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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 RFC 5672
DKIM D. Crocker, Ed.
Internet-Draft Brandenburg InternetWorking
Updates: RFC4871 June 26, 2009
(if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: December 28, 2009
RFC 4871 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures -- Update
draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871-errata-07
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Abstract
This updates RFC 4871, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures.
Specifically the document clarifies the nature, roles and
relationship of the two DKIM identifier tag values that are
candidates for payload delivery to a receiving processing module.
The Update is in the style of an Errata entry, albeit a rather long
one.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RFC 4871 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. RFC4871 Section 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. RFC4871 Section 2.7 Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. RFC4871 Section 2.8 Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. RFC4871 Section 2.9 Signing Domain Identifier (SDID) . . . . 5
7. RFC4871 Section 2.10 Agent or User Identifier (AUID) . . . . 6
8. RFC4871 Section 2.11 Identity Assessor . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. RFC4871 Section 3.5 The DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . 7
10. RFC4871 Section 3.5 The DKIM-Signature Header Field . . . . . 8
11. RFC4871 Section 3.8 Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . 10
12. RFC4871 Section 3.9 Relationship Between SDID and AUID . . . 10
13. RFC4871 Section 6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy . . 11
14. RFC4871 Section 6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy . . 12
15. RFC4871 Appendix D. MUA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
17. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
18. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
About the purpose for DKIM, [RFC4871] states:
The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a signing domain
to assert responsibility for a message, thus protecting message
signer identity...
Hence, DKIM has a signer that produces a signed message, a verifier
that confirms the signature and an assessor that consumes the
validated signing domain. So the simple purpose of DKIM is to
communicate an identifier to a receive-side assessor module. The
identifier is in the form of a domain name that refers to a
responsible identity. For DKIM to be interoperable and useful,
signer and assessor must share the same understanding of the details
about the identifier.
However the RFC4871 specification defines two, potentially different
identifiers that are carried in the DKIM-Signature: header field, d=
and i=. Either might be delivered to a receiving processing module
that consumes validated payload. The DKIM specification fails to
clearly define which is the "payload" to be delivered to a consuming
module, versus what is internal and merely in support of achieving
payload delivery.
This currently leaves signers and assessors with the potential for
making different interpretations between the two identifiers and may
lead to interoperability problems. A signer could intend one to be
used for assessment, and have a different intent in setting the value
in the other. However the verifier might choose the wrong value to
deliver to the assessor, thereby producing an unintended (and
inaccurate) assessment.
This update resolves that confusion. It defines additional, semantic
labels for the two values, clarifies their nature and specifies their
relationship. More specifically, it clarifies that the identifier
intended for delivery to the assessor -- such as one that consults a
white list -- is the value of the "d=" tag. However, this does not
prohibit message filtering engines from using the "i=" tag, or any
other information in the message's header, for filtering decisions.
For signers and verifiers that have been using the i= tag as the
primary value that is delivered to the assessor, a software change to
using the d= tag is intended.
So, this Update clarifies the formal interface to DKIM, after
signature verification has been performed. It distinguishes DKIM's
internal signing and verification activity, from its standardized
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delivery of data to that interface.
The focus of the Update is on the portion of DKIM that is much like
an API definition. If DKIM is implemented as a software library for
use by others, it needs to define what outputs are provided, that is,
what data that an application developer who uses the library can
expect to obtain as a result of invoking DKIM on a message.
This Update draft defines the output of that library to include the
yes/no result of the verification and the "d=" value. In other
words, it says what (one) identifier was formally specified for use
by the signer and whether the use of that identifier has been
validated. For a particular library, other information can be
provided at the discretion of the library developer, since developers
of assessors -- these are the consumers of the DKIM library -- well
might want more information than the standardized two pieces of
information. However that standardized set is the minimum that is
required to be provided to a consuming module, in order to be able to
claim that the library is DKIM compliant.
This does not state what the implicit value of "i=" is, relative to
"d=". In this context, that fact is irrelevant.
Another example is the difference between the socket interface to TCP
versus the TCP protocol itself. There is the activity within the
protocol stack, and then there is the activity within in the software
libraries that are actually used.
