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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 RFC 4033

DNS Extensions                                                 R. Arends
Internet-Draft                                      Telematica Instituut
Expires: April 26, 2004                                       R. Austein
                                                                     ISC
                                                               M. Larson
                                                                VeriSign
                                                               D. Massey
                                                                 USC/ISI
                                                                 S. Rose
                                                                    NIST
                                                        October 27, 2003


               DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
                   draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-07

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
   www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds data origin
   authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  This
   document introduces these extensions, and describes their
   capabilities and limitations.  This document also discusses the
   services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide.



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   Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the
   group of documents that collectively describe DNSSEC.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definitions of Important DNSSEC Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Services Provided by DNS Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.1 Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity  . . . . . . . .  7
   3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-Existence . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Services Not Provided by DNS Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Resolver Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Stub Resolver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Zone Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.1 TTL values vs. RRSIG validity period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   7.2 New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  Name Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  DNS Security Document Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.1 DNS Security Document Roadmap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   9.2 Categories of DNS Security Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   10. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   11. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 24
























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1. Introduction

   This document introduces the Domain Name System Security Extensions
   (DNSSEC).  This document and its two companion documents
   ([I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records] and
   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol]) update, clarify, and refine the
   security extensions defined in RFC 2535 [RFC2535] and its
   predecessors. These security extensions consist of a set of new
   resource record types and modifications to the existing DNS protocol
   [RFC1035].  The new records and protocol modifications are not fully
   described in this document, but are described in a family of
   documents outlined in Section 9. Section 3 and Section 4 describe the
   capabilities and limitations of the security extensions in greater
   detail. Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 discuss the
   effect that these security extensions will have on resolvers, stub
   resolvers, zones and name servers.

   This document and its two companions update and obsolete RFCs 2535
   [RFC2535], 3008 [RFC3008], 3090 [RFC3090], 3226 [RFC3226], and 3445
   [RFC3445], as well as several works in progress: "Redefinition of the
   AD bit" [I-D.ietf-dnsext-ad-is-secure], "Legacy Resolver
   Compatibility for Delegation Signer"
   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change], and "Delegation Signer
   Resource Record" [I-D.ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer].

   The DNS security extensions provide origin authentication and
   integrity protection for DNS data, as well as a means of public key
   distribution.  These extensions do not provide confidentiality.























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2. Definitions of Important DNSSEC Terms

   authentication chain: an alternating succession of DNSKEY RRsets and
      DS RRs forms a chain of signed data, with each link in the chain
      vouching for the next.  A DNSKEY RR is used to check the signature
      covering a DS RR and allows the DS RR to be authenticated.  The DS
      RR contains a hash of another DNSKEY RR and this new DNSKEY RR is
      authenticated by matching the hash in the DS RR.  This new DNSKEY
      RR in turn authenticates another DNSKEY RRset and, in turn, some
      DNSKEY RR in this set may be used to authenticate another DS RR
      and so forth until the chain finally ends with a DNSKEY RR which
      signs the desired DNS data.  For example, the root DNSKEY can be
      used to authenticated the DS RR for "example."  The "example." DS
      RR contains a hash that matches some "example." DNSKEY and this
      DNSKEY signs the "example." DNSKEY RRset.  Keys in the "example."
      DNSKEY RRset sign data records such as "www.example." as well as
      DS RRs for delegations such as "subzone.example."

   authentication key: A public key which a security-aware resolver has
      verified and can therefore use to authenticate data.  A
      security-aware resolver can obtain authentication keys in three
      ways.  First, the resolver is generally preconfigured to know
      about at least one public key.  This preconfigured data is either
      the public key itself, or a hash of the key as found in the DS RR.
      Second, the resolver may use an authenticated public key to verify
      a DS RR and its associated DNSKEY RR.  Third, the resolver may be
      able to determine that a new key has been signed by another key
      which the resolver has verified.  Note that the resolver must
      always be guided by local policy when deciding whether to
      authenticate a new key, even if the local policy is simply to
      authenticate any new key for which the resolver is able verify the
      signature.

