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dice                                                  H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  ARM Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 26, 2014
Expires: April 29, 2015

A Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 Profile for the Internet
                               of Things


   This document defines a DTLS 1.2 profile that is suitable for
   Internet of Things applications and is reasonably implementable on
   many constrained devices.

   A common design pattern in IoT deployments is the use of a
   constrained device (typically providing sensor data) that interacts
   with the web infrastructure.  This document focuses on this
   particular pattern.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The Communication Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  The Ciphersuite Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Credential Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Pre-Shared Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Raw Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   10. Keep-Alive  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   11. Random Number Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   12. Client Certificate URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   13. Trusted CA Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   14. Truncated MAC Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   15. Server Name Indication (SNI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   16. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   17. TLS Session Hash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   18. Negotiation and Downgrading Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   19. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   20. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   21. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   22. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   23. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     23.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     23.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] profile that offers
   communication security for Internet of Things (IoT) applications and
   is reasonably implementable on many constrained devices.  The DTLS
   1.2 protocol is based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 [RFC5246]
   and provides equivalent security guarantees.  This document aims to
   meet the following goals:

   o  Serves as a one-stop shop for implementers to know which pieces of
      the specification jungle contain relevant details.

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   o  Does not alter the TLS/DTLS specifications.

   o  Does not introduce any new extensions.

   o  Aligns with the DTLS security modes of the Constrained Application
      Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

   DTLS is used to secure a number of applications run over an
   unreliable datagram transport.  CoAP [RFC7252] is one such protocol
   and has been designed specifically for use in IoT environments.  CoAP
   can be secured a number of different ways, also called security
   modes.  These security modes are as follows, see Section 5.1,
   Section 5.2, Section 5.3 for additional details:

   No Security Protection at the Transport Layer:  No DTLS is used but
      instead application layer security functionality is assumed.

   Shared Secret-based DTLS Authentication:  DTLS supports the use of
      shared secrets [RFC4279].  This mode is useful if the number of
      communication relationships between the IoT device and servers is
      small and for very constrained devices.  Shared secret-based
      authentication mechanisms offer good performance and require a
      minimum of data to be exchanged.

   DTLS Authentication using Asymmetric Cryptography:  TLS supports
      client and server authentication using asymmetric cryptography.
      Two approaches for validating these public keys are available.
      First, [RFC7250] allows raw public keys to be used in TLS without
      the overhead of certificates.  This approach requires out-of-band
      validation of the public key.  Second, the use of X.509
      certificates [RFC5280] with TLS is common on the Web today (at
      least for server-side authentication) and certain IoT environments
      may also re-use those capabilities.  Certificates bind an
      identifier to the public key signed by a certification authority
      (CA).  A trust anchor store has to be provisioned on the device to
      indicate what CAs are trusted.  Furthermore, the certificate may
      contain a wealth of other information used to make authorization

   As described in [I-D.ietf-lwig-tls-minimal], an application designer
   developing an IoT device needs to consider the security threats and
   the security services that can be used to mitigate the threats.
   Enabling devices to upload data and retrieve configuration
   information, inevitably requires that Internet-connected devices be
   able to authenticate themselves to servers and vice versa as well as
   to ensure that the data and information exchanged is integrity and
   confidentiality protected.  While these security services can be
   provided at different layers in the protocol stack the use of

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   communication security, as offered by DTLS, has been very popular on
   the Internet and it is likely to be useful for IoT scenarios as well.
   In case the communication security features offered by DTLS meet the
   security requirements of your application the remainder of the
   document might offer useful guidance.

   Not every IoT deployment will use CoAP but the discussion regarding
   choice of credentials and cryptographic algorithms will be very
   similar.  As such, the discussions in this document are applicable
   beyond the use of the CoAP protocol.

   The design of DTLS is intentionally very similar to TLS.  Since DTLS
   operates on top of an unreliable datagram transport a few
   enhancements to the TLS structure are, however necessary.  RFC 6347
   explains these differences in great detail.  As a short summary, for
   those not familiar with DTLS the differences are:

   o  An explicit sequence number and an epoch field is included in the
      TLS Record Layer.  Section 4.1 of RFC 6347 explains the processing
      rules for these two new fields.  The value used to compute the MAC
      is the 64-bit value formed by concatenating the epoch and the
      sequence number.

   o  Stream ciphers must not be used with DTLS.  The only stream cipher
      defined for TLS 1.2 is RC4 and due to cryptographic weaknesses it
      is not recommended anymore even for use with TLS.