NOTE: The text provided here updates [RFC4871]. All references and
all appearances of RFC-2119 keywords are replacing text in RFC
4871. Hence those references are in that document and are not
needed here.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]
2. RFC 4871 Abstract
Original Text:
The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a signing domain
to assert responsibility for a message,
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Corrected Text:
The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit a person, role or
organization that owns the signing domain to assert responsibility
for a message,
3. RFC4871 Section 1 Introduction
Original Text:
...permitting a signing domain to claim responsibility
Corrected Text:
permitting a person, role or organization that owns the signing
domain to claim responsibility
4. RFC4871 Section 2.7 Identity
Original Text:
(None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
A person, role or organization. In the context of DKIM, examples
include author, author's organization, an ISP along the handling
path, an independent trust assessment service, and a mailing list
operator.
5. RFC4871 Section 2.8 Identifier
Original Text:
(None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
A label that refers to an identity.
6. RFC4871 Section 2.9 Signing Domain Identifier (SDID)
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Original Text:
(None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
A single domain name that is the mandatory payload output of DKIM
and that refers to the identity claiming responsibility for
introduction of a message into the mail stream. For DKIM
processing, the name has only basic domain name semantics; any
possible owner-specific semantics are outside the scope of DKIM.
It is specified in section 3.5.
7. RFC4871 Section 2.10 Agent or User Identifier (AUID)
Original Text:
(None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
A single identifier that refers to the agent or user on behalf of
whom the SDID has taken responsibility. The AUID comprises a
domain name and an optional <Local-part>. The domain name is the
same as that used for the SDID or is a sub-domain of it. For DKIM
processing, the domain name portion of the AUID has only basic
domain name semantics; any possible owner-specific semantics are
outside the scope of DKIM. It is specified in section 3.5.
8. RFC4871 Section 2.11 Identity Assessor
Original Text:
(None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
A module that consumes DKIM's mandatory payload, which is the
responsible Signing Domain Identifier (SDID). The module is
dedicated to the assessment of the delivered identifier. Other
DKIM (and non-DKIM) values can also be delivered to this module as
well as to a more general message evaluation filtering engine.
However, this additional activity is outside the scope of the DKIM
signature specification.
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9. RFC4871 Section 3.5 The DKIM-Signature Header Field
Original Text:
d= The domain of the signing entity (plain-text; REQUIRED). This is
the domain that will be queried for the public key. This domain
MUST be the same as or a parent domain of the "i=" tag (the
signing identity, as described below), or it MUST meet the
requirements for parent domain signing described in Section 3.8.
When presented with a signature that does not meet these
requirement, verifiers MUST consider the signature invalid.
Internationalized domain names MUST be encoded as described in
[RFC3490].
ABNF:
sig-d-tag = %x64 [FWS] "=" [FWS] domain-name
domain-name = sub-domain 1*("." sub-domain)
; from RFC 2821 Domain,
but excluding address-literal
Corrected Text:
d=
Specifies the SDID claiming responsibility for an introduction
of a message into the mail stream (plain-text; REQUIRED).
Hence the SDID value is used to form the query for the public
key. The SDID MUST correspond to a valid DNS name under which
the DKIM key record is published. The conventions and
semantics used by a signer to create and use a specific SDID
are outside the scope of the DKIM Signing specification, as is
any use of those conventions and semantics. When presented
with a signature that does not meet these requirements,
verifiers MUST consider the signature invalid.
Internationalized domain names MUST be encoded as described in
[RFC3490].
ABNF:
sig-d-tag = %x64 [FWS] "=" [FWS] domain-name
domain-name = sub-domain 1*("." sub-domain)
; from RFC 5321 Domain,
but excluding address-literal
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10. RFC4871 Section 3.5 The DKIM-Signature Header Field
Original Text:
i= Identity of the user or agent (e.g., a mailing list manager) on
behalf of which this message is signed (dkim-quoted-printable;
OPTIONAL, default is an empty Local-part followed by an "@"
followed by the domain from the "d=" tag). The syntax is a
standard email address where the Local-part MAY be omitted. The
domain part of the address MUST be the same as or a subdomain of
the value of the "d=" tag.
Internationalized domain names MUST be converted using the steps
listed in Section 4 of [RFC3490] using the "ToASCII" function.