   island of security: Term used to describe a signed, delegated zone
      that does not have an authentication chain from its delegating
      parent.  That is, there is no DS RR with the island's key in its
      delegating parent zone (see [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records]). An
      island of security is served by a security-aware nameserver and
      may provide authentication chains to any delegated child zones.
      Responses from an island of security or its descendents can only
      be validated if its zone key can be obtained by some trusted means
      out of band from the DNS protocol.

   key signing key: An authentication key which is used to sign one or
      more other authentication keys.  Typically, a key signing key will
      sign a zone signing key, which in turn will sign other zone data.
      Local policy may require the zone signing key to be changed
      frequently, while the key signing key may have a longer validity



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      period in order to provide a more stable secure entry point into
      the zone.  Designating an authentication key as a key signing key
      is purely an operational issue: DNSSEC validation does not
      distinguish between key signing keys and other DNSSEC
      authentication keys.  Key signing keys are discussed in more
      detail in [I-D.ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag].

   security-aware name server: An entity acting in the role of a name
      server (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) which understands the
      DNS security extensions defined in this document set.  In
      particular, a security-aware name server is an entity which
      receives DNS queries, sends DNS responses, supports the EDNS0
      [RFC2671] message size extension and the DO bit [RFC3225], and
      supports the RR types and message header bits defined in this
      document set.

   security-aware recursive name server: An entity which acts in both
      the security-aware name server and security-aware resolver roles.
      A more cumbersome equivalent phrase would be "a security-aware
      name server which offers recursive service".

   security-aware resolver: An entity acting in the role of a resolver
      (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) which understands the DNS
      security extensions defined in this document set.  In particular,
      a security-aware resolver is an entity which sends DNS queries,
      receives DNS responses, supports the EDNS0 [RFC2671] message size
      extension and the DO bit [RFC3225], and is capable of using the RR
      types and message header bits defined in this document set to
      provide DNSSEC services.

   security-aware stub resolver: An entity acting in the role of a
      resolver (defined in section 2.4 of [RFC1034]) which has at least
      a minimal understanding the DNS security extensions defined in
      this document set, but which trusts one or more security-aware
      recursive name servers to perform most of the tasks discussed in
      this document set on its behalf.  In particular, a security-aware
      stub resolver is an entity which sends DNS queries, receives DNS
      responses, and is capable of establishing an appropriately secured
      channel to a security-aware recursive name server which will
      provide these services on behalf of the security-aware stub
      resolver.  Note that the distinction between security-aware
      resolvers and security-aware stub resolvers is different from the
      distinction between iterative-mode and recursive-mode resolvers in
      the base DNS specification: a particular security-aware resolver
      may operate exclusively in recursive mode, but still perform its
      own DNSSEC signature validity checks, while a security-aware stub
      resolver does not, by definition.




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   security-oblivious (server or resolver): The opposite of
      "security-aware".

   signed zone: A zone whose RRsets are signed and which contains
      properly constructed DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC and (optionally) DS
      records.

   unsigned zone: The opposite of a "signed zone".

   zone signing key: An authentication key which is used to sign a zone.
      See key signing key, above.  Typically a zone signing key will be
      part of the same DNSKEY RRset as the key signing key which signs
      it, but is used for a slightly different purpose and may differ
      from the key signing key in other ways, such as validity lifetime.





































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3. Services Provided by DNS Security

   The Domain Name System (DNS) security extensions provide origin
   authentication and integrity assurance services for DNS data,
   including mechanisms for authenticated denial of existence of DNS
   data.  These mechanisms are described below.

   These mechanisms require changes to the DNS protocol.  DNSSEC adds
   four new resource record types (RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS and NSEC) and two
   new message header bits (CD and AD).  In order to support the larger
   DNS message sizes that result from adding the DNSSEC RRs, DNSSEC also
   requires EDNS0 support [RFC2671].  Finally, DNSSEC requires support
   for the DO bit [RFC3225], so that a security-aware resolver can
   indicate in its queries that it wishes to receive DNSSEC RRs in
   response messages.

   These services protect against most of the threats to the Domain Name
   System described in [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dns-threats].