   o  The TLS Handshake Protocol has been enhanced to include a
      stateless cookie exchange for Denial of Service (DoS) resistance.
      Furthermore, the header has been extended to deal with message
      loss, reordering, and fragmentation.  Retransmission timers have
      been included to deal with message loss.  For DoS protection a new
      handshake message, the HelloVerifyRequest, was added to DTLS.
      This handshake message is sent by the server and includes a
      stateless cookie, which is returned in a ClientHello message back
      to the server.  This type of DoS protection mechanism has also
      been incorporated into the design of IKEv2.  Although the exchange
      is optional for the server to execute, a client implementation has
      to be prepared to respond to it.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Note that "Client" and "Server" in this document refer to TLS roles,
   where the Client initiates the TLS handshake.  This does not restrict

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   the interaction pattern of the protocols carried inside TLS as the
   record layer allows bi-directional communication.  In the case of
   CoAP the "Client" can act as a CoAP Server or Client.

   RFC 7228 [RFC7228] introduces the notion of constrained-node
   networks, which are small devices with severe constraints on power,
   memory, and processing resources.  The terms constrained devices, and
   Internet of Things (IoT) devices are used interchangeably.

3.  The Communication Model

   This document describes a profile of DTLS 1.2 and, to be useful, it
   has to make assumptions about the envisioned communication

   The communication architecture shown in Figure 1 assumes a unicast
   communication interaction with an IoT device utilizing a DTLS client
   and that client interacts with one or multiple DTLS servers.

   Clients are provisioned with information about the servers they need
   to initiate their DTLS exchange with and with credentials.  This
   information may be conveyed to clients as part of a firmware/software
   package or via a configuration protocol.  The following credential
   types are supported by this profile:

   o  For PSK-based authentication (see Section 5.1), this includes the
      paired "PSK identity" and shared secret to be used with each

   o  For raw public key-based authentication (see Section 5.2), this
      includes either the server's public key or the hash of the
      server's public key.

   o  For certificate-based authentication (see Section 5.3), this
      includes a pre-populated trust anchor store that allows the DTLS
      stack to perform path validation for the certificate obtained
      during the handshake with the server.

   This document focuses on the description of the DTLS client-side
   functionality but, quite naturally, the equivalent server-side
   support has to be available.

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              |          Configuration             |
              | Server A --> PSK Identity, PSK     |
              | Server B --> Public Key (Server B),|
              |              Public Key (Client)   |
              | Server C --> Public Key (Client),  |
              |              Trust Anchor Store    |
      +------+   \
                  \  ,-------.
                   ,'         `.            +------+
                  /  IP-based   \           |Server|
                 (    Network    )          |  A   |
                  \             /           +------+
                   `.         ,'
                     '---+---'                  +------+
                         |                      |Server|
                         |                      |  B   |
                         |                      +------+
                         |                  +------+
                                            |  C   |

                Figure 1: Constrained DTLS Client Profile.

4.  The Ciphersuite Concept

   TLS (and consequently DTLS) has the concept of ciphersuites and an
   IANA registry [IANA-TLS] was created to register the suites.  A
   ciphersuite (and the specification that defines it) contains the
   following information:

   o  Authentication and Key Exchange Algorithm (e.g., PSK)

   o  Cipher and Key Length (e.g., AES with 128 bit keys)

   o  Mode of operation (e.g., CBC)

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   o  Hash Algorithm for Integrity Protection (e.g., SHA in combination
      with HMAC)

   o  Hash Algorithm for use with the Pseudorandom Function (e.g.  HMAC
      with the SHA-256)

   o  Misc information (e.g., length of authentication tags)

   o  Information whether the ciphersuite is suitable for DTLS or only
      for TLS

   The TLS ciphersuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, for example, uses a
   pre-shared authentication and key exchange algorithm.  RFC 6655
   [RFC6655] defines this ciphersuite.  It uses the Advanced Encryption
   Standard (AES) encryption algorithm, which is a block cipher.  Since
   the AES algorithm supports different key lengths (such as 128, 192
   and 256 bits) this information has to be specified as well and the
   selected ciphersuite supports 128 bit keys.  A block cipher encrypts
   plaintext in fixed-size blocks and AES operates on fixed block size
   of 128 bits.  For messages exceeding 128 bits, the message is
   partitioned into 128-bit blocks and the AES cipher is applied to
   these input blocks with appropriate chaining, which is called mode of

   TLS 1.2 introduced Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
   (AEAD) ciphersuites [RFC5116].  AEAD is a class of block cipher modes
   which encrypt (parts of) the message and authenticate the message
   simultaneously.  Examples of such modes include the Counter with CBC-
   MAC (CCM) mode, and the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).

