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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 4703

DHC Working Group                                               M. Stapp
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: May 22, 2002                                  November 21, 2001


          Resolution of DNS Name Conflicts Among DHCP Clients
                <draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-03.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2002.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   DHCP provides a powerful mechanism for IP host configuration.
   However, the configuration capability provided by DHCP does not
   include updating DNS(RFC1034[1], RFC1035[2]), and specifically
   updating the name to address and address to name mappings maintained
   in the DNS.

   The "Client FQDN Option"[3] specifies the client FQDN option,
   through which DHCP clients and servers can exchange information
   about client FQDNs.  This document describes techniques for the
   resolution of DNS name conflicts among DHCP clients.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Issues with DNS Update in DHCP Environments  . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.1 Client Mis-Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.2 Multiple DHCP Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Use of the DHCID RR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.1 Format of the DHCID RRDATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  DNS RR TTLs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Procedures for performing DNS updates  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.1 Adding A RRs to DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.2 Adding PTR RR Entries to DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.3 Removing Entries from DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.4 Updating Other RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13































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1. Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119[4].

2. Introduction

   "The Client FQDN Option"[3] includes a description of the operation
   of DHCP[5] clients and servers that use the client FQDN option.
   Through the use of the client FQDN option, DHCP clients and servers
   can negotiate the client's FQDN and the allocation of responsibility
   for updating the DHCP client's A RR.  This document identifies
   situations in which conflicts in the use of FQDNs may arise among
   DHCP clients, and describes a strategy for the use of the DHCID DNS
   resource record[6] in resolving those conflicts.

   In any case, whether a site permits all, some, or no DHCP servers
   and clients to perform DNS updates into the zones which it controls
   is entirely a matter of local administrative policy. This document
   does not require any specific administrative policy, and does not
   propose one. The range of possible policies is very broad, from
   sites where only the DHCP servers have been given credentials that
   the DNS servers will accept, to sites where each individual DHCP
   client has been configured with credentials which allow the client
   to modify its own domain name. Compliant implementations MAY support
   some or all of these possibilities. Furthermore, this specification
   applies only to DHCP client and server processes: it does not apply
   to other processes which initiate DNS updates.

3. Issues with DNS Update in DHCP Environments

   There are two DNS update situations that require special
   consideration in DHCP environments: cases where more than one DHCP
   client has been configured with the same FQDN, and cases where more
   than one DHCP server has been given authority to perform DNS updates
   in a zone. In these cases, it is possible for DNS records to be
   modified in inconsistent ways unless the updaters have a mechanism
   that allows them to detect anomolous situations. If DNS updaters can
   detect these situations, site administrators can configure the
   updaters' behavior so that the site's policies can be enforced. We
   use the term "Name Conflict" to refer to cases where more than one
   DHCP client wishes to be associated with a single FQDN. This
   specification describes a mechanism designed to allow updaters to
   detect these situations, and suggests that DHCP implementations use
   this mechanism by default.





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3.1 Client Mis-Configuration

   At many (though not all) sites, administrators wish to maintain a
   one-to-one relationship between active DHCP clients and domain
   names, and to maintain consistency between a host's A and PTR RRs.
   Hosts which are not represented in the DNS, or hosts which
   inadvertently share an FQDN with another host may encounter
   inconsistent behavior or may not be able to obtain access to network
   resources. Whether each DHCP client is configured with a domain name
   by its administrator or whether the DHCP server is configured to
   distribute the clients' names, the consistency of the DNS data is
   entirely dependent on the accuracy of the configuration procedure.
   Sites which use Secure DNS[9] may configure credentials for each
   host and its assigned name in a way that is more error-resistant,
   but this level of pre-configuration is still rare in DHCP
   environments.

   Consider an example in which two DHCP clients in the "org.nil"
   network are both configured with the name "foo". The clients are
   permitted to perform their own DNS updates. The first client, client
   A, is configured via DHCP. It adds an A RR to "foo.org.nil", and its
   DHCP server adds a PTR RR corresponding to its IP address lease.
   When the second client, client B, boots, it is also configured via
   DHCP, and it also begins to update "foo.org.nil".