3.1 Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity

   DNSSEC provides authentication by associating cryptographically
   generated digital signatures with DNS RRsets. These digital
   signatures are stored in a new resource record, the RRSIG record.
   Typically, there will be a single private key that signs a zone's
   data, but multiple keys are possible: for example, there may be keys
   for each of several different digital signature algorithms. If a
   security-aware resolver reliably learns a zone's public key, it can
   authenticate that zone's signed data.  An important DNSSEC concept is
   that the key that signs a zone's data is associated with the zone
   itself and not with the zone's authoritative name servers (public
   keys for DNS transaction authentication mechanisms may also appear in
   zones, as described in [RFC2931], but DNSSEC itself is concerned with
   object security of DNS data, not channel security of DNS
   transactions).

   A security-aware resolver can learn a zone's public key either by
   having the key preconfigured into the resolver or by normal DNS
   resolution.  To allow the latter, public keys are stored in a new
   type of resource record, the DNSKEY RR.  Note that the private keys
   used to sign zone data must be kept secure, and should be stored
   offline when practical to do so.  To discover a public key reliably
   via DNS resolution, the target key itself needs to be signed by
   either a preconfigured authentication key or another key that has
   been authenticated previously.  Security-aware resolvers authenticate
   zone information by forming an authentication chain from a newly
   learned public key back to a previously known authentication public
   key, which in turn either must have been preconfigured into the



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   resolver or must have been learned and verified previously.
   Therefore, the resolver must be configured with at least one public
   key or hash of a public key: if the preconfigured key is a zone
   signing key, then it will authenticate the associated zone; if the
   preconfigured key is a key signing key, it will authenticate a zone
   signing key.  If the resolver has been preconfigured with the hash of
   a key rather than the key itself, the resolver may need to obtain the
   key via a DNS query.  To help security-aware resolvers establish this
   authentication chain, security-aware name servers attempt to send the
   signature(s) needed to authenticate a zone's public key in the DNS
   reply message along with the public key itself, provided there is
   space available in the message.

   The Delegation Signer (DS) RR type simplifies some of the
   administrative tasks involved in signing delegations across
   organizational boundaries.  The DS RRset resides at a delegation
   point in a parent zone and indicates the key or keys used by the
   delegated child zone to self-sign the DNSKEY RRset at the child
   zone's apex.  The child zone, in turn, uses one or more of the keys
   in this DNSKEY RRset to sign its zone data.  The authentication chain
   is therefore DNSKEY->[DS->DNSKEY]*->RRset, where "*" denotes zero or
   more DS->DNSKEY subchains.

   A security-aware resolver normally constructs this authentication
   chain from the root of the DNS hierarchy down to the leaf zones based
   on preconfigured knowledge of the public key for the root.  Local
   policy, however, may also allow a security-aware resolver to use one
   or more preconfigured keys (or key hashes) other than the root key,
   or may not provide preconfigured knowledge of the root key, or may
   prevent the resolver from using particular keys for arbitrary reasons
   even if those keys are properly signed with verifiable signatures.
   DNSSEC provides mechanisms by which a security-aware resolver can
   determine whether an RRset's signature is "valid" within the meaning
   of DNSSEC.  In the final analysis however, authenticating both DNS
   keys and data is a matter of local policy, which may extend or even
   override the protocol extensions defined in this document set.

3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-Existence

   The security mechanism described in Section 3.1 only provides a way
   to sign existing RRsets in a zone.  The problem of providing negative
   responses with the same level of authentication and integrity
   requires the use of another new resource record type, the NSEC
   record.  The NSEC record allows a security-aware resolver to
   authenticate a negative reply for either name or type non-existence
   via the same mechanisms used to authenticate other DNS replies.  Use
   of NSEC records require a canonical representation and ordering for
   domain names in zones.  Chains of NSEC records explicitly describe



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   the gaps, or "empty space", between domain names in a zone, as well
   as listing the types of RRsets present at existing names.  Each NSEC
   record is signed and authenticated using the mechanisms described in
   Section 3.1.















































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4. Services Not Provided by DNS Security

   DNS was originally designed with the assumptions that the DNS will
   return the same answer to any given query regardless of who may have
   issued the query, and that all data in the DNS is thus visible.
   Accordingly, DNSSEC is not designed to provide confidentiality,
   access control lists, or other means of differentiating between
   inquirers.