   Some AEAD ciphersuites have shorter authentication tags and are
   therefore more suitable for networks with low bandwidth where small
   message size matters.  The TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphersuite
   that ends in "_8" has an 8-octet authentication tag, while the
   regular CCM ciphersuites have 16-octet authentication tags.

   TLS 1.2 also replaced the combination of MD5/SHA-1 hash functions in
   the TLS pseudo random function (PRF) with cipher-suite-specified
   PRFs.  For this reason authors of more recent TLS 1.2 ciphersuite
   specifications explicitly indicate the MAC algorithm and the hash
   functions used with the TLS PRF.

   This document references the CoAP recommended ciphersuite choices,
   which have been selected based on implementation and deployment
   experience from the IoT community.  Over time the preference for
   certain algorithms will, however, change.  Not all components of a
   ciphersuite change at the same speed.  Changes are more likely to
   expect for ciphers, the mode of operation, and the hash algorithms.

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   Some deployment environments will also be impacted by local
   regulation, which might dictate a certain and less likely for public
   key algorithms (such as RSA vs. ECC).

5.  Credential Types

5.1.  Pre-Shared Secret

   The use of pre-shared secret credentials is one of the most basic
   techniques for DTLS since it is both computational efficient and
   bandwidth conserving.  Pre-shared secret based authentication was
   introduced to TLS with RFC 4279 [RFC4279].  The exchange shown in
   Figure 2 illustrates the DTLS exchange including the cookie exchange.
   While the server is not required to initiate a cookie exchange with
   every handshake, the client is required to implement and to react on
   it when challenged.  The cookie exchange allows the server to react
   to flooding attacks.

         Client                                               Server
         ------                                               ------
         ClientHello                 -------->

                                     <--------    HelloVerifyRequest
                                                   (contains cookie)

         ClientHello                  -------->
         (with cookie)
                                      <--------      ServerHelloDone
         Finished                     -------->
                                      <--------             Finished

         Application Data             <------->     Application Data


   * indicates an optional message payload

     Figure 2: DTLS PSK Authentication including the Cookie Exchange.

   [RFC4279] does not mandate the use of any particular type of
   identity.  Hence, the TLS client and server clearly have to agree on

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   the identities and keys to be used.  The mandated encoding of
   identities in Section 5.1 of RFC 4279 aims to improve
   interoperability for those cases where the identity is configured by
   a person using some management interface.  Many IoT devices do,
   however, not have a user interface and most of their credentials are
   bound to the device rather than the user.  Furthermore, credentials
   are provisioned into trusted hardware modules or in the firmware by
   the developers.  As such, the encoding considerations are not
   applicable to this usage environment.  For use with this profile the
   PSK identities SHOULD NOT assume a structured format (as domain
   names, Distinguished Names, or IP addresses have) and a bit-by-bit
   comparison operation can then be used by the server-side

   The client indicates which key it uses by including a "PSK identity"
   in the ClientKeyExchange message.  As described in Section 3 clients
   may have multiple pre-shared keys with a single server and to help
   the client in selecting which PSK identity / PSK pair to use, the
   server can provide a "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange
   message.  If the hint for PSK key selection is based on the domain
   name of the server then servers SHOULD NOT send the "PSK identity
   hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message.  Hence, servers SHOULD NOT
   send the "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message and
   client MUST ignore the message.  This approach is inline with RFC
   4279 [RFC4279].  Note: The TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension
   allows the client to tell a server the name of the server it is
   contacting, which is relevant for hosting environments.  A server
   using the identity hint needs to guide the selection based on a
   received SNI value from the client.

   RFC 4279 requires TLS implementations supporting PSK ciphersuites to
   support arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and
   arbitrary PSKs up to 64 octets in length.  This is a useful
   assumption for TLS stacks used in the desktop and mobile environment
   where management interfaces are used to provision identities and
   keys.  For the IoT environment, however, many devices are not
   equipped with displays and input devices (e.g., keyboards).  Hence,
   keys are distributed as part of hardware modules or are embedded into
   the firmware.  As such, these restrictions are not applicable to this

   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] currently specifies
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as the mandatory to implement ciphersuite
   for use with shared secrets.  This ciphersuite uses the AES algorithm
   with 128 bit keys and CCM as the mode of operation.  The label "_8"
   indicates that an 8-octet authentication tag is used.  This
   ciphersuite makes use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function
   (PRF), which uses an HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function.  (Note that

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   all IoT implementations will need a SHA-256 implementation due to the
   construction of the pseudo-random number function in TLS 1.2.)

