certificate associations, and
   thereby bypass any security benefit the legitimate domain owner might
   hope to gain by publishing usage 0 or 1 TLSA RRs.  Given the lack of
   public CA PKI support in existing MTA deployments, deprecating
   certificate usages 0 and 1 in this specifications improves
   interoperability without degrading security.

7.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dane-ops]
              Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "DANE TLSA implementation
              and operational guidance", draft-ietf-dane-ops-00 (work in
              progress), October 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2246]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC3207]  Hoffman, P., "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
              Transport Layer Security", RFC 3207, February 2002.

   [RFC3546]  Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
              and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4346]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.



Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 17]


Internet-Draft  SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS    October 2013


   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
              Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

   [RFC6186]  Daboo, C., "Use of SRV Records for Locating Email
              Submission/Access Services", RFC 6186, March 2011.

   [RFC6409]  Gellens, R. and J. Klensin, "Message Submission for Mail",
              STD 72, RFC 6409, November 2011.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Viktor Dukhovni
   Unaffiliated

   Email: ietf-dane@dukhovni.org


   Wes Hardaker
   Parsons
   P.O. Box 382
   Davis, CA  95617
   US

   Email: ietf@hardakers.net









Dukhovni & Hardaker      Expires April 24, 2014                [Page 18]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/