ABNF:
sig-i-tag = %x69 [FWS] "=" [FWS]
[ Local-part ] "@" domain-name
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The Local-part of the "i=" tag is optional
because in some cases a signer may not be able to establish a
verified individual identity. In such cases, the signer may
wish to assert that although it is willing to go as far as
signing for the domain, it is unable or unwilling to commit
to an individual user name within their domain. It can do so
by including the domain part but not the Local-part of the
identity.
INFORMATIVE DISCUSSION: This document does not require the value
of the "i=" tag to match the identity in any message header
fields. This is considered to be a verifier policy issue.
Constraints between the value of the "i=" tag and other
identities in other header fields seek to apply basic
authentication into the semantics of trust associated with a
role such as content author. Trust is a broad and complex
topic and trust mechanisms are subject to highly creative
attacks. The real-world efficacy of
bindings between the "i=" value and other identities is not
well established, nor is its vulnerability to subversion by
an attacker. Hence reliance on the use of these options
should be strictly limited. In particular, it is not at all
clear to what extent a typical end-user recipient can rely on
any assurances that might be made by successful use of the
"i=" options.
Corrected Text:
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i=
The Agent or User Identifier (AUID) on behalf of which the SDID
is taking responsibility (dkim-quoted-printable; OPTIONAL,
default is an empty Local-part followed by an "@" followed by
the domain from the "d=" tag).
The syntax is a standard email address where the Local-part MAY
be omitted. The domain part of the address MUST be the same
as, or a subdomain of the value of, the "d=" tag.
Internationalized domain names MUST be converted using the
steps listed in Section 4 of [RFC3490] using the "ToASCII"
function.
ABNF:
sig-i-tag = %x69 [FWS] "=" [FWS]
[ Local-part ] "@" domain-name
The AUID is specified as having the same syntax as an email
address, but is not required to have the same semantics.
Notably, the domain name is not required to be registered in
the DNS -- so it might not resolve in a query -- and the Local-
part MAY be drawn from a namespace that does not contain the
user's mailbox. The details of the structure and semantics for
the namespace are determined by the Signer. Any knowledge or
use of those details by verifiers or assessors is outside the
scope of the DKIM Signing specification. The Signer MAY choose
to use the same namespace for its AUIDs as its users' email
addresses, or MAY choose other means of representing its users.
However, the signer SHOULD use the same AUID for each message
intended to be evaluated as being within the same sphere of
responsibility, if it wishes to offer receivers the option of
using the AUID as a stable identifier that is finer grained
than the SDID.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The Local-part of the "i=" tag is optional
because in some cases a signer may not be able to establish a
verified individual identity. In such cases, the signer might
wish to assert that although it is willing to go as far as
signing for the domain, it is unable or unwilling to commit to
an individual user name within their domain. It can do so by
including the domain part but not the Local-part of the
identity.
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11. RFC4871 Section 3.8 Signing by Parent Domains
Original Text:
e.g., a key record for the domain example.com can be used to verify
messages where the signing identity ("i=" tag of the signature) is
sub.example.com, or even sub1.sub2.example.com. In order to limit
the capability of such keys when this is not intended, the "s" flag
may be set in the "t=" tag of the key record to constrain the
validity of the record to exactly the domain of the signing identity.
If the referenced key record contains the "s" flag as part of the
"t=" tag, the domain of the signing identity ("i=" flag) MUST be the
same as that of the d= domain. If this flag is absent, the domain of
the signing identity MUST be the same as, or a subdomain of, the d=
domain.
Corrected Text:
...for example, a key record for the domain example.com can be
used to verify messages where the AUID ("i=" tag of the signature)
is sub.example.com, or even sub1.sub2.example.com. In order to
limit the capability of such keys when this is not intended, the
"s" flag MAY be set in the "t=" tag of the key record, to
constrain the validity of the domain of the AUID. If the
referenced key record contains the "s" flag as part of the "t="
tag, the domain of the AUID ("i=" flag) MUST be the same as that
of the SDID (d=) domain. If this flag is absent, the domain of
the AUID MUST be the same as, or a subdomain of, the SDID.
12. RFC4871 Section 3.9 Relationship Between SDID and AUID
Original Text: (None. New section. Additional text.)