   A device compliant with this protocol MUST implement
   TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this section.

5.2.  Raw Public Key

   The use of raw public keys with DTLS, as defined in [RFC7250], is the
   first entry point into public key cryptography without having to pay
   the price of certificates and a PKI.  The specification re-uses the
   existing Certificate message to convey the raw public key encoded in
   the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure.  To indicate support two new TLS
   extensions had been defined, as shown in Figure 3, namely the
   server_certificate_type and the client_certificate_type.  To operate
   this mechanism securely it is necessary to authenticate and authorize
   the public keys out-of-band.  This document therefore assumes that a
   client implementation comes with one or multiple raw public keys of
   servers, it has to communicate with, pre-provisioned.  Additionally,
   a device will have its own raw public key.  To replace, delete, or
   add raw public key to this list requires a software update, for
   example using a firmware update mechanism.

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    Client                                          Server
    ------                                          ------

    ClientHello             -------->

                            <-------    HelloVerifyRequest

    ClientHello             -------->

                            <--------      ServerHelloDone

    Finished                -------->

                            <--------             Finished

   Figure 3: DTLS Raw Public Key Exchange including the Cookie Exchange.

   The CoAP recommended ciphersuite for use with this credential type is
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251].  This elliptic curve
   cryptography (ECC) based AES-CCM TLS ciphersuite uses the Ephemeral
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) as the key establishment
   mechanism and an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
   for authentication.  Due to the use of Ephemeral Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) the recently introduced named Diffie-Hellman
   groups [I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe] are not applicable to this
   profile.  This ciphersuite make use of the AEAD capability in DTLS
   1.2 and utilizes an eight-octet authentication tag.  The use of a
   Diffie-Hellman key exchange adds perfect forward secrecy (PFS).  More
   details about PFS can be found in Section 9.

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   RFC 6090 [RFC6090] provides valuable information for implementing
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithms, particularly for choosing
   methods that have been published more than 20 years ago.

   Since many IoT devices will either have limited ways to log error or
   no ability at all, any error will lead to implementations attempting
   to re-try the exchange.  Implementers have to carefully evaluate the
   impact of errors and ways to remedy the situation since a commonly
   used approach for delegating decision making to users is difficult in
   a timely fashion (or impossible).

   A device compliant with this protocol MUST implement
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this

5.3.  Certificates

   The use of mutual certificate-based authentication is shown in
   Figure 4, which makes use of the cached info extension
   [I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info].  Support of the cached info extension is
   required.  Caching certificate chains allows the client to reduce the
   communication overhead significantly since otherwise the server would
   provide the end entity certificate, and the certificate chain.
   Because certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
   independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
   certificate authority is omitted from the chain.  Client
   implementations MUST be provisioned with a trust anchor store that
   contains the root certificates.  The use of the Trust Anchor
   Management Protocol (TAMP) [RFC5934] is, however, not envisioned.
   Instead IoT devices using this profile MUST rely a software update
   mechanism to provision these trust anchors.

   When DTLS is used to secure CoAP messages then the server provided
   certificates MUST contain the fully qualified DNS domain name or
   "FQDN".  The coaps URI scheme is described in Section 6.2 of
   [RFC7252].  This FQDN is stored in the SubjectAltName or in the CN,
   as explained in Section of [RFC7252], and used by the client
   to match it against the FQDN used during the look-up process, as
   described in RFC 6125 [RFC6125].  For the profile in this
   specification does not assume dynamic discovery of local servers.

   For client certificates the identifier used in the SubjectAltName or
   in the CN MUST be an EUI-64 [EUI64], as mandated in Section
   of [RFC7252].

   For certificate revocation neither the Online Certificate Status
   Protocol (OCSP) nor Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are used.
   Instead, this profile relies on a software update mechanism.  While

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   multiple OCSP stapling [RFC6961] has recently been introduced as a
   mechanism to piggyback OCSP request/responses inside the DTLS/TLS
   handshake to avoid the cost of a separate protocol handshake further
   investigations are needed to determine its suitability for the IoT

    Client                                          Server
    ------                                          ------

    ClientHello             -------->

                            <-------    HelloVerifyRequest

    ClientHello             -------->
                            <--------      ServerHelloDone

    Finished                -------->

                            <--------             Finished

          Figure 4: DTLS Mutual Certificate-based Authentication.