   At this point, the "org.nil" administrators may wish to establish
   some policy about DHCP clients' DNS names. If the policy is that
   each client that boots should replace any existing A RR that matches
   its name, Client B can proceed, though Client A may encounter
   problems. If Client B replaces the A RR associated with its name,
   Client A must have some way to recognize that when its lease is
   about to expire, so that it can avoid removing an RR that reflects
   another client's DHCP lease.

   If the policy is that the first DHCP client with a given name should
   be the only client associated with that name, Client B needs to be
   able to determine that it is not the client associated with
   "foo.org.nil". It could be that Client A booted first, and that
   Client B should choose another name. Or it could be that B has
   booted on a new subnet, and received a new lease. It must either
   retain persistent state about the last lease it held (in addition to
   its current lease) or it must have some other way to detect that it
   was the last updater of "foo.org.nil" in order to implement the
   site's policy.

3.2 Multiple DHCP Servers

   At many sites, the difficulties with distributing DNS update
   credentials to all of the DHCP clients lead to the desire for the


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   DHCP servers to perform A RR updates on behalf of their clients. If
   a single DHCP server managed all of the DHCP clients at a site, it
   could maintain some database of the DNS names that it was managing,
   and check that database before initiating a DNS update for a client.
   Such a database is necessarily proprietary, however, and that
   approach does not work once more than one DHCP server is deployed.

   Consider an example in which DHCP Client A boots, obtains a DHCP
   lease from Server S1, presenting the hostname "foo" in a Client FQDN
   option[3] in its DHCPREQUEST message. Server S1 updates its domain
   name, "foo.org.nil", adding an A RR which matches Client A's lease.
   The client then moves to another subnet, served by Server S2. When
   Client A boots on the new subnet, Server S2 will issue it a new
   lease, and will attempt to add an A RR matching the new lease to
   "foo.org.nil". At this point, without some proprietary communication
   mechanism which S2 can use to ask S1 (and every other DHCP server
   which updates the zone) about the client, S2 has no way to know
   whether Client A is currently associated with the domain name, or
   whether A is a different client configured with the same hostname.
   If the servers cannot distinguish between these situations, they
   cannot enforce the site's naming policies.

4. Use of the DHCID RR

   A solution to both of these problems is for the updater (a DHCP
   client or DHCP server) to be able to determine which DHCP client has
   been associated with a DNS name, in order to offer administrators
   the opportunity to configure updater behavior.

   For this purpose, a DHCID RR, described in [6], is used to associate
   client identification information with a DNS name and the A or PTR
   RR associated with that name. When either a client or server adds an
   A or PTR RR for a client, it also adds a DHCID RR which specifies a
   unique client identity (based on a "client specifier" created from
   the data in the client's DHCPREQUEST message). In this model, only
   one A RR is associated with a given DNS name at a time.

   By associating this ownership information with each DNS name,
   cooperating DNS updaters may determine whether their client is
   currently associated with a particular DNS name and implement the
   appropriately configured administrative policy. In addition, DHCP
   clients which currently have domain names may move from one DHCP
   server to another without losing their DNS names.

   The specific algorithms utilizing the DHCID RR to signal client
   ownership are explained below.  The algorithms only work in the case
   where the updating entities all cooperate -- this approach is
   advisory only and is not a substitute for DNS security, nor is it
   replaced by DNS security.


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4.1 Format of the DHCID RRDATA

   The DHCID RR used to hold the DHCP client's identity is formatted as
   follows:

   The name of the DHCID RR is the name of the A or PTR RR which refers
   to the DHCP client.

   The RDATA section of a DHCID RR in transmission contains RDLENGTH
   bytes of binary data. From the perspective of DHCP clients and
   servers, the DHCID resource record consists of a 16-bit identifier
   type, followed by one or more bytes representing the actual
   identifier. There are two possible forms for a DHCID RR - one that
   is used when the client's link-layer address is being used to
   identify it, and one that is used when some DHCP option that the
   DHCP client has sent is being used to identify it.