Corrected Text:
DKIM's primary task is to communicate from the Signer to a
recipient-side Identity Assessor a single Signing Domain
Identifier (SDID) that refers to a responsible identity. DKIM MAY
optionally provide a single responsible Agent or User Identifier
(AUID).
Hence, DKIM's mandatory output to a receive-side Identity Assessor
is a single domain name. Within the scope of its use as DKIM
output, the name has only basic domain name semantics; any
possible owner-specific semantics are outside the scope of DKIM.
That is, within its role as a DKIM identifier, additional
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semantics cannot be assumed by an Identity Assessor.
A receive-side DKIM verifier MUST communicate the Signing Domain
Identifier (d=) to a consuming Identity Assessor module and MAY
communicate the Agent or User Identifier (i=) if present.
To the extent that a receiver attempts to intuit any structured
semantics for either of the identifiers, this is a heuristic
function that is outside the scope of DKIM's specification and
semantics. Hence it is relegated to a higher-level service, such
as a delivery handling filter that integrates a variety of inputs
and performs heuristic analysis of them.
INFORMATIVE DISCUSSION: This document does not require the value
of the SDID or AUID to match the identifier in any other message
header field. This requirement is, instead, an assessor policy
issue. The purpose of such a linkage would be to authenticate the
value in that other header field. This, in turn, is the basis for
applying a trust assessment based on the identifier value. Trust
is a broad and complex topic and trust mechanisms are subject to
highly creative attacks. The real-world efficacy of any but the
most basic bindings between the SDID or AUID and other identities
is not well established, nor is its vulnerability to subversion by
an attacker. Hence reliance on the use of such bindings should be
strictly limited. In particular, it is not at all clear to what
extent a typical end-user recipient can rely on any assurances
that might be made by successful use of the SDID or AUID.
13. RFC4871 Section 6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy
Original Text:
It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe what actions
a verifier system should make, but an authenticated email presents an
opportunity to a receiving system that unauthenticated email cannot.
Specifically, an authenticated email creates a predictable identifier
by which other decisions can reliably be managed, such as trust and
reputation. Conversely, unauthenticated email lacks a reliable
identifier that can be used to assign trust and reputation.
Corrected Text:
It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe what
actions an Identity Assessor can make, but mail carrying a
validated SDID presents an opportunity to an Identity Assessor
that unauthenticated email does not. Specifically, an
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authenticated email creates a predictable identifier by which
other decisions can reliably be managed, such as trust and
reputation.
14. RFC4871 Section 6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy
Original Text:
Once the signature has been verified, that information MUST be
conveyed to higher-level systems (such as explicit allow/whitelists
and reputation systems) and/or to the end user. If the message is
signed on behalf of any address other than that in the From: header
field, the mail system SHOULD take pains to ensure that the actual
signing identity is clear to the reader.
Corrected Text:
Once the signature has been verified, that information MUST be
conveyed to the Identity Assessor (such as an explicit allow/
whitelist and reputation system) and/or to the end user. If the
SDID is not the same as the address in the From: header field, the
mail system SHOULD take pains to ensure that the actual SDID is
clear to the reader.
15. RFC4871 Appendix D. MUA Considerations
Original Text: The tendency is to have the MUA highlight the
address associated with this signing identity in some way, in an
attempt to show the user the address from which the mail was sent.
Corrected Text: The tendency is to have the MUA highlight the SDID,
in an attempt to show the user the identity that is claiming
responsibility for the message.
16. Security Considerations
This Update clarifies core details about DKIM's payload. As such it
affects interoperability, semantic characterization, and the
expectations for the identifiers carried with a DKIM signature.
Clarification of these details is likely to limit misinterpretation
of DKIM's semantics. Since DKIM is fundamentally a security
protocol, this should improve its security characteristics.
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17. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
18. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC4871] Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton,
J., and M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
Signatures", RFC 4871, May 2007.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This document was initially formulated by an ad hoc design team,
comprising: Jon Callas, D. Crocker, J. D. Falk, Michael Hammer, Tony
Hansen, Murray Kucherawy, John Levine, Jeff Macdonald, Ellen Siegel
and Wietse Venema. The final version of the document was developed
through vigorous discussion in the IETF DKIM working group.
Author's Address
D. Crocker (editor)
Brandenburg InternetWorking
Phone: +1.408.246.8253
Email: dcrocker@bbiw.net
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