   Regarding the ciphersuite choice the discussion in Section 5.2
   applies.  Further details about X.509 certificates can be found in
   Section of [RFC7252].  The TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
   ciphersuite description in Section 5.2 is also applicable to this

   IoT devices MUST provide support for a server certificate chain of at
   least 3 not including the trust anchor and MAY reject connections
   from servers offering chains longer than 3.  IoT devices MAY have
   client certificate chains of any length.  Obviously, longer chains
   require more resources to process, transmit or receive.

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   A device compliant with this protocol MUST implement
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this

6.  Error Handling

   DTLS uses the Alert protocol to convey error messages and specifies a
   longer list of errors.  However, not all error messages defined in
   the TLS specification are applicable to this profile.  All error
   messages marked as RESERVED are only supported for backwards
   compatibility with SSL and are therefore not applicable to this
   profile.  Those include decryption_failed_RESERVED,
   no_certificate_RESERVE, and export_restriction_RESERVED.

   A number of the error messages are applicable only for certificate-
   based authentication ciphersuites.  Hence, for PSK and raw public key
   use the following error messages are not applicable:

   o  bad_certificate,

   o  unsupported_certificate,

   o  certificate_revoked,

   o  certificate_expired,

   o  certificate_unknown,

   o  unknown_ca, and

   o  access_denied.

   Since this profile does not make use of compression at the TLS layer
   the decompression_failure error message is not applicable either.

   RFC 4279 introduced a new alert message unknown_psk_identity for PSK
   ciphersuites.  As stated in Section 2 of RFC 4279 the
   decryption_error error message may also be used instead.  For this
   profile the TLS server MUST return the decryption_error error message
   instead of the unknown_psk_identity.

   Furthermore, the following errors should not occur based on the
   description in this specification:

   protocol_version:  This document only focuses on one version of the
      DTLS protocol.

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   insufficient_security:  This error message indicates that the server
      requires ciphers to be more secure.  This document does, however,
      specify the only acceptable ciphersuites and client
      implementations must support them.

   user_canceled:  The IoT devices in focus of this specification are
      assumed to be unattended.

7.  Session Resumption

   Session resumption is a feature of DTLS that allows a client to
   continue with an earlier established session state.  The resulting
   exchange is shown in Figure 5.  In addition, the server may choose
   not to do a cookie exchange when a session is resumed.  Still,
   clients have to be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every

         Client                                               Server
         ------                                               ------

         ClientHello                   -------->
                                       <--------             Finished
         Finished                      -------->
         Application Data              <------->     Application Data

                    Figure 5: DTLS Session Resumption.

   Clients MUST implement session resumption to improve the performance
   of the handshake (in terms of reduced number of message exchanges,
   lower computational overhead, and less bandwidth conserved).

   Since the communication model described in Section 3 does not assume
   that the server is constrained.  RFC 5077 [RFC5077] describing TLS
   session resumption without server-side state is not utilized by this

8.  Compression

   [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] recommends to always disable DTLS-level
   compression due to attacks.  For IoT applications compression at the
   DTLS is not needed since application layer protocols are highly
   optimized and the compression algorithms at the DTLS layer increase
   code size and complexity.

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   This DTLS client profile does not include DTLS layer compression.

9.  Perfect Forward Secrecy

   Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is designed to prevent the compromise
   of a long-term secret key from affecting the confidentiality of past
   conversations.  The PSK ciphersuite recommended in the CoAP
   specification [RFC7252] does not offer this property since it does
   not utilize a Diffie-Hellman exchange.  [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] on the
   other hand recommends using ciphersuites offering this security
   property and so do the public key-based ciphersuites recommended by
   the CoAP specification.

   The use of PFS is certainly a trade-off decision since on one hand
   the compromise of long-term secrets of embedded devices is more
   likely than with many other Internet hosts but on the other hand a
   Diffie-Hellman exchange requires ephemeral key pairs to be generated,
   which can be demanding from a performance point of view.  Finally,
   the impact of the disclosure of past conversations and the desire to
   increase the cost for pervasive monitoring (see [RFC7258]) has to be
   taken into account.