   The data following the identifier type code (for type codes other
   than 0xFFFF) is derived by digesting a buffer containing identifying
   information using the MD5[11] hash algorithm. The identifying
   information includes some data from the DHCP client's DHCPREQUEST
   message, and the FQDN which is the target of the update. The domain
   name is included in the computation in order to ensure that the
   DHCID RDATA will vary if a single client is associated over time
   with more than one name. This makes it difficult to 'track' a client
   as it is associated with various domain names. The domain name is
   represented in the buffer in dns wire-format as described in
   RFC1035[2], section 3.1. The domain name MUST NOT be compressed as
   described in RFC1035[2], section 4.1.4. Any uppercase alphabetic
   ASCII character in a label MUST be converted to lowercase before
   being in the hash computation.

   The MD5 hash algorithm has been shown to be weaker than the SHA-1
   algorithm; it could therefore be argued that SHA-1 is a better
   choice. However, SHA-1 is significantly slower than MD5. A
   successful attack of MD5's weakness does not reveal the original
   data that was used to generate the signature, but rather provides a
   new set of input data that will produce the same signature. Because
   we are using the MD5 hash to conceal the original data, the fact
   that an attacker could produce a different plaintext resulting in
   the same MD5 output is not a significant concern.

   When the updater is using the client's link-layer address, the first
   two bytes of the DHCID RRDATA MUST be zero. To generate the rest of
   the resource record, the updater MUST compute a one-way hash using
   the MD5 algorithm across a buffer containing the client's network
   hardware type, link-layer address, and the domain name.
   Specifically, the first byte of the buffer contains the network
   hardware type as it appears in the DHCP htype field of the client's


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   DHCPREQUEST message. All of the significant bytes of the chaddr
   field in the client's DHCPREQUEST message follow, in the same order
   in which the bytes appear in the DHCPREQUEST message. The number of
   significant bytes in the chaddr field is specified in the hlen field
   of the DHCPREQUEST message. The fully-qualified domain name, as
   specified above, follows.

   When the updater is using a DHCP option sent by the client in its
   DHCPREQUEST message, the first two bytes of the DHCID RR MUST be the
   option code of that option, in network byte order. For example, if
   the DHCP client identifier option is being used, the first byte of
   the DHCID RR should be zero, and the second byte should be 61
   decimal. The rest of the DHCID RR MUST contain the results of
   computing a one-way hash across the payload of the option being used
   and the FQDN (as specified above), using the MD5 algorithm. The
   payload of a DHCP option consists of the bytes of the option
   following the option code and length.

   The two byte identifier code 0xffff is reserved for future
   assignment.

   In order for independent DHCP implementations to be able to use the
   DHCID RR as a prerequisite in dynamic DNS updates, each updater must
   be able to reliably choose the same identifier that any other would
   choose.  To make this possible, we specify a prioritization which
   will ensure that for any given DHCP client request, any updater will
   select the same client-identity data.  All updaters MUST use this
   order of prioritization by default, but all implementations SHOULD
   be configurable to use a different prioritization if so desired by
   the site administrators.  Because of the possibility of future
   changes in the DHCP protocol, implementors SHOULD check for updated
   versions of this specification when implementing new DHCP clients
   and servers which can perform DNS updates, and also when releasing
   new versions of existing clients and servers.

   DHCP clients and servers should use the following forms of client
   identification, starting with the most preferable, and finishing
   with the least preferable.  If the client does not send any of these
   forms of identification, the DHCP/DNS interaction is not defined by
   this specification.  The most preferable form of identification is
   the DHCP Client Identifier option.  Last is the client's link-layer
   address, as conveyed in its DHCPREQUEST message.  Implementors
   should note that the link-layer address cannot be used if there are
   no significant bytes in the chaddr field of the DHCP client's
   request, because this does not constitute a unique identifier.

5. DNS RR TTLs

   RRs associated with DHCP clients may be more volatile than


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   statically configured RRs. DHCP clients and servers which perform
   dynamic updates should attempt to specify resource record TTLs which
   reflect this volatility, in order to minimize the possibility that
   there will be stale records in resolvers' caches. A reasonable basis
   for RR TTLs is the lease duration itself: TTLs of 1/2 or 1/3 the
   expected lease duration might be reasonable defaults. Because
   configured DHCP lease times vary widely from site to site, it may
   also be desirable to establish a fixed TTL ceiling. DHCP clients and
   servers MAY allow administrators to configure the TTLs they will
   supply, possibly as a fraction of the actual lease time, or as a
   fixed value. In general, the TTLs of RRs added as a result of DHCP
   lease activity SHOULD be less than the initial lease time.