   DNSSEC provides no protection against denial of service attacks.
   Security-aware resolvers and security-aware name servers are
   vulnerable to an additional class of denial of service attacks based
   on cryptographic operations.  Please see Section 11 for details.

   The DNS security extensions provide data and origin authentication
   for DNS data.  The mechanisms outlined above extend no protection to
   operations such as zone transfers and dynamic update [RFC3007].
   Message authentication schemes described in [RFC2845] and [RFC2931]
   address security operations that pertain to these transactions.
































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5. Resolver Considerations

   A security-aware resolver needs to be able to perform cryptographic
   functions necessary to verify digital signatures using at least the
   mandatory-to-implement algorithms.  Security-aware resolvers must
   also be capable of forming an authentication chain from a newly
   learned zone back to an authentication key, as described above.  This
   process might require additional queries to intermediate DNS zones to
   obtain necessary DNSKEY, DS and RRSIG records.  A security-aware
   resolver should be configured with at least one authentication key or
   a key's DS RR hash as the starting point from which it will attempt
   to establish authentication chains.

   If a security-aware resolver is separated from the relevant
   authoritative name servers by a recursive name server or by any sort
   of device which acts as a proxy for DNS, and if the recursive name
   server or proxy is not security-aware, the security-aware resolver
   may not be able to operate in a secure mode.  For example, if a
   security-aware resolver's packets are routed through a network
   address translation device that includes a DNS proxy which is not
   security-aware, the security-aware resolver may find it difficult or
   impossible to obtain or validate signed DNS data.

   If a security-aware resolver must rely on an unsigned zone or a name
   server that is not security aware, the resolver may not be able to
   validate DNS responses, and will need a local policy on whether to
   accept unverified responses.

   A security-aware resolver should take a signature's validation period
   into consideration when determining the TTL of data in its cache, to
   avoid caching signed data beyond the validity period of the
   signature, but should also allow for the possibility that the
   security-aware resolver's own clock is wrong.  Thus, a security-aware
   resolver which is part of a security-aware recursive name server will
   need to pay careful attention to the DNSSEC "checking disabled" (CD)
   bit [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records] in order to avoid blocking valid
   signatures from getting through to other security-aware resolvers
   which are clients of this recursive name server and which are capable
   of performing their own DNSSEC validity checks.  See
   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol] for how a secure recursive server
   handles queries with the CD bit set.










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6. Stub Resolver Considerations

   Although not strictly required to do so by the protocol, most DNS
   queries originate from stub resolvers.  Stub resolvers, by
   definition, are minimal DNS resolvers which use recursive query mode
   to offload most of the work of DNS resolution to a recursive name
   server.  Given the widespread use of stub resolvers, the DNSSEC
   architecture has to take stub resolvers into account, but the
   security features needed in a stub resolver differ in some respects
   from those needed in a full security-aware resolver.

   Even an unaugmented stub resolver may get some benefit from DNSSEC if
   the recursive name servers it uses are security-aware, but for the
   stub resolver to place any real reliance on DNSSEC services, the stub
   resolver must trust both the recursive name servers in question and
   the communication channels between itself and those name servers.
   The first of these issues is a local policy issue: in essence, a stub
   resolver has no real choice but to place itself at the mercy of the
   recursive name servers that it uses, since it does not perform DNSSEC
   validity checks on its own.  The second issue requires some kind of
   channel security mechanism; proper use of DNS transaction
   authentication mechanisms such as SIG(0) or TSIG would suffice, as
   would appropriate use of IPsec, and particular implementations may
   have other choices available, such as operating system specific
   interprocess communication mechanisms.  Confidentiality is not needed
   for this channel, but data integrity and message authentication are.