   Our recommendation is to stick with the ciphersuite suggested in the
   CoAP specification.  New ciphersuites support PFS for pre-shared
   secret-based authentication, such as
   [I-D.schmertmann-dice-ccm-psk-pfs], and might be available as a
   standardized ciphersuite in the future.

10.  Keep-Alive

   RFC 6520 [RFC6520] defines a heartbeat mechanism to test whether the
   other peer is still alive.  The same mechanism can also be used to
   perform Path Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) Discovery.

   A recommendation about the use of RFC 6520 depends on the type of
   message exchange an IoT device performs.  There are three types of
   exchanges that need to be analysed:

   Client-Initiated, One-Shot Messages

      This is a common communication pattern where IoT devices upload
      data to a server on the Internet on an irregular basis.  The
      communication may be triggered by specific events, such as opening
      a door.

      Since the upload happens on an irregular and unpredictable basis
      and due to renumbering and Network Address Translation (NAT) a new
      DTLS session or DTLS session resumption can be used.

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      In this case there is no use for a keep-alive extension for this

   Client-Initiated, Regular Data Uploads

      This is a variation of the previous case whereby data gets
      uploaded on a regular basis, for example, based on frequent
      temperature readings.  With such regular exchange it can be
      assumed that the DTLS context is still in kept at the IoT device.
      If neither NAT bindings nor IP address changes occurred then the
      DTLS record layer will not notice any changes.  For the case where
      IP and port changes happened it is necessary to re-create the DTLS
      record layer using session resumption.

      In this scenario there is no use for a keep-alive extension.  It
      is also very likely that the device will enter a sleep cycle in
      between data transmissions to keep power consumption low.

   Server-Initiated Messages

      In the two previous scenarios the client initiated the protocol
      interaction.  In this case, we consider server-initiated messages.
      Since messages to the client may get blocked by intermediaries,
      such as NATs and stateful packet filtering firewalls, the initial
      connection setup is triggered by the client and then kept alive.
      Since state expires fairly quickly at middleboxes regular
      heartbeats are necessary whereby these keep-alive messages may be
      exchanged at the application layer or within DTLS itself.

      For this message exchange pattern the use of DTLS heartbeat
      messages is quite useful.  The MTU discovery mechanism, on the
      other hand, is less likely to be relevant since for many IoT
      deployments the must constrained link is the wireless interface at
      the IoT device itself rather than somewhere in the network.  Only
      in more complex network topologies the situation might be

   For server-initiated messages the heartbeat extension can be

11.  Random Number Generation

   The DTLS protocol requires random numbers to be available during the
   protocol run.  For example, during the ClientHello and the
   ServerHello exchange the client and the server exchange random
   numbers.  Also, the use of the Diffie-Hellman exchange requires
   random numbers during the key pair generation.  Special care has to
   be paid when generating random numbers in embedded systems as many

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   entropy sources available on desktop operating systems or mobile
   devices might be missing, as described in [Heninger].  Consequently,
   if not enough time is given during system start time to fill the
   entropy pool then the output might be predictable and repeatable, for
   example leading to the same keys generated again and again.

   Recommendation: IoT devices using DTLS MUST offer ways to generate
   quality random numbers.  Guidelines and requirements for random
   number generation can be found in RFC 4086 [RFC4086].

   It is important to note that sources contributing to the randomness
   pool on laptops, or desktop PCs are not available on many IoT device,
   such as mouse movement, timing of keystrokes, air turbulence on the
   movement of hard drive heads, etc.  Other sources have to be found or
   dedicated hardware has to be added.

   The ClientHello and the ServerHello message contains the 'Random'
   structure, which has two components: gmt_unix_time and a random
   sequence of 28 random bytes.  gmt_unix_time holds the current time
   and date in standard UNIX 32-bit format (seconds since the midnight
   starting Jan 1, 1970, GMT).  [I-D.mathewson-no-gmtunixtime] argues
   that the entire value the ClientHello.Random and ServerHello.Random
   fields, including gmt_unix_time, should be set to a cryptographically
   random sequence because of privacy concerns (fingerprinting).  Since
   many IoT devices do not have access to a real-time clock this
   recommendation is even more relevant in the embedded systems

12.  Client Certificate URLs

   This RFC 6066 [RFC6066] extension allows to avoid sending client-side
   certificates and URLs instead.  This reduces the over-the-air

   This is certainly a useful extension when a certificate-based mode
   for DTLS is used since the TLS cached info extension does not provide
   any help with caching information on the server side.