6. Procedures for performing DNS updates

6.1 Adding A RRs to DNS

   When a DHCP client or server intends to update an A RR, it first
   prepares a DNS UPDATE query which includes as a prerequisite the
   assertion that the name does not exist.  The update section of the
   query attempts to add the new name and its IP address mapping (an A
   RR), and the DHCID RR with its unique client-identity.

   If this update operation succeeds, the updater can conclude that it
   has added a new name whose only RRs are the A and DHCID RR records.
   The A RR update is now complete (and a client updater is finished,
   while a server might proceed to perform a PTR RR update).

   If the first update operation fails with YXDOMAIN, the updater can
   conclude that the intended name is in use.  The updater then
   attempts to confirm that the DNS name is not being used by some
   other host. The updater prepares a second UPDATE query in which the
   prerequisite is that the desired name has attached to it a DHCID RR
   whose contents match the client identity.  The update section of
   this query deletes the existing A records on the name, and adds the
   A record that matches the DHCP binding and the DHCID RR with the
   client identity.

   If this query succeeds, the updater can conclude that the current
   client was the last client associated with the domain name, and that
   the name now contains the updated A RR. The A RR update is now
   complete (and a client updater is finished, while a server would
   then proceed to perform a PTR RR update).

   If the second query fails with NXRRSET, the updater must conclude
   that the client's desired name is in use by another host.  At this
   juncture, the updater can decide (based on some administrative
   configuration outside of the scope of this document) whether to let
   the existing owner of the name keep that name, and to (possibly)


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   perform some name disambiguation operation on behalf of the current
   client, or to replace the RRs on the name with RRs that represent
   the current client. If the configured policy allows replacement of
   existing records, the updater submits a query that deletes the
   existing A RR and the existing DHCID RR, adding A and DHCID RRs that
   represent the IP address and client-identity of the new client.


      DISCUSSION:
      The updating entity may be configured to allow the existing DNS
      records on the domain name to remain unchanged, and to perform
      disambiguation on the name of the current client in order to
      attempt to generate a similar but unique name for the current
      client. In this case, once another candidate name has been
      generated, the updater should restart the process of adding an A
      RR as specified in this section.

6.2 Adding PTR RR Entries to DNS

   The DHCP server submits a DNS query which deletes all of the PTR RRs
   associated with the lease IP address, and adds a PTR RR whose data
   is the client's (possibly disambiguated) host name. The server also
   adds a DHCID RR as specified in Section 4.

6.3 Removing Entries from DNS

   The most important consideration in removing DNS entries is be sure
   that an entity removing a DNS entry is only removing an entry that
   it added, or for which an administrator has explicitly assigned it
   responsibility.

   When a lease expires or a DHCP client issues a DHCPRELEASE request,
   the DHCP server SHOULD delete the PTR RR that matches the DHCP
   binding, if one was successfully added. The server's update query
   SHOULD assert that the name in the PTR record matches the name of
   the client whose lease has expired or been released.

   The entity chosen to handle the A record for this client (either the
   client or the server) SHOULD delete the A record that was added when
   the lease was made to the client.

   In order to perform this delete, the updater prepares an UPDATE
   query which contains two prerequisites.  The first prerequisite
   asserts that the DHCID RR exists whose data is the client identity
   described in Section 4. The second prerequisite asserts that the
   data in the A RR contains the IP address of the lease that has
   expired or been released.

   If the query fails, the updater MUST NOT delete the DNS name.  It


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   may be that the client whose lease on has expired has moved to
   another network and obtained a lease from a different server, which
   has caused the client's A RR to be replaced. It may also be that
   some other client has been configured with a name that matches the
   name of the DHCP client, and the policy was that the last client to
   specify the name would get the name. In these cases, the DHCID RR
   will no longer match the updater's notion of the client-identity of
   the host pointed to by the DNS name.