   A security-aware stub resolver which does trust both its recursive
   name servers and its communication channel to them may choose to
   examine the setting of the AD bit in the message header of the
   response messages it receives.  The stub resolver can use this flag
   bit as a hint to find out whether the recursive name server was able
   to validate signatures for all of the data in the Answer and
   Authority sections of the response.

   There is one more step which a security-aware stub resolver can take
   if, for whatever reason, it is not able to establish a useful trust
   relationship with the recursive name servers which it uses: it can
   perform its own signature validation, by setting the Checking
   Disabled (CD) bit in its query messages.  Upon taking this step, the
   resolver is no longer really a stub resolver at all anymore (in the
   terminology used in this document set, anyway), and is now a
   security-aware resolver with somewhat limited functionality.








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7. Zone Considerations

   There are several differences between signed and unsigned zones.  A
   signed zone will contain additional security-related records (RRSIG,
   DNSKEY, DS and NSEC records).  RRSIG and NSEC records may be
   generated by a signing process prior to serving the zone.  The RRSIG
   records that accompany zone data have defined inception and
   expiration times, which establish a validity period for the
   signatures and the zone data the signatures cover.

7.1 TTL values vs. RRSIG validity period

   It is important to note the distinction between a RRset's TTL value
   and the signature validity period specified by the RRSIG RR covering
   that RRset.  DNSSEC does not change the definition or function of the
   TTL value, which is intended to maintain database coherency in
   caches. A caching resolver purges RRsets from its cache no later than
   the end of the time period specified by the TTL fields of those
   RRsets, regardless of whether or not the resolver is security-aware.

   The inception and expiration fields in the RRSIG RR
   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records], on the other hand, specify the time
   period during which the signature can be used to validate the RRset
   that it covers.  The signatures associated with signed zone data are
   only valid for the time period specified by these fields in the RRSIG
   RRs in question.  TTL values cannot extend the validity period of
   signed RRsets in a resolver's cache, but the resolver may use the
   time remaining before expiration of the signature validity period of
   a signed RRset as an upper bound for the TTL of the signed RRset and
   its associated RRSIG RR in the resolver's cache.

7.2 New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones

   Information in a signed zone has a temporal dependency which did not
   exist in the original DNS protocol.  A signed zone requires regular
   maintenance to ensure that each RRset in the zone has a current valid
   RRSIG RR.  The signature validity period of an RRSIG RR is an
   interval during which the signature for one particular signed RRset
   can be considered valid, and the signatures of different RRsets in a
   zone may expire at different times.  Re-signing one or more RRsets in
   a zone will change one or more RRSIG RRs, which in turn will require
   incrementing the zone's SOA serial number to indicate that a zone
   change has occurred and re-signing the SOA RRset itself.  Thus,
   re-signing any RRset in a zone may also trigger DNS NOTIFY messages
   and zone transfers operations.






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8. Name Server Considerations

   A security-aware name server should include the appropriate DNSSEC
   records (RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS and NSEC) in all responses to queries from
   resolvers which have signaled their willingness to receive such
   records via use of the DO bit in the EDNS header, subject to message
   size limitations.  For this reason a security-aware name server must
   support the EDNS mechanism size extension, since otherwise inclusion
   of DNSSEC RRs could easily cause UDP message truncation and fallback
   to TCP.

   If possible, the private half of each DNSSEC key pair should be kept
   offline, but this will not be possible for a zone for which DNS
   dynamic update has been enabled.  In the dynamic update case, the
   primary master server for the zone will have to re-sign the zone when
   updated, so the private half of the zone signing key will have to be
   kept online.  This is an example of a situation where the ability to
   separate the zone's DNSKEY RRset into zone signing key(s) and key
   signing key(s) may be useful, since the key singing key(s) in such a
   case can still be kept offline.

   DNSSEC, by itself, is not enough to protect the integrity of an
   entire zone during zone transfer operations, since even a signed zone
   contains some unsigned data if the zone has any children, so zone
   maintenance operations will require some additional mechanisms (most
   likely some form of channel security, such as TSIG, SIG(0), or
   IPsec).
