   Recommendation: Add support for client certificate URLs for those
   environments where client-side certificates are used.

13.  Trusted CA Indication

   This RFC 6066 extension allows clients to indicate what trust anchor
   they support.  With certificate-based authentication a DTLS server
   conveys its end entity certificate to the client during the DTLS
   exchange provides.  Since the server does not necessarily know what
   trust anchors the client has stored it includes intermediate CA certs

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   in the certificate payload as well to facilitate with certification
   path construction and path validation.

   Today, in most IoT deployments there is a fairly static relationship
   between the IoT device (and the software running on them) and the
   server- side infrastructure and no such dynamic indication of trust
   anchors is needed.

   Recommendation: For IoT deployments where clients talk to a fixed,
   pre-configured set of servers and where a software update mechanism
   is available this extension is not recommended.  Environments where
   the client needs to interact with dynamically discovered DTLS servers
   this extension may be useful to reduce the communication overhead.
   Note, however, in that case the TLS cached info extension may help to
   reduce the communication overhead for everything but the first
   protocol interaction.

14.  Truncated MAC Extension

   The truncated MAC extension was introduced with RFC 6066 with the
   goal to reduces the size of the MAC used at the Record Layer.  This
   extension was developed for TLS ciphersuites that used older modes of
   operation where the MAC and the encryption operation was performed

   For CoAP, however, the recommended ciphersuites use the newer
   Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) construct,
   namely the CBC-MAC mode (CCM) with eight-octet authentication tags.
   Furthermore, the extension [RFC7366] introducing the encrypt-then-MAC
   security mechanism (instead of the MAC-then-encrypt) is also not
   applicable for this profile.

   Recommendation: Since this profile only supports AEAD ciphersuites
   this extension is not applicable.

15.  Server Name Indication (SNI)

   This RFC 6066 extension defines a mechanism for a client to tell a
   TLS server the name of the server it wants to contact.  This is a
   useful extension for many hosting environments where multiple virtual
   servers are run on single IP address.

   Recommendation: Unless it is known that a DTLS client does not
   interact with a server in a hosting environment that requires such an
   extension we advice to offer support for the SNI extension in this

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16.  Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation

   This RFC 6066 extension lowers the maximum fragment length support
   needed for the Record Layer from 2^14 bytes to 2^9 bytes.

   This is a very useful extension that allows the client to indicate to
   the server how much maximum memory buffers it uses for incoming
   messages.  Ultimately, the main benefit of this extension is it to
   allows client implementations to lower their RAM requirements since
   the client does not need to accept packets of large size (such as 16k
   packets as required by plain TLS/DTLS).

   Recommendation: Client implementations MUST support this extension.

17.  TLS Session Hash

   The TLS master secret is not cryptographically bound to important
   session parameters such as the client and server identities.  This
   can be utilized by an attacker to mount a man-in-the-middle attack
   since the master secret is not guaranteed to be unique across

   [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] defines a TLS extension that binds the
   master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus
   preventing such attacks.

   Recommendation: Client implementations SHOULD implement this
   extension support this extension even though the ciphersuites
   recommended by this profile are not vulnerable this attack.  For
   Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites the keying material is contributed
   by both parties and in case of the pre-shared secret key ciphersuite
   both parties need to be in possession of the shared secret to ensure
   that the handshake completes successfully.  It is, however, possible
   that some application layer protocols will tunnel other
   authentication protocols on top of DTLS making this attack relevant

18.  Negotiation and Downgrading Attacks

   CoAP demands version 1.2 of DTLS to be used and the earlier version
   of DTLS is not supported.  As such, there is no risk of downgrading
   to an older version of DTLS.  The work described in
   [I-D.bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv] is therefore also not applicable to
   this environment since there is no legacy server infrastructure to
   worry about.

   To prevent the TLS renegotiation attack [RFC5746] clients MUST
   respond to server-initiated renegotiation attempts with an Alert

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   message (no_renegotiation) and clients MUST NOT initiate them.  TLS
   and DTLS allows a client and a server who already have a TLS
   connection to negotiate new parameters, generate new keys, etc by
   initiating a TLS handshake using a ClientHello message.
   Renegotiation happens in the existing TLS connection, with the new
   handshake packets being encrypted along with application data.