6.4 Updating Other RRs

   The procedures described in this document only cover updates to the
   A and PTR RRs. Updating other types of RRs is outside the scope of
   this document.

7. Security Considerations

   Unauthenticated updates to the DNS can lead to tremendous confusion,
   through malicious attack or through inadvertent misconfiguration.
   Administrators should be wary of permitting unsecured DNS updates to
   zones which are exposed to the global Internet. Both DHCP clients
   and servers SHOULD use some form of update request authentication
   (e.g., TSIG[12]) when performing DNS updates.

   Whether a DHCP client may be responsible for updating an FQDN to IP
   address mapping, or whether this is the responsibility of the DHCP
   server is a site-local matter. The choice between the two
   alternatives may be based on the security model that is used with
   the Dynamic DNS Update protocol (e.g., only a client may have
   sufficient credentials to perform updates to the FQDN to IP address
   mapping for its FQDN).

   Whether a DHCP server is always responsible for updating the FQDN to
   IP address mapping (in addition to updating the IP to FQDN mapping),
   regardless of the wishes of an individual DHCP client, is also a
   site-local matter. The choice between the two alternatives may be
   based on the security model that is being used with dynamic DNS
   updates. In cases where a DHCP server is performing DNS updates on
   behalf of a client, the DHCP server should be sure of the DNS name
   to use for the client, and of the identity of the client.

   Currently, it is difficult for DHCP servers to develop much
   confidence in the identities of their clients, given the absence of
   entity authentication from the DHCP protocol itself. There are many
   ways for a DHCP server to develop a DNS name to use for a client,
   but only in certain relatively rare circumstances will the DHCP
   server know for certain the identity of the client. If DHCP
   Authentication[13] becomes widely deployed this may become more
   customary.


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   One example of a situation which offers some extra assurances is one
   where the DHCP client is connected to a network through an MCNS
   cable modem, and the CMTS (head-end) of the cable modem ensures that
   MAC address spoofing simply does not occur. Another example of a
   configuration that might be trusted is one where clients obtain
   network access via a network access server using PPP. The NAS itself
   might be obtaining IP addresses via DHCP, encoding a client
   identification into the DHCP client-id option.  In this case, the
   network access server as well as the DHCP server might be operating
   within a trusted environment, in which case the DHCP server could be
   configured to trust that the user authentication and authorization
   processing of the remote access server was sufficient, and would
   therefore trust the client identification encoded within the DHCP
   client-id.

8. Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Mark Beyer, Jim Bound, Ralph Droms, Robert Elz, Peter
   Ford, Edie Gunter, Andreas Gustafsson, R. Barr Hibbs, Kim Kinnear,
   Stuart Kwan, Ted Lemon, Ed Lewis, Michael Lewis, Josh Littlefield,
   Michael Patton, and Glenn Stump for their review and comments.

References

   [1]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - Concepts and Facilities", RFC
         1034, Nov 1987.

   [2]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - Implementation and
         Specification", RFC 1035, Nov 1987.

   [3]   Stapp, M. and Y. Rekhter, "The DHCP Client FQDN Option
         (draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-*.txt)", March 2001.

   [4]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [5]   Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
         March 1997.

   [6]   Stapp, M., Gustafsson, A. and T. Lemon, "A DNS RR for Encoding
         DHCP Information (draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-*)", March 2001.

   [7]   Marine, A., Reynolds, J. and G. Malkin, "FYI on Questions and
         Answers to Commonly asked ``New Internet User'' Questions",
         RFC 1594, March 1994.

   [8]   Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
         Updates in the Domain Name System", RFC 2136, April 1997.



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   [9]   Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
         2535, March 1999.

   [10]  Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
         Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

   [11]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
         April 1992.

   [12]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B. Wellington,
         "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC
         2845, May 2000.

   [13]  Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages
         (draft-ietf-dhc-authentication-*)", January 2001.


Author's Address

   Mark Stapp
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   250 Apollo Dr.
   Chelmsford, MA  01824
   USA

   Phone: 978.244.8498
   EMail: mjs@cisco.com
























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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.

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   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















Stapp                     Expires May 22, 2002                 [Page 13]


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