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9. DNS Security Document Family

   The DNSSEC set of documents can be partitioned into five main groups
   as depicted in Figure 1.  All of these documents are in turn under
   the larger umbrella of the DNS base protocol documents.

9.1 DNS Security Document Roadmap

                   +----------------------------------+
                   |   Base DNS Protocol Documents    |
                   | [RFC1035, RFC2181, et sequentia] |
                   +----------------------------------+
                                    |
                                    |
                              +-----------+          +----------+
                              |  DNSSEC   |          | New      |
                              | Protocol  |--------->| Security |
                              | Documents |          | Uses     |
                              +-----------+          +----------+
                                    |
                                    |
                     +---------------- - - - - - - -+
                     |                              .
                     |                              .
               +------------------+                 .
               |  Digital         |         +------------------+
               |  Signature       |         |  Transaction     |
               |  Algorithm       |         |  Authentication  |
               |  Implementations |         |  Implementations |
               +------------------+         +------------------+


9.2 Categories of DNS Security Documents

   The "DNSSEC protocol document set" refers to the three documents
   which form the core of the DNS security extensions:

   1.  DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (this document)

   2.  Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions
       [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records]

   3.  Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
       [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol]

   The "Digital Signature Algorithm Implementations" document set refers
   to the group of documents that describe how specific digital
   signature algorithms should be implemented to fit the DNSSEC resource



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   record format.  Each of these documents deals with a specific digital
   signature algorithm.

   The "Transaction Authentication Implementations" document set refers
   to the group of documents that deal with DNS message authentication,
   including secret key establishment and verification.  While not
   strictly part of the DNSSEC specification as defined in this set of
   documents, this group is noted to show its relationship to DNSSEC.

   The final document set, "New Security Uses", refers to documents that
   seek to use proposed DNS Security extensions for other security
   related purposes.  DNSSEC does not provide any direct security for
   these new uses, but may be used to support them.  Documents that fall
   in this category include the use of DNS in the storage and
   distribution of certificates [RFC2538].




































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10. IANA Considerations

   This overview document introduces no new IANA considerations. Please
   see [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records] for a complete review of the
   IANA considerations introduced by DNSSEC.














































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11. Security Considerations

   This document introduces the DNS security extensions and describes
   the document set that contains the new security records and DNS
   protocol modifications.  This document discusses the capabilities and
   limitations of these extensions.  The extensions provide data origin
   authentication and data integrity using digital signatures over
   resource record sets.

   In order for a security-aware resolver to validate a DNS response,
   all of the intermediate zones must be signed, and all of the
   intermediate name servers must be security-aware, as defined in this
   document set. A security-aware resolver cannot verify responses
   originating from an unsigned zone, from a zone not served by a
   security-aware name server, or for any DNS data which the resolver is
   only able to obtain through a recursive name server which is not
   security-aware.  If there is a break in the authentication chain such
   that a security-aware resolver cannot obtain and validate the
   authentication keys it needs, then the security-aware resolver cannot
   validate the affected DNS data.

   This document briefly discusses other methods of adding security to a
   DNS query, such as using a channel secured by IPsec or using a DNS
   transaction authentication mechanism, but transaction security is not
   part of DNSSEC per se.

   A security-aware stub resolver, by definition, does not perform
   DNSSEC signature validation on its own, and thus is vulnerable both
   to attacks on (and by) the security-aware recursive name servers
   which perform these checks on its behalf and also to attacks on its
   communication with those security-aware recursive name servers.
   Security-aware stub resolvers should use some form of channel
   security to defend against the latter threat.  The only known defense
   against the former threat would be for the security-aware stub
   resolver to perform its own signature validation, at which point,
   again by definition, it would no longer be a security-aware stub
   resolver.

   DNSSEC does not protect against denial of service attacks.  DNSSEC
   makes DNS vulnerable to a new class of denial of service attacks
   based on cryptographic operations against security-aware resolvers
   and security-aware name servers, since an attacker can attempt to use
   DNSSEC mechanisms to consume a victim's resources.  This class of
   attacks takes at least two forms.  An attacker may be able to consume
   resources in a security-aware resolver's signature validation code by
   tampering with RRSIG RRs in response messages or by constructing
   needlessly complex signature chains.  An attacker may also be able to
   consume resources in a security-aware name server which supports DNS



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   dynamic update, by sending a stream of update messages that force the
   security-aware name server to re-sign some RRsets in the zone more
   frequently than would otherwise be necessary.