19.  Privacy Considerations

   The DTLS handshake exchange conveys various identifiers, which can be
   observed by an on-path eavesdropper.  For example, the DTLS PSK
   exchange reveals the PSK identity, the supported extensions, the
   session id, algorithm parameters, etc.  When session resumption is
   used then individual TLS sessions can be correlated by an on-path
   adversary.  With many IoT deployments it is likely that keying
   material and their identifiers are persistent over a longer period of
   time due to the cost of updating software on these devices.

   User participation with many IoT deployments poses a challenge since
   many of the IoT devices operate unattended, even though they will
   initially be provisioned by a human.  The ability to control data
   sharing and to configure preference will have to be provided at a
   system level rather than at the level of the DTLS exchange itself,
   which is the scope of this document.  Quite naturally, the use of
   DTLS with mutual authentication will allow a TLS server to collect
   authentication information about the IoT device (likely over a long
   period of time).  While this strong form of authentication will
   prevent mis-attribution it also allows strong identification.
   Device-related data collection (e.g., sensor recordings) will be
   associated with other data to be truly useful and this extra data
   might include personal data about the owner of the device or data
   about the environment it senses.  Consequently, the data stored on
   the server-side will be vulnerable to stored data compromise.  For
   the communication between the client and the server this
   specification prevents eavesdroppers to gain access to the
   communication content.  While the PSK-based ciphersuite does not
   provide PFS the asymmetric versions do.  This prevents an adversary
   from obtaining past communication content when access to a long-term
   secret has been gained.  Note that no extra effort to make traffic
   analysis more difficult is provided by the recommendations made in
   this document.

20.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security.

   We would also like to point out that designing a software update
   mechanism into an IoT system is crucial to ensure that both

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   functionality can be enhanced and that potential vulnerabilities can
   be fixed.  This software update mechanism is also useful for changing
   configuration information, for example, trust anchors and other
   keying related information.

21.  IANA Considerations

   This document includes no request to IANA.

22.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Robert Cragie, Russ Housley, Rene Hummen, Sandeep Kumar,
   Sye Loong Keoh, Eric Rescorla, Michael Richardson, Zach Shelby,
   Michael StJohns, and Sean Turner for their helpful comments and
   discussions that have shaped the document.

   Big thanks also to Klaus Hartke, who wrote the initial version of
   this document.

23.  References

23.1.  Normative References

              REGISTRATION AUTHORITY", April 2010,

              Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Cached Information Extension", draft-ietf-tls-
              cached-info-16 (work in progress), February 2014.

              Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley,
              A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session
              Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", draft-ietf-
              tls-session-hash-02 (work in progress), October 2014.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

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   [RFC5746]  Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
              Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
              Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6520]  Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
              Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520, February 2012.

   [RFC7250]  Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
              T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.

   [RFC7251]  McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
              CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
              TLS", RFC 7251, June 2014.

23.2.  Informative References

              Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and A.
              Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
              Weak Keys in Network Devices", 21st USENIX Security
              technical-sessions/presentation/heninger, 2012.

              Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
              Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
              Attacks", draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02 (work in
              progress), May 2014.

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              Kumar, S., Keoh, S., and H. Tschofenig, "A Hitchhiker's
              Guide to the (Datagram) Transport Layer Security Protocol
              for Smart Objects and Constrained Node Networks", draft-
              ietf-lwig-tls-minimal-01 (work in progress), March 2014.

              Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Discrete Log Diffie-Hellman
              Ephemeral Parameters for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-
              dl-dhe-00 (work in progress), July 2014.

              Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
              ietf-uta-tls-bcp-06 (work in progress), October 2014.

              Mathewson, N. and B. Laurie, "Deprecating gmt_unix_time in
              TLS", draft-mathewson-no-gmtunixtime-00 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

              Schmertmann, L. and C. Bormann, "ECDHE-PSK AES-CCM Cipher
              Suites with Forward Secrecy for Transport Layer Security
              (TLS)", draft-schmertmann-dice-ccm-psk-pfs-01 (work in
              progress), August 2014.

              IANA, "TLS Cipher Suite Registry",
              tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4, 2014.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC5077]  Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
              Server-Side State", RFC 5077, January 2008.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

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   [RFC5934]  Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
              Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, August 2010.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

   [RFC6961]  Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
              June 2013.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, May 2014.

   [RFC7366]  Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", RFC 7366, September 2014.

Author's Address

   Hannes Tschofenig  (editor)
   ARM Ltd.
   110 Fulbourn Rd
   Cambridge  CB1 9NJ
   Great Britain

   Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at

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