   DNSSEC introduces the ability for a hostile party to enumerate all
   the names in a zone by following the NSEC chain. NSEC RRs assert
   which names do not exist in a zone by linking from existing name to
   existing name along a canonical ordering of all the names within a
   zone. Thus, an attacker can query these NSEC RRs in sequence to
   obtain all the names in a zone. While not an attack on the DNS
   itself, this could allow an attacker to map network hosts or other
   resources by enumerating the contents of a zone. There are non-DNS
   protocol means of limiting this attack such as limiting the number of
   NSEC queries from a single host, use of intrusion detection tools,
   etc.

   DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality, due to a deliberate design
   choice.

   DNSSEC does not protect against tampering with unsigned zone data.
   Non-authoritative data at zone cuts (glue and NS RRs in the parent
   zone) are not signed.  Thus, while DNSSEC can provide data origin
   authentication and data integrity for RRsets, it cannot do so for
   zones, and other mechanisms must be used to protect zone transfer
   operations.


























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12. Acknowledgements

   This document was created from the input and ideas of several members
   of the DNS Extensions Working Group.  The editors would like to
   acknowledge (in alphabetical order) the following people for their
   contributions and comments on this document: Derek Atkins, Donald
   Eastlake, Miek Gieben, Olafur Gudmundsson, Olaf Kolkman, Ed Lewis,
   Ted Lindgreen, Bill Manning, and Brian Wellington.











































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Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2535]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
              RFC 2535, March 1999.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC
              2671, August 1999.

   [RFC3225]  Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC", RFC
              3225, December 2001.

   [RFC3226]  Gudmundsson, O., "DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver
              message size requirements", RFC 3226, December 2001.

   [RFC3445]  Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY
              Resource Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records]
              Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions",
              draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-05 (work in progress),
              October 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol]
              Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-03 (work in
              progress), October 2003.

















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Informative References

   [RFC2538]  Eastlake, D. and O. Gudmundsson, "Storing Certificates in
              the Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2538, March 1999.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
              SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.

   [RFC3007]  Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
              Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

   [RFC3008]  Wellington, B., "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC)
              Signing Authority", RFC 3008, November 2000.

   [RFC3090]  Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone
              Status", RFC 3090, March 2001.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dns-threats]
              Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis Of The Domain
              Name System", draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-threats-04 (work in
              progress), October 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-ad-is-secure]
              Wellington, B. and O. Gudmundsson, "Redefinition of DNS AD
              bit", draft-ietf-dnsext-ad-is-secure-06 (work in
              progress), June 2002.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer]
              Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer Resource Record",
              draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-15 (work in progress),
              June 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change]
              Weiler, S., "Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation
              Signer", draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-05
              (work in progress), October 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag]
              Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J. and E. Lewis, "KEY RR Secure
              Entry Point Flag",
              draft-ietf-dnsext-keyrr-key-signing-flag-11 (work in
              progress), October 2003.





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Authors' Addresses

   Roy Arends
   Telematica Instituut
   Drienerlolaan 5
   7522 NB  Enschede
   NL

   EMail: roy.arends@telin.nl


   Rob Austein
   Internet Software Consortium
   40 Gavin Circle
   Reading, MA  01867
   USA

   EMail: sra@isc.org


   Matt Larson
   VeriSign, Inc.
   21345 Ridgetop Circle
   Dulles, VA  20166-6503
   USA

   EMail: mlarson@verisign.com


   Dan Massey
   USC Information Sciences Institute
   3811 N. Fairfax Drive
   Arlington, VA  22203
   USA

   EMail: masseyd@isi.edu


   Scott Rose
   National Institute for Standards and Technology
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899-8920
   USA

   EMail: scott.rose@nist.gov






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   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.











































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